Baseball Prospectus 2015 Astros Top 10 prospect rankings largely support the reaction of the time, in which Phillips was the “get” of the trade, Santana was a quality, workable advanced prospect, and Hader and Houser both served as equal parts risk-and-reward (albeit due to completely different profiles). It’s worth remembering what type of prospect Hader was when the Brewers acquired the potential fireballing lefty, so I’m quoting in full:

“The long and lanky lefty enjoyed a season to build upon with High-A Lancaster, working with an upper-80s to low-90s fastball with lots of dance out of a tough low three-quarters slot. He can reach as his as 95 mph and could sit closer to that mark in shorter bursts should he wind up in the pen as some evaluators suggest. His slider is a second potential above-average offering that can make lefty bats highly uncomfortable due to the angle of approach. His change is a third usable weapon, though both it and the slider regularly play fringe average or below, as Hader is still working to find a consistent release that allows him to work the totality of the zone with each. He’ll need more precision in execution to continue his run of success against stiffer Texas League competition, and could find a home as a useful lefty relief arm should he prove incapable of turning over upper-level lineups with his fastball-heavy approach.”

Of course, time is equal parts blessing and curse for player development, and in this case the Brewers used varying approaches with each player. Santana had already reached the MLB with the Astros, and the Brewers front office almost immediately caused the trade to pay dividends by recalling the right-handed batting outfielder on August 21, 2015. Santana showed it all within his first two weeks, belting four homers and two doubles while batting .216 and striking out 12 times in 43 PA. The Brewers gave the outfielder time in center field as well as his more common corner spot, potentially testing the waters for a high-power fourth outfield role if the regular right field spot did not work. Santana finished his 2015 Milwaukee campaign with modest success in 38 games, boasting a .299 True Average (TAv) and -4.8 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA). Adrian Houser joined Santana at the MLB level as a September call-up, immediately compounding the *reality* of this trade, or the sense that this trade could be of real impact for the Brewers.

Using depreciated surplus analysis, here’s how the trade looked on the “day-of.” (The TL;DR is that this analysis essentially monetizes Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) and Overall Future Potential (OFP), while also considering contract cost and reserve time, to compare prospects and MLB players of varying service time. It is a Benefit-Cost Analysis. More here if you’re interested):

In hind sight, over the course of three prospect cycles (pre-2016, 2017, 2018) and two full seasons, it is easy to view the Gomez-Fiers trade as a complete, smashing success for the Brewers. And the trade was indeed successful; on the day of the trade, the Brewers essentially “extracted” one additional potential MLB average player ($19.5 million) from the Astros, meaning that the trade could certainly be viewed as fair for both the Astros and the Brewers, with the Astros potentially surrendering a bit more than one would normally like for a super star CF and playoff race rotation help. The trade almost certainly was a huge success for the Astros in terms of revenue, as Carlos Gomez smashed the game-winning home run in the American League Wild Card in 2015, ensuring that Houston entered a longer series and had a chance at more playoff coin. I left this out of my analysis, but it is worth separately considering organizational trade incentive.

The last two trade check-ins published midseason 2016 and 2017 are worth publishing once again, just to show the ridiculous swing in surplus value:

So, why the retrospective? Well, frankly, it appears that the trade has already been promptly rewritten as highway robbery after the collapse of Carlos Gomez in Houston, and now the MLB ascent and success of Josh Hader, as well as many of the criticisms of the Brewers’ deep offseason outfield acquisitions, appears to color the value of the trade once more. Now, the Brewers apparently have a potential top rotation starter in Josh Hader, and a superstar right fielder in Domingo Santana…which is great to dream about, but misses the fun and importance of the Gomez-Fiers trade.

The Gomez-Fiers trade was a strong deal for Milwaukee on day one, but it was also a weird deal, and it’s worth exploring that a bit more. Entering 2018, the Brewers had a lot of value extracted from the Gomez-Fiers trade. Josh Hader lost his breaking ball and experiencing some mechanical / approach hiccups in Triple-A Colorado Springs, so his development continued at the MLB level. The twirling fastballer hardly hiccuped from his first June appearance onward, working seven scoreless outings before allowing his first run. Of course, the command was not yet there, as Hader also allowed eight walks to six strike outs over 9.3 IP; compare that to Hader’s current 22 strike out / three walk line over 9.7 IP to start 2018. Anyway, Hader established himself as a curious role player, almost instantly proving to serve as an MLB relief chameleon a la Andrew Miller, but without any of the 96 G / 66 GS / 359.3 IP of trial and error, 5.79 ERA baseball over three teams that actually defined Andrew Miller’s ascent to one of the greatest and most interesting relief aces in the game. For the honest developmental reason that Hader could not start, and that the lefty was re-establishing his stuff, delivery, and command, the Brewers’ young southpaw got to fast forward past the ugly stuff and reach his 2017 Baseball Prospectus realistic role: high leverage relief. This is different than his 2015 prospect role, but it’s not bad; it’s simply more in focus.

