Entering the 2017 season, the Washington Nationals seemingly solidified their batting order by acquiring Adam Eaton, the second-best position player from this prospect class in 2016 (Nolan Arenado was best). Eaton was promptly injured to start the season, ending his potential run at matching his incredible 2016 value, but teammate Anthony Rendon was ready to step up (in 2017, Rendon would be second-best to Arenado). Corey Seager and the aforementioned Arenado both worked to lead their respective teams to the playoffs. Alongside those expected stars, Jose Ramirez joined his teammate Francisco Lindor to lead Cleveland in an effort to defend their American League pennant. The playoffs teams are loaded with the who’s who of this prospect class; Gary Sanchez (5.3), Carlos Correa (4.6), Didi Gregorious (4.3), George Springer (4.2), deadline trade Sonny Gray (4.2), Byron Buxton (4.1), and Yasiel Puig and Alex Wood (3.6 each) all produced strong Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) value for their respective playoff clubs.

Related Reading: Refining WARP and OFP Pricing

Together the organizational Top 10 from 2013 produced 216.3 WARP in 2017, which was good for approximately 22 percent of MLB production for the season. What is rather interesting about this class is that five seasons in, the number of MLB players dipped from 178 in 2016, to 175 in 2017. Alongside the “who’s who” above, there’s quite a blast from the past in the “yet to reach the MLB” side of this prospect class: Bubba Starling, Clint Coulter, Courtney Hawkins, Duane Underwood, Kyle Zimmer, Stryker Trahan, Victor Roache, Austin Wood, Hak-Ju Lee, and Tyrone Taylor are just a few of the names that fans (especially Brewers fans) might recognize. Of course, some members of the class are just reaching the MLB, as Josh Hader and Lewis Brinson did for Milwaukee in 2017. Max Fried, Nick Delmonico, Jorge Bonifacio, and Lucas Sims were other 2017 debuts from this prospect class.

As a group, these prospects have produced more than 760 WARP at the MLB level during their respective careers.

As some of these prospects work to build or expand their legend through (hopeful) playoff success, it is worth looking into the completed 2017 season by these prospects in order to learn how a prospect class progresses over time. By tracking this class over five seasons, one can ask, “How do young prospects perform during their initial seasons?,” and additionally, “How likely are prospects to improve once they reach the MLB?,” or simply, “How many prospects become good MLB players?” These are crucial questions for the Brewers as they exit their rebuild and enter the stage of truly developing their youngest, (hopefully) most impactful potential at the MLB level:

What should be expected of the Brewers’ 2017 top prospect class as they develop at the MLB level?

First and foremost, what is telling about the 2013 prospect class is how quickly many prospects reach the MLB and exit the MLB. From this prospect class, 232 players reached the MLB at some point over the last five seasons. However, as mentioned above, only 175 players from this prospect class worked in the MLB during the 2017 season. So, it must first be emphasized that while the Top 10 organizational prospects as a group are the most elite prospects, within the top 5 percent of all minor leaguers, many of these players will not have long or impactful careers. This should not necessarily be surprising, as according to Baseball Reference Play Index the vast majority of MLB players hardly achieve 1.0 career WAR (1.2 WAR places batters and pitchers within the top third of all-time players); but, it should be underscored as a requisite warning against prospect list hype. Brewers fans will recognize Johnny Hellweg, Sean Nolin, and Garin Cecchini as Top 10 2013 prospects that fit this mold. Top 10 organizational prospect status is not a guarantee for a long career, or even anything more than a cup of coffee in some cases.

Second, while the number of 2013 Top 10 organizational prospects working in the MLB declined in 2017, the average WARP for these MLB players also declined. Granted, the decline in WARP was from 1.3 to 1.2, which basically means that the level of performance for these players largely remained the same from year-to-year. Basically, what ought to be read into this statistic is the fact that there is no clear narrative about improvements as a group for these prospects. Once in the MLB, there is no clear path for Top 10 prospects to continually improve or expand their WARP; roles fluctuate, injuries and ineffectiveness occur, and in some cases performance levels simply fluctuate. Viewing the time-series shifts for these players can demonstrate the volatility of year-by-year performance upon reaching the MLB.

