Missing from the changes, however, was any adjustment to the game’s antiquated waiver system, which has existed in its current form, more or less, for over a century. While this might not be optimal for baseball, for Brewers fans this is a blessing greater than the sum of the rest of the CBA combined.

Over the past year, David Stearns has been one of the most active general managers in all of baseball in dumpster diving the waiver wire.

While this hasn’t really paid dividends yet, it’s a good, risk-free strategy to maximize the talent on your 40-man roster. Though Milwaukee left several valuable pieces unprotected for December’s Rule 5 draft, and even lost young pitcher Miguel Diaz to San Diego via the Twins, it’s not as if David Stearns is letting the 40th spot on the roster go to waste. In fact, it is quite the opposite.

Fantasy baseball players reading this will need no introduction to the concepts of “stashing” and “streaming.” Neither one is a recent development in the game. “Stashing” refers to keeping a player with upside, but no real value in the present day, buried on your bench. “Streaming” is when you add a player you don’t intend to keep long-term, such as a starting pitcher on the day they start. Power-hitting outfielder Adam Walker is the latest example of Stearns’ shameless streaming strategy.

The Brewers claimed Milwaukee native Walker off of waivers from the Twins on November 18th. For two weeks, he remained on the team’s 40-man roster. Then, on December 2nd, the day after the new CBA failed to fix the waiver system, the Brewers waived Walker to clear out his roster spot. The Baltimore Orioles claimed Walker, ending his Brewers career before it began. But if they hadn’t, Milwaukee would have managed to successfully stash Walker in their minor-league system indefinitely. This is what the Twins tried to do two weeks prior and, somehow, they would have no claim to the player they’ve developed in their minor league system over the past four years.

If you’re marveling at how wildly unfair this system is, well, you’re not alone. But it doesn’t seem that fixing this is a priority for the players’ union at the moment, so the Brewers will continue to use it to their advantage.

Last year, Milwaukee found a small diamond in the rough through waiver trolling. They claimed reliever Jhan Marinez from the Rays in May, and worked out a trade for him after the claim. Marinez threw 58.7 innings for the club, pitching to a .267 True Average, 4.71 DRA, and 52 percent groundball rate. Marinez is a useful bullpen piece, utilizing a sinker and slider as his two primary pitches to induce ground balls and weak contact. One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. With Tyler Thornburg exported to Boston, Marinez could even emerge as a dark horse candidate to close for the 2017 Brewers. Originally, he was supposed to be a claim-and-designate candidate, but injuries in the bullpen around that time spared him from the chopping block long enough for him to establish himself. Marinez struck out 15 of 36 batters he faced in the month of May, and at that point it was pretty hard to justify sending him down.

Marinez was never sent down after the Brewers claimed him, but Rob Scahill was a true example of how streaming works. The Pirates designated him for assignment, opening him up to waivers, on July 3rd. Nine days later, the Brewers claimed him and optioned him to Colorado Springs. Later on, Scahill came up to Milwaukee for a late-season trial, where he would post a sterling 1.04 WHIP in 18.3 innings. In Scahill’s case, too, the Brewers managed to pilfer a player from the division rival Pirates at zero cost.

The way the system works, a player whose contract doesn’t have any minor league options remaining must clear waivers in order to be sent down from the Major League club. A club can also waive a player with options remaining, such as Walker. There are no rules governing how long the claiming team must keep a claimed player on the roster, however, and all it costs a team to do this is a reset of their place in the waivers order. If you’re trying to sneak claims right back down to the minors, this doesn’t faze you. You need a player to clear waivers through every other team anyways! And if you’re working under the assumption that waiver claims are basically low-odds lottery tickets that you can get for free, simple logic would follow that you want as many of them as you can.

For what it’s worth, the odds of finding anything more than marginally useful through this system isn’t great. But the Milwaukee farm system is already stocked with more than a few potential stars, meaning waivers is just a way to fill in the cracks free of charge. The 40th man on the 40-man roster is not a future superstar, and it could be argued that the most useful thing you can do with that spot is turn it into a tool with which to generate spare parts that cost nothing.

(1) Grading Thames
Several sources of projection have outlined expectations for Eric Thames in Milwaukee, so I’m not going to attempt to project Thames’s statistical performance in Milwaukee. Instead, I want to look at the opportunity cost of Thames, as well as the potential value from his scouting profile. Really, my analysis of both Thames and Thornburg will depend on your feelings of WARP; whether or not you believe that WARP adequately captured Chris Carter’s value to the Brewers is going to be a factor that impacts how you view the slugger’s surplus value, for instance (a similar issue will arise with Thornburg below).