As an aside, why should Hader be more than this? Of course the funky lefty everyone loves to cite for Hader’s fantastical upside is Chris Sale, an ace that surprised scouting profiles in some cases. But this is a moment worth instructing on player comparisons: Hader is not Chris Sale. Chris Sale was a 13th overall college pick by the White Sox (2010), a pick who was already working in the MLB during the same year that he was drafted; Hader was a 19th round pick who required two trades and nearly five-and-a-half seasons of development to reach the MLB. Sale was age-23 by the time the White Sox transitioned the one-time oddball reliever to the starting rotation; Josh Hader is in his age-24 season right now. Sale is listed at 6’6″ and threw between 96 and 98 MPH with a primary sinking-running fastball as a reliever; Hader is listed at 6’4″ and throws between 92 and 95 MPH with a primary rising fastball as a reliever. Josh Hader is not Chris Sale and should not be compared to Chris Sale; we have data available to make better comparisons, so make better comparisons. Anyway, Hader is already proving to have potential as a strangely role-flexible, elite quality MLB reliever. Don’t get greedy!

If Hader’s success was at the MLB level as a budding relief ace with extremely flexible roles, Brett Phillips opened 2018 as (presumably) the last Gomez-Fiers player on a Top 10 list. Baseball Prospectus ranked Phillips fifth in the Brewers system, and a couple years of struggle, redemption, and a smashing 2017 MLB debut placed the left-handed batting outfielder’s role in focus. Read this beautiful prose, as not many prospect list roles are so clear:

“OFP 60—First division center fielder carried by his glove and pop
Likely 50—Average outfielder whose secondary skills prop up low averages”

It does not get much better than that. So, Phillips is where he is, another so-called casualty of the Brewers’ #TeamDepth, but in a sense the age-24 outfielder is exactly where his scouting role should place him on a competitive MLB team: Phillips is going to be an indispensable depth player for the Brewers, offering a fantastic glove and arm that keep him in the MLB while the potential promise of power at the plate sorts itself out. This is different than his 2015 prospect role, but it’s not bad; it’s simply more in focus.

Domingo Santana is having a bit of a “ho hum” start to the 2018 campaign, which is not a bad thing. In fact, it’s nearly worth a sigh of relief to see the right fielder opening the year with a .283 batting average and 10 percent walk rate (entering play Sunday), driving a powerless TAv of .273 (not bad!). I know there are a ton of Brewers fans who just want Santana to be a superstar, to break out from the 2017 campaign that saw 3.3 WARP on the strength of a full season of improved plate discipline, .306 TAv, and -7.6 FRAA. It’s tough to say this in the right voice, that’s not a knock on Santana, but Santana need not be a superstar…Santana is a good MLB player. It’s okay to stop there; the OFP 50 / realistic 40 grade RF has already produced nearly 5.0 WARP for the Brewers over portions of four seasons. In fact, I dare say that this is his 2015 prospect role, with the swing and approach concerns ironed out. The Brewers may have picked up Domingo Santana they had hoped to acquire.

Watching Adrian Houser throw 95-to-96 MPH rising and running fastballs during his 2.0 IP relief outing against the Cubs was a wondrous occasion. The big righty (listed 6’4″, 235 lb) threw that heat with ease, and also sprinkled in both of his off speed offerings (a change and curve). There were rumblings in spring that the Brewers hope to stretch Houser into a starter, which was somewhat surprising given the righty’s return from Tommy John surgery and the club’s handling of Taylor Williams (another TJ-returnee). But, every injury case is different, and every rehab case is different, so the Houser that the Brewers picked up in the 2015 trade may now turn in to something that Brewers fans never could have expected: a central player in a pitching staff that is built around depth and aggressive use of a bullpen (Brewers fans literally could not have imagined a quality depth-based rotation rounded out with Wade Miley, Corbin Burnes, Freddy Peralta, and Houser in July 2015, but here we are). In this context, gambling on a potential back-end starter that has already reached the MLB and demonstrated some stuff that could play looks like quite an interesting bet (at least) for the Brewers runs prevention chances. Houser will not be flashy, but he’s here. His injury may change the risk profile, meaning that he’s not the prospect he was in 2015, which isn’t bad; it’s simply more in focus.

