Of course, the risk with trading is amplified: information asymmetry shifts from a player’s agent (on the free agency market) to a front office (in the trade market), which requires Stearns and the Brewers to maintain a different game theory (i.e., when making a trade, the Brewers cannot simply solve a coordination failure with another team by outspending all other comers); in addition to contractual risk, the risk of prospects or return assets must also be priced, which adds more room to strike a deal (“find the new market inefficiency!”) and to absolutely lose all value (the Jonathan Schoop and Andrew Susac / Phil Bickford trades are two examples of this for the Stearns front office).

There are several interesting trade partners across the league, including franchises that are tied to the Brewers’ front office personnel by lineage (as an example, Tampa Bay and Houston are probably the most prominent teams in this category). It would not be surprising to see the Brewers go after players that they are familiar with from Matt Arnold or Stearns’s previous organizational pipelines (or, whatever rumors those two can continually collect from the….er….informal information market). Recent changes across the league offer new trade opportunities as new eyes look over existing talent stock; here the Mets and the Giants most clearly come to mind. Additional rumors about rebuilding efforts in Arizona and Seattle, as well as the situation in Baltimore, add further trade opportunities for Stearns.

So who wants to deal? To make this article easier to read, the “Surplus Assumptions” are posted at the bottom of the article, as well as a Brewers roster (for full trade comparison).

First things first, everyone wants Jacob deGrom, so let’s take a look at the very best players that the Brewers could trade. At the top of this list, prospects like deGrom would basically require prospect packages like Keston Hiura / Corbin Burnes plus some filler; if the Brewers could acquire almost anyone atop this without surrendering Hiura, that would be magical.

To this observer, if the Mariners end up entering rebuild mode, the Brewers prospect package that could get the most mileage would be for a grouping of Mitch Haniger and James Paxton; this type of deal might be “lead” by Domingo Santana and Corey Ray if the Brewers also included a couple of their best arms. The price would be steep, but would bolster right field defense and On-Base Percentage (balancing the batting order, as well) and the starting rotation. Notably, this prospect cost would be roughly equivalent to spending one full market deal on Patrick Corbin.

There are also some players on this handful of teams that have gigantic contracts, and this is a place where Stearns could create a deal to “buy a prospect” or otherwise leverage the Brewers’ positive revenue scenario. The practice of “buying a prospect” basically means that the Brewers would take on the full balance (or significant balance) of a “bad” contract in order to receive a prospect from their trade partner. One example of this trade is how Atlanta acquired Touki Toussaint by “purchasing” Bronson Arroyo’s contract; to a lesser extent, the Brewers accomplished this when they grabbed Aaron Hill in the Jean Segura / Chase Anderson deal, which netted the Brewers potential impact prospect Isan Diaz (this was a great example of a “contrarian” deal by Stearns, as he acquired MLB talent during a supposed “rebuilding” cycle).

If Arizona is indeed rebuilding, a trade for Zack Greinke would be quite intriguing (someone like Corey Ray would fall right between his “raw” contractual surplus and total performative surplus). What is interesting is how many bad contracts the Orioles have; one would expect a creative rebuild from that organization, as they have so few valuable MLB assets that simply making solid trades for prospects will not be a clear option (at least not yet). It is interesting to imagine the type of trade the Brewers could make by retrieving Alex Cobb’s or Chris Davis’s contract from Baltimore. The Orioles are rebuilding, but their 2019 Top Prospect list indicates that there are nonetheless quite a few interesting players atop their farm system.

Finally, there is a group of very interesting trade targets that exist in a range of potentially cheaper prospect costs. I formed this group by looking at “raw” contractual surplus that would roughly cost an average prospect (50 Overall Future Potential), with total surplus that could range anywhere from average to impact prospect. One of the players on this list (Mike Zunino) has already been subject of a trade today:

Madison Bumgarner and Zack Wheeler are guys that jump off the page here for the “improve the starting rotation” types, and they are crucial examples of how tough it will be to price some veteran options. The range on Bumgarner’s value is quite extreme, and there is no way the Brewers would acquire the veteran southpaw close to his “low” price; so, the question would be whether one of the organizational impact prospects would be worth a player with quite a short-term contract horizon. Kyle Seager is another interesting trade candidate here, with a range that is almost impossible to decode into a useful prospect package: do you trade for elite Seager, or current Seager? What is the premium to be paid for his previously elite production?

Ironically, Jonathan Villar might be the Orioles’ most interesting and best available trade asset.

In short, there are plenty of intriguing players that the Brewers could acquire via trade. This exercise has hopefully opened a few of the strategies available to the Brewers (such as making a huge splash trade with prospects, or “buying” a bad contract). Additionally, the importance of being honest about high costs should also be apparent: the Brewers cannot simply “add an ace” if they view players like Keston Hiura as a part of their future, or even Zack Brown, Jacob Nottingham, Corbin Burnes, Brice Turang, and Trey Supak for that matter. Yet, in the event that the Brewers make a large trade, the pay off must be accurately assessed, which is one benefit of using a range of surplus assumptions to look at the high and low value markers available in a trade. For example, viewing Christian Yelich’s “raw” contractual surplus and total performance surplus below should show why it was worthwhile to surrender the prospect haul that Yelich required; the Brewers could conceivably do the same with an impact player for 2019, so long as the continued diminishing profile of their top prospects is assessed. If the Brewers forego a huge trade in the offseason, they could pay dividends both in terms of MLB development (in the case of prospects like Hiura), role determination (in the case of players like Supak and Turang), and more realistic roster need assessment during the midseason trade deadline.

Surplus Assumptions

To make it perfectly clear, here are my common surplus assumptions, with background here and here:

• Teams receive surplus value by retaining production and a contract (or, “scarcity”). Value in the MLB can be defined as the on-the-field performance and the scarcity of that performance (which is thus controlled by contractual terms).

• Surplus can be calculated in a “Raw” fashion, where the value of performance over time is simply assessed against contractual value; alternately, a “full” surplus assessment can be made by considering the future value on the field the club will receive, as well as the contractual hit they will take for employing that player.

• Arbitration and league minimum “reserve” contracts produce extremely high value because teams can frequently cut those contracts without paying full price. This adds value beyond the stipulations stated above.

• For this to work, MLB players, prospects, and cash must be translated to dollars. While this is an assumption that many do not like (opposing WARP/$ frameworks), I argue that the simple fact that teams trade prospects for MLB players, or cash, all the time demonstrates that these different asset classes can indeed be translated into a common currency.

• This should not be viewed as the be-all, end-all of player valuation, simply because there are different developmental models across organizations that could result in alternative models based on organizational strengths; WARP itself is only one way to measure players; prospect risk is nearly impossible to uniformly quantify across one group of players, which necessarily means that almost any prospect valuation system will be incomplete. Additionally, player development cycles are quite long, meaning that the value a player could be expected to produce within the next three years is nowhere near the value that could be produced in a decade; this matters depending on a team’s resources and the player’s distance from the MLB (or MLB service time), among other factors.

Here is one example of Overall Future Potential (OFP) pricing, based on a model that assesses all players in MLB history (to the point of that publication), and an update from 2017. These models will be further updated.

Based on these assumptions, here are the Brewers, including most of their players listed under contract at Cot’s Contracts, as well as a couple of their best advanced prospects (to compare prospect grading within the system). This article focuses on four calculations to produce surplus value:

• After depreciating production from 2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018, those three figures are averaged to produce a “Blended Surplus.”
• The largest of the depreciated production from 2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018 forms the “High Surplus.”
• “Immediate Surplus” takes a different look at production by simply using full 2018 performance and extrapolating it for three years. This is the equivalent of taking the most extreme view of immediate performance by a player.
• “Raw Surplus” is calculated by subtracting the average of these three figures, prorated for each player’s remaining contract, from the player’s contract (options excluded).
• “Surplus” is the final figure, adding the average of Blended, High, and Immediate surplus to the “Raw Surplus” contractual figure. This is equivalent to valuing a player’s on-field production separately from their contractual value.
• The “Raw” figure is meant to demonstrate a “buy low” price, and the “Surplus” column is meant to demonstrate a “buy high” price, but obviously these figures are not exclusive; they merely seek to establish potential boundaries for a trade.

