Mike Fiers
Fiers was non-tendered because Oakland is not paying a mid-rotation starter, at best, a $10 million salary. According to Cot’s Contracts, the last Oakland starting pitcher earning that much money was Scott Kazmir in 2015.

The Brewers immediately come to mind as a home for Fiers because he’s a former Brewer that has survived in MLB despite having below average fastball velocity. His fourseam fastball sits around 90 MPH, which Milwaukee has some experience with. There is ample cause for concern with Fiers though. Last season his swing and miss rate dropped for the fourth straight season, and dipped below 20 percent for the first time in his career. As his whiff percentage has dropped, Fiers has allowed more home runs (ranging from 1.2 to 1.9 per 9 innings) and struck out fewer batters (losing almost two strikeouts per nine innings as there are more strikeouts now than any time in the history of MLB).

However, there may be an area ripe for exploitation which could bring renewed success for Fiers: his curveball. He threw the curve for around 16 percent of his pitches in 2018, which is around his career average. Based on results though, Fiers should be throwing it more. Batters have hit .196 and have slugged .307 against the pitch, both of which are his best numbers. In 2018, those numbers improved to .145 and .181, once again performing as his best pitch results wise.  The pitch also generates his most ground balls: over 60 percent of curveballs put in play over his career have been ground balls. His 2018 ground ball rate on curveballs in play was almost exactly his career average.

Fiers consistently buries the ball below the zone and generates a large amount of whiffs on pitches that would be balls. In 2018, almost all of the damage against the pitch was on pitches out of the strike zone, which a player can live with.

For a pitch that he’ll throw equally to lefties and righties, it’s a little baffling that Fiers hasn’t decided to ride the curveball hard as his overall results have gotten worse. His curveball usage was actually down almost 20 percent last season when compared with 2017. Even after the trade to Oakland, while he threw the pitch more, there’s opportunity to make it the focal point of his attack and Milwaukee has some experience in signing free agent pitchers and having them focus on throwing more breaking balls.

Fiers may not be worth $10M, but I think he would be an interesting signing for a team that has helped pitchers maximize their stuff to more fully reach their potential.

Blake Parker
After a season that saw regression across the board, the Angels non-tendered Blake Parker rather than pay his projected $3.1 salary. Superficially, his 3.26 ERA and career high 14 saves indicate a decent reliever. Digging a little deeper reveals some problems, though:

Most of Parker’s regression is found in performance against his fastball. In 2017, batters hit .179 and slugged .313 against his fastball, with a .204 BABIP, but those numbers rose to .315, .562 and .328 in 2018. Batters hit more home runs against his fastball in 2018 (10) than he allowed in total in 2017 (7).

After spiking in 2017, Parker’s fastball velocity fell from 94 to 92.8 last season. The pitch started the season slower and the velocity continued trending down. He also had a location issue. Parker had previously located the pitch away from both righties and lefties, generally avoiding the middle of the plate and looking to jam hitters as much as possible. That plan failed against both sides as Parker literally had a Rudolph nose in his fastball strike zone plot. While the velocity may not come back, better location can cure a lot of Parker’s ills as batters did the most damage against his poorly located pitches.

Parker also has potential with his other two pitches: the curveball and splitter. The curveball used to be his secondary pitch, but he shelved in it favor of his splitter in 2017. Parker brought the pitch back towards the end of the season. His whiffs on both pitches were down in 2018 and location may have played a role here as well. In his most effective season, Parker threw almost 62 percent of his curves and splitters below the zone, which dropped to 56 percent in 2018. In particular, he consistently missed that spot against left handed hitters. His whiff numbers on those pitches compare favorably in 2017 and 2018, but because he was missing his spot more, batters made more contact.

Aside from the velocity drop, Parker also just didn’t execute his pitches in 2018. If the Brewers think there’s an easy mechanical fix, then Parker is a potential cheap addition to Milwaukee’s monster bullpen.

Note: Projected arbitration salaries are from MLB Trade Rumors.

Related Reading:
Spending Expectations
Free Agency Analysis: LHP SP

Simply in terms of statistics and historical records, though, the Brewers are also likely to fail to match their 2018 performance next year. Here’s how playoff teams in the Expanded Wild Card Era have fared with 96+ wins in their follow-up year, sorted by Follow-up Wins:

Some notes:

• In 12 of 17 cases, the “follow-up” to the 96+ win playoff season featured a better Run Differential progression than Win-Loss progression. This could be an easy fate for the 2019 Brewers, given that the 2018 Brewers outplayed their Runs Scored / Runs Allowed in resounding fashion: the Brewers in 2019 could easily become a 92 or 93 win run differential team that neverthless only cracks 88 to 90 wins on the field.