Several aspects of player development and strategic assessment make the Gomez-Fiers trade great.

• First and foremost, as I’ve written before and is always worth emphasizing, Doug Melvin did well to acquire mostly advanced prospects who had fairly well-defined scouting roles on the day of the trade. This trade was not as huge a gamble as it could have been.

• Second, the Brewers quickly advanced players when they needed to be advanced, and allowed players with shortcomings to develop at the MLB level.
  • Santana had nothing left to prove in Triple-A, even with strike zone contact questions that were very well known prior to the trade. It was up to the Brewers to help Santana develop that hit tool and iron out that approach at the MLB level.
  • Hader falls into this camp as well; imagine if the Brewers had demoted Hader to Double-A Biloxi last year, as an answer to altitude and as a chance to get the lefty back on track to becoming a starting pitching prospect. Imagine Hader working in Biloxi as a starter throughout the season, getting that command and delivery back while he re-established his breaking ball. That could have happened; see Jorge Lopez and Taylor Jungmann, for example. Instead, David Stearns correctly assessed a need on the MLB club, and correctly assessed Hader’s strength (delivery deception and advanced fastball) and wagered that the southpaw could answer his development questions at the MLB level. These are huge player development successes for Melvin and Stearns, and if you don’t believe it, again, imagine Hader opening the 2018 season as a starting pitching prospect in Triple-A once more, perhaps this time to add innings after he found his secondary stuff in Biloxi.

• Third, the Brewers adroitly took it slow when they needed to, working Adrian Houser all the way back from a Tommy John surgery and returning Brett Phillips to Double-A Biloxi for 2016 despite his shredding the league in 98 age-21 plate appearances. In case Phillips feels like an “old” prospect, remember that he’s still just in his age-24 season in a league with an average age nearly three years older (AAA), while serving as MLB depth. Houser is in his age-25 season serving as MLB depth. Time remains with this trade.

• Finally, with nearly three full years of assessment due on this trade, it is worth emphasizing that this trade is a smashing success despite only one of the prospects truly reaching their day-of ceiling (Santana), while others forged interesting new role questions (Hader), or at the very least solidified the value of usable MLB floors (Houser, Phillips). This is exactly the type of trade that Brewers fans and analysts can study in order to think through the varying degrees of prospect risk, and the types of roles that a prospect can demonstrate (or, the spectrum that even one single role could include). A trade does not need to include top of the rotation starters, superstar right fielders, and flashy everyday defense-first center fielders in order to become a smashing success. Sometimes reaching the MLB is enough, for good player development at that level ensures that some prospect questions can be answered with exclamation points, even without bona fide stardom.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

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Here, following the offseason treatment, I am including major deals from July 2015 (the arguable start of “Rebuilding”) through the present day, meaning that these moves are not entirely Stearns’s trades. Indeed, the Zach Davies / Gerardo Parra trade and the Carlos Gomez & Mike Fiers return remain two reasons that the Brewers did not need to “tank” and design a “scorched earth” rebuild that completely reconstructed the organization. Coupled with draft signings by the late Bruce Seid (such as Jacob Barnes and [soon] Brandon Woodruff), as well as graduated top prospects like Orlando Arcia, and superstar Ryan Braun, the “rebuilding” Brewers have remained competitive due to several different talent streams entering, remaining, and graduating through the system.

Trade Surplus Depreciated WARP & OFP Summary:

As a reminder, I will be following the historical model of Overall Future Potential (OFP) production drawn from the history of MLB performances. Scaled for prospect risk, here’s how those prospect levels can be valuated, with 50 OFP being an “average” MLB player:

Last check-in, here’s how the Brewers’ trades looked. Given Zach Davies’s quick ascent to the MLB, I forgot to add him in this list, so his trade will be featured below.

