The question is where the Brewers’ front office will decide to spend that money. There is speculation the team will go big and throw a large chunk of their resources toward a Jake Arrieta/Yu Darvish type to bolster their starting rotation. Adam McCalvy, MLB.coms Brewers beat writer, quoted Stearns saying “it makes sense to cast a wide net,” when referring to whether the team would spend big on a starting pitcher or not.

It would be a huge mistake to go all in on an expensive, aging starting pitcher. The Brewers’ entire rebuild model through savvy trades and bargain-bin free agent pick-ups would be disrupted. Not only would a high-profile free agent signing severely hold the Brewers back as far as financials go, it would create fewer opportunities for their excellent collections of prospects to find time in the big leagues.

A look at the two high-profile free agents with the most chatter linking them to the Brewers, Arrieta and Darvish, shows that although the two’s well-known names suggest ace-level production, they both have their flaws.

In Arrieta’s case, he wasn’t a great pitcher last year. He was worth just 2.5 wins above replacement player (WARP), along with a Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) and Deserved Runs Average (DRA) above 4.00. Arrieta was plagued by the long-ball and had a walks-per-9-innings rate near 3.0. 2017 was easily his worst full season since joining the Chicago Cubs, and the righty is also an older free agent due to his late start in the big leagues. He will turn 32 in Spring Training. Arrieta is expected to garner somewhere in the range of 100 million dollars over four or five years. The Brewers cannot afford to pay for the age 34, 35, or 36 seasons of a pitcher who was not even worth three WARP in his age 31 season.

Darvish had much more success in 2017, but he presumably comes with a higher price tag and more injury risk. He just threw over 150 innings for the first time since 2013. He has thrown over 200 innings only once in his career. Darvish is expected to garner at least 120-130 million dollars over five, six, or possibly seven seasons. All the Brewers’ eggs would likely be in the Darvish basket due to the large price tag.

Not only are both of these big-name starting pitchers almost as risky as they come, they don’t fit into the Brewers rebuild timeline. As of now, the team’s five-year outlook is rosy. Some prospects, Lewis Brinson in particular, have been slow in their promotion to the big leagues, but their farm system remains one of the best and deepest in baseball. Most of the major league club’s core is in their twenties. Draining all of their resources on a 30+ year-old starting pitcher moves their window up. Instead of building a long-term winner, they are gambling on the next few years.

The Brewers rotation wasn’t exactly a weak spot in 2017. Jimmy Nelson emerged as a Cy Young candidate until a shoulder injury ended his season. He is expected to miss significant time in 2018, but the Brewers have the starters to pick up most of the slack. Zach Davies, who has yet to turn 25, enjoyed the best season of his career at 3.4 WARP. Chase Anderson had his big breakthrough, posting 2.4 WARP in less than 150 innings. Brent Suter, who could be expected to open the season in the Brewers rotation, posted a 3.45 earned run average in 70 1/3 innings as a starter. As soon as Nelson returns from injury, one can squint and see the makings of a playoff caliber rotation.

David Stearns needs to spread the team’s resources. The team lacks any glaring holes; instead they need mild improvements across the board. Their rotation could use another middle-of-the-rotation piece such as C.C. Sabathia, Jhoulys Chacin, or Tyler Chatwood. They need more depth in the bullpen. There is no Aroldis Chapman, Kenley Jansen, or Mark Melancon in this free agent class, but there is an abundance of set-up reliever type assets. Addison Reed, Mike Minor, or Brandon Morrow could bolster the Brewers bullpen and ease the burden on the starting rotation at the same time. Two or three smaller moves such as these will lower risk while strengthening several areas of the roster rather than just one.

As much as Brewers fans want to see that big splash, it would be wise to stay away from the big-money signing and go the conservative route. This is not the offseason to be spending big. It seems as though the Brewers front office has no choice but to spend in order to build off the 2017 season, but the hunk of change gamble is not the way to go.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USAToday Sports Images

Here are the Top 10 2017 free agent arms, with the full table available here:

Related Reading: “Forecasting Chase” || “Free Agency”

Thankfully for the Brewers, no one is talking about Hellickson. Baseball Prospectus recently began a free agency ranking series, and Hellickson failed to make the Top 50. This is perfectly acceptable for Milwaukee’s purposes, however, for Hellickson is the perfect definition of a free agency class that is loaded with pitchers that have surface imperfections but are perfectly suitable to design deep and serviceable rotations. Hellickson is a more interesting case in terms of convincing Brewers fans of his merits, given his 8-11, 5.43 ERA surface performance in 2017, as well as his declining strike out rate (from 19.6 percent in 2016 to 13.8 percent in 2017). Yet, the 6’1″, 190 pound righty armed with a cutter, curve, and change up behind his primary fastball could be the perfect opportunity to apply the lessons from Jimmy Nelson and Chase Anderson’s mechanical successes.

Over the last four seasons, Hellickson has morphed his pitching arsenal to amplify his change up and move away from his primary, rising-riding fastball. In fact, it is surprising to see the righty work as a true “junkball” arm in 2017, turning to that change up so frequently as to select it more than any of his other pitches. The intrigue about this arsenal development will be in the balance between 2015, 2016, and 2017. Between 2015 and 2016, Hellickson made his first shift to the cutter while also doubling down on his change up, which drove his most successful season since 2011 (and arguably his most successful season of his career in terms of strike out rate and groundball rate alongside DRA). One could question whether these developments went a step too far in 2017, as the veteran leaned on his change up more than ever while also turning to a riding-sinking fastball and increasing that cutter.The following table tracks the basic development of Hellickson’s arsenal and pitch selection over the last four seasons (“FB” means “fastball” here):

Following these arsenal shifts and pitch selection patterns, Hellickson’s strike out rate suffered in 2017. The decline in strike outs seemingly follows a very clear pattern with the evolution in this pitching approach. Compare 2016 Brooks Baseball outcomes….