• The Brewers are comparable to the 2015 Cubs, which is interesting because those Cubs were the outcome of a “tanking” / scorched-earth rebuild that required multiple years of building, while the 2018 Brewers required no such rebuild. Those Cubs featured a young emerging core of Javier Baez, Addison Russell, Kris Bryant, Kyle Schwarber, and others, while these Brewers featured a decidedly ragtag gang of free agents, trade acquisitions, and advanced minors chumps who rode their strengths to excellent team success (overcoming a veritable book of scouting weaknesses). There is no Bryant / Russell / Baez core for the Brewers; there might not even be a prospect as good as Javier Baez from the 2018 Brewers. Yet here we are: those 2015 Cubs were not a juggernaut, instead averaging an 84-win run differential and surging after the All-Star Break, which is rather similar to the 2018 Brewers’ mediocre underlying performance and white hot September.

• Perhaps the most compelling comparison is the 2014 Orioles, who (like the Brewers) posted mediocre run differential totals early in the season but contended thanks to an extended late season surge. The 2014 Orioles were in the midst of an excellent five year contending run that included three playoff appearances (including a League Championship Series exit in 2014). These Orioles were also quite similar to the Brewers insofar as they strung together elite pitching performances out of their bullpen and an unsung rotation, while also keeping a relative hodge-podge of different player development cycles in their batting order (ranging from young Manny Machado and Jonathan Schoop to aging Nick Markakis, Steve Pearce, and Nelson Cruz.

• Trends exhibited by the Nationals, Reds, Red Sox, and Cardinals should underscore the up-and-down, uneven quality of the current era of baseball. Stated simply, being a near-100 win season in one season is nothing close to a guarantee that a roster core will even be a playoff contender the next season, especially as teams lean on young roster cores to define their success “out of nowhere” (such as 2018 Athletics, or 2017 Rockies and Twins). The median win total among these 96+ win behemoths is 86, in the following season.

How will the Brewers overcome these trends? Or, if the Brewers do take a step backwards, how will that be defined as a success for 2020 and onward? Given the state of the Brewers roster and organizational depth, the answer to both questions is the same: the Brewers’ success will largely be defined either by establishing MLB roles for Keston Hiura, Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, Freddy Peralta, Jacob Nottingham, and other prospects, or else netting elite talent in a trade return (especially involving Hiura, who should not be traded but for returning surefire MLB production). Prospect development at the MLB level should be a significant portion of the story for the 2019 Brewers, regardless of whether those newcomers help bolster a playoff club or whether the club fails to defend their NL Central crown but establishes future roles for the players.

Additionally, the Brewers can continue to define themselves as a club “on the margins” by providing the proper salary arbitration deals; for example, the club already accomplished this cutthroat mission by designating injured veteran catcher Stephen Vogt, rather than allocating a couple million of payroll dollars on a gamble that he returns to his bat-first profile behind the dish. As demonstrated below, Vogt’s contract and production history would yield nothing more than a 45 Overall Future Potential (OFP) asset via trade (i.e., basically an organizational depth player with an MLB floor), and at an estimated cost of nearly $4 million (via Cot’s Contracts), it is clear that the Brewers could readily fill that organizational depth function with that amount of money while also potentially pursuing additional upside. This is a crucial source of value because (unfortunately for players) salary arbitration offers the Brewers a chance to “freely” cut a player if they do not wish to enter salary arbitration process; depending on how tight the club’s revenue and payroll scenarios are, rampant non-tenders could be a great opportunity to expand resources for improving the club.

The table below demonstrates the Average Surplus of the Brewers’ salary arbitration deals. The ideal of Surplus is defined with value including both production (“pure” performance in the field) and scarcity (how readily available that production is, in other words how expensive that production is). Unlike previous models of Surplus Value I’ve published, this year I’m using multiple ranges of three-year performances (2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018) to produce estimates, while also including contract estimates that are “depreciated” and “highest possible value.” A depreciated contract detracts from previous performance, expecting that a player’s performance will decline over time, while a highest possible value contract places a premium on the most recent performance (the best example here would be someone like Patrick Corbin, who would probably get his best contract based on who places the highest value on 2018 and assumes that performance can be replicated). [Last year’s rankings are here].

