Related Reading:
Brewers Organization Catchers

The Baseball Prospectus top 2019 Free Agents list had four catchers in the top 50: Yasmani Grandal, Wilson Ramos, Kurt Suzuki and Jonathan Lucroy. Eliminating Lucroy, who was the second worst catcher who received regular playing time in 2018, the Brewers have three options if they wanted to dip into the free agent pool to try and upgrade the position.

Yasmani Grandal was ranked 9^th best free agent this offseason and projections put him at least a  three year commitment between $15-16M a year. At that salary, Grandal would rank second on the team in annual salary, only behind Ryan Braun. While Grandal is entering his age-30 season, he only trailed J.T. Realmuto in catcher Wins Above Replacement Player (BWARP) in 2018 and was close enough that one could consider him the best in baseball. Grandal may have been the most complete catcher as he ranked second in both Value Over Replacement Player (VORP) and FRAA amongst catchers, which respectively measure offensive and defensive value, showing that he’s strong at both ends of the game.

If there’s one area of concern, it’s that most of Grandal’s defensive value came from framing. He led MLB in framing runs in 2018 but provided only slightly positive value for blocking and throwing runs. If the Brewers were to commit the resources necessary to sign Grandal, then they would need to believe his bat will age gracefully as well as that  he can continue to provide defensive value through framing, which is not a given.

Wilson Ramos is a year older than Grandal and with his injury history projects for a three year contract at $36 million. He doesn’t provide much defensive value. In his last season before tearing his ACL, Ramos had a 10 FRAA. Since the tear, he’s -3.9. Amongst catchers who caught at least 2,000 pitches, Ramos ranked 35^th of 61 catchers in FRAA, which make sense given his numbers: he’s not bad in any one area, but he also doesn’t stand out defensively.

Ramos will provide offensive value. In 2018, his True Average (TAv) was right behind Grandal and ranked fourth amongst all catchers. If you were concerned that a rate stat props up his value, then don’t worry because he was tied for seventh in VORP.

A big worry with Ramos would be playing time management. Prior to his knee injury, he maxed out at 131 games and 523 plate appearances. Last year he appeared in 111 games and went to the plate 416 times between Tampa and Philadelphia. While the Brewers don’t have any problems with rotating players, Ramos has no positional flexibility and would need to be paired with a competent backup who can cover somewhere between twenty-five to thirty-three percent of the playing time. Unless the market on Ramos falls short of projections, it’s difficult to see the Brewers making a strong play for his services because they’d also need to commit to a strong backup, perhaps straining the payroll too much for one position.

The last catcher in the top fifty is one who may make the most sense as a Brewer if he’s willing to leave his current club. Kurt Suzuki has had a late career renaissance at the plate in Atlanta, posting his two best TAvs in 2017 and 2018. In those two seasons, Suzuki started swinging more. Whereas prior to 2017, he was swinging at less than forty-five percent of the pitches he saw, he’s above a fifty two percent swing rate now, while also maintaining a contact rate above eighty percent. Suzuki finished sixth in both TAv and VORP amongst catchers in 2018, providing near equal offensive value to Ramos.

Suzuki does not provide much value behind the plate. He had a -5.5 FRAA in 2018, which was fueled by his poor framing numbers. He finished 52^nd out of 61 catchers in framing runs and his modest blocking and throwing numbers couldn’t offset the framing numbers.

Suzuki’s numbers have increased as he’s played fewer games. He’s split time with Tyler Flowers in Atlanta, playing in 186 games over two seasons with less than 700 plate appearances. The good news is that his advanced age and limited playing time make him a potential cheap upgrade for Milwaukee. Projections have him at two years and $10 million, which is reasonable enough to make him a realistic alternative to Pina or Kratz.

If the team does decide to look to the free agent marker to upgrade the catcher position, it feels like Suzuki would be the target. He’s a low cost option who could provide outsized production when compared with his salary. For an organization that always looks for surplus value in their acquisitions, a player like Suzuki makes sense for the team. Grandal and Ramos are buzzier additions but the cost of those two veterans may not fit in the budget. The good news is that the team has options at different levels outside the organization, so they can negotiate from a position of strength.

Albers is coming off the best season of his twelve-year career. He posted 1.2 WARP, a career-high, over 61 innings in 63 games. His K/9 shot up to 9.30 after striking out just 5.26 per nine in 2016. The righty also posted a WHIP below 1.00 (0.85) for the first time in his career.

