Yet, for all its logic (if you’re not going to contend, you might as well lose and sign a lot of talent in the next draft), this rebuilding argument paints over the relative lack of productivity teams gain through the draft. It also glosses over the extent to which most drafted talent does not make the MLB with their original club, and the extent to which many of the drafted, developed “organizational players” that do reach the MLB and stay with their original club are typically replacement players (rather than stars). For every Clayton Kershaw or Evan Longoria, there are throngs of Chris Marrero, Ryan Adams, Alex Sanabia, Chris Petit, Nick Buss, Tobi Stoner, Brett Sinkbeil: the “September call-up” is a more common “organizational draft outcome” than the superstar. If this seems self-explanatory (because, duh, there are very few superstars), it deserves investigation as clubs embark on purposefully noncompetitive seasons to ostensibly gain the benefits of the draft. My survey in this post focuses on one draft (2006), and serves as one addition to a set of recent BPMilwaukee features on the draft and rebuilding.

Related Content:
The Draft is Only a Tool in the Rebuilding Process
The Lessons of the Astros’ 2016 Backslide
The Macro Draft

Brewers fans are especially vulnerable to this type of logic after the much-maligned drafting record produced by Jack Zduriencik and Bruce Seid from approximately 2006-2010. While some of those drafts have highlights like Seid’s unbelievable 2009 depth (saving that draft entirely), or Zduriencik’s pieces to the CC Sabathia, Shaun Marcum, and Zack Greinke trades, they are largely void of contending organizational depth. As a result, the Brewers arguably had less ease in reaching for stopgaps, bench players, and other useful fill-ins during their serious contending attempts from 2011-2015. A common refrain among the fans is that the bigtime trades ruined the Brewers’ farm systems, but the simple fact is that the Sabathia / Greinke / Marcum moves were great transactions that lacked significant MLB impact from a series of drafts.

This general point should not be construed as an argument that each Brewers draft during this five year stretch was bad; the verdict remains “out” on the 2010 draft, and the exceptional depth of the 2009 draft class produced median value for the Brewers. It’s simply an acknowledgment that the timing of trades and organizational development from these drafts did not produce a regular contender; sometimes players need to develop with a different organization (see Lawrie & Odorizzi, for example); and, even roster core stars at key positions (like Lucroy) are not always enough to contend regularly.

Fans that are yearning for a better draft return from that era can begin with the 2006 draft, which is conveniently a decade past and (also conveniently) a fascinating demonstration of the MLB draft’s strengths and weaknesses. The 2006 draft produced Kershaw and Longoria, two elite players that epitomize the dreams of organizational anchors and stars produced from that amateur talent pool. However, those superstars overshadow the fact that of the approximately 220 players that made the MLB in that draft pool, nearly 170 left their original organization in some way, shape, or form; the teams’ margins for error were further reduced due to the fact that approximately 20 percent of those MLB players were not even signed from the 2006 draft. This chart highlights the basic draft outcomes by including:

• Players that remained with their original club through free agency or their final MLB game.
• Players that were traded at any point by their original club (here a trade as a prospect is equal to a midseason trade from an MLB roster, for classification purposes).
• Players that were lost through many means (unsigned from the draft, lost via waivers, rule 5 draft, MiLB free agency, release, etc.)
• General player value produced by those that remained with their original club (or produced prior to leaving via trade. I did not include waived / released, etc., players here, because those players had negligible value stats as a rule).

All stats compiled Thursday and Friday, May 19-20.

Milwaukee’s draft exemplifies the difficulties of returning a shallow talent pool, but the club also represents one of the best trades produced from the 2006 draft. Incidentally, the Greinke trade lineage continues in Milwaukee, first through Jean Segura’s time in the organization, and now through Aaron Hill and Chase Anderson (and eventually, potentially, Isan Diaz). It’s obviously difficult to fully categorize the value of many trades for the reason that some trades “keep going” by beginning a string of transactions and multifaceted acquisitions (such as the MLB-established Anderson and Hill, alongside the highly touted prospect Diaz). However, considering the outcome of the Greinke trade should at least be evidence enough that measuring on-the-field, organizational value from the 2006 Brewers draft is difficult and incomplete.

Notably, the teams that produced the most valuable on-the-field, organizational production from the 2006 draft show that there is no correct way to maximize draft value. My favorite illustrations: the Yankees established a substantial back-end bullpen; the Rays produced members of a positional core; the Dodgers landed one of the greatest pitchers in baseball history; the Cardinals employed members of a Championship core before shrewdly trading them away; and, the Athletics traded two pitchers at the (arguable) peak of their value. Each of these teams supplies lessons for the Brewers: assess and keep the very best talent from a draft class, but don’t rule out trading a player while they’re valuable, and don’t necessarily rule out relievers as a source of value (among other lessons).

