After one year, this trade raises many question marks. Granted, there’s still quite a lot of value present in the trade, both in terms of future rotation potential (or trade value) for Houston (with Fiers), and trade, controllable contracts, and hopefully potential performance for the Brewers quartet. Still, even raising these types of vacant hopeful pleasantries does not substitute the fact that one year out, what looked like a blockbuster for both sides is creeping toward a somewhat value-neutral non-event. If there’s any lesson to be drawn from this trade, however, it is that the perception of a trade can change over time, and that a trade’s legacy is certainly not finished on its consummation day, nor one year later. In 2017, this trade might still have those value questions for Milwaukee, and even in 2018 or 2019; yet, it is somewhat absurd to suggest that analysts must wait five years to assess the total value of the trade. What is more interesting is to dig deeper into those years and understand how a trade’s legacy and change year-in and year-out.

I know no better trade with which to demonstrate this point than the Zack Greinke trade orchestrated between the Brewers and the Royals. It was commonplace during the 2014-2015 World Series appearances (and Championship) by the Royals to hear Brewers fans groaning about how former President Doug Melvin traded away Championship-caliber players, but it’s easy to forget that by opening day 2013, the quartet of youngsters traded to Kansas City had dwindled to two roster spots (Alcides Escobar and Lorenzo Cain) and a total of 3.1 WARP between the 2011-2012 seasons. Interestingly enough, Zack Greinke suffered his own surface stat nightmares in 2011, waddling through a productive WARP season while ranking fourth best in terms of runs prevention on a solid, consistent Division Championship rotation. Still, the trades for Shaun Marcum and Greinke were indeed vindicated by the Division Championship and League Championship Series run, which undoubtedly netted the Brewers significant playoff revenue shares, not to mention local merchandise.

Greinke netted a strong 8.67 WARP for the Brewers before the front office traded the righty away midseason 2012, understanding that the club would not be able to defend their NL Central crown. By the end of 2012, the trade looked like a rout — the Brewers netted 8.67 WARP, playoff revenue, and Jean Segura, while the Royals controlled the contracts for 3.1 WARP worth of production; about the only benefit Kansas City could claim were those reserve rights.

Using harsh 3-Year, 10-percent depreciation analysis, as with the other sections of the Grading Trades series, one can see that the prospective value of the Brewers prospects matched up quite well with the production value of Zack Greinke; various WARP or contract surplus estimates place the trade package within 80 percent of Greinke’s expected value, which seems quite good for estimating trade value.

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP in 2010; 0.14 3-Year Depreciation ($0.5M). Contract surplus: -$5.8M. 

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Of course, Wade Davis and James Shields may have been more crucial to the Royals’ postseason success than Cain or Escobar (not to say they were unimportant), and both of those righties were traded in a package involving the Royals’ Jake Odorizzi. It is interesting that fans almost never mention that Doug Melvin traded away a depth prospect that allowed the Royals to land crucial Championship-drivers, instead focusing on the controllable Cain and Escobar. Trades are as important to building contenders as controlling players, and the Royals instantly turned around their fortunes even while making a trade that caused much head-scratching at the time (myself included). By 2013, the Zack Greinke traded proliferated to two other deals, as the Royals matched Brewers newcomer Segura with their own acquisition of key production assets.

The Jean Segura story has been told multiple times, and it may be worth revisiting it again a few years in the future. But here it is most interesting to point out that even if Segura had an up-and-down-and-out performance in Milwaukee, the shortstop may have helped to net one of the franchise’s new cornerstones. Isan Diaz, Aaron Hill, and Chase Anderson are the latest branches from the Greinke deal, with Wendell Rijo and Aaron Wilkerson added to the family by extension of the Aaron Hill deal. And so this trade moves on and on: with Diaz, the Brewers have another potentially elite trading chip, or a potential middle infield cornerstone if everything goes right.

It is nearly impossible to write these twists and turns into the Greinke trade saga. Kansas City drew 14+ WARP from James Shields and Wade Davis, although one gets the sense that WARP sells short the situational mastery of Davis. Milwaukee received more than 10 WARP of production from Jean Segura before netting a 50-60 grade surging prospect in Isan Diaz. These figures can be added to total production received by both clubs in the original Greinke deal. Of course, even Cain and Escobar famously overcame their 2011-2012 hiccups to bolster the Royals with valuable play during their contending seasons. Prorated to normalize six years of performance against Greinke’s year-and-four-months for Milwaukee, the production value of the original Greinke deal again appears quite evenly matched:

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP (2011); $5.5M contract surplus ($16.0M total annual value). NOTE: 6.6 FRAA in 2011 (!!!).

