Related Reading:
Spending Expectations
Free Agency Analysis: LHP SP

Simply in terms of statistics and historical records, though, the Brewers are also likely to fail to match their 2018 performance next year. Here’s how playoff teams in the Expanded Wild Card Era have fared with 96+ wins in their follow-up year, sorted by Follow-up Wins:

Some notes:

• In 12 of 17 cases, the “follow-up” to the 96+ win playoff season featured a better Run Differential progression than Win-Loss progression. This could be an easy fate for the 2019 Brewers, given that the 2018 Brewers outplayed their Runs Scored / Runs Allowed in resounding fashion: the Brewers in 2019 could easily become a 92 or 93 win run differential team that neverthless only cracks 88 to 90 wins on the field.

• The Brewers are comparable to the 2015 Cubs, which is interesting because those Cubs were the outcome of a “tanking” / scorched-earth rebuild that required multiple years of building, while the 2018 Brewers required no such rebuild. Those Cubs featured a young emerging core of Javier Baez, Addison Russell, Kris Bryant, Kyle Schwarber, and others, while these Brewers featured a decidedly ragtag gang of free agents, trade acquisitions, and advanced minors chumps who rode their strengths to excellent team success (overcoming a veritable book of scouting weaknesses). There is no Bryant / Russell / Baez core for the Brewers; there might not even be a prospect as good as Javier Baez from the 2018 Brewers. Yet here we are: those 2015 Cubs were not a juggernaut, instead averaging an 84-win run differential and surging after the All-Star Break, which is rather similar to the 2018 Brewers’ mediocre underlying performance and white hot September.

• Perhaps the most compelling comparison is the 2014 Orioles, who (like the Brewers) posted mediocre run differential totals early in the season but contended thanks to an extended late season surge. The 2014 Orioles were in the midst of an excellent five year contending run that included three playoff appearances (including a League Championship Series exit in 2014). These Orioles were also quite similar to the Brewers insofar as they strung together elite pitching performances out of their bullpen and an unsung rotation, while also keeping a relative hodge-podge of different player development cycles in their batting order (ranging from young Manny Machado and Jonathan Schoop to aging Nick Markakis, Steve Pearce, and Nelson Cruz.

• Trends exhibited by the Nationals, Reds, Red Sox, and Cardinals should underscore the up-and-down, uneven quality of the current era of baseball. Stated simply, being a near-100 win season in one season is nothing close to a guarantee that a roster core will even be a playoff contender the next season, especially as teams lean on young roster cores to define their success “out of nowhere” (such as 2018 Athletics, or 2017 Rockies and Twins). The median win total among these 96+ win behemoths is 86, in the following season.

How will the Brewers overcome these trends? Or, if the Brewers do take a step backwards, how will that be defined as a success for 2020 and onward? Given the state of the Brewers roster and organizational depth, the answer to both questions is the same: the Brewers’ success will largely be defined either by establishing MLB roles for Keston Hiura, Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, Freddy Peralta, Jacob Nottingham, and other prospects, or else netting elite talent in a trade return (especially involving Hiura, who should not be traded but for returning surefire MLB production). Prospect development at the MLB level should be a significant portion of the story for the 2019 Brewers, regardless of whether those newcomers help bolster a playoff club or whether the club fails to defend their NL Central crown but establishes future roles for the players.

Additionally, the Brewers can continue to define themselves as a club “on the margins” by providing the proper salary arbitration deals; for example, the club already accomplished this cutthroat mission by designating injured veteran catcher Stephen Vogt, rather than allocating a couple million of payroll dollars on a gamble that he returns to his bat-first profile behind the dish. As demonstrated below, Vogt’s contract and production history would yield nothing more than a 45 Overall Future Potential (OFP) asset via trade (i.e., basically an organizational depth player with an MLB floor), and at an estimated cost of nearly $4 million (via Cot’s Contracts), it is clear that the Brewers could readily fill that organizational depth function with that amount of money while also potentially pursuing additional upside. This is a crucial source of value because (unfortunately for players) salary arbitration offers the Brewers a chance to “freely” cut a player if they do not wish to enter salary arbitration process; depending on how tight the club’s revenue and payroll scenarios are, rampant non-tenders could be a great opportunity to expand resources for improving the club.

