Mike Fiers
Fiers was non-tendered because Oakland is not paying a mid-rotation starter, at best, a $10 million salary. According to Cot’s Contracts, the last Oakland starting pitcher earning that much money was Scott Kazmir in 2015.

The Brewers immediately come to mind as a home for Fiers because he’s a former Brewer that has survived in MLB despite having below average fastball velocity. His fourseam fastball sits around 90 MPH, which Milwaukee has some experience with. There is ample cause for concern with Fiers though. Last season his swing and miss rate dropped for the fourth straight season, and dipped below 20 percent for the first time in his career. As his whiff percentage has dropped, Fiers has allowed more home runs (ranging from 1.2 to 1.9 per 9 innings) and struck out fewer batters (losing almost two strikeouts per nine innings as there are more strikeouts now than any time in the history of MLB).

However, there may be an area ripe for exploitation which could bring renewed success for Fiers: his curveball. He threw the curve for around 16 percent of his pitches in 2018, which is around his career average. Based on results though, Fiers should be throwing it more. Batters have hit .196 and have slugged .307 against the pitch, both of which are his best numbers. In 2018, those numbers improved to .145 and .181, once again performing as his best pitch results wise.  The pitch also generates his most ground balls: over 60 percent of curveballs put in play over his career have been ground balls. His 2018 ground ball rate on curveballs in play was almost exactly his career average.

Fiers consistently buries the ball below the zone and generates a large amount of whiffs on pitches that would be balls. In 2018, almost all of the damage against the pitch was on pitches out of the strike zone, which a player can live with.

For a pitch that he’ll throw equally to lefties and righties, it’s a little baffling that Fiers hasn’t decided to ride the curveball hard as his overall results have gotten worse. His curveball usage was actually down almost 20 percent last season when compared with 2017. Even after the trade to Oakland, while he threw the pitch more, there’s opportunity to make it the focal point of his attack and Milwaukee has some experience in signing free agent pitchers and having them focus on throwing more breaking balls.

Fiers may not be worth $10M, but I think he would be an interesting signing for a team that has helped pitchers maximize their stuff to more fully reach their potential.

Blake Parker
After a season that saw regression across the board, the Angels non-tendered Blake Parker rather than pay his projected $3.1 salary. Superficially, his 3.26 ERA and career high 14 saves indicate a decent reliever. Digging a little deeper reveals some problems, though:

Most of Parker’s regression is found in performance against his fastball. In 2017, batters hit .179 and slugged .313 against his fastball, with a .204 BABIP, but those numbers rose to .315, .562 and .328 in 2018. Batters hit more home runs against his fastball in 2018 (10) than he allowed in total in 2017 (7).

After spiking in 2017, Parker’s fastball velocity fell from 94 to 92.8 last season. The pitch started the season slower and the velocity continued trending down. He also had a location issue. Parker had previously located the pitch away from both righties and lefties, generally avoiding the middle of the plate and looking to jam hitters as much as possible. That plan failed against both sides as Parker literally had a Rudolph nose in his fastball strike zone plot. While the velocity may not come back, better location can cure a lot of Parker’s ills as batters did the most damage against his poorly located pitches.

Parker also has potential with his other two pitches: the curveball and splitter. The curveball used to be his secondary pitch, but he shelved in it favor of his splitter in 2017. Parker brought the pitch back towards the end of the season. His whiffs on both pitches were down in 2018 and location may have played a role here as well. In his most effective season, Parker threw almost 62 percent of his curves and splitters below the zone, which dropped to 56 percent in 2018. In particular, he consistently missed that spot against left handed hitters. His whiff numbers on those pitches compare favorably in 2017 and 2018, but because he was missing his spot more, batters made more contact.

Aside from the velocity drop, Parker also just didn’t execute his pitches in 2018. If the Brewers think there’s an easy mechanical fix, then Parker is a potential cheap addition to Milwaukee’s monster bullpen.

Note: Projected arbitration salaries are from MLB Trade Rumors.

Here at BPMilwaukee, Andrew Salzman surveyed Schoop’s season and the roster factors related to the arbitration-eligible veteran, and also analyzed Schoop’s batting elements in early August. Salzman noted the declining aspects of Schoop’s plate approach, which resulted in a general profile of weak contact involving groundballs and pop-ups (both headed in the wrong direction). Paul Noonan offered a thorough critique of the logic of the trade during the deadline press cycle. Noonan illustrated the confusing logic of using Schoop in potentially interchangeable roster strategies at second base (including a potential platoon scenario), and highlights the difficulty of the second baseman fitting into the batting order.

