The first thing that stands out about the 22-year-old Supak is his sheer physical presence. At 6’5” and 235 pounds, he cuts a classic, old-school silhouette on the mound. The guy looks like a throwback workhorse, capable of soaking up 200 decent innings with a rubbery arm and a smooth, repeatable delivery. It’s a great starting point for a pitching prospect.

What may hold Supak back from becoming a rotation mainstay is the quality of his raw stuff, which is largely average. Even at the time of his trade three years ago, Supak’s frame was more or less maxed out. Accordingly, the big Texan’s fastball velocity hasn’t really budged as he’s grown older; Supak still operates right around 90 or 91 mph, with the ability to reach back on occasion and crank it up to 94. It’s a decent pitch, as fastballs go, but hardly an elite offering. Supak has, however, taken some steps forward with his secondaries. What was once a fringe-y curveball has turned into a legitimate weapon; it now profiles as no worse than average, with good downward break and great velocity separation off of his heater (the curve spins in at 75-78 mph). His changeup, too, has been much improved over the last several years, traveling from non-existent all the way up to fringe-average. It should, at worst, become a “show-me” pitch in the majors, which may be just enough to allow Supak to stick in a starting rotation. At best, it could become average; it’s a little firm at the moment, but it comes in right around 85 mph and is at least capable of disrupting a hitter’s timing.

Supak has always shown good command of his pitches, leading to some suspicion that the solid results he produced in the low minors had more to do with the inexperience of his opponents than his own prowess on the mound. (Through A-ball, pitchers with good command and middling stuff routinely fudge their way through to impressive stat lines; once they reach the upper minors, more advanced hitters start to hit back.) That Supak was able to maintain his effectiveness as a 22-year-old getting his first taste of Double-A last season lends some optimism to his outlook.

His performance in the Southern League becomes even more impressive when it’s examined in halves. Supak made 16 starts for the Shuckers last year after his late-May promotion, with a nice cumulative ERA of 2.91. But in the first eight of those starts, he allowed 23 earned runs in 39.7 innings for a 5.22 ERA. Opposing batters lit him up for a .720 OPS. Wins don’t matter, but Supak was also winless in six decisions during that span.

The next eight starts were a little different. From July 16 through the end of the season, Supak pitched 47.0 innings and allowed a measly five earned runs. Opposing batters struggled to an anemic .527 OPS. His ERA during that time was 0.96, and he won each of the six decisions into which his performance factored.

If that line in the sand seems a little too convenient to be taken seriously, well, sure. We’re talking about a pretty small sample here, for one. I wasn’t present at any of Supak’s starts, so I’m unable to comment on how his stuff, or his demeanor, or the defense behind him, looked during that rough first taste of Double-A. For better or worse, I’m relying on the numbers and some scant video, neither of which always paints the full picture. (Exhibit A: Supak’s swinging strike percent actually edged downwards during his dominant late-season stretch.) Even so, those sorts of stats tend to jump off the page.

Add them all up, and we’re left with this: 25 games started and a career-high 137.7 innings pitched across two levels in 2018. 123 strikeouts, 44 walks, and only six home runs allowed. A cumulative ERA of 2.48, including his time in Carolina. DRA, it must be noted, is a little more measured in assessing Supak’s 2018 performance, pegging him as a league-average pitcher for the Mudcats, where his 4.69 Deserved Run Average stands in contrast to a glittering 1.76 ERA and his 99.7 DRA- is hardly exciting (a 100 DRA- is league and park average, and the lower the number, the better). But DRA also acknowledges that Supak turned it on after his promotion, finishing with a 3.73 DRA and a tidy 79.2 DRA- in Biloxi. That kind of performance is worth protecting.

Supak will start the 2019 in the minors, perhaps even back in Biloxi. But his above-average command and fastball-curveball combo make him a solid candidate to join the bullpen shuttle to the big leagues as early as mid-season. If 2018 taught us anything, it’s that the Brewers know how to make good use of their players with option years, rotating them between Triple-A and Milwaukee as needed.

The bullpen may well be Supak’s longterm home, too. If he performs well next year, he’ll have a chance to claim a spot as a middle-reliever or swingman for the foreseeable future. His stuff may also tick up a notch or two; instead of cresting at 94 mph, like he does as a starter, that number may become more of a baseline in relief.

There’s also a chance that Supak develops into an effective back-end starter, of the kind that the Brewers have had so much success with lately. He’s got that classic innings-eater frame, but limiting him to two trips through the batting order could do wonders for his ability to prevent runs. What’s more valuable: 200 innings with a 4.50 ERA, or 150 innings with a 3.80 ERA?

Supak has flown under the radar a bit in recent years. He’s pitched well, but not spectacularly; his ascent has been slower and less noticeable than those of 2016 Brandon Woodruff, 2017 Corbin Burnes, and even 2018 Zack Brown. But it has been steady. Now, he’s knocking at the door. Add his name alongside those of Woodruff, Burnes, Brown, Peralta, and others, and it’s clearer than ever that it’s time to retire the years-old narrative that the Brewers can’t develop good arms. Supak and his peers say otherwise.

Ashby comes from a big league pedigree; he is the nephew of former MLB pitcher Andy Ashby, who also pitched at Crowder College before going on to a 14-year career that ended with a 4.12 ERA across more than 1,800 innings. Aaron himself finished with an impressive resume at Crowder, posting a 2.29 ERA across 74.2 innings in his final season while leading all Junior College pitchers in strikeouts (156) and strikeout rate (18.8 K/9). But his below-average control (5.18 BB/9) caused him to slip down to 125th overall, where he signed for a slightly above-slot $520,000 bonus.

Ashby began his career in the professional ranks in Helena, Montana, pitching for the Brewers’ Pioneer League affiliate. The bottom-line numbers say that he didn’t fare too well during his brief stint in rookie ball, as he worked to a 6.20 ERA while logging 20.3 innings. The Pioneer League is notoriously hitter-friendly, however, and the decent 19:8 K/BB ratio and 93 Deserved Run Average Minus (DRA- ) that he produced for Helena are probably more indicative of his true performance during those six outings (on a scale of 100, a DRA- below 100 is better than average). Ashby was never going to be long for rookie ball, and he was promoted to make his debut with the Class-A Wisconsin Timber Rattlers on July 29th.

Aaron would go on to make seven dazzling starts for Appleton to conclude his season, never allowing more than two earned runs in any of them. He tossed six shutout innings in his Midwest League debut against Kane County, and in back-to-back starts against Cedar Rapids on August 19th and Clinton on August 24th, he worked six innings while striking out 10 and 12 batters, respectively. All told, Ashby pitched 37.3 innings at Class-A with a 2.17 ERA, 47 strikeouts against a mere nine walks, and only one home run allowed. He limited opponents to a .233 True Average (TAv) even though he was stung by a .398 batting average on balls in play, and Ashby finished with a sterling Deserved Run Average that saw his work as 39 percent more effective than his Midwest League peers.

Free passes were Ashby’s biggest bugaboo as a collegiate hurler, but he was able to limit the walks quite well during his first 57.7 innings as a professional in 2018. His 2.7 BB/9 across two levels was nearly half his total during his last year at Crowder, though some scouts wonder how long that will continue as he begins to face more advanced hitters while climbing the minor league ladder. Ashby has a “funky,” high-effort delivery that makes it difficult for him to throw strikes at times, but it does add plenty of deception and helped him induce swings aplenty at pitches outside the strike zone against the Pioneer and Midwest League hitters.

The raw stuff is truly excellent, though. A moving fastball that routinely registers in the 91-94 MPH range; A plus curveball that has long been his go-to pitch and was graded by Baseball America as the best secondary offering of any Brewers’ pitcher drafted in 2018; A power slider that has “impressive depth and two-plane break,” that BA says Milwaukee’s development staff likes even better than the curve; and a changeup that doesn’t get used much, but projects as an average offering at maturity.

