Milwaukee would not be in the position that they are without Yelich, who was a stud for the Miami Marlins before fashioning himself into a bonafide superstar during the 2018 campaign. His .326 batting average /.402 on-base percentage /.598 slugging percentage slash line earned him the National League batting title (Milwaukee’s first ever) and he was this close to the first NL Triple Crown since 1937, tallying 36 home runs and 110 runs batted in (Yelich finished behind Nolan Arenado and Trevor Story in home runs, and Javier Baez for runs batted in). His superlative performance yielded a .356 True Average (TAv) and 7.7 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) in his age-26 season, and he’s become the odds-on favorite to capture the league’s Most Valuable Player award.

Thinking back to January 25th, 2018, not everyone was thrilled when Slingin’ David Stearns signed off on the trade that sent four prospects to the Little Havana neighborhood in Miami. At the time, he gave up Milwaukee’s number one, three, and six prospects (according to Baseball Prospectus) along with a pitcher who Stearns himself had called one of his favorite arms in the organization. So as we bask in the glow of the first playoff victory our local club has produced in seven long years, let’s take a moment to check in on the guys that Stearns have up to help get us here:

OF Lewis Brinson
For most fans, Brinson was the player that stung most to lose. He was considered top-25 talent league wide, a potential five-tool center fielder who offered a few glimpses of his potential during a brief MLB trial in 2017. Miami handed Brinson a regular role at the big league level to begin the year, and he responded by putting together one of the least productive campaigns of any player in 2018. Brinson hit only .199/.240/.338 in 109 games and 406 plate appearances, good for an anemic TAv of .220. He did pop 11 long balls (including a mult-homer game against Milwaukee) and tallied 3.0 FRAA, but on the whole he was valued as a sub-replacement level player, tallying -0.3 WARP.

OF Monte Harrison
After a breakout season in 2017 between Appleton and Carolina, Miami tasked Harrison with one of the toughest challenges a minor leaguer will face: the jump from Class-A Advanced to Double-A. His slash line for Jacksonville of the Southern League wasn’t too bad at .240/.316/.399, which translated to a better-than-average .272 TAv on the pitcher-friendly circuit. Harrison again showed off his tantalizing power/speed combination, swiping 28 bases to go along with 19 dingers in 583 plate appearances. But the outfielder was also by far the league leader in strikeouts, whiffing an astonishing 215 times, or 37 percent of his trips to bat.

2B Isan Diaz
Like Harrison, Isan Diaz was assigned to Double-A Jacksonville to begin his time in the Marlins organization after finishing 2017 in Class-A Advanced. Diaz had a fair amount more success in the Southern League, however, producing a nifty .245/.365/.418 slash with 10 homers and 10 steals for a .294 TAv. After 83 games he earned a promotion to Triple-A New Orleans, and his numbers cratered at the highest level of the minors. In 36 games and 155 plate appearances, Diaz could manage only a .204/.281/.358 slash (.217 TAv). Strikeouts remain a concern for the infielder as well, as he whiffed a total of 140 times in 119 games between the two affiliates.

RHP Jordan Yamamoto
Yamamoto was stung by the injury bug this season, not taking the mound until late May and then missing another month of action between July and August. As a result, the righty made only 13 appearances and tossed 68 and 2/3 innings on the year, split between rookie ball, Class-A Advanced, and Double-A. In those innings, however, he put together a sparkling 1.68 ERA. Batters hit only .176 against the Hawaiian right-hander, and he struck out 84 (11.14 K/9) versus just 14 walks (1.83 BB/9). The profile is still more smarts and guile than it is pure stuff, leading to questions about how his game will play at the highest levels. Of the four prospects in the deal, though, Yamamoto is the only one who surely improved his stock heading into 2019, and the Baseball Prospectus team cited his ability to change speeds as one reason for rising prospect stock.

So, given these reports, have you been talked into a do-over on the trade? 

The Brewers selected Olczak out of NC State in the 21st round back in 2015, Ray Montgomery’s first year back with the organization and running the draft. He missed plenty of bats and prevented runs well during his junior season, posting a 2.55 ERA with 47 strikeouts in 23 appearances and 42.0 innings, but his struggles with command led to questions about how his game would translate to the professional ranks. He issued more than six walks per nine innings during his final collegiate season for the Wolfpack, but chose to put his fate in the hands of Milwaukee’s coaching staff rather than return for his senior season and try to improve his draft stock.

It didn’t take long for Olczak to start finding the strike zone more consistently once he started getting paid to pitch. The righty immediately slashed his walk rate during his first professional season in 2015, doling out only five of them across 27.7 innings split between Milwaukee’s two rookie-level affiliates. His command hasn’t been quite that good in the years since, but he’s been able to hover in that 3.0 BB/9 range in each of the past three seasons. That is certainly a palatable number for a reliever.

If it wasn’t for the walks, batters would hardly ever reach base against Olczak. He has allowed only 7.2 hits per nine innings in the minor leagues, a number that is inflated by the 11.5 hits per nine (and .397 Batting Average on Balls in Play [BABIP]) he posted in 2017 when a lat strain limited him to 22.0 innings and diminished his overall effectiveness. This past season for the Double-A Biloxi Shuckers, batters recorded only 36 hits in 56.3 innings for an average of .180. Olczak is a fly-ball pitcher who has shown to be adept at producing pop ups; he generated infield flies at a terrific 19.4 percent rate this season and was between 24-30 percent at the lower levels.

Olczak was a revelation in the bullpen for the playoff-bound Shuckers this season, joining the team after two early-season appearances for the Class-A Advanced Mudcats. As mentioned he tossed 56.3 innings for Biloxi across 42 appearances, and in that time he yielded only a minuscule 1.44 ERA. He struck out 60 batters while issuing only 19 free passes, and only one opposing batter took him deep all season. Jon’s walks and hits per innings pitched (WHIP) was stellar at 0.977; his True Average allowed of .205 is perhaps even more impressive. Olczak’s DRA- of 73 means that Deserved Run Average views his work as 27 percent better than his Southern League cohorts this season; outside of his injury hiccups in 2017, Olczak has posted far better-than-average Deserved Run Average totals at every level he’s pitched at.

