Those narratives will undoubtedly carry into 2018 guided by the very same contradictions: Milwaukee will indeed be developing many young players at the MLB level (including Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, and Brandon Woodruff), while the team also has several opportunities to improve with established players (either through trades involving their prospects, through free agency signings, or both).

To put it another way: GM David Stearns can take the roster in several directions, and certainly has the resources available to contend while continuing to develop some players.

One way to assess player value, and therefore roster needs, is to estimate the surplus value that each player (and their contractual situation) provides the team. Value is assumed to be production and scarcity, recognizing that a player is not simply valuable to a club based on production, but also based on cost and the general availability of that skill set within the MLB. Surplus is the difference provided between a player’s production and their contract, recognizing that these aspects can be double-counted (a team simultaneously receives a player’s production on the field and their production gauged against their contract). Based on these assumptions, I tracked the surplus value of the Brewers 40-man roster (as of October 20, 2017) by using harsh depreciation to reduce each player’s maximum value (recognizing that a player’s performance typically declines over time save for rare cases).

The following chart tracks changes in surplus entering 2017 to entering 2018, while also assigning an Overall Future Potential (OFP) role for each Brewers roster member:

What these surplus numbers can suggest, in the abstract, is the difference between “the number of the wins above replacement” a player will produce during their contract and the OFP a team might receive if they traded the player at this point in time (alternately, they might suggest a contract range; for example, if the Brewers offered Neil Walker a $30 million contract, they would likely retain some surplus value during that contract).

Using the extremely interesting and difficult case of Jonathan Villar to interpret this table, his 2016 campaign and contract control years still loom large enough to suggest that the Brewers should not move the infielder for cheap; but the shortstop-turned-bench/utility option does mean that Villar’s ultimate role is trending downward, meaning that if Milwaukee believes that role decline is real and will continue to materialize, moving Villar for less than his top value could offset the issues of rostering a declining role. This should outline the difficulty of making roster decisions: in the case of Villar, there is not necessarily a right answer.

I should add that surplus value is abstract in the sense that there is a point at which additional surplus does not provide a team transaction value. Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter should be the most specific examples of this phenomenon in recent Brewers memory, as both players retained solidly positive surplus value entering 2017, but were essentially unwanted on the trade market and therefore expendable for nothing. Following this example, a rule of thumb might be to expect any type of roster move once a player’s surplus value dips below $20 million (or, less than three wins above replacement). Looking at the table of the Brewers roster above, this fact should seem intuitive with many of the names on the list (for example, it is highly unlikely that the Brewers would be able to move a player like Andrew Susac or even Eric Thames for their maximal surplus value).

By averaging each player’s 2017, 2018, and OFP surplus value, and comparing that to their change in value over time, a rather intuitive 2018 roster emerges. In this case, I excluded each player with a Negative-50 percent change in value (ex., a 50 percent decline), which produced need at Catcher, Second Base, and Right-Handed Pitcher, with additional question marks about the Utility roles. This is a rather succinct picture of the actual needs for the 2018 Brewers, and it also shows that if a few key free agents are retained, or similar free agents from outside the organizational signed, the Brewers can assemble quite a good roster:

These tables need not force an analyst to rely on numbers alone in order to validate roster decisions. Compare the following descriptions of potential role upgrades for the 2018 Brewers with those players’ statistical trends, and find nearly 20 roster spots (on the 40-Man) that can be upgraded for 2018:

The benefit of this exercise is that additional roster functions can be analyzed, either through descriptive or analytical means. For example, one could compare some of the best Rule 5 Draft Roster Protection candidates with the players above in order to find the most salient moves for the future value of the organization. Via Brewerfan.net:

Once again, this should exhibit a rather intuitive process of evaluation. If the future value of a catcher such as Jacob Nottingham is better than either Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy (or all three players), it should not hurt to lose one of those players in order to roster Nottingham. Each of these catchers are good candidates for contractual non-tenders for this reason (and, indeed, catcher is a position that the Brewers can upgrade in terms of depth behind/alongside Manny Pina). Similarly, allowing Matt Garza to walk via free agency and rostering Marcos Diplan, Freddy Peralta, or Devin Williams in that place should improve the pitching surplus of the roster. Where it gets more interesting is considering a player like Mauricio Dubon, and whether he simply takes the spot of free agent Eric Sogard, or overtakes Villar or Hernan Perez.

Using these analytical approaches should validate the fact that the Brewers are in a unique position entering 2018. They are a good team, indeed, that also features many up-and-coming players to develop at the MLB level and many declining roles that can be replaced. Where surplus value becomes useful is targeting particular trades, or simply determining when a player should be released or non-tendered.

A player like Keon Broxton, Perez, Susac, or Vogt should demonstrate this difficult decision-making process, and perhaps cause fans to realign their expectations that these types of players can receive impactful trade returns to Milwaukee. Given the packed outfield for 2018, the Brewers could conceivably release a player like Broxton should trade partners refuse to bite with a 45-to-50 OFP / quality depth trade (matching Broxton’s $11.5M-to-$19.8M surplus), for the trouble is that Broxton’s expected role is indeed declining (and any particular trade partner will also know that). This should not simply be viewed as picking on Broxton, as the point exists for Vogt and several other players on the roster.

“Slingin’ Stearns” earned his nickname for wheeling-and-dealing on the trade market during his first offseason in Milwaukee, but that reputation has calmed over time (not surprisingly, as the club completed their rebuilding process). Stearns did not show any hesitation in aggressively using waiver claims and releases to define his 2016-2017 offseason, and now the GM’s reputation may be defined by how effectively he clears roster space for what’s next: refined future development and improved MLB roles to contend in 2018.

The 2017 season proved that these goals can align and coexist within the same roster, so there are no excuses for failing to improve this strategy by learning from the 2017 progression.

Photo Credit: Jim Young, USAToday Sports Images.