In my last analysis, I estimated that in terms of contractual value and production, Carter was worth between $18 million and $25 million to the Brewers (the main focal point here is not to consider the fact that he may have cost between $8 million and $10 million in salary arbitration, but that the Brewers could release Carter without spending a dime [and they did just that], which frames his contractual value). The most interesting note on Thames is that the slugger has changed his approach and mechanics while working in the KBO, which places a different lens on his outburst in that league, and also changes his scouting outlook in the USA. Beyond the Box Score features a detailed look at Thames’s swing in the KBO, which shows some development from his MLB swing.

If one attempts to balance Thames’s winding career path with his recent KBO superstardom, a “punt” scouting grade of 45-50 may be in order for the age 30-33 first baseman’s contract. Yet, visions of Jose Bautista come to mind whenever someone says “late 20s mechanical adjustment,” as the Blue Jays’ iconic slugger was little more than a .239 / .324 / .398 slasher through 2008 when Toronto acquired him. The idea that a player can unleash his power after his prime development years is not implausible, and indeed some of those players become superstars (Edwin Encarnacion, Bautista’s teammate, is another example).

In 1,000 scenarios, imagine that Thames reaches 40 OFP 900 times ($1,800M), 50 OFP 80 times ($2,976M), 60 OFP 19 times ($1,452M), and Jose Bautista once ($218M): the Brewers still come out ahead, even if in 90 percent of scenarios Thames effectively busts (0.93 WARP over four seasons). Their total surplus, in this scenario, would be approximately $2.8M. So, the Thames contract is a wash at worst, and at best a fantastic opportunity to sign a foreign league superstar that was simply a late bloomer. Now the only question is if Thames ends up closer to the 0.1 percent odds of breaking out as an MLB superstar on the strength of his KBO adjustments.
Surplus Value: Approximately $2.8M if assumed 40 OFP in 90 percent of outcomes.

(2) Trading Thornburg
How does one grade the Thornburg trade? In my previous grading of current assets, Thornburg’s three-year performance weighed down his significant gains as a reliever. Boston obviously traded for Thornburg with the idea of building on his season as an excellent high leverage relief option, and whether or not Thornburg is a closer, there is a chance that he will provide excellent value to their roster if given the chance to prove himself in the late innings over another season. The best aspect for the big market Red Sox is that they now reserve arbitration rights for Thornburg for three seasons, meaning that there is plenty of time for Thornburg to move within different high leverage roles, struggle, iron out any issues, even weather an injury. In this case, a study of the McCann trade, which caused me to reconsider using depreciation-models to assess trade value, one would do well to assess Thornburg in the most robust manner, certainly weighing his 2016 improvements much more heavily than his previous struggles.

If anything, this comparison should show that it’s extremely difficult to simply assess a trade based on one single model, or one assumption. The Brewers could assume that Thornburg’s troubles would weigh heavier, and they wouldn’t necessarily be wrong; the Red Sox could buy high and have a robust model for Thornburg, and be equally correct. I dare say there will be no equilibrium found for this deal, between either club. The deal is an immediate victory for the contending Red Sox, who bolster their bullpen with a hard throwing up-and-coming reliever that offers three years of arbitration reserve; the deal is an immediate victory for the Brewers, who turned a struggling swingman-at-best into a lights-out reliever and then sold at the best possible moment (it can be argued that even waiting to see if Thornburg could close for the first half of 2017 is too risky for the Brewers, since any issues in that regard would tank the value built during 2016).

Considering both conservative and aggressive estimates for the trade as currently constructed, it should not be outlandish to say that the Red Sox properly gambled that they can retain value with Thornburg’s contract (which can be non-tendered without cost prior to 2018 and 2019). If the PTBNL turns out to be a player with a pedigree other than organizational depth, that might push Thornburg into 2.0 WARP/year territory to regain value. Yet, given that the Red Sox are gambling for playoff spots, overpaying in a trade for a high leverage player is not necessarily a bad deal if the payoff is somewhere between $10 million and $30 million of playoff revenue. Adding together playoff revenue, playoff prestige, and potential flags flying is well worth a PTBNL. There is plenty of evidence to argue the trade a success for either team, which is a good sign that Milwaukee maximized their short-term closer’s value.