Last year, Albers was one of just seven relief pitchers to strikeout more than nine batters per nine innings and have a ground ball rate above 50 percent. It was the first time in Albers’s career he was able to pair an elite strikeout rate with his usually-excellent ground ball rate. For example, in 2011, he posted a strikeout per nine above 9.00 but his ground ball rate dipped below 50 percent.

Albers will likely fill the setup role Anthony Swarzak filled in the second half of 2017, but at about a third of the price. Swarzak signed for fourteen million over two years with the New York Mets in December. Although Albers can’t match Swarzak’s flashy earned run average and strikeout rate, he provides much needed depth while allowing the Brewers to spread out financial resources.

Since Albers had a career-year at thirty-four, the righty’s 2016 immediately screams fluke to most. However, the combination of refining his walk rate and his newfound, nearly complete reliance on his slider and sinker made Albers’s breakout possible.

Early in his career, Albers was a base on balls machine. He walked over four batters per nine innings in each of his first six seasons. In the two following seasons, 2012 and 2013, he walked 3.3 batters per nine. Since 2014, the righty has walked over 3 batters per nine just once, and walked just 2.5 batters per nine last year. Although Albers’s walk rate is still not elite, it’s respectable, opposed to the disaster it was early in his career.

Last year, Albers nearly became a two-pitch pitcher after working as a four or five-pitch pitcher throughout the rest of his career. He completely ditched his curveball, a pitch he threw just under a quarter of the time in his first four seasons in the big leagues and 12 percent of the time as recently as 2013. He used his four-seam fastball for just one month, August, his worst month of the season, and then ditched it again in September.

Albers became almost exclusively a sinker/slider guy. He threw either his sinker or slider over 91 percent of the time in 2017. In April, his best month of the season, he threw his sinker or slider over 97 percent of the time.

Because of his age and questionable late-career breakout, PECOTA is justifiably down on Albers. PECOTA calls for a 4.64 DRA and just 0.2 WARP in 52 innings for the right hander. But PECOTA may not account for Albers becoming a different pitcher as far as pitch mix goes last season. Additionally, his improved command throughout his career may change his outlook. Albers has learned to harness his control while relying on pitches that dip and cut.

David Stearns gave Albers the first multi-year contract of his career out of faith in the pitcher he was last year. If Albers can continue his solid command, while relying solely on his sinker and slider, the Brewers have just found their new setup man for Corey Knebel for pennies on the dollar.

Photo Credit: Patrick McDermott, USAToday Sports Images

When I profiled free agents to begin the season, Lorenzo Cain graded as the best available position player free agent with a $71.5M three-year depreciated surplus. Given that the Brewers landed Cain for $80 million over five years, the Cain deal grades as close to an absolute steal. Cain’s surplus grades out to approximately $120.0M over five years, which means that at a $16.0M/year rate the Brewers basically received two free years on Cain’s deal. Basically, Cain should be able to deliver value on this contract in nearly every scenario short of catastrophic injury.

Contrary to the common line that the Brewers basically acquired Cain for market value, it is arguable that the club attained the center fielder’s services for quite a valuable deal.

What is thrilling about the Yelich deal is that it is not a steal. It is not a value move. The Brewers exhausted the full value of Yelich by trading three of their top six prospects. However, this is not problematic because Yelich’s surplus value is almost comical; he’s a young, budding superstar who has already proven a floor somewhere between 2.5 WARP and 5.0 WARP as he enters his prime age seasons. Tracking surplus value is important here because one can use the idea of organizational surplus value to assess when and how a team is extracting wins from their players.

Surplus Value Pricing
Refining WARP & OFP Pricing
Translating OFP
OFP and Minor League Pay
Revisiting the CC Sabathia Trade
Cashing Out OFP 2
Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades
Historical WARP and OFP

Had the Brewers kept Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto, they would have indeed retained those prospects’ surplus value (defined here by their potential MLB ceilings, or Overall Future Potential (OFP), and their risk floor) while also carrying all of the risk of developing them year-to-year. This development risk was especially present with Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto, who are a couple of professional levels away from the MLB, but it was also somewhat present in Brinson’s profile should the center fielder never adjust his hit tool to MLB pitching. An elite fielding, speedy center fielder with some power but contact issues at the plate is not a bad MLB profile, but it’s not a superstar profile.