A role as a power reliever will always be there for Ashby to fall back on if the command issues creep back up in the future, but so long as he can continue refining his mechanics and adding strength to his 6’1″, 170 lb frame, Ashby could grow into a “really intriguing mid-rotation prospect” according to Baseball Prospectus’ Mark Anderson. He’ll no doubt be hoping to following the footsteps of fellow fourth-round pick Corbin Burnes, who also began as an intriguing prospect from a small college before blossoming under Milwaukee’s minor league coaching staff. Burnes fashioned himself into an integral part of Milwaukee’s big league roster within two years of being drafted; with some minor adjustments, Aaron Ashby could follow a similarly quick path to the majors.

Yes, Grandal or Realmuto would represent significant upgrades. But in the meantime, David Stearns, Craig Counsell, and the rest of the Brewers staff have been able to squeeze great value out of the current crop of time-shares and journeymen. Looking beyond the major league roster, catcher is a position full of surprising contributors up and down the organizational ladder. What follows is an overview of some of those contributors, as well as some brief notes on their outlook for the 2019 season and beyond. Upgrading would be nice; staying the course is probably fine, as well.

Major League Options

Player Name: Plate Appearances, Batting Average / On Base Percentage / Slugging Percentage, Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP)

Manny Piña; 337 PA, .252/.307/.395, 1.7 WARP
For the second year in a row, Piña handled the lion’s share of catching duties for Milwaukee. He continued to be a steady performer, offering tolerable offense and sturdy defense. His offensive production fell off some, relative to his breakout 2017 campaign, thanks to a slow start and a dip in Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP). Piña turned it on in the second half, hitting .295/.328/.429 after the break even as he lost playing time to immortal folk hero Erik Kratz.

With just over three years of service time on his major league clock, Piña is controllable for three more seasons through the arbitration process. He’ll be 34 by then, so it’s likely that someone else will have wrested away the bulk of available playing time behind the dish. Still, he handles a pitching staff well, and figures to get plenty of turns through the order in 2019 barring a major roster shakeup.

Erik Kratz; 219 PA, .236/.280/.355, 1.4 WARP
Erik Kratz came to the Brewers via a surprise trade with the Yankees, and wasted little time in endearing himself to fans and teammates alike. Though he didn’t bring much of a big league résumé into Milwaukee, he performed quite well in limited time, making up for his anemic offensive output with superlative glove work (11.1 Adjusted Fielding Runs Above Average in fewer than 500 defensive innings!).

Kratz elected free agency when he was removed from the Yankees’ 40-man roster prior to the 2018 season. He re-signed with New York before his trade to Milwaukee, but finished the year with fewer than six years of big league service time to his name. He can be controlled via arbitration for the 2019 season, though at age 39, he may have retirement (or a late career surge as a knuckle-balling reliever) on his mind. I’m not betting on a return, much as my heart hopes otherwise.

Stephen Vogt; Did Not Play in Majors (Shoulder Surgery)
All-around good guy Stephen Vogt was limited to 9 plate appearances for the Biloxi Shuckers in May before undergoing season-ending shoulder surgery. It was the second major shoulder operation of Vogt’s career; his big league future is in jeopardy. I’m not aware of any public information on his rehab, but Vogt could be controlled via arbitration in 2019 if he’s able to work his way back to the ball field.

For his career, Vogt is a .251/.310/.416 hitter, good for a strong .267 True Average (TAv). He’s below-average with the glove, though, and struggled to throw out base runners even before re-injuring his throwing arm. He’s well-loved among his teammates, but Vogt’s path back to the majors may be as a reserve first baseman or a DH.

Jacob Nottingham; 196 PA, .281/.347/.528 in Triple-A
Public opinion of Nottingham was fairly sour heading in to the year, and it’s not too difficult to see why: A .209/.326/.369 slash line in your second year of AA isn’t going to win over many casual fans. Biloxi is a run-suppressing environment, though, in a tough league for hitters. So that same ugly triple-slash translated to a barely-above-average.264 TAv. This year, with much better baseball-card stats courtesy of Colorado Springs, Nottingham’s TAv in the minors was all the way up to .282.

Expecting that kind of production in the big leagues, at least at first, is probably foolish. In his (very) limited time in Milwaukee, Nottingham compiled just 24 plate appearances and looked a tad over-matched at times, striking out on eight occasions. He also drew four walks, to his credit, and the sample size is far too small to be seriously examined. Most excitingly, Nottingham can seriously hurt a baseball when he finds one in his sweet spot, to the tune of 450+ feet. He’s made tremendous strides with the glove over the last few years, transforming himself into something approaching an average defensive catcher. Couple that with league-average-or-better offense at the position, and he still has the ability to produce sneaky value for the Brewers over the next six seasons. (Catchers in 2018 batted .232/.304/.372, so Nottingham doesn’t have to turn into Pudge Rodriguez to give the Brewers a boost.) I’m hoping he piles up a couple hundred big league plate appearances next season.

Jett Bandy; 216 PA, .292/.353/.510 in Triple-A
Bandy broke camp with the Brewers, but failed to impress. He hit .188/.268/.266 with shaky defense in 24 games before being removed from the roster and passed over on waivers. The 28-year-old came alive in Triple-A, but he’s reaching do-or-die status as a major league contributor. He’ll have to contend with at least two of the above names on the depth chart, and will likely struggle to find big league playing time should he remain in the Brewers organization. Still, he’s youngish enough and talented enough that he has a chance to shed his current quad-A label and become a solid backup with some pop.

Prospects and Depth

Christian Bethancourt; 418 PA, .297/.328/.506 in Triple-A
Brought in on a minor league pact, Bethancourt played very well in his return from the pitcher’s mound. He has soft hands behind the dish, and a good arm. He also hit a bit in Colorado Springs, with 20 home runs and a nifty .271 TAv. One knock on his offense: He gave away plenty of walks as a pitcher, but largely refuses them as a hitter.

Bethancourt was brought into the organization on a minor league pact. There will be plenty of plate appearances available for catchers in AAA next year, but it’s no guarantee that Bethancourt will be making the move to San Antonio along with the rest of the organization’s most advanced minor leaguers. Plenty of rebuilding clubs may take a roll of the dice on the former top prospect.

Dustin Houle and Max McDowell, Advanced A & Double-A
These two are the same age, and at about the same stage developmentally. Houle was drafted out of high school way back in 2011; McDowell followed from college in 2015.

Houle is a big-bodied catcher without a true carrying tool. He’s got a decent arm and is fairly strong, but the lack of a hit tool cramps his game power. He’s a nice organizational depth piece, but something very strange will have happened if he sees major league time in 2019.

McDowell has a bit more upside, with a strong throwing arm, decent athleticism, solid glove, and some untapped raw power. He flashed a nice bat in Wisconsin in 2016, but his hit tool hasn’t progressed much as he’s moved up the ladder. He’s got a chance to turn into a light-hitting backup at the highest level.

Mario Feliciano; 165 PA, .205/.282/.329 in Advanced A
2018 was basically a lost season for the 19-year-old, who battled back from an arm injury to play in 42 games for the Carolina Mudcats. He started slow in June, showed signs of life in July, then cratered in August. It was a disappointing year for a player who impressed in 2017 as one of the youngest prospects in the Midwest League. Ultimately, though, I see little reason to dampen long-term expectations. Catching at Class-Advanced A is an almost laughable challenge for a 19-year-old. He should return for another round in 2019, and I expect him to play pretty well. Keep in mind that the Carolina League is hard on hitters, so his stat line may not be all that impressive. The fact that he’ll be there at all, though, at 20 years old? Impressive. The defense could use some work, and he has plenty of time for that. Meanwhile, he could develop into a .270 hitter with a line-drive approach and average power.