Evaluating Schoop according to his Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) progression complicates the matter. While Schoop undoubtedly declined in 2018, his stature as an arbitration-eligible player and his exceptional 2017 season impacts almost any pricing mechanism of his performance. If the Brewers take Schoop through the arbitration process, they cannot decrease his salary according to his performance (as salaries are protected through the arbitration process, which values service time more than performance). In terms of overall career progression, Schoop’s production remains close to a $11 million per season value, which is his estimated arbitration salary according to Cot’s Contracts; other estimates are similar, assessing approximately $10 million in 2019 salary for Schoop.

The following table estimates Schoop’s three-year surplus value, which roughly means evaluating Schoop’s production and scarcity (or, production and cost), and derives one-year contracts from those models. A “harmonic mean” contract is used to balance overall 2014-2018 surplus values with the highest possible value from that time period; this is an attempt to even out the roughest edges of these value estimates.

It’s not hard to see a scenario in which Schoop is worth $10 to $11 million; in fact, balancing high- and low-value figures for Schoop places his ideal contract in that neighborhood. Even if Schoop is not “truly” worth $10 million or $11 million, it should not be difficult to see a League Championship Series caliber team overpay a player if they believe they can yield the best possible performance from that player. The difficulty is determining whether Schoop fits that logic.

An additional difficulty is that because Schoop is so young, the “Aging Curve Logic” suggests that he should be working in a prime season, and therefore produce quality performances. Yet, relying on an aging curve to promote a bounce back season from Schoop is somewhat dubious, as there are numerous disagreements about peak age, evidence that season-over-season statistics become less volatile once a player reaches age-26, and a recognition that different types of players age in different ways, anyway (Silver 2015, 81-86). There is a very real sense that Schoop already “is who he is.”

As of March 30, 2018, PECOTA picked Bret Boone, Howie Kendrick, and Jeff Kent as the age-26 comparable players for Schoop. Kendrick is an interesting pick, as his 2010 season fell backwards from a 2009 breakout, but Kendrick eventually recovered to produce better offensive value. Kent is an interesting pick because at age-26 he was not yet “Jeff Kent,” and there were some real doubts about what he might become. Boone is more interesting still, as the young phenom fell back during 1995-1997 campaigns, and produced fringe average seasons prior to breaking out again during his early 30s. These last two comparisons should be kept in mind, as it could be possible that Schoop takes several years to continue developing aspects of his plate approach, and that his 2018 and 2019 season have little to no bearing on what Schoop eventually becomes. This may not appear to be a likely scenario, but it’s a possibility worth keeping in mind given the long and often unpredictable twists of player development.

The simple point is that projecting and pricing 2019 Schoop is not simply a binary exercise; his future is not one basic either/or scenario.

With these caveats in mind, I investigated MLB seasons with at least 300 plate appearances in their age-24, 25, and 26 seasons during the Wild Card Era (1995-present) with the intention of finding players similar to Schoop’s extreme plate discipline and power approach. This is a biased sample in several ways, most importantly in the sense of seeking out “starting roles,” which I roughly designated as players with 300 or more plate appearances (which reasonably excludes players with catastrophic injuries, fringe players, and many bench players). Additionally, the sample is confined to the institutional, player development, and game constraints of the last generation, which means that this survey is in no way representative of some “true population” of age-24, 25, or 26 players throughout baseball history. Additionally, by excluding minor league players of the same age groups, I am not fully assessing Schoop’s development and plate discipline against potential replacements or other developmental trends in the game, which is another limitation for assessing players by age. Given these biases, I am reasonably asking, “Who are relatively recent MLB starting players who approach the game like Schoop?,” and “How did these players age?”; since this is not any sort of sample representative of a population, I am using this to describe development trends rather than predict Schoop’s path in 2019.

(1) Schoop and Grichuk. In the last 24 seasons, there is one player who matches Schoop’s general trend of striking out more than 20 percent of the time, walking less than 6 percent of the time, and homering more than 3.5 percent of the time during each of his age-24, 25, and 26 seasons. Interestingly enough, that player is also a contemporary of Schoop, Randal Grichuk. Even within these general parameters, Grichuk is quite different than Schoop, as his walk totals are sometimes closer to that 6 percent threshold, and the strike outs are also much higher; Grichuk is more of a “Three True Outcomes Hitter” (relying on strike outs, walks, and homers) than Schoop, who is more of a bizarre type of contact hitter.