The table below demonstrates the Average Surplus of the Brewers’ salary arbitration deals. The ideal of Surplus is defined with value including both production (“pure” performance in the field) and scarcity (how readily available that production is, in other words how expensive that production is). Unlike previous models of Surplus Value I’ve published, this year I’m using multiple ranges of three-year performances (2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018) to produce estimates, while also including contract estimates that are “depreciated” and “highest possible value.” A depreciated contract detracts from previous performance, expecting that a player’s performance will decline over time, while a highest possible value contract places a premium on the most recent performance (the best example here would be someone like Patrick Corbin, who would probably get his best contract based on who places the highest value on 2018 and assumes that performance can be replicated). [Last year’s rankings are here].

• Estimate: Cot’s Contracts arbitration estimate.
• Arbitration Year: Demonstrates a player’s specific point in the arbitration process (which is typically three years long, but can in some cases last four years with the most advanced service time players).
• HarmonicOne: This is a one-year contract estimate that takes the harmonic mean between a player’s harshest depreciated performance and their fullest current performance valuation.
• Maximum: This is a one-year contract estimate that uses a player’s fullest current performance valuation.
• Minimum: This is a one-year contract estimate that uses a player’s harshest past performance depreciation.
• Average Surplus: This figure weighs the average of the three contract estimates against the salary arbitration estimate, while also recognizing that a team will benefit from the player’s production both in controlling the production contractually and receiving the production on the field. [Average of HarmonicOne / Maximum / Minimum] – [Arbitration Estimate] + [Average of HarmonicOne / Maximum / Minimum], or, [Scarcity – Contract + Production].
• OFP: This is the historical equivalent Overall Future Potential grade that relates to the player’s Average Surplus  (more here). Essentially, this estimates the type of prospect the Brewers might expect in return if another team values each player in a similar manner.

This table should demonstrate several important roster decisions:

• First, it is clear that there are several Brewers players that do not have Wins Above Replacement (WARP) histories that match their value. This is especially true in the case of Hernan Perez, whose scarce defensive flexibility is probably worth significantly more than WARP estimates, and Erik Kratz, whose glove-first profile at catcher could be crucial to helping Brewers pitchers without phenomenal stuff “play up” in terms of production. Corey Knebel is obviously valued much higher than WARP based on his stuff and high leverage relief profile. So, this surplus value model is not definitive, it should only be viewed as a starting point.

• Players like Domingo Santana and Zach Davies have unclear production roles and unclear trade value. This probably explains why Santana was not traded last offseason, despite fans’ perception of a “clear” need for starting pitching and Santana’s “odd man out” status in a packed outfield; but other clubs probably do not value Santana beyond surrendering a rotation depth / organizational depth arm, and it is understandable why the Brewers would not accept that. It’s likely players like Santana and Davies “play out” their roles in Milwaukee, rather than being subjects of trade.

• Stephen Vogt is obviously not under contract any longer, but I included Vogt for two reasons. First, including Vogt’s Surplus estimate should show the type of range of contract that may be released by the Brewers. Second, Vogt’s estimate is included above to gauge what a potential contract value might be in case he is retained in some other manner (such as a minor league deal with an MLB guaranteed rate). A $1.4 million investment in Vogt, for example, would provide ample surplus value for the Brewers retaining the veteran within the organization.

• Jonathan Schoop’s past production really drives any model of his contract value; Schoop is likely a non-tender candidate if his salary expands to $11 million, but it should be noted that if there is any expectations for the slugger to reclaim anything resembling his previous performance level, the Brewers could make a contract offer.

• Travis Shaw is an absurdly valuable player to the Brewers, and in fact is probably more important than any player on the club short of Cain and Yelich (below is a sampling of the surplus value for much of the remaining roster, for comparison).