Feliciano is currently playing in the Arizona Fall League to make up for some of his lost time this year. It’s not working, though: He’s only worked his way into two games, with one single in four at bats.

Payton Henry; 389 PA, .234/.327/.380 in Advanced A
Henry had a rough April and a tremendous May, followed by an acceptable June and July and a ghastly August and September. He’s a bat-first prospect with plus raw power, but he struck out in about 32 percent of his plate appearances. He needs to work on his receiving and his arm if he wants to stay behind the plate; he becomes a much less exciting prospect if he moves to first base or an outfield corner.

Worth Noting
Finally, backstops David Fry and Robie Rojas are due a mention here. Fry hit .315/.406/.563 while playing catcher, first base, and third base for the rookie league Helena Brewers. He drew 29 walks and struck out just 42 times in 261 plate appearances. Rojas, a 38th-round pick in 2017, spent plenty of time on the 7-day Disabled List and was relegated to the minor league taxi squad. He managed just 66 plate appearances on the year, including 13 at Triple-A, and hit surprisingly well in a (very small) 13-game sample in Carolina. All together, he had a line of .304/.409/.393.

Fry’s rookie league stats, while nice, are by and large worthless, and I have no idea what to make of Rojas at this point. But I’ll be curious to see what the organization does with both of these prospects in 2019.

Milwaukee would not be in the position that they are without Yelich, who was a stud for the Miami Marlins before fashioning himself into a bonafide superstar during the 2018 campaign. His .326 batting average /.402 on-base percentage /.598 slugging percentage slash line earned him the National League batting title (Milwaukee’s first ever) and he was this close to the first NL Triple Crown since 1937, tallying 36 home runs and 110 runs batted in (Yelich finished behind Nolan Arenado and Trevor Story in home runs, and Javier Baez for runs batted in). His superlative performance yielded a .356 True Average (TAv) and 7.7 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) in his age-26 season, and he’s become the odds-on favorite to capture the league’s Most Valuable Player award.

Thinking back to January 25th, 2018, not everyone was thrilled when Slingin’ David Stearns signed off on the trade that sent four prospects to the Little Havana neighborhood in Miami. At the time, he gave up Milwaukee’s number one, three, and six prospects (according to Baseball Prospectus) along with a pitcher who Stearns himself had called one of his favorite arms in the organization. So as we bask in the glow of the first playoff victory our local club has produced in seven long years, let’s take a moment to check in on the guys that Stearns have up to help get us here:

OF Lewis Brinson
For most fans, Brinson was the player that stung most to lose. He was considered top-25 talent league wide, a potential five-tool center fielder who offered a few glimpses of his potential during a brief MLB trial in 2017. Miami handed Brinson a regular role at the big league level to begin the year, and he responded by putting together one of the least productive campaigns of any player in 2018. Brinson hit only .199/.240/.338 in 109 games and 406 plate appearances, good for an anemic TAv of .220. He did pop 11 long balls (including a mult-homer game against Milwaukee) and tallied 3.0 FRAA, but on the whole he was valued as a sub-replacement level player, tallying -0.3 WARP.

OF Monte Harrison
After a breakout season in 2017 between Appleton and Carolina, Miami tasked Harrison with one of the toughest challenges a minor leaguer will face: the jump from Class-A Advanced to Double-A. His slash line for Jacksonville of the Southern League wasn’t too bad at .240/.316/.399, which translated to a better-than-average .272 TAv on the pitcher-friendly circuit. Harrison again showed off his tantalizing power/speed combination, swiping 28 bases to go along with 19 dingers in 583 plate appearances. But the outfielder was also by far the league leader in strikeouts, whiffing an astonishing 215 times, or 37 percent of his trips to bat.

2B Isan Diaz
Like Harrison, Isan Diaz was assigned to Double-A Jacksonville to begin his time in the Marlins organization after finishing 2017 in Class-A Advanced. Diaz had a fair amount more success in the Southern League, however, producing a nifty .245/.365/.418 slash with 10 homers and 10 steals for a .294 TAv. After 83 games he earned a promotion to Triple-A New Orleans, and his numbers cratered at the highest level of the minors. In 36 games and 155 plate appearances, Diaz could manage only a .204/.281/.358 slash (.217 TAv). Strikeouts remain a concern for the infielder as well, as he whiffed a total of 140 times in 119 games between the two affiliates.

RHP Jordan Yamamoto
Yamamoto was stung by the injury bug this season, not taking the mound until late May and then missing another month of action between July and August. As a result, the righty made only 13 appearances and tossed 68 and 2/3 innings on the year, split between rookie ball, Class-A Advanced, and Double-A. In those innings, however, he put together a sparkling 1.68 ERA. Batters hit only .176 against the Hawaiian right-hander, and he struck out 84 (11.14 K/9) versus just 14 walks (1.83 BB/9). The profile is still more smarts and guile than it is pure stuff, leading to questions about how his game will play at the highest levels. Of the four prospects in the deal, though, Yamamoto is the only one who surely improved his stock heading into 2019, and the Baseball Prospectus team cited his ability to change speeds as one reason for rising prospect stock.

So, given these reports, have you been talked into a do-over on the trade? 

Stepping outside of the distributive justice of this question, there are numerous structural elements that currently give MLB clubs incentive to pay minor league players at a low rate. The first structural impediment is the MLB Draft slot system, which now forces MLB clubs to pay quite steep penalties for spending more than their allotted slot money on a given amateur draft. For example, Table One below approximates the historical value of losing a mid-round first pick versus spending approximately $600,000 to land a couple of over-slot signings that might have slipped beyond Round Ten. Basically, given the current MLB slot system rules, an MLB team would have to find a way to sign two Second-Round ceiling guys in the mid rounds in order to justify losing a first round pick; in reality, the bonuses an MLB team would be required to pay potential Second-Round ceilings that fell to the middle of the draft would likely be higher than the 10 percent overage penalty. This keeps players like Keston Hiura, who would be worth at least $20 million contracts on the open market, from earning that amount early in their respective careers.

Table One: Approximate Historical MLB Draft Surplus Value

Additionally, if the bulk of professional careers end in the low levels of a system, MLB teams are most constrained by Minor League Baseball rules to deflate pay at the lowest levels (a Minor League player cannot earn more than $1,100 per month during their first contract year. According to Minor League Baseball, salaries are open to negotiation after that point). The ideal of a vertically aligned player development system essentially serves as a giant check on a player’s professional earning potential, and it may even exaggerate odds of a player reaching the MLB. After all, if one views the idea that a player can only reasonably reach the MLB out of Double-A or Triple-A affiliates, then one would be hard-pressed to expect most players to reach the MLB with fewer than four years of seasoning.

What is stunning about the structures of the Amateur Draft and Affiliated Minor League baseball system is their rigidity where no rigidity is required. Throughout a sizable portion of professional baseball history, the minor leagues were more of a frontier for MLB baseball than a proving ground, as competitive leagues across the USA often operated with players that would widely be viewed as MLB-equivalent. The Pacific Coast League of the early Twentieth Century is probably the most famous example of this level of talent (especially because those years occurred prior to MLB’s westward expansion), but it is surely not the lone example. Now, in an environment where many fans and analysts are obsessed with finding “the next market inefficiency,” the structure of Affiliated Minor League baseball itself may be worth realignment.

The beauty of Minor League structure is that any individual team could operate according to their own structural preference at any point in time. According to Minor League Baseball, “Major League organizations can promote players through the affiliated leagues, or directly to the Majors, as they wish.” What is fascinating about this idea is that an MLB club could simply keep their own players in complex ball for years, and then promote them to the MLB, or they could simply promote everyone to the MLB after signing out of the Amateur Draft (or any combination in-between). Additionally, contractual obligations after the first year are wide open for MLB clubs, giving them fantastic flexibility to sign minor league contracts to any deals they like.