It is startling that even given the general acceptance of strike outs over the last generation, and the proliferation of home-run based batting approaches, baseball simply does not produce batting profiles like Schoop. This could be a good thing for the Brewers, as the club certainly seems comfortable working with unorthodox plate approaches; for example, another recent Stearns era player with an unprecedented approach is Keon Broxton; additionally, another unprecedented role on the Brewers’ roster is Hernan Perez. It certainly cannot be said that Stearns is squeamish about working with relatively oddball player profiles, and that trait probably helps to explain his ability to quickly turn around the Brewers franchise by assembling a bunch of high-floor players with extremely prominent scouting flaws. The only question now is whether Stearns will pay $10 million for that privilege.

(2) Examining “low walk” players (Schoop and Salvador Perez). Working with the parameters defined above (1995-present survey), Baseball Prospectus CSV provided 29,397 players overall, which whittled down to 6,495 players with 300 (or more) plate appearances; when searching for players with at least 300 plate appearances in each of their age-24, 25, and 26 seasons, I constructed a batch of 246 players for analysis (thus the above caveats for sample bias). This is quite an interesting group of players, and as one might expect from the present biases, it’s a very productive group of players:

Within this group of players, the most striking and promising trait for comparison with Schoop was walk rate, which was a good indicator to separate comparisons and descriptions of development from big walk, big strike out, big home run players. For Schoop’s intriguing trait is generally huge power (and indeed, he consistently produced better-than-median power for this group) without corresponding high walk totals. Thus, it wouldn’t do much good to compare Schoop to Mike Trout, Adam Dunn, Prince Fielder, Edgardo Alfonzo, and other age-26 walk monsters; those players are doing something different at the plate to reach their prodigious power. So, I isolated a group of 37 low-walk total players that posted an additional 300 (or more) plate appearances during their age-27 campaign, in order to describe an age-26 to age-27 aging pattern for these players. This is quite a fun group!

Here, the top table shows the change in category performance from age-26 to age-27 season, while the bottom table shows the basic age-26 production for Wins Above Replacement Player, Plate Appearances, True Average, and Strike Outs / Walks / Home Runs.

By plate discipline (K / BB / HR), the most comparable player to Jonathan Schoop on this table was Salvador Perez. Perez was able to cut down the strike outs and tap into more power during his age-27 campaign, which provided a boost back to league average batting production for the catcher. Jedd Gyorko was the best of these players at age-27, but did so by completely retooling both walks and home run power; this is a demonstration that large scale plate discipline changes can occur on a season-over-season basis. What is striking is that even among players who are comparable to Schoop in terms of low walk rates, there are very few that strike out as much as Schoop, or hit for big power. Hence the lack of comparable players, save for Randal Grichuk.

Schoop has his work cut out for his age-27 season, as the middle infielder can retain value through his power if his strike outs and groundball / pop-up fluctuations do not impede that power. He’s a strange $10 million gamble for a front office, as the general ideal of age-27 seasons from players with 4.0+ WARP seasons on their resumes suggests bright futures rather than large question marks. Yet, there could be reason to suspect that Schoop may age differently than other prime age middle infielders, both due to his consistently better than average power and due to his extreme plate discipline. Nobody hits like Schoop, and in some sense this ought to result in a vote of confidence from GM Stearns when the opt-in is a one-year gamble. But the lean months of 2018 speak loudly, where the power was rendered empty by low batting averages and the lack of another offensive carrying tool when that one vanished. So here we are, fixated on a relatively marginal roster deal, looking for excellent production in the middle of the diamond.

Citation

Silver, Nate. 2015. The Signal and The Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail – but Some Don’t.. Penguin.

This post was updated at 5:24 PM on November 23, 2018 to correct the figures in the Grichuk / Schoop table.

A quick recap on roster rules: the non-tender deadline this offseason is November 30. By that date, teams have to offer a contract to all players on the 40-man roster with fewer than six years of service time. If the team does not offer a contract to a player, then he becomes a free agent. Because Jonathan Schoop has 5.027 years of Major League service time and has not signed any extension, the Brewers have until November 30 to decide if they want to retain him for next season.