What is difficult about assessing the Brewers roster for 2019 is that the club is void of many obvious trade candidates. For example, in cases like Schoop, Chase Anderson, and Eric Thames, the club would almost certainly be selling low and thus limit themselves to seeking a “diamond in the rough” of an organizational depth trade return (such as a reliever or starting pitcher that could be rehabbed, or a utility-type profile like Hernan Perez that could “play up” in Milwaukee’s defensive system). Here the importance of making proper development decisions for the likes of Burnes, Peralta, Nottingham, and other prospects comes into focus, as it should be evident that the Brewers do not have many roster assets that could yield talent that would be obvious improvements above their depth prospects (or primary ones, at that). Milwaukee’s crossroads for the 2019 offseason will be combining those proper development decisions with payroll freed at the margins of the roster to seek at least one impact free agency contract.

Thus, it is true that GM David Stearns could non-tender much of the club to refine the roster, and non-tenders in bulk might be expected as a way to accumulate impact cash: this is one route to an attempt at beating the recent record of excellent playoff clubs, and ensuring that Milwaukee does not have a playoff hangover. Yet making proper prospect development decisions will ensure that even if the Brewers do not reach the playoffs in 2019, it won’t be anything more than a small blemish, a chance to reload, within the five-year window opened last offseason.

His first go-round in the Southern League came in 2015, the inaugural season for the Biloxi Shuckers. He spent the majority of the year manning center field, but after posting solid True Averages (TAv) of .266 for Wisconsin in 2013 and .267 for Brevard County in 2014, Taylor could only manage to put forth a .260/.312/.337 slash for a TAv of .243. Power has never been a major part of Tyrone’s profile but what little pop he could boast all but evaporated, as he clubbed a mere three home runs while posting an .077 Isolated Power (ISO) mark.

It’s not uncommon for a player to struggle during their first exposure to Double-A, especially when they make it to the level by the tender age of 21. So it wasn’t much of a surprise when Taylor returned to the Southern League for a second time in 2016; his continued struggles were flummoxing. This time, he yielded a .232/.303/.327 batting line across 519 plate appearances, with his TAv of .244 almost mirroring his total from the year prior. Tyrone did run into a few more homers (9), but still posted an ISO below .100 and stole fewer than 10 bases (9) for the first time since debuting in full-season ball. Taylor was Rule 5 eligible for the first time that offseason, and he was left unprotected by the Brewers and unpicked by any other team around the league.

His prospect stock was already plummeting when hamstring issues began to plague Taylor during the following season in 2017. He wasn’t able to get on the field until late June, taking at-bats in the Arizona League for a couple of weeks before heading back to Biloxi for a third time. He wound up finding action in only 25 games for the Shuckers and again, failed to inspire any sort of confidence with his bat. Taylor ended 2017 with a .247/.316/.376 slash in 95 plate appearances, tallying a single home runs and two stolen bases. Another sub-.250 TAv, and Taylor was nowhere near the club’s top-30 prospect rankings and was once again passed over in the Rule 5 Draft.

Despite his struggles, there was at least one man within the front office who was still in Taylor’s corner. “Tyrone Taylor is a guy who really battled injuries last year. He’s fully healthy. He’s had a chance to get over into some big league games. The power stroke seems to be coming back. It’s just great to see him healthy. He’s been a sleeper in the past,” Farm Director Tom Flanagan told MLB Pipeline’s prospect team during Spring Training 2018. The Brewers remained steadfast in their belief that there was still untapped offensive potential within Taylor because of his bat speed and contact ability, and hoped that ability to pepper the gaps with line drives could translate into more home run power. So after three years if struggles in Biloxi, the org decided it was time for a new challenge and assigned Taylor to Triple-A Colorado Springs for the 2018 season.

It was Taylor’s first subjection to the highest level of the minor leagues, and at age-24 he was nearly two and a half years younger than the median age for the Pacific Coast League. The outfielder was anything but overmatched, however. It was quite the contrary, in fact, as Taylor put together an offensive season like he’d never produced before. The Sky Sox outfield featured several MLB veterans throughout the course of the season (including Domingo Santana, Keon Broxton, Rymer Liriano, Quintin Berry, Brett Phillips, and Nate Orf, among others) and yet Taylor still saw his name etched on the lineup card nearly everyday, appearing in 119 games. In 481 trips to the plate, he hit .278/.321/.504, translating to a .265 TAv that was his highest in four years. And, as Flanagan and the Pipeline scouts intimated, the power finally showed up: Tyrone launched 20 balls over the fence after never hitting even double-digit dingers in a single season previously.