Related Reading:
3 Up 3 Down: May
3 Up 3 Down: April
2016 Series

With this in mind, myself and Assistant Editor Kyle Lesniewski, with help from Baseball Prospectus prospect gurus Craig Goldstein and John Eshleman, have assembled a midseason deluxe edition of “3 Up, 3 Down.” Consider this an entry in lieu of a midseason Top 30 ranking. Ranking prospects at this point is definitely in demand from many fans, but I’d like to offer this type of content in lieu of a ranking. This editorial decision is justifiable with a system such as Milwaukee’s, I believe, especially because the very top prospects are graduating (meaning, say, RHP Luis Ortiz and 2B Isan Diaz are perhaps most likely to take the top spots in the organization), but also because talent is bunched together at so many points.

If the Brewers control approximately 200 professionals within their affiliated system, a Top 30 list comprises the top 15 percent of the system. With that in mind, it’s worth emphasizing that such a list can only ever split hairs over the most elite talent within the system. Outside of the true top talent role projections (such as Ortiz and Diaz, for example, the One Percenters of the system), there are more question marks and more risk that define ranges of talent between #3-to-#10 (next 4 percent), and then organizational depth roles that define #11-20 (rounding out the top 10 percent). Consider previous Top Ten residents like Nottingham or Monte Harrison; are these players headed back to the Top 10 give Nottingham’s bat rounding out and likelihood to stick behind the dish? Or Harrison’s resolution of tools into a ballplayer? Where do you put Top 10 newcomers like Feliciano and Burnes? What about Jake Gatewood? To this, one might be able to debate about each player’s top MLB potential and likely MLB floor role (or organizational depth role), but to that point it is also worth asking whether it matters that Feliciano slots in at, say, #6 instead of #15, or Burnes at #9 instead of #14. So, consider this feature an exercise in thinking through layers of quality depth that define a system that is going to be quite volatile after Brinson and Hader are gone (and probably with them, too), but a strong system nonetheless.

3 UP
UTIL Jake Gatewood, Advanced A Carolina (picked by John Eshleman): Following BPMilwaukee’s list last year, Jake Gatewood is quite a regular face in the midseason 3 Up, 3 Down, but that’s simply a reflection of the stages of this prospect’s progression. James Fisher scouted Gatewood at A Wisconsin in spring 2016, noting that “much of his improvement has come this year from an adjustment in his starting position. He has lowered his hands slightly and that has led to a much shorter and direct path to the ball. While his plate discipline is still suspect, he has been making harder and more consistent contact.” This observation accompanied the pick of Gatewood as a power prospect to watch, especially after a surge in Rookie Helena to close 2015. Following Fisher’s observation, Gatewood made another set of adjustments over the 2016-2017 offseason and has been one of the great surprises of the 2017 season.

John Eshleman writes, “his power has already been widely acknowledged, but this year he is less vulnerable to spin and pitches out of the zone. [This] not only shows up in his walk rate but also puts him in more hitters counts to tap that power.” Adjustments breeding adjustments, and another question mark answered; in this placement it almost appears that Fisher raised the question of Gatewood’s discipline for Eshleman to answer it this year. So here Gatewood stands, now receiving plenty of time at 1B, carving himself a nice role as a Brewers corner prospect while exposing the irony of prospect hype: it seems absurd to call this age-21 player “post hype” in 2017, but I’m also not sure Gatewood is a sleeper any longer. Look for these adjustments to round out an upper minors organizational ceiling into something that may be better suited to crack the big league roster (and goodness knows David Stearns is eyeing that SS / 3B / LF / 1B positional pedigree). Power and flexibility should hopefully keep Gatewood on close watch in this system.

1B Garrett Cooper, AAA Colorado Springs (picked by Kyle Lesniewski): The Milwaukee Brewers have one of the best farm systems in baseball, littered with top-100 prospects like Lewis Brinson, Corey Ray, and Isan Diaz. But who has the best OPS of anyone in Milwaukee’s system currently? None other than the org’s 2013 6th-round pick, Garrett Cooper. The hulking product of Auburn University has displayed a penchant for contact throughout his minor league career, but has never really displayed the power that one typically likes to see from a player that primarily mans first base. That is, until now. After popping what was a career-high 9 home runs in 128 games last season between Class-AA and Class-AAA, Cooper has already blasted 14 long balls in just 64 games this season. A career .303/.366/.463 hitter in five seasons, Cooper has tattooed Pacific Coast League pitching to the tune of a .357/.412/.614 slash this season, with his .257 ISO nearly 100 points better than his career average (though it’s worth noting his home OPS at Colorado Springs of 1.258 is much higher than his .805 OPS on the road). A toned-down leg kick appears to have helped the 26 year old right-handed hitter tap more consistently into the power than a man standing at 6’6″ and 230 lbs should be able to generate. Unfortunately for Garrett, he is currently blocked at the big league level by Eric Thames and Jesus Aguilar. Cooper was passed over in the Rule 5 Draft after being left unprotected last season but given his improved level of production this year, it’s easy to imagine someone taking a shot on him if he’s left off the 40-man roster once again this winter.

2B Keston Hiura, Rookie Arizona (picked by Nicholas Zettel): In one sense, it’s absurd to place Hiura on this list. Hiura is not on this list because of his hitting surge in Rookie ball, where the age-20 Hiura is already old. Rather, even though some scouting outlets disagreed on the strength of Hiura’s bat (without disagreeing that the bat is the calling card for the advanced college prospect), the major question marks for Hiura revolved around both his defense and his injured elbow. The Brewers beat has reported that Hiura is working at Arizona on a throwing program before playing in the field, so the jury is out on that fielding grade for the prospect. A 2B-profile without an average glove but a great hit tool make Hiura look like a rich man’s Scooter Gennett (a good thing, if perhaps a floor). However, upon being drafted, the Brewers learned that Hiura does not require surgery for his elbow injury, which adds quite a bit of immediate certainty to the prospect profile (and no, I don’t buy that the line that “recovering from Tommy John surgery is easier for position players” reduces the uncertainty involved in rehabbing a prospect from surgery). Thus, the Brewers have their top draft pick on a throwing program rather than a surgery rehab program, and this (to my mind) allows Hiura’s top ceiling to tick slightly less risky.

