Like the July deadline, David Stearns is giving Brewers fans transactions that can be viewed from many standpoints:

• Stearns is improving both key roles and marginal roles through both deadlines.

• Stearns is arguably stockpiling as much talent as is physically possible (within the constraints of the 40-man roster).

• The GM is dealing prospects with lofty Overall Future Potential (OFP).

• The GM is dealing ultimate roles that may be blocked (Brett Phillips), uncertain (Jorge Lopez), or years away from fruition (this can apply to everyone from Jean Carmona to Orimoloye, Lara, Connell, Dominguez, and Harrison).

• Stearns is looking toward potentially longer outlooks by acquiring several players with 2019 options or roster reserve rights.

This is a lot to take in, and frankly it’s made it difficult to write about the trade deadlines in one swift motion. For on the one hand, by estimating long term value of some of the roles traded away, it appears that Stearns truly did overpay in several deals in order to succeed within a short window. Yet, it’s not entirely clear that Stearns traded away anyone that was fitting into Milwaukee’s immediate window. It pains me to say this even with strong prospects like Brett Phillips, or serviceable roles like Jorge Lopez (one of my favorite pitchers in the system for a long time). As much as I love to use depreciated surplus value to assess trades, since it is a tool that attempts Benefit-Cost Analysis on players’ production and contract, Stearns is providing a clear template for critiquing moves outside of any WARP/$ framework.

Specifically, by moving clear MLB players from a small market club that ostensibly requires cost-controlled, easily reserved talent to win, Stearns’s deadline provides an excellent opportunity to survey the uneven landscape of player development. In this regard, it is worth noting that no trade can truly meet WARP/$ standards, because in the universe of player development a pitcher can add a new pitch or rework their mechanics, a batting can revise a timing mechanism or refine a swing, a player can fall under the influence of a new coach (for better or worse), or a player can simply experience a new environment in which opportunities shift. Information asymmetry is the landscape of player development, and thus MLB transactions, and in this regard no deal can ever reach equilibrium between parties, as both teams involved in a given trade will arguably be assessing players through different environments (this argument has hidden behind my work on depreciated surplus, but surfaced in a demonstration with the Brian McCann trade).

On Tuesday, another one of the prospects dealt away from Milwaukee acquired a true MLB floor as well, as the Baltimore Orioles selected the contract of RHP Luis Ortiz (traded away as the lead prospect in the Jonathan Schoop deal). Now, the “surefire” MLB players that one could have assessed from the July deadline deals are all in The Show (Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez are in Kansas City, and Ortiz is now in Baltimore). I will not be focusing extensively on Phillips’s case here, as he is doing pretty much what could have been expected on the day of the trade: starting in center field (21 of 26 games) and right field (4 of 26 games). Lopez and Ortiz, however, offer completely asymmetrical development from the Brewers’ system, and this is worth investigating because the Brewers have what is justifiably regarded as a strong pitching program, due to their track record in 2017 and 2018 (yes, in 2018!), oft-praised coach (Derek Johnson), and their unorthodox pitching acquisitions that appear to follow very specific profiles (this applies to everyone from Oliver Drake to Chase Anderson and Zach Davies, among others). Answering questions about Lopez and Ortiz may help to address other bizarre roles in the 2018 pitching system, most notably involving Brandon Woodruff, Adrian Houser, and even (arguably) Corbin Burnes.

First, let’s establish two role discrepancies that may be the result of different organizational interpretations of information:

• Jorge Lopez has already started four games for the Kansas City Royals, boasting an 18 strike out / eight walk / two homer / 37 percent ground ball profile (4.86 Deserved Run Average). He has alternated good and bad starts thus far. However, the Brewers failed to use Lopez as a starter in 2018, instead employing Lopez as a successful member of the Triple-A shuttle team between Milwaukee and Colorado Springs; this mirrors Lopez’s 2018 minor league role (reliever) and follows his organizational shift to relief role in 2017. Despite what may be viewed as a spotty command profile and a lack of a deep pitching arsenal, the Royals promptly started Lopez and have him shifting sinker / riding fastball and slider offerings to “re-balance” his approach.

• Luis Ortiz battled some injuries and stamina concerns during his time in the Milwaukee organization, which spanned 44 games at Double-A Biloxi across parts of three seasons. Ortiz was mostly a starter in the Milwaukee organization, building his innings pitched total to career highs in three consecutive seasons; the righty is now at 99.7 innings and counting upon entering the MLB. Upon acquiring Ortiz, Baltimore assigned him directly to their Triple-A Norfolk club, and now are selecting his contract for a September showing. One might surmise this is to help boost his innings pitched total closer to 120.0 IP by season end, setting the youngster for a perfectly respectable workload floor for 2019.

Since I do not have additional, unpublished scouting information on Ortiz from his short time in the Baltimore organization (and there do not appear to be any updates from Norfolk), I am going to simply note that according to his minor league game data, there is no discernible statistic that demonstrates why the Orioles might recall the prospect. Alternately, there is equally no discernible argument as to why the Brewers did not view Ortiz as an immediate depth option to potentially bolster a contending pitching staff (and their aggressive handling of Freddy Peralta supports that question).

On Ortiz, the following table is from Baseball Reference CSV:

I would like to reject the “Orioles have nothing to lose” argument for recalling Ortiz, and I’d apply that same reasoning to the Royals, as well. For example, the Brewers apparently have everything to lose in 2018, and they entered the season with Jhoulys Chacin, Yovani Gallardo, and Wade Miley as their major pitching acquisitions for a year in which they probably suspected Jimmy Nelson would miss substantial time. The point being, “having something to lose” has not kept the Brewers from making unorthodox development moves and acquisitions, and that applies equally to starting Freddy Peralta ahead of top pitching prospect (and much clearer starting role) Corbin Burnes as it does to Chacin, Gallardo, and Miley. For goodness sake, the club just recently acquired veteran southpaw Gio Gonzalez, a starting pitcher by trade, and then mentioned that they might not use him as a starter. So, it is clear that “having something to lose” is no motivator for the Brewers to make “expected” or orthodox pitching moves; relative position in the standings should not explain these player development moves.

The flipside of this argument, I will add, is that this should not be taken as a “Derek Johnson is magic” argument, either. I do not believe that Brewers fans and analysts should fall back on that argument, because it basically substitutes a new type of devotional thinking about pitching development for previous orthodox thinking about pitching roles, and solely using a coach’s successful cases for transactional justification is a bad thing. Those of us relying on public knowledge will not understand or know any of Johnson’s potential “failures” in terms of mechanical or arsenal adjustments among Brewers pitching. Furthermore, this type of magical line of argument about Johnson’s skills could thus theoretically justify any pitching acquisition, which should be viewed as ridiculous on the face of it. For example, none of us should be rummaging the lowest DRA of 2018 simply to argue “x, y, and z should be Brewers targets because of Wade Miley and Derek Johnson,” and that’s not meant as a knock on either Johnson or Miley.

Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, has provided new data as a member of the Royals, and the righty is demonstrating a complete shift in his arsenal. Brewers fans will recall that Lopez used his big, tall frame to generate a fairly traditional rising fastball, curveball, change up arsenal. During Lopez’s time in Milwaukee in 2018, the Brooks Baseball classification system captured a “sinker,” which might also be called a riding / running fastball (although the vertical movement readings on the pitch hint that it may actually be a sinker). Lopez also introduced some variation of a slider:

Thus far in Kansas City, Lopez has reoriented this arsenal by reducing his “primary fastball” in favor of his sinker and slider. Along with these noticeable moves, Lopez is also ticking up his change and curve slightly.

Lopez has had two rough starts, but his most recent start against the Orioles was the best of his young career. In this start, perhaps Lopez cashed out the most extreme version of his arsenal adjustment, working sinker or slider for nearly 55 percent of his deliveries. Yet that curve still figures prominently at 21 percent of his overall selections, meaning that Lopez could also be called a sinker-curve guy.

This new arsenal is a fantastic look for Lopez, and it raises a difficult question that is worth asking, but must be asked in the proper critical mindset and organizational vantage point: when is a pitcher simply a new pitch, or a re-balancing of their arsenal, away from success? When is a pitcher simply in need of an opportunity? I hinted at this question following the July trade deadline, as the Brewers traded a pitcher who might be dismissed as “merely serviceable” at a time of increased need for quality depth due to injuries and ineffectiveness. Yet the Brewers did not give Lopez a start, nor did they keep him as a fixture in the bullpen, perhaps as a multi-inning guy. I don’t mean this as a criticism of the Brewers, however, because one could have reasonably asserted at the time that previously lofty goals of Lopez’s rotational Overall Future Potential were a thing of the past; here we are, though, with the tide potentially shifting within the Royals rotation.

The least satisfactory answer is that the Brewers simply missed on Ortiz and Lopez. Perhaps they were so cautious with Ortiz as to miss the potential upside (or even the current MLB floor!) in his profile. One could have said on deadline day that Luis Ortiz was maybe two or three years away from being a true impact, Number Two starter (if he were to reach his ceiling); perhaps that logic misses the value of how good a low rotation floor can be on many days in the MLB (cf. the 2018 Brewers, from Wade Miley to Freddy Peralta and, yes, even Junior Guerra most days). A more realistic answer, and perhaps the Lopez development supports this, is that maybe Milwaukee simply was not the place for these developments; even the acquisition of Jake Thompson and Jordan Lyles suggests that Stearns may have already found other development projects that better fit the organizational plan.

It is interesting to work with these unsatisfactory, vague conclusions while designing a framework for assessing Brandon Woodruff’s future with the organization, or even the potential future role for someone like Wade Miley:

• Is Miley a Brewers pitcher now, worth a contract extension and a trip back to the well, a celebration of a job well done and certainly a job worth tens of millions of dollars?

