Our Milwaukee Brewers sent eight representatives to the Fall League to suit up for Peoria (and later, a ninth player headed down to pitch for Mesa) so let’s take a moment to recap how well those players performed in the so-called “prospect finishing school.”

LHP Daniel Brown

Brown, a fastball-slider lefty who works in the low-to-mid-90s, enjoyed an excellent AFL. In nine appearances he covered 12.0 innings, allowing only eight hits, four walks, and a 3.00 Earned Run Average (ERA). Deserved Run Average thought his performance was nearly perfect; his DRA came in at 0.12 for a DRA- of 2.5! (DRA- measures DRA in league context, with 100 as average and the lower the number, the better).

RHP Bowdien Derby

The Javelinas used Derby as a starter in the AFL, and he toed the slab to begin seven games while logging 26.3 innings pitched. He did so with a modest 4.78 ERA, though DRA- (86) still assessed Derby as 14 percent better than the average pitcher on the circuit. Derby’s 18:9 strikeout:walk ratio wasn’t exactly inspiring, and we’ll see if the AFL performance that followed up a decent season as a swingman for Colorado Springs is enough to convince some team to pick him in this year’s Rule 5 Draft. Derby was left unprotected by the Brewers.

RHP Jon Olczak

Olczak turned in one of the most stellar campaigns of any reliever on the AFL circuit this year. He logged a 1.50 ERA across 12.0 innings, striking out 13 while allowing only eight hits and five walks. DRA- (45) valued his work as 55 percent better than his league-average cohorts. This comes after a terrific 73 DRA- in 56.3 innings for Double-A Biloxi during the regular season, and it wouldn’t come as a surprise to find out that the fastball/slider slinging Olczak (who sits 92-94 MPH) winds up generating plenty of Rule 5 interest in advance of next month’s draft.

RHP Miguel Sanchez

The 24 year old Sanchez put together a surprising pop-up season in 2018, advancing from Class A-Advanced all the way up to Triple-A before earning a shot at the Fall League. He continued to be effective in Arizona, posting a 3.60 ERA in 10.0 innings. He struck out eight while walking three, generating ground balls at a 65 percent rate. DRA- (74) saw his performance as well above average for the league.

RHP Aaron Wilkerson

After a truncated regular season split between Triple-A and the big leagues, the Brewers sent Wilkerson as a late addition to the AFL so that he could stretch back out in advance of pitching in winter ball in the Dominican Republic. Wilkerson joined the Mesa Solar Sox and appeared in three games, tossing four scoreless innings with three strikeouts and three walks.

C Mario Feliciano

Injuries limited Feliciano to just 46 games between the Arizona Rookie League and Class-A Advanced in 2018, so the Brewers assigned him to the Fall League to try and catch him up with some addition reps. It didn’t work out, though, as injuries unfortunately halted Feliciano’s progress once again. After only two games and six plate appearances (that included a hit and two walks), he was sidelined with discomfort in his throwing shoulder that led to arthroscopic surgery at the beginning of November. He should be ready to go again come next spring.

UTIL Weston Wilson

A jack-of-all-trades utility man, Wilson was highly impressive during the AFL campaign, batting .364 average /.462 on-base /.636 slugging percentage in 39 plate appearances for a True Average of .387. He clubbed a double, a triple, and two home runs, and even stole a pair of bases, too. A former 17th-round draft pick, more and more are coming around to the idea that the 24 year old Wilson has the ability to be a big leaguer after his terrific season between Class A-Advanced, Double-A, and the Arizona Fall League in 2018.

OF Trent Grisham

This former first-round pick, on the other hand, has plenty of people doubting that he’ll ever make it to The Show based on what he’s been showing lately (and really since being picked in 2015). Grisham’s passive approach has led to walks aplenty as a professional, but not much in the way of batting average of hard contact. Grisham hit .133/.304/.133 with 17 strikeouts in 57 AFL plate appearances, leading Mark Anderson of the BP Prospect Team to comment recently that “his comfort in the box and overall feel for hitting are seemingly non-existent at this point.”

2B Keston Hiura

Hiura is Milwaukee’s top prospect for good reason. Often described as a “hitting savant,” Hiura led the AFL in hits (31), RBI (33), and total bases (54). His five home runs were one off the league lead and his .934 OPS ranked sixth overall. Hiura’s overall slash was good enough for a .352 True Average, and he was so good so often that the BP Prospect Team seemed almost annoyed that they needed to keep writing about him. Hiura’s tremendous performance helped net not only the AFL Championship trophy, but earned him some well-deserved personal hardware, too.

#Brewers‘ hitting machine Keston Hiura is the 2018 @MLBazFallLeague MVP after hitting .323 with 5 homers and a league-leading 33 RBIs in 23 games. More from @wboor: https://t.co/Qbc6keDe54 pic.twitter.com/f47t6zO7fR

— MLB Pipeline (@MLBPipeline) November 17, 2018

The Brewers need starting pitching help. The Brewers need an ace.

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— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) July 31, 2018

Of course this would be the return line for the 2018-2019 offseason, because the line never went away during the season. A large faction of fans were dissatisfied with the starting pitching in April; they were satisfied with the starting pitching in May, “but can this staff beat ‘a dude’ in the playoffs?” (Yes!, it turns out); they were particularly dissatisfied with the starting pitching when the season ended in June and July, and again they were dissatisfied with the starting pitching at the trade deadline. This debate was simply never going to be won, because there is a contingent of baseball fans that refuse to either understand or accept what GM Stearns, pitching coach Derek Johnson, systemwide player development, and the front office are trying to accomplish. For arguably the first time in Brewers franchise history, certainly for the first time in a generation, the Milwaukee system strength is pitching, and not of the sort of high octane, all-risk dreamy profiles that flamed out at the turn of the 21st Century; this is a system that is built on turning a fabulous diversity of pitching profiles into potentially successful MLB profiles (witness the scouting range between Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes, for example).

When the dust settled, the system worked. The Brewers rotation was good. It was good any particular way you measured it; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on overall Games Started and workload measurements; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on true rotational scarcity (i.e., comparing each spot across the MLB); and it was a good rotation if you separate pitching classes into “true starters” and “replacements,” and measure each set of pitchers against different “spots” or “workloads.” The pitching staff was good if you believe in “Aces,” and it was good if you don’t believe Aces exist.

The Brewers rotation was good by every measurement except DRA, which should be the significant focal point of 2018-2019 offseason analysis in an effort to understand how Milwaukee assembled an elite fielding component in order to prevent runs.

If you do not wish to read the details, the table above summarizes the comparative results from each model. Each Brewers starter was assessed according to their relevant spot, and then compared by Innings Pitched (IP), Deserved Run Average (DRA), and Runs Prevented.

Rotation One: By Games Started
One way to assess a starting rotation is by ranking pitchers according to games started on a leaguewide basis. This ranking method is effective because it approximates the scarcity of both MLB resources (there’s not a whole lot of pitchers that can work full seasons) and roster construction. One benefit of focusing on games started instead of another performance metric is that analysts can reflect the success or failure of an MLB club across games started totals; for example, it matters that Gerrit Cole and Lucas Giolito both started 32 games despite widely divergent performances. The distance between Cole and Giolito is approximately 65 runs prevented, even though they worked the same number of starts, which raises an important question about how different teams assess the importance of effective starters versus soaking up innings. In fact, had Brent Suter and Zach Davies not faced injuries in 2018, they may have forced this question with the Brewers front office, and Freddy Peralta also arguably faced this (along with innings workload concerns) down the stretch run.