Following this set of deals, it should be interesting to note that while the Brewers system prospects have had ups and downs, the players traded away have exhibited true depreciation within one year. This should demonstrate one benefit of using a depreciation model to assess future player value, which is the model I have been working with throughout the offseason; players do depreciate in terms of production. Jonathan Lucroy, Jeremy Jeffress, Gerardo Parra, Carlos Gomez, Mike Fiers, Adam Lind, and Jason Rogers all demonstrate this, and it should be noted they demonstrate this without completely crashing their value in the meantime (especially in the case of Lucroy). Khris Davis is perhaps the worst counterexample, as Stearns almost certainly sold low on the slugger, who also deserves credit for making adjustments and shifting his approach in Oakland.

A few quick notes:

• The Lucroy-Jeffress and Gomez-Fiers deals shifted value for completely different reasons. The former relies fully (thus far) on problematic performances by the players the Brewers traded away, while the latter is improving in value both due to struggles by Gomez and Fiers and improvements by Domingo Santana. The Gomez-Fiers deal remains one of the strongest deals to build the Brewers system, even with Josh Hader’s recent struggles, and Brett Phillips’s graduation solidifies at least the 45 OFP grade (which is not nothing), while the ceiling remains to be seen.

• Hidden in the middle of this table is the Francisco Rodriguez trade, which was one of Stearns’s worst trades on the day it occurred. But thankfully, trades are not solely graded on the day-of, and post hoc analysis loves Manny Pina’s development into (at least) a split time catcher at the MLB level. K-Rod has not been terrible, for what it’s worth, but when that contract winds down to its last year the surplus value really depends on short-term production rather than longterm outlook. This hurts the K-Rod score as much as it hurts Lucroy’s assessment in Texas.

• Let it be stated that the Khris Davis trade return was solid (if not spectacular) on the day-of. But it’s great to be reminded that prospect stock can depreciate, too. Fortunately, scouting reports suggest that Jacob Nottingham can remain behind the plate, answering one previous question. But if that power (and bat) does not come around, it may not matter as much; it is getting more appropriate to highlight, say, the 40-45 end of Nottingham’s grade (still means he reaches the MLB) than the 55 end that helped him reach Oakland’s Top 10. Of course, remember that Manny Pina was probably a 40-45 grade minor leaguer when Milwaukee acquired him, so…you know the rest.

• I believe there could be some reason to reassess prospects like Freddy Peralta or Ryan Cordell, who I would rate as valuable depth options for the system. However, for the purposes of this exercise, there is not necessarily enough non-statistical information to fully develop a new scouting grade. So perhaps a few prospects in this table deserve an asterisk next to their grade.

Turning from the “earlier” trades to the 2017 offseason, one can see how Stearns developed the surprising 2017 contender. It is interesting to note that for the offseason coverage of the club, so many of us (myself included) completely failed to properly price the GM’s immediate value for these trades.

For example, Mauricio Dubon was never (and probably will not be) the prime value of the Thornburg deal. What makes the Thornburg deal so amazing is that, given Thornburg’s career development, a straight-up Dubon-for-Thornburg deal would have been solid. Yet, Stearns did not stop there; the GM managed to return not just Dubon, but also a legitimate MLB asset in Travis Shaw, as well as two total lottery tickets (exemplified in Yusion Coca, the Player-To-Be-Named-Later who completed this deal). This trade should continue to “give” to the organization, whether it is in the form of Josh Pennington or Coco being included in a future trade (they are sufficiently far from the MLB to be traded once more), or Dubon working in a utility role or second-tier MLB starting role.

A quick word: These numbers are indeed abstract! The Brewers claim approximately $472.2 million in depreciated surplus value from these trades, which roughly translates to 67 WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player) within the system. These 67 WARP could be maximized and turned into 87 market-rate WARP, they could remain steady over time, or they could further depreciate to 49 WARP. These figures are abstract, of course, because they incorporate risk into the system, and can be cashed out any which way; if Stearns cashes out 87 WARP within the next two years, the Brewers will have quite a competitive team; if these players remain merely competitive or decline further, it will be questioned whether more trades were necessary. The players could continue to depreciate, and many could fail to reach the MLB (if they are prospects). Stearns can cash out surplus through trades or development. So these numbers should not necessarily be interpreted to apply to any timeframe; that’s up to the GM to determine.