(3) Miguel Diaz’s Value
I previously called GM David Stearns’s refusal to protect top RHP prospect Miguel Diaz from the Rule 5 draft a “dreadful, terrible” move, but I think I emphasized the wrong reasons. As the Brewers potentially lost Diaz to the Padres (via the Twins), depending on how he fares early in the season and whether he sticks with San Diego, it is worth recasting the move as a failure even if Diaz does not reach the MLB or his gaudiest 60 OFP from summer 2016.

Imagine that Diaz follows the odds of reaching the MLB at approximately 20 percent; among those potential MLB futures, consider a 40 OFP / roster filler status as the vast majority (95 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 1.0 WARP over three seasons), a 50 OFP (4.5 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 4.0 WARP over three seasons), and 60 OFP in 0.5 percent of MLB futures (maybe reaching 7.0 WARP over three seasons). Spread over 1,000 potential futures, Miguel Diaz averages out to approximately 0.23 WARP, or someone worth between $0.500 million league minimum contract (replacement contract) and $1.61 million using the standard $7 million / WARP “market estimation.” This is the biggest problem with failing to protect Diaz: in the first place, he’s one of only a few true 50+ / 60 OFP prospects in the Brewers system. There are many 50 prospects in the system, and several 50+ prospects, even, but not many reached a 60 OFP grade in 2016. Diaz reached that level, and is therefore one of the best prospects even adding in all the risk one can find.
Value Lost: $1.6 million.

(4) Roster Summary
Here is a summary of notables trades, Rule 5 transactions (MLB and AAA), and free agency signings. Moves with 40-man roster impact are highlighted.

Thus far, the Brewers have added approximately $23.7 million in total surplus through 40-man roster transactions (this figure does not factor in full reserve control for minor leaguers, but instead focuses on OFP value). That is basically worth 1.7 WARP from a league minimum contract, or 2.75 WARP from Eric Thames (2.75 WARP is worth approximately $19.3 million, minus $15 million guaranteed). In total surplus value, Stearns has acquired approximately $63 million for the organization, which can be translated as approximately 4.5 total WARP from a league minimum salary, or acquiring approximately three 50 OFP prospects via trade.

The organization was in an interesting position with Carter this offseason; the slugging first baseman led the league in home runs but was otherwise not very good, but the club didn’t have a clear replacement for him. Carter was once a highly-touted prospect, but he is about to turn 30, has now had four full seasons in the big leagues, and has been worth more than 1.0 WARP just once in his career. The chances that he actually developed into a quality big leaguer were relatively low, but I thought the Brewers might hold onto him simply because there wasn’t a clear alternative at first base and he was a cost-controlled option for the next couple years.

With that information in hand, the fact that the Brewers have essentially swapped him for Eric Thames is not that surprising. But the path that the club took to get there is perplexing, and it reveals a weird lack of foresight.

Just before the deadline to finalize the 40-man roster, the Brewers claimed Adam Walker off of waivers from Milwaukee. Walker has a similar profile to Carter, as he is a first-base type with big power but lots of swing-and-miss in his game. He was added to the 40-man roster, protecting him from the Rule 5 draft at the expense of other, more viable options such as Wei-Chung Wang. Then, though, he was designated for assignment after the Brewers claimed reliever Steve Geltz.

Thames, who the Brewers signed this week, is a question mark who is returning to the big leagues from Korea. He put up impressive power and patience numbers in the KBO, but it is hard to know how well those numbers will translate back to MLB. When Thames was in the big leagues in 2011 and 2012, he was a high-power, high-strikeout corner outfielder.

The takeaway from this series of moves is that the Brewers clearly don’t want to waste more than one roster spot on this type of all-bat, no glove player. The club DFA’d Walker shortly after signing him, so they clearly were not enamored with him specifically. They then DFA’d Carter and signed Thames, so the only one currently left on the Brewers’ 40-man roster is Thames.

What is weird about this is why the club cares about having this particular archetype on its roster at all. The swapping out of Carter and Walker for Thames indicates that the club is interested in versatility, because Thames can also play the outfield occasionally. Versatility has been a theme though for the Stearns front office, though, so it isn’t as if this is a newfound desire that the organization just realized it wanted to emphasize in the last few days.