At the time that he was hired, it seemed like as though the Brewers were many years away from consistent contention. Even the optimistic fan would have pointed to 2019 or so as the year in which the Brewers may start to make some noise. Stearns has exceeded expectations by any measure.

But because baseball is a sport perfect for speculative thought exercises, I asked the following question: What if he didn’t?

What would have happened if Stearns settled into his desk on the morning of September 20, 2015, took stock of the team and its farm system, and said, “You know what? Let’s just ride it out and see what happens.”

In the alternate universe you are about to enter, every Stearns trade is gone. He just never even picks up the phone. The free agent signings and waiver claims, for the sake of this exercise, remain. (In the Bizarro universe, his nickname is Waivin’ Dave.)

We’ll also assume that the performances of all players involved in the Bizarro universe would be comparable to their real-world counterparts, aside from some minor park adjustments, perhaps. Why this particular set of rules? ‘Cuz.

The first order of business: Undoing every trade the Brewers made after handing the franchise reins to David Stearns.

Trades Undone:

November 18, 2015 – Traded RHP Francisco Rodriguez to the Detroit Tigers for MiLB IF Javier Betancourt and C Manny Piña
November 19, 2015 – Traded MiLB RHP Cy Sneed to the Astros for 2B Jonathan Villar
November 20, 2015 – Traded IF Luis Sardiñas to the Mariners for OF/1B Ramon Flores
December 9, 2015 – Traded IB Adam Lind to the Mariners for MiLB RHPs Carlos Herrera, Daniel Missaki, and Freddy Peralta
December 17, 2015 – Traded 1B Jason Rogers to the Pirates for MiLB RHP Trey Supak and OF Keon Broxton
January 30, 2016 – Traded 2B/SS Jean Segura and MiLB RHP Tyler Wagner to the Diamondbacks for MiLB 2B/SS Isan Diaz, RHP Chase Anderson, and IF Aaron Hill
February 12, 2016 – Traded OF/DH Khris Davis to the Athletics for MiLB RHP Bubba Derby and MiLB C Jacob Nottingham
July 7, 2016 – Traded IF Aaron Hill to the Red Sox for MiLB IF Wendell Rijo and MiLB RHP Aaron Wilkerson
August 1, 2016 – Traded RHP Jeremy Jeffress and C Jonathan Lucroy to the Rangers for MiLBers Lewis Brinson (OF), Luis Ortiz (RHP), and Ryan Cordell (OF)
August 1, 2016 – Traded LHP Will Smith to the Giants for C Andrew Susac and MiLB RHP Phil Bickford
December 6, 2016 – Traded RHP Tyler Thornburg to the Red Sox for 3B Travis Shaw, MiLB SS/2B Mauricio Dubon, MiLB RHP Josh Pennington, MiLB SS Yeison Coca
December 13, 2016 – Traded C Martin Maldonado and MiLB RHP Drew Gagnon to the Angels for C Jett Bandy
April 13, 2017 – Traded RHP Damien Magnifico to the Orioles for RHP Oliver Drake
June 30, 2017 – Traded IF/OF Nick Franklin to the Angels for cash
July 13, 2017 – Traded 1B Garrett Cooper to the Yankees for LHP Tyler Webb
July 26, 2017 – Traded OF Ryan Cordell to the White Sox for RHP Anthony Swarzak
July 31, 2017 – Traded RHP Tayler Scott to the Rangers for RHP Jeremy Jeffress
August 12, 2017 – Traded RHP Eric Hanhold to the Mets for 2B Neil Walker
January 25, 2018 – Traded OF Lewis Brinson and MiLBers Isan Diaz (SS/2B), Monte Harrison (OF), and Jordan Yamamoto (RHP) to the Marlins for OF Christian Yelich
February 2, 2018 – Traded C Andrew Susac to the Orioles for cash
May 25, 2018 – Traded MiLB IF Wendell Rijo to the Yankees for C Erik Kratz
June 10, 2018 – Traded 1B/OF Ji-Man Choi to the Rays for IF Brad Miller and cash
July 26, 2018 – Traded MiLB LHP Kodi Medeiros and MiLB RHP Wilber Perez to the White Sox for RHP Joakim Soria and cash
July 27, 2018 – Traded RHP Jorge López and OF Brett Phillips to the Royals for 3B Mike Moustakas
July 31, 2018 – Traded 2B Jonathan Villar, MiLB RHP Luis Ortiz, and MiLB IF Jean Carmona to the Orioles for 2B Jonathan Schoop
August 31, 2018 – Traded MiLB RHP Johan Dominguez and MiLB IF/OF Bryan Connell to the White Sox for LHP Xavier Cedeño
August 31, 2018 – Traded MiLB C/1B KJ Harrison and MiLB IF Gilbert Lara to the Nationals for LHP Gio González and international bonus slot money
August 31, 2018 – Traded MiLB OF Demi Orimoloye to the Blue Jays for OF Curtis Granderson

Total Players Retained: Francisco Rodriguez (Controlled through 2017 with a club option), Cy Sneed (minors), Luis Sardiñas (Batted .111 for Baltimore in 8 2018 games), Adam Lind (Free Agent after 2016), Jason Rogers (Has spent time in NPB and indie ball), Jean Segura (FA 2019), Tyler Wagner (minors), Khris Davis (48 HR, FA 2020), Aaron Hill (FA after season), Jeremy Jeffress, Jonathan Lucroy (FA 2018), Will Smith (FA 2020), Tyler Thornburg (FA 2020), Martin Maldonado (FA 2019), Drew Gagnon (5.25 ERA in 12 IP for the Mets in 2018), Damien Magnifico (minors), Nick Franklin (re-signed), Garrett Cooper (60-Day DL for Marlins), Tayler Scott (minors), Eric Hanhold (7.71 ERA in 3 games with Mets), Monte Harrison (minors), Jordan Yamamoto (minors), Ji-Man Choi (10 HR in 221 PA), Kodi Medeiros (minors), Wilber Perez (minors), Jorge López (combined 5.03 ERA), Brett Phillips (great defense, 41.7 K%), Jean Carmona (minors), Johan Dominguez (minors), Bryan Connell (minors), KJ Harrison (minors), Gilbert Lara (minors), Demi Orimoloye (minors)

Total Players Never Acquired: Javier Betancourt, Manny Piña, Jonathan Villar, Ramon Flores, Carlos Herrera, Daniel Missaki, Freddy Peralta, Trey Supak, Keon Broxton, Isan Diaz, Chase Anderson, Aaron Hill, Bubba Derby, Jacob Nottingham, Wendell Rijo, Aaron Wilkerson, Lewis Brinson, Ryan Cordell, Luis Ortiz, Andrew Susac, Phil Bickford, Travis Shaw, Mauricio Dubon, Josh Pennington, Yeison Coca, Jett Bandy, Oliver Drake, Tyler Webb, Anthony Swarzak, Neil Walker, Christian Yelich, Erik Kratz, Brad Miller, Joakim Soria, Mike Moustakas, Jonathan Schoop, Xavier Cedeño, Gio González, Curtis Granderson

The first thing that stands out in all of this is the sheer volume of major transactions occurring for the Brewers in a relatively short period of time. Stearns has acquired more major league contributors than he’s given up, a further testament to the rapidity of his rebuild, but both lists are startlingly long. The man’s been busy.