Since I’ve already focused specifically on the Jett Bandy-Martin Maldonado deal recently, I will not dive deeper into that deal except to emphasize the importance of post hoc trade analysis. Returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is not simply “using hindsight,” but rather healthy Benefit-Cost Analysis. Moreover, returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is an opportunity to potentially sharpen those analytical tools in order to provide better day-of trade analysis. But of course, the Bandy trade is not yet complete, nor are most of these deals, really. So, by returning to these trades with analytical methods over time, one can come to understand organizational value as a malleable entity that is never truly solidified at one point in time. This is arguably yet another reason to oppose “rebuilding,” or to opposing “winning now,” or any extreme organizational strategy; it is also possible to never build an organization, or to build an organization through contrarian means (as Stearns is doing). There should be no reason for an MLB club to fail to simultaneously build for the present and future, save for a lack of creativity.

After one year, this trade raises many question marks. Granted, there’s still quite a lot of value present in the trade, both in terms of future rotation potential (or trade value) for Houston (with Fiers), and trade, controllable contracts, and hopefully potential performance for the Brewers quartet. Still, even raising these types of vacant hopeful pleasantries does not substitute the fact that one year out, what looked like a blockbuster for both sides is creeping toward a somewhat value-neutral non-event. If there’s any lesson to be drawn from this trade, however, it is that the perception of a trade can change over time, and that a trade’s legacy is certainly not finished on its consummation day, nor one year later. In 2017, this trade might still have those value questions for Milwaukee, and even in 2018 or 2019; yet, it is somewhat absurd to suggest that analysts must wait five years to assess the total value of the trade. What is more interesting is to dig deeper into those years and understand how a trade’s legacy and change year-in and year-out.

I know no better trade with which to demonstrate this point than the Zack Greinke trade orchestrated between the Brewers and the Royals. It was commonplace during the 2014-2015 World Series appearances (and Championship) by the Royals to hear Brewers fans groaning about how former President Doug Melvin traded away Championship-caliber players, but it’s easy to forget that by opening day 2013, the quartet of youngsters traded to Kansas City had dwindled to two roster spots (Alcides Escobar and Lorenzo Cain) and a total of 3.1 WARP between the 2011-2012 seasons. Interestingly enough, Zack Greinke suffered his own surface stat nightmares in 2011, waddling through a productive WARP season while ranking fourth best in terms of runs prevention on a solid, consistent Division Championship rotation. Still, the trades for Shaun Marcum and Greinke were indeed vindicated by the Division Championship and League Championship Series run, which undoubtedly netted the Brewers significant playoff revenue shares, not to mention local merchandise.

Greinke netted a strong 8.67 WARP for the Brewers before the front office traded the righty away midseason 2012, understanding that the club would not be able to defend their NL Central crown. By the end of 2012, the trade looked like a rout — the Brewers netted 8.67 WARP, playoff revenue, and Jean Segura, while the Royals controlled the contracts for 3.1 WARP worth of production; about the only benefit Kansas City could claim were those reserve rights.

Using harsh 3-Year, 10-percent depreciation analysis, as with the other sections of the Grading Trades series, one can see that the prospective value of the Brewers prospects matched up quite well with the production value of Zack Greinke; various WARP or contract surplus estimates place the trade package within 80 percent of Greinke’s expected value, which seems quite good for estimating trade value.

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP in 2010; 0.14 3-Year Depreciation ($0.5M). Contract surplus: -$5.8M. 

***

Of course, Wade Davis and James Shields may have been more crucial to the Royals’ postseason success than Cain or Escobar (not to say they were unimportant), and both of those righties were traded in a package involving the Royals’ Jake Odorizzi. It is interesting that fans almost never mention that Doug Melvin traded away a depth prospect that allowed the Royals to land crucial Championship-drivers, instead focusing on the controllable Cain and Escobar. Trades are as important to building contenders as controlling players, and the Royals instantly turned around their fortunes even while making a trade that caused much head-scratching at the time (myself included). By 2013, the Zack Greinke traded proliferated to two other deals, as the Royals matched Brewers newcomer Segura with their own acquisition of key production assets.

The Jean Segura story has been told multiple times, and it may be worth revisiting it again a few years in the future. But here it is most interesting to point out that even if Segura had an up-and-down-and-out performance in Milwaukee, the shortstop may have helped to net one of the franchise’s new cornerstones. Isan Diaz, Aaron Hill, and Chase Anderson are the latest branches from the Greinke deal, with Wendell Rijo and Aaron Wilkerson added to the family by extension of the Aaron Hill deal. And so this trade moves on and on: with Diaz, the Brewers have another potentially elite trading chip, or a potential middle infield cornerstone if everything goes right.