• Estimate: Cot’s Contracts arbitration estimate.
• Arbitration Year: Demonstrates a player’s specific point in the arbitration process (which is typically three years long, but can in some cases last four years with the most advanced service time players).
• HarmonicOne: This is a one-year contract estimate that takes the harmonic mean between a player’s harshest depreciated performance and their fullest current performance valuation.
• Maximum: This is a one-year contract estimate that uses a player’s fullest current performance valuation.
• Minimum: This is a one-year contract estimate that uses a player’s harshest past performance depreciation.
• Average Surplus: This figure weighs the average of the three contract estimates against the salary arbitration estimate, while also recognizing that a team will benefit from the player’s production both in controlling the production contractually and receiving the production on the field. [Average of HarmonicOne / Maximum / Minimum] – [Arbitration Estimate] + [Average of HarmonicOne / Maximum / Minimum], or, [Scarcity – Contract + Production].
• OFP: This is the historical equivalent Overall Future Potential grade that relates to the player’s Average Surplus  (more here). Essentially, this estimates the type of prospect the Brewers might expect in return if another team values each player in a similar manner.

This table should demonstrate several important roster decisions:

• First, it is clear that there are several Brewers players that do not have Wins Above Replacement (WARP) histories that match their value. This is especially true in the case of Hernan Perez, whose scarce defensive flexibility is probably worth significantly more than WARP estimates, and Erik Kratz, whose glove-first profile at catcher could be crucial to helping Brewers pitchers without phenomenal stuff “play up” in terms of production. Corey Knebel is obviously valued much higher than WARP based on his stuff and high leverage relief profile. So, this surplus value model is not definitive, it should only be viewed as a starting point.

• Players like Domingo Santana and Zach Davies have unclear production roles and unclear trade value. This probably explains why Santana was not traded last offseason, despite fans’ perception of a “clear” need for starting pitching and Santana’s “odd man out” status in a packed outfield; but other clubs probably do not value Santana beyond surrendering a rotation depth / organizational depth arm, and it is understandable why the Brewers would not accept that. It’s likely players like Santana and Davies “play out” their roles in Milwaukee, rather than being subjects of trade.

• Stephen Vogt is obviously not under contract any longer, but I included Vogt for two reasons. First, including Vogt’s Surplus estimate should show the type of range of contract that may be released by the Brewers. Second, Vogt’s estimate is included above to gauge what a potential contract value might be in case he is retained in some other manner (such as a minor league deal with an MLB guaranteed rate). A $1.4 million investment in Vogt, for example, would provide ample surplus value for the Brewers retaining the veteran within the organization.

• Jonathan Schoop’s past production really drives any model of his contract value; Schoop is likely a non-tender candidate if his salary expands to $11 million, but it should be noted that if there is any expectations for the slugger to reclaim anything resembling his previous performance level, the Brewers could make a contract offer.

• Travis Shaw is an absurdly valuable player to the Brewers, and in fact is probably more important than any player on the club short of Cain and Yelich (below is a sampling of the surplus value for much of the remaining roster, for comparison).

What is difficult about assessing the Brewers roster for 2019 is that the club is void of many obvious trade candidates. For example, in cases like Schoop, Chase Anderson, and Eric Thames, the club would almost certainly be selling low and thus limit themselves to seeking a “diamond in the rough” of an organizational depth trade return (such as a reliever or starting pitcher that could be rehabbed, or a utility-type profile like Hernan Perez that could “play up” in Milwaukee’s defensive system). Here the importance of making proper development decisions for the likes of Burnes, Peralta, Nottingham, and other prospects comes into focus, as it should be evident that the Brewers do not have many roster assets that could yield talent that would be obvious improvements above their depth prospects (or primary ones, at that). Milwaukee’s crossroads for the 2019 offseason will be combining those proper development decisions with payroll freed at the margins of the roster to seek at least one impact free agency contract.

Thus, it is true that GM David Stearns could non-tender much of the club to refine the roster, and non-tenders in bulk might be expected as a way to accumulate impact cash: this is one route to an attempt at beating the recent record of excellent playoff clubs, and ensuring that Milwaukee does not have a playoff hangover. Yet making proper prospect development decisions will ensure that even if the Brewers do not reach the playoffs in 2019, it won’t be anything more than a small blemish, a chance to reload, within the five-year window opened last offseason.

Of course, the rotation was not that unstable, as there were “sub-rotational cores” beneath those aforementioned four- , five- , and six-man turns, which basically means that manager Craig Counsell would frequently stick with three starters and then rotate out two other arms. Yet even here the manager would change the order of the three main starters as necessary. The 2018 Brewers rotation could afford such flexibility because the club aggressively used minor league assignments for pitchers with contractual option years; they signed guaranteed MLB contracts (like Chacin) and minor league deals (like Miley), spatially staggering their production across organization levels; they made additional acquisitions (Gio Gonzalez); and, perhaps most importantly, there really was no pitcher “set” in the rotation as a true, standalone ace (in the sense that most fans and analysts use the term “ace”; in fact, Wade Miley and Jhoulys Chacin each produced excellent seasons).