According to this measurement, there are approximately 10 rotation spots discernible by workload throughout the 2018 MLB, as well as emergency starters (who started one game; I will always assess emergency starters as their own category). On the surface, this is a pleasing model; the top starters by workload typically are the best starters in the game, even if there are differences between guys like Cole and Giolito, as discussed above.

On this model, it is clear that the Brewers succeeded because of their depth. A critique about the top of the rotation could be true in terms of DRA, as the contextual performances of Jhoulys Chacin and Chase Anderson were not comparable to top workload pitchers across the MLB. The importance of the depth should not be understated, from Wade Miley and Peralta to Brandon Woodruff and even Gio Gonzalez. If you’re reconsidering Gonzalez’s trade cost, not only should the veteran lefty’s surface performance be assessed, but one should not that, marginally, he was worth seven runs better than his median workload.

Another benefit of using this model is that analysts can assess “phantom” runs prevented where teams “miss” particular spots. For example, Chacin may not measure up to the median Top Spot prototype, but having his performance was better than not having a heavy workload pitcher whatsoever (in theory; Giolito’s performance would obviously have not validated a heavy workload benefit for the Brewers). If a team was missing a Top Spot, they theoretically would be punished 16-to-17 Runs Prevented. Milwaukee did not use a Five, Seven, Eight, or Ten workload, each of which approximately ranged from 2 to 4 runs below average; one could argue in this way that the Brewers also received 10 “phantom” Runs Prevented by avoiding these typical workloads.

This should help to validate the ideal that there are a couple of different ways to construct a rotation. A team could indeed bank on a Jacob deGrom type atop the rotation, and seek a 30 run advantage from their top workload. One must be careful of the cost for this type of pitcher, however, as if considerable resources are spent at the top of the rotation, they may be diminished at the bottom of the rotation. The Brewers demonstrated the “bottom-up” approach: they lost out on the Yu Darvish sweepstakes, and Alex Cobb did not bite on a one-year deal, so they proceeded with Chacin and Miley, plus their developmental pipeline. That internal pipeline was worth approximately five runs (better than their median workload) to the 2018 Brewers, while external candidates were worth more than 15 runs (better than their median workload). It was not flashy, there were no “dudes” on the marquee, but it worked.

Rotation Two: By Team

Of course, even the preceding model is relatively clean or “idealistic,” for MLB teams do not necessarily construct their rotations according to the same ideal. An additional method for assessing rotations is to judge each team’s rotation spot by turn; since two pitchers literally cannot start the same game, this method goes spot-by-spot, start-by-start for each MLB team. The benefit of this method of rotational assessment is that it reflects team preference, or injury and ineffectiveness circumstances, across the league. Some teams attempt to duct tape 13- or 14-pitcher rotations together, whether they are contending or tanking, while others attempt to yield more mileage from each spot. By giving each team one exclusive spot for each turn (until their pitchers run out), this type of rotational model can allow teams to be analyzed against attrition across the league.

Every team in the MLB required at least six rotational turns throughout the season, but this model demonstrates the divergence of team strategies one they hit six starters. Some teams preferred to give replacement starters two or three starts each, while others leaned on emergency starters.

The Brewers front office, coaching staff, and pitchers did a fantastic job weathering 162. They hit the right buttons in replacing some starters at certain points in time (such as resting Peralta down the stretch, or [arguably] “shuttling Woodruff between Triple-A and MLB), while giving starters room to breathe at others point in the season (this also applies to Peralta, who was given some time to adjust from rough starts, as well as Junior Guerra). By spitting on rotation spots 10 through 14, the Brewers also arguably saved 16 “phantom” runs, as the club would not have found effective pitchers (on average) digging that deep into league or organizational resources. (This line could be argued with further research, however, as one could note that someone like Corbin Burnes could have been effective in two starts, for example).

Rotation Three: By Type
During my time writing at Sportsbubbler (RIP) and Disciples of Uecker, I published annual starting pitching rotation rankings based on the decision point of 100 IP. If a pitcher worked 100 or more innings with 50 percent of their games as starts, they were a starting pitcher; if not, they were replacement depth. On this model, I attempted to assess pitchers according to Runs Prevented, with the ideal that (a) working a lot of innings should be worth more as a starter, and (b) rotation spots could be designated based on the resulting Runs Prevented rankings. I’m no longer certain of this method’s veracity, as I believe there are better ways to assess rotational scarcity and usage across the MLB. But, here we are, testing the Brewers 2018 rotation, so let’s assemble the pitchers.

Wouldn’t you know it, the 2018 MLB did not have many “true” rotation spots: there were only 129 pitchers across 30 teams that fit the first criterion listed above. This is not enough pitchers to fill a true five man rotation, and it’s hardly enough to fill a four man turn.

Yet, those Runs Prevented totals present some order to the universe. There are aces, even if there’s only a couple of them. There are nice middle of the rotation “dudes” that you can really sink your teeth into; 150 IP and 2 Runs Prevented feels like a solid effort for a team. Every contender would accept that workload (every MLB team would, for that matter).

Where there are not full-time starters, replacements are necessary, and MLB really dug deep in 2018: there were 227 replacement starters, including 57 Emergency Starters, across 30 MLB teams in 2018. Basically, on average, MLB teams were using more replacements than they were using regular starters. The Brewers are no different here, and in fact, that’s partially how they gained their value. Viewing the range of Runs Prevented across each of these roles should demonstrate the importance of having a solid organizational pitching strategy; replacement starters need not simply be the pitching equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall. Tampa Bay demonstrated this with their genius “Opener” strategy, and they produced one of the elite Runs Prevented units in baseball. The Brewers accomplished their success by using long-term replacements like Miley and Peralta, but they also received value elsewhere across their high-floor organizational depth.

If you previously thought the idea of “Phantom Runs Prevented” by not using a rotation spot was a suspect idea, this seems to be your chance to pounce on the Brewers for not using an “Ace” or true “Number One” starter. By this model, the Brewers were gutsy, punting nearly 63 runs prevented at the front end of the rotation. Yet, the club also did not use a true “Number Four” or full-time starter that should have been replaced, which bought the club another 43 runs prevented. All told, the Brewers rotation of regular starters lost the club approximately 19 runs here, thanks to their cavalier strategy.

Of course, the Brewers used every Replacement typology except a “true swingman,” and this is where the club torched the league. Gio Gonzalez and Wade Miley covered the lack of an “Ace” or “Number One” starter, and demonstrated the value in not having a Regular Four, either. Peralta, Dan Jennings (yes, Dan Jennings), and Woodruff gained significant Runs Prevented advantages in the replacement ranks as well. On top of these depth successes, the rotation was not bad overall; Suter and Guerra were close to true Number Three starters, and Anderson was close to a true Number Two starter. Chacin was better than a typical Number Two starter, boasting a Runs Prevented performance that almost placed him in a phantom “Number One” role for the club.