Regarding contracts, then, a speculative opportunity for MLB teams, especially a relatively small market franchise like the Brewers, rests in the second, third, fourth, etc., years of minor league play. After an MLB team basically is forced to pay a minor leaguer approximately $7,000 during their first year of work, the club could settle any arrangement they like with a player. For example, consider a long-term development play like Tristen Lutz, or Carlos Herrera; the Brewers could conceivably have signed both players to four-year, $400,000 minor league development deals beginning with 2018. Keston Hiura could have been signed out of the draft with a three-year, minor league development deal worth $1,000,000, and so on and so forth. Where this logic leads is to a mechanism through which a club like the Brewers could exploit amateur draft slot rules by offering a player draft day bonuses that do not trigger the overage rules by using an understanding that the player would receive a well-priced development deal in their second year.

In terms of league structure, one wonders why an MLB team would not use their complex facilities to organize several teams’ worth of players to train within a closed organizational structure. On this systemic development, a team like the Brewers could sign anywhere between 200-to-300 players of varying talent levels, and operate eight-to-ten teams at the Complex Level. These teams could face one another, and essentially produce a league in which Milwaukee Brewers organizational strategies and development occurred within a relatively controlled circuit. This could also streamline coaching, training, and managerial functions, in order to ensure that the very best coaching talent receives the greatest reach in terms of impact; if a club can identify their best coaches and trainers, why shouldn’t they have leadership roles that impact 200-to-300 players instead of 20-to-30?

Additionally, is worth questioning whether the discrepancies between league environments actually provide developmental challenges to ascending prospects in a manner that actually prepares them for the MLB-levels of professional baseball; this question should not simply be raised given the difficult pitching environment for Triple-A Colorado Springs, which has claimed several Brewers pitching prospects from starting pitching roles thus far. This question could be raised about early-spring weather conditions in the Midwest League, offensive-suppressing environments in some advanced leagues, etc. This question can also be raised in terms of high-floor roles, as intriguing organizational depth prospect Thomas Jankins is proving after jumping from Class-A Midwest to Double-A Southern League, or Cardinals pitcher Jordan Hicks is proving after jumping from Advanced-A to MLB.

Table Two: Conventional Minor League Structure and One Speculative Alternative

But mostly, if the Brewers were to suddenly restructure their complex ball to support its own league of intraorganizational ball, and the club poured between $25 to $50 million to support those efforts, the organization could potentially gain an advantage in reserving the rights of more minor league players through larger development contracts while also placing the players into an environment better suited to cushion the variance inherent in player development. Additionally, the Brewers could gain an advantage by organizing a new form of competitive player development by which players of varying talent levels are scouted, coached, taught, and cared for (in terms of diet, health care, etc.) within one locale. There could even be an advantage in playing related affiliates against one another, in order to view organizational strategies in competition with one another.

Yet this strategy of competitive player development need not occur solely at the complex level. The Brewers ought to scrutinize the best combination of affiliated clubs for the purposes of player development, which may not be a vertically aligned staircase (from Class-A to Advanced-A to Double-A and Triple-A). If the Carolina League is indeed a solid development environment, the Brewers should buy another Carolina League franchise, and maintain a second Advanced-A team in that locale. If the team continues to hope that a replacement-by-design, shuttle squad, high-floor, MLB depth role roster can be constructed (as the current 40-man roster and Advanced Minors are constructed), the team could benefit from having two Double-A clubs.

This is a rather speculative discussion, but it is worth emphasizing that if professional player development is non-linear, non-linear organizational structures could benefit the process. There is no reason to maintain the fiction of a progressing development staircase to the MLB when front office has the resources to make alternative modes of development work.

Recommended Reading:
True Outcomes (Jarrett Seidler, Baseball Prospectus)
Round Table: Short Hitter Stigma (Baseball Prospectus)
The May Promotions (Baseball Prospectus, Prospect Team)

In a way, I don’t need to write this article. So many minds are already made; I see it on Brewers Twitter everyday, that Keston Hiura is a slam dunk, guaranteed superstar prospect, and it does not matter where or how you look at it. Hiura should be untouchable in midseason trade talks; Hiura will be a guaranteed top of the order bat for the Brewers for the foreseeable future; when the Brewers’ impressive 40+ Wins Above Replacement (WAR) First Round Draft record was noted on draft day, it was easy for some to emphasize that Keston Hiura is next. Never mind that according to Baseball Reference, approximately 500 players in the entire history of baseball have reached this plateau, this next prospect is a certain thing. But my mind has waivered on Hiura, and I gather I’m not the only one who not only cringes at the unnecessary prospect hype (these will be the same people leading the torches to Miller Park should Hiura “settle” as a 5.0 WAR player or become a DH-trade asset, yet another unnecessary practice with judging MLB players), but who is genuinely perplexed about the issue posed by Hiura’s potential role. For it is easy to focus on the Top Percentile outcome, “Keston Hiura, All Star Second Baseman for the Brewers,” and end the dreaming there; if that’s your position, you probably do not need to read this article. Yet serious questions remain about how Hiura fits in the organization in his secondary, realistic risk roles of Left Field or Designated Hitter, and those questions are tied up in the thorny information asymmetry wrapped in the prospect’s throwing elbow.

It is obvious that none of us know who Hiura will be. One could look at his hitting mechanics and doubles-oriented pop and see a realistic chance that he sticks in the MLB regardless of his fielding role. His fielding roles might not be certain, or even linear; he could begin his career at second base in Milwaukee, fall off defensively, and move to designated hitter or left field. A development in his game could theoretically find him at a different position all together, especially given the flexibility-oriented mindset of many contemporary MLB teams (he could be a PH / DH / 2B / LF). He could fall off second base before even leaving the minors, but prove himself worthy of a shot in left field (this is the phenomenal Willie Calhoun role comp provided by Baseball Prospectus on their Top 10 list). All that is before considering any potential development courses derailed by the elbow injury. Yet even some members of the Baseball Prospectus prospect team have changed their public voice on Hiura, leading one to wonder whether the floor of that realistic / risk role is diminishing in likelihood.

This feature is meant as an exercise in probabilistic thinking, in which aspects of the historical record in MLB are used to define Hiura’s potential outlook using the structure of the game. The assumption is that because of MLB’s competitive organizational environment, including the quick learning of new strategies as well as the constant search for viable alternative or underappreciated strategies, there are legitimate organizational-structural constraints that define Player Development. This does not mean that history forms the future, but rather that the history of the game used in a narrow, comparative manner will provide some evidence that can inform projections about contemporary players. Here, I will focus on body type, pedigree, and defensive profile to outline just some of the extremely diverse futures that could greet Hiura.

Entering 2018, the PECOTA comparison system viewed Hiura as a bat-first prospect, and developed a projection that pegged the prospect as a replacement player second baseman for Milwaukee (a good thing). Hiura’s MLB batting line according to the March 23, 2018 PECOTA projection (CSV download, March 23, 2018) was .225 / .274 / .363, which is not bad for a prospect leaping to the MLB within a year of the MLB Amateur Draft. Much more interesting than the stats are the player comparisons generated by the underlying patterns and age curve recognized for Hiura.

PECOTA compared Hiura to three strong MLB role prospects. Matt Davidson ranked in the second tier of a stacked Arizona Diamondbacks Top 10 for 2012, with a clear bat-first role based on his power. Entering 2016, Dominic Smith ranked fifth in the New York Mets system with a 45 Overall Future Potential role as Second-Division Starter. Here the batting question awaited power at a limited defensive role. Jose Osuna was the only member of this trio unranked by Baseball Prospectus entering their age-21 season, although it’s worth emphasizing that this is not a knock against Osuna. The Pirates prospect was fighting within a system that saw Alen Hanson, Luis Heredia, and Harold Ramirez as prospects 8-through-10. Nevertheless, this trio provides interesting minor league statistical performances in their age-21 campaigns, drawing some comparison to Hiura in terms of relative discipline profile (here I am using strike outs (K) and walks (BB)), especially for both Smith and Osuna.