The 24 year old (25 in November) isn’t just some experienced collegiate arm using his guile to outsmart inexperienced minor league hitters, either. Olczak’s raw stuff is pretty nasty, by all accounts. Olczak has an easy, fluid delivery and releases the ball from a fairly standard high three-quarters arm slot. He can crank his fastball up to 95 MPH, but more typically sits in the 91-93 MPH range along with a sharp-breaking curveball in the high-70s MPH that flashes plus at times. He’s been known to manipulate the shape of his breaking pitch, sometimes showing batters more of a slurvy action with it.

The Brewers will have a decision to make on Jon Olczak during the upcoming offseason, as the relief ace will be Rule-5 Draft eligible for the first time. The fact that he’s solely a bullpen arm could work against him in his quest for a 40-man roster spot with Milwaukee, although there could be a better chance for Olczak now given that the org shipped out several other guys with upcoming Rule-5 decisions during their July and August trades. The statistical and scouting profiles say that Jon Olczak should be getting guys out at the game’s highest level in the near future, perhaps even as soon as next season. A strong showing in the Arizona Fall League could go a long way towards convincing the powers that be that his destiny ought to lie with the Menomonee Valley Nine.

Recommended Reading:
True Outcomes (Jarrett Seidler, Baseball Prospectus)
Round Table: Short Hitter Stigma (Baseball Prospectus)
The May Promotions (Baseball Prospectus, Prospect Team)

In a way, I don’t need to write this article. So many minds are already made; I see it on Brewers Twitter everyday, that Keston Hiura is a slam dunk, guaranteed superstar prospect, and it does not matter where or how you look at it. Hiura should be untouchable in midseason trade talks; Hiura will be a guaranteed top of the order bat for the Brewers for the foreseeable future; when the Brewers’ impressive 40+ Wins Above Replacement (WAR) First Round Draft record was noted on draft day, it was easy for some to emphasize that Keston Hiura is next. Never mind that according to Baseball Reference, approximately 500 players in the entire history of baseball have reached this plateau, this next prospect is a certain thing. But my mind has waivered on Hiura, and I gather I’m not the only one who not only cringes at the unnecessary prospect hype (these will be the same people leading the torches to Miller Park should Hiura “settle” as a 5.0 WAR player or become a DH-trade asset, yet another unnecessary practice with judging MLB players), but who is genuinely perplexed about the issue posed by Hiura’s potential role. For it is easy to focus on the Top Percentile outcome, “Keston Hiura, All Star Second Baseman for the Brewers,” and end the dreaming there; if that’s your position, you probably do not need to read this article. Yet serious questions remain about how Hiura fits in the organization in his secondary, realistic risk roles of Left Field or Designated Hitter, and those questions are tied up in the thorny information asymmetry wrapped in the prospect’s throwing elbow.

It is obvious that none of us know who Hiura will be. One could look at his hitting mechanics and doubles-oriented pop and see a realistic chance that he sticks in the MLB regardless of his fielding role. His fielding roles might not be certain, or even linear; he could begin his career at second base in Milwaukee, fall off defensively, and move to designated hitter or left field. A development in his game could theoretically find him at a different position all together, especially given the flexibility-oriented mindset of many contemporary MLB teams (he could be a PH / DH / 2B / LF). He could fall off second base before even leaving the minors, but prove himself worthy of a shot in left field (this is the phenomenal Willie Calhoun role comp provided by Baseball Prospectus on their Top 10 list). All that is before considering any potential development courses derailed by the elbow injury. Yet even some members of the Baseball Prospectus prospect team have changed their public voice on Hiura, leading one to wonder whether the floor of that realistic / risk role is diminishing in likelihood.

This feature is meant as an exercise in probabilistic thinking, in which aspects of the historical record in MLB are used to define Hiura’s potential outlook using the structure of the game. The assumption is that because of MLB’s competitive organizational environment, including the quick learning of new strategies as well as the constant search for viable alternative or underappreciated strategies, there are legitimate organizational-structural constraints that define Player Development. This does not mean that history forms the future, but rather that the history of the game used in a narrow, comparative manner will provide some evidence that can inform projections about contemporary players. Here, I will focus on body type, pedigree, and defensive profile to outline just some of the extremely diverse futures that could greet Hiura.

Entering 2018, the PECOTA comparison system viewed Hiura as a bat-first prospect, and developed a projection that pegged the prospect as a replacement player second baseman for Milwaukee (a good thing). Hiura’s MLB batting line according to the March 23, 2018 PECOTA projection (CSV download, March 23, 2018) was .225 / .274 / .363, which is not bad for a prospect leaping to the MLB within a year of the MLB Amateur Draft. Much more interesting than the stats are the player comparisons generated by the underlying patterns and age curve recognized for Hiura.

PECOTA compared Hiura to three strong MLB role prospects. Matt Davidson ranked in the second tier of a stacked Arizona Diamondbacks Top 10 for 2012, with a clear bat-first role based on his power. Entering 2016, Dominic Smith ranked fifth in the New York Mets system with a 45 Overall Future Potential role as Second-Division Starter. Here the batting question awaited power at a limited defensive role. Jose Osuna was the only member of this trio unranked by Baseball Prospectus entering their age-21 season, although it’s worth emphasizing that this is not a knock against Osuna. The Pirates prospect was fighting within a system that saw Alen Hanson, Luis Heredia, and Harold Ramirez as prospects 8-through-10. Nevertheless, this trio provides interesting minor league statistical performances in their age-21 campaigns, drawing some comparison to Hiura in terms of relative discipline profile (here I am using strike outs (K) and walks (BB)), especially for both Smith and Osuna.