40-man roster spots are valuable. The Brewers seem committed to reserving one for a slugging first baseman, which is a surprisingly rigid approach for a team that has been quite flexible over the past year-plus. Instead, the Brewers chose not to protect someone from within the organization.

Importantly, the end result makes sense. The Brewers will go into the season with Eric Thames as the only one of these three players on their 40-man, which is a logical outcome. Most likely, Wang (or whichever organizational player would have been the 40th man on the roster) will never amount to anything in the big leagues, and Steve Geltz may or may not ever pitch for the Brewers. But this was a weird few days for that roster spot, as the Brewers specifically chose to select someone who they then released a week later.

It is difficult to find the relevant points for constructing marginal analysis of baseball transactions because MLB teams are arguably not in economic competition for resources (they are more effectively viewed as colluding firms seeking to keep other operators — competing baseball leagues — from succeeding). Also, MLB-level talent is so incredibly scarce that it is difficult to say that there is a diminishing return from adding too much talent; this is not the same as hiring too much labor or investing too much into capital infrastructure in a competitive market. To demonstrate the latter point, consider the number of 3.0 WARP players in 2016 MLB (77) compared to 1348 batters; given that teams are willing to employ 148 more batters than the total number of 40-man roster spots (1200) in a season to squeeze out every win, at the very least one would argue that (1) there is no diminishing return on adding impact players, and (2) the best place to look at marginal value would be the cost and production of those additional 148 players cutting their teeth at the edges of the MLB roster. But no one would say that MLB teams should only acquire, say, two 3.0 WARP players, and with their third 3.0 WARP player they lose value.

What does this have to do with anything? The Brewers are doing practically nothing thus far in the 2016-2017 offseason, and some of the moves from GM David Stearns are downright perplexing. Others still are non-events, and some of those moves might still produce another surprise player (like Junior Guerra or Jacob Barnes or Keon Broxton or something). So, while I am not going to be able to offer you a full theory of marginal roster value here, consider that in these early season transactions, we are judging the cost of adding one additional player to the 40-man roster, either at the expense of additional future value to the organization, additional surplus value (in terms of production value, trade value, at a certain contract rate), or additional WARP right now. Since most people still assume the Brewers are rebuilding, let’s forget the third motive for rosterbuilding, and prioritize the first two (I’d even add an asterisk to the first goal, adding future value).

(1) Dreadful, dreadful, terrible move: Not Adding Miguel Diaz to 40-man roster.
Set aside the fact that one of these days, analytical front offices will eventually start plucking intriguing A-ball prospects in the Rule 5 draft with regularity. The Brewers made such an audacious (and brilliant) move when they nabbed LHP Wei-Chung Wang from the Pittsburgh Pirates for the 2014 season, effectively stashed him, and even effectively kept him within the organization after designation for assignment. That was a phenomenal future play for a low-cost asset that addressed a (then) organizational weakness (left-handed starting pitching). Of course, the Brewers neglected to protect Wang from the 2016 Rule 5 draft, which is rather problematic in itself. But Wang himself shows the potential value in toughing it out with an extremely inexperienced professional ballplayer as a Rule 5 pick: Wang improved the system’s starting pitching and replacement pitching depth at low cost. The Padres also demonstrated this strategy by selecting RHP Luis Perdomo in 2016, suggesting that perhaps this is finally the beginning of analytical front offices doing audacious things to find value.

Miguel Diaz is probably a Top Five pitching prospect in the Milwaukee farm system to most evaluators, and if you weigh fastball, secondary stuff, potential command and development, and even risk, the righty could probably also land a Top Three pitching prospect designation on the right day (I’d slot Diaz behind RHP Luis Ortiz and LHP Josh Hader; on my own Brewers list, I have Diaz (easily) ranked within the Top Five Percent of the entire Milwaukee organization (with Ortiz, CF Lewis Brinson, and IF Isan Diaz standing as the One Percenters). In a June 2016 eyewitness report, Diaz landed heady 70 fastball OFP, 60 slider OFP, 55 change OFP, and “ability to throw all three for strikes;” risk comes from level / distance from the MLB, full command development, and delivery repetition. All told, a 60 OFP on Diaz makes him easily one of the best prospects in Milwaukee’s system; one could probably rank him in the Top Five and not think twice.