• Is Woodruff, about as bread-and-butter middle rotation starter / potential impact relief profile as one could ask for, a pitcher with a steady rotation or bullpen future in Milwaukee?

• With the continued development of Adrian Houser as a starting pitcher in the minor leagues, is Houser already poised to become the MLB starting role recovery for the Brewers that Jorge Lopez was not?

The trouble with these questions is that they could be answered in different ways for different organizations, but the benefit is that the Brewers currently reserve an crucial opportunity to learn from their recent transactions and maximize their development approach with each of these pitchers.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

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This is not even some “to-be-expected” regression, as even if one wishes to look at Deserved Runs Average (DRA) throughout the season as a “true” measure of the Brewers talent (which should be cautioned), the Brewers would have been expected to allow anywhere between 23 and 30 fewer second half runs than they actually have allowed.

This is unforeseen and catastrophic.

The blame can be spread around to everyone, from the post-forearm injury Junior Guerra (10 IP, 9 runs on July 24 & 29), injured reliever Matt Albers (1.7 IP, 10 R), former? closer Corey Knebel (9.3 IP, 8 R entering Sunday), and even rookie rotation depth Freddy Peralta (19 IP, 17 R since the break). Worse yet, there is a sense of adding insult to injury, as newly acquired Joakim Soria hit the disabled list promptly after surrendering a grand slam home run in a devastating loss to San Diego, and quietly effective Taylor Williams hit the disabled list with an elbow injury. While fans will feel less sympathy for Matt Albers, who had a couple of different bouts of ineffectiveness surrounded by separate disabled list stints, the veteran righty was crucial to early season success (25 IP, 4 R through the end of May) and each day his injury status and effectiveness is not answered is a day that manager Craig Counsell must carefully ration Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader with little back-up. The same goes for Williams, and now Soria; while Jacob Barnes was previously an impact reliever and boasts solid peripherals and a 2.99 Deserved Run Average (DRA), his runs prevention performance in 2018 has not been to the level of that injured trio, and now it’s Barnes, Corbin Burnes, and Jordan Lyles trying to nail down the quietly effective support roles.

It’s as simple as this: the Brewers’ bullpen has two truly fantastic options in Jeffress and Hader, and those options will be great regardless of their surrounding cast. For the purposes of contending, however, this duo is amplified when Stearns’s excellent depth picks (Albers, Williams, even Corbin Burnes), closer (Knebel), and additional acquisitions (Soria) are performing well. Jeffress and Hader cannot do it themselves.

Injuries have also trimmed the rotation, as Brent Suter’s torn elbow ligament and Zach Davies’s back ailments have limited the Brewers’ effective rotational depth. Using Baseball Reference Three Year Park factors, both Suter and Davies combined for 18 Runs Prevented over 273 innings in 2017, offering excellent middle and replacement rotation depth. That level of impact depth performance will not be matched by the duo in 2018. Additionally, even if one could have argued that the club might not have expected Jimmy Nelson to return from his shoulder injury in 2018, having that materialize as a likely injury-scenario reality in 2018 is quite another ballgame. Consider this as Freddy Peralta meets a likely innings limit, Chase Anderson continues an uneven season, and Brandon Woodruff finds himself without a rotational role: #TeamDepth is now basically #TeamNecessity in terms of rotation building.

There’s no need to state it any other way: as much as one would like to criticize the Brewers pitching staff, and GM David Stearns for his failure to build a staff, the club is now to the point where injuries are diminishing even his strongest moves. The Soria trade looms loudest here, as the Brewers grabbed a legitimate high leverage, veteran reliever at the trade deadline and did not get six innings from his right arm before he hit the DL with a groin injury; Albers and Williams could be fan whipping posts when they were ineffective, but the Albers free agency deal looked like a brilliant low-cost gamble early in the season while Williams seemed poised to catapult himself into the high leverage workload discussion (Williams worked a 17.3 IP, 5 R stretch, Holding three leads, from June until the All Star Break).

Citing injuries to the pitching staff is not an “excuse” for the poor performance.

It would have been enough to deal with this group of recent injuries and setbacks, but the Brewers also simultaneously were gifted with a set of role reversions on the pitching staff. Corey Knebel’s descent from excellent closer in 2017 cost the Brewers a chance at a truly elite relief corps; according to Baseball Reference Three Year Park Factors, Knebel prevented nearly 25 runs in 2017. Even a 50 percent regression from that performance level would fit nicely with Jeffress and Hader, who have both been consistent Top 25 pitchers in the 2018 MLB. Add in the aforementioned struggles of Peralta, Barnes, and a bit of stalled usage from the shuttled Houser (he’s only worked two MLB appearances from July onward), and Counsell’s strategic options are looking much more thin while they are also being exasperated by some ineffective starts.

Beyond these role question marks, it is worth questioning the timing of the inclusion of Jorge Lopez in the Mike Moustakas trade. Since Lopez has served the season as an up-and-down member of the Triple-A / MLB “shuttle team” relief squad, discussions of the quality of Lopez’s performance were largely nonexistent at the trade deadline (I’m also guilty of this charge). But, it is worth emphasizing that as a back-roster depth strategy, the “shuttle team” prevented runs at a solid clip, especially when one considers the nature of this replacement role and the likely quality of other replacement pitchers to be acquired in their place.

In fact, these shuttle relievers combined to produce near-average aggregate performance for the Brewers, which leads one to question why Stearns traded Lopez and simultaneously decided to keep Brandon Woodruff at the Triple-A level to serve as replacement starting pitching depth. With Lopez in the Royals system and Woodruff now serving as starting pitching depth, the revolving door relief strategy is effectively dead at what could be the worst time of the season. Given that Woodruff boats a 3.55 DRA at the MLB level to accompany a 52 percent ground ball rate, while also demonstrating an average DRA at Colorado Springs with a consistent ground ball rate there, it is worth questioning why Stearns has not simply replaced Peralta with Woodruff (on the one hand) or simply promoted Woodruff to a steady MLB relief role (on the other hand). According to Brooks Baseball, the relief role is agreeing with Woodruff, who is throwing a sizzling 95-to-96 MPH fastball with more armside run than his 2017 variation, complete with steady change up and slider usage (both with more whiffs than in 2017, too).

This is not a bottomless pit (yet). That the Brewers remain the 12th best pitching staff in the MLB, within one standard deviation of the 10th spot, and sixth best pitching staff in the National League, should demonstrate just how good the club has been for most of the year. Indeed, this pitching staff has fallen off, and it’s important to underscore that it’s not simply “regression,” but a bad combination of regression, injuries, and strategic missteps at the worst possible time. But there could be a quick way out of this issue for the club:

• Get Zach Davies healthy, without any further setbacks, and use him to replace Freddy Peralta in the rotation.

• Develop an MLB role for Brandon Woodruff; preferably this would be a rotational role to spell another ineffective starter down the stretch (or add a sixth man for September), but even a well-defined one-inning bullpen role could be extremely helpful at the moment.

• Re-evaluate depth roles for Ariel Hernandez, Jordan Lyles, Alec Asher, and Aaron Wilkerson, and make any necessary waiver trades to boost the pitching staff. E.g., is Jordan Lyles the right arm to work in the shadow of the successful Triple-A shuttle crew? Is now the best time to make a potential long-term development play for Ariel Hernandez?

• Reconsider Adrian Houser’s shuttle role in favor of a regular one-inning role.

With the assumption that some combination of Soria, Albers, and Williams can get healthy for the stretch run, and that some of the “role regression” pitchers can make adjustments at the MLB level once again, this is a pitching staff that can improve quickly and regain its flexible frontier of roles and runs prevention that were celebrated in April and May. With Zach Davies healthy, a waiver trade acquisition (or two), and potentially prominent roles for two righties that can rush it up there (Woodruff and Houser), this pitching staff can rebound. Now we wait and watch.

Baseball Prospectus 2015 Astros Top 10 prospect rankings largely support the reaction of the time, in which Phillips was the “get” of the trade, Santana was a quality, workable advanced prospect, and Hader and Houser both served as equal parts risk-and-reward (albeit due to completely different profiles). It’s worth remembering what type of prospect Hader was when the Brewers acquired the potential fireballing lefty, so I’m quoting in full:

“The long and lanky lefty enjoyed a season to build upon with High-A Lancaster, working with an upper-80s to low-90s fastball with lots of dance out of a tough low three-quarters slot. He can reach as his as 95 mph and could sit closer to that mark in shorter bursts should he wind up in the pen as some evaluators suggest. His slider is a second potential above-average offering that can make lefty bats highly uncomfortable due to the angle of approach. His change is a third usable weapon, though both it and the slider regularly play fringe average or below, as Hader is still working to find a consistent release that allows him to work the totality of the zone with each. He’ll need more precision in execution to continue his run of success against stiffer Texas League competition, and could find a home as a useful lefty relief arm should he prove incapable of turning over upper-level lineups with his fastball-heavy approach.”

Of course, time is equal parts blessing and curse for player development, and in this case the Brewers used varying approaches with each player. Santana had already reached the MLB with the Astros, and the Brewers front office almost immediately caused the trade to pay dividends by recalling the right-handed batting outfielder on August 21, 2015. Santana showed it all within his first two weeks, belting four homers and two doubles while batting .216 and striking out 12 times in 43 PA. The Brewers gave the outfielder time in center field as well as his more common corner spot, potentially testing the waters for a high-power fourth outfield role if the regular right field spot did not work. Santana finished his 2015 Milwaukee campaign with modest success in 38 games, boasting a .299 True Average (TAv) and -4.8 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA). Adrian Houser joined Santana at the MLB level as a September call-up, immediately compounding the *reality* of this trade, or the sense that this trade could be of real impact for the Brewers.

