Then there are the independent leagues. Situated below affiliated ball, the indy leagues dole out a few hundred dollars to players who play for a couple of months in small, empty stadiums before heading back to the families and day jobs they left behind. Not all of them harbor major league ambitions – there are many more realists in the independent leagues than there are in the minors. But plenty of others dream of getting that ten percent chance. Never mind that independent league coaching is a world away from minor league coaching. Never mind that indy league salaries are so low that players can scarcely afford temporary housing, let alone gym memberships or nutritious food. Never mind that some of these players were passed over in the major league draft, or were released after failing to hit in A-ball. Some combination of a love for the game and belief in themselves motivates them to keep playing.

Sometimes it pays off. Each year, a couple of players on a given independent league team might be scooped up by a big league organization. But what are the odds of those players ever making it to a big league club? The Brewers hope they’re one in four or better. In the last year, the Brewers plucked three players directly from independent teams, and stole another from a division rival via the Rule 5 draft. If everyone loves an underdog, these should be your new favorite prospects.

Santos Saldivar
Pitcher Santos Saldivar kicked off the Milwaukee’s recent string of indy league finds when he signed his free-agent contract last May. Perhaps more than any other Stearns transaction, signing Saldivar cemented the Brewers’ commitment to analytics and statistical analysis. His name may be familiar to long-time devotees of Baseball Prospectus – Saldivar was one of the pitchers signed by Ben Lindbergh and Sam Miller to play for the Sonoma Stompers in 2015, and he features prominently in their book about the experience, The Only Rule is it Has to Work.

Miller and Lindbergh signed Saldivar using nothing but the data on a spreadsheet. In his senior year at Southern University, Saldivar worked to an even 3.00 ERA, striking out 115 batters over 87 innings for a rate of 11.9 Ks per nine innings. The righty failed to allow a single home run, and his WHIP was a cool 1.17. Yet he was overlooked in the major league draft, perhaps because he’s somewhat easy to overlook in general – Saldivar stands 5’8” and pitched for a small school. But he starred for the Stompers to the tune of a 2.05 ERA and 58 strikeouts against 17 walks in 48.1 innings. That sort of work will generally get you noticed.

His Brewers debut was not without its bumps. Saldivar was sent to the Helena Brewers of the Pioneer League, where he was about one and a half years older than most of his competition. He still struck out a batter per inning, but he also issued 4.5 BB/9, and limped to a 5.73 ERA over 19 relief appearances.

Don’t count him out just yet – Saldivar is nothing if not ambitious (his goal for last season was to finish in A-ball and start 2017 in AA), and the Helena coaching staff took him out of his comfort zone by restricting his ability to throw his two-seam fastball. He throws four other pitches, ranging from the low 60s to the low 90s, all with plenty of movement. And he set his college record for strikeouts, beating out then-teammate (and current Tampa Bay Ray) Jose De Leon. De Leon is six inches taller, but Santos likes his chances to continue to outshine the top prospect. With a strong showing in full-season ball in 2017, he could give himself a chance to do just that.

Chad Nading
Evaluating righty Chad Nading is tricky business. This is because Chad Nading is without compare. To start with, he’s from Alaska, and became one of only 20 high school players drafted from that cold-weather state when the Detroit Tigers called his name in the 36th round in 2006. The 6’5” hurler didn’t sign, opting instead to redshirt at Oregon State. His battery mate was dating the daughter of erstwhile Padres manager Bud Black, and the two struck up an acquaintanceship. Nading then transferred to UNLV, where he pitched to a cumulative 9.18 ERA in two seasons. He was drafted again after his junior year in 2009, this time by the Texas Rangers in 37th round. He still didn’t sign.

After his senior year, Nading spent a summer chatting with Black about his mechanics and potential, and scored a contract with the Padres’ Arizona League affiliate to boot. It did not go well. He worked to a 14.29 ERA as a submariner, coughing up 13 hits and 9 earned runs in only 5.2 innings. He walked two and struck out three. The next two seasons – 2011 and 2012 – saw Nading laboring in independent leagues. He didn’t get much work, pitching a combined 12.1 innings with a ghastly 20.83 ERA and 15.62 BB/9.

He was down, but he wasn’t out. After three seasons away, Nading came roaring back into the independent leagues in 2016 with the Wichita Wingnuts (whose recent alums include David Peralta and Junior Guerra). Featuring a 94-97 mph fastball and a new over-the-top delivery, Nading found the strike zone and posted a 1.83 ERA, accompanied by a 30:17 K/BB ration in 39 innings. His turnaround was impressive enough for Baseball America to rank him the fourth-best independent league prospect available at the start of the offseason, despite the fact that 2017 will be his age-29 season. He caught the eye of Brewers evaluators, too, who bought his rights in late October. Look for Nading to get a look out of the bullpen down on the farm in 2017.

Luke Barker
Sometimes, you’re just unlucky. That would certainly explain why 6’4” right-hander and Greg Maddux fan Luke Barker was passed over in the 2015 MLB draft. In four years at Chico State, Barker posted a 2.91 ERA over 72 appearances, including 26 starts and 18 saves. He throws five pitches, headlined by a four-seam fastball that sits in the low 90s. That pitch pairs well with his upper-70s slider and mid-80s splitter. He’ll also mix in a two-seamer and a changeup to keep hitters guessing.

