While the series is over and done with and the team should be looking forward and planning for next season, there was one decision I wanted to revisit from Game Seven. Before the game, the pitcher usage had been fully mapped out, with contingencies built in based on what actually occurred once the game started. Thus, lifting Jhoulys Chacin for a pinch hitter in the bottom of the 2^nd inning with two outs and runners on second and third was not a surprise, nor is it a decision I feel qualified questioning. However, I think using Jonathan Schoop as the pinch hitter in that specific spot was a legitimate tactical error which contributed to the Game Seven loss.

Leverage Index is a stat which quantifies the importance of a situation in a game, where the average is 1.0 and the higher the number, the higher leverage the situation. That plate appearance had a leverage score of 1.86, making it the highest leverage plate appearance in the game for Milwaukee, yet Jonathan Schoop was the batter at the plate.

Up to that point, Schoop was 0-for-7 in the playoffs, including two pinch hitting appearances. Schoop’s performance since coming to Milwaukee had no hidden indicators that he was good selection for this spot. Other than running into a few balls, Schoop hadn’t hit in three months and spent October swinging at everything. Using Schoop didn’t even get Milwaukee the platoon advantage, so there was no old-school baseball rationale either.

Walker Buehler attacked Schoop with sinkers. He threw only nine sinkers in the game, and four were in this at-bat. Schoop only swung at two of the pitches, both of which were arguably balls, but he still grounded out the end the threat.

Domingo Santana would have been a better choice for the situation. Since his recall on September 1, Santana slashed .409 batting average /.458 on-base percentage /.909 slugging percentage in pinch hitting appearances during the regular season, and added another two hits and two walks in ten playoff pinch hit opportunities. Pinch hitting is an acquired skill and Santana had at least shown some knack for it in the past six weeks. He did get a pinch-hitting appearance with one out in the fifth inning, but the leverage index on that at bat was .97, almost exactly half of Schoop’s plate appearance.

With the aggressive use of the pitching staff, it’s slightly baffling as to why they held back their best pinch hitter and Curtis Granderson in favor of Schoop. None of them played in the field, so no defensive considerations seemed to play into the decisions, so it should have purely been the best hitter in that spot. You cannot save a better hitter for a higher leverage situation which may never come, and it didn’t in Game 7.

Jeremy Jeffress had a poor postseason, as I’ve unfortunately noted in the past two weeks. He allowed runs in three of his eight appearances and only had one game where he didn’t allow at least two baserunners. On Saturday entered the game in the 6^th inning with a runner on first and wound up giving up a backbreaking home run to Yasiel Puig which shot the Dodgers’ win expectancy up to ninety-one percent. In Jeffress’ 1 and 1/3 innings, he threw twenty pitches, none of which were splitters. It was only his third game this season where he threw at least twenty pitches and no splitters. All of those outings have occurred since September 10^th.

Starting in September, Jeffress drastically reduced his splitter usage. For the season, batters hit .209 against the pitch with only a .045 isolated slugging percentage, making it one of his most effective pitches. The splitter also had a seventeen percent whiff rate, on par with Jeffress’s curveball. However, those whiffs almost completely disappeared in September and October, with only one swing and miss on eighteen total splitters.

While it probably doesn’t fully explain Jeffress’s struggles, his pitch mix lost its balance when he stopped throwing the splitter and he started struggling. If it was a matter of feel, he has the whole offseason to regain confidence in the pitch or develop another weapon to induce swings and misses, because his results took a step back in October.

Christian Yelich had a tough postseason, but his struggles shouldn’t be a cause for concern for Brewers fans. First, the approach pitchers took against Yelich is not sustainable for a full season, unless they’re prepared to walk him at a rate comparable to Barry Bonds. Here’s the zone profile for Yelich for all of 2018:

Here’s Yelich’s zone profile during the playoffs:

While there was some effort to stick with the general plan to pitch him low and away, there’s a lot of blue in the strike zone and a lot of red bordering it. Pitchers spent three weeks staying away from Yelich, which makes sense after his second half of the season. However, pitchers will have to throw him more strikes in 2019. Yelich also maintained his plate discipline during the barrage of balls. He cut down on his swings on non-fastballs and also swung and missed less on breaking and offspeed pitches, while staying around his seasonal fastball whiff rate. By focusing on pitches in the zone, Yelich will lure pitchers back into throwing more strikes and he should pick up at the start of next season where he left off on October 1^st.

Unfortunately, there’s no new series to preview this week for the Brewers. While the result fell short of what fans were hoping for, it’s important to remember the ride to Game Seven and not focus on the NLCS loss itself. This was a fun team to follow all season and is poised to repeat its performance next season while also changing expectations on what a pitching staff should be in terms of usage and the best fits of skills in each role. The organization works as one unit and made an experiment like Travis Shaw: Major League Baseball Second Basement evolve from a sarcastic joke to a legitimate option by the end of the season. Remember the fun in getting to this point and start getting excited about what team will be put together this offseason.