Jonathon Schoop is the greatest young power hitting second baseman of all time. There’s a lot to unpack there, but if we wanted to measure by players twenty-six and under who have played at least fifty percent of their games at second base, he’s hit the most home runs. However, impressive raw home run totals don’t necessarily mean a player is a star; even with that fun fact to his name, Schoop’s bat completely fell apart in 2018 after showing so much promise in 2017.

As a twenty-five year old second basemen in 2017, Schoop had a .280 True Average (TAv) and produced 37.6 Value Over Replacement Player (VORP), which estimates the number of runs Schoop produced beyond a freely available minor league replacement. PECOTA pegged him for a regression with .256 TAv and 15.8 VORP, yet his numbers sunk lower. Schoop’s plate discipline remained remarkably similar. His swing rate rose four percentage points to 56.8 percent, while his contact rate (71.4) and swinging strike rate (28.6) remained virtually unchanged from 2017, so his strikeout percentage only rose from twenty-one percent to twenty-three percent. The biggest difference is that his walk rate sunk from 5.2 percent to 3.8 percent, both of which are below average. Schoop’s walk rate would have placed him in the bottom five of all qualified hitters if he’d had enough at bats.

As I noted back in August, there was no smoking gun on Schoop’s poor performance at the plate, he just wasn’t hitting the ball as well. From that article’s publication date on August 13^th, Statcast numbers only slightly recovered. Even with some improvement his barrel percentage, exit velocity, launch angle, and hard hit percentage all were career lows. His expected WOBA placed in the bottom 1 percent of all hitters.

The Brewers traded for a player they probably saw as a buy low candidate. If they elect to offer Schoop arbitration, it likely means that they see something in his 2018 performance that they believe can be corrected to get him back to his 2017 numbers.

One projection for Schoop’s potential arbitration award places him at a $10.1M salary in 2019, which would be 3^rd on the team in salary, just above Christian Yelich, in case you needed another reminder about how great that contract is for the Brewers. The only other potential second basemen on the 40-man roster, presuming that Shaw is back at third base on Opening Day, are Tyler Saladino, Hernan Perez and Mauricio Dubon. None of these players are projected as a starting caliber player on a contending team.] in 2019.

The most intriguing internal option to replace Schoop would be Keston Hiura. Our mother site’s midseason top 50 prospects list had Hiura at number five and claimed that Hiura was “basically major-league ready” back when it was posted in mid-July. If the team agrees with the assessment, then he could be the starting at second by May 1, with service time manipulation likely preventing him from starting the season with the big-league club. While he’s considered a bat-first prospect, if the Brewers could shift and game plan their way into making Travis Shaw league average at second, fans shouldn’t be too worried about Hiura.

The Brewers could also look at potential free agents who could sign a one-year deal and provide flexibility in case the team wants to wait on Hiura (or if he proves not to be ready). Ian Kinsler had a terrible post-trade run with the Red Sox capped with baserunning and fielding blunders in Game 3 of the World Series. However, he provided above average defense according to Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) (even if it wasn’t quite Gold Glove worthy). If you squint, his offense wasn’t terrible in 2018! From his nadir on May 28 through his trade to Boston on July 30, he slashed .286/.349/.518, which is above his career line of .271/.339/.443. One wouldn’t expect a two-month hot streak to be his baseline production going forward, but it does show he has some life left in his bat, and could serve a useful role as a bridge to Hiura.

The Brewers are lucky to be in the position where they don’t need to double down on the Schoop trade. It would hurt the front office’s external perception to write off the acquisition as a total loss after three months of poor production, but I don’t believe that’s going to factor into their calculation. Milwaukee is always going to operate on a limited budget, but if the team decides its best choices are Schoop and Hiura, two different budget issues arise. Is the team willing to keep Schoop at more than $10 M when there’s a non-zero chance he’s not worth a roster spot? If Hiura shines in spring training and proves he’s the best player for the team, are they willing to ignore service time considerations and have him start the season with the team? If not, who would cover the gap of at least two weeks? Milwaukee’s front office has a few weeks to make these decisions, but whichever direction they turn will shed light on their internal evaluations of the players in question.

The Brewers need starting pitching help. The Brewers need an ace.