I began tracking Brewers surplus value during the club’s rebuild as a way to understand the success of a rebuild. What I found problematic about analyzing a rebuilding club was determining when and how a rebuilding team would achieve success. Since a rebuilding team is by definition “cashing out” its potential to win ballgames far down the road, there must be interim metrics used to judge a front office’s success. I use surplus value to assess MLB players by judging “production” (how well a player plays) and “scarcity” (how the player’s contract is structured) to express Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) in monetary terms. Since risk can be priced, prospect OFP can be assessed in monetary terms as well, either by assessing the scarcity of certain grades and profiles or by historically analyzing production by prospect classes. By using these methods, MLB players and prospects can be evaluated on the same terms, which is a necessary task since MLB players are often traded for prospects; this method can also help one assess the success of a rebuild.

While there will be issues with designing any surplus value system for assessing MLB players and prospects, I maintain that working toward such a pricing system is necessary because MLB teams trade prospects for MLB players all the time.

The trouble with a player like Christian Yelich is that because he is cost-controlled by a $50 million contract (plus an option), his top surplus grade is extremely high. Over the course of the remaining five-years, extrapolating Yelich’s best WARP (5.3) yields potential production value worth $185.5M; even harshly depreciating Yelich’s 2015-2017 production yields potential value worth $93.1M. The reason Yelich’s surplus value runs so high, however, is that Yelich can also be graded by the cost of his contract against his production value; with $58.3M remaining over five years (if the Brewers exercise Yelich’s option), Yelich’s contractual surplus is at least $34.8M, and could be as high as $127.2M should his superstar potential continue to materialize.

Simply stated, Yelich is an absurdly valuable MLB player; he’s about as valuable as it gets. What is fascinating about Yelich’s value is that one would expect that he is nearly untradeable because of his value. Basically, there is no single prospect who will ever be worth Yelich, and this is why the Marlins’ reported demand of Braves prospect Ronald Acuna (arguably the very top prospect in the game) was not ridiculous or even audacious. Thus, it should make sense that the Brewers traded three high-ceiling prospects and one intriguing pitching flyer for Yelich: where one prospect cannot exhaust the value of an MLB player, many prospects must be used to form a transaction worth completing.

Using historical OFP pricing, one can see that a prospect package of Brinson, Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto very nearly exhausts Yelich’s highest surplus pricing. This is not necessarily a problem, given that Yelich is such a valuable player one should not have (reasonably) expected anything lower. For example, once the Miami Marlins reached their threshold to fund their 2018 payroll, they could demand pure talent in return for Yelich, rather than talent and payroll relief. The “lowest” possible deal for Yelich, which would have priced the left fielder at his depreciated value over four years, would have roughly required Brinson and Diaz in return; but once the Marlins were able to demand talent alone, that type of price would not have been attainable by Milwaukee. Given that the Brewers had a deep farm system, especially at center field, the Brewers front office correctly ascertained that the Marlins would be pricing out Yelich at his highest possible value. With both Yelich and Lorenzo Cain sliding into outfield slots for five years, many have noted that the actual prospect hit is lessened for Milwaukee.

Of course, it must be stated that a player’s MLB potential ceiling is a dynamic phenomenon, and OFP only measures a player at one static point in time. Take Isan Diaz, for example; the second base prospect attained a higher OFP ranking entering the 2017 season, and a rough injury-riddled year dented that a bit. Jordan Yamamoto is almost impossible to price, as scouts that like the righty have recognized potential areas for the youngster to succeed as a rotation arm, but his development profile still carries a high amount of risk to reach that level. It is plausible that the Marlins priced out Diaz at a range potentially higher than the OFP published above, simply because his full prospect profile suggests that Diaz can once again reach that higher ceiling should he mend a few weaknesses as he reaches the advanced minors.

From the Brewers’ perspective, the front office surrendered much potential starpower, but they transferred all of the development risk to the Marlins. It should not be assumed that any of these prospects will be the same player in both locations: perhaps Lewis Brinson receives advice on a mechanical adjustment in Miami that the Brewers Player Development would have overlooked; perhaps each of these prospects receives enough time to adjust at the MLB level in the pressure-free environment of Miami, whereas a contending Milwaukee club may have had less patience for shortcomings at the MLB level.