In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura’s First Round, Ninth pick standard is quite interesting because this area of the draft begins to shift from “going for a clear superstar territory” to “gambling on many comparable ‘best player available’ types,” leaving an unclear expectation for the pick. Yet, according to Baseball Reference, 34 of 54 players have historically made the MLB from this draft slot, and that ticks up in the modern draft era (17 of 21 Ninth overall picks from 1995-2015 reached the MLB). These players are typically not superstars in the sense one would use to discuss the most elite players in the game. Of the 21 Wild Card era Ninth picks, Geoff Jenkins, Michael Cuddyer, and Mark Kotsay are the best retired position players, and Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ are just now establishing their careers. Historically, each Ninth pick is worth approximately 5.0 WAR with 62 percent odds of reaching the MLB, while more recently (1995-2015) each Ninth pick is worth approximately 7.0 WAR (and counting) with 81 percent odds of reaching the MLB (the standard deviation is 10.1, which demonstrates the absurd volatility of the MLB draft and MLB career trajectories). In other words, the baseline for Hiura’s professional career features quite strong odds of reaching the MLB (they are not set in stone) and a very solid average performance (5.0 to 7.0 WAR is nothing to sneeze at in terms of the grand scheme of baseball). In fact, in a crude sense, a 7.0 WAR performance would extrapolate Hiura’s 50th Percentile PECOTA over the course of approximately four seasons: a solid career, indeed, and potentially one that is viewed as reasonable by projection systems.

It is fun to see that, thus far, several of the active Ninth Pick players are playing in the National League Central, adding intrigue to the standard divisional competition. If Hiura wishes to make his mark on this Overall Pick, Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ could each impact Hiura’s potential assessment of greatness.

Keston Hiura is a relatively short ballplayer, and one can use his body type to investigate MLB roles as well. This is not an insult to Hiura; it’s simply a fact, as even on his own Double-A Biloxi Shuckers squad, 33 Shuckers taller than Hiura have played in 2018. Height has real world consequences in defining MLB roles, as Hiura may become less likely to play at first base than other bat-first prospects in search of a positional home; given that the arm may also keep Hiura off right field, the nomadic defensive spectrum speculation for Hiura’s future mightily limits the prospect’s path. This is not a problem, but it should help to round out some role risk probabilities. Height also affects Hiura’s positional future in left field, as Baseball Reference Play Index shows that Kiké Hernandez is the first 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player since 1989 to play Left Field while debuting at age-22; the last 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player to debut at Left Field during their age-21 season was Danny Heep in 1979. During the Expansion Era, only 94 MLB position players debuted at age-21 with a listed height of 5’11”, while only 134 MLB position players debuted at age-22 with a listed height of 5’11”.

The historical path to an early (age-21 or age-22) debut for a 5’11”, 182-200 pound player is much clearer at second base. Here, a fascinating range of roles emerge.

It’s impossible to unsee Pete Rose, and that’s just such an interesting comparison for a million reasons, not the least of which that Rose’s general lack of home run power in favor of a high average, doubles-oriented approach might actually fit Hiura’s batting profile in some ways. But I do not find it helpful to focus on 80 WARP players while discussing potential prospect roles; obviously that would be an “everything goes perfectly,” elite percentile prospect outcome that would challenge Robin Yount as the greatest player in Brewers history (in terms of WARP). Kiké Hernandez, Steve Sax, and Blake DeWitt are my favorites on this list in terms of rounding out potential role determinations or profiles.

• Hernandez is a positionally flexible player that showed an early career ability to hit (2015) prior to becoming a utility player;

• Steve Sax was a batting-average and doubles hitter that used those skills to drive valuable profiles even when the glove was not there (ultimately, Sax’s 23.1 career WARP occurred with -18.8 FRAA contrasted by a .260 TAv);

• DeWitt was a player that saw an early career (first year, actually!) surge coupled with some positional trouble and a steep, almost immediate drop off.

• A “Steve Sax” career would be a phenomenal outcome for Hiura, which would also help Hiura contend with Geoff Jenkins as the best Ninth Overall position player (thus far); yet I think a “Blake DeWitt” career shows how a ballplayer can be a good prospect, produce MLB value, and also encounter some role shifts and decline at the MLB level while ultimately having a good career. To my mind, this is one way it might look if Hiura storms the MLB out of the gate at 2B, and then encounters some positional shift and offensive adjustment issues.

Figure One

One final role question concerns Hiura’s potential quality of defense at second base. Outside of the prospect’s own injury concerns, it is worth investigating the structure of the position: if Hiura’s concerns produce a below average defensive profile, will that stick as an everyday 2B? Second base is a strange position, as the progression of positional average performances during the Wild Card Era (1995-2017 for full seasons) suggests that teams are generally favoring glove-first players at second base. While True Average (TAv) is modestly improving over time for regular second basemen, Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) is significantly improving across the league (see Figure One, above). Yet, isolating the very best bats among second basemen shows that contemporary MLB teams are very tolerant of below average FRAA seasons when the bat is excellent. Recent seasons by Scooter Gennett (2017), Ben Zobrist (2016), Jose Altuve (2016, 2014), and Joe Panik (2015) show that imperfect second base defensive profiles can continue to play so long as they hit. In fact, for each five year period (or so) during the Wild Card Era, there are roughly four bat-first, poor glove 2B in the MLB at any given time. Thus, there should certainly be a future for Keston Hiura at second base if his injury does not diminish his ability to play the field, should his bat deliver at an excellent clip.

None of these structural aspects of the game impact assessments of Hiura’s mechanical and plate approach profile, which is another endeavor that can establish the right-handed batter’s risk, floor, and potential ceiling. But, these structural aspects can be used to place Hiura’s profile within the broader context of the game. Hiura is not simply a slam dunk prospect. Based on his size, if Hiura debuts in 2018 at second base, he will be a rather rare prospect and one without much historical understanding for paths to big league success. Here, a Steve Sax career is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura was not picked in a realm that generally produces game-changing superstars, instead presenting very solid regulars and All-Stars for the game. In this regard, a Geoff Jenkins profile is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. While assessing potential shortcomings in Hiura’s profile, especially at second base, it is worth emphasizing that a great-bat-bad-glove second baseman will work in the contemporary MLB. Here, the role ranges clearly from Scooter Gennett to Jose Altuve, rounding out a wide range of useful MLB potential futures.