In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura’s First Round, Ninth pick standard is quite interesting because this area of the draft begins to shift from “going for a clear superstar territory” to “gambling on many comparable ‘best player available’ types,” leaving an unclear expectation for the pick. Yet, according to Baseball Reference, 34 of 54 players have historically made the MLB from this draft slot, and that ticks up in the modern draft era (17 of 21 Ninth overall picks from 1995-2015 reached the MLB). These players are typically not superstars in the sense one would use to discuss the most elite players in the game. Of the 21 Wild Card era Ninth picks, Geoff Jenkins, Michael Cuddyer, and Mark Kotsay are the best retired position players, and Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ are just now establishing their careers. Historically, each Ninth pick is worth approximately 5.0 WAR with 62 percent odds of reaching the MLB, while more recently (1995-2015) each Ninth pick is worth approximately 7.0 WAR (and counting) with 81 percent odds of reaching the MLB (the standard deviation is 10.1, which demonstrates the absurd volatility of the MLB draft and MLB career trajectories). In other words, the baseline for Hiura’s professional career features quite strong odds of reaching the MLB (they are not set in stone) and a very solid average performance (5.0 to 7.0 WAR is nothing to sneeze at in terms of the grand scheme of baseball). In fact, in a crude sense, a 7.0 WAR performance would extrapolate Hiura’s 50th Percentile PECOTA over the course of approximately four seasons: a solid career, indeed, and potentially one that is viewed as reasonable by projection systems.

It is fun to see that, thus far, several of the active Ninth Pick players are playing in the National League Central, adding intrigue to the standard divisional competition. If Hiura wishes to make his mark on this Overall Pick, Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ could each impact Hiura’s potential assessment of greatness.

Keston Hiura is a relatively short ballplayer, and one can use his body type to investigate MLB roles as well. This is not an insult to Hiura; it’s simply a fact, as even on his own Double-A Biloxi Shuckers squad, 33 Shuckers taller than Hiura have played in 2018. Height has real world consequences in defining MLB roles, as Hiura may become less likely to play at first base than other bat-first prospects in search of a positional home; given that the arm may also keep Hiura off right field, the nomadic defensive spectrum speculation for Hiura’s future mightily limits the prospect’s path. This is not a problem, but it should help to round out some role risk probabilities. Height also affects Hiura’s positional future in left field, as Baseball Reference Play Index shows that Kiké Hernandez is the first 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player since 1989 to play Left Field while debuting at age-22; the last 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player to debut at Left Field during their age-21 season was Danny Heep in 1979. During the Expansion Era, only 94 MLB position players debuted at age-21 with a listed height of 5’11”, while only 134 MLB position players debuted at age-22 with a listed height of 5’11”.

The historical path to an early (age-21 or age-22) debut for a 5’11”, 182-200 pound player is much clearer at second base. Here, a fascinating range of roles emerge.

It’s impossible to unsee Pete Rose, and that’s just such an interesting comparison for a million reasons, not the least of which that Rose’s general lack of home run power in favor of a high average, doubles-oriented approach might actually fit Hiura’s batting profile in some ways. But I do not find it helpful to focus on 80 WARP players while discussing potential prospect roles; obviously that would be an “everything goes perfectly,” elite percentile prospect outcome that would challenge Robin Yount as the greatest player in Brewers history (in terms of WARP). Kiké Hernandez, Steve Sax, and Blake DeWitt are my favorites on this list in terms of rounding out potential role determinations or profiles.

• Hernandez is a positionally flexible player that showed an early career ability to hit (2015) prior to becoming a utility player;

• Steve Sax was a batting-average and doubles hitter that used those skills to drive valuable profiles even when the glove was not there (ultimately, Sax’s 23.1 career WARP occurred with -18.8 FRAA contrasted by a .260 TAv);

• DeWitt was a player that saw an early career (first year, actually!) surge coupled with some positional trouble and a steep, almost immediate drop off.

• A “Steve Sax” career would be a phenomenal outcome for Hiura, which would also help Hiura contend with Geoff Jenkins as the best Ninth Overall position player (thus far); yet I think a “Blake DeWitt” career shows how a ballplayer can be a good prospect, produce MLB value, and also encounter some role shifts and decline at the MLB level while ultimately having a good career. To my mind, this is one way it might look if Hiura storms the MLB out of the gate at 2B, and then encounters some positional shift and offensive adjustment issues.

Figure One

One final role question concerns Hiura’s potential quality of defense at second base. Outside of the prospect’s own injury concerns, it is worth investigating the structure of the position: if Hiura’s concerns produce a below average defensive profile, will that stick as an everyday 2B? Second base is a strange position, as the progression of positional average performances during the Wild Card Era (1995-2017 for full seasons) suggests that teams are generally favoring glove-first players at second base. While True Average (TAv) is modestly improving over time for regular second basemen, Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) is significantly improving across the league (see Figure One, above). Yet, isolating the very best bats among second basemen shows that contemporary MLB teams are very tolerant of below average FRAA seasons when the bat is excellent. Recent seasons by Scooter Gennett (2017), Ben Zobrist (2016), Jose Altuve (2016, 2014), and Joe Panik (2015) show that imperfect second base defensive profiles can continue to play so long as they hit. In fact, for each five year period (or so) during the Wild Card Era, there are roughly four bat-first, poor glove 2B in the MLB at any given time. Thus, there should certainly be a future for Keston Hiura at second base if his injury does not diminish his ability to play the field, should his bat deliver at an excellent clip.

None of these structural aspects of the game impact assessments of Hiura’s mechanical and plate approach profile, which is another endeavor that can establish the right-handed batter’s risk, floor, and potential ceiling. But, these structural aspects can be used to place Hiura’s profile within the broader context of the game. Hiura is not simply a slam dunk prospect. Based on his size, if Hiura debuts in 2018 at second base, he will be a rather rare prospect and one without much historical understanding for paths to big league success. Here, a Steve Sax career is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura was not picked in a realm that generally produces game-changing superstars, instead presenting very solid regulars and All-Stars for the game. In this regard, a Geoff Jenkins profile is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. While assessing potential shortcomings in Hiura’s profile, especially at second base, it is worth emphasizing that a great-bat-bad-glove second baseman will work in the contemporary MLB. Here, the role ranges clearly from Scooter Gennett to Jose Altuve, rounding out a wide range of useful MLB potential futures.

None of these structural aspects of the game provide predictive insights for Hiura’s future. Rather, they can be used in order to help inform background expectations and probabilistic insights into the value of Hiura’s production should the youngster reach the MLB. Instead of attempting to view Hiura as an MLB slam dunk, it is worth meandering through these fields of potential roles in order to understand the wide range of success that could await Hiura. For MLB success is not simply stardom-or-bust, even for a prospect like Hiura.

References:

Baseball Prospectus. Individual Stats – Season Totals [CSV]. Parameters: 2B, MLB, All-Time.

Baseball Prospectus. Top 10 Prospects Landing Page.

Baseball Reference. MLB Draft. Ninth Overall Pick, and 2017 First Round.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Separate Age-21 and Age-22 Searches, separate searches for 2B, DH, and LF, each where height = 71 inches; weight >= 182 lbs; weight <= 200 lbs.

Please consider Baseball Prospectus subscription and Baseball Reference ad-free browsing to support these endeavors.