Using depreciated surplus analysis, here’s how the trade looked on the “day-of.” (The TL;DR is that this analysis essentially monetizes Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) and Overall Future Potential (OFP), while also considering contract cost and reserve time, to compare prospects and MLB players of varying service time. It is a Benefit-Cost Analysis. More here if you’re interested):

In hind sight, over the course of three prospect cycles (pre-2016, 2017, 2018) and two full seasons, it is easy to view the Gomez-Fiers trade as a complete, smashing success for the Brewers. And the trade was indeed successful; on the day of the trade, the Brewers essentially “extracted” one additional potential MLB average player ($19.5 million) from the Astros, meaning that the trade could certainly be viewed as fair for both the Astros and the Brewers, with the Astros potentially surrendering a bit more than one would normally like for a super star CF and playoff race rotation help. The trade almost certainly was a huge success for the Astros in terms of revenue, as Carlos Gomez smashed the game-winning home run in the American League Wild Card in 2015, ensuring that Houston entered a longer series and had a chance at more playoff coin. I left this out of my analysis, but it is worth separately considering organizational trade incentive.

The last two trade check-ins published midseason 2016 and 2017 are worth publishing once again, just to show the ridiculous swing in surplus value:

So, why the retrospective? Well, frankly, it appears that the trade has already been promptly rewritten as highway robbery after the collapse of Carlos Gomez in Houston, and now the MLB ascent and success of Josh Hader, as well as many of the criticisms of the Brewers’ deep offseason outfield acquisitions, appears to color the value of the trade once more. Now, the Brewers apparently have a potential top rotation starter in Josh Hader, and a superstar right fielder in Domingo Santana…which is great to dream about, but misses the fun and importance of the Gomez-Fiers trade.

The Gomez-Fiers trade was a strong deal for Milwaukee on day one, but it was also a weird deal, and it’s worth exploring that a bit more. Entering 2018, the Brewers had a lot of value extracted from the Gomez-Fiers trade. Josh Hader lost his breaking ball and experiencing some mechanical / approach hiccups in Triple-A Colorado Springs, so his development continued at the MLB level. The twirling fastballer hardly hiccuped from his first June appearance onward, working seven scoreless outings before allowing his first run. Of course, the command was not yet there, as Hader also allowed eight walks to six strike outs over 9.3 IP; compare that to Hader’s current 22 strike out / three walk line over 9.7 IP to start 2018. Anyway, Hader established himself as a curious role player, almost instantly proving to serve as an MLB relief chameleon a la Andrew Miller, but without any of the 96 G / 66 GS / 359.3 IP of trial and error, 5.79 ERA baseball over three teams that actually defined Andrew Miller’s ascent to one of the greatest and most interesting relief aces in the game. For the honest developmental reason that Hader could not start, and that the lefty was re-establishing his stuff, delivery, and command, the Brewers’ young southpaw got to fast forward past the ugly stuff and reach his 2017 Baseball Prospectus realistic role: high leverage relief. This is different than his 2015 prospect role, but it’s not bad; it’s simply more in focus.

As an aside, why should Hader be more than this? Of course the funky lefty everyone loves to cite for Hader’s fantastical upside is Chris Sale, an ace that surprised scouting profiles in some cases. But this is a moment worth instructing on player comparisons: Hader is not Chris Sale. Chris Sale was a 13th overall college pick by the White Sox (2010), a pick who was already working in the MLB during the same year that he was drafted; Hader was a 19th round pick who required two trades and nearly five-and-a-half seasons of development to reach the MLB. Sale was age-23 by the time the White Sox transitioned the one-time oddball reliever to the starting rotation; Josh Hader is in his age-24 season right now. Sale is listed at 6’6″ and threw between 96 and 98 MPH with a primary sinking-running fastball as a reliever; Hader is listed at 6’4″ and throws between 92 and 95 MPH with a primary rising fastball as a reliever. Josh Hader is not Chris Sale and should not be compared to Chris Sale; we have data available to make better comparisons, so make better comparisons. Anyway, Hader is already proving to have potential as a strangely role-flexible, elite quality MLB reliever. Don’t get greedy!

If Hader’s success was at the MLB level as a budding relief ace with extremely flexible roles, Brett Phillips opened 2018 as (presumably) the last Gomez-Fiers player on a Top 10 list. Baseball Prospectus ranked Phillips fifth in the Brewers system, and a couple years of struggle, redemption, and a smashing 2017 MLB debut placed the left-handed batting outfielder’s role in focus. Read this beautiful prose, as not many prospect list roles are so clear:

“OFP 60—First division center fielder carried by his glove and pop
Likely 50—Average outfielder whose secondary skills prop up low averages”

It does not get much better than that. So, Phillips is where he is, another so-called casualty of the Brewers’ #TeamDepth, but in a sense the age-24 outfielder is exactly where his scouting role should place him on a competitive MLB team: Phillips is going to be an indispensable depth player for the Brewers, offering a fantastic glove and arm that keep him in the MLB while the potential promise of power at the plate sorts itself out. This is different than his 2015 prospect role, but it’s not bad; it’s simply more in focus.

Domingo Santana is having a bit of a “ho hum” start to the 2018 campaign, which is not a bad thing. In fact, it’s nearly worth a sigh of relief to see the right fielder opening the year with a .283 batting average and 10 percent walk rate (entering play Sunday), driving a powerless TAv of .273 (not bad!). I know there are a ton of Brewers fans who just want Santana to be a superstar, to break out from the 2017 campaign that saw 3.3 WARP on the strength of a full season of improved plate discipline, .306 TAv, and -7.6 FRAA. It’s tough to say this in the right voice, that’s not a knock on Santana, but Santana need not be a superstar…Santana is a good MLB player. It’s okay to stop there; the OFP 50 / realistic 40 grade RF has already produced nearly 5.0 WARP for the Brewers over portions of four seasons. In fact, I dare say that this is his 2015 prospect role, with the swing and approach concerns ironed out. The Brewers may have picked up Domingo Santana they had hoped to acquire.

Watching Adrian Houser throw 95-to-96 MPH rising and running fastballs during his 2.0 IP relief outing against the Cubs was a wondrous occasion. The big righty (listed 6’4″, 235 lb) threw that heat with ease, and also sprinkled in both of his off speed offerings (a change and curve). There were rumblings in spring that the Brewers hope to stretch Houser into a starter, which was somewhat surprising given the righty’s return from Tommy John surgery and the club’s handling of Taylor Williams (another TJ-returnee). But, every injury case is different, and every rehab case is different, so the Houser that the Brewers picked up in the 2015 trade may now turn in to something that Brewers fans never could have expected: a central player in a pitching staff that is built around depth and aggressive use of a bullpen (Brewers fans literally could not have imagined a quality depth-based rotation rounded out with Wade Miley, Corbin Burnes, Freddy Peralta, and Houser in July 2015, but here we are). In this context, gambling on a potential back-end starter that has already reached the MLB and demonstrated some stuff that could play looks like quite an interesting bet (at least) for the Brewers runs prevention chances. Houser will not be flashy, but he’s here. His injury may change the risk profile, meaning that he’s not the prospect he was in 2015, which isn’t bad; it’s simply more in focus.

Several aspects of player development and strategic assessment make the Gomez-Fiers trade great.

• First and foremost, as I’ve written before and is always worth emphasizing, Doug Melvin did well to acquire mostly advanced prospects who had fairly well-defined scouting roles on the day of the trade. This trade was not as huge a gamble as it could have been.

• Second, the Brewers quickly advanced players when they needed to be advanced, and allowed players with shortcomings to develop at the MLB level.
  • Santana had nothing left to prove in Triple-A, even with strike zone contact questions that were very well known prior to the trade. It was up to the Brewers to help Santana develop that hit tool and iron out that approach at the MLB level.
  • Hader falls into this camp as well; imagine if the Brewers had demoted Hader to Double-A Biloxi last year, as an answer to altitude and as a chance to get the lefty back on track to becoming a starting pitching prospect. Imagine Hader working in Biloxi as a starter throughout the season, getting that command and delivery back while he re-established his breaking ball. That could have happened; see Jorge Lopez and Taylor Jungmann, for example. Instead, David Stearns correctly assessed a need on the MLB club, and correctly assessed Hader’s strength (delivery deception and advanced fastball) and wagered that the southpaw could answer his development questions at the MLB level. These are huge player development successes for Melvin and Stearns, and if you don’t believe it, again, imagine Hader opening the 2018 season as a starting pitching prospect in Triple-A once more, perhaps this time to add innings after he found his secondary stuff in Biloxi.

• Third, the Brewers adroitly took it slow when they needed to, working Adrian Houser all the way back from a Tommy John surgery and returning Brett Phillips to Double-A Biloxi for 2016 despite his shredding the league in 98 age-21 plate appearances. In case Phillips feels like an “old” prospect, remember that he’s still just in his age-24 season in a league with an average age nearly three years older (AAA), while serving as MLB depth. Houser is in his age-25 season serving as MLB depth. Time remains with this trade.

• Finally, with nearly three full years of assessment due on this trade, it is worth emphasizing that this trade is a smashing success despite only one of the prospects truly reaching their day-of ceiling (Santana), while others forged interesting new role questions (Hader), or at the very least solidified the value of usable MLB floors (Houser, Phillips). This is exactly the type of trade that Brewers fans and analysts can study in order to think through the varying degrees of prospect risk, and the types of roles that a prospect can demonstrate (or, the spectrum that even one single role could include). A trade does not need to include top of the rotation starters, superstar right fielders, and flashy everyday defense-first center fielders in order to become a smashing success. Sometimes reaching the MLB is enough, for good player development at that level ensures that some prospect questions can be answered with exclamation points, even without bona fide stardom.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Stepping into speculative histories of MLB players, I’ve been thinking about what I’d expect from players like Burnes or Peralta if they reached the MLB in 2018. Both pitchers provide extreme challenges to the observer, and for different reasons.