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— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) July 31, 2018

Of course this would be the return line for the 2018-2019 offseason, because the line never went away during the season. A large faction of fans were dissatisfied with the starting pitching in April; they were satisfied with the starting pitching in May, “but can this staff beat ‘a dude’ in the playoffs?” (Yes!, it turns out); they were particularly dissatisfied with the starting pitching when the season ended in June and July, and again they were dissatisfied with the starting pitching at the trade deadline. This debate was simply never going to be won, because there is a contingent of baseball fans that refuse to either understand or accept what GM Stearns, pitching coach Derek Johnson, systemwide player development, and the front office are trying to accomplish. For arguably the first time in Brewers franchise history, certainly for the first time in a generation, the Milwaukee system strength is pitching, and not of the sort of high octane, all-risk dreamy profiles that flamed out at the turn of the 21st Century; this is a system that is built on turning a fabulous diversity of pitching profiles into potentially successful MLB profiles (witness the scouting range between Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes, for example).

When the dust settled, the system worked. The Brewers rotation was good. It was good any particular way you measured it; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on overall Games Started and workload measurements; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on true rotational scarcity (i.e., comparing each spot across the MLB); and it was a good rotation if you separate pitching classes into “true starters” and “replacements,” and measure each set of pitchers against different “spots” or “workloads.” The pitching staff was good if you believe in “Aces,” and it was good if you don’t believe Aces exist.

The Brewers rotation was good by every measurement except DRA, which should be the significant focal point of 2018-2019 offseason analysis in an effort to understand how Milwaukee assembled an elite fielding component in order to prevent runs.

If you do not wish to read the details, the table above summarizes the comparative results from each model. Each Brewers starter was assessed according to their relevant spot, and then compared by Innings Pitched (IP), Deserved Run Average (DRA), and Runs Prevented.

Rotation One: By Games Started
One way to assess a starting rotation is by ranking pitchers according to games started on a leaguewide basis. This ranking method is effective because it approximates the scarcity of both MLB resources (there’s not a whole lot of pitchers that can work full seasons) and roster construction. One benefit of focusing on games started instead of another performance metric is that analysts can reflect the success or failure of an MLB club across games started totals; for example, it matters that Gerrit Cole and Lucas Giolito both started 32 games despite widely divergent performances. The distance between Cole and Giolito is approximately 65 runs prevented, even though they worked the same number of starts, which raises an important question about how different teams assess the importance of effective starters versus soaking up innings. In fact, had Brent Suter and Zach Davies not faced injuries in 2018, they may have forced this question with the Brewers front office, and Freddy Peralta also arguably faced this (along with innings workload concerns) down the stretch run.

According to this measurement, there are approximately 10 rotation spots discernible by workload throughout the 2018 MLB, as well as emergency starters (who started one game; I will always assess emergency starters as their own category). On the surface, this is a pleasing model; the top starters by workload typically are the best starters in the game, even if there are differences between guys like Cole and Giolito, as discussed above.

On this model, it is clear that the Brewers succeeded because of their depth. A critique about the top of the rotation could be true in terms of DRA, as the contextual performances of Jhoulys Chacin and Chase Anderson were not comparable to top workload pitchers across the MLB. The importance of the depth should not be understated, from Wade Miley and Peralta to Brandon Woodruff and even Gio Gonzalez. If you’re reconsidering Gonzalez’s trade cost, not only should the veteran lefty’s surface performance be assessed, but one should not that, marginally, he was worth seven runs better than his median workload.

Another benefit of using this model is that analysts can assess “phantom” runs prevented where teams “miss” particular spots. For example, Chacin may not measure up to the median Top Spot prototype, but having his performance was better than not having a heavy workload pitcher whatsoever (in theory; Giolito’s performance would obviously have not validated a heavy workload benefit for the Brewers). If a team was missing a Top Spot, they theoretically would be punished 16-to-17 Runs Prevented. Milwaukee did not use a Five, Seven, Eight, or Ten workload, each of which approximately ranged from 2 to 4 runs below average; one could argue in this way that the Brewers also received 10 “phantom” Runs Prevented by avoiding these typical workloads.

This should help to validate the ideal that there are a couple of different ways to construct a rotation. A team could indeed bank on a Jacob deGrom type atop the rotation, and seek a 30 run advantage from their top workload. One must be careful of the cost for this type of pitcher, however, as if considerable resources are spent at the top of the rotation, they may be diminished at the bottom of the rotation. The Brewers demonstrated the “bottom-up” approach: they lost out on the Yu Darvish sweepstakes, and Alex Cobb did not bite on a one-year deal, so they proceeded with Chacin and Miley, plus their developmental pipeline. That internal pipeline was worth approximately five runs (better than their median workload) to the 2018 Brewers, while external candidates were worth more than 15 runs (better than their median workload). It was not flashy, there were no “dudes” on the marquee, but it worked.