The Brewers neglected to protect Diaz from the Rule 5 draft. Consider this: if a 60 OFP player might be expected to produce at an above-average level at least once, and maybe produce at an average level at least once, it is quite easy to assign a 4.0 WARP / 2.0 WARP / 1.0 WARP three-year spread for a 60 OFP prospect. Yet, recognizing the risk of reaching that level, and the likelihood of depreciating performance, a harsh depreciation level of 70 percent still lands Diaz a three-year OFP grade of 4.9 WARP; an even harsher depreciation level of 40 percent (10 percent for each level away from the MLB, on top of 70 percent depreciation) still lands Diaz a three-year OFP grade of 2.8 WARP.

What I’m trying to say is this: at the basic cost of less than $0.6 million and maybe a burned option year, the Brewers neglected to find roster space for at least $19.6 million in OFP production value. What’s worse is that that future production does not account for the contract eating into that value (it costs nothing to release Diaz, meaning his $19.6 million minimum future value is completely untouched by his contract), nor does it account for the trade value inherent in (1) his strongest projections and (2) his potential production + potential contract. Miguel Diaz is worth at least $39.2 million to the Milwaukee Brewers in surplus value; but that’s an incomplete picture, as it does not include the full contractual reserve rights for the Brewers (but it’s also less effective to say that Diaz is worth $80 million in surplus value).

That the front office neglected to spend a 40-man roster spot on Diaz is an unforgivable offense. I know that’s harsh, but this is the first true mistake of GM David Stearns’s administration, and here’s why: the whole point of an analytical front office, if one views their aims as different than “winning ballgames,” is (a) to cut costs by steering revenue from players to ownership, (b) maximize WARP / $ ratios, and (c) value process over everything, or rather, create processes that consistently and effectively identify value.That the Brewers could not identify the clear value play in Miguel Diaz for an unforgivable risk in even 1-in-100 scenarios (that is, losing Diaz in the Rule 5 draft, for nothing), by spending nothing more than a 40-man roster spot on the righty, is plainly baffling. Moreover, if another MLB team does not select Diaz, they are also making a mistake and poorly evaluating the cost of stashing $39.2 million in surplus value on their roster.

2017 Opportunity Cost: 5.6 WARP ($39.2 million / $7 million per WARP). Ex., you could probably trade Diaz for a very good MLB player.

(2) Other Rule 5 Guys?
For fun, using slightly different calculations than the process I outlined above for Diaz, from my previous post on “Grading Trades“:

I think there are other claims to be made about protecting someone like Wei-Chung Wang, or even someone like Tyrone Taylor. But, since I just went off about Miguel Diaz for far too many words, let’s just say losing Taylor or Wang would be slightly more forgivable. Notably, Adam Walker has a similar prospect grade to both Taylor and Wang, meaning that the Brewers grabbing Walker at the expense of Wang and Taylor is probably close to a value non-event.

(3) The Waiver Shuffle

David Goforth has a career WARP of 0.3, driven by 24.7 innings worked in 2015 to the tune of 0.4 WARP, on the strength of a 3.44 DRA. On the 2016 Brewers, for context, that performance would have made him the fifth best reliever. Unfortunately, it’s a year removed for Goforth and memories are short and there are no second chances in baseball — scratch that, we’re rebuilding, there are plenty of opportunities for a pitcher such as David Goforth to get another chance in Milwaukee. Unfortunately, in the last 10 days, the Brewers have added Adam Walker, added Blake Parker, subtracted Walker, and now added Steven Geltz. The club designated Goforth for assignment to make room for Parker, which was a positive value play on the margins by approximately 0.3 WARP over six seasons (#ThisIsHowYouWinChampionships).

Much more interesting is the fact that both Geltz and Parker throw splitters according to BrooksBaseball, and even more interesting are both righties potential ties to current Brewers pitching coach Derek Johnson (Parker, potentially in the Cubs system) and Vice President and Assistant General Manager Matt Arnold (Geltz, potentially in the Rays system). It’s hard to dislike the mental picture of Stearns and Arnold emerging from the tank in Miller Park with two hard fought waiver claims based on the organization’s splitter-algorithm that caught Junior Guerra; or I don’t know, maybe like Guerra these signings are scouting-gut “I like this guy getting another chance” deals.