3 DOWN
C Andrew Susac, AAA Colorado Springs (picked by Kyle Lesniewski): Though no longer technically a prospect (he’s taken 262 turns at the plate in the MLB), plenty of folks around Milwaukee hoped that Susac could become a multiyear starter for the Brewers behind the plate after he was acquired in the Will Smith trade from San Francisco last year. An injury during spring training this year helped cost him a spot on the Opening Day roster and delayed the start of his regular season by a few weeks, but since returning to action in mid-April the former top-100 prospect has struggled to get much of anything going at the plate. He’s split time with Tyler Heineman (and now Jett Bandy) and has appeared in just 32 games so far; in that time Susac has been able to manage only a .194/.250/.407 slash with five home runs in the hitter-friendly confines of Security Service Field. He has thrown out seven of the 17 runners that have tried to steal on him, but his framing numbers and all-around fielding metrics have taken a step back this year. Susac now appears at the very least to be behind Manny Pina, Stephen Vogt, and Bandy on the organizational catching depth chart, and with Jacob Nottingham coming on strong just one level behind, the age-27 catcher needs to start figuring things out before he gets lost in the shuffle once again.

IF Gilbert Lara, A Wisconsin (picked by Craig Goldstein): As the Brewers are reportedly linked to a few top International Prospects according to BaseballAmerica, one ought use the Gilbert Lara signing as a cautionary tale of sorts, but one should not use Lara’s struggles as an argument against investing in international talent for Milwaukee. The shortstop-to-third baseman has had his trip off shortstop delayed in 2017, which does raise a question about whether Lara’s defensive requirements at a position he is not suited for is impacting his performance thus far.

Goldstein on Lara: He’s only 19, but he hasn’t looked right for a couple years and I think it’s time to move on unless something changes in dramatic fashion. Oh, and he’s definitely not a shortstop.

RHP Cody Ponce, Advanced A Carolina (picked by Nicholas Zettel): Cody Ponce is one of my favorite arms in the Brewers system, so my placing him here is not really an indictment against his ceiling and floor that appeared on the 2017 Brewers Top Ten at Baseball Prospectus. Rather, it’s worth reflecting on my own biases that found Ponce to be placed in the “Potential Quick Riser” bucket I keep in my mind, as there was so much to instantly love about Ponce’s arsenal straight out of the gate. Ponce seemed like a guy who had stuff to reach the MLB as an almost certainly serviceable reliever, and I thought that floor would help him push his way to the MLB. As of this writing, Ponce is now 152.3 combined innings deep in Advanced A between 2016 and 2017, which leads one to question whether the righty’s injury during 2016 pushed back his development clock somewhat. Scouting the box score, Baseball Prospectus notes that Ponce’s groundball rate is falling as his strike out rate also declines in 2017, although it is worth noting that the Carolina League has generally been tough on Brewers prospects in 2017. Skipped over by Corbin Burnes and Freddy Peralta in terms of promotions to Class-AA Biloxi, one cannot let their previous expectations turn to disappointment on the age-23 hurler. Indeed, this is a great lesson that undue expectations are the foundation of hype, and hype does not develop prospects into serviceable MLB players.

Related Reading:
Brewers Claim Vogt
Brewers Revolving Waiver Claims

If there was any doubt before, the Vogt claim certainly cements the fact that David Stearns, who I’ve affectionately called “the thrift-shop GM” in the past, has an affinity for this process, which essentially gives teams a free trial on somebody else’s flotsam. The David Stearns who runs a contender has a recognizable M.O. if you’ve been following the David Stearns who built that contender from the rubble. But the Vogt claim reflects a subtle shift in strategy from previous waiver moves, which tells us that the team is trying to compete in 2017.

Up until now, the Brewers’ waiver claims have shared a common thread of unseen, or unrealized, potential. Nick Franklin is a former top prospect who just turned 26 years old at the start of the season. Junior Guerra was a total lottery ticket that turned into a jackpot. Jhan Marinez and Rob Scahill weren’t good enough for someone else’s bullpen, but were young and promising, and, hey, Milwaukee had the roster space to stash ‘em. All of those pickups came with a potential payoff that was pretty big which is essential to consider when you’re building a contender from the ground up.

Stephen Vogt, however, is unlikely to appreciate in value. He’s a catcher in name, but he’s sorta crummy behind the plate. And by “he’s sorta crummy,” I mean “deployed regularly, he’ll actively cost your team a dozen or more runs per full season:”

But for the past three years, that’s just been the cost of doing business with Vogt’s bat. His career isolated power mark of .158 is borderline elite by catcher standards. His career True Average is .266, which is not great, but also not exactly mitigating the value of all that power. Vogt has been bad this year, but he’s also been a little bit unlucky (evidenced by a .242 BABIP versus his .276 career mark).

You’ve heard him referred to frequently in the past few days as “two-time All-Star Stephen Vogt,” and in light of that casual fans could be forgiven for assuming that we just inexplicably got a superstar for free. But that’s not the case. At his best, Vogt is a little bit better than replacement level. If a change of scenery is enough to kick him back to that level, the Brewers just upgraded their backup catcher spot. And if not, they can move on from Vogt in a couple of weeks, recall Jett Bandy from AAA, and forget this whole thing ever happened.

Vogt’s career ISO is a hair lower than Bandy’s (by .012) but his TAv, BB percentage, and K percentage are all significantly better. And as Jack Moore showed at BPMilwaukee earlier this week, Bandy has deteriorated from a top-tier backup to, well, a guy who needs something to change. Thankfully, the demotion seems to have energized Bandy, who launched a monster grand slam in his first game with the Sky Sox:

Jett Bandy grand slam HR in his 1st game with the #SkySox. pic.twitter.com/hmIRyEeAuR

— Brewers Prospects (@BrewerProspect) June 28, 2017

Vogt has played in just 477 Major League games, but he’s 32 years old and a catcher. For all we know, he could be finished. But if he’s not, and he’s an improvement over Bandy, that makes the Playoff Stretch Brewers just a little more capable of hanging with the Cubs and Cardinals. And, obviously, it gives the team a capable, three-deep depth chart behind the plate.

Andrew Susac, once thought to be the team’s catcher of the future, is off track at Colorado Springs. Susac is slashing just .190/.241/.410 and striking out a ghastly 32.8 percent of the time. If an injury were to sideline Manny Pina for any extended period of time, calling that up to the big-league level in the heart of a playoff race is simply not acceptable. Adding Vogt might seem targeted at Bandy, and there’s no doubt that getting him back on track is essential, but it’s also a buffer against Susac being forced into big-league duty before he can fix whatever’s wrong.