Rotation Two: By Team

Of course, even the preceding model is relatively clean or “idealistic,” for MLB teams do not necessarily construct their rotations according to the same ideal. An additional method for assessing rotations is to judge each team’s rotation spot by turn; since two pitchers literally cannot start the same game, this method goes spot-by-spot, start-by-start for each MLB team. The benefit of this method of rotational assessment is that it reflects team preference, or injury and ineffectiveness circumstances, across the league. Some teams attempt to duct tape 13- or 14-pitcher rotations together, whether they are contending or tanking, while others attempt to yield more mileage from each spot. By giving each team one exclusive spot for each turn (until their pitchers run out), this type of rotational model can allow teams to be analyzed against attrition across the league.

Every team in the MLB required at least six rotational turns throughout the season, but this model demonstrates the divergence of team strategies one they hit six starters. Some teams preferred to give replacement starters two or three starts each, while others leaned on emergency starters.

The Brewers front office, coaching staff, and pitchers did a fantastic job weathering 162. They hit the right buttons in replacing some starters at certain points in time (such as resting Peralta down the stretch, or [arguably] “shuttling Woodruff between Triple-A and MLB), while giving starters room to breathe at others point in the season (this also applies to Peralta, who was given some time to adjust from rough starts, as well as Junior Guerra). By spitting on rotation spots 10 through 14, the Brewers also arguably saved 16 “phantom” runs, as the club would not have found effective pitchers (on average) digging that deep into league or organizational resources. (This line could be argued with further research, however, as one could note that someone like Corbin Burnes could have been effective in two starts, for example).

Rotation Three: By Type
During my time writing at Sportsbubbler (RIP) and Disciples of Uecker, I published annual starting pitching rotation rankings based on the decision point of 100 IP. If a pitcher worked 100 or more innings with 50 percent of their games as starts, they were a starting pitcher; if not, they were replacement depth. On this model, I attempted to assess pitchers according to Runs Prevented, with the ideal that (a) working a lot of innings should be worth more as a starter, and (b) rotation spots could be designated based on the resulting Runs Prevented rankings. I’m no longer certain of this method’s veracity, as I believe there are better ways to assess rotational scarcity and usage across the MLB. But, here we are, testing the Brewers 2018 rotation, so let’s assemble the pitchers.

Wouldn’t you know it, the 2018 MLB did not have many “true” rotation spots: there were only 129 pitchers across 30 teams that fit the first criterion listed above. This is not enough pitchers to fill a true five man rotation, and it’s hardly enough to fill a four man turn.

Yet, those Runs Prevented totals present some order to the universe. There are aces, even if there’s only a couple of them. There are nice middle of the rotation “dudes” that you can really sink your teeth into; 150 IP and 2 Runs Prevented feels like a solid effort for a team. Every contender would accept that workload (every MLB team would, for that matter).

Where there are not full-time starters, replacements are necessary, and MLB really dug deep in 2018: there were 227 replacement starters, including 57 Emergency Starters, across 30 MLB teams in 2018. Basically, on average, MLB teams were using more replacements than they were using regular starters. The Brewers are no different here, and in fact, that’s partially how they gained their value. Viewing the range of Runs Prevented across each of these roles should demonstrate the importance of having a solid organizational pitching strategy; replacement starters need not simply be the pitching equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall. Tampa Bay demonstrated this with their genius “Opener” strategy, and they produced one of the elite Runs Prevented units in baseball. The Brewers accomplished their success by using long-term replacements like Miley and Peralta, but they also received value elsewhere across their high-floor organizational depth.

If you previously thought the idea of “Phantom Runs Prevented” by not using a rotation spot was a suspect idea, this seems to be your chance to pounce on the Brewers for not using an “Ace” or true “Number One” starter. By this model, the Brewers were gutsy, punting nearly 63 runs prevented at the front end of the rotation. Yet, the club also did not use a true “Number Four” or full-time starter that should have been replaced, which bought the club another 43 runs prevented. All told, the Brewers rotation of regular starters lost the club approximately 19 runs here, thanks to their cavalier strategy.