None of these structural aspects of the game provide predictive insights for Hiura’s future. Rather, they can be used in order to help inform background expectations and probabilistic insights into the value of Hiura’s production should the youngster reach the MLB. Instead of attempting to view Hiura as an MLB slam dunk, it is worth meandering through these fields of potential roles in order to understand the wide range of success that could await Hiura. For MLB success is not simply stardom-or-bust, even for a prospect like Hiura.

References:

Baseball Prospectus. Individual Stats – Season Totals [CSV]. Parameters: 2B, MLB, All-Time.

Baseball Prospectus. Top 10 Prospects Landing Page.

Baseball Reference. MLB Draft. Ninth Overall Pick, and 2017 First Round.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Separate Age-21 and Age-22 Searches, separate searches for 2B, DH, and LF, each where height = 71 inches; weight >= 182 lbs; weight <= 200 lbs.

Please consider Baseball Prospectus subscription and Baseball Reference ad-free browsing to support these endeavors.

Hit tool? Keston Hiura.
Throwing arm? That’s Brett Phillips. (Laugh also belongs to Phillips.)
Curveball? I’ll take Adrian Houser here.

What about the fastball? There are some fun arguments to be had. Taylor Williams is pretty electric. Brandon Woodruff can touch 98. How about a spin-rate sleeper like Caden Lemons? And of course we all saw what Freddy Peralta can do with his heater when he’s on.

I’ve got somebody else in mind, though. He may not be the best, but he’s certainly in the conversation. He’s a 6’7”, 250-pound kid signed out of the Dominican Republic, and he became one of the first Brewers farmhands to earn a mid-season promotion when he was bumped up to the Carolina League on May 18. He’s imposing on the mound to say the least, where his preternatural strength combines with easy, fluid arm action to pump gas into the zone in the upper 90s.

He’s Braulio Ortiz.

We’ll start with the positives here. Obviously, Ortiz is capable of blowing a hitter away. If the velocity doesn’t tell you that, check his minor league career K/9 of 10.3, or this year’s figure, which sits at 14.85.

Here’s an excerpt from a Fangraphs scouting report on Ortiz:

“[G]uys with this sort of arm strength don’t come around very often, so he merits close
attention to see what sort of control and consistency he can gain.”

And here’s Baseball Prospectus’ take:

“Ortiz profiles as a power arm in the ‘pen, riding an impressive mid-90s fastball and missing more than a bat per inning. The command is loose and the secondary arsenal needs refinement, but Ortiz is on the fast-track, and looks like a prospect to keep an eye on going forward.”

The problem? Those reports were both filed in 2013, shortly after Ortiz reached High-A for the first time. Five years later, he’s still toiling away in the lower levels.

As is so often the case, one can place the bulk of the blame for this on walks. Ortiz has walked 17 batters so far this year in 13.3 innings, for an ugly WHIP of 2.03. (He’s struck out 22.) Throughout his career, Ortiz carries a 6.9 BB/9, and the last time he pitched more than a few innings above Low-A, his DRA was 9.27 (30 walks and 25 strikeouts in AA, back in 2014).

You probably guessed that the problem is mechanical. Fluid arm action aside, Ortiz struggles to ever repeat the same motion on the mound. His foot never seems to land in the same place twice, and his release point floats around like a balloon. All of this leads to wild inconsistency on a game-to-game basis for Ortiz. One day he’ll implode, like his first outing of the season with the Timber Rattlers (one out recorded on 36 pitches, including two hits, four walks, and three earned runs). A little later on, he’ll get his delivery together and turn in a line that looks like it could have come from Josh Hader (May 17: 1.3 innings pitched, one hit allowed, no walks, each out recorded via strikeout). Occasionally he’ll even showcase the two conflicting versions of himself within the same outing, battling through a bout of minor league Jekyll and Hyde (May 2: One inning pitched, no hits or runs allowed, three walks, two strikeouts, ten total strikes thrown).

Now 26 years old and pitching for his third organization, Ortiz faces a steep climb to so much as a cup of big league coffee; while the Brewers own his rights for the time being, he won’t be cracking their bullpen anytime soon, and even the most experimental rebuilding club will need to see more than a nice number on a radar gun to promote Ortiz past Double-A or thereabouts. The ugly truth of Ortiz’s career is that even the strongest pitcher needs more than velocity and pretty arm action to succeed. And that’s all Ortiz has got.

Almost all, anyway. Scant video evidence suggests a chance at a competent breaking ball. I’d call it a curve, but it could be a slider. There’s also another thing: He’s persistent. Ortiz has been released twice, has dabbled in independent ball, and has pitched at or below Class-A Advanced for six consecutive years. Something keeps him going: an innate belief in himself, or a love for the game, or a desire to taste success and achieve financial security. And who knows? Maybe he’ll put it all together and earn a chance to soak up some low-leverage innings in another couple of years, finally joining players like George Springer and Christian Yelich (both included in that BP scouting report above) in the big leagues. Walks and age aside, his 3.08 DRA this year for Wisconsin looks pretty nice. Stranger things have happened.

Of course, history tells us that those are some pretty long odds. But at this point, Ortiz has worked as a professional baseball player for parts of eight seasons. That’s quite an achievement in and of itself, doubly so when you remember that he wasn’t earning a living wage during that time. I’ll be rooting for him in Carolina, and wherever his road takes him next.

That ends today, when righty Freddy Peralta takes the mound in a spot start for the Brewers. Peralta is listed at 5’11”, 175 pounds, and quickly gained a reputation among the trio of Lind starters for a potential MLB role. In 2016, Peralta surged through Class-A Wisconsin, striking out 77 batters in 60 innings, while maintaining a relatively solid command profile. What is particularly interesting about Peralta is that the prospect allowed 35 percent ground ball rate in 2016, which ticked up to 51 percent when he was promoted to Advanced-A Brevard County before falling again in 2017. Thus far in 2018, Peralta made a strong transition to the difficult pitching confines of Triple-A Colorado Springs, bumping his ground ball rate up to 54 percent to go along with that big strike out rate (this time it’s 46 strike outs in 34.7 IP thus far). But now prospect analysts and fans can surmise Peralta’s groundball approach from his scouting profile: the righty is a moving fastball specialist, and one wonders if his repeated mechanical development and arsenal adjustments is allowing him to keep the ball on the ground at a more steady rate.