If you’re inclined to wonder why the Brewers are designating Walker for assignment, and inclined to be upset about it, consider the chance that he clears waivers and remains in Milwaukee, accepting a minor league assignment: the club just added a potential play worth $11.6 million in surplus value, to stash away for a rainy day (or by mid-June, we’ll see). Liken this move to the Garin Cecchini move, which was great even though it didn’t work out (or, more properly, has yet to work out). It’s tough to judge Walker’s value against Geltz’s rough WARP performance, but somewhere there’s a spin in that splitter that made someone’s afternoon in the plush offices of Miller Park.

2017 Opportunity Cost: Probably no more than 0.25 WARP assuming Walker clears waivers and accepts assignment ($1.8 million maximum roster space / $7 million per WARP). 1.71 WARP maximum cost ($12 million / $7 million per WARP).

(4)The Carter Misstep?
One of the biggest mistakes baseball fans make is viewing value as “production,” rather than “production + scarcity.” Production may be what it may be, but depending on other teams’ needs or wants, a player’s service time, and a player’s contract (among other factors), “scarcity” can be traded. This is what cannot be missed in the case of Chris Carter, after anyone smugly multiplies 0.8 WARP * $7 million, writes “Chris Carter is not worth salary arbitration,” and wrings their hands. So, while rumors suggest that the Brewers may non-tender Carter should they fail to receive a trade offer for the first baseman, a non-tender option should not necessarily be viewed as a positive event for the 40-man roster. For even at $10 million, Carter has value to the Brewers: he has three-year depreciation value at 2.66 WARP ($18.6 million), and two years of arbitration control (at zero cost to non-tender, worth approximately $12.4 million). Carter, at the very least, is worth $18.6 million to the Brewers, and even with harsh depreciation he could be worth as much as $24.8 million to Milwaukee. If you’re unimpressed by this, Carter’s contract surplus and production for one season is worth approximately $11.2 million.

Perhaps this rumor by the Brewers is a public relations plot, or perhaps it is an effort to negotiate a different contract with Carter (imagine a two year, $18 million contract, for example, which would pay Carter 100% of his production value, and 50% of his surplus value). This scenario would be valuable to the Brewers for several reasons: (1) No one better is available at 1B within the system; (2) Carter is relatively dependable; (3) the club still maintains trade value with that contract; and (4) Who cares, the team is sitting on $60 million already and there’s another $60 million due in 2017, and Carter can hit home runs like this:

Do you think Carter was aiming for his picture on the scoreboard? Anyway, the point is, it’s not enough to look at Carter’s production alone and judge a potential non-tender. In the context of the Brewers organization, and even the 2016-2017 first base free agency market, there is little opportunity cost in keeping Carter and paying him grand slam bucks. One of the few MLB free agents that would improve on Carter’s value is Steve Pearce, whose 5.39 WARP three-year depreciation score doubles Carter’s.

2017 Opportunity Cost: 3.5 WARP ($24.8 million / $7 million per WARP). Just pay the slugger!

(5) Total 2017 Opportunity Cost: 9.35 WARP ($65.5M). What this means is that Stearns is willing to pay $65.5M for these roster moves, or rather, that these roster moves have given him the space to find 9.35 WARP. In more straightforward language, the forthcoming roster moves will need to generate 9.35 WARP to balance the roster from these moves.

Offense
When discussing Adam Walker, the first topic of conversation has and always will be his prodigious home runs. “He has among the strongest power grades of any hitter in professional baseball from our scouting reports,” GM David Stearns told Adam McCalvy of MLB.com. “Whenever you see a tool like that that’s readily available, you take notice.” In 584 minor league games since being drafted in the 3rd round by the Twins in 2012, Walker has clubbed 124 home runs. Walker is powerfully built at 6’5″ and 225 lbs, has a natural uppercut to his right-handed swing and generates tremendous bat speed, leading to 60 power grades from Baseball Prospectus and MLB Pipeline. Pipeline’s report praises Walker for having “as much raw power as just about any prospect in baseball” and Jeff Moore of BP noted that Walker is “extremely dangerous” on pitches located up in the strike zone.

Let's take a look at a couple Adam Walker HR's, shall we? #Brewers pic.twitter.com/Myri4YTxjR

— Brewers Prospects (@BrewerProspect) November 18, 2016

Unfortunately, that tremendous level of power comes at the cost of a highly questionable hit tool. Walker is only a career .251/.310/.486 hitter in those aforementioned 584 minor league games and has struck out in a startling 744 of 2,449 career plate appearances (30.4 percent). In his first exposure to AAA competition in 2016, Walker hit .243/.305/.479 with 27 home runs for a .279 TAv, but he struck out a whopping 202 times in 531 plate appearances (38 percent).