What is startling on this model is that the Brewers typologies also worked according to DRA. Once an analyst accepts that the club did not have a True Ace or True Number One starter, the threshold for assessing DRA is lowered significantly. Witness Chacin, for example, who was assessed against DRA that were significantly better than 4.00 on the first two models; his DRA performance looks much better on the final model, because once you stop comparing him to Aces, the comparison becomes more realistic. The Brewers deep organization also performs very well against median DRA requirements on this model, which raises a question about which model’s expectations one should use going forward.

The last remaining criticism for fans and analysts rests on how one interprets Deserved Run Average results for the Brewers rotation. On any model one chooses, be it based on Games Started, Team Rotational Turns and Scarcity, or Actual Runs Prevented performance, the Brewers’ rotation was good in 2018. Now it is worth digging through these models during the offseason, in order to gain important lessons for Corbin Burnes, Woodruff, and Peralta during their potential first full workloads in 2019, and even for reworking Jimmy Nelson. Milwaukee has proven the success that can come with aggressive rotational swings and an organizational pitching strategy, coupled with elite, efficient fielding.

An underrated 2018-2019 offseason would find David Stearns making moves to further improve the fielding (such as improving Right Field, and then working Christian Yelich primarily as a Left Fielder), which should in turn help boost the pitching depth strategy going forward. As it stands, the Brewers do not even need an external pitching move; this makes potential offseason moves even more interesting for speculation.

New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KBQ19VcMZ4g7oW1jkGiYwxCadqjw3rYXkqN200f4lHc/edit?usp=sharing

This is not even some “to-be-expected” regression, as even if one wishes to look at Deserved Runs Average (DRA) throughout the season as a “true” measure of the Brewers talent (which should be cautioned), the Brewers would have been expected to allow anywhere between 23 and 30 fewer second half runs than they actually have allowed.

This is unforeseen and catastrophic.

The blame can be spread around to everyone, from the post-forearm injury Junior Guerra (10 IP, 9 runs on July 24 & 29), injured reliever Matt Albers (1.7 IP, 10 R), former? closer Corey Knebel (9.3 IP, 8 R entering Sunday), and even rookie rotation depth Freddy Peralta (19 IP, 17 R since the break). Worse yet, there is a sense of adding insult to injury, as newly acquired Joakim Soria hit the disabled list promptly after surrendering a grand slam home run in a devastating loss to San Diego, and quietly effective Taylor Williams hit the disabled list with an elbow injury. While fans will feel less sympathy for Matt Albers, who had a couple of different bouts of ineffectiveness surrounded by separate disabled list stints, the veteran righty was crucial to early season success (25 IP, 4 R through the end of May) and each day his injury status and effectiveness is not answered is a day that manager Craig Counsell must carefully ration Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader with little back-up. The same goes for Williams, and now Soria; while Jacob Barnes was previously an impact reliever and boasts solid peripherals and a 2.99 Deserved Run Average (DRA), his runs prevention performance in 2018 has not been to the level of that injured trio, and now it’s Barnes, Corbin Burnes, and Jordan Lyles trying to nail down the quietly effective support roles.

It’s as simple as this: the Brewers’ bullpen has two truly fantastic options in Jeffress and Hader, and those options will be great regardless of their surrounding cast. For the purposes of contending, however, this duo is amplified when Stearns’s excellent depth picks (Albers, Williams, even Corbin Burnes), closer (Knebel), and additional acquisitions (Soria) are performing well. Jeffress and Hader cannot do it themselves.

Injuries have also trimmed the rotation, as Brent Suter’s torn elbow ligament and Zach Davies’s back ailments have limited the Brewers’ effective rotational depth. Using Baseball Reference Three Year Park factors, both Suter and Davies combined for 18 Runs Prevented over 273 innings in 2017, offering excellent middle and replacement rotation depth. That level of impact depth performance will not be matched by the duo in 2018. Additionally, even if one could have argued that the club might not have expected Jimmy Nelson to return from his shoulder injury in 2018, having that materialize as a likely injury-scenario reality in 2018 is quite another ballgame. Consider this as Freddy Peralta meets a likely innings limit, Chase Anderson continues an uneven season, and Brandon Woodruff finds himself without a rotational role: #TeamDepth is now basically #TeamNecessity in terms of rotation building.

There’s no need to state it any other way: as much as one would like to criticize the Brewers pitching staff, and GM David Stearns for his failure to build a staff, the club is now to the point where injuries are diminishing even his strongest moves. The Soria trade looms loudest here, as the Brewers grabbed a legitimate high leverage, veteran reliever at the trade deadline and did not get six innings from his right arm before he hit the DL with a groin injury; Albers and Williams could be fan whipping posts when they were ineffective, but the Albers free agency deal looked like a brilliant low-cost gamble early in the season while Williams seemed poised to catapult himself into the high leverage workload discussion (Williams worked a 17.3 IP, 5 R stretch, Holding three leads, from June until the All Star Break).

Citing injuries to the pitching staff is not an “excuse” for the poor performance.

It would have been enough to deal with this group of recent injuries and setbacks, but the Brewers also simultaneously were gifted with a set of role reversions on the pitching staff. Corey Knebel’s descent from excellent closer in 2017 cost the Brewers a chance at a truly elite relief corps; according to Baseball Reference Three Year Park Factors, Knebel prevented nearly 25 runs in 2017. Even a 50 percent regression from that performance level would fit nicely with Jeffress and Hader, who have both been consistent Top 25 pitchers in the 2018 MLB. Add in the aforementioned struggles of Peralta, Barnes, and a bit of stalled usage from the shuttled Houser (he’s only worked two MLB appearances from July onward), and Counsell’s strategic options are looking much more thin while they are also being exasperated by some ineffective starts.

Beyond these role question marks, it is worth questioning the timing of the inclusion of Jorge Lopez in the Mike Moustakas trade. Since Lopez has served the season as an up-and-down member of the Triple-A / MLB “shuttle team” relief squad, discussions of the quality of Lopez’s performance were largely nonexistent at the trade deadline (I’m also guilty of this charge). But, it is worth emphasizing that as a back-roster depth strategy, the “shuttle team” prevented runs at a solid clip, especially when one considers the nature of this replacement role and the likely quality of other replacement pitchers to be acquired in their place.

In fact, these shuttle relievers combined to produce near-average aggregate performance for the Brewers, which leads one to question why Stearns traded Lopez and simultaneously decided to keep Brandon Woodruff at the Triple-A level to serve as replacement starting pitching depth. With Lopez in the Royals system and Woodruff now serving as starting pitching depth, the revolving door relief strategy is effectively dead at what could be the worst time of the season. Given that Woodruff boats a 3.55 DRA at the MLB level to accompany a 52 percent ground ball rate, while also demonstrating an average DRA at Colorado Springs with a consistent ground ball rate there, it is worth questioning why Stearns has not simply replaced Peralta with Woodruff (on the one hand) or simply promoted Woodruff to a steady MLB relief role (on the other hand). According to Brooks Baseball, the relief role is agreeing with Woodruff, who is throwing a sizzling 95-to-96 MPH fastball with more armside run than his 2017 variation, complete with steady change up and slider usage (both with more whiffs than in 2017, too).