The following table tracks the largest year-to-year WARP declines from 2016 to 2017 for prospects from the 2013 organizational Top 10:

This is not necessarily a case where the volatility can be explained away as a function of young and inexperienced players finding their respective paths within the MLB. The average 2013 Top 10 organizational prospect that has reached the MLB already has more than three seasons of play under their respective belts. Granted, this counts partial seasons the same as full seasons, but the point remains that volatility is not simply an aspect of inexperience for this cohort. Certainly, the largest declines in 2017 performance can be explained by injury in many cases (Adam Eaton, Noah Syndergaard, Aaron Sanchez, and Joc Pederson), but there are also players like Jonathan Villar, Jackie Bradley, Gregory Polanco, Maikel Franco, and Christian Yelich high on the volatility list. Yet even if “injury volatility” is viewed as somewhat more “legitimate,” or perhaps outside of the control of the player, it nevertheless remains a serious aspect of volatility and should be considered when fans, analysts, and teams are assessing prospect classes.

It is a real question to aks whether or how injuries between 2017-2021 to Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, Brandon Woodruff, Josh Hader, and other top Brewers prospects, will impact contending chances or roster-building strategies for Milwaukee (it may seem audacious to suggest, but indeed injury is an aspect of the game for which teams should prepare. For example, this is one reason Brewers fans should not be quick to trade away from the Ryan Braun, Keon Broxton, Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, and Domingo Santana outfield stockpile).

The following table exhibits the most volatile 2013 Top 10 organizational prospects by summing the absolute value of annual WARP shifts:

What is most intriguing about this group of prospects is that five seasons from the publication of these lists (2013-2017), the overall value expectations of each Overall Future Potential (OFP) category can be outlined. I published a discussion on this basic valuation on Sunday, in order to emphasize the usefulness of using WARP and OFP to interpret player value in monetary terms. I discussed the shortcomings of these statistics at length there.

Key conclusions:

• 70 OFP prospects can be defined as potential superstars that not only perform very well during their first MLB seasons, but also have significant ceiling yet to attain after those initial years. In this regard, though, this category is perhaps most risky in terms of cashing out their top ceiling value versus their more realistic, depreciated value.

• 60 OFP prospects can viewed similarly, although there is significantly less range between their initial MLB performance (within 5 years of their appearance in the organizational Top 10) and absolute ceiling.

• 50 OFP prospects are quite intriguing, as they are the riskiest in terms of returning prospects to the MLB, and also returning quality MLB performances. However, they are the least risky in terms of reaching ceiling at the MLB level (although the depreciation from “average MLB regular” grade as a prospect to “replacement role or quality depth” at the MLB level is quite steep)

In terms of judging one prospect class, it should be stated that the Baseball Prospectus team made largely and significantly correct evaluation decisions in grading players. If one wishes to protest the inclusion of Nolan Arenado as a 50 OFP, for example, it should be stated that Arenado’s class also includes prospects like Tyrone Taylor (athletic prospects with MLB roles fizzling out), as well as 35 players with negative MLB WARP and another 15 with WARP between 0.0 and 0.5 (i.e., 50 replacement players). One can also return to the original Arenado scouting profiles from 2013, and understand the context of a top prospect that was not necessarily living up to contextual expectations at that time (there are valuable lessons to be learned here, too).

There will indeed be some 50 OFP prospects that overcome their scouting shortcomings and play up to their strengths while adjusting at the MLB level, but the 50 OFP performance by the 2013 class should show why this is not a given; one needs to wade through 50 replacement players and 37 players yet to reach the MLB to land one Arenado from the 50 OFP class. By contrast, the 70 OFP prospect class is filled with fewer misses, as 28 of 29 prospects from this OFP rank reached the MLB already, with many quickly posting fantastic performances (see Carlos Correa, Carlos Martinez, and Francisco Lindor, with others reaching solidly above average performance levels (Gerrit Cole, Xander Bogaerts, among others, come to mind here).