The list of organizational players supports arguments in trading draftees, rather than relying solely on developing MLB mainstays. More than 40 percent of these organizational players served only one or two years with a club, and nearly 60 precent never reached 100 games played with their original organization, which shows that over several seasons, these players were largely relegated to depth roles:

While not all of the trades resulting from 2006 draftees were productive, many of the ’06 class served as foundational or supplemental parts of some of the recent MLB blockbusters. Along with Greinke, the 2006 draft class was involved in trades for Jake Arrieta (Steve Clevenger), Manny Ramirez (Bryan Morris), Wandy Rodriguez (Rudy Owens), and a substantial percentage of the contending Phillies rotation (Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay, and Joe Blanton, thanks in part to Jason Donald, Kyle Drabek, and Adrian Cardenas). Other trades involving the 2006 draft class netted Felipe Lopez to the Brewers, Dee Gordon to the Marlins, Johan Santana to the Mets, Josh Hamilton and Geovany Soto to the Rangers, and Damaso Marte and Xavier Nady to the Yankees (among others still). Teams should not shy away from using drafted talent to acquire valuable big leaguers or supplant contending aspirations.

Incidentally, the players lost by their parent organizations serve some crucial lessons about marginal roster value, as well. While many of these players may be regarded as “replacements” at best, there are several players that produced depth value after their parent club exposed them to waivers, released them, or allowed them to walk via Minor League free agency:

These moves, taken as a whole, signify the element of timing that lurks behind player development and roster building. Even where draft picks work out (each of these players are MLBers, even if they are marginal value players), an organization may not be able to coax their best value on the field, or translate perceived value into a trade. As a result, one may scrutinize the draft-oriented focus of tanking as a misguided understanding of “getting the time right;” there is no guarantee that an organization will develop the right players from the right rebuilding draft at the right time, just as there is no guarantee that a team looking to contend will get that same development equation correct (cf. 2012-2015 Brewers). While tanking to get a larger draft bonus pool, one must question whether a team is missing other opportunities to acquire talent with the players they have currently developed (even marginal roster depth).

A simple corollary question can summarize this meandering stroll through the 2006 draft: which current Brewers prospects and organizational depth players can Milwaukee trade to maximize their value? Which is to say, if hardly 25 percent of any given draft will stay with the organization, who are the stars that the Brewers absolutely must keep from their 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 drafts? Who are the players that the Brewers can employ and trade at peak value? By addressing these questions, one can engage in counterbuilding, or the act of strategizing roster acquisitions that are apparently contrary to a team’s given aims (such as acquiring MLB talent by trading prospects during a supposed-rebuilding year). The basic point is that an organization should not ever enter into a one-dimensional roster-building phase such as a tank or win-now extreme — or, if they do, they had better tread carefully and get their timing right.

Milwaukee can use 2016 to work with players like Jonathan Villar, Chris Carter, Kirk Nieuwenhuis, Chase Anderson, and others still, to define and refine the roster depth necessary for contending in the very near future. While they align these players within the organization, they can begin to play some of their best prospects at the MLB level, hastening and emboldening the next step of sifting those talent to keep as contributors, or trade for better MLB players. In an environment where several National League teams are already trending downward into basement-level tanking, such a contrarian roster building strategy could provide the perfect opportunity to contend much faster than anyone currently expects.

The Brewers will have the benefit of a high pick in the 2016 draft, and they should at least draft within the Top 10 of the 2017 draft as well. With these facts in mind, the front office can maximize a contrarian position regarding current draftees and organizational depth: as Milwaukee’s farm system ascends to the top of the league, it is time to use that depth to begin supplanting and improving the MLB roster via trades, alongside the hopeful stars that the organization will decide to keep. This is no small decision, as the Brewers cannot use a large TV revenue wallet to cover-up their mistakes as easily as other MLB clubs. It is also a matter of timing the moves right, which is why the Brewers should not waste time on a multi-season rebuilding campaign. A non-competitive 2017 MLB season is as much of a waste for the Brewers as making a mistaken trade.