This is not a bottomless pit (yet). That the Brewers remain the 12th best pitching staff in the MLB, within one standard deviation of the 10th spot, and sixth best pitching staff in the National League, should demonstrate just how good the club has been for most of the year. Indeed, this pitching staff has fallen off, and it’s important to underscore that it’s not simply “regression,” but a bad combination of regression, injuries, and strategic missteps at the worst possible time. But there could be a quick way out of this issue for the club:

• Get Zach Davies healthy, without any further setbacks, and use him to replace Freddy Peralta in the rotation.

• Develop an MLB role for Brandon Woodruff; preferably this would be a rotational role to spell another ineffective starter down the stretch (or add a sixth man for September), but even a well-defined one-inning bullpen role could be extremely helpful at the moment.

• Re-evaluate depth roles for Ariel Hernandez, Jordan Lyles, Alec Asher, and Aaron Wilkerson, and make any necessary waiver trades to boost the pitching staff. E.g., is Jordan Lyles the right arm to work in the shadow of the successful Triple-A shuttle crew? Is now the best time to make a potential long-term development play for Ariel Hernandez?

• Reconsider Adrian Houser’s shuttle role in favor of a regular one-inning role.

With the assumption that some combination of Soria, Albers, and Williams can get healthy for the stretch run, and that some of the “role regression” pitchers can make adjustments at the MLB level once again, this is a pitching staff that can improve quickly and regain its flexible frontier of roles and runs prevention that were celebrated in April and May. With Zach Davies healthy, a waiver trade acquisition (or two), and potentially prominent roles for two righties that can rush it up there (Woodruff and Houser), this pitching staff can rebound. Now we wait and watch.

Stepping into speculative histories of MLB players, I’ve been thinking about what I’d expect from players like Burnes or Peralta if they reached the MLB in 2018. Both pitchers provide extreme challenges to the observer, and for different reasons.

• Burnes provides a challenge because the righty’s quick ascent to the advanced minors has out-paced the non-proprietary information available about the pitcher, which manifested itself during the 2017 season in the form of widely varying fastball, slider, and delivery reports. From early in the season, when on-the-ground reports placed Burnes as a potentially high reliever-risk profile who could make it work as a middle rotation starter, to late in the season when delivery adjustments and improved fastball reports began leaking out, fans and analysts were essentially given several different pitchers’ worth of information. Entering 2018, then, it’s worth asking whether Burnes is the fastball / slider reliever with middle rotation question marks, the middle rotation arm who could decrease reliever risk by continuing to refine his delivery, or the surging pitching prospect who simply continues to redefine roles by refining mechanics and therefore allowing his stuff to take the next step. All of this can happen with Burnes, or none of it; thus the righty prospect is an acute example of information asymmetry.

• Peralta faces different questions about his stuff and profile, especially due to his diminished stature (compared to Burnes) and his pitching approach (he’s not quite a command-and-deception guy, but he twists and turns his fastballs in order to help his stuff “play up”). In one sense, Peralta is much more conventional than Burnes, insofar as Peralta will be lauded as “the small framed righty who proved everyone wrong” should his frame stick in a functional mid-rotation role. On the other hand, given the frame and lack of a strong fastball, it is worth questioning how Peralta’s arsenal and command will play as he advances in the system. The significance of the righty’s pitch sequencing and location will not be understated. It’s tough to say whether Peralta faces “reliever risk” in the same sense Burnes does, as Peralta’s top role is even murkier than his Advanced Minors teammate.

So, if Burnes and Peralta reach the MLB in 2018, what will their potential roles be? What performance levels might fans expect? With Counsell looking at both pitchers as potential midseason reinforcements for the staff, it is worth digging into potential production expectations.

Role risk will be nothing new to the 2018 Brewers; role risk is all over the roster, even beyond the rookie class. But, in attempting to form expectations about Burnes and Peralta, I turned to other rookie pitchers that are on the MLB roster or in Spring Training camp as non-roster invitees. By my count, these rookies comprise (in order of height) Peralta, Taylor Williams, Marcos Diplan, Jorge Lopez, Aaron Wilkerson, Erik Davis, Burnes, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Brandon Woodruff, Tyler Webb, and Jon Perrin.

• Several of these arms are already established as MLB relievers or very likely to have relief roles in 2018 (see Williams, Lopez, Davis, Houser, and Webb).

• A few of these arms are organizational depth with questionable futures in terms of organizational plans (see Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Davis, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Finally, there’s a deep group of potential rotation depth, in terms of starters who could work as rotational replacements or MLB emergency starters in 2018 (Peralta, Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Burnes, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Woodruff is likely the only pitcher here who is a rotational lock in 2018 (and even writing that leads me to raise some questions, as “There is no such thing as a pitching prospect,” there is no such thing as a surefire pitching role).

Available PECOTA projections (March 2, 2018) for 2018 Brewers rookies (Erik Davis and Jon Perrin projections unavailable). This table features IP projections, as well as Runs Allowed and Runs Prevented figures drawn from projected Deserved Runs Average. Runs Prevented figures are drawn from an average of the 2016-2017 Miller Park / National League. PECOTA strike outs, walks, and WARP are also featured.

With these dozen pitchers, I’ve already laid out extensive role risk simply by categorizing these arms. So, in order to form potential expectations for 2018, I turned to speculative history: namely, how many pitchers in the MLB expansion era matched these arms’ precise height, weight range, handedness, and age as rookies? That is to ask, if these pitchers reach the MLB as rookies in 2018 (e.g., their precise 2018 age), how does their physical profile fare (e.g., their handedness, height, and weight?).

To answer this question, and engage in this speculative exercise, I used the indispensable (and highly recommended) Baseball Reference Play Index to search comparable expansion era players. I searched the expansion era because it is a largely integrated era that also includes a relatively similar form of baseball over the decades in terms of pitching arsenals or prototypes (it tracks the diminishing knuckleball, rise of the splitter / forkball, rise of the fastball / slider profile, etc.). Additionally, as I attempted to search other time frames, I found the reasoning to be rather arbitrary (e.g., if I search the Wild Card Era, should I simply search the Contemporary PED era? If I only search the expanded Wild Card Era (2012-present) will I have a large enough group of players to analyze? And so on).

Using the expansion era, here are the search results from Baseball Reference Play Index. For each player, I searched exact height, handedness, age, and rookie status, while also searching a five percent range in weight (there are some issues with using listed weight). The “Comps” column shows the number of historical rookie comparisons for each potential 2018 Brewers rookie.

This table shows the basic summary of the searches that I conducted using the Play Index tool. What immediately surprised me was the lack of comparisons for some players (like Peralta, Diplan, and Webb), and the large number of comparisons available for “prototypical” starting pitching frames (particularly Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff). Alternately, for a supposedly “old” prospect, the number of comparisons available for Perrin also surprised me, which suggests to me that there has been a path in MLB history for righties of his size and draft pedigree to reach the MLB, even if it takes a while.