• Burnes provides a challenge because the righty’s quick ascent to the advanced minors has out-paced the non-proprietary information available about the pitcher, which manifested itself during the 2017 season in the form of widely varying fastball, slider, and delivery reports. From early in the season, when on-the-ground reports placed Burnes as a potentially high reliever-risk profile who could make it work as a middle rotation starter, to late in the season when delivery adjustments and improved fastball reports began leaking out, fans and analysts were essentially given several different pitchers’ worth of information. Entering 2018, then, it’s worth asking whether Burnes is the fastball / slider reliever with middle rotation question marks, the middle rotation arm who could decrease reliever risk by continuing to refine his delivery, or the surging pitching prospect who simply continues to redefine roles by refining mechanics and therefore allowing his stuff to take the next step. All of this can happen with Burnes, or none of it; thus the righty prospect is an acute example of information asymmetry.

• Peralta faces different questions about his stuff and profile, especially due to his diminished stature (compared to Burnes) and his pitching approach (he’s not quite a command-and-deception guy, but he twists and turns his fastballs in order to help his stuff “play up”). In one sense, Peralta is much more conventional than Burnes, insofar as Peralta will be lauded as “the small framed righty who proved everyone wrong” should his frame stick in a functional mid-rotation role. On the other hand, given the frame and lack of a strong fastball, it is worth questioning how Peralta’s arsenal and command will play as he advances in the system. The significance of the righty’s pitch sequencing and location will not be understated. It’s tough to say whether Peralta faces “reliever risk” in the same sense Burnes does, as Peralta’s top role is even murkier than his Advanced Minors teammate.

So, if Burnes and Peralta reach the MLB in 2018, what will their potential roles be? What performance levels might fans expect? With Counsell looking at both pitchers as potential midseason reinforcements for the staff, it is worth digging into potential production expectations.

Role risk will be nothing new to the 2018 Brewers; role risk is all over the roster, even beyond the rookie class. But, in attempting to form expectations about Burnes and Peralta, I turned to other rookie pitchers that are on the MLB roster or in Spring Training camp as non-roster invitees. By my count, these rookies comprise (in order of height) Peralta, Taylor Williams, Marcos Diplan, Jorge Lopez, Aaron Wilkerson, Erik Davis, Burnes, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Brandon Woodruff, Tyler Webb, and Jon Perrin.

• Several of these arms are already established as MLB relievers or very likely to have relief roles in 2018 (see Williams, Lopez, Davis, Houser, and Webb).

• A few of these arms are organizational depth with questionable futures in terms of organizational plans (see Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Davis, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Finally, there’s a deep group of potential rotation depth, in terms of starters who could work as rotational replacements or MLB emergency starters in 2018 (Peralta, Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Burnes, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Woodruff is likely the only pitcher here who is a rotational lock in 2018 (and even writing that leads me to raise some questions, as “There is no such thing as a pitching prospect,” there is no such thing as a surefire pitching role).

Available PECOTA projections (March 2, 2018) for 2018 Brewers rookies (Erik Davis and Jon Perrin projections unavailable). This table features IP projections, as well as Runs Allowed and Runs Prevented figures drawn from projected Deserved Runs Average. Runs Prevented figures are drawn from an average of the 2016-2017 Miller Park / National League. PECOTA strike outs, walks, and WARP are also featured.

With these dozen pitchers, I’ve already laid out extensive role risk simply by categorizing these arms. So, in order to form potential expectations for 2018, I turned to speculative history: namely, how many pitchers in the MLB expansion era matched these arms’ precise height, weight range, handedness, and age as rookies? That is to ask, if these pitchers reach the MLB as rookies in 2018 (e.g., their precise 2018 age), how does their physical profile fare (e.g., their handedness, height, and weight?).

To answer this question, and engage in this speculative exercise, I used the indispensable (and highly recommended) Baseball Reference Play Index to search comparable expansion era players. I searched the expansion era because it is a largely integrated era that also includes a relatively similar form of baseball over the decades in terms of pitching arsenals or prototypes (it tracks the diminishing knuckleball, rise of the splitter / forkball, rise of the fastball / slider profile, etc.). Additionally, as I attempted to search other time frames, I found the reasoning to be rather arbitrary (e.g., if I search the Wild Card Era, should I simply search the Contemporary PED era? If I only search the expanded Wild Card Era (2012-present) will I have a large enough group of players to analyze? And so on).

Using the expansion era, here are the search results from Baseball Reference Play Index. For each player, I searched exact height, handedness, age, and rookie status, while also searching a five percent range in weight (there are some issues with using listed weight). The “Comps” column shows the number of historical rookie comparisons for each potential 2018 Brewers rookie.

This table shows the basic summary of the searches that I conducted using the Play Index tool. What immediately surprised me was the lack of comparisons for some players (like Peralta, Diplan, and Webb), and the large number of comparisons available for “prototypical” starting pitching frames (particularly Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff). Alternately, for a supposedly “old” prospect, the number of comparisons available for Perrin also surprised me, which suggests to me that there has been a path in MLB history for righties of his size and draft pedigree to reach the MLB, even if it takes a while.

Meandering through the comparisons, there are simply some fun and interesting names that appear.

• 2018 rookie Jon Perrin would reach the MLB at the same time as 2012 rookie Yu Darvish, who shares Perrin’s handedness, age, height, and basic weight range; among older comps, Doug Brocail and Todd Worrell are my favorites for Perrin.

• A few names jump off of 2018 rookie Brandon Woodruff’s spreadsheet, like Corey Kluber (!), Ryan Vogelsong, and (of course), Tim Worrell.

• Corbin Burnes has Michael Fulmer and Steve Bedrosian, Houser has Kevin Quackenbush, while Neftali Feliz and Shelby Miller belong to Luis Ortiz. Fulmer is a fascinating comp for Burnes not because of his excellent MLB performance, but because he shared Burnes’s information asymmetry in terms of advanced minors scouting roles and MLB adjustments to exceed expectations. Feliz and Miller are interesting comps for Ortiz, for as the righty faces questions about innings workload and relief risk, it’s good to remember that successful arms have also shared the righty’s frame, height, and age as rookies.

• The lone comps for Diplan and Peralta? Peralta matches 2000 rookie Byung-Hyun Kim (!), while Diplan matches 1965 rookie Dick Selma.

• Obviously, there is a world of gray area here, as these comparisons say nothing about a player’s draft or international development status, stuff, place in the minor league system, etc. Moreover, for my search, I did not use these comparisons to create trends or aging curves, so what I am attempting should not be read alongside the (much more methodologically sound) PECOTA system.

From these searches, a batch of 257 rookie comparison seasons resulted. In order to analyze potential performance markers in environments comparable to the 2016-2017 MLB, I indexed each season according to Runs Allowed per Game (RA/G), and sampled post-Strike rookies that played during a season with a run environment within 5 percent of the 2017 RA/G. This analysis produced a sample of 85 rookie comparison seasons. The following table shows the basic production range for this 85 rookie population:

For this analysis, I focused on Innings Pitched and basic league-level Runs Prevented (I did not investigate historical park factors for this analysis). To compensate for the lack of park factors, I produced a range of runs prevented estimates. Overall, this group of pitchers did not average high innings pitched totals (presumably due to their rookie status, in many cases), with the average pitcher in this sample working nearly 39.0 innings.

This sample can be further categorized to focus on each specific Brewers rookie’s physical profile. In the next table, a range of runs prevented (RnPrv, LowRnPrv, and HighRnPrv) accompany Innings Pitched and Runs averages and standard deviation (IP, IP_StDev; Rn, Rn_StDev).

This table undoubtedly demonstrates a wide range of potentialities for these Brewers rookie pitchers. The innings pitched variance alone suggests that these players could range anywhere from “Did Not Play” to 70-to-80 IP seasons. It’s easy to get excited about some of these results; for example, 75 innings pitched and five runs prevented from Corbin Burnes, or 56.3 IP and six runs prevented from Taylor Williams would represent excellent rotational and bullpen support for Milwaukee.

Yet, the basic averages might provide some hint as to why the Brewers front office has remained quiet on the pitching free agency market thus far: even averaging around 35 innings and providing moderate runs prevented totals, this group of pitchers has a physical pedigree that suggests competent replacement depth can come from rookie ranks. Of course, it is impossible to fully extrapolate from these historical rookie comparisons to the Brewers 2018 pitching staff; this is not a correlative relationship. Yet, through this speculative historical analysis, one can find that Milwaukee has some solid physical characteristics with plenty of historical counterparts (especially Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff); there are also some nearly one-of-a-kind profiles (see Diplan, Peralta, and Webb). Ultimately, these dozen rookies present Milwaukee’s front office and field management with an array of options to collect outs and prevent runs, even if they’re a group of wide-ranging replacements.

Baseball Prospectus. 2018 PECOTA (March 2, 2018) [CSV]. Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Prospectus. “More PECOTA” (Player Cards). Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Sports Reference, LLC., Sports Reference LLC, 2000-2018. Searches conducted March 3, 2018 from baseball-reference.com.