Sensing an opportunity, the Traverse City Beach Bums of the Frontier League signed Barker for 2016, and he responded by posting a heroic 1.44 ERA with 12.0 strikeouts per nine against only 1.4 walks. His WHIP for the season was 0.802. If ever there was a golden ticket out of the independent leagues, those numbers are it. The Brewers snatched his rights in mid-November, and may develop him as a starter next year. He’ll turn 25 in March, so a strong showing this spring could push him as high as Class-A Carolina.

If pitching doesn’t work out, Barker could still offer the Brewers significant value. Before being signed, he planned to pursue a PhD in biomechanics and a career in coaching. It’s safe to say that sports are in his blood – his mother is Chico State’s Athletic Director, and his father is the head trainer. Guys like that are good to have around.

Art Charles
The Toronto Blue Jays selected lefty first baseman Art Charles in the 20th round of the 2010 draft, on the heels of a monster sophomore season at Bakersfield College (.317/.405/.514). Last March, he was released by the Philadelphia Phillies after limping to a .229 average (albeit with 25 doubles, four triples, and 19 home runs) in the pitcher-friendly Florida State League. In December, the Brewers selected him from the Cincinnati Reds in the AAA portion of the Rule 5 draft. So it’s safe to say he’s been around.

Charles stands 6’6” and weighs in at 260 pounds. He has long arms and a smooth swing that allows him to access his plus power. He’s not bad with the glove, either – he can dig out a low throw, and he’s big enough to catch anything within six or seven feet of the bag that comes in between the ground and, oh, about ten feet in the air. He’s also a gregarious personality with great makeup on and off the field – for Charles, being released and playing in indy ball was a powerful motivator. There’s a lot about him to like.

There have also been a lot of strikeouts, which prevented him from ever eclipsing a .251 average in the minor leagues. He was cut loose by a good Phillies system, but quickly got a call from the Laredo Lemurs of the independent American Association. The New Jersey Jackals of the Can-Am League liked him even better, and swung a trade for Charles before the season started.

It was a savvy move. Charles ran away with the Can-Am Triple Crown after putting up Eric-Thames-in-Korea numbers. His triple slash for the season was a ludicrous .352/.461/.699, which went nicely with his 29 home runs and 101 RBIs. Encouragingly, he drew 66 walks and struck out just 92 times over 355 ABs – hardly elite, but much better than he fared in affiliated ball. Baseball America named him their Independent Leagues Player of the Year, and ranked him as the second-best indy league prospect this offseason. On the heels of this success, he was signed by the Reds, left unprotected, and claimed by the Brewers. Now he’ll have a chance to make his mark in an organization thin on upper-level corner talent. Still just 25 years old, watch for Charles to wreak havoc in the hitter’s paradise that is Colorado Springs.

Of course, his odds of becoming an impactful player at the major league level are still vanishingly slim. All four of these players are facing a steep climb to Milwaukee. But it’s also worth remembering that David Peralta, Junior Guerra, and Rich Hill were all playing independent ball a few years ago. In indy league baseball, there’s an awful lot of “rough.” But there are plenty of diamonds, too. Here’s hoping the Brewers strike rich.

(1) Grading Thames
Several sources of projection have outlined expectations for Eric Thames in Milwaukee, so I’m not going to attempt to project Thames’s statistical performance in Milwaukee. Instead, I want to look at the opportunity cost of Thames, as well as the potential value from his scouting profile. Really, my analysis of both Thames and Thornburg will depend on your feelings of WARP; whether or not you believe that WARP adequately captured Chris Carter’s value to the Brewers is going to be a factor that impacts how you view the slugger’s surplus value, for instance (a similar issue will arise with Thornburg below).

In my last analysis, I estimated that in terms of contractual value and production, Carter was worth between $18 million and $25 million to the Brewers (the main focal point here is not to consider the fact that he may have cost between $8 million and $10 million in salary arbitration, but that the Brewers could release Carter without spending a dime [and they did just that], which frames his contractual value). The most interesting note on Thames is that the slugger has changed his approach and mechanics while working in the KBO, which places a different lens on his outburst in that league, and also changes his scouting outlook in the USA. Beyond the Box Score features a detailed look at Thames’s swing in the KBO, which shows some development from his MLB swing.

If one attempts to balance Thames’s winding career path with his recent KBO superstardom, a “punt” scouting grade of 45-50 may be in order for the age 30-33 first baseman’s contract. Yet, visions of Jose Bautista come to mind whenever someone says “late 20s mechanical adjustment,” as the Blue Jays’ iconic slugger was little more than a .239 / .324 / .398 slasher through 2008 when Toronto acquired him. The idea that a player can unleash his power after his prime development years is not implausible, and indeed some of those players become superstars (Edwin Encarnacion, Bautista’s teammate, is another example).