This year, things look different in the minors. The Brewers dropped 16 spots in the Baseball Prospectus organizational rankings, due as much to the underperformance of top draft picks (Trent Grisham, Corey Ray) as the big Christian Yelich trade (which sent away three of the highest ceiling prospects in the system, even if they were risky ones). Looking through the affiliated clubs’ opening day rosters, one can get the feeling that the system is less exciting than the 2016 and 2017 versions; or, if the system remains exciting, it’s exciting because of some of the very raw, underdeveloped talent in the club’s low minor affiliates, rather than the advanced affiliated prospects. Nevertheless, extremes abound for this system, as the Brewers are also using their most advanced affiliates to store MLB 40-man roster players (prospect or not).

Below is a list of the 2018 Top 10 Brewers Baseball Prospectus prospects, as well as eleven additional prospects that were covered in the list, plus Jordan Yamamoto (who was also included in the Yelich trade package). I’ve assembled their 2018 age, assignment, as well as the Overall Future Potential role and likely projection for each player (where available). In the case of the eleven additional prospects, only one role or outlook was typically provided by the scouting team, whereas a “high percentile” and “likely outcome” were both provided for the Top 10.

A few quick notes:

• Yesterday, Brewers beat reported Adam McCalvy reported that Keston Hiura will begin the season as a DH due to some elbow soreness experienced while throwing during camp. This is one key reason that fans need to slow the brakes on Hiura Hype, as the DH-risk remains real, and the highly regarded second base prospect really is not a professional second baseman yet; until that is proved otherwise, one also has to wonder if he will end up in left field or as a DH.

• Anchored by Corey Ray and Trent Grisham, the Double-A Biloxi outfield might have the best bounceback tandem in the system. It’s so easy to find critiques with each player’s development thus far, and yet here we are with both players working a level away from the MLB at very young ages. If either play puts things together at this level, MLB role projections could quickly come into focus.

• Tristen Lutz and Carlos Herrera both debut in full season ball, making A Wisconsin one of the most exciting teams in the system. That team is loaded with sleepers, as well as some prospects like Lutz and Herrera who are looking to define that top percentile MLB role and the risk associated with it.

Of course, this list does not even cover 10 percent of the Brewers system, so while assembled minor league assignments, I collected ten of my favorite “deep system” prospect picks. Here I picked one arm and one bat from each level:

A few quick notes on my favorites:

• I will continue to write about Demi Orimoloye as long as he stands outside of typical top prospect debates, because in terms of having tools and waiting to hone the baseball aspect of the game, there’s probably not a higher return in the system (of true extreme risk players) than Orimoloye putting it all together. Watching his second turn at Wisconsin could demonstrate how likely this type of scenario may be, or how risky Orimoloye really will be.

• I picked a few long development and “old” guys in the system because there are simply some very interesting underlying performances (Daniel Brown, Nelson Hernandez) and tools (Luis Aviles) in some of these minor league grinders. Hernandez and Aviles have not necessarily had easy and clear development paths the last few years, but Hernandez is making his full season debut at a reasonable age overall, and Aviles has always simply been about whether the bat comes around. In 2016, the glove was the same story with Aviles in midseason Wisconsin Timber Rattlers coverage, so there’s a question about how long it’s worth hammering home this scouting line, but here we are with another chance for Aviles to prove himself.

• In contrast, it is worth emphasizing that an extremely athletic, ex-Top 10 Prospect like Tyrone Taylor remains (very) young for Triple-A, and is now working a level removed from the MLB. While there are undoubtedly reasons that Taylor’s prospect star has fallen, the recent identification of mechanical adjustments to unleash MLB stars should underscore that where talented, athletic players work to fix their approach, even a seemingly pedestrian profile can emerge as a productive MLB player. Taylor has the athleticism to work as an MLB depth outfielder, now it is worth seeing whether the bat follows at the most advanced level.

• The aggressive Thomas Jankins assignment is probably my favorite for the 2018 season. At BP Milwaukee last season, Kyle Lesniewski profiled Jankins as one of a handful of intriguing late round arms in the Brewers system. While Jankins might not have the “big stuff” profile of a Trey Supak to dream on, the righty has a command profile that matches some of the analytic trends emerging in the Brewers big league rotation (Zach Davies) and offseason acquisitions (Wade Miley).

Finally, throughout the minor league season, remember to support minor league players in their quest for a living wage, and continue to discuss alternatives to the current format of minor league compensation upheld by Major League Baseball. Prospects deserve transparent press coverage and support from fans, and part of this support should include transparency about MLB efforts to openly suppress pay of their affiliated professional players. It is worth emphasizing that the MLB is codifying their position of exploiting minor league players at a time of great wealth for the sport, as evidenced by the extra $50 million MLB Advanced Media revenue payment paid to every team; in an elite revenue industry, why are many minor league players struggling to earn even $7,000 a year for their professional efforts?

Stepping into speculative histories of MLB players, I’ve been thinking about what I’d expect from players like Burnes or Peralta if they reached the MLB in 2018. Both pitchers provide extreme challenges to the observer, and for different reasons.

• Burnes provides a challenge because the righty’s quick ascent to the advanced minors has out-paced the non-proprietary information available about the pitcher, which manifested itself during the 2017 season in the form of widely varying fastball, slider, and delivery reports. From early in the season, when on-the-ground reports placed Burnes as a potentially high reliever-risk profile who could make it work as a middle rotation starter, to late in the season when delivery adjustments and improved fastball reports began leaking out, fans and analysts were essentially given several different pitchers’ worth of information. Entering 2018, then, it’s worth asking whether Burnes is the fastball / slider reliever with middle rotation question marks, the middle rotation arm who could decrease reliever risk by continuing to refine his delivery, or the surging pitching prospect who simply continues to redefine roles by refining mechanics and therefore allowing his stuff to take the next step. All of this can happen with Burnes, or none of it; thus the righty prospect is an acute example of information asymmetry.

• Peralta faces different questions about his stuff and profile, especially due to his diminished stature (compared to Burnes) and his pitching approach (he’s not quite a command-and-deception guy, but he twists and turns his fastballs in order to help his stuff “play up”). In one sense, Peralta is much more conventional than Burnes, insofar as Peralta will be lauded as “the small framed righty who proved everyone wrong” should his frame stick in a functional mid-rotation role. On the other hand, given the frame and lack of a strong fastball, it is worth questioning how Peralta’s arsenal and command will play as he advances in the system. The significance of the righty’s pitch sequencing and location will not be understated. It’s tough to say whether Peralta faces “reliever risk” in the same sense Burnes does, as Peralta’s top role is even murkier than his Advanced Minors teammate.

So, if Burnes and Peralta reach the MLB in 2018, what will their potential roles be? What performance levels might fans expect? With Counsell looking at both pitchers as potential midseason reinforcements for the staff, it is worth digging into potential production expectations.

Role risk will be nothing new to the 2018 Brewers; role risk is all over the roster, even beyond the rookie class. But, in attempting to form expectations about Burnes and Peralta, I turned to other rookie pitchers that are on the MLB roster or in Spring Training camp as non-roster invitees. By my count, these rookies comprise (in order of height) Peralta, Taylor Williams, Marcos Diplan, Jorge Lopez, Aaron Wilkerson, Erik Davis, Burnes, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Brandon Woodruff, Tyler Webb, and Jon Perrin.

• Several of these arms are already established as MLB relievers or very likely to have relief roles in 2018 (see Williams, Lopez, Davis, Houser, and Webb).

• A few of these arms are organizational depth with questionable futures in terms of organizational plans (see Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Davis, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Finally, there’s a deep group of potential rotation depth, in terms of starters who could work as rotational replacements or MLB emergency starters in 2018 (Peralta, Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Burnes, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Woodruff is likely the only pitcher here who is a rotational lock in 2018 (and even writing that leads me to raise some questions, as “There is no such thing as a pitching prospect,” there is no such thing as a surefire pitching role).