…with 2017 outcomes:

For developing an account of the vanishing strike outs, following the change up and curveball results between these charts. Those 2016 whiff rates on the change up and curveball are not necessarily outliers, which is the first important information to supplement these outcome charts. In 2015, Hellickson drew 23 percent whiffs with his change up and 16 percent with the curve; in 2014, those numbers were 22 percent with the change and 12 percent with the curve. The major factors here are (1) the complete turn from a primary, rising fastball approach to a sinking fastball approach, (2) the extreme reliance on the change up over time, and (3) the introduction and increased reliance on the cut fastball.

The cutter is a peculiar pitch for Hellickson, as the righty landed it in the strike zone less frequently in 2017, but still elicited swings on the pitch approximately half the time. This pitch was seemingly meant to induce weak contact, as the whiffs remained low both seasons (below 5 percent), while the foul ball percentages were very high both seasons. In 2017, those increased foul balls, as well as pop ups, drained the line drive rate from the pitch. This arguably ate into Hellickson’s strike out results, but the outcomes with the cutter were not problematic. Here, the change and curve come to mind as the primary sources of trouble: while Hellickson continued to combine both pitches for approximately 42 percent of his total arsenal, he continued to diminish use of the curve in favor of the change. However, this arrangement was accompanied by fewer strikes, a notable decline in swings, and subsequently plummeting whiff rates. When batters did swing, they hit the ball far, doubling the number of fly balls off of the change up; what was a fantastic pitch in 2016 (.173 AVG, 41 percent strike out rate, and .274 BABIP), the change up morphed into a nightmare in 2017 (.250 AVG, .509 SLG, 28 percent strike out rate, and .283 BABIP). Coupled with increased usage of the sinking fastball, which was not a strong suit for Hellickson to begin with, the shift to increased cutter usage, decreased curve, and extreme change up selection resulted in mound performance that drifted away from the quiet success of 2016.

Looking back at Chase Anderson’s profile, one can see how 2017 exhibited success through balance, alongside mechanical adjustments related to the secondary offerings for the righty. Comparing Anderson to Hellickson on a one-to-one basis is difficult in part because of Anderson’s climbing fastball velocity, but the adjustments involving the secondary pitches, and the balancing of those offerings between the change, curve, and even cutter became a source of success for the veteran. For example, Anderson’s whiff rate on the curve and cutter skyrocketed as both pitches increased in usages and Anderson pounded the zone more frequently than in 2016.

It’s difficult to not see the similarities between Hellickson and Anderson, as well. Both pitchers had difficult years in terms of run prevention, the latter in 2017 and the former in 2016, when their change up use climbed, their curve decline, and the balance was not yet right between the three fastballs. Without the velocity increase of Anderson, one might not expect Hellickson to improve as drastically within the Brewers system, yet it’s worth remembering that the veteran Hellickson was a 3.0+ WARP starting pitcher before Anderson was; this is not a knock on Anderson, but a recognition that he has some template for success that he can return to, or some feel for adjusting at the MLB level. In fact, given the rotational success of Zach Davies, as well as pitching staff success involving Brent Suter, it is arguable that Milwaukee is a fantastic pitching location for the exact arsenal imbalance exhibited by Hellickson in 2017. There has been a 3.4 K/BB, 43 percent groundball pitcher in Hellickson, just as there was a 3.3 K/BB, 41 percent groundball pitcher embedded in Anderson’s arsenal and world of mechanical potentialities; a particular challenge for Brewers analytics is to design a system based around specific profiles of success and spin those lessons into valuable roster acquisitions and development.

The test here is how the Brewers front office can forecast from their scouting, mechanical, and coaching successes with their 2017 staff: Hellickson is another righty with an extremely similar frame, upright delivery, and five-pitch arsenal centered around three fastballs, change up, and curve. Between age-29 and age-31, this profile is not particularly common in the MLB. An outwardly “analytical” front office should be able to process the information collected from their previous successes, from PITCHf/x data to professional insights from coaches, and balance those lessons for each particular profile that resides on their pitching staff.

From a statistical standpoint, this case is beyond a “small sample size,” for it is as arguably as biased as nearly any mechanical problem could be. Working with pitching mechanics presents an inherently biased standpoint to the pitcher, coaching staff, and front office alike. Yet, while statistical methods indeed draw fruitful observations through many applications, more narrow, biased problems reveal the depths of thought that can be applied to pitching (or mechanical problems in general); pitching in this regard is more of an ecosystem, a system of dynamic interactions, a case where even through unrepeatable singularities one may find signals worth amplifying.

Where a previous imbalance existed in Chase Anderson’s approach, a current imbalance exists in Jeremy Hellickon’s arsenal, and the Brewers are precisely the club that can capitalize on the latter’s free agency status, redevelop that arsenal within their system, and deploy a deep rotation to maintain the pitching successes of 2017. This is the type of move that can define the club moving forward, and the type of move that can answer now-popular questions like, “Who is the next Charlie Morton?,” now applied to Milwaukee’s particular coaching standpoint.

Photo Credit: Derik Hamilton, USAToday Sports Images