Although it is tempting to hang on to the idea that players can transcend their OFP grades, it should be noted that while there are indeed cases of such transcendence, that transcendence comes at the cost of risky development across scouting categories. Furthermore, using time-series analysis and comparing OFP categories against average performance leaves clear conclusions about the general impact of certain levels of prospect talent. The benefit of working with these assumptions and data is that not only can the potential impact of prospects be estimated at the MLB level, but that level of performance can be calculated to assess the risk of developing that prospect as opposed to trading that prospect. Where players with clearer roles, potentially less volatile production, and otherwise favorable surplus value scenarios are available via trade, teams should not hesitate to trade prospects to secure that production. There is no “silver bullet” through which teams are developed by using prospects, save those prospects that are so impactful as to occupy the highest reaches of the scouting rankings.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

• MLB production by known assets will frequently be valued more so than unknown production by future assets (even where numerous scouting accounts and talent assessments are available).

• Trades involving MLB players and prospects will be difficult to assess because immediate production at the MLB level requires a different scale for assessment than numerous contract reserve years for a prospect.

• The existence of six-to-seven years of contract reserve rights for prospects will tempt analysts to value length of control over quality of production (ex., the Brewers traded Martin Maldonado, a superior player, for Jett Bandy, a player with a potentially similar profile but more risk as well as more “control years”).

• Analysts, fanbases, and probably even teams will be biased in favor of the value of the players that they currently reserve within their system and undervalue the players that are outside of their system.

Throughout the 2016 season and 2016-2017 offseason, I worked on a Benefit-Cost Analysis style pricing system that sought to place MLB Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP), prospect/role Overall Future Potential (OFP), and cash ($$$) on an interactive scale. The culmination in this system was my “Translating OFP” article, which hypothesized that the potential value of a prospect could be calculated by categorizing historical baseball performances. By taking the broadest picture possible (indeed, calculating the WAR/WARP surplus for 18,000 batters and pitchers), I ascribed monetary value to specific prospect classes. Since these classes are interactive, they can effectively be used to test various assumptions (for example, if one wishes to calculate a player’s full range of 40 OFP-floor-to-60-OFP-ceiling, like the case of Lucas Erceg, one can average that full range of values; or, one can simply focus on highest possible ceiling, likely middle ground, etc., for prospects).

The point is not that there is one way to assess prospects, nor that player value is solely transactional. Instead, the point is that since MLB teams do in fact engage in rebuilding or win-now strategies at varying points in their franchise tenures, and do in fact trade minor league players for MLB players (and vice versa), these player types are indeed interactive even where their value is placed on entirely different scales. Taking inspiration from Benefit-Cost Analysis is important, then, as one can understand that the economic value of logging can indeed be assessed against the value of endangered species that reside within a particular logging habitat, or that the cost of a highway can be assessed in terms of fiscal impact, shipping improvements, commute time improvements, safety for drivers (expressed reducing preventable deaths), etc. Once again, these types of metrics are not absolute, which is why reasonable Benefit-Cost Analysis procedures include post hoc assessments to review assumptions and actual asset performance (compared to expectations). The same can be done for MLB players and minor league prospects insofar as front offices do indeed transact for such players.

Series & Revisions:
Translating OFP
OFP and Minor League Pay
Revisiting the CC Sabathia Trade
Cashing Out OFP 2
Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades
Historical WARP and OFP

In a forthcoming post, I will present an update on the 2013 Baseball Prospectus Organizational Top 10 lists, which I began tracking this season in the hopes of designing a realistic time series assessment of prospect value. The ideal in developing this approach is to answer the question, “How do prospect classes progress over time?” A related question can then be answered: “How do prospects of a particular OFP perform over time?” By the time 2017 started, clear delineations between 50 OFP (average), 60 OFP (first division), and 70 OFP (superstar!) prospects were already forming at the MLB level from the 2013 Organizational Top 10 class. These classifications further solidified during the 2017 season, and the benefit is that there are now five full seasons from the publication of this list through which player value can be assessed.