For demonstration, take Bruce Seid’s 2009 draft, which was driven (according to popular arguments) either by great late round value or astonishing early round missteps. Any way one slices it, Seid ended up with three 2.5+ WARP players (“Fastballer” Mike Fiers, “Khrush” Davis, and Scooter “Scoots McGee” Gennett. Incidentally three of my favorite Brewers). That former GM Doug Melvin was unable to transform the 2013-2015 Brewers into strikingly consistent contenders with this supporting cast is less an indictment of these players than an indictment of the front office’s miscalculations (or failures of imagination) during those years. Complain all you like about the early round failures, that’s an astonishingly good draft (interestingly enough, the draft return will be even better once one incorporates the trade returns for deals involving Fiers and Davis, respectively).

Alternately, take Scoots McGee’s predecessor, Rickie Weeks, arguably one of the greatest Brewers of all time and (probably quite easily) the organization’s best second baseman. One of the commonly cited “Core Players” drafted by Jack Zduriencik, Weeks easily lands among the top third of MLB players from the 2003 First Round. The median player from that round (according to bWAR) was outfielder Mitch Maier (1.5 career WARP accumulated from 2006-2012). Of course, by now everyone knows that Weeks’s career was derailed by misguided prospect hype, which unfortunately makes the Brewers’ franchise second baseman a “bust” in many fans’ eyes. Nevermind that he’s nearly 12x more valuable than the median player drafted in the 2003 First Round; one of the very best players drafted in 2003 overall; or a better-than-median overall 2nd pick in the history of the draft: Many Brewers fans prefer to side with hype over their beloved power/speed franchise second baseman.

These drafts are merely two organizational examples of the extremes that populate draft analysis. One of the basic reasons that these types of analytical and narrative shortcomings exist is that fans and analysts alike “dismiss” as a truism the fact that the striking majority of players in every draft will never make the MLB: such a fact is taken to be so clearly true on the surface that its impact is not seriously considered.

To counter this analytical blindspot, one can simply look at the median player value for each round in each draft. For this exercise, I wanted to focus on drafts that are mostly “finished,” since more recent drafts would require judging players by value metrics, organizational depth charts, and prospect rankings. By beginning a decade out (with the fantastic 2006 draft), one can find a rather clear model for how player talent may populate the rounds of an MLB draft. To construct the chart below, I began in 1999 and stopped at 2008, since I understand that even aspects of the 2009 draft remain unsettled (take Davis, Gennett, and Fiers, for instance: their careers still hang in the balance, so it’s not really safe to say that their overall value can reasonably be measured).

The spoiler alert is that due to the overwhelming or daunting fact that most drafted players simply fail to reach the MLB, by the third round of the draft the solidly median player value is “Did Not Reach MLB” (DNRM for short). One should not necessarily dismiss this as nonsense, as one must consider that teams are still (mostly) drafting within the Top 100 in the third round. So, if a team is drafting median talent that fails to reach the MLB as early as the first, second, or third round, one can use that metric to evaluate draft day approaches, expectations, risk assessment and management, bonus assessment and analysis, player profiles, hype, etc. (that’s for another day). The purpose of this chart is to simply begin the analysis, starting with the first five rounds:

In the most straightforward terms, this chart means that for the first five rounds, at least 16 players (per round) fail to make the MLB.

Incidentally, the importance of the first round should not be understated: in recent drafts, it is likely that somewhere around 20 percent of all MLB players from a given draft will reside within the first round of that given draft. So, in this sense one can weigh first round misses much more heavily than others, since that is the most likely spot to find an MLB’er (like Rickie Weeks, even, as noted above).

This lends some credence to criticisms of Seid’s early drafts, although one still must deal with the pushback from that excellent late round value (some teams failed to land 10.0+ WARP in the entire 2009 draft, let alone after the fifth round, which should increase the considered value of Davis, Fiers, and Gennett). Successful depth drafting places Seid’s efforts in the top half of MLB draft value in 2009.

One should also note how the increase in supplemental first round picks (and therefore overall first round picks) spiked the MLB player totals (especially in the 2005, 2007, and 2008 drafts). It stands to reason that the basic institutional fact of higher draft bonuses in the first round accounts for those steep MLB player totals; judging by the sheer number of replacement level players available in the first round, one might question whether an 11th or 15th or 20th round organizational player would have an equal shot at reaching the MLB as replacement depth if their bonuses were as high as first rounders. Even a replacement player bumps a club’s first round efforts into “successfully produced an MLB,” which must be a much more favorable return on investment in the eyes of that organization.

Who are these median players? For fun, let’s highlight the best median talent from the first through fifth rounds of the 1999-2008 MLB drafts:

Building a narrative and analysis of the draft, one can take two steps.