The second thing is that, hey, a few good players around the league were Brewers in the not-too-distant past. A few of those players would still be under team control. Which brings us to…

2018 Bizarro Brewers Starting Lineup & Depth Chart

1. Lorenzo Cain (CF)
2. Jean Segura (2B)
3. Ryan Braun (RF)
4. Khris Davis (LF)
5. Jesus Aguilar (3B)
6. Eric Thames (1B)
7. Martin Maldonado (C)
8. Orlando Arcia (SS)
9. Pitcher

Depth
Left Field: Khris Davis, Ryan Braun, Domingo Santana, Ji-Man Choi

Center Field: Lorenzo Cain, Brett Phillips

Right Field: Ryan Braun, Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips

First Base: Eric Thames, Ji-Man Choi, Garrett Cooper

Second Base: Jean Segura, Hernán Pérez

Shortstop: Orlando Arcia, Jean Segura, Hernán Pérez

Third Base: Jesus Aguilar, Hernán Pérez, Garrett Cooper

Catcher: Martin Maldonado, Christian Bethancourt

Starting Rotation: Jhoulys Chacín, Zach Davies, Wade Miley, Junior Guerra, Brent Suter, Brandon Woodruff, Corbin Burnes, Jorge López, Adrian Houser, Tyler Wagner

Bullpen: Josh Hader, Jeremy Jeffress, Corey Knebel, Will Smith, Dan Jennings, Jacob Barnes, Tyler Thornburg, Taylor Williams, Matt Albers, Jordan Lyles, Quintin Torres-Costa, Nick Ramirez

DL: Jimmy Nelson, Stephen Vogt

What emerges is a surprisingly decent group, albeit one that would lose several key players to free agency following both the 2018 and 2019 seasons. Onto the head-to-head.

Pitching Staff
The absence of Chase Anderson and Freddy Peralta thins the crop of starting pitchers, but would also pave the way for Brandon Woodruff and Corbin Burnes to pick up some meaningful starts. Meanwhile, the bullpen still looks strong. Real Brewers pitchers combined for approximately 18 Pitcher Wins Above Replacement Player (PWARP) in 2018, placing them right in the middle of the league. The Bizarro Brewers pretty much measure up. Overall, the Brewers shed a total of 1.1 PWARP, mostly thanks to Gio González and Joakim Soria, but add that 1.1 back through Will Smith. It’s difficult to say how the Bizarro rotation would have fared, with inexperienced arms like Woodruff and Burnes assuming more important roles. But the pitching, on its face, seems to be more or less a wash.
Advantage: Even

Defense
Behind those pitchers, the defense would be a bit of a mess. Despite a strong presence up the middle (Maldonado, Arcia, Segura, and Cain), the corners look leaky, with third base threatening to approach 2007-Ryan-Braun levels of futility, and Khris Davis battling The Creature in left. Ryan Braun in right wouldn’t be too pretty, either. So while manager Craig Counsell could count on those big bats to create a lead, he’d likely yank them out of the game in the seventh or eighth inning in favor of Hernán Pérez, Brett Phillips, and Domingo Santana. Not the most comfortable system, but one that could work.
Advantage: Real Brewers

Offense
Real Brewers hitters had a terrific year, and come out on top of the Bizarro Brewers pretty handily. Christian Yelich and Travis Shaw combined for approximately 12.0 Batter Wins Above Replacement Player (BWARP) in 2018, handily beating the 7.3 BWARP compiled by Jean Segura and Khris Davis. Bizarro catcher Martin Maldonado contributes less than one BWARP-win behind the plate against Many Piña’s 1.5, and Christian Bethancourt isn’t a likely bet to replace the 1.4 BWARP accumulated by Erik Kratz. Jesus Aguilar’s value would be diminished at third base, and it’s tough to say how Thames and Choi would have responded to increased playing time.
Advantage: Real Brewers

Dingers
It’s close, but assuming they all get a full season of playing time, I’ll take the combined output of Davis-Aguilar-Thames-Braun over Yelich-Aguilar-Shaw-Braun. Playing in Miller Park, Khrush could have eclipsed Prince Fielder’s team record of 50 home runs in 2007.
Advantage: Bizarro Brewers

Final Thoughts
2018 is probably the best chance for the Bizarro Brewers to make the playoffs, as they stand to lose Martin Maldonado and Jean Segura (who never signed that extension in the Bizarro universe) to free agency after the season. They could always shell out for Daniel Murphy or DJ LeMahieu and patch their catching situation with Kurt Suzuki or Wilson Ramos, but that’s not exactly the Brewers’ style, plus they’ll lose Khris Davis, Will Smith, Jhoulys Chacín, and Tyler Thornburg the next year (with Braun and Thames not far behind).

Squint a little bit (and imagine a few lucky breaks going their way), and it’s not impossible to think that the Bizarro squad could have pushed for a Wild Card spot this season. But it’s also not hard to see that the Real Brewers are a stronger team right now, and will be a stronger team for years to come.

Which reminds me: Postseason baseball is here. Go Crew!

The argument is that these players faced an impending roster crunch, so I thought it was time for another big, unwieldy, speculative post on such a crunch. What does the Brewers’ crunch look like? Is there a roster crunch?

Brief Aside on the Rule 5 Draft:
The Rule 5 draft is ostensibly meant to serve as a labor institution that keeps MLB teams from hoarding minor league players without an equal shot at MLB roles with other teams; thus, after certain required time periods (based on when / how a player was acquired), the Brewers must protect minor league players on their 40-man roster or risk their exposure to the Rule 5 draft (which typically takes place at the end of each winter meetings). The gamble is that any team selecting a Rule 5 player must typically keep that player on their MLB roster, meaning that if the Brewers do not necessarily foresee an impact or serviceable MLB role for a minor leaguer, they can leverage that risk by not protecting the player for the Rule 5 draft. Recently, teams like the San Diego Padres have called teams’ bluffs by selecting low-minors players, including the Brewers’ gamble with former Top Ten prospect RHP Miguel Diaz, eschewing the typical Triple-A / advanced minors depth player selected in the draft. The Brewers have multiple players spanning these types of gambles for 2019, ranging from low minors gambles like Carlos Herrera to advanced depth players like Bubba Derby or Quintin Torres-Costa.

Let’s start with a look at some of the best Rule 5 prospects available from the Brewers system. This list of eligible players is available thanks to the indispensable Brewerfan.net. The order is mine, based on how I might grade out the risk and potential future roles of these players:

First and foremost, if it matters, I would have slotted RHP Luis Ortiz first on this list, and he is also the most certain player of this group to appear on a 2019 Top 10 list due to one of the clearest potential impact roles of the bunch (even given his risk); LHP Kodi Medeiros would have slotted around Cody Ponce and Jake Gatewood; RHP Jon Perrin would have slotted around Herrera / Segovia / Torres-Costa. (For what it’s worth, among this group I would consider protecting Supak, Stokes, Gatewood, and Ponce).

This is a long way of saying that the Brewers arguably already traded away their best possible roles available in the Rule 5 draft for 2019, which is certainly one way to rid an organization of a potential roster crunch. As you can see looking at these prospects, there are fewer potential impact roles available, and notably fewer tough decisions for GM David Stearns. It is not clear who on this list is a player that would derail the organization if left unprotected. I’d love to sing the praises of Nathan Kirby or Devin Williams, but their respective injury histories and subsequent development raises significant questions to the point that I’m not sure how to form MLB roles; I’d place both in the Taylor Williams “it would be great if they came back and could be serviceable MLB relievers” role.

I am certain that other fans have potential Rule 5 picks that they like more than the prospects I listed, and I’m certain other folks would list these prospects in different orders. That is fine. What I want to stress is that if one actually lays out the potential roles of these players, it’s tough to see some crush of must-protect-impact-players that would cause a roster crunch worthy of trading away the (most likely) best roles from the group. Right now, it seems like Trey Supak, Quintin Torres-Costa, and Bubba Derby are players who could “play up” in Milwaukee’s current pitching system. But should all three be protected on the 40-man roster?

Thanks to recent moves, the Brewers also have a group of players with contract options for 2019, which is a good thing because the club has less than $70 million in agreements guaranteed thus far. In short: this is a team that could pick up some options and spend some cash at the MLB level, especially given the financial success of the rebuild.