Like David Stearns’s prior waiver-wire gambles, this is a smart bet, made with a player that could provide a payoff on this particular roster. The big difference is the time frame of the move. Milwaukee’s front office, in claiming Vogt, has said, if tepidly, that winning in 2017 is a priority. It will be interesting to see how that mindset shapes the rest of the summer’s moves.

This past weekend, though, after a long stretch of nothing broken up by the occasional bullpen signing, the Milwaukee hot stove showed some signs of life. Reports emerged linking them as a potential suitor for free-agent catcher Matt Wieters, formerly of the Baltimore Orioles. The pattern-literate will make note of the timing–last year, the Brewers’ biggest free-agency splash occurred in January, when they inked Chris Carter to a one-year deal.

Carter and Wieters are alike in that they’re both useful, but frustrating, veteran players who saw their free agency market come up well short of expectations. In Carter’s case, his offensive defense and tendency to swing and miss will always hold him back, even if his elite power and willingness to take ball four have consistently buoyed him to above replacement level. He’s not going to hurt you, but if you’re a good organization you can probably do better–especially a National League organization that can’t hide Carter as a designated hitter.

Wieters came up through the minor leagues as one of the most hyped prospects in recent memory. He was regarded as a premier defensive prospect all the way back to the 2007 draft, when the Orioles got him with the fifth overall pick. The 2008 season was his first full one as a professional, and he put up a heady offensive campaign too–a .335 True Average and .345/.453/.576 slash line at High-A Fredericksburg got him a promtion to AA Bowie, where he increased those numbers to .338 and .365/.466/.625. And on top of those eye-popping stat lines he was a switch-hitting catcher with elite defensive chops behind the plate. You couldn’t have lab-created a prospect who ticked off every elite-prospect box so neatly and so emphatically.

That being said, it’s hard to call Wieters’ Baltimore tenure a successful one, given the expectations that were placed on him from the outset. Other than the 2014 season, when he played 26 games before being shut down for Tommy John surgery, he hasn’t posted a True Average above .265 in the big leagues. His power production is top-tier for the position, but his durability is a concern and his defense has not been elite in many years. And as yet another tumbleweed drifts lazily across Wieters’ free agent market, one can’t help but speculate just how likely it is that front offices around the league will be just as tepid on Wieters come July.

When the big picture is taken into consideration, it would be pennywise but pound foolish for Milwaukee to bring him in as a mercenary catcher for the first half of 2017.

Because Wieters was a top-five pick who vaporized minor-league pitching with chilling efficiency upon his arrival in the professional ranks, his ensuing Major League career has been narrated as a bust. But is this label really fair? From 2010 through 2013, Wieters posted WARP totals of 2.5, 4.6, 3.3, and 2.1. That’s two years as an average MLB starting catcher, and two years solidly in the first division. He topped 20 home runs in the final three of those seasons too, establishing himself as a reliable power-hitting catcher.

And since then, Wieters has been more hard-luck than hard decline. His 2014 and 2015 seasons were both cut short by the Tommy John surgery, and his .265 BABIP in 2016 was both his second-lowest yet and a full 21 points lower than his career mark, indicating that he could be primed for a rebound if his luck just evens out. His power has eroded slightly from his 20-HR days, but he’s still better than par for the position.

Most importantly, from an offensive perspective, Wieters’ whiff rate stabilized in 2016. In 2015, it spiked at 23.8 percent–a curious development considering that, while rehabbing from elbow surgery, Wieters underwent LASIK surgery. Usually, hitters who get their vision corrected hit much better–this is, to my knowledge, the first case where the reverse happened. But he struck out 18.3 percent in 2016, which is almost perfectly in line with his career mark of 18.8 percent, so we can call that spike a fluke with confidence.

That being said, one legitimate issue that has caused Wieters to fall short of the hype is his less-than-stellar approach at the plate. While Wieters’ patience was hailed as he burned through the minor leagues, he’s posted walk rates of 7.3 percent, 9.4 percent, 8.7 percent, 10.1 percent, 7.4 percent, 5.4 percent, 7.4 percent, and 6.9 percent chronologically as a major leaguer. BrooksBaseball shows that Wieters has always had an unquenchable thirst for the high strike. Furthermore, when there’s a right-handed pitcher on the mound, and there usually is, Wieters is even more likely to flail away at pitches above the hitting zone.

We are 3,000-plus at-bats deep into Wieters’ career. It is the year 2017. You can rest assured that every single team in baseball knows this about Wieters, and that nearly every pitcher that has ever seen him in live action has been coached to attack him with letter-high fastballs and dare him to lay off, because the odds say he can’t. Even now, as a veteran, Wieters is simply unable to help himself when a pitcher climbs the ladder:

But Wieters’ tendency to defeat himself with the high swinging strike has always been an issue, and he pressed through it to post four good MLB seasons. He might never be a Hall of Famer, like he was supposed to be, but fantasy baseball players all know Wieters as one of the most dependable options at a premium position–you know, when he’s healthy. That hasn’t changed, and those skills will likely erode slowly as he ages.

His depreciation as a defensive catcher, however, should be far more alarming to the Brewers’ front office as they evaluate him and decide what their catcher position should look like in 2017.

The 2014 BP Annual praised Wieters as “an elite defender and game-caller,” but the numbers suggest that this has not been the case since we were all worrying about Mayan doomsday predictions. Wieters’ adjusted FRAA numbers from 2010-2012 were stellar–in total, he saved 49.3 runs behind the plate during that three-year stretch. But since then, he has actually been a below-average defensive catcher by the numbers.

Wieters’ poor framing skills are clearly doing a lot of the work in dragging him down, something that Travis Sawchik of Fangraphs made note of at the turn of the calendar. Jonathan Lucroy, the ultimate authority on defensive catching in Milwaukee, has long insisted that a low center of gravity is essential to framing the low strike. Wieters, who stands 6-foot-5, really struggles to get down and frame strikes along the bottom of the zone. His age, and his continually declining skills as a receiver, invite speculation that Wieters’ days as a catcher might be numbered. For a short-term suitor, that might not matter so much. But for a short-term suitor looking to turn a profit on their investment, like Milwaukee, it really does.