Following the end of the 2017 regular season, the team allowed ace setup man Anthony Swarzak to hit the open market despite a stated desire to return to Milwaukee. They made a halfhearted bid to retain him, but in the end their offer was outbid by a measly $3 million from the New York Mets. Middle reliever Jared Hughes was projected for a $2.2 million salary in his final year of arbitration after arguably the best season of his career, but was non-tendered. Jeremy Jeffress would’ve suffered the same fate as Hughes had he not agreed to take a steep pay cut in arbitration and sign a club-friendly deal with not one, but two team options.

While quality relievers like Swarzak, Juan Nicasio, Brandon Morrow, Bryan Shaw, Steve Cishek, and others were flying off the board during the early portion of the offseason, David Stearns sat on the sidelines. He has added three veterans to the bullpen mix over the course of the winter but again, only on cheap, low-risk deals: a non-guaranteed $2 million commitment to Yovani Gallardo, $1.875 million with a club option/buyout for Boone Logan, and $5 million for Matt Albers spread out over two seasons. A few notable vets, like JJ Hoover, Erik Davis, and Mike Zagurski, will also be in camp on non-roster invites.

So should we as fans be concerned with Stearns placing a low priority on shoring up the relief corps this winter? No, or at least not in the eyes of PECOTA. As BPMilwaukee editor-in-chief Nicholas Zettel dug into earlier this week, the projections think that the Brewers still ought to have a highly productive bullpen with the group of players currently in-house. According to PECOTA, the top-five relievers in Craig Counsell’s pen project to be Corey Knebel, Josh Hader, Jacob Barnes, Oliver Drake, and Logan, with each member of that group projected to churn out an ERA below 3.86 and produce close to 4 WARP cumulatively. The numbers for Albers, Jeffress, and Gallardo peg them as more of roster filler-types than difference makers in 2018, but if the projections are to be believed then there should be two prospects nipping at their heels for spots in the bullpen within short order.

Taylor Williams and Adrian Houser are a pair of promising right-handers that have both spent a short amount of time in the big leagues and both have a Tommy John procedure in their recent past. Williams was a 4th-round pick by the club back in 2013 and was put on the map during Spring Training in 2015 when Ryan Braun compared his stuff to that of Craig Kimbrel. Unfortunately Williams went under the knife shortly after garnering such praise and missed all of the 2015 and 2016 seasons. Houser was considered the fourth piece in the 2015 Gomez-Fiers blockbuster with Houston and made his MLB debut with Milwaukee that September. He was pitching in AA in 2016 when his elbow gave out in July and forced him to hit the operating table.

The Brewers stuck by both hurlers during their recoveries, though. Williams was added to the 40-man roster in November of 2016 despite not throwing a regular season pitch in two years, based solely on what he was able to show during that year’s Fall Instructional League. After a carefully managed workload in AA last season (where he posted a 3.09 ERA/100 DRA- in 46.7 innings), Williams joined the big league club as a September call-up and made five appearances down the stretch, allowing one run with two walks and four punchouts in 4.7 innings. Houser, meanwhile, kept his spot on the 40 man roster even while he was down and out but was able to get back on the mound much more quickly than his cohort. Just 12 months after undergoing UCL surgery, Houser was in Maryvale making rehab starts with Milwaukee’s rookie-level affiliate. He made eight appearances between Maryvale and Appleton and in 17.2 innings, he compiled a 1.02 ERA with 27 strikeouts against just four free passes. Houser was then assigned to the Arizona Fall League, where he impressed scouts with his stuff and physicality on the mound coming off of the surgery.

PECOTA doesn’t project large innings totals at the MLB level for either pitcher next season, but if one were to extrapolate their expected numbers out for a full-season each would be a significant contributor in the bullpen. The soon-to-be 27 year old Williams is forecasted for a 3.65 ERA with 10.7 K/9 and 3.9 BB/9 in 2018; only two pitchers on the staff, Knebel and Hader, project for a lower earned run average in the coming year. Williams’ four-seamer averaged 96.1 MPH during his brief stint in The Show last season and he can get swings-and-misses with his plus slider, as well. That profile fits in perfectly with the philosophy that Stearns and company have employed while building up their pitching depth throughout the winter.

As far as Houser, PECOTA sees him capable of 3.83 ERA along with marks of 9.9 K/9 and 3.6 BB/9 in 2018. If he can match that output, it would place him among the top run preventers that Milwaukee has in their bullpen mix. According to Eric Longenhagen of Fangraphs, Houser was sitting between 93-97 MPH during AFL action and he also graded Adrian’s 12-6 curveball as a plus pitch. The 25 year old will also utilize a cutter and changeup, helping to lead Keith Law of ESPN to conclude that Houser still has the potential to be a league-average starting pitcher. But, as Longenhagen notes “if Milwaukee plans on fast-tracking him as a reliever, all the ingredients are already here.”

Milwaukee figures to have a strong bullpen once again in 2018 led by the triumvirate of Knebel, Hader, and Barnes. While David Stearns may have gone the economical route with the signings he has made to help raise the group’s floor, perhaps he only did so out of the belief that he already had more high impact arms in-house. If Adrian Houser and Taylor Williams can meet or exceed the projections laid out for them, Milwaukee will become that much more of a threat to break their six-year postseason drought.

Baseball Prospectus:
Why PECOTA Hates Your Favorite Team
13 Noteworthy Projections

Since PECOTA is a probabilistic model, which means that it is designed to reflect the most probable outcome in a distribution of projected outcomes, Brewers fans should keep in mind that “84” is not some special or magic number. As demonstrated last season, a club that was expected (at best) to flirt with .500 surged ahead and competed for the playoffs, but that surge was not even greater than one standard deviation away from the projected win total. These Brewers could indeed use their strengths to once again push the club ahead of schedule by contending for a playoff spot or winning the division in 2018, or they could indeed sputter in development patterns or role depreciation and return closer to .500. What PECOTA reflects is that the Brewers’ big offseason moves (trading for Christian Yelich, signing Lorenzo Cain) did not guarantee them a playoff spot or even playoff contention, but instead, “more probable” competition or “more probable” playoff contention.

So, what’s going to make the Brewers “tick” in 2018? Here are my favorite picks from 2018 Brewers PECOTA:

PECOTA “punts” the Yelich Trade
Standing behind the curtain during some of the PECOTA work throughout the offseason, it was very interesting to see that the trade involving Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto for Christian Yelich….did not really “move the needle” on the Brewers’ 2018 expected win total. This is surprising given the court of public opinion, but there are two specific reasons that the trade does not immediately yield an absurd advantage for the 2018 Brewers: (1) Lewis Brinson’s high floor is real, and (2) Christian Yelich could experience some role depreciation. It’s always so easy to look at the best possible outcomes or potentialities in each trade; Brinson the future superstar, Yelich the 5.0 WARP player, but it’s also worth emphasizing Brinson’s risk in reaching his peak role and Yelich’s fluctuation between varying degrees of serviceable-to-great production.

Don’t get me wrong: Christian Yelich is a very good baseball player, and his contract makes him worth every potential prospect future that the Brewers surrendered. PECOTA thinks so, too, projecting Yelich primarily as a Brewers left fielder working a .279 TAv and serviceable fielding at a corner position. That’s good for 2.7 WARP, second only to Lorenzo Cain (3.5 WARP). But, remember that floor for Brinson? Even if the center fielder fails to reach his fullest and best hit tool (and therefore, fullest and best power) in the MLB, he’s still a speedy, strong defense, strong arm player in the center of the diamond. PECOTA projects Brinson at .262 TAv and an overall plus on defense for the Marlins, which is good for a club leading 2.5 WARP. This is great for both teams: the Brewers land a quality outfielder under control for five years who has already shown his developed peak abilities at the MLB level (while rounding out the club with a left-handed bat and better plate discipline), while Marlins fans immediately landed the face of their rebuild, the best player on their team, and (at best) someone who neutralizes the toxic offseason orchestrations of Project Wolverine.

Zach Davies and Orlando Arcia Remain Quietly Competitive
As mentioned, the Brewers contended in 2017 due to the “high floor” strengths of their youngsters: players like Orlando Arcia and Zach Davies were not set up to be immediate superstars, but still maintained quality, consistent MLB seasons that propelled the team along “behind the scenes.” PECOTA projects the same for 2018, although this time Zach Davies is leading the pitching staff with a solid 4.43 DRA over 170+ innings, good for a 1.6 WARP. Arcia sits behind Cain and Yelich in terms of overall WARP, but the young shortstop is projected to continue onward with excellent defense and a serviceable bat at shortstop. One could look at these players’ projections and emphasize that PECOTA sees them declining from their absolute 2017 WARP, but I don’t think the WARP is the point here. Instead, what matters is that this duo is still viewed as a quality backbone of the club, even with some attrition, which will undoubtedly serve crucial roles for grinding through 162.

The Outfield Depth is a Problem
Projecting the Brewers’ outfield depth was a nightmare. I previously wrote about how a rotational system can make five outfield spots work for Yelich, Cain, Santana, Ryan Braun, and Brett Phillips, but it’s much more difficult to put those ideals into the mixer and dissect the potential probabilities. Probability #1, which PECOTA currently projects sans Santana trade, is that Ryan Braun plays right field, but only some first base and left field, and therefore loses all of his defensive value. Both Braun and Santana suffer in this universe, creating a total of 1.9 WARP (but 75 extra base hits!) and TAv below .280. Comparable players for Domingo Santana are Oswaldo Arcia, Jonny Gomes, and Joc Pederson, and his plate discipline regresses (98 strike outs and 36 walks in 315 plate appearances). Granted, I do think there is still a path of optimism about the current roster depth (perhaps Braun works 1B more frequently, and Santana receives more regular playing time across the outfield, interleague designated hitter, and pinch hitting roles), but I do not think that means PECOTA is categorically mistaken for the pessimistic trends for Braun or Santana. After all, the current roster mash up is designed in a way to particularly showcase flaws for both Braun and Santana, which does not mean they’re bad baseball players (in fact, their TAv are projected to contend for best overall offensive production on the club), they simply may be imperfect ballplayers for this current roster.