Among this group, only Jordan Lyles would be a “roster crunch”-causing player. The Brewers could decline Lyles’s option in order to protect an additional player from the Rule 5 draft, or (obviously) make some other type of acquisition to bolster the club. For what it is worth, I would renew both Moustakas and Soria. Both are valuable veteran types who would help to boost a club that is now clearly within a contending window.

As I have covered throughout the year with the Daily Pythagorean record posting on @BPMilwaukee Twitter, the Brewers are averaging approximately 85-win outcomes throughout 2018 (based on their park-and-league-adjusted Runs Scored / Runs Allowed). Milwaukee is a team that is succeeding due to the uneven distribution of their bullpen and fielding success, meaning that elite relievers and extremely efficient fielding are bringing-up other aspects of the club. Additionally, there are park factor discrepancies between Baseball Prospectus and Baseball Reference such that if one follows Baseball Prospectus, the offense is much better than most fans and analysts observe (in terms of underlying elements). It’s simply the case that those underlying elements (prior to the trade deadline) still resulted in frightening frequent low-scoring games.

One benefit of the Brewers #TeamDepth attitude is that the roster is built with numerous cost-controlled players who seemingly look replaceable on paper. And thus, considering Milwaukee’s potential arbitration-eligible players and free agents is the most interesting area of the so-called roster crunch. Here I’ve attempted to rank players roughly by role:

Looking at these players, it is first and foremost clear that there is a discrepancy between Wins Above Replacement Player statistics (based on underlying stats) and the distributional strengths of the club in terms of Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. Thus, seemingly replaceable players like Junior Guerra, Wade Miley, Hernan Perez, and Dan Jennings thrive in Milwaukee’s system. This is a good thing, and perhaps some of the reason for this current roster-crunch talk is that the Brewers are loaded with a group of players that are not great but certainly cannot be discarded.

Yet, even with this caveat, nearly half of these players could be replaced in 2019. Some of these difficult decisions could follow injuries (such as Stephen Vogt), or an “end-of-the-line” in terms of MLB role in Milwaukee (see Nick Franklin, Keon Broxton, or Tyler Saladino). One could conceivably slice this group of pending transactions in numerous ways.

Coupled with yet another group of players ranging from Marcos Diplan to Matt Albers and Ariel Hernandez, Alec Asher and Aaron Wilkerson, there appears to be significant wiggle room on the 40-man roster. Thus, one ought to return to the deadline trades and reassess the acquisition cost and trade strategy used by Stearns; this is not to say that the trades were bad across the board, but rather that the allocation of resources to pick up these players is worth questioning. It is not clear that a pending Rule 5 roster crunch was so severe to necessitate steep costs where those costs involved Rule 5 players. Given this, one can turn back to the MLB acquisitions returned in the trades, and assess those roles for the contending stretch.

It is fun to be in a position to assess a club’s moves solely on a contending basis, but when the long-term picture is also invoked, it must be invoked carefully: in the case of the 2019 Brewers, the roster crunch storyline does not appear to add up. Stearns had, and continues to have, far too many 2019 options for clearing roster space to have traded Ortiz, Medeiros, and Perrin solely for those reasons. Thus, it is more interesting to suggest that Stearns was flipping potential long-term assets for controllable MLB players (in the case of Schoop, Soria, and Moustakas), or potentially clearing roster space for additional acquisitions during the 2018-2019 offseason. With (easily) more than $60 million to spend and a once in a lifetime free agency class, that latter point serves as an even more interesting roster motivation for clearing away Rule 5 protections.

Yet, there are many shortcomings with the 2018 Brewers, for all their strengths. The difficulty with quantifying the shortcomings for this team, however, is that they are not strategic shortcomings. In 2018, the shortcomings of the roster are shortcomings borne of development cycles and the long paths necessary to build extended MLB success from young players, or players seeking to establish their respective careers. The former category suits both Domingo Santana and Orlando Arcia, and to a lesser extent Jorge Lopez, Brandon Woodruff, and Zach Davies; the latter category suits players like Manny Pina, and to a lesser extent Brent Suter. These players challenge the long-term development goals of the Brewer given the extremely successful start to the 2018 season, but it is not an overstatement to write that each of these reserve-controlled contracts are significant assets to the Brewers organization and crucial for future success to the degree that they can build consistent MLB roles. This difficult development scenario is compounded when one realizes that pitching prospects Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes could also factor into second half plans for the Brewers, as well as depth position players like Jacob Nottingham and Brett Phillips.

Looking back on 2017, it’s easy to see that the Brewers could have solved their midseason shortcomings in a transactional manner. The club did not even need to make an impact starting pitching move, but could have used waiver claims or depth trades to bolster a rotation that was hit with midseason injuries and wearing thin (much more thin than the 2018 rotation, by the way). With the success of youngsters in 2017, their roster concerns were not development-oriented. Looking forward to the finish line in 2018, it is much more difficult to simply fix a transactional ideology to the Milwaukee roster issues. Simply stated, the Brewers need to prove their ability to help young players through adjustments at the MLB level, which is applicable to both Santana and Arcia. Both Arcia and Santana are crucial members of our beloved Milwaukee Nine despite their diverse scouting roles and tools. But this development decree also extends to the refinement of roles for Lopez and Woodruff in the pitching staff, as well as questions about clearing space for Peralta and Nottingham, let alone Burnes and Phillips. The Brewers can bolster their midseason 2018 club by doubling down on their player development approach at the MLB level, and giving players the space to make adjustments at the MLB level.

Related to this question about the Brewers’ ability to develop young players at the MLB level, it is worth asking whether a “rebuilding effort” was necessary to create this Brewers team. Or rather, are the Brewers succeeding “but for” their rebuilding efforts by previous President Doug Melvin and GM Stearns? Here’s a look at top Milwaukee players by WARP and acquisition:

What is fascinating about the 2018 Brewers is that despite the “branding” of the so-called rebuilding effort, a “rebuild” is hardly stamped on this team. 5.6 WARP of the team leaders could have been acquired by nearly any MLB team, through a purchase (i.e., a trade for cash) or MLB free agency. 0.7 WARP belongs to the MLB amateur draft, meaning that there is no high draft pick from a rebuilding season boosting this club (a la the “classic” scorched earth Cubs and Astros efforts); it’s even debatable whether one could call Corey Ray (picked Fifth overall) and Keston Hiura (picked Ninth overall) true “rebuilding” draft picks (in other words, a team does not “tank” to draft fifth overall). At best, one might argue that the Brewers’ 2016 record helped them gain favorable position to land Jesus Aguilar, allowing Milwaukee’s front office to build their #TeamDepth strengths.

The trades on this list are most interesting, though; the trades by both Melvin and Stearns form a spectrum ranging from “rebuilding” to “organizational depth” to “extended win-now,” and everything in-between.

• The move to acquire Josh Hader was most certainly a “rebuilding” move, by which I mean that Melvin traded away MLB contracts for minor league prospects.

• The move to acquire Christian Yelich was most certainly the opposite of a rebuilding move, as Stearns traded away four minor league prospects for an MLB contract, but it’s not quite a “win now” move as Yelich’s age and contract keep that window open for years. Yet in another sense this trade could certainly not have happened without rebuilding efforts, as acquisitions involving Lewis Brinson and Isan Diaz were necessary to eventually land Yelich.

• Meanwhile, the Tyler Thornburg – Travis Shaw transaction is arguably a textbook “counterbuilding” move in which Milwaukee and Boston swapped positions of MLB surplus (or, lack of need); it was not a classic rebuilding move, as Shaw was acquired to become the starting MLB 3B. That Boston somehow also included prospects in the deal is icing on the cake.

• Finally, the latest Jeremy Jeffress acquisition was a classic organizational depth trade.

Were these 10 players the ones you expected to lead the Brewers to contend for the 2018 NL Central crown? (I gather it’s an interesting mix of “Yes” and “No,” but I personally find this list endlessly fascinating. #YouCantPredictBaseball).