There is one argument in favor of bringing Wieters on board that is absolutely impossible to argue directly: that Wieters is a superior option as a starting catcher to any combination of Jett Bandy, Andrew Susac, and Manny Pina. Barring an unforseen and significant leap forward by one of the former two, Wieters would almost certainly be an improvement over Milwaukee’s current catching situation by several wins. However, the current front office doesn’t seem likely to fall into this trap–and you’d better believe it’s a trap.

We’ve established that Wieters is a catcher whose defensive skills have been fading for years now, and he hit the free agent market with just shy of 7,000 Major League innings on his knees. So, let’s say the Brewers sign him. Even assuming that everything goes right, and Wieters experiences an Aaron Hill-like revival in Milwaukee over the first half, these question marks will still be a concern to potential buyers. Like with Ryan Braun (and Carter last year), the Brewers could easily see Wieters exceed expectations–and still be treated like a lump of Kryptonite by the rest of the league.

Meanwhile, by his mere presence in the lineup, Wieters would be hindering the front office from their main goals at this stage of the game–talent evaluation and asset accumulation.

Neither Jett Bandy nor Andrew Susac has, to this point in their respective careers, outplayed Matt Wieters, and both of them lack anything resembling a track record at the Major League level. But they are both four years younger than Wieters, and both players are still on their rookie contracts. For Milwaukee and their svelte payroll, this is not an issue–they can afford Wieters–but in terms of marketability to other general managers, it plays a huge role–not everyone can, and that hurts his perceived value.

Bandy, acquired this winter for Martin Maldonado, has an even more self-defeating approach than Wieters. In 2014, at AA Arkansas, Bandy wallked 9.1 percent of the time. Throw out that lone data point, though, and he has never taken a base on balls more than 5.5 percent of the time in a professional career that began in 2011. Bandy’s “home runs, strikeouts, and no walks” offensive input is not without precedent in today’s game. In fact, when you compare the K percent, BB percent, and ISO of both players, he actually looks pretty similar to Salvador Perez of the Royals. Granted, he’s going to need breaking in–Bandy has never caught more than 94 games in a season, and never seen more than 365 plate appearances in a year. But his ratios stretched out to a full season of production look like 20-25 home runs with an average that won’t kill you, and that’s valuable behind the plate. Defensively, Bandy is nothing special, but does have the chance to be better than average–and his body has seen far less wear and tear than Matt Wieters has.

Susac, on the other hand, profiles as a similar Major Leaguer to Wieters in his prime, albeit with a little bit more swing and miss in his game. But he’s shown a similar combination of passable patience, above-average defense, and big power. Plus, he struck out less than 20 percent of the time at AAA for the Giants last season, so there’s hope that he can suppress his whiffs and further improve as an offensive player. Just two years ago, he was rated as the third-best prospect in the Giants’ system and there was speculation that he would inherit the job as the team pushed Buster Posey off to first base, but that did not happen. Still, Bret Sayre predicted back then that “Given a full complement of at-bats, Susac could hit .260 with 20 homers,” which is a good Matt Wieters season.

If the Brewers signed Wieters, these two potential assets would be relegated to fighting for a backup role and the scraps of at-bats that come with it, with the loser getting banished to AAA, where both players have already proven themselves competent enough for a promotion. Those at-bats might be converted more productively, but that’s not a guarantee–and even if they were, the long-term payoff would actually be worse, as Wieters is unlikely to fetch much in a trade and he’ll be well into his 30s by the time Milwaukee puts a competitive club on the field. Meanwhile, both Susac and Bandy would be still in their primes by the time the competitive window opens up.

Five years ago, taking a discount flier on a player like Wieters is exactly the kind of “smart move” that the Brewers’ front office would have pulled. Thankfully, the crew calling the shots today seems to have a better understanding of where and when to spend their cash.

Susac was a second-round draft pick back in 2011 out of Oregon State. The catcher was a steady performer in the Giants system, working his way from High-A ball in his first professional season and then spending all of 2013 at Double-A for his age-23 season. At Double-A, Susac started to show that he might have a place in a major league lineup after demonstrating above average power and a keen eye for the strike zone. In 2013, Susac smashed 12 home runs to go along with 17 doubles, good for a .458 slugging percentage in 310 plate appearances. His 21.9 percent strikeout rate was not particularly concerning given that he also walked 13.5 percent of his plate appearances.

In 2014, Susac showed more of the power and plate discipline that was putting him on the Giants’ radar for their major league roster. Over 253 plate appearances, Susac hit 10 home runs and nine doubles, amounting to a .451 slugging percentage. His strikeout rate dipped below 20 percent to 19.8 percent and he still walked at an impressive 13.4 percent clip.

By the end of 2014, Susac had been rewarded by the Giants with a call to the majors. Susac delivered a 0.5 WARP in 95 plate appearances, including three home runs and 8 doubles. He struggles a bit more with strikeouts, as he went down on strikes a near third of his plate appearances with 28 K’s in those 95 plate appearances.

Still, by the end of 2014 there was clearly a bright future for the soon to turn 25-year-old backstop. However, as Buster Posey continued to produce at an MVP level year after year with no real signs of slowing down, it was clear that the future for Susac was not in San Francisco.

Before the 2015 season, Baseball Prospectus ranked Susac the 97th best overall prospect. However, the season would not go as smoothly as he would have hoped. Susac struggled through a rough 2015 that included multiple disabled list trips. After being banged up in spring training and into the start of the season, Susac sprained his wrist on July 19 in Arizona and was sent to the 15-day DL. Upon his return, he was shut down for the season on September 6when the team discovered ligament damage in his right wrist. His 2015 injuries help explain his uninspiring slash line of .218/.297/.368.

2016 was a new year, and a new opportunity for Susac to regain his value as both an above-average performer and potential trade piece.  Back in Triple-A, he cut his strikeouts down to just 18.8 percent with his walk rate holding steady at 10.0 percent.  In 239 plate appearances, he was able to hit 8 home runs, 12 doubles, and even sprinkled in a triple. He Finished his time at Triple-A with a .273/.343/.455 slash line, staying consistent at all minor league levels.