Of course, the Brewers used every Replacement typology except a “true swingman,” and this is where the club torched the league. Gio Gonzalez and Wade Miley covered the lack of an “Ace” or “Number One” starter, and demonstrated the value in not having a Regular Four, either. Peralta, Dan Jennings (yes, Dan Jennings), and Woodruff gained significant Runs Prevented advantages in the replacement ranks as well. On top of these depth successes, the rotation was not bad overall; Suter and Guerra were close to true Number Three starters, and Anderson was close to a true Number Two starter. Chacin was better than a typical Number Two starter, boasting a Runs Prevented performance that almost placed him in a phantom “Number One” role for the club.

What is startling on this model is that the Brewers typologies also worked according to DRA. Once an analyst accepts that the club did not have a True Ace or True Number One starter, the threshold for assessing DRA is lowered significantly. Witness Chacin, for example, who was assessed against DRA that were significantly better than 4.00 on the first two models; his DRA performance looks much better on the final model, because once you stop comparing him to Aces, the comparison becomes more realistic. The Brewers deep organization also performs very well against median DRA requirements on this model, which raises a question about which model’s expectations one should use going forward.

The last remaining criticism for fans and analysts rests on how one interprets Deserved Run Average results for the Brewers rotation. On any model one chooses, be it based on Games Started, Team Rotational Turns and Scarcity, or Actual Runs Prevented performance, the Brewers’ rotation was good in 2018. Now it is worth digging through these models during the offseason, in order to gain important lessons for Corbin Burnes, Woodruff, and Peralta during their potential first full workloads in 2019, and even for reworking Jimmy Nelson. Milwaukee has proven the success that can come with aggressive rotational swings and an organizational pitching strategy, coupled with elite, efficient fielding.

An underrated 2018-2019 offseason would find David Stearns making moves to further improve the fielding (such as improving Right Field, and then working Christian Yelich primarily as a Left Fielder), which should in turn help boost the pitching depth strategy going forward. As it stands, the Brewers do not even need an external pitching move; this makes potential offseason moves even more interesting for speculation.

The argument is that these players faced an impending roster crunch, so I thought it was time for another big, unwieldy, speculative post on such a crunch. What does the Brewers’ crunch look like? Is there a roster crunch?

Brief Aside on the Rule 5 Draft:
The Rule 5 draft is ostensibly meant to serve as a labor institution that keeps MLB teams from hoarding minor league players without an equal shot at MLB roles with other teams; thus, after certain required time periods (based on when / how a player was acquired), the Brewers must protect minor league players on their 40-man roster or risk their exposure to the Rule 5 draft (which typically takes place at the end of each winter meetings). The gamble is that any team selecting a Rule 5 player must typically keep that player on their MLB roster, meaning that if the Brewers do not necessarily foresee an impact or serviceable MLB role for a minor leaguer, they can leverage that risk by not protecting the player for the Rule 5 draft. Recently, teams like the San Diego Padres have called teams’ bluffs by selecting low-minors players, including the Brewers’ gamble with former Top Ten prospect RHP Miguel Diaz, eschewing the typical Triple-A / advanced minors depth player selected in the draft. The Brewers have multiple players spanning these types of gambles for 2019, ranging from low minors gambles like Carlos Herrera to advanced depth players like Bubba Derby or Quintin Torres-Costa.

Let’s start with a look at some of the best Rule 5 prospects available from the Brewers system. This list of eligible players is available thanks to the indispensable Brewerfan.net. The order is mine, based on how I might grade out the risk and potential future roles of these players:

First and foremost, if it matters, I would have slotted RHP Luis Ortiz first on this list, and he is also the most certain player of this group to appear on a 2019 Top 10 list due to one of the clearest potential impact roles of the bunch (even given his risk); LHP Kodi Medeiros would have slotted around Cody Ponce and Jake Gatewood; RHP Jon Perrin would have slotted around Herrera / Segovia / Torres-Costa. (For what it’s worth, among this group I would consider protecting Supak, Stokes, Gatewood, and Ponce).

This is a long way of saying that the Brewers arguably already traded away their best possible roles available in the Rule 5 draft for 2019, which is certainly one way to rid an organization of a potential roster crunch. As you can see looking at these prospects, there are fewer potential impact roles available, and notably fewer tough decisions for GM David Stearns. It is not clear who on this list is a player that would derail the organization if left unprotected. I’d love to sing the praises of Nathan Kirby or Devin Williams, but their respective injury histories and subsequent development raises significant questions to the point that I’m not sure how to form MLB roles; I’d place both in the Taylor Williams “it would be great if they came back and could be serviceable MLB relievers” role.