But are these WARP leaders truly the fruits of a rebuilding effort? One could argue that rebuilding should not have a transactional form, as I’m using the term, but instead should denote a phase in a club’s development cycle (a “spatial” form). In this regard, acquisitions like Eric Thames or Travis Shaw may not have technically been rebuilding moves, but they would have been less likely to occur by a true win-now club on a contending cycle since they required a certain “space to play” and “room to fail,” or room to find an MLB role. (This is the spatial role of rebuilding that many have argued is a valuable aspect of the MLB development cycle.) The same could be said about the MLB development of Jacob Barnes, or even, inexplicably, the development of Jesus Aguilar. Yet, in this regard, these spaces of rebuilding were rather shallow, as key development players like Pina, Santana, and even Chase Anderson and Jonathan Villar have struggled since their major breakthroughs. This is not a criticism of the players, for development cycles are long and each of these players could find success in their next turn. For example, Villar is already coming around for the 2018 Brewers, for instance, completely silencing the need for a 2B trade, while Chase Anderson is ironing out mechanical issues and potentially rebounding.

Following the spatial definition of rebuilding, then, one can completely reverse course and argue that the Brewers have mess less incentive to make large trades in 2018 than they did in 2017.

• The 2017 club ironically may have featured players have simultaneous peak years, or at least peak role surges: Jimmy Nelson (now injured), Chase Anderson (now mechanically repaired?), Orlando Arcia (needs to adjust), and Domingo Santana (needs to adjust) were worth 15.1 WARP in 2017, a production level that will almost certainly not return in 2018 (they are currently valued at -0.7 WARP [!!!]). The Brewers are never guaranteed to have that combination of elite defense, strong offensive production, and top rotation pitching again from this quartet, not in the same year. Even if each of these players settles into regular MLB roles, they may have reached peak production last year.

• (A counterargument could be made that given the Brewers’ production of Lorenzo Cain, Christian Yelich, Travis Shaw, Josh Hader, and Jeremy Jeffress, the 2018 window features at least five performances that may not occur again. I believe these roles are different than those of Nelson and Anderson, or even Arcia and Santana. Yelich, Cain, and even Jeffress have more established MLB success, and their time horizons with the club arguable improve the chances that this type of success could occur again. In fact, someone like Yelich could even improve. One could also argue that the Brewers should not waste this opportunity to win with an elite bullpen; I am much more sympathetic to that position.)

• So, it’s worth questioning whether more urgency for a roster-improving transaction was necessary in 2017 than 2018, when the club is already succeeding and can take a chance at continuing the development cycle with each of these players, or other organizational depth roles.

• Following the spatial definition of rebuilding, in which a rebuilding club is one that allows players the room to develop at the MLB level regardless of consequence, 2018 could serve as a strange competitive window season in which the club is justified in turning their gaze to the long-term: how important is it for the 2019, 2020, 2021 Brewers, etc., for Arcia and Santana to get right at the MLB level? Can they both be “rehabbed” at Triple-A Colorado Springs? Is it worth Milwaukee disrupting potential MLB rotational introductions to their trio of Woodruff, Peralta, and Burnes? If those pitchers have true MLB rotation roles, they are going to have to be introduced to the staff at some point during this current five-year contending window.

What is exciting about these Brewers, more than the winning, is that they remain an unexpected work in progress where suddenly every strength gained from 2015-2017, every lesson learned from 2015-2017, can be repurposed for the future. Contending teams need not stick to rigid transactional regimes; they can make trades to gamble on Travis Shaw, or free agency signings to gamble on Eric Thames, and still compete for the playoffs. Rebuilding teams need not bottom out, for there can be as much value in simply using roster space to gamble on Jonathan Villar, Junior Guerra, or Manny Pina, even compared to a top draft pick (for it is questionable whether an MLB team can truly forge useful developmental spaces while attempting to field a roster worthy of the first two or three draft picks).

Boiling this lesson down, it may seem like a radical departure from my previous criticisms, but the logic of the 2018 roster remains the same: open those developmental spaces for the organizational players struggling to correct their careers and build roles for 2019 and onward while this well-designed #TeamDepth contends onward. If they execute it correctly, these Brewers have an opportunity to exist entirely outside of win-now and rebuilding cycles.

Photo Credit: Bill Streicher, USA Today Sports Images

When I profiled free agents to begin the season, Lorenzo Cain graded as the best available position player free agent with a $71.5M three-year depreciated surplus. Given that the Brewers landed Cain for $80 million over five years, the Cain deal grades as close to an absolute steal. Cain’s surplus grades out to approximately $120.0M over five years, which means that at a $16.0M/year rate the Brewers basically received two free years on Cain’s deal. Basically, Cain should be able to deliver value on this contract in nearly every scenario short of catastrophic injury.

Contrary to the common line that the Brewers basically acquired Cain for market value, it is arguable that the club attained the center fielder’s services for quite a valuable deal.

What is thrilling about the Yelich deal is that it is not a steal. It is not a value move. The Brewers exhausted the full value of Yelich by trading three of their top six prospects. However, this is not problematic because Yelich’s surplus value is almost comical; he’s a young, budding superstar who has already proven a floor somewhere between 2.5 WARP and 5.0 WARP as he enters his prime age seasons. Tracking surplus value is important here because one can use the idea of organizational surplus value to assess when and how a team is extracting wins from their players.

Surplus Value Pricing
Refining WARP & OFP Pricing
Translating OFP
OFP and Minor League Pay
Revisiting the CC Sabathia Trade
Cashing Out OFP 2
Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades
Historical WARP and OFP

Had the Brewers kept Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto, they would have indeed retained those prospects’ surplus value (defined here by their potential MLB ceilings, or Overall Future Potential (OFP), and their risk floor) while also carrying all of the risk of developing them year-to-year. This development risk was especially present with Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto, who are a couple of professional levels away from the MLB, but it was also somewhat present in Brinson’s profile should the center fielder never adjust his hit tool to MLB pitching. An elite fielding, speedy center fielder with some power but contact issues at the plate is not a bad MLB profile, but it’s not a superstar profile.

I began tracking Brewers surplus value during the club’s rebuild as a way to understand the success of a rebuild. What I found problematic about analyzing a rebuilding club was determining when and how a rebuilding team would achieve success. Since a rebuilding team is by definition “cashing out” its potential to win ballgames far down the road, there must be interim metrics used to judge a front office’s success. I use surplus value to assess MLB players by judging “production” (how well a player plays) and “scarcity” (how the player’s contract is structured) to express Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) in monetary terms. Since risk can be priced, prospect OFP can be assessed in monetary terms as well, either by assessing the scarcity of certain grades and profiles or by historically analyzing production by prospect classes. By using these methods, MLB players and prospects can be evaluated on the same terms, which is a necessary task since MLB players are often traded for prospects; this method can also help one assess the success of a rebuild.

While there will be issues with designing any surplus value system for assessing MLB players and prospects, I maintain that working toward such a pricing system is necessary because MLB teams trade prospects for MLB players all the time.

The trouble with a player like Christian Yelich is that because he is cost-controlled by a $50 million contract (plus an option), his top surplus grade is extremely high. Over the course of the remaining five-years, extrapolating Yelich’s best WARP (5.3) yields potential production value worth $185.5M; even harshly depreciating Yelich’s 2015-2017 production yields potential value worth $93.1M. The reason Yelich’s surplus value runs so high, however, is that Yelich can also be graded by the cost of his contract against his production value; with $58.3M remaining over five years (if the Brewers exercise Yelich’s option), Yelich’s contractual surplus is at least $34.8M, and could be as high as $127.2M should his superstar potential continue to materialize.

Simply stated, Yelich is an absurdly valuable MLB player; he’s about as valuable as it gets. What is fascinating about Yelich’s value is that one would expect that he is nearly untradeable because of his value. Basically, there is no single prospect who will ever be worth Yelich, and this is why the Marlins’ reported demand of Braves prospect Ronald Acuna (arguably the very top prospect in the game) was not ridiculous or even audacious. Thus, it should make sense that the Brewers traded three high-ceiling prospects and one intriguing pitching flyer for Yelich: where one prospect cannot exhaust the value of an MLB player, many prospects must be used to form a transaction worth completing.