Additionally, trading Brinson and Diaz essentially “completes” the Jean Segura deal, and realigns the Jonathan Lucroy deal. When I last checked in, the Segura trade remained Stearns’s worst deal (in terms of assessing day-of and post hoc surplus value), while the Lucroy deal remained his best.

Now these deals look like this:

It is nearly impossible to effectively apportion surplus from a four-player trade package across two previous trades, but the basic story is that Stearns has improved his trading record. By extending Chase Anderson and trading away Isan Diaz and Aaron Hill, Stearns has basically completed the Segura deal. In terms of the original Lucroy deal, the remaining player development task is Luis Ortiz, although the young righty is also prime trade potential due to his current innings pitched ceiling and flyball profile (36 percent groundball rate in 2017).

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

The Milwaukee Brewers are coming off an 86-win season and trying to add to that success. Despite what appears to be one of the most favorable free agent markets in recent history, David Stearns seems to be turning to the trade market for improvements. In this discounted market, Stearns would be mistaken going to the trade route rather than spending in free agency.

The Brewers are rumored to be in trade talks with the Miami Marlins for Christian Yelich.

<blockquote class=”twitter-tweet” data-lang=”en”><p lang=”en” dir=”ltr”>Source : Brewers have put together a trade offer &amp; have shown strong interest Marlins OF Christian Yelich. Other teams remain in the mix.</p>&mdash; Craig Mish (@CraigMish) <a href=”https://twitter.com/CraigMish/status/955907465538822144?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw”>January 23, 2018</a></blockquote> <script async src=”https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js” charset=”utf-8″></script>

Yelich is the most valuable piece on the trade market. He’s barely twenty-six-years-old, and under a $43.3 million contract through 2021 with a $15 million team option for 2022. He’s been worth 15.8 WARP in four-and-a-half major league seasons. Yelich is a borderline superstar on an extremely team-friendly contract.

Yelich’s talent level and contract situation not only makes him the most coveted piece on the trade market this offseason, but he’s also one of the most valuable assets in the league period. He’s going to garner a haul.

A trade for Yelich like starts with one of the Brewers young outfielders, Domingo Santana or Lewis Brinson, both of which are under favorable contract situations of their own. Santana or Brinson alone won’t be nearly enough to acquire Yelich. A hypothetical trade will likely cost one of the two outfielders and probably two of the Brewers top ten prospects or one of their top three prospects. Yelich’s age, skill, and contract allow the Marlins to ask for the world.

The Brewers have one of the strongest farm systems in the league, which is one of the reasons they are in on players such as Yelich and Chris Archer. Rather than blowing up the farm system Stearns has spent the past few seasons building, he has the option of going to the free agent market to find outfield and pitching improvements.

The Brewers ended the last two seasons with the lowest payroll in the league after finishing with the 15th highest payroll in 2014, according to Cots Baseball Contracts. In other words, the organization should have money to spend.

The front office should be looking to add pieces to this young core coming up through the system, not shedding pieces to add talent. Especially when assets on the free agent market are to be had.

If the Brewers are set on improving center field, they should look no further than Lorenzo Cain. Cain is much older, not as talented, and would likely cost a bit more financially than Yelich. However, the veteran Cain wouldn’t cost anything in prospect loss, save a compensatory pick in this years draft. The Brewers could then use their deep outfield to trade for rotation or relief help.

There are plenty of options on the free agent market for Stearns to add to the starting rotation. Yu Darvish, Jake Arrieta, Lance Lynn, and Alex Cobb are just a few names who have yet to find a home. In Darvish’s case, he wouldn’t cost a compensation pick. The Brewers should be doing everything they can to add pitching in this market while they are still available. If all else fails and the team is desperate for pitching, then turn to the trade market.

There’s no reason to ruin what the Brewers have going, as far as their farm system goes. A farm system is something to build around. The Chicago Cubs won their first championship in 108 years by building and holding onto a strong farm system, and then adding veteran talent around them, most through free agency. The Brewers should be looking to go the same route, particularly in this team-friendly free agent market.

Although it’s tempting to jump the gun and acquire an Archer or Yelich, especially when you have the assets to make that possible, it’d be ideal for the Brewers to hold onto their prospects, stay out of the trade market, and build around their young prospects rather than using them as trade assets.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USAToday Sports Images

Logan was limited to just 38 games and 21 innings in 2017 due to a lat strain that ended his season in late July. In the two seasons prior to 2017, he pitched in 126 games and 81 ⅔ innings, posting a 3.40 fielding independent pitching (FIP) over that stretch. The veteran lefty finished with an uninspiring 4.71 ERA last season, but when considering his strikeout numbers, FIP, and batting average on balls in play (BABIP), Logan looks like he had a semi-dominant 21 innings in the big leagues last season.