In 1,000 scenarios, imagine that Thames reaches 40 OFP 900 times ($1,800M), 50 OFP 80 times ($2,976M), 60 OFP 19 times ($1,452M), and Jose Bautista once ($218M): the Brewers still come out ahead, even if in 90 percent of scenarios Thames effectively busts (0.93 WARP over four seasons). Their total surplus, in this scenario, would be approximately $2.8M. So, the Thames contract is a wash at worst, and at best a fantastic opportunity to sign a foreign league superstar that was simply a late bloomer. Now the only question is if Thames ends up closer to the 0.1 percent odds of breaking out as an MLB superstar on the strength of his KBO adjustments.
Surplus Value: Approximately $2.8M if assumed 40 OFP in 90 percent of outcomes.

(2) Trading Thornburg
How does one grade the Thornburg trade? In my previous grading of current assets, Thornburg’s three-year performance weighed down his significant gains as a reliever. Boston obviously traded for Thornburg with the idea of building on his season as an excellent high leverage relief option, and whether or not Thornburg is a closer, there is a chance that he will provide excellent value to their roster if given the chance to prove himself in the late innings over another season. The best aspect for the big market Red Sox is that they now reserve arbitration rights for Thornburg for three seasons, meaning that there is plenty of time for Thornburg to move within different high leverage roles, struggle, iron out any issues, even weather an injury. In this case, a study of the McCann trade, which caused me to reconsider using depreciation-models to assess trade value, one would do well to assess Thornburg in the most robust manner, certainly weighing his 2016 improvements much more heavily than his previous struggles.

If anything, this comparison should show that it’s extremely difficult to simply assess a trade based on one single model, or one assumption. The Brewers could assume that Thornburg’s troubles would weigh heavier, and they wouldn’t necessarily be wrong; the Red Sox could buy high and have a robust model for Thornburg, and be equally correct. I dare say there will be no equilibrium found for this deal, between either club. The deal is an immediate victory for the contending Red Sox, who bolster their bullpen with a hard throwing up-and-coming reliever that offers three years of arbitration reserve; the deal is an immediate victory for the Brewers, who turned a struggling swingman-at-best into a lights-out reliever and then sold at the best possible moment (it can be argued that even waiting to see if Thornburg could close for the first half of 2017 is too risky for the Brewers, since any issues in that regard would tank the value built during 2016).

Considering both conservative and aggressive estimates for the trade as currently constructed, it should not be outlandish to say that the Red Sox properly gambled that they can retain value with Thornburg’s contract (which can be non-tendered without cost prior to 2018 and 2019). If the PTBNL turns out to be a player with a pedigree other than organizational depth, that might push Thornburg into 2.0 WARP/year territory to regain value. Yet, given that the Red Sox are gambling for playoff spots, overpaying in a trade for a high leverage player is not necessarily a bad deal if the payoff is somewhere between $10 million and $30 million of playoff revenue. Adding together playoff revenue, playoff prestige, and potential flags flying is well worth a PTBNL. There is plenty of evidence to argue the trade a success for either team, which is a good sign that Milwaukee maximized their short-term closer’s value.

(3) Miguel Diaz’s Value
I previously called GM David Stearns’s refusal to protect top RHP prospect Miguel Diaz from the Rule 5 draft a “dreadful, terrible” move, but I think I emphasized the wrong reasons. As the Brewers potentially lost Diaz to the Padres (via the Twins), depending on how he fares early in the season and whether he sticks with San Diego, it is worth recasting the move as a failure even if Diaz does not reach the MLB or his gaudiest 60 OFP from summer 2016.

Imagine that Diaz follows the odds of reaching the MLB at approximately 20 percent; among those potential MLB futures, consider a 40 OFP / roster filler status as the vast majority (95 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 1.0 WARP over three seasons), a 50 OFP (4.5 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 4.0 WARP over three seasons), and 60 OFP in 0.5 percent of MLB futures (maybe reaching 7.0 WARP over three seasons). Spread over 1,000 potential futures, Miguel Diaz averages out to approximately 0.23 WARP, or someone worth between $0.500 million league minimum contract (replacement contract) and $1.61 million using the standard $7 million / WARP “market estimation.” This is the biggest problem with failing to protect Diaz: in the first place, he’s one of only a few true 50+ / 60 OFP prospects in the Brewers system. There are many 50 prospects in the system, and several 50+ prospects, even, but not many reached a 60 OFP grade in 2016. Diaz reached that level, and is therefore one of the best prospects even adding in all the risk one can find.
Value Lost: $1.6 million.

(4) Roster Summary
Here is a summary of notables trades, Rule 5 transactions (MLB and AAA), and free agency signings. Moves with 40-man roster impact are highlighted.

Thus far, the Brewers have added approximately $23.7 million in total surplus through 40-man roster transactions (this figure does not factor in full reserve control for minor leaguers, but instead focuses on OFP value). That is basically worth 1.7 WARP from a league minimum contract, or 2.75 WARP from Eric Thames (2.75 WARP is worth approximately $19.3 million, minus $15 million guaranteed). In total surplus value, Stearns has acquired approximately $63 million for the organization, which can be translated as approximately 4.5 total WARP from a league minimum salary, or acquiring approximately three 50 OFP prospects via trade.