Using historical OFP pricing, one can see that a prospect package of Brinson, Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto very nearly exhausts Yelich’s highest surplus pricing. This is not necessarily a problem, given that Yelich is such a valuable player one should not have (reasonably) expected anything lower. For example, once the Miami Marlins reached their threshold to fund their 2018 payroll, they could demand pure talent in return for Yelich, rather than talent and payroll relief. The “lowest” possible deal for Yelich, which would have priced the left fielder at his depreciated value over four years, would have roughly required Brinson and Diaz in return; but once the Marlins were able to demand talent alone, that type of price would not have been attainable by Milwaukee. Given that the Brewers had a deep farm system, especially at center field, the Brewers front office correctly ascertained that the Marlins would be pricing out Yelich at his highest possible value. With both Yelich and Lorenzo Cain sliding into outfield slots for five years, many have noted that the actual prospect hit is lessened for Milwaukee.

Of course, it must be stated that a player’s MLB potential ceiling is a dynamic phenomenon, and OFP only measures a player at one static point in time. Take Isan Diaz, for example; the second base prospect attained a higher OFP ranking entering the 2017 season, and a rough injury-riddled year dented that a bit. Jordan Yamamoto is almost impossible to price, as scouts that like the righty have recognized potential areas for the youngster to succeed as a rotation arm, but his development profile still carries a high amount of risk to reach that level. It is plausible that the Marlins priced out Diaz at a range potentially higher than the OFP published above, simply because his full prospect profile suggests that Diaz can once again reach that higher ceiling should he mend a few weaknesses as he reaches the advanced minors.

From the Brewers’ perspective, the front office surrendered much potential starpower, but they transferred all of the development risk to the Marlins. It should not be assumed that any of these prospects will be the same player in both locations: perhaps Lewis Brinson receives advice on a mechanical adjustment in Miami that the Brewers Player Development would have overlooked; perhaps each of these prospects receives enough time to adjust at the MLB level in the pressure-free environment of Miami, whereas a contending Milwaukee club may have had less patience for shortcomings at the MLB level.

Additionally, trading Brinson and Diaz essentially “completes” the Jean Segura deal, and realigns the Jonathan Lucroy deal. When I last checked in, the Segura trade remained Stearns’s worst deal (in terms of assessing day-of and post hoc surplus value), while the Lucroy deal remained his best.

Now these deals look like this:

It is nearly impossible to effectively apportion surplus from a four-player trade package across two previous trades, but the basic story is that Stearns has improved his trading record. By extending Chase Anderson and trading away Isan Diaz and Aaron Hill, Stearns has basically completed the Segura deal. In terms of the original Lucroy deal, the remaining player development task is Luis Ortiz, although the young righty is also prime trade potential due to his current innings pitched ceiling and flyball profile (36 percent groundball rate in 2017).

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

It is time to win. It is time to win now, it is time to win next year, and the year after that, and after those years, too. This is a thrilling feeling as a Brewers fan, especially as one who came of age as an everyday fan during the initial Doug Melvin rebuild. I gather this feeling is difficult for a fanbase that is so used to losing and disappointment so as to design defensive personalities toward the idea of going for it this year. But that’s over now: There’s never next year, not for the next five, and this completely reorients the Brewers organization. With Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto each head to Miami, clearing out three of the top ten spots (and two of the top three spots on the Baseball Prospectus 2018 Top 10). But that’s okay, take your pick: does RHP Freddy Peralta re-enter the top ten? 3B Lucas Erceg? C Mario Feliciano? RHP Marcos Diplan? OF Tristen Lutz? IF Mauricio Dubon? These are all prospects that did not reach the Baseball Prospectus Top 10 that still have Overall Future Potential (OFP) that are somewhere between “useful” and “interesting” MLB potential, and each has something to prove in 2018 (and more space within which to do so).

There will be more time to digest and analyze these moves, but now the Brewers faithful have immediately turned toward trading Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, and/or Keon Broxton. I am not simply playing the contrarian when I emphasize that the Brewers do not need to make such a move. First and foremost, each of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton remain under club reserve beyond the Ryan Braun era in Milwaukee, which means that the club can still play the long game with each of these players. It gets a little more difficult after Broxton will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2018, and Brett Phillips will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2019 (Brewerfan.net, 40-Man Roster).

But, the Brewers have a unique position of strength: first, they began a rest campaign for Ryan Braun in 2017, and there is no reason that the club cannot use a rest campaign for Lorenzo Cain as well. These players represent Milwaukee’s largest contracts, and the club has nothing to lose by remaining cautious with their health and playing time. By providing systematic rest to these veterans, the Brewers can gamble that these outfielders may be less susceptible to nagging injuries, and therefore maximize their potential production. It is worth it to Milwaukee to have the best possible versions of Cain and Braun available over the course of 162 and the playoffs. How can the club accomplish this and continue to win? By deploying some combination of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton between the bench and the minor leagues. Imagine these outfield sets:

Using a very basic assumption of four plate appearances per game for starters and one plate appearance for pinch hitters, these outfield schemes produce the following results:

This scenario obviously leans more on resting Braun than Cain, but more PA can be negotiated to maximize these scenarios. Phillips could serve as a defensive replacement for all three positions, and both Phillips and Santana could be used as late innings pinch hitters in various scenarios. Moreover, these scenarios are developed prior to considering injuries. Each of these players faces injury risks that could eat into playing time, which opens further opportunities for the next outfielder in line. If fans think about what it means to have an “analytic” front office, aggressive rest coupled with aggressive depth could be an important step in gaining an advantage over the 162 grind and the playoffs. In the World Series, after all, there will be a starting spot for three or four games for Braun, Cain, Yelich, and Santana; this is the type of long game that the Brewers can begin playing in rest strategies and roster building.

I am a proponent of the Brewers building the deepest team possible because the club needs every resource they can get in order to contend within their market. The club currently has enough cash to handle a signing of Cain and Yu Darvish or Jake Arrieta, so this is a real opportunity to build the best possible team for a half-decade span. At some point, trade returns for players like Santana, Phillips, and Broxton mean diminishing returns to the system. Neither Santana nor Broxton have enough of an MLB track record to yield impact prospect talent, and Phillips is in a strange in-between where he will neither be a likely trade destination for returning impact MLB talent or prospects. Holding steady with the outfield roster as is will work just fine; at worst, the club will run into a scenario in which players such as Hernan Perez, Stephen Vogt, Eric Sogard, or Jonathan Villar fail to make the MLB roster out of training camp. If that is the price to pay for significant outfield depth, that is a better price than to trade Santana, Phillips, or Broxton before necessary, and return a less attractive depth option at the first sight of injury or ineffectiveness during the season.

Photo Credit: Isaiah J. Downing, USAToday Sports Images

The Milwaukee Brewers are coming off an 86-win season and trying to add to that success. Despite what appears to be one of the most favorable free agent markets in recent history, David Stearns seems to be turning to the trade market for improvements. In this discounted market, Stearns would be mistaken going to the trade route rather than spending in free agency.

The Brewers are rumored to be in trade talks with the Miami Marlins for Christian Yelich.

<blockquote class=”twitter-tweet” data-lang=”en”><p lang=”en” dir=”ltr”>Source : Brewers have put together a trade offer &amp; have shown strong interest Marlins OF Christian Yelich. Other teams remain in the mix.</p>&mdash; Craig Mish (@CraigMish) <a href=”https://twitter.com/CraigMish/status/955907465538822144?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw”>January 23, 2018</a></blockquote> <script async src=”https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js” charset=”utf-8″></script>

Yelich is the most valuable piece on the trade market. He’s barely twenty-six-years-old, and under a $43.3 million contract through 2021 with a $15 million team option for 2022. He’s been worth 15.8 WARP in four-and-a-half major league seasons. Yelich is a borderline superstar on an extremely team-friendly contract.