Logan’s 3.13 FIP would have been his best of his 12 year career over a full season. His ERA was bloated almost entirely by an inflated opposing BABIP of .353, although his 51 percent ground ball rate was two percentage points better than his career average. The southpaw struck out 12 batters per nine innings, the best mark of his career. His walks per nine were a tick below 4 at 3.9, a concerning total but right in line with his career average. He also had a park factor that was 8 percent above average, which did no good for his ERA totals. The only thing out of line was his opposing BABIP.

Even as Logan scratched the surface of his mid-thirties and endured an injury-riddled season, the velocity on his pitches maintained. According to Brooks Baseball, his fastball and sinker both remained slightly below 94 MPH. Logan threw his slider harder and more often than ever, selecting it nearly 58 percent of his pitches, with a velocity around 84 MPH.

Although Brewers fans are longing for the big move to take this team over the hump and into the playoffs, it is small moves such as the Logan signing that builds a well-rounded roster. By spending just $2.5 million, David Stearns has lengthened and strengthened his bullpen without any long-term commitment. If Logan stays healthy and returns to being the more-than-solid lefty-specialist he has proven to be throughout his career, the Brewers can bring him back in 2019 at a modest price. Stearns has built the Brewers current roster on seemingly minor moves such as these, and the Boone Logan signing has the potential to join his long list of underrated moves.

Photo Credit: Kelley L. Fox, USAToday Sports Images

The point is, it doesn’t require a lot of convincing to say the Brewers’ pursuit of Ohtani is a good idea. MLB.com columnist Jon Paul Morosi speculated after speaking to team executives that Ohtani is looking to hit and pitch, and that may give the AL an advantage to promise that he’d be able to DH on at least some of his non-pitching days. It’s a logical conclusion, but in a market where almost all teams are going to submit proposals and giving Ohtani their best pitch, maybe National League teams like the Brewers can zig where others zag.

Surely if being a two-way player is important to Ohtani, there’s a solid case to be made that the AL offers him that opportunity. He can pitch and on off-days serve as the DH without significant injury risk in the field. But, and before I say this let me remind you that I purchased in-flight wifi on the Ohtani bandwagon and have downloaded multiple seasons of Black Mirror because I’m here for the long haul…, what if he’s bad at hitting?

How long would an AL team let Ohtani continue to go up and swing the bat if he struggles at the plate? It’s not exactly a stretch to say a 23 year old making his first appearance in the majors would struggle over his first few months in the league. It is not difficult to imagine that if a hitter in the DH spot hit like, well, a pitcher, there would be some point at which a team would abandon that experiment.

Enter our Milwaukee Brewers.

Perhaps the best sales pitch to convince Ohtani to sign doesn’t involve David Stearns laying out what would happen if he’s terrible. I’ll grant you that.

Instead, the Brewers could focus on maximizing Ohtani’s future earnings potential as a two-way player, by letting him know that he’s going to get time to develop and adjust at the plate. He’s going to hit on days when he pitches, no matter how he performs at the plate in the early going. The Brewers had exactly one starting pitcher with a TAv over .200, and how many of them were in danger of losing plate appearances on days they pitched? None!

Then, you would tell Ohtani, he’ll have every chance to get low-leverage plate appearances as he learns MLB pitchers and the strike zone as a batter. Once he’s ready he’ll have the chance to pinch-hit, and once he’s comfortable with that, you’ll look to make him a bench regular. All while still hitting every day he’s on the mound.

This alleviates the problem of guaranteeing plate appearances, which AL teams that are proposing a DH role are almost certainly committing themselves to for an unknown amount of time. It also sells Ohtani on the idea that the team is looking for his best opportunity to succeed and grow and develop in the majors, and then maximize his earnings potential as a two-way player down the road.

It’s a risky strategy to be sure, and Ohtani may very well just be looking for the greatest number of plate appearances he can get or be reasonably guaranteed. But the Brewers and other NL teams shouldn’t overlook the possibility of selling what sets their league and teams apart, and that includes the lowered expectations of a pitcher hitting.