Defensively, Susac has a relatively positive outlook. Over the 2013-14 seasons in the minors for Susac, he amounted to a total 20.6 framing runs saved through 8,322 pitches caught. In 2016 at Triple-A, Susac saved 10.3 runs in 4,,296 pitches caught. In his sporadic time the majors, he has not been able to replicate his pitch-framing prowess. Between his time with the Giants in 2015 and Brewers in 2016, Susac has only produced a -0.4 runs saved value in 2,387 pitches caught. Given that Susac has a considerably positive pitch framing record, it’s not unreasonable to think that the Brewers could see his runs saved totals rise in the majors with consistent playing time.

Based on the measure that the average starting catcher in the major leagues will receive about 8,000 pitches per full season, Susac could augment his WARP value by at least one full win, and possibly two, if he replicates his minor league framing measures in the majors. A main reason for the difference, of course, could be the quality of minor league umpires compared to major league umpires. While this could play a significant role, Susac’s consistence in the minors in regards to pitch framing paints a positive image moving forward.

Susac’s extensive time and success in the minors projects him to be able to stick as the everyday catcher in Milwaukee for 2017. Finally, it seems as though Susac is getting his chance to see consistent plate appearances.  Although working with a relatively inexperienced pitching staff will be a challenge, his pitch-framing prowess should help his pitchers over the course of the season.

Overall, there is a lot to like about the newest Milwaukee backstop. Given his ability to draw walks, hit for power, and play above average defense, it is not out of the realm of possibility that Susac would be a 2-to-3 WARP player in 2017. He isn’t an all-or-nothing player, as his consistent near 20 percent strikeout rate suggests. However, it is yet to be seen if Susac can duplicate his minor league numbers in the majors successfully. Maybe now with the peace of mind that comes with seeing your name penciled into the starting lineup every day, Susac can use his promotion to become the Brewers’ catcher of the future starting in 2017.

Related Article:
2016 Southern League bats

So we continue with the Pacific Coast League variation of the contextual minor league statistics for Milwaukee Brewers prospects. I began this series in order to judge each player within his own age group within his own league, in order to keep players in groups that are more likely to fit their own developmental standpoints. For instance, Orlando Arcia ought not to be judged on the same scale as a Garin Cecchini or Will Middlebrooks, two players with MLB experience that are receiving a second chance in the Brewers organization; while those two might be judged moreso on their ability to get back into the grove and produce quality outcomes on the plate, a prospect at Arcia’s age and developmental standpoint may be more likely to work on improving one specific aspect of his game. In fact, for his age-21 season, Arcia completely shifted his strike zone discipline, improving his walk rate significantly, while also striking out more; for all the complaints about the rookie’s slow-rising batting line and .212 TAv, Arcia is already posting a walk rate that has hovered around 10 percent since leaping to the majors. So, a project such as “improving plate discipline” could help to explain why other areas of Arcia’s bat “took a step back” in 2016.

Not unlike the Southern League, a wide variety of professional ballplayers work in the Pacific Coast League. Many second-chance MLB players work in the most advanced minor league level, giving the Pacific Coast League the look of an organizational depth association. Yet, a few supremely young players rush through, and there are even organizational depth players that remain young for AAA (such as Garrett Cooper, for instance, who is “old” for AA and “young” for AAA).

Not surprisingly, isolating players with more than 5 PA, there are many different performance levels, age-by-age, on the Pacific Coast:

While it does not necessarily seem surprising that the youngest players in the league lack slugging numbers, or overall offensive performances that match the general impression that the PCL is a “free-for-all,” it was surprising to see how quickly the slugging tails off after age-25. Slugging percentage jumps once more at age-27, but then players working in the PCL between age-28 and age-35 seasons generally do not provide large slugging totals for their work. Hypothetically, one might guess that if a player is at age-28 and slugging effectively, they get their chance to work at the MLB level, while glovemen or bat-control depth guys are more likely to work their late-20s seasons at AAA; this is only one possible explanation.

By my count, the Brewers organization featured 15 players at AAA Colorado Springs that had rookie status entering the year. The vast majority of these players were young or relatively young for Class-AAA ball.

A few notes:

• Without any regular age-19 or -20 bats in the Pacific Coast League, Arcia was basically tied for the youngest regular position player in the league (with Padres’ top prospect, Manuel Margot, who had one of the best seasons in the entire PCL).

• Contrary to popular belief, Arcia showed excellent discipline and excellent isolated power for his age group.

• Garrett Cooper had a surprisingly good batting line, which I did not expect given my assumption that older players would be held to harsher performance criteria at AAA.

• Lewis Brinson really stormed the league in his Brewers debut!

• While Brewers fans commonly focused on his MLB struggles, Keon Broxton put together a great AAA campaign, even (especially?) for the league’s median age.

• Kyle Wren did nothing but hit in 2016, but he lacks isolated power behind his strong AVG and OBP totals. One wonders whether he’ll get his MLB shot in Milwaukee, given the stacked tools situated in the crowded Brewers outfield.

• Garin Cecchini produced a solid line for his age group, although the slugging did not come for the second-chance rookie. Cecchini could potentially profile as a contact-discipline depth player, but the lack of power could hurt a corner-defense profile.

• BPMilwaukee featured Nate Orf as one of the Three-Up players at midseason, given his batting profile and utility glove. Hopefully Orf makes it to the MLB!

• One wonders whether Yadiel Rivera and Ramon Flores will stick around in the organization for their respective gloves; unfortunately, their bats did not come around in 2016.

Milwaukee added some potential high-impact talent to a minor league system that is now rated as the best in baseball according to at least one outlet. Here are Baseball Prospectus scouting reports on the newest future Brewers.

Rangers Trade Return:

CF Lewis Brinson
6’3″ || 195 lb || B/T: R/R || Age: 22

Hit: 55 || Power: 55 || Speed: 60 || Arm: 60 || Glove: 70 ||

Future Role: 60 – first division starting center fielder

Report: There’s the potential for five above-average tools, which wasn’t the case in 2014. He now shows a shorter stroke capable of hard contact to all parts of the field, along with a more advanced approach. There’s always been plus raw power, and that pop shows up in games thanks to his strong wrists and his ability to use the lower half to create leverage. If there’s a concern offensively it’s that he still gets pull-happy, and while the strikeout rates have dropped each year, this is still the type of player who is going to swing and miss. A lot.