Yelich’s talent level and contract situation not only makes him the most coveted piece on the trade market this offseason, but he’s also one of the most valuable assets in the league period. He’s going to garner a haul.

A trade for Yelich like starts with one of the Brewers young outfielders, Domingo Santana or Lewis Brinson, both of which are under favorable contract situations of their own. Santana or Brinson alone won’t be nearly enough to acquire Yelich. A hypothetical trade will likely cost one of the two outfielders and probably two of the Brewers top ten prospects or one of their top three prospects. Yelich’s age, skill, and contract allow the Marlins to ask for the world.

The Brewers have one of the strongest farm systems in the league, which is one of the reasons they are in on players such as Yelich and Chris Archer. Rather than blowing up the farm system Stearns has spent the past few seasons building, he has the option of going to the free agent market to find outfield and pitching improvements.

The Brewers ended the last two seasons with the lowest payroll in the league after finishing with the 15th highest payroll in 2014, according to Cots Baseball Contracts. In other words, the organization should have money to spend.

The front office should be looking to add pieces to this young core coming up through the system, not shedding pieces to add talent. Especially when assets on the free agent market are to be had.

If the Brewers are set on improving center field, they should look no further than Lorenzo Cain. Cain is much older, not as talented, and would likely cost a bit more financially than Yelich. However, the veteran Cain wouldn’t cost anything in prospect loss, save a compensatory pick in this years draft. The Brewers could then use their deep outfield to trade for rotation or relief help.

There are plenty of options on the free agent market for Stearns to add to the starting rotation. Yu Darvish, Jake Arrieta, Lance Lynn, and Alex Cobb are just a few names who have yet to find a home. In Darvish’s case, he wouldn’t cost a compensation pick. The Brewers should be doing everything they can to add pitching in this market while they are still available. If all else fails and the team is desperate for pitching, then turn to the trade market.

There’s no reason to ruin what the Brewers have going, as far as their farm system goes. A farm system is something to build around. The Chicago Cubs won their first championship in 108 years by building and holding onto a strong farm system, and then adding veteran talent around them, most through free agency. The Brewers should be looking to go the same route, particularly in this team-friendly free agent market.

Although it’s tempting to jump the gun and acquire an Archer or Yelich, especially when you have the assets to make that possible, it’d be ideal for the Brewers to hold onto their prospects, stay out of the trade market, and build around their young prospects rather than using them as trade assets.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USAToday Sports Images

Related Reading:
Do the Brewers Need to Trade?
Roster Surplus and Depth Questions

In fact, one potential demonstration of a 40-man roster entering 2019 offseason shows how prospects can be accommodated and protected from the Rule 5 draft. In this scenario, I left someone like RHP Carlos Herrera unprotected under the assumption that the young prospect will still be in A-ball (likely Carolina) for 2019, making his scenario a potential repeat of the Miguel Diaz non-protect by Stearns. Players like RHP Corbin Burnes and 2B Keston Hiura do not make an appearance on this roster because they do not need to be protected after the 2018 season, and I am not making any assumptions about MLB ascension; this is an exercise in organizational necessity as connected to prospect protection.

On the face of it, this is not a bad roster. However, once one views this strategy of protecting prospects, and valuing their protection over potential trades, another set of questions arise. Most importantly, is this type of roster actually moving the club forward? Should this club enter 2019, there would be many question marks about the development of players from Orlando Arcia and Josh Hader to Lewis Brinson and Brandon Woodruff. This type of roster would absolutely heighten the “role risk” faced by each developing player. Additionally, one could challenge whether or not this type of roster strategy adequately capitalizes on the great steps forward in 2017, as the added focus on rostering Monte Harrison, Josh Pennington, and Luis Ortiz, among others, behind the likes of Brinson, Hader, and Woodruff undoubtedly pushes the Brewers’ likely competitive window into the 2020s. If players like Brinson or Brett Phillips will need a couple of years to develop at the MLB level, the same may be said for the next line of prospects as well. This puts a premium on developing players at the MLB level, which raises questions about whether the Brewers can consistently sustain a develop-and-compete strategy. One could argue that the club adequately demonstrated this ability in 2017, although it bears repeating that the front office failed to maximize resources to reach the playoffs in that case (even though the development aspect of the roster was largely a success).

Moreover, after 2018, rostering another set of prospects heightens the role risk of that group of players. Below, here is an example of some of the risks one can expect from this group of players:

The trouble with the current Brewers farm system is that even if there are potential impact roles under club control (such as Monte Harrison’s star centerfielder potential, or Luis Ortiz’s mid-rotation+ potential), there is considerable risk for reaching these roles at the MLB level (Harrison remains a raw prospect who has the same type of hit tool questions of Lewis Brinson; Ortiz has significant workload risk that impacts the quality rotation ceiling). Remaining arms in the system also exhibit rotation risk, from Nathan Kirby’s injury history to repertoire concerns from Cody Ponce and Freddy Peralta to Josh Pennington and Trey Supak.

In many cases, the roles that Brewers fans are dreaming on will indeed be impeded by risk. So the question becomes not whether the Brewers must trade these players (they don’t have to), either to win-now or to avoid a roster crunch, but whether the 40-man roster can bear the level of risk presented by these prospects. The risks associated with developing these players from advanced minors roles to MLB roles must be heavily weighed against the risks associated with trading these prospects. I do not believe that this conversation occurs in earnest among Brewers fans and analysts. The assumption is always that if the Brewers trade Brinson or Harrison, they are trading a star centerfielder; but, should the Brewers trade these types of players, they are also trading the risks associated with developing those roles at the MLB level (including adjustments necessary to address those risks).

Drawn from this particular 40-man roster, and the acceleration of potential roles and risks associated with those roles from the minor league to MLB scale, one must understand that relying on internal prospects to develop the next Brewers contender is as “all-in” a strategy as trading away prospects to acquire MLB contracts. A middle ground includes some of these prospects on the big league club, say one of Brinson or Harrison, and a trade involving the other; the same can be said of Corbin Burnes and Freddy Peralta, Josh Pennington and Trey Supak, and so on down the minor league ladder. The ability of the Brewers front office to develop the next contending club will rest with their diversification of risk throughout the MLB club and 40-man roster: there is no silver bullet for winning, not even one that involves hanging on to each and every high ceiling prospect in the system. Will David Stearns learn from midseason 2017, and become shrewd enough to find the proper balance of risk types and roster roles?

Stearns has already spoken this offseason about how the way the core group of players gelled and succeeded together allows the org to “accelerate the timeline” of competing. The GM has indicated that the focus this offseason will be improving the Major League club, whereas building the farm system was the main focus of Stearns’s first two winters at the helm. This is an exciting time to be a Brewers’ fan, as the team has resources aplenty in terms of both payroll space and prospect capital to work with while searching for upgrades.

Starting pitching depth is said to be the main point of emphasis for the Brewers this winter, and it’s easy to see why. With Jimmy Nelson set to miss significant time in 2018 after shoulder surgery (and his return to 2017 form in question), Chase Anderson and Zach Davies represent the only proven starters on hand. The team needs innings, and Brewers have already been linked to names like Jake Arrieta and Lance Lynn in the early going this winter. Stearns has been quick to downplay those rumors, as he is with just about any transaction his team is rumored to be considering, but he has acknowledged that he and his team have had exploratory free agent and trade discussions. He has also discussed how as a small market team, it is difficult for the Brewers to build their team through free agency and make significant commitments to players over the age of 30. The goal, once again, is to “acquire, develop, and retain young talent.”

With that in mind, it may not be surprising then to see the Brewers turn to the trade market in search of addition arms to fortify their pitching staff for 2018. While Dan Straily and Jake Odorizzi are two players who figure to be available that could be of interest, there have also been rumblings about more premium arms like 29 year old Chris Archer and 26 year old Marcus Stroman potentially being available in the right deal. Acquiring one of those frontline caliber starters will require giving up quite a nifty package of players, but the Brewers have the prospects to entice other organizations and the depth in their farm system such that brokering a deal for a multiyear asset like Archer or Stroman won’t “mortgage the future.”