Freddy Peralta is a potential back-end rotation starter, but in Milwaukee that does not necessarily mean what it says, for two reasons. In the first case, one must emphasize that potential scouting roles, even those scouted in the advance minors, are not the be-all, end-all of player development; in fact, the David Stearns Brewers should demonstrate specifically how player development windows are much longer than the A-to-A+-to-AA-and-AAA progression. Zach Davies is a fantastic comparison for Peralta here, both in terms of advanced minors role (Davies was scouted as a high-floor back-end rotation arm prior to his debut), and diminutive arsenal development at the MLB level. Davies, the back-end sinker/change up pitcher, entered 2018 having prevented approximately 15 runs through 388.7 innings, which is quite strong at the back end. This does not necessarily mean that Peralta is a guaranteed rotational success (in fact, his scouting floor might ultimately place him in the bullpen, which is not necessarily a bad thing), but it is at the very least a hint that Milwaukee is a place where player development can extend to the MLB in an extremely positive manner.

Second, Freddy Peralta, along with Davies, Brent Suter, Junior Guerra, Jacob Barnes, Jeremy Jeffress, Oliver Drake, and even Chase Anderson, is one of the faces of the Brewers current pitching-first, depth-based strategy. The organization has been built around acquiring pitchers with very specific, and quite intriguing, profiles in the age of fireballing velocity around the MLB: the Brewers are a generally a slow-throwing bunch, and when they’re not a slow-throwing bunch, they are typically focused on change-up / curveball / cutter / splitter arsenals. Perhaps this is a feature that will become clearer over time with more player acquisitions, but thus far it seems unmistakable that Stearns and pitching coach Derek Johnson prefer a very particular type of profile to feed ground balls to the extremely efficient groundball defense.

This offseason, Freddy Peralta was featured as one of the Top 20 prospects in the system by Baseball Prospectus. Scott Delp wrote:

“One reason for the lack of hype is that Peralta has no show-stopping pitches. The fastball tops out at just 92, but he cuts it, runs it, sinks it, and can move it all around the zone. The changes in speed and movement allow him to keep hitters off balance. He is especially good at locating up in the zone to put hitters away. He also has a potentially plus slider with good late bite that he throws 84-86. He is looking for a reliable third pitch and can flash average with both a curve and change, but neither pitch has any consistency right now.”

Delp also added an essay to the end of the list, arguing that Peralta should be in the Top Ten, writing “Then there is profile bias. Certain players can get less notice because they are lacking the profile that we feel is necessary for true success.” Peralta fits this mold, as Delp noted:

“The conventional wisdom says that guys without a big fastball and without the classic pitcher’s body can only have success by either having a lot of deception in their deliveries or by having elite command. Peralta’s command is just a bit above average and, while he throws slightly across his body which gives him some deception, his results mostly come from his ability to change speeds and looks with his fastball and to mix his other pitches to keep hitters off balance.”

Peralta’s size and profile, in this sense, scream relief risk, and maybe a potential impact relief role or impact swingman role (like a righty Suter), for the future. But there’s a glimpse in a moving fastball arsenal that perhaps Peralta could stick in a back-end rotational role should his command continue to develop at the MLB (and, I’d add, that he continues his positive ground ball rate progression). Suddenly, though, Milwaukee is also becoming such a good pitching environment that one can squint at guys like Peralta and sense that maybe this is the best system in which for Peralta to work.

For Brewers fans wondering why the club did not acquire a pitcher such as Lance Lynn, Alex Cobb, Jeremy Hellickson, or Jake Arrieta during the offseason, and instead opted to work with Wade Miley and Jhoulys Chacin as the major rotational acquisitions, the Freddy Peralta promotion should serve as one particular answer. The Brewers are already exercising their depth, with Wade Miley injured, Brent Suter and Brandon Woodruff as swingmen, and Junior Guerra excelling. Moreover, though, the Brewers have correctly assessed a league filled with pitching attrition, and today the club will become the fourth National League team to work with eight starting pitchers thus far. Through roughly a quarter of the season, only one NL team (Colorado) has used five starters, and overall teams have used 102 pitchers to fill their rotation spots.

Milwaukee has designed their rotation to work with their advanced minors depth, and if fans are exciting about Freddy Peralta working, they should think about Corbin Burnes potentially taking the next rotational availability when needed. But that’s just one of many possibilities, as even newly-recalled Alec Asher fits the Stearns-Johnson Pitcher Factory profile as a relatively low velocity, sinker / cutter / change / curve hurler. Before too long, Milwaukee will probably have ten starting pitchers in the mix at the MLB level in 2018, and that’s before one even considers Jimmy Nelson’s position with the club. The rotation is quite serviceable with this approach (approximately -6 runs prevented thus far), and the mix-and-match rotational profile is basically serving as early innings damage mitigation prior to handing the ball off to an elite bullpen (24 runs prevented!). So, Peralta enters a successful pitching staff and an organization that seems perfectly suited for his continued development: here the hope is that the righty gets to showcase his best stuff today, and make the next decision regarding a spot start or an extended call-up a little tougher amidst all the future competition from Miley, Guerra, Nelson, and Burnes.

Related Reading:
2017 Minors: Bats

For this reason, I periodically publish statistical indices that link individual player performance to the statistical contexts of their respective leagues. This should not be viewed as a scouting exercise, or an assessment that has any validity in actually designing an MLB role. At best, players registering surprising index rankings due to the statistical context of their respective leagues should simply be viewed as opportunities to look for further scouting assessments or to dig into existing scouting assessments. These data should be viewed as important for outlining which prospects are facing tough competition and which prospects are facing weak competition; which prospects are old for their respective levels and which prospects are young; which prospects have faced favorable park environments, and which prospects have faced tough parks; and, new for this year’s indices, which players have produced “lucky” Batting Averages on Balls in Play and which players have not.