Chase Anderson is Chase Anderson
There are many good stories about the 2017 Brewers, but it’s tough to find one that’s better than Anderson’s arrival as an impact starting pitcher. Anderson resonated with Brewers fans not simply because he was a previous low-to-mid rotation depth option who arrived as one of the very best pitchers in the National League, but because he also vindicated the mechanical, analytical, and strategic approach of pitching coach Derek Johnson. In 2018, PECOTA projects some of 2016 Anderson to return, particularly in the shape of walks, hits, and home runs, without phenomenal gains in strike outs or ground balls. Underlying modeling views Anderson as one of the most likely pitchers on the Brewers to “collapse” in 2018, and less likely to “improve,” and it’s not hard to squint and see a scenario in which a comparable of Dustin McGowan is suitable for the righty’s age-30 campaign. Even with all of this noted, Anderson’s DRA is projected at 4.59 for the year, which should be a better than average performance if the offensive environment holds steady. There is value in that performance over 168.0 innings pitched, and this type of season still validates the contract extension that Anderson signed.

The Bullpen is Fantastic
As a group, the primary Brewers bullpen as currently constructed looks fantastic. Josh Hader and Corey Knebel are projected as the most likely relievers to improve in 2018, but Jeremy Jeffress, Boone Logan, and Matt Albers also receive relatively strong scores in the category. The current main group is projected to produce a DRA below 4.30, which should demonstrate the potential for average or better production in most offensive environments that the arms face in 2018. Some red flags float beneath the surface, however, as the walk rates are slightly worse than average for the relief group, and outside of Adrian Houser, Jeffress, Albers, and Jacob Barnes the group is projected to have relatively low ground ball rates. Yet, even outside of Knebel and Hader the relievers are projected as a strong strike out group, suggesting that some of the slider-heavy moves of the offseason should pay dividends in high leverage situations.

Prospects Begin Appearing on the Scene
One of my favorite aspects of digging into PECOTA projections is the appearance of new faces to the MLB. Caden Lemons, Keston Hiura, KJ Harrison, and Tristen Lutz are all listed as highly improbable MLB players by PECOTA, but their appearance on the radar after the 2017 draft means that the system is now generating comparable players for this group. Jacob Nottingham was added to the 40-Man Roster at the beginning of the 2017-2018 offseason, and one of the comparable names that popped up in his player line is Jonathan Lucroy, which is fascinating for many reasons (not the least of which is Lucroy’s general reputation as a defense-first catcher for the beginning of his career, and Nottinghma’s floor as a back-up catcher with pop). Mauricio Dubon appears as one of the more probable MLB prospects for the club, and his line is a very serviceable utility infielder (.250 batting average, .380 slugging percentage).

Brewers fans might be most excited to see Corbin Burnes at the bottom of the club’s starting pitcher list with three starts, as the pop-up righty prospect is given relatively favorable odds to reach the MLB and a set of comparable players that effectively grade out his reliever risk, reliever potential, and (most excitingly) his starting pitching potential. Additionally, Adrian Houser is given lower odds of reaching the MLB in 2018, but seeing the power sinker reliever in the mix leads to an exciting scenario where the entire Carlos Gomez / Mike Fiers trade return is potentially playing with the Brewers during the same season.

It’s a good reminder that even though common perception is that the Brewers system took a big hit with the Christian Yelich trade, there is still an intriguing group of prospects potentially knocking at the door for 2018. Add an asterisk to this potential 83-win season, as one that exhibits contending-ready talent and depth roles that are still developing for more future success.

Photo Credit: Ken Blaze, USAToday Sports Images

Edit: Updated at 7:15 AM to reflect updated win total, from 84 to 83.

Those narratives will undoubtedly carry into 2018 guided by the very same contradictions: Milwaukee will indeed be developing many young players at the MLB level (including Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, and Brandon Woodruff), while the team also has several opportunities to improve with established players (either through trades involving their prospects, through free agency signings, or both).

To put it another way: GM David Stearns can take the roster in several directions, and certainly has the resources available to contend while continuing to develop some players.

One way to assess player value, and therefore roster needs, is to estimate the surplus value that each player (and their contractual situation) provides the team. Value is assumed to be production and scarcity, recognizing that a player is not simply valuable to a club based on production, but also based on cost and the general availability of that skill set within the MLB. Surplus is the difference provided between a player’s production and their contract, recognizing that these aspects can be double-counted (a team simultaneously receives a player’s production on the field and their production gauged against their contract). Based on these assumptions, I tracked the surplus value of the Brewers 40-man roster (as of October 20, 2017) by using harsh depreciation to reduce each player’s maximum value (recognizing that a player’s performance typically declines over time save for rare cases).

The following chart tracks changes in surplus entering 2017 to entering 2018, while also assigning an Overall Future Potential (OFP) role for each Brewers roster member:

What these surplus numbers can suggest, in the abstract, is the difference between “the number of the wins above replacement” a player will produce during their contract and the OFP a team might receive if they traded the player at this point in time (alternately, they might suggest a contract range; for example, if the Brewers offered Neil Walker a $30 million contract, they would likely retain some surplus value during that contract).

Using the extremely interesting and difficult case of Jonathan Villar to interpret this table, his 2016 campaign and contract control years still loom large enough to suggest that the Brewers should not move the infielder for cheap; but the shortstop-turned-bench/utility option does mean that Villar’s ultimate role is trending downward, meaning that if Milwaukee believes that role decline is real and will continue to materialize, moving Villar for less than his top value could offset the issues of rostering a declining role. This should outline the difficulty of making roster decisions: in the case of Villar, there is not necessarily a right answer.

I should add that surplus value is abstract in the sense that there is a point at which additional surplus does not provide a team transaction value. Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter should be the most specific examples of this phenomenon in recent Brewers memory, as both players retained solidly positive surplus value entering 2017, but were essentially unwanted on the trade market and therefore expendable for nothing. Following this example, a rule of thumb might be to expect any type of roster move once a player’s surplus value dips below $20 million (or, less than three wins above replacement). Looking at the table of the Brewers roster above, this fact should seem intuitive with many of the names on the list (for example, it is highly unlikely that the Brewers would be able to move a player like Andrew Susac or even Eric Thames for their maximal surplus value).

By averaging each player’s 2017, 2018, and OFP surplus value, and comparing that to their change in value over time, a rather intuitive 2018 roster emerges. In this case, I excluded each player with a Negative-50 percent change in value (ex., a 50 percent decline), which produced need at Catcher, Second Base, and Right-Handed Pitcher, with additional question marks about the Utility roles. This is a rather succinct picture of the actual needs for the 2018 Brewers, and it also shows that if a few key free agents are retained, or similar free agents from outside the organizational signed, the Brewers can assemble quite a good roster:

These tables need not force an analyst to rely on numbers alone in order to validate roster decisions. Compare the following descriptions of potential role upgrades for the 2018 Brewers with those players’ statistical trends, and find nearly 20 roster spots (on the 40-Man) that can be upgraded for 2018:

The benefit of this exercise is that additional roster functions can be analyzed, either through descriptive or analytical means. For example, one could compare some of the best Rule 5 Draft Roster Protection candidates with the players above in order to find the most salient moves for the future value of the organization. Via Brewerfan.net:

Once again, this should exhibit a rather intuitive process of evaluation. If the future value of a catcher such as Jacob Nottingham is better than either Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy (or all three players), it should not hurt to lose one of those players in order to roster Nottingham. Each of these catchers are good candidates for contractual non-tenders for this reason (and, indeed, catcher is a position that the Brewers can upgrade in terms of depth behind/alongside Manny Pina). Similarly, allowing Matt Garza to walk via free agency and rostering Marcos Diplan, Freddy Peralta, or Devin Williams in that place should improve the pitching surplus of the roster. Where it gets more interesting is considering a player like Mauricio Dubon, and whether he simply takes the spot of free agent Eric Sogard, or overtakes Villar or Hernan Perez.

Using these analytical approaches should validate the fact that the Brewers are in a unique position entering 2018. They are a good team, indeed, that also features many up-and-coming players to develop at the MLB level and many declining roles that can be replaced. Where surplus value becomes useful is targeting particular trades, or simply determining when a player should be released or non-tendered.

A player like Keon Broxton, Perez, Susac, or Vogt should demonstrate this difficult decision-making process, and perhaps cause fans to realign their expectations that these types of players can receive impactful trade returns to Milwaukee. Given the packed outfield for 2018, the Brewers could conceivably release a player like Broxton should trade partners refuse to bite with a 45-to-50 OFP / quality depth trade (matching Broxton’s $11.5M-to-$19.8M surplus), for the trouble is that Broxton’s expected role is indeed declining (and any particular trade partner will also know that). This should not simply be viewed as picking on Broxton, as the point exists for Vogt and several other players on the roster.

“Slingin’ Stearns” earned his nickname for wheeling-and-dealing on the trade market during his first offseason in Milwaukee, but that reputation has calmed over time (not surprisingly, as the club completed their rebuilding process). Stearns did not show any hesitation in aggressively using waiver claims and releases to define his 2016-2017 offseason, and now the GM’s reputation may be defined by how effectively he clears roster space for what’s next: refined future development and improved MLB roles to contend in 2018.

The 2017 season proved that these goals can align and coexist within the same roster, so there are no excuses for failing to improve this strategy by learning from the 2017 progression.