Meandering through the comparisons, there are simply some fun and interesting names that appear.

• 2018 rookie Jon Perrin would reach the MLB at the same time as 2012 rookie Yu Darvish, who shares Perrin’s handedness, age, height, and basic weight range; among older comps, Doug Brocail and Todd Worrell are my favorites for Perrin.

• A few names jump off of 2018 rookie Brandon Woodruff’s spreadsheet, like Corey Kluber (!), Ryan Vogelsong, and (of course), Tim Worrell.

• Corbin Burnes has Michael Fulmer and Steve Bedrosian, Houser has Kevin Quackenbush, while Neftali Feliz and Shelby Miller belong to Luis Ortiz. Fulmer is a fascinating comp for Burnes not because of his excellent MLB performance, but because he shared Burnes’s information asymmetry in terms of advanced minors scouting roles and MLB adjustments to exceed expectations. Feliz and Miller are interesting comps for Ortiz, for as the righty faces questions about innings workload and relief risk, it’s good to remember that successful arms have also shared the righty’s frame, height, and age as rookies.

• The lone comps for Diplan and Peralta? Peralta matches 2000 rookie Byung-Hyun Kim (!), while Diplan matches 1965 rookie Dick Selma.

• Obviously, there is a world of gray area here, as these comparisons say nothing about a player’s draft or international development status, stuff, place in the minor league system, etc. Moreover, for my search, I did not use these comparisons to create trends or aging curves, so what I am attempting should not be read alongside the (much more methodologically sound) PECOTA system.

From these searches, a batch of 257 rookie comparison seasons resulted. In order to analyze potential performance markers in environments comparable to the 2016-2017 MLB, I indexed each season according to Runs Allowed per Game (RA/G), and sampled post-Strike rookies that played during a season with a run environment within 5 percent of the 2017 RA/G. This analysis produced a sample of 85 rookie comparison seasons. The following table shows the basic production range for this 85 rookie population:

For this analysis, I focused on Innings Pitched and basic league-level Runs Prevented (I did not investigate historical park factors for this analysis). To compensate for the lack of park factors, I produced a range of runs prevented estimates. Overall, this group of pitchers did not average high innings pitched totals (presumably due to their rookie status, in many cases), with the average pitcher in this sample working nearly 39.0 innings.

This sample can be further categorized to focus on each specific Brewers rookie’s physical profile. In the next table, a range of runs prevented (RnPrv, LowRnPrv, and HighRnPrv) accompany Innings Pitched and Runs averages and standard deviation (IP, IP_StDev; Rn, Rn_StDev).

This table undoubtedly demonstrates a wide range of potentialities for these Brewers rookie pitchers. The innings pitched variance alone suggests that these players could range anywhere from “Did Not Play” to 70-to-80 IP seasons. It’s easy to get excited about some of these results; for example, 75 innings pitched and five runs prevented from Corbin Burnes, or 56.3 IP and six runs prevented from Taylor Williams would represent excellent rotational and bullpen support for Milwaukee.

Yet, the basic averages might provide some hint as to why the Brewers front office has remained quiet on the pitching free agency market thus far: even averaging around 35 innings and providing moderate runs prevented totals, this group of pitchers has a physical pedigree that suggests competent replacement depth can come from rookie ranks. Of course, it is impossible to fully extrapolate from these historical rookie comparisons to the Brewers 2018 pitching staff; this is not a correlative relationship. Yet, through this speculative historical analysis, one can find that Milwaukee has some solid physical characteristics with plenty of historical counterparts (especially Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff); there are also some nearly one-of-a-kind profiles (see Diplan, Peralta, and Webb). Ultimately, these dozen rookies present Milwaukee’s front office and field management with an array of options to collect outs and prevent runs, even if they’re a group of wide-ranging replacements.

Baseball Prospectus. 2018 PECOTA (March 2, 2018) [CSV]. Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Prospectus. “More PECOTA” (Player Cards). Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Sports Reference, LLC., Sports Reference LLC, 2000-2018. Searches conducted March 3, 2018 from baseball-reference.com.

Domingo Santana went 5-9, including a home run, during Friday and Saturday’s games before sitting out the season finale on Sunday. Those two games represented a fitting closing kick as Santana was arguably the team’s best hitter in September, and the performance constituted a true breakout performance in his first full season in MLB.

Santana set a new career high in TAv with .306, while improving his plate discipline with career highs in walk rate (12 percent) and strikeout rate (29.3 percent). Normally when one sees numbers like that, there are obvious swing holes which are papered over or a hitter tightens up his approach. However, Santana swung more than ever this season. His swing rate jumped to 46 percent, up from 41 percent in 2016. It didn’t matter whether the pitch was a strike (zone swing rate 68.64 percent from 62.26 percent in 2016) or a ball (out of zone swing rate up to 25 percent from 20.17 percent in 2016). Yet even with this increased swing rate, his swinging strike percentage only jumped from 30.85 percent to 32.27 percent.

Looking into his zone charts, there are some subtle shifts which explain the step forward at the plate. Coming into 2017, Santana at bats ended in a proportionately higher rate of pop ups, with this zone chart showing that many of those popups came in inside pitches that Santana should have been able to drive or lay off. This year, he significantly cut down on the pop ups, turning more of those pitches into fly balls and line drives. Santana actually ranked 7^th among all qualified hitters in pop up rate, showing his growth in this area. He also ranked 5^th in line drive rate among qualified hitters. Fewer pop ups, more fly balls, and more line drives is a good recipe for success. If Santana can maintain or even improve his performance in these areas, he’s going to be a star for years to come.

Aaron Wilkerson got the last start of the season and threw a perfect game through six innings, before letting up a pinch hit single to Jose Martinez. In total, Wilkerson pitched seven innings, allowing one run on two hits and no walks, while striking out five. It was Wilkerson’s second start for Milwaukee, and a chance to make up for his disaster ten days ago when Milwaukee was still in playoff contention.

Wilkerson pitched off his four seam fastball, throwing it for forty three of his eighty six pitches, reducing his rate from his other start this year. His average fastball velocity was down to 89.8 MPH, .5 MPH slower his speed in late September, perhaps the result of a career high in innings this season by a fairly significant margin.

While Wilkerson struck out about a batter an inning in Class-AA, he hasn’t shown swing and miss ability at the big league level yet. On Sunday he generated five whiffs on the fastball and one each on his changeup, slider and curveball, better results his performance against Pittsburgh, but his five strikeouts were more than in his other two MLB appearances combined. Part of the issue may be that he throws too much in the strike zone:

There’s not many pitches for batters to chase in that plot. Of course, his approach may have been tailored to his opponent. While he was facing the St. Louis Cardinals, he wasn’t actually facing a team most would recognize. After Randal Grichuk and Aledmys Diaz, the Cardinal with the most MLB plate appearances in 2017 was Luke Voit with 120. No one else had more than 100.

Going forward, Wilkerson pitched himself into the mix as an up and down guy for 2018. He should move up to Class-AAA and strong performances will keep him in line as a candidate to fill in as a sport starter or a long man in the bullpen. Unless his stuff moves a tick forward, which is unlikely for a player who just finished his age 28 season, he’ll never be a rotation regular, but Wilkerson can fill a key role as a player who could provide innings and competence when the team is short staffed. Those types of players can be the difference between the playoffs and going home early.