P.S. They’re still not trading for/signing an ace.

Ryu is good. The Brewers have trouble in their must-win scenario.

Brewers bats have been sleeping throughout much of the Dodgers series, with their Game One outburst and Clayton Kershaw the highlight (the club was also roughly average in Game Three, capitalizing on a long start by rookie Walker Buehler with some third-time through the order heroics). Here’s the rub for the Dodgers: they have a relatively traditional rotation, in the sense that Ryu and company are the types of pitchers a manager would simply leave on the mound to get out of their own trouble in most cases. Ryu justified any such managerial faith in 2018, shifting his times-through-the-order On Base Percentage Plus Slugging Percentage (OPS) from .585 (first time) to .682 (second time) and then .558 (third time) in a manner that suggests improvement throughout the game. For reference, the 2018 National League starters went .684 (first time) / .718 (second time) / .777 (third time), which means that Ryu was better than average each trip through the batting order, and substantially so in the much-maligned third trip. There’s a bit of a selection bias evident here, as Ryu only logged 65 batters faced in 13 games the third time through the order, meaning that if he was not knocked out of the game during his second trip through, he probably had his great stuff working.

In terms of stuff and approach, I find it stunning how much “Ryu is Ryu.” While there’s some fidgeting against the Brewers in the League Championship Series, for the most part Ryu has been the same pitcher in October that he was throughout 2018. What is striking about that first LCS start against the Brewers is that Ryu went away from his change up and curveball, in favor of throwing more sinkers to Brewers batters. This strategy ostensibly was intended to keep the Brewers off of the cutter and potentially keep the ball on the ground, but only one of those outcomes worked; Brewers bats boasted a .333 batting average on the sinker, and slugged .667. The sinker did yield the highest percentage of groundballs for the southpaw, but not with the benefit of keeping the Brewers bats from squaring up the cutter. The cutter simply was not working in Game Two, as the Brewers nabbed their homer off of the pitch, slammed a couple of line drives, and only whiffed approximately 6 percent of cutters (which is not far from Ryu’s 8 percent whiff rate on the pitch for the season, to be fair).

The secret to Ryu’s first start against the Brewers was those off-speed offerings, which the lefty can present to batters at two different speeds below his fastball, while also breaking the pitches to different sides of the plate. Both of these pitches offer Ryu distinct looks, and the Brewers were baffled by them the first time they faced the southpaw during the LCS. Zach Crizer noted that the Dodgers’ other notable lefty, Clayton Kershaw, leaned heavily on the spinners during his second outing against the Brewers, and used those offerings plus the shadows in Los Angeles to quiet the Brewers bats. This begs the question of whether Ryu was “too cute” in moving away from his bread-and-butter pitch mix for the 2018 season, and whether a similar pitch selection development is in store for Brewers bats in Game Six.

Miller Park will offer beautiful batting visibility for the close of the series, which raises another distinct advantage for Ryu’s slow stuff. First, Milwaukee mostly sat on the heavy stuff during their first meeting in Milwaukee, and Ryu did not see the Brewers at any other point in 2018. So working with the slow stuff will truly provide a new look against Brewers batters. Second, without shadows or any of the other afternoon oddities that have presented the series thus far, working with different break and three speed levels (four if you count the cutter) will allow Ryu to counteract the excellent batting conditions in Milwaukee. Working 92-83-74 is no joke, and if Ryu works from cutter to go 89-83-74 that’s not going to be a picnic either.

Thus the series rests on one crucial adjustment. Ryu can attempt to implement his Game Two plan once more, in an attempt to keep the ball on the ground and beat Brewers bats with his hardest stuff. Or he can change that edition of his pitching approach, in favor of his more familiar pitch mix from the season. The problem for the Brewers batters is that that pitch mix from the season was one that yielded great success for the southpaw: if Milwaukee has this adjustment in mind, they must seriously watch the change and curve, and look for Ryu to manipulate the ball in many different shapes. Given the Brewers’ success against the hard stuff during Game Two, expect a type of aggression from Milwaukee as well; if Milwaukee can see that cutter or one of the fastballs, and get a good swing on one, watch them swinging early in counts to drive that pitch. This will undoubtedly result in some frustrating one pitch plate appearances, but it could be the necessary antidote to late count off speed offerings.

Baseball does not get any better than this series.