From the 2013 prospect class, I constructed the following table comparing each prospect category to the average MLB performance from that class, and used those figures to determine a monetary “price” for those prospects and MLB production. The difference between each OFP category and the average production from the full prospect class can create a WARP figure that can then be “monetized,” thereby translating OFP into a WARP category. “Risk” (based on each OFP category’s frequency of reaching the MLB) can also adjust these WARP and monetary figures. In this case, however, OFP production value is concrete instead of speculative; this is what certain OFP classes actually did at the MLB level (the same goes for these risk classifications, which are also “actual”):

Assessing 756 MLB seasons, played from 2011-2017 (with most prospects playing between 2014-2017) by the 2013 BP Organizational Top 10, allows for a broad range of data to be analyzed. This produced time series for each player that can be analyzed, as well as annual summaries and prospect class summaries. From this table, one can compare initial historical OFP estimates with risk-oriented “bare minimum” prices and “top ceiling” prices:

The same criticisms of using WARP and OFP to assess players obviously apply: MLB players and minor league prospects are dynamic, and at different points of time their WARP or OFP may indeed mean different things; a player can add a new pitch or make a delivery adjustment and improve upon their previous performance (like Jimmy Nelson), or answer a specific set of approach and mechanics questions to achieve a higher grade (compare Josh Hader’s 2013 Top 10 appearance as a 50 OFP Orioles prospect with his 2017 Top 10 appearance as a near-surefire impact MLB player between 55-60 OFP depending on high-leverage relief or Number 3 starter risk assessments). For 2018, Brewers CF prospect Monte Harrison will be a great example of a prospect whose OFP role has evolved over time, due in part to injuries and also in part to on-field adjustments and advancements; Corey Ray will almost certainly demonstrate this fact in the opposite direction, due to mechanical question marks and growing pains.

So, indeed, WARP and OFP should not be viewed as fixed, or definitive metrics. They should be viewed as reasonable snapshots of a player’s value or potential at a given time, which MLB teams can indeed use in order to assess transaction value. A common complaint about my method is that MLB teams do not use WARP and OFP to assess players, but I find that this complaint misses the point that teams do boil players down to a “number” when they decide to trade, or keep, a player; their “number” might be predicated on a blend of proprietary scouting insights, years of mechanical data, and other performative metrics. That MLB teams do not use WARP and OFP to assess trades does not mean that fans and analysts should not use these metrics where other proprietary information is not available; for failing to capitalize on the interaction between Future Potential, Replacement Value, and cash means that the MLB analyst and fan missing one specific constellation with which transactions can be assessed.

Photo Credit: Steve Mitchell, USAToday Sports Images

• How do Overall Future Potential (OFP) valuations based on historical MLB performances compare to valuations drawn from actual scouting rankings?
• What is the short-term performance value that the Brewers can come to expect from their 2017 Baseball Prospectus Top 10?

These are two crucial questions. The first question is crucial because it is worth determining the percentage of elite players that were elite prospects, and the percentage of elite players that have come from less stellar OFP backgrounds. If a 50 OFP prospect can become a 20.0 WARP player with regularity, that essentially turns prospect rankings on their heads. In this regard, the focus would be placed on player development departments targeting particular tools that they can polish into MLB productivity, regardless of OFP. If the opposite is true, that elite MLB players are elite OFP prospects, then there is some merit to the idea that player development departments should indeed focus on stockpiling as many 60-70 OFP prospects as possible, perhaps even regardless of risk. Obviously I am writing in generalities here, as player development departments will fight to acquire as many potentially elite players as possible and fight for every 1.0 WARP out of the late round and non-elite prospects as well. It matters if the Brewers can translate Corey Ray’s tools into an MLB performance that approximates his OFP value and that they produce Jacob Barneses along the way.