This post is presented in reverse order. I understand some will just want to see the results, so the results are published next. I’ve also included a spreadsheet with cleaned data for further manipulation or analysis. Following the table will be an explanation of methodology to accompany the spreadsheets.

Data: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1J02Ioj1GP08nS0aIiLqYiFb3j42evvcm7N6lm2TVrys/edit?usp=sharing

Index Rankings:
Player (50+ PA): This is the name of the player, included where PA >= 50
Team: This is the Baseball Prospectus code for the player’s team
Age: This is the player’s age
OPS: This is the player’s harmonic On-Base-Percentage-plus-Slugging-Percentage (OPS) index, which assesses a BABIP-adjusted OPS against (a) the player’s opposing OPS (i.e., strength of opposing pitchers) scaled by the player’s age and park (i.e., difficulty of environment), and (b) the player’s opposing OPS compared to the league median opposing OPS (for players with 50+ PA).
TAv: This is the player’s True Average (TAv) index, which assesses (a) the player’s opposing TAv scaled by age and park, and (b) the player’s TAv compared to league median opposing TAv (for players with 50+ PA).
LeagueRank: This is a rough approximation of the player’s index “percentile” within their respective league (higher = better rank).

1.00 or greater means that the player’s performance based on contextual statistics is likely “better than median” within their respective league.
Less than 1.00 means that the player’s performance based on contextual statistics is likely “worse than median” within their respective league.

Brewers Minor League System
Below is a table of Brewers minor leaguers with 50 or more plate appearances through May 9, ranked by their contextual statistic league percentile.

What does this mean? Let’s directly compare two minor leaguers to show the impact of minor league context. Consider Nate Orf, everyone’s favorite utility player (call up Orf!), and Wendell Rijo, a nearly-forgotten prospect acquired from Boston in the Aaron Hill deal. Rijo has never really gotten it going in Milwaukee’s system, while Orf has come on strong hitting the last few years. By both TAv and OPS, as well as level (Orf is one level beneath MLB), Orf appears ahead of Rijo on the surface:

However, contextually, some key differences emerge. While neither Orf nor Rijo have faced difficult competition, Rijo is notably younger for Double-A Biloxi than Orf is for Triple-A Colorado Springs. Meanwhile, Rijo and Orf have had completely different luck in terms of BABIP, and Orf’s park impacts his production as well.

Thus, using these factors to provide context for each player’s TAv and OPS, the surface view is obscured: Rijo’s .309 TAv and .849 OPS appear much more impressive given his age, park, and BABIP, and that assessment holds steady even given Rijo’s relatively mediocre competition. Note, once again, that none of this says anything about MLB role; Nate Orf should still be considered in MLB roster depth conversations if necessary, due to the merits of his flexible glove and overall hit tool. What this should say is that fans and analysts might want to give Rijo an extended look, or seek additional scouting information about Rijo (a good, early, pre-trade look at Rijo can be found at the excellent SoxProspects).

Methodology
In order to construct contextual OPS and TAv, I used two different methods, and sought the harmonic mean between those two indices. The goal here is to recognize that (a) there is no proper or easy way to measure context, and (b) outliers can have an extreme effect on data. To reconcile (a), I used two completely different calculations to assess strength of opposition, and to reconcile (b) I used the harmonic mean, which irons out the extremes between two numbers moreso than standard average (for example, using [(2*X*Y)/(X+Y)] with 1.5 and 1.0, standard average calculation says 1.25 is the mean, while harmonic mean says the mean is 1.2. Thus the distance between 1.5 and 1.0 is expressed and equalized more effectively by using harmonic mean).

After collecting a number of statistics from Baseball Prospectus CSV (“Individual Stats – by Team” and “Batter Quality of Opponent Faced,” both retrieved May 10, 2018), I excluded players with fewer than 50 PA, collected TAv and OPS; as well as oppOPS and oppTAv (opposing OPS and TAv, respectively, of pitchers faced), and opposing RPA+ (the opposing pitchers’ runs per plate appearance relative to the league); and, BABIP, Age, and Park (Baseball Prospectus BPF, for batter’s park environment). Once these statistics were collected, I calculated the median for each league, and then divided each player’s individual statistic by the league median. This provides a basic contextual index that could read, “Player’s Statistic Compared to League Median,” where 1.01 is larger than median and 0.99 is smaller than median. Note that this does not uniformly mean “better or worse;” the value system for an Age Index of 0.92 (younger than median league age) would be much different than a 0.92 index for BABIP (lower BABIP than league median).

From these basic index figures, I calculated several new stats:

Luck: [OPS Index] / [BABIP Index]. This was an index statistic used to estimate the impact of a high BABIP on OPS.

oppOPS_1: [OppOPS] * [Age Index * Park Index]. This is an attempt to estimate what a player’s opposing OPS might be if corrected for Age and Park (i.e., higher Age Index suggests a player is older for their level, and higher Park Index suggests a player worked in a more favorable park).

oppOPS_2: [OppOPS] * [oppOPS Index]. This is a more straightforward attempt to express the player’s opposing OPS compared to the league median back into an opposing OPS scale.

oppTAV_1: [OppTAv] * [Age Index * oppRPA Index]. This is an attempt to estimate what a player’s opposing TAv might be if corrected for age and the opposing run production allowed by pitchers.

oppTAV_2: [OppTAv] * [oppTAv Index]. This is a more straightforward attempt to express the player’s opposing TAv compared to the league median back into an oppTAv scale.

Once I calculated these stats, I took the harmonic mean between each set (harmonic index). This allowed me to directly compare each player’s TAv and OPS to their harmonic index for both stats:

OPS Index: [OPS / BABIP Index] / [Harmonic Index of OPS]
TAv Index: [TAv] / [Harmonic Index of TAv]

I divided each player’s OPS by their BABIP Index to attempt to correct for the impact of their luck on their OPS. Thus, if a player had an inflated BABIP, the assumption would be that the OPS would partially be inflated as well due to the inclusion of component parts. So, this correction is meant as an additional contextual expression of a player’s performance.