With these pitching match-ups set, it’s possible to assess the Runs Prevention comparisons for the starters, and also look at the current depth in both squads’ bullpens. These figures come from the season ending Runs Prevented worksheet, assembled on October 2, 2018. If you’re new to Runs Prevented, I’ve linked a couple of primer articles below; the gist of it is that Runs Prevention is a descriptive statistic (not a predictive one) about the quality of a pitcher’s Runs Allowed performance scaled to their average ballpark and league environment.

Runs Prevented Primer || Playoffs! ||
Sharing Worksheet: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1kf2hMxo9p4H92R7S5N7y-_d-AhrayPJgGFXjPKLpKDs/edit?usp=sharing

Game Four finds a relatively even match up between Gonzalez and Hill, as Gonzalez improved significantly in September with the Brewers. Hill was one of the innings pitched workhorses for the Dodgers rotation, and his full-season mark of approximately 6 Runs Prevented places him squarely within the top twenty percent of all MLB pitchers.

The match-up between Wade Miley and Clayton Kershaw is all thanks to Craig Counsell’s limitations on the veteran’s workload during Saturday’s game, which allows Miley to turnaround on so-called short rest. This isn’t to belittle the effort behind Miley’s pitches, but it’s not as though the left is returning on short rest after throwing 100 pitches; given the relative success with this strategy involving Jhoulys Chacin during the League Divisional Series, one cannot be surprised that Counsell is trying it again. Both Kershaw and Miley are veritable veteran leaders of their respective rotations; the former was the second-best pitcher on the Dodgers staff (behind on Walker Buehler), while Miley is the third-best pitcher on the Brewers staff (behind Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader).

This is ace versus ace territory, in the playoffs! A potential top rotation versus top rotation match-up probably will determine the trajectory of the series.

pic.twitter.com/VcKQlBwHRc

— DeathToFlyingThings (@SpectiveWax) October 13, 2018

Turning to the bullpens tonight, one can see that the Dodgers have a relative advantage in terms of resting their key relievers in Game Three. Of course, one can question that rest, as it came at the expense of an additional inning from the rookie Buehler and the subsequent insurance runs tacked on. Milwaukee had a 1-0 lead when Buehler came to the plate in the bottom of the fifth inning with a runner in scoring position; the righty remained in the game then, and allowed another run in the sixth before allowing two additional runs in the seventh. One wonders how Pedro Baez or Ryan Madson would have fared after effectively silencing Brewers bats in Games One and Two.

Craig Counsell had no problem going to his main guys in Game Three, but it is also worth questioning that decision when one assesses the relative strength and lack of workload of some of his rested relievers. Freddy Peralta has yet to throw a pitch, and one could question whether his fastball heavy approach would have been a favorable change in view against Dodgers bats, especially once a four-run lead was established. Junior Guerra’s poor Runs Prevented numbers largely occurred as a starter; he’s been an entirely different pitcher as a reliever. Comparing Runs Prevented figures between Counsell’s “rested” relievers and his Game Three choices, it’s easy to see why he worked so hard to get Jeremy Jeffress back on track, and why he went to Josh Hader and Corey Knebel, too (Knebel, of course, entered when the game was 2-0 and the tying runner was at the plate).

Entering Game Four, one almost has to expect an appearance from Freddy Peralta, Brandon Woodruff, Junior Guerra, Corbin Burnes, and/or Xavier Cedeno in order to patch things through to Game Five. Obviously, Hader hardly threw any pitches last night, and as Counsell told the FS1 crew, if he’s cleared by trainers and feels good, Hader’s availability will be a “play it by ear” situation (read between the lines: expect Hader if the game is very close and on the line). At some point, one must expect that the Brewers will need to use this secondary group of relievers, both because Knebel and Jeffress have thrown between 50-60 pitches over four days, and because the group of “rested” relievers is quite solid in their own right. While the national commentary about the Brewers has been a sore subject for many following the series from the midwest (and rightfully so, in many cases), if Games Four and Five feature crucial moment meltdowns from the Milwaukee pen, commentators will undoubtedly look to the managerial decisions during that four-run lead as a source of criticism.

The Los Angeles Dodgers opened the 2018 season with a payroll of more than $187 million, according to Cot’s Contracts, more than double Milwaukee’s figure. In fact, that number alone would comprise approximately 70 percent of the Brewers’ total revenue. Those contracts feature players like Clayton Kersaw, an elite southpaw who defies the rule that aces don’t exist, the exception that proves the rule, a pitcher boasting approximately 66 career Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP). That’s no fluke; Kershaw may not be as magical these days as he works in his age-30 season, but the lefty still managed a 3.11 Deserved Run Averaged (DRA). By comparison, Jimmy Nelson, the Brewers ace that everyone missed due to injured in 2018, posted a DRA of 3.32 last year. Ryan Braun, the Brewers’ best player, falls short of Kershaw by 20 WARP; Gio Gonzalez, the waiver trade deadline acquisition that serves as Milwaukee’s best career pitcher, has produced half the career value as Kershaw.