The second question matters because there is some time-linear thinking about rebuilding cycles that I do not believe is fully warranted. Ideally, the Brewers (or any other club, for that matter) tear down their MLB rosters when they reach the end of a competitive cycle, acquire and develop as much talent as possible, and then that talent is graduated to the MLB to produce wins. This is an obviously appealing line of thinking because there is a certain type of order to this; rebuilding has a certain type of religiosity that is necessary to function, because if fans don’t believe that the rebuild will produce winners due to rebuilding efforts, then MLB teams will produce a cynical line of thinking that severs their relationship between fanbases and front offices during rebuilds. The Brewers need their fans to believe that Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, and Corey Ray will win games in Milwaukee, because it’s hard to sell “the future” as “check out these future trade pieces and player development misses.” But this latter potential is something that analysts must take seriously, because player development is not a linear process (cf. Jake Odorizzi or Junior Guerra or Carlos Gomez or Scooter Gennett or Tyler Thornburg or Orlando Arcia, etc.).The ability of Milwaukee to achieve any sort of linearity with their rebuilding-to-contending cycle will depend on how their prospects perform immediately upon reaching the MLB.

If the Brewers are to be competitive in 2018 and 2019, and contend in 2020 and 2021, they will need to accurately assess the odds of return elite value for their elite prospects at the MLB level (via development or trade), and they will need to determine the likely production of early career prospects as they gain their sealegs and establish (or fail to establish) MLB roles.

To address these questions, I assessed the 2013 Baseball Prospectus organizational Top 10 lists, as 2017 marks the fifth season since those rankings. I will publish my findings in thee features: first, on risk and value, then on organizational performance, and finally, on individual players. This is an interesting class to assess because Baseball Prospectus began the shift to an OFP ranking system, rather than a “Four Star / Three Star / Two Star / etc.” assessment system in 2013. There are significant differences between the 2013 and 2017 approach to OFP, so this study should be taken with a grain of salt, as the prospect team defined roles differently and did not grade potential MLB floor as clearly as the current (especially 2017 rankings) did. It is a fair argument to state that BP has shifted to a more nuanced approach of prospect ranking by balancing floor and ceiling, as that approach provides a broader range of assessments (compare Josh Hader’s 55-60 to Lewis Brinson’s 55-70, or Brett Phillips’s 45-55). Using this comparison, the 2013 prospect class is more or less divided into three tiers, where the 70 OFP highlights prospects land within the top percentage of minor leaguers, 60 OFP outlines the top two percent of minor leaguers, and 50 OFP prospects round out the top five percent (roughly).

It must be stressed that OFP itself is an imperfect measure. First, effectively using the measure requires analysts to balance a player’s “ceiling” (best possible outcome) and “floor” (realistic minimum MLB outcome). But these aspects are not necessarily the same for any two prospects; certainly Lewis Brinson has a different risk equation between his ceiling and floor than Brett Phillips, as one example (and I mean that without picking on Phillips). The distance between ceilings and floors can also be significantly different, as some players quickly morph into their developmental floors (consider the Brewers’ treatment of Michael Reed’s role after his 2015 breakout) while others are given every chance possible to reach their ceiling (Wily Peralta might be an interesting example here).

Furthermore, there is something of a disconnect between MLB value and prospect value. MLB players do not have static careers, and some players can indeed make adjustments to become fantastic players, as classic non-prospects like Khris Davis and Corey Kluber show (in fact, the non-prospect Khrush has produced more MLB WARP than the entire 2013 Brewers Top 10 thus far). In terms of WARP, Davis now solidly approaching the 90th percentile of all MLB position players, and Kluber is nearing the 97th percentile of all MLB pitchers despite the fact that neither cracked a Baseball Prospectus Top 10. Even ranked prospects can surpass their projected ceilings, as 2013 rankers such as Nolan Arenado and Jake Odorizzi show; making adjustments at the MLB level, or learning a new pitch, etc., can wildly realign OFP.