Brinson’s offense hasn’t caught up to the defense, but that’s a compliment to the glove rather than an insult to the bat. His plus speed helps him get to pretty much everything in center field. He has the type of arm strength you’d love to see in your right fielder, and swoon for when you see that it plays in center.

There were only a handful of players more impressive than Brinson in the Arizona Fall League, and it helped confirm what those who saw him all year had been saying. Even with the strikeouts, this is player who can impact the game in essentially every realistic way you could ask for.  – Chris Crawford

2016 Statistics:

AA Frisco – 326 PA, .236 TAv || .237/.280/.431 || 11 HR || 11 SB || 19.6 percent K || 5.2 percent BB
AAA Colorado Springs – 13 PA, .585 TAv || .615/.615/.923 || 1 HR || 2 SB|| 15.4 percent K || 0 percent BB

RHP Luis Ortiz
6’3″ || 230 lbs || B/T: R/R || Age: 20

Fastball: 65 || Slider: 60 || Changeup: 45 || Command: 55

Future Role: 60 – #3 starting pitcher

Report: Not only do some prefer Ortiz over (Dillon) Tate, but there are those who believe Ortiz has the highest ceiling of any prospect in the (Rangers’) system. He gets his fastball into the mid 90s consistently from an easy arm action, sitting 93-95. The slider is his go-to out pitch. It doesn’t have as much depth as Tate’s, but it has more deception because the tilt comes so late. The only thing keeping him from projecting as a frontline starter right now is the lack of a quality third pitch, as both his curveball and change are closer to 40 than 50. Even without an average third offering, he has a chance to start because the command is so advanced. He repeats his delivery as well as you can expect a teenager to repeat things, and he not only throws strikes with all four pitches, he locates them to any part of the plate.

The concerns with Ortiz don’t come from stuff or an inability to throw strikes, but whether or not he’ll be able to hold up during a season. He’s burly—to put it nicely—and he’s missed time in each of the past two years, ending his 2015 season with elbow tendinitis. If he can stay healthy and keep the weight in check, he could be an innings-eater who misses bats, but there’s more volatility here than the stuff might suggest.  – Chris Crawford

2016 Statistics:

A+ High Desert – 27.2 IP, .216 TAv || 2.60 ERA || 4.20 FIP || 25.5 percent K || 5.5 percent BB || 51 percent GB
AA Frisco – 39.2 IP, .256 TAv || 4.08 ERA || 3.32 FIP || 19.5 percent K || 4.0 percent  BB || 47 percent GB

(Note: Player to be named later won’t be announced until after the completion of the minor league season.)

Giants trade:

RHP Phil Bickford
6’4″ || 200 lbs || B/T: R/R || Age: 20

Fastball: 65/70 || Slider: 50 || Changeup: 40 || Command: 50

Future Role: 45 – back end starter/high-leverage reliever

Report: Bickford’s stuff profiles best in a late-innings relief role. He has the body and arm to work multiple times through a lineup, and he features a deceptive fastball with late life up that generates swings and misses, but he lacks a third pitch and struggles commanding within the zone. His slider can change multiple grades from one start to the next but is something that can be masked in short stints. Bickford’s best-case scenario is a two-pitch starter with a back-end rotation spot. A high-leverage reliever is the safe bet.  -David Lee

Report: Bickford’s arm strength is elite, and when he’s working in short spurts, he’ll touch the high 90s with a four-seam fastball that has late life. His slider is maddeningly inconsistent; he struggles to repeat his three-quarters arm slot, and it will vary from a 40 pitch that he can’t locate to a 60 with hard tilt. The change is very much a work in progress, and like the slider its grade varies wildly from appearance to appearance. The control is ahead of the command, but he does a good enough job filling the strike zone that he should be able to start. However, because the stuff is so much better in shorter outings, it shouldn’t surprise anyone if he ends up making his living as a reliever.  – Chris Crawford

2016 Statistics:

A Augusta – 60.0 IP, .233 TAv || 2.70 ERA || 2.44 FIP || 28.3 percent K || 6.1 percent  BB || 34 percent GB
A+ San Jose – 33.0 IP, .214 TAv || 2.73 ERA || 3.97 FIP || 27.9 percent K || 9.3 percent BB || 35 percent GB

C Andrew Susac
6’1″ || 215 lbs || B/T: R/R || Age: 26

Hit: 50 || Power: 60 || Speed: 30 || Arm: 55 || Glove: 50

Future Role: 55 – above-average MLB starting catcher

Report: Advanced approach with good feel for zone; solid plus power plays in game at present; good strength; balanced swing stays on plane and allows for hard contact pole to pole; natural backspin and carry; improving actions behind the plate; capable defender who could refine to average overall producer with glove; above-average arm with solid release and accuracy. Average bat speed and coverage holes; can be beat by sequencing and elevated heat; danger that overexposure at big-league level will eat into contact and power utility once book gets out; well below-average runner; likely tops out as average defender.  – Nick J. Faleris

Fantasy Impact: Given a full complement of at-bats, Susac could hit .260 with 20 homers, making him a potential top-10 catcher.  – Bret Sayre

MLB Career Statistics (2014-15):

San Francisco – 243 PA, .268 TAv, -1.3 FRAA || .240/.309/.407 || 6 HR || 0 SB || 29.2 percent K || 8.6 percent BB

2016 Statistics:

AAA Sacramento – 239 PA, .302 TAv || .273/.343/.455 || 8 HR || 0 SB || 18.8 percent  K || 10 percent BB
AAA Colorado Springs – 9 PA, .030 TAv || .111/.111/.111 || 0 HR || 0 SB || 33.3 percent  K || 0 percent BB

Recent Podcasts:
Deadline Recap
Dan Szymborski on Deadline

It has been worth retelling this story over the last year, since the franchise is clearly changing their vision from the short term to the long term. But in this story, there is a clear difference between the talent landed by Melvin, and the talent that incoming GM David Stearns acquired from fall 2015 onward. The GMs worked the rebuild on several different fronts, which arguably has strengthened Milwaukee’s current position.