Related Reading:
Rebuild Rebuilding
Playoffs!
Sprint

But that’s not it; the Dodgers traded for superstar shortstop Manny Machado, they boast elite prospects from Cody Bellinger to elite reclamation projects like Justin Turner. The best position player prospect developed onto the 2018 Brewers is Orlando Arcia, who could certainly build a career as a glove-first shortstop, but struggled in 2018 before a demotion to Triple-A helped him his offensive production. Los Angeles boasts such a deep batting order that you might be forgiven if you forget that Yasiel Puig, Matt Kemp, Max Muncy, Enrique Hernandez, Yasmani Grandal, or Chris Taylor are a part of it (at any given moment); in fairness, though, I suppose the Brewers bullpen works the same way, as L.A. faithful might forget about Jeremy Jeffress, Josh Hader, Joakim Soria, Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, and company. Perhaps in a few years we’ll be writing about how the Brewers’ best pitching prospects developed onto the 2018 club (Hader and Burnes) forged their respective careers in the 2018 stretch run; that remains to be written.

By using Baseball Reference Multi-Year Park Factors, the Dodgers are easily the better team. Park-adjusting Runs Scored and Runs Allowed, and scaling them to the National League, one would have expected the Dodgers to win approximately six more games than the Brewers.

Team Deserved Run Average says the same (Los Angeles comes in at 3.51 while the Brewers are at a [still-respectable] 4.31); True Average (TAv) says the same, although it’s closer (Milwaukee’s overall batting performance of .275 is just behind the Dodgers’ MLB-leading mark of .280). The key areas where Milwaukee has the edge are in fielding (both in terms of Defensive Efficiency and Park-Adjusted Defensive Efficiency, although, again, it’s close), and the bullpen (again, it’s close).

Thankfully for all of us, they don’t play the games on paper. Thankfully for Brewers fans, fielding and bullpen can help to decide playoff series. On the field, the Brewers have a fighting chance.

It’s so easy to call the Dodgers the better team. What’s fascinating about the Dodgers, however, is that on the whole their overall on-field performance was worse than Milwaukee’s throughout the season. One way to measure the overall strength of a ballclub throughout the season is to average the team’s Winning Percentage pace (against a 162 game schedule) and average the team’s so-called “Pythagorean W-L” (this is the difference between a team’s Runs Scored and Runs Allowed translated into expected wins and losses).

Certainly, the Dodgers’ overall average Runs Scored and Runs Allowed performance looks much stronger than that of Milwaukee, but between games 28 and 81 the teams were basically equal to one another (that’s not an inconsequential number of games, either; that’s fully one third of the season). Interestingly enough, the Dodgers and Brewers started the season in completely inverse fashion. Los Angeles struggled to produce actual wins despite strong underlying run differential fundamentals, while Milwaukee used a bunch of close game victories to drive a mediocre run differential to elite record. Those following @BPMilwaukee on Twitter know that via Daily Pythagorean reports, the Brewers were basically an 84-win club as late as September 1.

Viewing these data in progressive fashion, one can see how each season unfolded:

Brewers fans loved to pick out random dates from the season and proclaim that Milwaukee was basically a .500 team. For this hobby, Los Angeles may have even been the better team to follow. On June 5, the Dodgers were 30-30; it even took a four game winning streak to get there. Of course, the Dodgers were battling quite a set of injuries, as one could literally form an All-Star team from some of their key beleaguered players from the first three months of the season. The rest is history, anyway, as the Dodgers sustained .600 baseball for three months to reach the playoffs. The underlying elements always looked good, and the on-field results eventually followed suit.

Milwaukee’s hot streaks came in fits and starts, by comparison. The Brewers were also a 30-30 baseball team, with their stretch occurring from June 1 through August 8 (the pessimists will point out that they really went 33-37 from late May deep into August!). Like the Dodgers, the Brewers snapped out of it and then some, basically book-ending their mediocrity with lights-out May and September campaigns.

For both teams, the successful narratives converge in September, which was the best month for both clubs in terms of actual record and runs scored / runs allowed. And so, their fates continued in Game 163, and through the Divisional Series, to what appears as a predestined series. Who else could take on these almighty Dodgers, the big-spending small market club that seemingly does everything right (save for ranking their executives’ criminal culpability). When you’re tempting to fall back on the narrative that the Dodgers indeed are the better team, as I frequently have been while studying both teams this week, remember that in the case of converting actual wins, the Brewers have been better for the entire season; when it comes to surging at the end of the season and forcing crucial games, both teams are equal. So why should there be any other League Championship Series on the Senior Circuit?

#ThisIsMyCrew #OurCrewOurOctober