Available PECOTA projections (March 2, 2018) for 2018 Brewers rookies (Erik Davis and Jon Perrin projections unavailable). This table features IP projections, as well as Runs Allowed and Runs Prevented figures drawn from projected Deserved Runs Average. Runs Prevented figures are drawn from an average of the 2016-2017 Miller Park / National League. PECOTA strike outs, walks, and WARP are also featured.

With these dozen pitchers, I’ve already laid out extensive role risk simply by categorizing these arms. So, in order to form potential expectations for 2018, I turned to speculative history: namely, how many pitchers in the MLB expansion era matched these arms’ precise height, weight range, handedness, and age as rookies? That is to ask, if these pitchers reach the MLB as rookies in 2018 (e.g., their precise 2018 age), how does their physical profile fare (e.g., their handedness, height, and weight?).

To answer this question, and engage in this speculative exercise, I used the indispensable (and highly recommended) Baseball Reference Play Index to search comparable expansion era players. I searched the expansion era because it is a largely integrated era that also includes a relatively similar form of baseball over the decades in terms of pitching arsenals or prototypes (it tracks the diminishing knuckleball, rise of the splitter / forkball, rise of the fastball / slider profile, etc.). Additionally, as I attempted to search other time frames, I found the reasoning to be rather arbitrary (e.g., if I search the Wild Card Era, should I simply search the Contemporary PED era? If I only search the expanded Wild Card Era (2012-present) will I have a large enough group of players to analyze? And so on).

Using the expansion era, here are the search results from Baseball Reference Play Index. For each player, I searched exact height, handedness, age, and rookie status, while also searching a five percent range in weight (there are some issues with using listed weight). The “Comps” column shows the number of historical rookie comparisons for each potential 2018 Brewers rookie.

This table shows the basic summary of the searches that I conducted using the Play Index tool. What immediately surprised me was the lack of comparisons for some players (like Peralta, Diplan, and Webb), and the large number of comparisons available for “prototypical” starting pitching frames (particularly Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff). Alternately, for a supposedly “old” prospect, the number of comparisons available for Perrin also surprised me, which suggests to me that there has been a path in MLB history for righties of his size and draft pedigree to reach the MLB, even if it takes a while.

Meandering through the comparisons, there are simply some fun and interesting names that appear.

• 2018 rookie Jon Perrin would reach the MLB at the same time as 2012 rookie Yu Darvish, who shares Perrin’s handedness, age, height, and basic weight range; among older comps, Doug Brocail and Todd Worrell are my favorites for Perrin.

• A few names jump off of 2018 rookie Brandon Woodruff’s spreadsheet, like Corey Kluber (!), Ryan Vogelsong, and (of course), Tim Worrell.

• Corbin Burnes has Michael Fulmer and Steve Bedrosian, Houser has Kevin Quackenbush, while Neftali Feliz and Shelby Miller belong to Luis Ortiz. Fulmer is a fascinating comp for Burnes not because of his excellent MLB performance, but because he shared Burnes’s information asymmetry in terms of advanced minors scouting roles and MLB adjustments to exceed expectations. Feliz and Miller are interesting comps for Ortiz, for as the righty faces questions about innings workload and relief risk, it’s good to remember that successful arms have also shared the righty’s frame, height, and age as rookies.

• The lone comps for Diplan and Peralta? Peralta matches 2000 rookie Byung-Hyun Kim (!), while Diplan matches 1965 rookie Dick Selma.

• Obviously, there is a world of gray area here, as these comparisons say nothing about a player’s draft or international development status, stuff, place in the minor league system, etc. Moreover, for my search, I did not use these comparisons to create trends or aging curves, so what I am attempting should not be read alongside the (much more methodologically sound) PECOTA system.

From these searches, a batch of 257 rookie comparison seasons resulted. In order to analyze potential performance markers in environments comparable to the 2016-2017 MLB, I indexed each season according to Runs Allowed per Game (RA/G), and sampled post-Strike rookies that played during a season with a run environment within 5 percent of the 2017 RA/G. This analysis produced a sample of 85 rookie comparison seasons. The following table shows the basic production range for this 85 rookie population:

For this analysis, I focused on Innings Pitched and basic league-level Runs Prevented (I did not investigate historical park factors for this analysis). To compensate for the lack of park factors, I produced a range of runs prevented estimates. Overall, this group of pitchers did not average high innings pitched totals (presumably due to their rookie status, in many cases), with the average pitcher in this sample working nearly 39.0 innings.

This sample can be further categorized to focus on each specific Brewers rookie’s physical profile. In the next table, a range of runs prevented (RnPrv, LowRnPrv, and HighRnPrv) accompany Innings Pitched and Runs averages and standard deviation (IP, IP_StDev; Rn, Rn_StDev).

This table undoubtedly demonstrates a wide range of potentialities for these Brewers rookie pitchers. The innings pitched variance alone suggests that these players could range anywhere from “Did Not Play” to 70-to-80 IP seasons. It’s easy to get excited about some of these results; for example, 75 innings pitched and five runs prevented from Corbin Burnes, or 56.3 IP and six runs prevented from Taylor Williams would represent excellent rotational and bullpen support for Milwaukee.

Yet, the basic averages might provide some hint as to why the Brewers front office has remained quiet on the pitching free agency market thus far: even averaging around 35 innings and providing moderate runs prevented totals, this group of pitchers has a physical pedigree that suggests competent replacement depth can come from rookie ranks. Of course, it is impossible to fully extrapolate from these historical rookie comparisons to the Brewers 2018 pitching staff; this is not a correlative relationship. Yet, through this speculative historical analysis, one can find that Milwaukee has some solid physical characteristics with plenty of historical counterparts (especially Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff); there are also some nearly one-of-a-kind profiles (see Diplan, Peralta, and Webb). Ultimately, these dozen rookies present Milwaukee’s front office and field management with an array of options to collect outs and prevent runs, even if they’re a group of wide-ranging replacements.

Baseball Prospectus. 2018 PECOTA (March 2, 2018) [CSV]. Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Prospectus. “More PECOTA” (Player Cards). Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Sports Reference, LLC., Sports Reference LLC, 2000-2018. Searches conducted March 3, 2018 from baseball-reference.com.

Related Reading:
Do the Brewers Need to Trade?
Roster Surplus and Depth Questions

In fact, one potential demonstration of a 40-man roster entering 2019 offseason shows how prospects can be accommodated and protected from the Rule 5 draft. In this scenario, I left someone like RHP Carlos Herrera unprotected under the assumption that the young prospect will still be in A-ball (likely Carolina) for 2019, making his scenario a potential repeat of the Miguel Diaz non-protect by Stearns. Players like RHP Corbin Burnes and 2B Keston Hiura do not make an appearance on this roster because they do not need to be protected after the 2018 season, and I am not making any assumptions about MLB ascension; this is an exercise in organizational necessity as connected to prospect protection.

On the face of it, this is not a bad roster. However, once one views this strategy of protecting prospects, and valuing their protection over potential trades, another set of questions arise. Most importantly, is this type of roster actually moving the club forward? Should this club enter 2019, there would be many question marks about the development of players from Orlando Arcia and Josh Hader to Lewis Brinson and Brandon Woodruff. This type of roster would absolutely heighten the “role risk” faced by each developing player. Additionally, one could challenge whether or not this type of roster strategy adequately capitalizes on the great steps forward in 2017, as the added focus on rostering Monte Harrison, Josh Pennington, and Luis Ortiz, among others, behind the likes of Brinson, Hader, and Woodruff undoubtedly pushes the Brewers’ likely competitive window into the 2020s. If players like Brinson or Brett Phillips will need a couple of years to develop at the MLB level, the same may be said for the next line of prospects as well. This puts a premium on developing players at the MLB level, which raises questions about whether the Brewers can consistently sustain a develop-and-compete strategy. One could argue that the club adequately demonstrated this ability in 2017, although it bears repeating that the front office failed to maximize resources to reach the playoffs in that case (even though the development aspect of the roster was largely a success).