• Doug Melvin acquired prospects that could immediately begin playing in the MLB with a strong “floor” (or base skillset. See Barrios, Domingo Santana, and Zach Davies, for instance).
• Melvin bolstered his trades with advanced minors prospects that basically could and should arrive in the MLB around the 2017 trade deadline (Brett Phillips and Josh Hader).
• Outfielder Malik Collymore, previously a potential Top 30 member for the St. Louis Cardinals, is Melvin’s largest future play (along with January trade return, righty Marcos Diplan, which makes the Yovani Gallardo trade look more like a rebuilding effort).
• Stearns countered with low minor acquisitions that began filling out the system behind Melvin’s advanced acquisitions (this list includes roughly six players).
• The new GM also spurred several counterbuilding efforts, including trades involving Brewers’ prospect depth Cy Sneed, Trevor Seidenberger, and 40-man reserve asset Jason Rogers. This added significant “high floor” talent to the system, in the form of the “second-chance prospect.” It is crucial to keep mentioning this because this talent now largely escapes prospect lists (see Garin Cecchini or Keon Broxton, for instance).

With this development as a backdrop, Stearns’s 2016 deadline moves appear shrewd. The GM received a sizable amount of social media backlash for failing to demand the “hype” prospects, but what these prospects lack in name recognition they counter with tools. Previous top five Rangers prospects Lewis Brinson and Luis Ortiz could arguably top the system immediately, as Baseball Prospectus graded both players with strong 60 future roles. Giants prospect Phil Bickford received less stunning grades from the BP team, but even if Bickford ends up in the bullpen his role could grade out into the high leverage camp. Catcher Andrew Susac may be the best deadline acquisition, adding to the clear “second chance” prospect theme of 2016. Susac previously received future grades as a starting backstop, and, freed from Buster Posey, he will now receive the plate appearances to prove it.

So, the rebuild comprises approximately three clear fronts at the moment:

• Continue acquiring low minors talent to create solid pipelines of talent at each position (approx. 8 prospects).
• Grab as much advanced minors potential impact talent as possible (approx. 9 prospects).
• Acquire “second chance” or blocked prospects that have either “outlived” their welcome or do not have an impact role in their previous organization.

In terms of timeline, the rebuild has now added another notch. If you don’t believe that the system is quite far along, consider a three year window beginning with last year’s opening shot for rebuilding:

• 2015 (July, Offseason)
• 2016 (July, Offseason)
• 2017 (July, Offseason)
• 2018 (July, Offseason)

Milwaukee is now through approximately half of their midseason trading windows, and a quarter of their offseason trading windows. Of course, it is worth mentioning that if the club continues to land second chance prospects (like Jonathan Villar) and successfully develop them into regular MLB players (like “future third baseman”), that shortens the rebuilding window in terms of answering MLB question marks (“who will be the third baseman of the future?” Jonathan Villar).

In terms of result, one cannot necessarily call the rebuild a success until one defines the desired outcome (Championship? LCS? Consecutive division titles? Sustained 1525 Elo Rating? 900 wins between 2019 and 2028?). In terms of process, however, it is difficult not to praise the systems building efforts of both Doug Melvin and David Stearns. Melvin effectively ensured that the rebuilding years could sustain a high floor by adding near-ready prospects; Stearns could then continually look for talent across various levels without as much concern for immediate MLB graduations. Adding in various player development successes (from Michael Reed, Jorge Lopez, and Orlando Arcia in 2015, to Jake Gatewood, Jon Perrin, or Brandon Woodruff (among others) in 2016), Stearns can soon turn his future efforts to both acquiring depth and dealing from depth. The rebuilding process now becomes one of consistent velocity, where each player development success becomes an answer to a particular question. It is now up to Stearns to know the questions.

Perhaps the arguments are not what Brewers fans need any longer. So, to grade the progress of the rebuild, let’s visualize the system through three routes (the draft, the trades, and international signings).

Related Reading:
Three Up Three Down: Gatewood, Nottingham, Phillips
Three Up Three Down: Mallen, Orf, Perrin
Three Up Three Down: Diaz, Ponce, Yamamoto

If the 2015 season belonged largely to the 2011 draft (Reed, Lopez, and Jacob Barnes), the 2016 season belongs to the 2014 draft. Jake Gatewood is using mechanical adjustments to spur his most successful professional campaign, and a step into multiple positions to accommodate other prospects will only hasten Gatewood’s MLB opportunities (consider Gatewood the “true corner depth player” or “the 1B” or “the 3B;” that’s at least three potential MLB roles now). Brandon Woodruff is surging at AA Biloxi, thanks to his hard upper-90s fastball and strike zone dominance (78 K / 22 BB / 3 HR / 49 percent GB against 282 AA batters).

But, this is only two examples. If one seeks to construct a potential “Top 30″ list based on roles, floors, ceilings, and MLB proximity, the drafts are looking quite strong.

• KEY:
• Top Ten considerations in bold and italics, top 30 considerations in bold, [just interesting depth or MLB grads in brackets].

The drafts have provided a steady set of strong tools for the Brewers system, especially from 2014-2016. By contrast, the Brewers front office has revolutionized the system through trade. This is not to knock the draft, but to note that it features an entirely different purpose than the trades; via trade, Milwaukee has largely acquired players with better defined future roles / ceilings and tools than via the draft (which seems logical):

Finally, a revitalized International Complex has allowed the Brewers to more aggressively sign some top talent (like Gilbert Lara), and graduate more talent into the low minors. The international prospects are quite intriguing, if far from defining their MLB potential roles and tools.

SS Orlando Arcia will be recalled from Triple-A @skysox tomorrow. He will be making his Major League debut.

— Milwaukee Brewers (@Brewers) August 2, 2016

It is easier to dream, however, as Orlando Arcia makes the leap to the MLB:

If you’ve lost count, that’s approximately 23 MLB graduates, 16 prospects worthy of Top Ten consideration, more than 40 prospects worthy of Top 30 consideration, and at least another dozen “just interesting” prospects. This visualization should underscore the extent to which the Brewers system will soon bear MLB impact development and sustain “win now” trades (when necessary).