Up Next: One could make the argument that after your team’s season ends, you’ve reached the cold abyss of the offseason, with only rumors and player acquisitions to tide one over until the birds emerge from winter’s darkness and it’s time for spring training. However, baseball is fun and there are plenty of reasons to be excited about the playoffs, even without Milwaukee’s participation. Take joy in potential early round exits from the Cubs and Rockies! Root for a World Series drought to end! Regardless, enjoy the baseball and hope that the Brewers make the right moves so they’re participating next year.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

AAA Colorado Springs Sky Sox (80-57)

MVP: OF Brett Phillips

After a down year in AA last season, Phillips re-established himself as a promising outfield prospect this season with the Sky Sox. He finished fourth on the team in plate appearances despite a few stints in the big leagues, lead the club in home runs, and was second in RBI. He struck out more than one would like to see (29.9 percent) but posted a solid 10.4 percent walk rate and Phillips seems to have truly settled in as an above-average defender in center field.

432 PA || .305/.377/.567 || 19 HR || 9 SB || .295 TAv

Pitcher: RHP Taylor Jungmann

Not too long ago, it looked like Jungmann might become a fixture in Milwaukee’s rotation. He was awful last season in the majors and minors, but bounced back with a terrific performance in Colorado Springs in 2017. Jungmann spent some time with both the big league club and the AA Shuckers, but made 17 appearances and tossed 90.3 innings for the Sky Sox this season. In that time he posted a 2.59 ERA, the lowest earned run average a Sky Sox pitcher has authored in that many innings this century. A DRA- of 78 agrees that Jungmann was much better than the league-average pitcher, but that still wasn’t enough to merit a September call-up, casting some doubt on Taylor’s future with the organization.

90.3 IP || 2.59 ERA || 4.04 DRA || 82 K || 39 BB || 4 HR || 1.20 WHIP || 48% GB

AA Biloxi Shuckers (71-66)

MVP: C Jacob Nottingham

Biloxi is a tough venue for hitters, evidenced by the fact that only two Shuckers received more than 300 plate appearances and posted above a .700 OPS. Jacob Nottingham was not one of those players, compiling a .695 OPS with 9 homers and 48 RBI across 101 games. That was still good enough for a slightly above-average TAv, but most important for Nottingham’s value this season were the steps forward he took behind the plate. He graded out with +7.1 framing runs, caught 40% of would-be base thieves, and sliced his passed balls by more than 50% from last season. It’s looking more and more like Nottingham will be able to stay behind the plate, now the bat just has to start coming along a little bit more.

385 PA || .209/.326/.369 || 9 HR || 7 SB || .263 TAv

Pitcher: RHP Aaron Wilkerson

When you’re a 28 year old minor league veteran, it can get tough to convince and organization that you still deserve a shot at the big leagues. Aaron Wilkerson was able to do just that with an outstanding showing for the Shuckers this year. He started 24 games and tossed 142.3 innings, both tops on the club. He struck out more than a batter per inning while demonstrating his signature control, ultimately earning his first call-up to the MLB this September. Now that Wilkerson has broken through on to the 40 man and into The Show, he could compete for a starting rotation slot or spot in the bullpen as a swingman next spring.

142.3 IP || 3.16 ERA || 2.32 DRA || 143 K || 36 BB || 12 HR || 1.07 WHIP || 37% GB

High-A Carolina Mudcats (73-65)

MVP: OF Troy Stokes

In an organization crowded with outfield talent, Stokes finally managed to stay healthy and stand out this season. The 2014 4th-rounder played in 100 games for Carolina and lead the team in OPS, was 2nd in home runs and runs batted in, and fourth in stolen bases. A diminutive specimen, Stokes has demonstrated plus speed to go along with above-average power, and finished out the season with a strong 35 game run in AA Biloxi. He’s certainly put himself on the front office’s radar with his performance in 2017.

426 PA || .250/.344/.445 || 14 HR || 21 SB || .279 TAv

Related Reading:
Stoked for Carolina

Pitcher: RHP Jordan Yamamoto

Corbin Burnes (who was the org’s minor league pitcher of the year) and Freddy Peralta both had excellent partial seasons with Carolina, but we’ll give the nod here to Yamamoto for spending all year with the Mudcats. The 21 year old Hawaiian captured the league’s ERA title after finishing with 14.0 consecutive shutout innings, struck out better than a batter per inning and didn’t allow many walks. He throws four pitches and generally locates well, and there’s a possibility that the former 12th round pick can be a back-end starter at the big league level.

111.0 IP || 2.51 ERA || 2.80 DRA || 113 K || 30 BB || 8 HR || 1.09 WHIP || 40% GB

A Wisconsin Timber Rattlers (59-79)

MVP: OF Monte Harrison

Wisconsin was the worst offensive team in the Midwest League this season, so there’s not a whole lot of strong performers to choose from. We’ll give the nod to Monte Harrison, who only spent a half season with the T-Rats but was an offensive dynamo for Wisconsin before getting a mid-season promotion. Finally healthy, Harrison flashed the power/speed potential that made him such a tantalizing draft prospect back in 2014. He looked good in center field, too. It’s tough not to buy in when he’s praised a 2018 Breakout Candidate with tools that rival that of Lewis Brinson’s.

261 PA || .265/.359/.475 || 11 HR || 11 SB || .307 TAv

Pitcher: RHP Thomas Jankins

Within the organization only Corbin Burnes and Aaron Wilkerson tossed more innings than Jankins’ 141.7 for Wisconsin this season, and he certainly made them quality ones. A 13th-round pick in 2016, Jankins was considered a “projectable” pick by Baseball America due to his lack of exposure to high-end coaching. It seems he’s now thriving in Milwaukee’s ranks, utilizing a three-pitch mix to attack batters and generate ground balls. He has a starter’s build and repertoire and is certainly someone to keep an eye on going forward.

141.7 IP || 3.62 ERA || 2.53 DRA || 121 K || 32 BB || 14 HR || 1.22 WHIP || 55% GB

Related reading:
Meet Thomas Jankins

Rookie Helena Brewers (28-48)

MVP: 1B/3B/OF Gabriel Garcia

A 14th-round pick by the Brewers in the 2016 draft, Garcia has done nothing but hit since joining the professional ranks. The 19 year old lead the Brewers in plate appearances this season, had the most doubles, the third-most long balls, second-most RBI, and second-best OPS among batters with at least 200 PA. Drafted as a catcher, Garcia played mostly first base this year but also made over a dozen starts at third and a few appearances in the outfield. It will be interesting to see how well his offensive performances translate to full-season ball next year.