The key for Taylor appears to have been a successful indoctrination into the ranks of the “fly ball revolution.” Early on in his career, his batted ball profile resembled that of most speedsters; plenty of ground balls, relying on his fleet feet to beat out base hits. But things began to shift during his injury-shortened season in 2017, as Taylor (who posted fly ball percentages around 38, 30, and 39 percent, respectively, from 2014-16 in AA) hit 65 percent of his batted balls in the air during his rehab stint in Arizona.Taylor then produced nearly 45 percent flyball rate during his 25 games for Biloxi. In Colorado Springs, his fly ball rate jumped up again, this time close to 50 percent. Taylor hit the ball in the air nearly half the time last season, and his 11 percent HR/FB ratio was double his previous career rate.

Perhaps most impressive is that Taylor was able to add more loft to his swing and dramatically improve his power without sacrificing any of his bat-to-ball ability. He posted a .226 ISO and mashed those 20 taters while striking out in only 15.4 percent of his plate appearances, and he’s never whiffed at higher than a 19 percent clip at any level of the minors.

Taylor may have added a newfound power stroke to his tool box in 2018, but the speed and defense part of his profile is still indeed present. He once again swiped double-digit bases, nabbing 13 bags on 17 attempts. He’s also a capable defender at all three outfield spots and spent a majority of his time (56 appearances) in the premium position of center field this season. Taylor piled up 8.9 Fielding Runs Above Average in a shade over 950 innings in the field this season and was credited with a whopping 18 outfield assists, including four double plays.

Tyrone Taylor would have been eligible to become a minor league free agent this fall, but as a reward for his breakout campaign in Colorado Springs, the Milwaukee Brewers purchased his contract and made him a member of the 40 man roster earlier this week. A fallen prospect whose career appeared to be on life support just one year ago, Taylor now seems destined to make his MLB debut at some point in 2019. Milwaukee’s backup outfielder mix could be in a bit of flux this winter, as both Keon Broxton and Domingo Santana will be out of minor league options heading into camp next spring. With his right-handed bat, ability to go out and get it at all three outfield spots, and full slate of minor league options, Tyrone Taylor could wind up playing a meaningful role for the Menomonee Valley Nine next season.

The Brewers have money to spend. They still have just $39.9 million committed before arbitration contracts, projected to cost roughly $21 million, for a total of $61 million. Considering the club drew over two million fans once again in 2016, there should be room in the budget for at least one or two more acquisitions, even if they are smaller deals on a similar scale as the Thames contract. Relief pitchers are usually considered the last piece necessary for a rebuilding franchise like Milwaukee. However, due to their typically short-term contracts, relievers are the perfect fit for the Brewers budget at this point.

One of the clearest goals of David Stearns’s rebuilding efforts has been to create financial flexibility in the future. Ryan Braun and Thames are the only players under contract past 2017, and given the rumor mill since back in the regular season, it wouldn’t be surprising if Braun’s contract isn’t long for the books. Without any lingering major contracts stuffing the payroll, the Brewers will be able to strike in the free agent market when they have a strong enough core to make a playoff run.

It’s understandable for fans of teams in this situation to dislike the idea of long, committal offers for free agents, a vast majority of whom are in the decline phases of their careers. But teams have very few resources with which to get better. Recent changes to the collective bargaining agreement like bonus pools for draft picks and restrictive amateur bonus caps are leaving teams with only one talent market to throw their cash at: major league free agents.

If the Brewers don’t push their payroll to its limit, they’re leaving cards on the table. Since they understandably don’t want to make a long-term commitment, relievers are an ideal investment. There is always a robust midseason trade market for them, and contenders will be willing to overpay for short-term improvements. And veteran relief presence does have value on a rebuilding team like Milwaukee’s, as they can soak up innings and help the club avoid overworking their developing younger pitchers.

The names connected to the Brewers include many former closers. Most interesting are the post-injury reclamation projects like Greg Holland and Neftali Feliz. There are also some older players like Santiago Casilla, Sergio Romo, or Koji Uehara who may be looking for their last contract and could be signed for a less committal one or two year deal. All of these players could develop huge trade value should they win the Brewers closing role and succeed to begin the 2017 season.