Photo Credit: Jim Young, USAToday Sports Images.

For Milwaukee, on the other hand, the trade has only really begun to pay off in spades. Domingo Santana enjoyed a breakout campaign after struggling with injuries last year; he clubbed 30 home runs and posted a .306 TAv and 3.4 WARP in 2017, his age-24 season. Josh Hader opened up eyes around baseball with his outstanding performance in an Andrew Miller-type fireman role, posting a 2.08 ERA / 86 cFIP / 81 DRA- along with a whopping 68 strikeouts in 47.7 innings covering 35 appearances at age 23. Brett Phillips, also 23, earned some important at-bats down the stretch after debuting earlier in the season and has greatly improved his stock within the organization after +4.4 FRAA in center field and a .293 TAv with four home runs in his 37 games this year (though a .408 BABIP sure helped things).

The Brewers received a fourth player in that trade as well, and some unfortunate circumstances have lead to him becoming sort of the forgotten man in the deal. Hard-throwing righty Adrian Houser was also sent to Milwaukee as part of that deal, and he even made his brief major league debut back in September of 2015, throwing two scoreless innings. During spring training in 2016, BP scout Craig Goldstein was quite complimentary in what he saw from the Oklahoma native. He noted that Houser’s plus fastball sat in the 94-95 MPH range, could touch 97, and featured frequent “wiggle.” Goldstein praised Houser’s curveball as “comfortably above-average” and a plus pitch at its best, with some ability to locate the pitch both in the zone and generate swings-and-misses outside of it. There was still work to do with the changeup, but according to Goldstein “[W]ith his frame and a clean, repeatable delivery, the changeup should only have to play as usable for him (Houser) to earn multiple shots as a starter.”

Houser reported to Class-AA Biloxi to begin the 2016 season, and was actually pitching pretty well despite some ugly earned run totals. Houser had yielded a 5.25 ERA through his first 13 starts, but had cut his walk rate down, increased his strikeouts, and was generating ground balls at a 62 percent clip. The 89 cFIP and 3.20 Deserved Run Average that he had produced were much better indicators of how he was actually performing against his Southern League competition. Then in June, disaster struck. Houser made his final appearance of the year on June 23rd before he began dealing with forearm tightness. It was ultimately determined that he would require Tommy John surgery, and he underwent the procedure on July 21st, 2016.

The recovery and rehab from elbow ligament replacement surgery is a lengthy process, and on July 25th, 2017, a little more than a year after his procedure, Houser took the mound again in a competitive game situation for the first time. Pitching for the Arizona League Brewers, Houser tossed a single inning against the rookie-level Dodgers, allowing a hit and an unearned run while punching out one. It didn’t take long for him to get back in the groove against the low-level bats of the AZL; he made five more appearances and in 8.7 innings, he struck out 16, walked four, and registered a 1.06 DRA. Houser would finish out the 2017 regular season by making three appearances (two starts) for class-A Wisconsin, allowing a single run in 9.0 innings with 11 strikeouts and, more notably, zero walks.

The annual Arizona Fall League begins play next week, and the Brewers have selected Houser as one of their eight representatives in this year’s running. Having already pitched in the MLB, Houser isn’t the typical arm that gets chosen to pitch in what’s essentially a prospect showcase league. But it does provide an opportunity for him to get some more post-surgery innings under his belt as he works his way back to full strength, and he’ll be facing higher quality competition than he did in the AZL or Midwest League.

Houser has been pitching at Milwaukee’s instructional camp in preparation for his AFL assignment, and according to Eric Longenhagen of Fangraphs there is reason to believe things are going pretty well:

“RHP Adrian Houser made a tune-up start ahead of Fall League play and looks to be in great physical condition. He made nine late-season starts after missing just over a year due to elbow surgery and rehab. He was up to 96 with his fastball and missing bats with a 12-6 curveball.”

Houser may be a little bit behind the developmental curve after missing a calendar year of action, but he will still be just 25 years old when the 2018 season begins. The Brewers will probably continue to have him pitch as a starter as he rebuilds his arm strength, but given his plus fastball/curveball combination there is reason to believe that he could be making big league contributions in the bullpen in short order. The early career contributions of Santana, Phillips, and Hader have already made the 2015 trade with Houston look like a lopsided one; if Adrian Houser can successfully restore some of the lost prospect luster he had earned prior to his elbow injury, the deal may very well wind up surpassing 2003’s Richie Sexson trade as Doug Melvin’s best during his tenure as GM of the Milwaukee Nine.

After one year, this trade raises many question marks. Granted, there’s still quite a lot of value present in the trade, both in terms of future rotation potential (or trade value) for Houston (with Fiers), and trade, controllable contracts, and hopefully potential performance for the Brewers quartet. Still, even raising these types of vacant hopeful pleasantries does not substitute the fact that one year out, what looked like a blockbuster for both sides is creeping toward a somewhat value-neutral non-event. If there’s any lesson to be drawn from this trade, however, it is that the perception of a trade can change over time, and that a trade’s legacy is certainly not finished on its consummation day, nor one year later. In 2017, this trade might still have those value questions for Milwaukee, and even in 2018 or 2019; yet, it is somewhat absurd to suggest that analysts must wait five years to assess the total value of the trade. What is more interesting is to dig deeper into those years and understand how a trade’s legacy and change year-in and year-out.

I know no better trade with which to demonstrate this point than the Zack Greinke trade orchestrated between the Brewers and the Royals. It was commonplace during the 2014-2015 World Series appearances (and Championship) by the Royals to hear Brewers fans groaning about how former President Doug Melvin traded away Championship-caliber players, but it’s easy to forget that by opening day 2013, the quartet of youngsters traded to Kansas City had dwindled to two roster spots (Alcides Escobar and Lorenzo Cain) and a total of 3.1 WARP between the 2011-2012 seasons. Interestingly enough, Zack Greinke suffered his own surface stat nightmares in 2011, waddling through a productive WARP season while ranking fourth best in terms of runs prevention on a solid, consistent Division Championship rotation. Still, the trades for Shaun Marcum and Greinke were indeed vindicated by the Division Championship and League Championship Series run, which undoubtedly netted the Brewers significant playoff revenue shares, not to mention local merchandise.

Greinke netted a strong 8.67 WARP for the Brewers before the front office traded the righty away midseason 2012, understanding that the club would not be able to defend their NL Central crown. By the end of 2012, the trade looked like a rout — the Brewers netted 8.67 WARP, playoff revenue, and Jean Segura, while the Royals controlled the contracts for 3.1 WARP worth of production; about the only benefit Kansas City could claim were those reserve rights.

Using harsh 3-Year, 10-percent depreciation analysis, as with the other sections of the Grading Trades series, one can see that the prospective value of the Brewers prospects matched up quite well with the production value of Zack Greinke; various WARP or contract surplus estimates place the trade package within 80 percent of Greinke’s expected value, which seems quite good for estimating trade value.

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP in 2010; 0.14 3-Year Depreciation ($0.5M). Contract surplus: -$5.8M. 

***

Of course, Wade Davis and James Shields may have been more crucial to the Royals’ postseason success than Cain or Escobar (not to say they were unimportant), and both of those righties were traded in a package involving the Royals’ Jake Odorizzi. It is interesting that fans almost never mention that Doug Melvin traded away a depth prospect that allowed the Royals to land crucial Championship-drivers, instead focusing on the controllable Cain and Escobar. Trades are as important to building contenders as controlling players, and the Royals instantly turned around their fortunes even while making a trade that caused much head-scratching at the time (myself included). By 2013, the Zack Greinke traded proliferated to two other deals, as the Royals matched Brewers newcomer Segura with their own acquisition of key production assets.

The Jean Segura story has been told multiple times, and it may be worth revisiting it again a few years in the future. But here it is most interesting to point out that even if Segura had an up-and-down-and-out performance in Milwaukee, the shortstop may have helped to net one of the franchise’s new cornerstones. Isan Diaz, Aaron Hill, and Chase Anderson are the latest branches from the Greinke deal, with Wendell Rijo and Aaron Wilkerson added to the family by extension of the Aaron Hill deal. And so this trade moves on and on: with Diaz, the Brewers have another potentially elite trading chip, or a potential middle infield cornerstone if everything goes right.

It is nearly impossible to write these twists and turns into the Greinke trade saga. Kansas City drew 14+ WARP from James Shields and Wade Davis, although one gets the sense that WARP sells short the situational mastery of Davis. Milwaukee received more than 10 WARP of production from Jean Segura before netting a 50-60 grade surging prospect in Isan Diaz. These figures can be added to total production received by both clubs in the original Greinke deal. Of course, even Cain and Escobar famously overcame their 2011-2012 hiccups to bolster the Royals with valuable play during their contending seasons. Prorated to normalize six years of performance against Greinke’s year-and-four-months for Milwaukee, the production value of the original Greinke deal again appears quite evenly matched:

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP (2011); $5.5M contract surplus ($16.0M total annual value). NOTE: 6.6 FRAA in 2011 (!!!).

***

So, one can only imagine the twists and turns that the Gomez-Fiers trade will take in Milwaukee. One can extend this lesson to nearly every trade, in terms of understanding that the lineage of a trade can take winding manifestations that are never imagined at the time of that trade. It remains to be seen if Hader, Houser, Phillips, and Santana impact the next Brewers contender more via trade or their own performances, or a mix of both. If the first year is any lesson, it is worth expecting another strange twist in 2017.