With caveats in mind, the 2013 Baseball Prospectus Top 10 lists quite effectively separated talent into three distinct categories. Taking the macro-view and setting aside intriguing hits and misses on an individual prospects, the systemwide summary clearly shows that the OFP rankings rather accurately assessed talent level (in terms of translation into WARP) and risk (in terms of prospects reaching the MLB level).

Here’s how the 2013 prospect grades have fared entering the 2017 season (WARP totals and “seasons played” totals are through 2016):

Whatever the shortcomings of BP’s first foray into OFP ranking systems, their rankings were perfectly set up not to miss the cream-of-the-crop, even if 60 OFP and 50 OFP prospects are not as clearly differentiated. Yet, why should 50 and 60 prospects be as clearly differentiated as 70 OFP prospects from everyone else? If I said, “Lewis Brinson and Mauricio Dubon have close odds to produce at the same level upon entering the MLB,” that would be much more difficult to believe and substantiate than if I said “Mauricio Dubon and Lucas Erceg have close odds to produce at the same level upon entering the MLB.” Neither statement may be true in the strictest sense, but it is easier to believe that early career 60 OFP prospects could struggle to find MLB roles as much as early career 50 OFP roles, while 70 OFP prospects more easily step into the limelight.

Yet, the differences in MLB graduations and WARP per season should not be undersold, even between early 50 and 60 OFP prospects from the 2013 rankings class. There is quite a significant difference between a near-70 percent and near-75 percent MLB graduation rate for a particular talent class, especially when that early career MLB pay off is 0.5 WARP higher for the more-likely MLB graduates. That difference arguably reduces the early career value of a 50 OFP prospect from the 2013 class to 63 percent of the early career 60 OFP class. Again, MLB teams are fighting for each step to the big leagues; the difference between graduating an additional prospect or not, and potentially grabbing an additional win, is not insignificant even beyond a “mere” marginal roster analysis.

I followed this investigation by comparing three classes of 2013 prospects (70, 60, and 50) with historical value rankings from my previous Benefit-Cost Analysis model. In terms of reaching their potential career value, 50 OFP prospects are much closer to their expected career outcomes early in their careers than either 60 OFP or 70 OFP prospects. This should not be surprising, as one would reasonably expect the higher ranked prospects to have better odds at sustaining MLB careers beyond their first few years:

Comparing this 2013 OFP survey to my historical OFP valuation, it is interesting to see that 50 OFP prospects may be less valuable than their early career counterparts, but they also potentially return much of their career value earlier than the other prospect classes. In contrast, 60 OFP and 70 OFP prospects are substantially more valuable than 50 OFP prospects (it’s not really that close), but there is considerably more risk that 60 or 70 grade prospects reach their fullest possible MLB career (in terms of sustained starting roles or all-star production). From the 2013 class, Carlos Martinez and Jake Odorizzi, or Wily Peralta and Archie Bradley, might be intriguing comparisons for further investigation into career progression, risk, and prospect grade. MLB teams can use these weights to determine the best combination between trading prospects and developing prospects while attempting to build competitive or contending clubs.

Based on these estimates from the 2013 prospect class, it is possible to estimate a production range for the 2017 Brewers Top 10 prospects between 2017 and 2020. This is a highly speculative exercise, but also one that places the potential impact of a top 10 class in perspective:

22.6 WARP over the course of four seasons is obviously not enough to justify rebuilding, and should provide a good justification for using every available avenue of talent acquisition (in the next installment, it will be shown that even a great prospect class will struggle to produce even 40.0 WARP within their first four seasons). This should also show the importance of sustaining multiple strong prospect classes in consecutive seasons, as an MLB club cannot typically build around one prospect class. Since it takes quite some time for prospects to reach their OFP in terms of MLB production, if they reach it at all, MLB teams understandably cash out prospects for established MLB wins when they have a chance to compete or contend. In Milwaukee’s case, the WARP production of the 2017 Top 10 may be higher due to the number of prospects adjacent to the MLB, but then again, that’s no sure bet for MLB production as the 2013 list shows. A rebuilding effort must include other significant areas of roster construction in order to produce an MLB winner.