• First, one must heavily weigh the “DNRM” reality and build a comprehensive analysis of scouting profiles, player backgrounds, player competitive levels, pre-draft hype, and various aspects of organizational ideologies (mechanical & statistical analytical tools, risk assessment, bonus pool strategies, etc.). There is one sense in which all players that fail to reach the MLB are equal, but the institutional factors of signing bonuses and scarcity of elite talent render first round failures more problematic than, say, 20th round failures.
• Second, one can mine the profiles, backgrounds, hype, and organizational ideologies involving successful “median” drafted players as well, in order to effectively recognize additional replacement talent within any given system, and ultimately build an effective account of how talent is dispersed throughout a draft. In this sense, the profiles of “median” first or second round players (like Eddie Kunz or James Darnell) can potentially serve as guideposts to other replacements or depth talent within an organization.

Of course, one might eventually opt to celebrate the careers of the likes of Josh Banks or John Mayberry, etc., in order to further appreciate the weight of reaching the MLB. Even at the margins of the draft, there is talent that can help an organization in some regard. Should organizations wish to push ahead with current cost-cutting measures, thereby enhancing and maintaining their revenue shares, and extract ultimate value from the draft, they may find valuable lessons by wading through the draft median and DNRM.

Earlier this season, the Brewers relieved Ron Roenicke of his managerial duties. He had skippered the club since 2011, which saw him lead the Brewers into the postseason. In his place, the organization installed lifer Craig Counsell with a three-year contract and have since publicly backed him for the 2016 season and beyond.

These moves form what we now see as a series of significant changes — though they tragically began towards the end of the 2014 season. Long-time Brewers scouting director Bruce Seid passed away in September. Ray Montgomery, a former scout with Milwaukee, replaced him and headed what has been viewed as a successful 2015 draft.

With all of these changes, we are undoubtedly entering a new era of Brewers baseball.  This movement, at least for now, will be focused on the future of the team. However, with so much happening in the last eleven months, I want to look backward. I specifically thought it insightful to look back at the drafts Bruce Seid oversaw.

The Brewers appointed Seid as scouting director on November 11, 2008 — which means his first draft came in the summer of 2009. His final one was the 2014 draft. That provides a window of six drafts on which to focus. Obviously, the more recent drafts will be harder to evaluate. Most prospects take several years to work their way though the minors, and until they’ve had a chance to do that, it’s difficult to determine if a particular draft was successful.

Notable Names From 2009: RHP Eric Arnett (1st rd), OF Khris Davis (7th rd), SS Scooter Gennett (16th rd), RHP Tyler Cravy (17th rd), RHP Mike Fiers (22nd round)

The top of this draft has proven to be an absolute disaster. Of the thirteen picks the Brewers had in the first ten rounds, only two players remain in the organization and only Khris Davis has had an impact on the major-league roster. However, he is not the only member of this draft to reach the majors. Before being traded to Houston in June, Mike Fiers had been with the big-league club in some capacity since 2012. Scooter Gennett is the starting second baseman. He’s struggling this year, but has shown an ability to hit right-handed pitching in the past. Tyler Cravy has surpassed expectations and pitched in the majors.

The results are mixed. It’s painful to have so many picks in the top-ten rounds but only have one of them pan out. However, walking away from a draft with two starting position players and one starting pitcher with the chance of a second is actually quite good.

Notable Names From 2010: RHP Dylan Covey (1st rd), RHP Jimmy Nelson (2nd rd), RHP Tyler Thornburg (3rd rd), SS Yadiel Rivera (9th rd), 1B Jason Rogers (32nd rd)

Dylan Covey is the only first-round pick during Bruce Seid’s tenure not to sign. During his routine medical exam, it was discovered that he had Type-1 diabetes. Upon learning this, the right-hander understandably chose to stay near family and pitch at the University of San Diego in order to best learn how to manage his condition. Fortunately for Covey, it seems he has been successful in that, as he was later drafted by the Oakland Athletics, where still pitches.

The Brewers hit on their next selection in the draft, right-hander Jimmy Nelson. For most of his minor-league career, Nelson was something of an unheralded prospect. It wasn’t until the winter before the 2014 season that he finally made a Top-100 list, ranking 83rd. By July, he had rocketed to 38th on Baseball America’s mid-season list. This year, he has been the Brewers’ best starting pitcher and looks to be on the verge of taking another step forward.