285 PA || 300/.420/.498 || 9 HR || 6 SB || .296 TAv

Pitcher: RHP Gabe Friese

Friese was an passed over in this summer’s draft and signed with Milwaukee as a free agent. After tossing 20.1 innings in Maryvale without allowing an earned run, Friese was bumped up to Helena to finish out the summer. In a league that is notoriously hitter-friendly, the results remained strong for Friese. In 33.0 innings for the Brewers, Friese yielded a 3.82 ERA and 4.24 DRA. For some context, that translates to a DRA- of 63, or 37 percent better than the average Pioneer League pitcher. As a 22 year old who was a bit old for the level, it’s tough to know what we should expect from Friese going forward. If his 0.8 BB/9 rate can continue, though, he’s likely to keep finding success as he climbs the minor league ladder.

33.0 IP || 3.82 ERA || 4.24 DRA || 26 K || 3 BB || 4 HR || 1.27 WHIP || 50% GB

Rookie Arizona Brewers (33-23)

MVP: 1B/OF Pat McInerney

Passed over after his senior season at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, McInerny signed with Milwaukee following the draft and was assigned to the AZL, where he was more than two years older than the average player. McInerney took advantage of the inferior competition. He finished second on the club with 230 PA, tied for the league lead in home runs, took the fourth-most walks, and had the league’s 8th-best OPS. He showed some versatility, too, playing both left and right field in addition to first base. He did strike out 65 times in 50 games, though. McInerney could be a guy that sticks around the org for awhile, but given his advanced age he’ll have to show an awful lot if he hopes to ever reach the big leagues.

230 PA || .243/.378/.487 || 9 HR || 8 SB || .288 TAv

Pitcher: RHP Joaquin De La Cruz

De La Cruz began the season in the Dominican Summer League, but after our starts got his first stateside promotion to Arizona. He wound up tossing the third-most innings on the club while posting the league’s fifth-lowest ERA and the eighth-best strikeout rate (minimum 40 IP). De La Cruz doesn’t throw especially hard, but does feature a splitter, which is the organization’s favorite pitch. He’s got a long ways to climb before reaching the big league level, but at the very least his statistics appear promising.

42.7 IP || 2.53 ERA || 3.10 DRA || 46 K || 20 BB || 0 HR || 1.20 WHIP || 56% GB

Related Reading:
Joaquin De La Cruz and Second Chances

Dominican Summer League (Brewers 28-43, Indians/Brewers 23-47)

MVP: 1B/3B Aaron Familia

18 year old Familia signed with Milwaukee last summer and completed his second season in the DSL in 2017. Only two players in the DSL hit more home runs than Familia this summer, and he had the 13th-best OPS among qualifiers. At 6’2″ and 170 lbs, Familia still has plenty of filling out to do and could add to his raw power potential. He could make the jump stateside next season, though hopefully his swing-and-miss tendencies (70 strikeouts) will improve as he climbs the minor league ladder.

237 PA || .289/.422/.455 || 5 HR || 3 SB || .318 TAv

Pitcher: RHP Freisis Adames

Adames got a bit of a late start to his career in comparison to others in the DSL, not signing until last year at 19. As such he was a bit old for the league this summer, and he was one of the top hurlers on the circuit. Adames worked the league’s fourth-most innings, finished second in strikeouts, and even tossed a complete game shutout. His ERA was about a half-run lower than league average, but a DRA- of 41 suggests that Adames’ performance was a whopping 59 percent better than the typical DSL arm in 2017. Hopefully he too will get the opportunity to make the jump stateside next season, where it will be easier for scouts to give us a clue about what sort of stuff Adames is working with.

74.7 IP || 3.13 ERA || 1.98 DRA || 80 K || 21 BB || 1 HR || 1.12 WHIP || 59% GB

Photo Credit: Charles LeClaire, USAToday Sports Images

First, the Brewers struck gold by betting on 31-year-old Junior Guerra, as has been well documented. The acquisition of Guerra showed David Stearns and company weren’t afraid to bet against the age curve. The Brewers front office once again bet against the age curve in the Aaron Hill trade by acquiring 27-year-old right-handed pitcher Aaron Wilkerson. The almost ‘post-peak’ starting pitcher was the main haul in the trade that included 20-year-old second basemen Wendell Rijo, who doesn’t project to be much of a prospect. The Brewers gave up a decent asset in Hill in order to acquire a player that no one would call a prospect and many would just write off because of his age.

Rather than bind themselves into acquiring ‘real’ prospects, Milwaukee took on a little more risk in acquiring a player of Wilkerson’s age. The Red Sox saw Wilkerson as expendable mostly in part because of his age. If a 22-year-old was putting up the numbers Wilkerson put up in AAA Pawtucket, he would be one of the best prospects in baseball. The 2017 season will be the age-28 season for Wilkerson. He has yet to throw a major league pitch and most likely, considering his skill set and age, won’t be a part of the next winning Brewers team. These are still the types of deals winning franchises make.

Aaron Wilkerson has an incredible story that even further under-rated his value. He was signed by Boston out of the independent leagues, where he was once traded four times in one season, two years ago. He was a dominant NAIA pitcher. He had Tommy John surgery in 2011, after which he left baseball in order to work in a grocery store. All of this adds up to a breathtaking story, but it is easy to see why teams would remain skeptical of a player like Wilkerson. Despite all of obstacles and difficulties, he has been dominant over his minor league career.

The NAIA product has excelled at every level. In his debut 2014 season, he posted a 1.62 ERA and a 2.84 FIP over 50 innings in Low-A. He started the 2015 season in single-a but after 12 starts and five relief appearances in which he posted a 1.97 FIP and struck out 9.7 per nine innings, he quickly moved up to double-a. Wilkerson carried this success into the 2016 season. He posted a 2.44 ERA and 1.36 DRA over 48 innings in triple-a Pawtucket before being traded to the Brewers. He had a PPF well over 100 in every stint in the Red Sox organization. If these numbers were slapped on the profile of any 23-year-old pitcher in baseball, they would be a top 10 prospect, regardless of repertoire.

The 27-year-old has lost credit for the success he has had in just over two years of minor league ball simply because of how old he is. The Brewers front office took a look at the sparkling numbers Wilkerson put up and acquired him for a veteran infielder who is now struggling to find a job. They saw Wilkerson as a real prospect. He may not be able to contribute in the long-term, like I said earlier, he may not even be on the next winning Brewers team, but if he continues on the same trajectory he has shown over the past few years, he will be in the Brewers rotation in 2017. If everything works out perfect, he will be the 28-year-old version of Junior Guerra, which would have immense trade value with the demand for pitching these days. The Brewers have discovered a minor market inefficiency by looking past the blindspot when it comes to age curves.

The league leader in the MLB for CSAA was Zach Davies, with a 3.51 percent mark. As one can glean from the chart, several minor leaguers in Milwaukee’s system alone eclipsed that total last year. That likely has something to do with the quality of umpiring found at the minor league level versus in the big leagues, so the numbers should be taken with a bit of a grain of salt.

According to the numbers, several of the hurlers at Colorado Springs had difficulty commanding their pitches. Hard-throwing arms like Damien Magnifico and David Goforth have been in The Show before but failed to secure a role in spite of their plus fastballs. In both cases, the lack of a swing-and-miss pitch as well as poor command have held the two pitchers back from becoming big league contributors. Taylor Jungmann and Jorge Lopez were both demoted from Colorado Springs down to Biloxi after struggling mightily to keep hitters from reaching base and runs off the board, and both unsurprisingly graded out well-below average in CSAA while in AAA.