It must be stated that these indices are quite problematic, given that they are simply expressions of one point in time. They are not scaled for historical importance, or regressed to establish any linear significance of the component statistics. This is a methodology that I am working through, and I opted to publish these stats any how because I do not believe there has been enough of a discussion about the impact of context on 2018 minor league stats thus far. So, this is meant to be the beginning of a work in progress, and for that reason any feedback is much appreciated.

The biggest argument against Taylor, at that point, was his dreadful year in 2016, when the Brewers encouraged him to leverage his swing for more power. Instead of taking a step forward, Taylor slid back to a .232/.303/.327 slash line (.244 TAv). The 9 home runs were a career high, but the .095 ISO and the abandonment of the opposite field still left much to be desired. 2017 was meant to be a chance to right those wrongs, but a series of injuries to his hamstring and oblique limited Taylor to just 32 games. With all the other talent up and down the minor league system, Taylor receded into the shadows, never mind that he opened eyes in the Florida State League at the tender age of 20 three years prior.

2018 has been different. Fortified by the thin air of Triple-A Colorado Springs, Taylor has started the year by hitting the cover off the ball, to the tune of a .308/.352/.508 slash line entering Sunday. He’s striking out in only 12.7 percent of his plate appearances, and he’s back to poking the ball the other way when the mood strikes him. He may be hitting a few more fly balls than usual, but it’s hard to classify that as a conscious decision, the effects of Colorado Springs, or a small sample fluke at this point. In any case, the results have been tremendous.

There are, of course, the usual caveats associated with offensive stats at Colorado Springs. One still wonders about Taylor’s ability to recognize and punish breaking balls, for instance—he started to struggle with that aspect of his game in Biloxi, and the flattened-out sliders of Colorado Springs are toothless compared to the sharp bite of, say, a Corey Kluber special. And while Taylor’s .200 Isolated Slugging (ISO) is very strong (easily the strongest of his career, should he keep it up over the full season), the league average ISO in the Pacific Coast League is a robust .154. Among the Sky Sox, who play half of their games in the clouds, that number ticks up to .162. Taylor is patient enough, but he still doesn’t walk much (7.0 percent in 2018, 6.9 percent for his career). And by Baseball Prospectus TAv, his gaudy slash line still only translates to a .259 TAv, or right smack on the nose of league average, in other words. (It’s worth pointing out that other metrics are a little kinder to Taylor’s work this year, as wRC+ has him at a solid 118.)

Taylor’s no slouch on the other side of the ball. He’s spent time at all three outfield slots in 2018 and is capable of manning each position with at least average competency. His above-average speed is an asset in center (and has helped him thieve five bases in six tries this season), but he’s unlikely to set Statcast on fire with elite sprint speeds or five-star catches. The arm is fine for right field, though not exactly a weapon.

In summary: The bat could be “meh” for a corner, unless the Colorado Springs power gains stick around, and the glove could be “meh” for center. Nonetheless, the hit tool and approach are solid, and the rest of his game is sufficiently well-rounded. Taylor’s back to looking like he could provide league-average-or-a-tick-above production in spite of any deficiencies; at the very least, he could bloom into an extremely valuable fourth outfielder.

From a certain point of view, Taylor’s big performance so far this year isn’t too surprising. He’s always flashed high-level potential on the diamond, but he was also known as a standout running back when the Brewers drafted him out of high school in 2012. There’s a narrative around two-sport athletes suggesting that they’re slow to develop once they finally commit to one sport over the other. Taylor had never focused on baseball year-round before starting his professional career, and was a little raw compared to the talent at the top of his draft class. He spent the first few seasons of his professional career dismantling that particular narrative, but it caught up with him in 2015 at Double-A, which is arguably the level at which elite athleticism is no longer able to mask flaws in approach or swing. The injuries buried him even further, costing a year and condemning him to the list of forgotten prospects. And yet here he is, raking at Triple-A in 2018, close to where you’d have guessed he’d be by now, had you seen him play on draft day six years ago.

Only 24, Taylor is young enough to absorb a lost season and still crack the 25-man roster at a reasonable age. He’s got a long line of outfielders currently positioned in front of him. Ryan Braun, Lorenzo Cain, Christian Yelich, Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, and Keon Broxton are the obvious hurdles, with guys like Kyle Wren and Quintin Berry representing possible obstacles standing between Taylor and a September call-up. But odds are good that one or two of those won’t be wearing Brewers (or Sky Sox) blue in a year, including, possibly, Taylor himself. For now, he’s staked down a future spot on the 40-man roster and is back on his way to earning a shot. That’s a mighty leap for a player to take in a year; time will tell how far Taylor can continue to fly.

The Timber Rattlers began their 2018 season with a 4-3 loss to in-state rival Beloit in extra innings last night, but that shouldn’t take away anything from the performance of Opening Day starter Bowden Francis. The soon-to-be 22 year old right hander tossed 5.0 solid innings with six hits and only two earned runs allowed, striking out three while walking none. It was the full-season debut for the 2017 draftee, and he’ll be one of four members of his draft class that form Wisconsin’s starting rotation in the season’s early going, along with former international free agent Nelson Hernandez:

.@TimberRattlers starting rotation order to kick-off the season:

Bowden Francis
Nelson Hernandez
Alec Bettinger
Dylan File
Christian Taugner

— Brewers Farm (@BrewersFarm) April 4, 2018

Francis (7th round) was the highest selection of the group of hurlers that includes Alec Bettinger (10th round), Dylan File (21st round), and Christian Taugner (37th round). The Chipola College product made the fewest appearances out of that group last season, however, finding his way into only 10.0 innings in the Arizona League. He allowed 17 hits and nine runs in his short AZL stint last season, but did put together an encouraging 13:3 K/BB ratio. A jump in velocity helped bump up Francis’s stock prior to last summer’s draft. According to Francis, in an interview with Brad Ford at Brew Crew Ball, he regularly throws in the 90-93 MPH range with his sinking fastball and will also mix in a slider and changeup. Baseball America (BA) projects Francis as a future bullpen arm, but he has the ideal build (6’5″, 240 lbs) to remain a starter and the Brewers figure to give him every opportunity to continue down that path, so long as he’s successful in his role.