An elbow injury has derailed Tyler Thornburg’s career. At one time, it seemed possible that he could stick in the rotation; however, the bullpen now seems more likely. Jason Rogers has made appearances with the major-league club, where he currently is. He hit all through the minors, but his likely role is a platoon or bench bat. Yadiel Rivera is an electric defender in the middle of the infield but has never hit much. If he can crack a major-league roster, it will likely be as nothing more than a utility infielder.

Again, these are mixed results. Fans cannot hold the Dylan Covey situation against the Brewers and Bruce Seid. And while Jimmy Nelson has the upside of a No. 2 starter, he appears to be the only starting-caliber player the Brewers drafted in 2010.

Notable Names From 2011: RHP Taylor Jungmann (1st rd), LHP Jed Bradley (1st rd), RHP Jorge Lopez (2nd rd), 1B Nick Ramirez (4th rd), OF Michael Reed (5th rd), RHP David Goforth (7th rd), LHP Mike Strong (10th rd)

Now we’re delving into territory where it’s hard to judge the draft. Taylor Jungmann and David Goforth have made their major-league debuts this year, but the book is very much out on them. The rest of the listed players could make their big-league debuts next year. Little is known about what role they could play or how good they could be.

Taylor Jungmann is a great example of this. Being their first pick in what was thought to be a stacked draft, expectations for him were likely set too high. I think fans expected an ace when he should’ve been viewed as a mid-rotation type. One thing upon which we can agree is that it took longer for him to reach the majors than expected. But he’s there now and looks like the mid-rotation starter it was hoped he would become.

Right-hander Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, was expected to take longer. He is currently enjoying an excellent season in Double-A Biloxi and looks like he might be taking a step forward in his development as a pitcher. He’s another guy that has mid-rotation potential.

If anyone in this group looks as if he could blow away the projections, it’s Michael Reed. He’s unlikely to be a superstar, but he’s gone from a relatively unknown prospect to potential starting right fielder. Squint a little bit and one can see a Nori Aoki-esque outfielder. That’s pretty good for a fifth-round pick

The feelings one has about this draft depend on how one evaluates players. If one looks at pure value, this draft stacks up pretty well. The team might have a pair of mid-rotation-caliber pitchers and a starting right fielder to go along with some bench players and relievers. If one puts it in context of a draft that had guys like Jose Fernandez and Sonny Gray available, then one probably thinks the return is a little light. I think that simplifies things a little too much, however, and relies too heavily on hindsight.

Notable Names From 2012: C Clint Coulter (1st rd), OF Victor Roache (1st rd), OF Mitch Haniger (comp rd), OF Tyrone Taylor (2nd rd), RHP Tyler Wagner (4th rd), RHP Damien Magnifico (5th rd), LHP Anthony Banda (10th rd)

This draft is very interesting. As yet, it’s impossible to accurately judge because none of these players have had a chance to play at the major-league level. Wagner made a spot start, but he is probably another year away from being ready. Also, two of these players have been traded.

Mitch Haniger and Anthony Banda were sent to the Diamondbacks for Gerardo Parra, who was in turn sent to the Orioles this year for Zach Davies. How does one factor that into the evaluation of this draft? I’m not sure. It’s hard to judge Haniger and Banda’s season, as they’re with a different club being coached and developed by different people.

Of the remaining group, Clint Coulter, Tyrone Taylor, and Ty Wagner stand above the rest. Coulter has been moved out from behind the plate to right field, but his bat looks like it can play there. Tyrone Taylor came into this season as the Brewers second-best prospect. Though his bat has stagnated, he’s young and projects to adroitly handle center field. Ty Wagner has done nothing except compile solid numbers in the minors and looks like he could stick in a major-league rotation as a back-end option.

Victor Roache has perhaps re-emerged as a legitimate prospect this year by mashing the ball at High-A and Double-A. Questions still remain about how his bat will play at the major-league level, though, and he’s limited defensively. There is a lot of power in that bat, so if he really has figured something out, it stands to reason that he could be a solid corner outfielder.

A lot of people can’t get over the fact that the Brewers passed on Joey Gallo. But many teams did. There could also be factors behind the scenes about which we’re ignorant. One thing we do know is that Gallo signed for over $2 million which is much more than the Brewers spent on any single player in that draft. The Brewers probably just couldn’t afford Gallo.

The overall draft looks solid. With a fair amount of luck, the Brewers gave themselves the chance for a complete outfield (LF- Roache, CF-Taylor, RF-Coulter). They also got a solid starting-pitching prospect and had assets leftover to acquire Gerardo Parra.