Moreover, after 2018, rostering another set of prospects heightens the role risk of that group of players. Below, here is an example of some of the risks one can expect from this group of players:

The trouble with the current Brewers farm system is that even if there are potential impact roles under club control (such as Monte Harrison’s star centerfielder potential, or Luis Ortiz’s mid-rotation+ potential), there is considerable risk for reaching these roles at the MLB level (Harrison remains a raw prospect who has the same type of hit tool questions of Lewis Brinson; Ortiz has significant workload risk that impacts the quality rotation ceiling). Remaining arms in the system also exhibit rotation risk, from Nathan Kirby’s injury history to repertoire concerns from Cody Ponce and Freddy Peralta to Josh Pennington and Trey Supak.

In many cases, the roles that Brewers fans are dreaming on will indeed be impeded by risk. So the question becomes not whether the Brewers must trade these players (they don’t have to), either to win-now or to avoid a roster crunch, but whether the 40-man roster can bear the level of risk presented by these prospects. The risks associated with developing these players from advanced minors roles to MLB roles must be heavily weighed against the risks associated with trading these prospects. I do not believe that this conversation occurs in earnest among Brewers fans and analysts. The assumption is always that if the Brewers trade Brinson or Harrison, they are trading a star centerfielder; but, should the Brewers trade these types of players, they are also trading the risks associated with developing those roles at the MLB level (including adjustments necessary to address those risks).

Drawn from this particular 40-man roster, and the acceleration of potential roles and risks associated with those roles from the minor league to MLB scale, one must understand that relying on internal prospects to develop the next Brewers contender is as “all-in” a strategy as trading away prospects to acquire MLB contracts. A middle ground includes some of these prospects on the big league club, say one of Brinson or Harrison, and a trade involving the other; the same can be said of Corbin Burnes and Freddy Peralta, Josh Pennington and Trey Supak, and so on down the minor league ladder. The ability of the Brewers front office to develop the next contending club will rest with their diversification of risk throughout the MLB club and 40-man roster: there is no silver bullet for winning, not even one that involves hanging on to each and every high ceiling prospect in the system. Will David Stearns learn from midseason 2017, and become shrewd enough to find the proper balance of risk types and roster roles?

Working with the current roster, the Brewers will once again compete in 2018 with stunning depth, complete with a rotation that looks better suited to planting dreams of dingers in batters’ heads, rather than striking fear. This very systematic approach worked in 2017 by using a series of pitching adjustments and strategies, and now the club has doubled down on potential low rotation depth in a manner that should push some fringe arms into more effective bullpen roles. If the Gallardo signing was poised to potentially improve the fifth rotation spot by approximately 10 runs (in a best case scenario), adding veteran Jhoulys Chacin features some runs prevented upside (Chacin prevented six runs in 2017, and was a fantastic starter in earlier days with the Colorado Rockies) that makes him even more attractive as innings-eating depth for the club. Here’s one potential pitching staff alignment (based on 2017 roles):

The club’s batting moves thus far are nearly head-scratching in their assemblage of talent that essentially blocks Lewis Brinson and Brett Phillips from starting CF or impact OF depth roles at the MLB level. As constructed, the current roster sends Brinson and Phillips to Triple-A as “next man up” depth. For this reason, it would not be surprising to see some combination Stephen Vogt, Hernan Perez, Jonathan Villar, or Keon Broxton fail to make the club from Spring Training.

There’s something underwhelming about this roster outside of cheering for the upside plays. Getting Jonathan Villar another chance to hit on the tools and disciplined approach that created his breakout 2016 campaign could be extremely worthwhile to the Brewers longterm contending chances, as could getting Junior Guerra to continue his winter ball success at the MLB level to rebound in 2018 (Guerra has allowed 19 runs on 40 hits and 17 walks, with 30 strike outs, in 48.3 winter innings). Watching Brinson, Phillips, Josh Hader, and Brandon Woodruff further develop MLB roles will also be worthwhile. Yet, what’s interesting is the number of singular players on the roster; according to Baseball Reference Play Index, there is no position player in the MLB Expansion Era that has combined Keon Broxton’s extreme plate approach through 700 career plate appearances; the only other Expansion Era catcher to play his rookie season at age-30 while amassing 300 PA is Kenji Johjima; Hernan Perez is the youngest effective superutility player in Expansion Era history. GM David Stearns may be validated by giving these players another chance to prove themselves in 2018, despite all common sense and MLB history saying “these are not typical MLB contributors.” In fact, drawing on these unorthodox talents may be one way to help bolster the roster around the top prospects.

One of the raging debates is when, or how, the Brewers should trade prospects in order to acquire MLB-ready producers to enhance their roster. An interesting take on this debate is that even if the Brewers do not trade their very best prospect (Lewis Brinson), they could use their future 2018 Rule 5 draft depth to form trades and beat a roster crunch. BrewersFarm assembled one such list of this Rule 5 roster crunch on Twitter, and at first glance it looks quite daunting.

Sure. But all of these guys will need to be on 40-man by next winter or risk being taken in Rule 5. Dealing from prospect depth is gonna be darn near a necessary at some point. There’s probably 15 or so guys that will probably need to be added. pic.twitter.com/RqJ4iGnxBb

— Brewers Farm (@BrewersFarm) December 20, 2017

Alongside top prospects such as Monte Harrison and Isan Diaz, obvious Rule 5 protections, stand a group of potential pop-up pitchers for 2018 (Josh Pennington, Carlos Herrera, and Trey Supak), alongside additional useful depth that can use 2018 to take their next steps to the MLB (here Troy Stokes, Luis Ortiz, and Cody Ponce might come to mind). How many of these players should be protected? Here’s one potential short list of “interesting” 2018 Rule 5 guys:

The argument goes something like this: since the Brewers will have a roster crunch pending after 2018 with these players, they can use some of these players to headline trades to compete in 2018. This is obviously most attractive in the case of players like Monte Harrison and Luis Ortiz, who have solid potential roles that outweigh much of their risk.  Harrison and Ortiz would be the types of prospects that could probably help to construct an impact MLB trade. But otherwise, the trouble with this group of players is that they have largely failed to come into focus yet; it’s difficult to look at Carlos Herrera, Josh Pennington, or even Trey Supak as anything more than throw-ins right now. 2018 will be as crucial for them in terms of developing in the minor leagues as the year will be for establishing MLB roles for Brinson, Phillips, and Woodruff.

For all the strengths of the roster’s depth, a waltz through the current Brewers 40-man roster (and the rumored signing of Boone Logan) shows a sizable group of players that either have contracts expiring, easy contracts to drop, non-tender options, etc. If the Brewers need to find room for even eight or ten Rule 5 protections (in the most extreme case, perhaps), the front office should easily be able to find room for them on the roster:

One potential issue with shifting such depth from MLB-tested players to such a large number of prospects is that the 2019 club will simply encounter the same types of issues that the 2018 club faces: namely, finding playing time for prospects while they develop at the MLB level, and facing the uncertainty of developing MLB players in the midst of designing an otherwise competitive club. Yet, this type of strategy solidifies the sense that this Brewers team may actually win through depth, or because of their depth, rather than relying on one star to emerge from this pack of prospects. The only questions that remain concern the types of MLB deals that can be had with this next group of prospects, and how the players at the fringes of the 2018 MLB roster perform during the season. Unlike the relative strategic ease of rebuilding, there are no right answers in 2018 and 2019. How many paths to winning may the club follow?

Photo Credit: Dale Zanine, USAToday Sports Images