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So, one can only imagine the twists and turns that the Gomez-Fiers trade will take in Milwaukee. One can extend this lesson to nearly every trade, in terms of understanding that the lineage of a trade can take winding manifestations that are never imagined at the time of that trade. It remains to be seen if Hader, Houser, Phillips, and Santana impact the next Brewers contender more via trade or their own performances, or a mix of both. If the first year is any lesson, it is worth expecting another strange twist in 2017.

It’s a continuation of an amazing trend from the regular season: When Escobar swung at the first pitch of the game, the Royals were a ridiculous 42-17 (.711). The Royals are now 4-1 when Escobar swings at the first pitch and 1-1 when he takes a pitch in the postseason; I’m willing to bet, knowing how superstitious baseball players can be, Escobar will be swinging at the first pitch the rest of the way. Just listen to Ned Yost talk about the energy Escobar’s first pitch swings give his team.

“And, I mean, there are times where he will get up there and swing at the first pitch of the game. Our guys go crazy when he does that, because our percentage in winning ball games when Eskie swings at the first pitch is huge. As soon as Eskie swings at the first pitch, you hear everybody in the dugout go: ‘We’re winning today. We’re winning today.’”

This is the kind of analysis we’re used to from Ned “Rickie is a run scorer, you guys have no concept” Yost. The Royals’ record when Escobar swings at the first pitch is a classic packaged-for-the-media statistic, something to build a story around (“the Royals are loose cannons on the edge who don’t play by the rules!”). The predictive link can’t be satisfactorily disproven, especially not when the Royals are on a run like this. Fans will be eager to buy into the story and believe their team is special. As they should — it’s incredibly fun, even if it might be more likely the team is special because they win despite their unorthodox play.

On paper, Escobar remains the same disappointing hitter the Brewers shipped out in the Zack Greinke trade four years ago. His line in five seasons with Kansas City (.264/.298/.346) is nearly identical to his work in 192 games for Milwaukee (.250/.298/.335). He rode a wave of Royals fan support into the All-Star Game but hit a brutal .220/.256/.264 with fewer hits (65) than games played (72) in the second half. His batting line is indistinguishable from Jean Segura’s over the past two years (.252/.285/.331). He’s not the one who got away, I just wish he had caught playoff fire in Milwaukee instead of Kasnas City.

In the playoffs over the past two years, Escobar is now hitting .301/.323/.441. He has been everything the scouts saw in him as a Double-A stud back in 2008, when he hit .328/.368/.434 and rocketed up top-prospect lists. He makes things happen with his speed, he makes big defensive plays, and his ability to make contact has made him a difficult out for even the American League’s best pitchers. Or at least he has for 22 playoff games, despite the fact that the 973 regular season games he has played suggest he is by far the worst regular leadoff hitter in the major leagues.

I expect at some point before this postseason ends, the Royals will pay for batting Escobar in the leadoff spot. There’ll be a ninth inning where he’s facing Roberto Osuna or Hector Rondon or Jeurys Familia with two outs and the Royals will wish they had a superior hitter like Ben Zobrist, Lorenzo Cain or Eric Hosmer up. There will be a time they’ll wish their leadoff hitter knew how to take a walk — his next postseason walk will be just his second in over 100 plate appearances. The Blue Jays already paid for this themselves when Ben Revere batted against Wade Davis with two on and nobody out in the ninth inning of game two. He struck out to end an 0-for-5 night and the game ended with Edwin Encarnacion in the on-deck circle.

But the Royals won’t change anything. And they can’t, really. Not because of what an extremely weird first pitch statistic says, but because of that energy Yost talked about that has emanated from the Royals dugout in the playoffs each of the past two years. Call it Royals Devil Magic or whatever you want. The Royals have shown they can draw power from Escobar’s indiscriminate approach at the top of their lineup, and they can rally around it. It’s the kind of energy that fuels both quick strikes and late comeback rallies, the kind of energy that makes a team believe it’s never out of a game. At this point, it seems well worth whatever minimal gain the Royals might get from dropping Escobar in the order.

I doubt what’s happening with Escobar in Kansas City could have happened in Milwaukee, because this Royals team is special. Alcides Escobar still is who he is, a light-hitting shortstop who belongs at the bottom of most batting orders. He probably wouldn’t have moved the needle much for the Brewers at all in the past few years. But intangibles like the Royals Devil Magic aren’t tidy little attributes that can be added and subtracted from a ledger. They’re the result of combinations of talent and personalities and absurd happenings like Kansas City’s record when Escobar swings on the first pitch. These moments aren’t planned, they just happen, and when they do, there’s not much else you can do but marvel at them.