On the flip-side, both Brent Suter and Aaron Wilkerson enjoyed excellent seasons at the AAA level (though Wilkerson didn’t arrive in Colorado Springs until coming over in an early July trade with the Red Sox). Neither arm possesses outstanding “stuff”, especially the left-handed Suter, whose fastball tops out around 85 MPH. But both were able to post dominant Deserved Run Averages in a hitter-friendly ballpark at the highest level of the minors thanks in large part to their excellent command.

In the more pitcher-friendly environs of AA Biloxi, we find a bit more success for Milwaukee’s farmhands. Tristian Archer quietly put together an superlative performance for the Shuckers this past season on the strength of his excellent command, including an 82:9 K/BB ratio in 81.7 innings. Josh Hader also displayed above-average command during his dominant 57.0 inning run through the Southern League, though he backed up a bit upon reaching Colorado Springs while issuing 4.7 free passes per nine innings. Jorge Lopez and Taylor Jungmann both improved upon their dreadful CSAA numbers from Colorado Springs but were still a bit below-average command wise. Control of the strike zone has always been a question for those two and figures to be an issue that both will have to fight through if they want to see big league success. I was a bit suprised by Wei-Chung Wang’s numbers, as he only issued only a combined 2.4 BB/9 innings during his time at AA and AAA. He may have displayed decent control by keeping runners from reaching base via the walk, but his command graded out as below-average at both of his stops in 2016.

No pitcher in Milwaukee’s system improved their stock this year more than Brandon Woodruff. The former 11th-round pick had a middling collegiate career at Mississippi State and posted DRAs of 4.73 and 5.74 in the two years preceding 2016. His stuff ticked up this past season, including improved fastball velocity that was often 95+ MPH and a slider now graded as plus by some outlets. That, along with vastly improved command, helped Woodruff lead the minor leagues with 173 strikeouts in 158.0 combined innings between A+ and AA while allowing only 2.3 batters per nine innings to reach via base on balls. Woodruff posted sub-2.00 DRAs at both of the levels he pitched at this year on his way to winning the organization’s Minor League Pitcher of the Year. He’s now considered a top-10 organization prospect by many of the ranking outlets (though he didn’t crack BP’s Brewers top 10) and should have a good chance to make an impact on the major league team in 2017.

INF Aaron Hill and cash have been traded to Boston in exchange for RHP Aaron Wilkerson and 2B Wendell Rijo.

— #VoteBraun (@Brewers) July 7, 2016

Aaron Hill wasn’t technically a sign-and-flip player, but he essentially served that function for Slingin’ David Stearns and the Brewers after being brought in as a part of the Jean Segura/Tyler Wagner deal with Arizona. Coming off of sub par campaigns of .234 TAv and .241 TAv in 2014-15, the Diamondbacks were looking to shed as much of the $12 million final season of Hill’s contract as they could. Once Isan Diaz and Chase Anderson were added in to sweeten the pot, the Brewers agreed to take on Hill and pay $5.5 million of the money owed to him. He was installed as their regular third baseman to start the season, and the hope was that he’d play well enough to be able to flipped at the deadline.

Aaron didn’t disappoint. After a brutal first month that caused me to incorrectly call for his benching, Hill’s bat caught fire. Since May 1, Hill logged a torrid .323/.408/.481 slash line to bring his season total up to .283/.359/.421 along with eight home runs and four stolen bases. His .286 TAv is the highest he’s managed since 2013 and he’s been worth nearly two WARP already this year after combining for less than one WARP during the previous two seasons. Hill spent most of his time with the Brewers at the hot corner along with a fair amount of time at second base, which has been his primary position throughout his career. He’s received solid defense marks at both spots and will provide the Red Sox with some bench depth and versatility for a potential playoff run at a rather minuscule cost, depending on how much cash Milwaukee sends their way.

In exchange for Hill, the Brewers received a couple of interesting prospects. Aaron Wilkerson is the kind of story that you root for: the 27 year old right hander went undrafted out of NAIA Cumberland University after undergoing Tommy John following his senior season. He pitched for three different indy league teams during 2013-14 before hooking on with the Red Sox as a 25 year old and has done nothing but dominate his minor league competition since then. In 54 MiLB appearances covering 279.0 innings, Wilkerson has worked to a 2.52 ERA along with a 293:75 K/BB ratio. That includes a 2.44 ERA and 3.16 FIP in 48.0 innings in AAA this season, where he has struck out 54 batters against 11 walks.

The tools aren’t quite as dominant as the statistical profile suggests, however. According to Sox Prospects, the 6’3″ and 205 lb righty throws about a 50 grade fastball in the 88-92 MPH range, a 50 grade curve with 12-6 movement that sits 73-75 MPH, a 45ish changeup with good arm speed that sits 83-85, and an 82-84 MPH slider that is inconsistent and well behind his other pitches in terms of effectiveness. He doesn’t walk many guys and has excellent pitchability. An easy comparison would be to former Brewer Mike Fiers: another low velocity, high strikeout pitcher that’s on the older side. Wilkerson is most likely a back-end of the rotation type hurler at best, but given the fact that he was rumored to be on his way to Boston in the weeks before the trade came down, we can almost assuredly expect to see him pitching big league innings for the Brewers this season.

Wendell Rijo, the other piece of the deal, is the Brewers’ upside play here. A native of the Dominican Republic, Rijo signed with Boston as an international free agent back in 2012 and received a rather sizable $575,000 bonus. The 20 year old has displayed a good eye at the plate in the minor leagues, having walked in roughly 10 percent of his plate appearances while working to an overall .250/.329/.373 slash with 16 home runs and 50 steals across 333 contests. Once a plus runner, a torn ACL cost Rijo some of his speed and it’s closer to average now, though he’s still shown the ability to use his good instincts to swipe a bag. Rijo should develop an average hit tool with quick bat speed according to MLB Pipeline, though his limited arm strength pigeonholes him to second base defensively and he projects to have below average power.

The 20 year old right-handed hitter began the year in high-A but was quickly promoted to the AA Portland Sea Dogs, where he has looked over matched as one of the youngest players in the Eastern League. Rijo has struggled to a meager .186/.245/.266 slash (.195 TAv) through 51 games at the level. There’s certainly no rush with Wendell for the Brewers, so they’ll give him plenty of time and opportunity to allow him to hopefully develop into the “offensive-minded regular” that Pipeline suggests Rijo could become at the keystone, though a utility/fringe starter type of player is probably the more likely outcome here.

All in all, it’s tough not to like this trade for the Brewers. Aaron Hill looked like a corpse for two years in Arizona before his surprising age-34 renaissance with Milwaukee, so we really should be happy that the club was able to extract any sort of value from him. At the end of the day, receiving an MLB-ready back end starter and a possible fringe-regular middle infielder in exchange for an expiring contract is excellent work by Slingin’ Stearns, who has certainly wasted no time in putting his stamp on the franchise.

Turns out having one of the best all-around front offices in baseball is pretty fun.

— J.P. Breen (@JP_Breen) July 7, 2016