Notable Names From 2013: RHP Devin Williams (2nd rd), SS Tucker Neuhaus (competitive-balance rd), RHP Taylor Williams (4th rd), OF Omar Garcia (7th rd), OF Brandon Diaz (8th rd), LHP Hobbs Johnson (14th rd), 1B David Denson (15th rd)

Bruce Seid was hamstrung with this draft. The Brewers signed Kyle Lohse over the winter, and because of the new free-agent-compensation rules, the Brewers forfeited their first-round pick. While that hurt, most experts seemed to agree that the Brewers did well to grab Devin Williams at 54th-overall. He has arguably the highest ceiling of any pitcher in the Brewers organization. However, he’s pitching for Low-A Wisconsin and likely won’t make his major-league debut until 2018 at the earliest.

Taylor Williams looked like he was going to make some waves this season, but unfortunately suffered an elbow injury. They tried rehab. Ultimately, he underwent or will undergo Tommy John surgery this week. It’s probable that he will miss all of next season, which is a huge blow after missing all of this year.

The leftovers in this group project as role players, at best. Hobbs Johnson could succeed as a back-end starter or swingman. If David Denson can figure out how to hit, he has the kind of power profile you want to see in a starting first baseman. Omar Garcia and Brandon Diaz are both speedy outfielders who have likely ceilings of a fourth outfielder. Tucker Neuhaus is gifted defensively at third base but hasn’t quite figured out how to hit. He is still young, though.

At this point, I’m not comfortable making any kind of judgement on this draft. The players are too far off, and there were extenuating circumstances — namely, the fact that Bruce Seid didn’t get a first-round draft pick.

Notable Names From 2014: LHP Kodi Medeiros (1st rd), SS Jacob Gatewood (competitive-balance rd), OF Monte Harrison (2nd rd), RHP Cy Sneed (3rd rd), OF Troy Stokes (4th rd), RHP David Burkhalter (6th rd), RHP Javier Salas (10th rd), RHP Jordan Yamamoto (12th rd)

This would end up being Bruce Seid’s final draft. Like 2013’s draft, it’s far too early to proclaim it a success or not. The early returns, however, are encouraging.

Most viewed Kodi Medeiros to be a reach. He has a slight build and unorthodox mechanics. This led many to peg him as a future reliever. The Brewers gave him an aggressive assignment this year to Low-A Wisconsin, instead of another season in rookie ball. Unlike his other draftees that were given the same assignment, Medeiros performed well enough to stay. It’s encouraging for several reasons, but it could also speed up his major-league debut by a year which is significant.

Monte Harrison was one of the players, along with Gatewood and Medeiros, to be assigned to Wisconsin. The position players struggled and wound up being demoted to Helena to work on things. That’s what Harrison seemed to be doing (.299/.410/.474) before suffering a broken ankle. He’s expected to make a full recovery in time for spring training next year. Entering the season, he had the highest ceiling of the Brewers’ outfield prospects and little has happened to change that view (outside of the additions of Trent Clark and Brett Phillips).

Cy Sneed is looking like he might be the sleeper in this group. Drafted out of Dallas Baptist, he’s on a more accelerated path through the minors. He started the year in Low-A Wisconsin but received a mid-season promotion to High-A Brevard County. He has pitched well at both levels and appears that he may have the stuff to remain in a major-league rotation.

*****

It’s hard to judge a draft. What is the criteria for success? Is it a success if you get one or two major-league regulars? If so, then the 2009 draft must be considered a success, despite the top of the draft not producing any major-league players.

Do you have to hold it in context of the total level of talent available that year? Because the 2011 might then not be considered a success. It looks like several major-league players will emerge from the draft. But that was a tremendous year for talent and the Brewers probably only got average to slightly above average major-league regulars instead of All-Star-caliber players.

How do you account for players traded? How much credit does Bruce Seid and the scouting department have to share with the player development staff when guys like Khris Davis, Mike Fiers, and Michael Reed surpass expectations? How do you account for injuries and the randomness of the universe? I don’t know the answer to all of these questions.

I do know that Bruce Seid did give the Brewers several major-league regulars over his six-year stint as scouting director. He also gave them some pretty high-ceiling talent in recent drafts. The dividends of those recent drafts won’t be seen for years to come, and I think a lot of people are going to overlook Seid’s contribution because of it.

The Brewers’ farm system is probably going to rank somewhere in the top half in offseason rankings. Not a small portion of that is due to a successful first draft for Ray Montgomery in addition to an active trade deadline. But a large portion of that is also due to the contributions of Bruce Seid.