Related Reading:
The Almost-Trade of Carlos Gomez
Brett Phillips: Newest Future Brewer
An Ode to the Uniquely Bright Carlos Gomez
All-Aboard the Jungmann-Santana Express
The Player-Hader’s Ball

Keeping this in mind, it is worth looking at the development of each player involved in the Mets’ and Astros’ bids for Carlos Gomez in 2015. The Mets non-trade for Gomez gave fans a rare look into the different types of offers that front offices can field for a player (or set of players), highlighting the difficulty of determining the most valuable trade in an industry where value can move in many different directions. Yet if this lesson was instantly available in 2015, the trade also offers even more intriguing lessons one year later. Even if a team executes a solid trade, they may need patience to await results that match the expected value of that trade. With that in mind, it is worth analyzing the 2016 campaigns of the Gomez trades.

The Trade Assets
Both Carlos Gomez and Mike Fiers underscore the reality that established MLB players can also have rough years,and non-linear paths to success. In 2016, Fiers and Gomez are each having rough years for the Astros, although both for different reasons. Be it for injury (Gomez) or inconsistency (Fiers), the headliners of the Brewers’ biggest 2015 trade exemplify the struggles of the prospects and other players involved, for both the Mets and the new Brewers farmhands. Almost everyone involved in either version of the Gomez deal is worse off in 2016, which is a great opportunity to showcase the difficulties involved with player development.

For Gomez, the elite power/speed centerfielder is finally warming up after an injury-plagued early season. Gomez landed on the disabled list with a ribcage injury, although he was ailing prior to that, too. His .185 / .246 / .250 batting line entering June does not tell the full story for Gomez. Since returning, Gomez has flashed some of those tools that make him an elite threat, posting five homers and five stolen bases over his last 169 PA. However, Gomez is not otherwise hitting the ball, as the veteran is struggling with a .230 AVG and 47 strikeouts over that same time period. One can squint and see the old Gomez building back up, however, and as Gomez continues to get back into his groove, he can build on his power, speed, and walks.

Fiers has shifted his approach toward off-speed pitching in 2016, after earning his name as a one-of-a-kind fastballer. According to Brooks Baseball, Fiers selected his rising or cut fastball more than 65 percent of his 2015 pitches; that rate is down below 55 percent this year. In place of the rising and cut fastballs, Fiers has doubled his slider usage and significantly increased his change up selections. Almost across the board, Fiers is allowing more groundballs, line drives, and fly balls within in repertoire, in place of the whiffs he saw in 2015. It’s tough to pick a culprit for his increased home run rate, as his homers are up on the primary fastball, cutter, slider, and change. It’s not as though Fiers has been bad across the board, however, as the righty is managing to shift between quality and rough outings. His 5.05 DRA paces him approximately five runs below average for Minute Maid Park, which is still respectable for a back rotation profile.

The Mets Players

RHP Zack Wheeler
The New York Times published a detailed discussion of Zack Wheeler’s elbow surgery rehabilitation over the weekend. Wheeler was to be the prize of the Brewers / Mets version of the Gomez trade, a high-rotation potential that would be worth the injury risk and (hopefully) offering much more immediate value than a pitching prospect. Despite a March 2015 surgery date, Wheeler has yet to work in a game in the Mets system during 2016, and only has a few bullpen sessions to his name.

For that potential, one dreams on the running 95-96 MPH fastball and deep breaking pitch repertoire, which helped land Wheeler atop the stacked Mets organizational chart for Baseball Prospectus in 2013. Wheeler, once lauded as one of the best right-handed pitching prospects and a Top 5 overall prospect, now has the risk side of that gambling equation speak louder than the potential reward. Yet, the Mets eagerly await his return, as the righty could serve as a valuable stretch addition for an injury-plagued rotation if he returns to games in time.

• 2016 Impact: N/A (Yet to pitch).
• Future Impact: 3 years arbitration control; Role unknown

UTIL Wilmer Flores
In the middle of May, it looked like Wilmer Flores might join his teammate in the category of “Injured Potential.” The flexible infielder suffered a hamstring injury, and was batting .180 / .255 / .280 when he hit the DL. Since arriving from the disabled list, however, Flores has turned around his performance for the Mets while also serving a crucial role as a utility starting infielder. This rare role has produced a -2.5 FRAA, but one might place an asterisk next to that number to note the fielder’s positional flexibility.

At the plate, Flores is maintaining a strong contact and discipline profile since his injury. With 11 walks and 15 extra base hits (nine homers) in 145 plate appearances, Flores is further strengthening that .282 AVG. This stretch of improvement has resulted in Flores’s most valuable offensive season of his career with a .314 TAv. BaseballProspectus noted that Flores could have heavy pressure on his bat if he landed at 1B, but the 2013 #5 Mets prospect may now possess that elusive above average in-game power.

• 2016 Impact: 1.3 WARP (.314 TAv, -2.5 FRAA)
• Future Impact: 3 years arbitration control; power bat infielder/1B.

The Astros Return

RF Domingo Santana
The biggest contrast between the Mets and Astros package was the future-oriented aspect of the Houston offering (with much less immediate access to that potential). In the context of that package, Domingo Santana was the least risky trade return, in the sense that the powerful right fielder had already cracked the big leagues. However, the MLB future of Santana had many question marks, especially in terms of Santana’s contact within the strike zone. Upon entering Milwaukee’s batting order, Santana instantly won admirers with a .299 TAv and enough walks to offset those strike outs. Santana had nothing left to prove at AAA, so the Brewers traded established left fielder Khris Davis to Oakland to open a roster spot for Santana (thereby doubling down on organizational future potential).

Unfortunately, Santana has struggled with injuries throughout the bulk of the 2016 season. These struggles include a recent setback that truncated Santana’s rehab stint. On the field, the right fielder continued the extremely high walk and strike out profile at the plate, but lacked the home run punch in irregular playing time. Still, a .278 TAv is not dreadful, especially as one considers that the 23 year old’s longest stretch of uninterrupted starts yielded only 100 PA. One could be inclined to argue that Santana’s injury riddled season hurts the Brewers in the sense that Milwaukee still has to answer his question mark in 2017, but that’s hardly a complaint given Santana’s positive bursts since coming to Milwaukee.

• 2016 Impact: 0.5 WARP (missed 56 team games thus far)
• Future Impact: Remains under reserve (approximately 1 year, 79 days service after 2016); Three True Outcomes starting right fielder

CF Brett Phillips
If Santana was the least risky prospect returned in the trade, Phillips was arguably the headliner, as the athletic CF annihilated Advanced A ball and had already earned a promotion to AA within the Astros system. 2015 BaseballProspectus scouting reports of Phillips generally painted a potential five average tool (at least) profile, even though both observers disagreed about the potential hit and power tools (50 / 50 vs. 55 / 45). Phillips’s glove and arm drove the outfielder’s value, however, largely leaving most to believe that he could start in centerfield.

Phillips’s 2016 campaign at AA Biloxi is not as thrilling as his 2015 efforts for that club, as the left-handed bat has found his game power and maintained his walk profile while also enduring a brutal slump. Over the weekend, Phillips snapped a nine game hitless streak, which was part of a prolonged .143 / .271 / .275 slump over 109 PA. Even during that slump, Phillips’s bright spots shone, as the 22 year old collected seven extra base hits and 16 walks. Now, Phillips has a chance to show that he can endure professional difficulty and respond by making adjustments and showcasing that hit tool along with his others.

• 2016 Impact: 1.52 WARP (.273 TAv, -2.6 FRAA. Overall 37th of 81 200+ PA Southern League)
• Competition: Youngest 30 percent of Southern League regulars (200+ PA median age 24); Top 40 percent competition (.690 opposing OPS). [Translation: Phillips is notably young for his league and is facing relatively tough competition.]
• Future Impact: Full reserve control; Toolsy starting centerfielder.

LHP Josh Hader
There is an argument to be made that Josh Hader was the biggest riser among the Brewers prospects returned in the Gomez / Fiers deal, given the lefty’s 50 K / 11 BB / 3 GR performance over his seven games in Biloxi during 2015. The debate about Hader is well-known to BPMilwaukee readers by now: despite a legitimate high velocity fastball from the south side, some combination of off-speed stuff, command, and/or delivery (arm slot) caused many to question whether Hader will be a starter or elite reliever.

Hader has hit some road bumps since earning his 2016 promotion to AAA Colorado Springs, but the southpaw still looks like someone who may force their way into a September call-up. Of course, the youngest age of any Pacific Coast League regular pitcher (50+ IP) in 2016 is 23, so the 22 year old Hader is almost absurdly young for that advanced league. The strike out profile has not left in this advanced league, either, even if Hader is showing some issues with command while pitching in the Rockies. Even if the role is not predetermined, Hader will probably receive every chance to start with the rebuilding Brewers.

• 2016 AA Impact: 2.14 FIP (top among Southern League regulars [45+ IP])
• AA Competition: Youngest 25 percent of Southern League regulars (45+ IP median age 24); second-weakest competition (.662 opposing OPS). [Translation: Despite being notably young for his league, Hader faced weak competition.]
• Future Impact: Full reserve control; High octane lefty.

RHP Adrian Houser
Adrian Houser was the least hyped among the prospects returned, but the righty earned a quick call-up to Milwaukee and Arizona Fall League placement (along with Hader). Last Friday, BPMilwaukee’s Kyle Lesniewski featured Houser in detail in his weekly prospect feature. Lesniewski highlights Houser’s “under the surface” improvements that preceded the righty’s Tommy John surgery.

• 2016 Impact: 3.67 FIP median among Southern League regulars (45+ IP median FIP of 3.66)
• Competition: Youngest 45 present of Southern League regulars (45+ IP median age 24); Top Third opposing difficulty among Southern League regulars (.695 opposingOPS). [Translation: Houser was near median age for his league, but faced notably difficult competition.]
• Future Impact: Injury risk increased; Role Unknown.