Moore wrote that Walker “struggles to recognize curveballs and changeups,” and that he’s over-aggressive, expanding his strike zone too easily. Walker’s 2016 entry in the BP Annual described his approach at the plate as “unsustainable” and noted that “[h]e kills fastballs, but struggles to recognize other stuff, and his attempts to wait longer and pick up spin seem to be coming at the cost of that attacking mentality. His future rides on being able to find a balance.” MLB Pipeline grades Walker’s hit tool as only 40 on the 20-80 scale and John Sickels of Minor League Ball wrote that Walker “could struggle to hit .230 in the majors.”

Often times we’ll see a low-average slugger pair a high strikeout rate with a high walk rate and still manage a respectable on-base percentage, but that’s never been the case with Walker. He reached base via free pass just 8.3 percent of the time in 2016 and has drawn a base on balls in 7.7 percent of his plate appearances throughout his career. When coupled with his almost comically high whiff rates, that means Walker’s not likely to ever be much of an on-base threat.

Defense/Baserunning
There’s not much reason for optimism on the defensive side of things, either. MLB Pipeline gives Walker well-below average grades of 40 for his glove and 40 for his arm. Regarding his throwing prowess, Jeff Moore writes “Extremely long arm-action, little carry on throws. Left field arm.” Khris Davis’ throwing arm in the outfield would probably be a fair comparison here. Walker has been valued at -26.5 Fielding Runs Above Average over the past two seasons while playing left field almost exclusively at the AA and AAA levels. Walker’s speed was once graded as above-average to plus, but he’s been more in the average to slightly-below range in more recent reports. He’s stolen 43 bases in 56 attempts during his career, but was successful in just seven of 11 in theft attempts in 2016.

The Brewers may have a plan to try and mitigate some of Walker’s defensive woes, however. The club apparently plans to try Walker as a first baseman, a position that is sorely lacking for depth in the system beyond Chris Carter (who may himself be non-tendered this winter). Walker has never played the position professionally, but he did see some action there when he played collegiately at Jacksonville University so a first baseman’s mitt won’t exactly be foreign to him. Walker would be a big target at first and given his previous experience, there’s at least some reason to be hopeful that he can eventually become a passable defender at the position in the professional ranks.

Overview
Adam Walker has one loud, exciting tool but doesn’t bring much else to the table at this time. He could be a 30+ home run threat as an everyday player at the MLB level, but nothing about his current offensive approach says he’ll make enough contact to tap into that power consistently. He struggles to recognize pitches that aren’t fastballs and doesn’t walk enough to mitigate his extremely high strikeout rate. Eno Sarris of Fangraphs joked that Walker could punch out in 45 percent of his plate appearances if he were in the MLB next season. Even if that seems hyperbolic, it’s true that without a significant adjustment in his approach at the plate, the odds that Walker can be a dependable offensive threat at the MLB level look exceedingly long.

Walker provides little value defensively, and the fact that he is limited to left field severely hampers his chances to break through among a crowded outfield that includes more versatile defenders like Keon Broxton, Domingo Santana, Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, Michael Reed, and Corey Ray. A permanent move to first base may provide a much clearer path to big league playing time for Walker, but would also put that much more pressure on him to provide value with the bat.

Chris Crawford wrote back in July that if Walker could tone down his strikeouts, “he’d have a chance to be a regular” at the major league level. His offensive ceiling could be something along the lines of current Brewers’ first baseman Chris Carter: a late-blooming, low-average, low-OBP slugger with game-changing power and big strikeout numbers. But it’s important to remember that before actualizing that profile at the big league level, Carter was a much more accomplished hitter in the minor leagues (.283/.378/.535, 182 home runs, 23.5 percent K rate, 12.2 percent BB rate in 826 games) than Walker has been to this point.

It could be telling that the 59 win Twins chose not to give Walker a September call-up this past season and gave up on his development shortly thereafter. But Walker is still quite youthful and has never repeated a level in his career, so it’ll be interesting to see what sorts of adjustments he may be able to make during a likely assignment back to AAA for 2017. With two option years remaining, the rebuilding Brewers can afford to be patient with Walker and see if he can become a part of their next winning core in the role of everyday first baseman. At this point in Walker’s career, however, the odds appear to be firmly stacked against that outcome.