Alec Bettinger was a senior sign for Milwaukee last summer out of Virginia, where he pitched mostly as a multi-inning bullpen arm. He was assigned to rookie-level Helena in the Pioneer League upon signing and wound up finishing third on the squad with 50.7 innings pitched across 15 appearances (9 starts). The circuit is heavily tilted towards offense, so Bettinger’s 4.97 ERA was actually quite a bit better than the league’s average ERA of 5.65. Bettinger was able to keep the ball on the ground at a 53 percent rate and he allowed only one home run, finishing 2nd in the league in HR/9 among those with at least 40 innings pitched. That helped him produce a terrific 84 DRA- despite a more middling 39:23 K/BB ratio. According to BA, “Bettinger shows a low 90s fastball and hits his spots” and the Baseball Draft Report describes a “potent sinker/slider mix.” His future could come as a ground ball specialist out of the bullpen.

One of Bettinger’s teammates in Helena was Dylan File, a righty who was selected from small Dixie State College in the 21st round, the second-highest player ever selected from the school. He left as the college’s all-time leader in wins, innings pitched, and strikeouts, and continued that success into the Pioneer League. Using a fastball that regular ramps up to 94+ MPH, File posted a 4.02 ERA across 47.1 innings with Helena last season. Only three pitchers on the circuit pitched as many as 40 innings and had a lower earned run average than the 21 year old, who compiled 37 strikeouts against only 13 walks. That all added up to a better-than-average DRA- of 90 across his 12 appearances (7 starts) and he’ll get the opportunity to build on that success in the rotation for Appleton.

Finally, the most interesting arm in the group may be 22 year old Christian Taugner, a native of Trevor, Wisconsin. The 37th rounder out of Brown University spent last summer in the AZL, and was flat out dominant. It’s not unusual for a more advanced collegiate arm to perform well in the complex league in Arizona, but even with that in mind Taugner’s numbers jump off the page. He tossed 45.2 innings for the baby Brewers, whiffing 50 batters while yielding only eight free passes. His ERA may have read 3.74, but by Deserved Run Average, there may not have been a better pitcher on the circuit. Taugner posted a 1.87 DRA, which translates to a ridiculous 33 DRA-. Scouting reports on Taugner are difficult to come by, but according to Bobby DeMuro of Baseball Census, the 6’3″ right hander generates “great downward plane” and has a feel for a slider.

The Brewers have seen a couple of later-round collegiate draft picks exceed expectations in recent years. Brandon Woodruff (11th round, 2014) is in the big league rotation right now, Jon Perrin (AAA, 27th round, 2015) and Quintin Torres-Costa (AA, 35th round, 2015) both earned spots in the Arizona Fall League last autumn, Corbin Burnes (4th round, 2016) is considered one of baseball’s top prospects right now, and Thomas Jankins (13th round, 2016) skipped Class-A Advanced to be placed in the rotation this spring. So, which one of the four collegiate arms in Appleton’s rotation will be able to follow in those footsteps and take a major step forward in 2018?

There’s one more impact prospect on the cusp of this wave, buried behind more steady performers but well ahead of the next tier of arms: Luis Ortiz, the last man standing from the blockbuster 2016 return for Jonathan Lucroy and Jeremy Jeffress. If things go right for Ortiz, he has a chance to outshine all the rest.

Thus far in Ortiz’s brief tenure as a Brewers farmhand, though, things have not gone right. He posted impressive baseball-card-stats upon joining the organization late in 2016, but the 1.93 ERA he ran across six starts in Biloxi belied a plummeting K-rate and a 6.51 DRA. Still, it was only six starts, and Ortiz entered the 2017 season solidly in the middle of most top-100 prospect lists. You won’t find him on any of those lists now. Ortiz battled injury and stretches of ineffectiveness throughout last season. A balky hamstring forced him out of the rotation twice and contributed to some shaky mechanics and 3.5 walks per nine innings. At season’s end, Ortiz was sitting on a 4.01 ERA, 4.84 DRA, and 94.3 innings across 20 starts. He’s fallen short of 100 innings pitched in each of his professional seasons.

It’s tempting to see a body like Ortiz’s and forecast continued struggles with health and conditioning. Listed at 6’3” and 230 pounds, Ortiz will always be a big guy, and it’s fair to wonder whether last year’s hamstring injury could have been avoided with better conditioning. Ortiz may have wondered that himself, actually. He showed up to spring camp this year in better shape than he left last fall, and worked over the offseason to improve his flexibility and stamina. If he’s able to stay on the mound, the organization sees big things in Ortiz’s future.

When Ortiz is on, he’ll show three average-or-better offerings, plus a slow curve that he’ll sprinkle in his second and third time through a lineup. Used in that way, the curveball plays up a bit; it’s good for puzzled caught-lookings and flummoxed half-swings. He’s predominantly a fastball-slider pitcher, though, and both of those pitches easily grade out as plus. They’re ready to retire major league hitters right now, and Ortiz is still just 22 years old. The fastball runs in the 93–96 mph range, and Ortiz manipulates it well, adding sink and swerve as needed to keep hitters off balance. He knows how to locate his mid-80s, biting slider, giving him an effective out pitch. His changeup is an average pitch with glimmers of more, and he commands it well. Put all the pieces together and cross your fingers for health, and that’s the profile of a #2 or #3 starter. It’s just that the results haven’t quite backed that up yet.

Ortiz is determined to change that in 2018, where he’ll likely settle in for a third tour at Biloxi (it bears repeating: he’s still just 22), this time with a clean bill of health atop his priority list. He’ll need to be added to the 40-man roster next offseason to avoid being exposed in the Rule 5 draft, a fact that he’s aware of and using for motivation. With age on his side and something to prove, Ortiz is poised to shoot back up prospect lists and into the Brewers’ near-term rotation plans. His is a volatile profile: one should never assume health for a starting pitcher, and Ortiz’s frame makes it even harder. But all the tools are there. And the Brewers need only a few of their prized arms to pan out to have the makings of an excellent 2019 or 2020 starting rotation. Ortiz has as good a chance as any of them to slot in towards the top of that staff.