Whatever the Brewers decide, there are good options out there. This club makes too much money for them to sit on their hands with a minimal payroll. If they want to acquire enough talent to contend with the big guns in this division, a Cubs team that virtually prints money and a Cardinals team often hailed as the best-run in baseball, they can’t afford to waste any resources. That free agent money, if well spent, will turn into talent down the road.

• The club has one of the best farm systems, if not the best in terms of depth and top prospects, in the MLB.
• Milwaukee has extreme payroll flexibility in terms of guaranteed and arbitration contracts.
• While the front office was sorting through roster options after a disastrous April, the Brewers played sustained stretches of near .500 baseball (a 44-49 stretch from May through August 14 being the best such stretch, prior to a 4-12 stretch to close August against the Cubs, Mariners, Pirates, and Cardinals).
• Following sustained roster orchestration, the Brewers also discovered a core team that went 132 RS / 108 RA (17-13) to close the year, demonstrating average offense and significantly better than average pitching.
• As I’ve written extensively here, the Brewers are basically devoid of rebuilding trade options, to boot; it’s now time to develop players and assemble the best possible team.

What this all means is that the Brewers can use this offseason to align great future value — as any MLB team can — while also making decisions about who best fits the roster needs for 2017. This is slightly different than the goals for 2016, where assembling as much talent as possible, including several gambles, was the goal. Now, value-plays like Keon Broxton or Jonathan Villar have their respective chances to form starting roles in Milwaukee, building on their 2016 successes. This is an exciting environment, especially in the outfield, where Broxton is essentially fighting Lewis Brinson, arguably the club’s top prospect, for centerfield time; Villar will play around the infield, but undoubtedly wants to prove that he is the club’s shortstop (although an Orlando Arcia-Villar middle infield combination appears tantalizing).

Grading Trades:
III: Normative Analysis
II: Surplus
I: Inventory

So now, one can ask of the Brewers roster, who are the most valuable trading chips? Who are the most valuable roster assets to keep with the club? This is a crucial question because the right answer can both help the future Brewers and help GM David Stearns to assemble the most competitive club possible in 2017. For example, if Keon Broxton is poised to be a starter, it would be worth keeping the centerfielder to see how the first few months of the season play out, prior to Lewis Brinson forcing his way to the MLB. However, if there is a discrepancy between how the Brewers front office views Broxton versus other clubs, this is a potential area for a trade. Milwaukee can go down the line, player by player, to make this type of decision.

I’m not saying that the Brewers should trade anyone; they could arguably be justified in keeping together their exciting September core and seeing how that fast-track, power-speed combo continues to gel in April and May. Moreover, getting a “Broxton trade” (or Villar, or Gennett, etc.) correct is not necessarily going to make or break the franchise. This is not the same type of decision as, say, maximizing Jonathan Lucroy’s trade value for prospects. Many of the potential trades open for the Brewers will be depth trades, which are immensely interesting in the sense of improving the margins of the roster, but obviously not as thrilling as a rebuilding blockbuster that returns star prospects.

Following this series of trade analysis, I assembled a group of the most valuable 2016 performers, as well as each guaranteed contract and arbitration eligible player, and assessed each player on a 10 percent depreciation scale. This means that I used their previous three-year WARP performance as a baseline, and then projected three-year value at 70 percent. Since teams are not simply trading for production, but also for contracts, I then compiled the contractual value of that production, and added both figures together. Not surprisingly, extremely productive players under reserve control are the most valuable, but there remain some intriguing conclusions to be drawn from this list. I am assembling the list based on the trade return for previous Brewers counterbuilding and rebuilding deals, in order to provide an idea of what a specific value means in concrete transactional terms. I cannot stress enough that this is only one model with many shortcomings, and I am simply using it as one template for attempting to judge trade value.

(1) Jean Segura Surplus Value
Trade return baseline: 50-60 surging prospect (Isan Diaz), established MLB depth player, MLB veteran contract.