This is a pitching staff designed for attrition, and the club was forced to deal with contingencies throughout the entire season. One suspects that Jimmy Nelson was out longer than expected for the front office, even if they publicly noted that the righty would miss a “chunk” of 2018; Nelson missed the entire season. This opened up spots, at varying points, for Zach Davies and Brent Suter, who both suffered injuries throughout 2018. Wade Miley was also on-and-off the disabled list early on, which offered additional room for the Brewers to “prove” their organizational depth. And so they did: the pitching rotation was fantastic, all things considered, precisely because the organization did not keep ineffective pitchers on the mound for long, and they were able to shuffle competent depth up-and-down between Triple-A Colorado Springs and the big club.

Keep this in mind for the offseason: this is a pitching rotation that could look much more “traditional” in 2019 if Jimmy Nelson returns, Corbin Burnes and Brandon Woodruff are returned to formal roles, and Jhoulys Chacin, Chase Anderson, Zach Davies, and the gang are afforded roles in some capacity. Yet this is also a team, should Jordan Lyles and Jake Thompson stick around, that could produce the same revolving door results. It all depends on how the season goes, and the Brewers proved in 2018 (even where it may not have been their preferred plan) that a club can succeed simply by building a roster prepared to withstand the full extent of the season.

In March, responding to the (exhausting) constant calls for the Brewers to trade excess outfield depth for starting pitching, I presented the Brewers roster as a true-depth marvel ready for wear-and-tear. I found it important to demonstrate that, across the MLB, teams were not finding regular starters in the field, be it in the outfield or at specific infield positions. It may not be the case that MLB teams prefer to operate this way, but due to player development cycles, injuries, and other transactions, teams operate with revolving door player rosters much more than fan imaginations allow.

In 2018, attrition was the name of MLB once more.

Like 2017, only six outfields in the MLB featured three 100 game starters, including two repeat teams (but only five repeat players) from 2017. This demonstrates that even where teams had consistent, regular starting outfields last season, those outfields were not sustained into 2018. Regular starting groups come and go quickly in the MLB.

The 2018 Brewers are a fantastic example of why this type of roster shuffle occurs. At the beginning of the season, fans may have been most upset about the outfield depth because they would either have liked to pencil in Ryan Braun / Lorenzo Cain / Christian Yelich or Yelich / Cain / Domingo Santana, but not both. I suspect give Santana’s exceptional 2017 campaign and quick ascent into fan-favorite territory, fans would have preferred to see the Yelich / Cain / Santana outfield penned into the list above. Yet it simply was not meant to be; Santana could not cut it throughout the first two months of the season, and needed another stint at Triple-A to redevelop his bat; Ryan Braun was not a regular outfielder due to injuries and (thanks to Santana) early season stints at first base. But it all worked out: Keon Broxton provided phenomenal defense during call-up stints, Hernan Perez did what Hernan does, and even Eric Thames started 31 games in the outfield (!!!). Counsell did whatever was necessary to put the best team on the field, and once again, even if this was not the ideal team in the minds of the front office or field management staff, this squad was the ideal of weathering the storm.

The same story goes for the infield in 2018, where the Brewers were perhaps the most radical team in MLB, both with their Hernan Perez usage and their Travis Shaw / Jonathan Schoop experiment. But even here, the less-than-ideal scenario played out, as Orlando Arcia required additional minor league seasoning, and a group of second basemen could never really get it figured out for a sizable chunk of the season.

Keep these lessons in mind when you’re designing your ideal 2019 Brewers squad. Simply stated, the expectations that MLB teams would not find regular starters across the diamond held throughout the season, and the Brewers showed exactly how clubs can take advantage of that. Furthermore, it’s already possible to imagine how the club will elude 100-game starters at many positions, even without injury; for instance, second base could easily be a turnstile between Perez, (hopefully) Shaw, arbitration-eligible Jonathan Schoop, Mauricio Dubon, and Keston Hiura; if Mike Moustakas sticks around, Shaw will take time away from second base and first base “regulars”; and one might expect the Brewers to design more quality depth after some of their left-handed pitching match up weaknesses were regularly exposed.

A roster without regularity could present another fantastic endeavor for both David Stearns and Craig Counsell in 2019, because the next step in their puzzle requires them to develop their top prospects at the MLB level (if they are not traded) while defending a National League Central Championship bid. The club cannot punt the latter effort in order to accomplish the former, so the Brewers will need to be creative in shuffling their roster around to create time for prospects and contending players alike. In this regard, the lucky outcome of 2018 was that it was simply a practice run that went sideways and turned into a League Championship Series run. May 2019 be another practice run.

Alternately, things are not going to work out as you expect in 2019. But that’s not categorically a bad thing. Let’s use this offseason to think through roster building and understand how the Brewers can place their best foot forward using all 40-man roster spots.