I am certain that other fans have potential Rule 5 picks that they like more than the prospects I listed, and I’m certain other folks would list these prospects in different orders. That is fine. What I want to stress is that if one actually lays out the potential roles of these players, it’s tough to see some crush of must-protect-impact-players that would cause a roster crunch worthy of trading away the (most likely) best roles from the group. Right now, it seems like Trey Supak, Quintin Torres-Costa, and Bubba Derby are players who could “play up” in Milwaukee’s current pitching system. But should all three be protected on the 40-man roster?

Thanks to recent moves, the Brewers also have a group of players with contract options for 2019, which is a good thing because the club has less than $70 million in agreements guaranteed thus far. In short: this is a team that could pick up some options and spend some cash at the MLB level, especially given the financial success of the rebuild.

Among this group, only Jordan Lyles would be a “roster crunch”-causing player. The Brewers could decline Lyles’s option in order to protect an additional player from the Rule 5 draft, or (obviously) make some other type of acquisition to bolster the club. For what it is worth, I would renew both Moustakas and Soria. Both are valuable veteran types who would help to boost a club that is now clearly within a contending window.

As I have covered throughout the year with the Daily Pythagorean record posting on @BPMilwaukee Twitter, the Brewers are averaging approximately 85-win outcomes throughout 2018 (based on their park-and-league-adjusted Runs Scored / Runs Allowed). Milwaukee is a team that is succeeding due to the uneven distribution of their bullpen and fielding success, meaning that elite relievers and extremely efficient fielding are bringing-up other aspects of the club. Additionally, there are park factor discrepancies between Baseball Prospectus and Baseball Reference such that if one follows Baseball Prospectus, the offense is much better than most fans and analysts observe (in terms of underlying elements). It’s simply the case that those underlying elements (prior to the trade deadline) still resulted in frightening frequent low-scoring games.

One benefit of the Brewers #TeamDepth attitude is that the roster is built with numerous cost-controlled players who seemingly look replaceable on paper. And thus, considering Milwaukee’s potential arbitration-eligible players and free agents is the most interesting area of the so-called roster crunch. Here I’ve attempted to rank players roughly by role:

Looking at these players, it is first and foremost clear that there is a discrepancy between Wins Above Replacement Player statistics (based on underlying stats) and the distributional strengths of the club in terms of Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. Thus, seemingly replaceable players like Junior Guerra, Wade Miley, Hernan Perez, and Dan Jennings thrive in Milwaukee’s system. This is a good thing, and perhaps some of the reason for this current roster-crunch talk is that the Brewers are loaded with a group of players that are not great but certainly cannot be discarded.

Yet, even with this caveat, nearly half of these players could be replaced in 2019. Some of these difficult decisions could follow injuries (such as Stephen Vogt), or an “end-of-the-line” in terms of MLB role in Milwaukee (see Nick Franklin, Keon Broxton, or Tyler Saladino). One could conceivably slice this group of pending transactions in numerous ways.

Coupled with yet another group of players ranging from Marcos Diplan to Matt Albers and Ariel Hernandez, Alec Asher and Aaron Wilkerson, there appears to be significant wiggle room on the 40-man roster. Thus, one ought to return to the deadline trades and reassess the acquisition cost and trade strategy used by Stearns; this is not to say that the trades were bad across the board, but rather that the allocation of resources to pick up these players is worth questioning. It is not clear that a pending Rule 5 roster crunch was so severe to necessitate steep costs where those costs involved Rule 5 players. Given this, one can turn back to the MLB acquisitions returned in the trades, and assess those roles for the contending stretch.

It is fun to be in a position to assess a club’s moves solely on a contending basis, but when the long-term picture is also invoked, it must be invoked carefully: in the case of the 2019 Brewers, the roster crunch storyline does not appear to add up. Stearns had, and continues to have, far too many 2019 options for clearing roster space to have traded Ortiz, Medeiros, and Perrin solely for those reasons. Thus, it is more interesting to suggest that Stearns was flipping potential long-term assets for controllable MLB players (in the case of Schoop, Soria, and Moustakas), or potentially clearing roster space for additional acquisitions during the 2018-2019 offseason. With (easily) more than $60 million to spend and a once in a lifetime free agency class, that latter point serves as an even more interesting roster motivation for clearing away Rule 5 protections.