It should be no surprise that Jonathan Villar is the most valuable trade potential on the Brewers roster. The infielder has many standpoints for offensive success (discipline, power, speed), positional flexibility, and a reserve contract. This value indicator should be prohibitive — the only way Milwaukee trades Villar is if they are blown out of the water by an extremely valuable prospect or prospect+MLB package.

(2) Khris Davis Surplus Value ($39.4 million) / Lucroy-Jeffress Surplus Value ($41.4 million)

Trade return baseline: 55 prospect baseline, plus organizational depth play. Considerable risk assumed.
Trade return baseline: Two 60 prospects, plus organizational depth play. Less risk assumed.

If Villar is the most valuable trading asset for Milwaukee, Zach Davies and Ryan Braun might be the most interesting. First, both players are “traditional contending core” profiles: Braun is an elite veteran outfielder, Davies is (at the very least) a clear rotational depth option, and maybe much more if he continues to hone his ability to adjust at the MLB level. Although these players’ actual contractual value suggests that they are at a trade level lower than Villar’s value, it is worth stating that the Brewers front office should not trade either of these players for anything short of an excellent prospect package.

(3) Middle of the Road Value
Will Smith model: Blocked MLB player / potential starter, 45 prospect / controversial unclear prospect value. Extreme risk assumed.
Gomez-Fiers model: MLB-ready prospect, two 50+ range prospects, one organizational depth play. Moderate risk assumed.

This is where it gets more difficult to judge full trade value, likelihood of trading, and the value of prospect returns themselves. Since I already wrote at length about Gomez-Fiers and Smith deals this week, I will not rehash the arguments about those trades here. At this point, some of the surplus value suggestions seem absurd, as it would be stunning to see Carlos Torres traded for a 45 prospect and blocked MLB player, for example. Other players listed here have more value to the MLB roster, arguably, than via trade: Martin Maldonado is an excellent depth catcher, an essential aspect of filling 162 games; Junior Guerra is almost impossible to grade, but remains one of the best pitchers under club control; Andrew Susac, Domingo Santana, and Keon Broxton themselves are recent trade returns that will probably receive long looks in Milwaukee.

This category is where the value of this model breaks down. But if there are two interesting trade options here, those options are Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter, who presented sturdy 2016 seasons for the Brewers. While neither is clearly a first division starter, both players could offer value for the right suitor. In both of these cases, returning something like a Susac/Bickford combo (in terms of risk and potential) seems about right.

(4) Depth Players
Adam Lind model: assume extreme risk by trading for depth prospects that are extremely far from the MLB.

Gerardo Parra / Francisco Rodriguez model: take on 45 grade prospect with depth/back-end rotation profile that is close (or relatively close) to MLB.

Aaron Hill model: Organizational depth play.

This list looks like so many non-tenders in one shape or form, or even roster cut candidates. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that this level of player can produce some value in the right type of deal. These types of players could be added to other trades to increase value in some cases, or could be moved in other organizational depth trades. Most likely, many of these players will remain in Milwaukee simply because of the demands of filling a roster for 162 games.

(5) Rule 5
For fun, I also assembled a list of 2015 Rule 5 protections, as well as 2016 top Rule 5 eligible players. For this model, I used prospect Overall Future Potential grades to predict a WARP-depreciation figure; a three-year performance for a 60 scale prospect went 4 WARP, 2 WARP, 1 WARP; a 55 scale played 3 WARP, 2 WARP, 0 WARP; a 50 OFP might play 2 WARP 2 WARP, 0 WARP; and a 45 scale player might go 2 WARP, 0 WARP, 0 WARP. Obviously, this list will show just how far some players can outperform their grades; Zach Davies is the best example here:

The most valuable players here are interesting because one can use their OFP and proximity to the MLB to gauge the likelihood of being included in a deal for an impact MLB player. Lewis Brinson, Luis Ortiz, and Miguel Diaz are the best examples here. Compare Davies’s $16.3 million surplus value here to his $60.4 million surplus value above: one season can certainly change a player’s outlook, even if that player’s overall grade might not necessarily change. In scouting terms, Davies might still be expected to serve as a middle-to-back end rotation option in terms of size, stuff, and projection, but the righty himself showed the value of making adjustments in arsenal and strategy at the MLB level.