If Stearns and company do decide to turn their attention towards the trade market, there are a couple of prospects within the system that it may be wise to try and build a deal around. The first is Monte Harrison. Harrison was finally able to stay healthy for a full season for the first time in his career and posted a breakout year across the Class A and Class-A Advanced levels – a .306 TAv, 21 home runs, and 27 steals in 513 plate appearances between the two stops. Evaluators have been drooling over the tools he was finally able to display, and he garnered praise as a true “five-tool talent” with a 70 OFP – future All-Star caliber center fielder in BP’s recent top prospects update for the Brewers.

Though Harrison may very well have a bright future ahead of him, he’s has yet to reach the AA level and is a few years away from making an impact at the Major League level. There are also questions that could limit his ceiling, namely the rawness of his baseball skills and the utility of his hit tool. Reports indicate that his swing-and-miss tendencies were trending in the right direction by season’s end, but he whiffed 139 times in 122 games in 2017, a rate of more than 27 percent of his plate appearances. Without further adjustments, that rate figures to only increase as Harrison continues to climb the ladder to face (and potentially be exploited by) more advanced pitching. There’s also the obvious questions about his durability, as well, after he missed significant chunks of time in 2015 and 2016.

The other player is right-hander Corbin Burnes. The former 4th-rounder won Milwaukee’s minor league pitcher of the year after tossing 145.2 innings with an astonishing 1.67 ERA in 2017, compiling 140 strikeouts against just 36 walks between Class-A Advanced and Double-A this past season. His DRA- at the lower level was 40 and it was 56 after his promotion, further exhibiting the dominance that he displayed over his minor league competition in 2017.

Burnes came in at #4 on Milwaukee’s updated top prospect list and certainly has an enticing profile. Namely, the righty has the ideal build (6’3″, 205 lbs) and advanced command of four solid pitches. The stuff doesn’t quite match up with the dominating results he posted in 2017, though. Corbin Burnes doesn’t appear to be the “future ace” that fans are always pining for. His changeup needs some work to reach an average grade and his curveball is inconsistent will likely settle in as a below-average offering. At present he lacks a true plus offering, which will make it difficult for him to consistently miss bats at the big league level. Craig Goldstein noted that without some further growth, the ultimate package is probably “an inconsistent back-end starter, or a candidate to shift to the bullpen and focus on his heater and best secondary.”

The Brewers have a plethora of young, advanced outfield depth (Domingo Santana, Keon Broxton, Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, Troy Stokes) as well as right-handed pitchers (Brandon Woodruff, Freddy Peralta, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Cody Ponce, Jon Perrin, Aaron Wilkerson), which helps make the idea of a trade more palatable. Monte Harrison and Corbin Burnes both enjoyed excellent performances in 2017 and scouts believe that they may eventually be destined for big things in the MLB. But there are reasons to be wary of each player’s continued development, and with Milwaukee shifting the focus towards winning at the big league level, now may be the ideal time to sell high on Harrison and Burnes if the right deal comes along and let another franchise worry about developing them. Certainly, if the Brewers are planning on playing that segment of the market it’s worth at least exploring if a package for an Archer or Stroman could be built around those two players rather than two would-be MLB contributors in 2018 like, say, Lewis Brinson and Brandon Woodruff.

Last year, the PTBNL bug also bit Brewers fans in the Jonathan Lucroy – Jeremy Jeffress deal, as fans allowed their imagination to run wild with apparently leaked scouting assignments of Texas Rangers prospects and dreams of landing another top prospect (the club landed useful outfield / utility depth in Ryan Cordell, who was shipped to the White Sox to acquire Anthony Swarzak). Obviously this time around Brewers fans are not dreaming of the top ten prospect that might head to the Mets, as almost everyone expects GM David Stearns to have landed the veteran Walker for next to nothing. This is a faulty expectation.

What complicates the deal is the fact that the Mets are sending an undisclosed amount of cash to the Brewers, which could sweeten the prospect return from Milwaukee. This is a logical assumption, as MLB teams frequently demonstrate that cash and prospects are transferable, and one can deduce that there is an exchange rate for prospects and cash within each front office. However, the haziness does not end here for two reasons: (1) Walker demonstrates wild discrepancies between past and present value, and (2) there is a perception that the trade market for position players is currently depressed.

First, consider point (1) with the assumption that the Mets covered approximately half of Walker’s contract in the trade. In the abstract, assessing Walker by considering WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player), cash, and Prospect Overall Future Potential (OFP) as interchangeable by monetizing each value yields several potential categories of value:

Already one should see that there is plenty of wiggle room for assessing Stearns in this trade. While fans know a name like Mauricio Dubon and would feel upset to see the young infielder leave the Brewers system, such a trade would match the high end of Walker’s value (plus cash). A more interesting idea is seeing an injured prospect head out of Milwaukee’s system, which could perhaps explain the time lag necessary to call the return a “Player To Be Named Later,” as scouting the progress of an injury return prospect could make all the difference in determining the deal. A hurler such as Nathan Kirby could fulfill the top end of this deal, and would be an interesting case of transferring extreme injury risk out of the system in a gamble for immediate wins. Should Milwaukee reach the League Divisional Series in the playoffs, this deal would be immediately paid off. Obviously, fans dream of sending nobody important to New York, but that’s not how trades work.

To this last point, (2) is worth further investigating. While front offices do not use WARP to calculate trades, I use a WARP / OFP / cash model to easily allow various areas of the game to speak to one another in order to determine value for an organization. This can also be a useful scale to view trades en masse; for example, let’s look at a few key trades from the 2017 deadline and August waiver trade period. In this table, I also added a Playoff Assessment to the trade, where potential advances in playoff revenue are considered as trade motivation as well (see additional table below, and linked article).

Once one gets past the initial fact that the biggest trade returns indeed occurred when pitchers were grouped with position players, there are some solid deals in this group of position player transactions. While fans might find easy excuses to write off a prospect like Boog Powell, given Yonder Alonso’s track record that’s quite a solid return for a rental. Sean Rodriguez and Jonathan Lucroy deals represent the Hail Mary attempts by the Pirates and Rockies, respectively, and neither team will be expected to face playoff pressure for either deal (rather, both deals are clearly supplemental). The Tim Beckham and Jay Bruce deals might be the most interesting, as the Rays and Mets respectively gambled on extremely inexperienced arms with unknown potential. Yet, draft day assessments and initial prospect reports could allow both those prospect packages to be viewed as intriguing projection gambles, and the Bruce deal especially could look like a brilliant move by the Mets in five years.

This prospect return landscape does not provide much help to determining the gray areas of which type of prospect might leave the Brewers system. The Bruce deal hints that someone like Carlos Herrera or Trey Supak could be the one to leave; the Alonso deal could support sending anyone from Dubon to an Advanced Minors outfield depth option. Walker’s value is most comparable to both Bruce and Alonso, and both of those deals showcase scenarios in which the trading club received solid or intriguing prospect returms. What this chart should hopefully show is that position players have not necessarily been undervalued; rather, the position players reflected here represent relatively spotty production records, which impacts that type of prospect one should expect to be involved in those deals. But, even with that caveat in mind, the prospects involved in these deals were solidly priced overall.

With this in mind, Brewers fans should be ready for Stearns to continue to deal from prospect depth, as this is the true benefit of having this type of system in Milwaukee. There will be prospects who, as much as we love to follow them as fans, will be used to attempt to maximize immediate MLB wins for the franchise. Should a prospect that seems rich for your blood end up in the Neil Walker deal, remember that not only does this price probably suit the current trade environment, but it also helps attain the goal of winning MLB games. Even better, the Brewers are winning MLB games and expending prospect resources sooner than expected, which are both facts that should be celebrated.

Appendix: Playoff and Prospect Conversion Chart:

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