It is nearly impossible to write these twists and turns into the Greinke trade saga. Kansas City drew 14+ WARP from James Shields and Wade Davis, although one gets the sense that WARP sells short the situational mastery of Davis. Milwaukee received more than 10 WARP of production from Jean Segura before netting a 50-60 grade surging prospect in Isan Diaz. These figures can be added to total production received by both clubs in the original Greinke deal. Of course, even Cain and Escobar famously overcame their 2011-2012 hiccups to bolster the Royals with valuable play during their contending seasons. Prorated to normalize six years of performance against Greinke’s year-and-four-months for Milwaukee, the production value of the original Greinke deal again appears quite evenly matched:

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP (2011); $5.5M contract surplus ($16.0M total annual value). NOTE: 6.6 FRAA in 2011 (!!!).

***

So, one can only imagine the twists and turns that the Gomez-Fiers trade will take in Milwaukee. One can extend this lesson to nearly every trade, in terms of understanding that the lineage of a trade can take winding manifestations that are never imagined at the time of that trade. It remains to be seen if Hader, Houser, Phillips, and Santana impact the next Brewers contender more via trade or their own performances, or a mix of both. If the first year is any lesson, it is worth expecting another strange twist in 2017.

“I think that people here, at least most of them, recognize there is at least a chance that today is my last home game as a Brewer,” Braun said in the wake of a 4-2 loss to the Reds. “I don’t think there is a great chance, but certainly a higher chance than at any point in the 10 years that I’ve spent here.”

Brewers fans have gotten awfully good at ovations like this over the last six years, dating back to the ovation fans gave Prince Fielder at the close of the 2010 season when it appeared all but certain Fielder would be dealt before he had the chance to test the free agent market the next season. We understand that the few established stars we’re lucky enough to watch in Milwaukee will be heading for greener pastures at some point. Fielder received another ovation during the 2011 NLCS, his actual last game as a Brewer. And this season, Jonathan Lucroy received an ovation before the trade deadline. If you were to point to any three Brewers who were the core of the club’s recent successes, it would be clearly be those three.

It’s unfortunate that this scenario keeps popping up, and that Brewers fans are so used to talented players leaving the city that we have this ritual already prepared. But it is wonderful to see the appreciation Brewers fans have for these stars, and it’s clear that the appreciation is reciprocated. All those players have in some form declared their love for Milwaukee’s fans, and I think it’s in no small part due to the consistent love we show for the players.

Jonathan Lucroy probably put it best after receiving his ovation this July. He told the AP:

“The fans here are awesome. They’ve always treated me great, and I’m very blessed to be able to grow up in front of fans like this. The fans have treated me really well. They have shown me nothing but love and respect — and that’s all you can ask out of your home fans. There are not a lot of home teams that can say that. We have fans here that love you no matter what. I can’t even remember the last time we were booed here — so it’s pretty impressive with our fan base how positive and loving they are.”

Carlos Gomez’s exit from the Brewers wasn’t quite as telegraphed, and there wasn’t an ovation for him before the trade deadline in 2015, as he still had some time remaining on his contract. But nonetheless, he expressed similar sentiments when he told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “”I have a lot of respect for this organization. They gave me the opportunity to be the way I am right now. And the fans are passionate and they are always there for you, when you’re good or you’re bad. I feel like I’m home.”

The fact that Brewers fans could help make Milwaukee, Wisconsin feel like home for Gomez, a native of the Dominican Republic, practically half a world away, is remarkable. It speaks to the power of a fanbase that can make its players feel loved and appreciated, and I hope the fans at Miller Park never lose that joy and respect for the players that make the ballpark worth coming to even when the club isn’t racking up wins like we would want.

As I’m sure you’ve been made aware at some point, the Houston Astros have placed Carlos Gomez on release waivers. Even if you haven’t heard yet, you probably could’ve guessed, seeing as the Astros designated him for assignment earlier in the week.

You guys know that Gomez was designated for assignment, right? I’ve heard his name connected to the Marlins:

#Marlins remain interested in Carlos Gomez, source says. He is scheduled to clear release waivers this weekend. @MLB

— Jon Morosi (@jonmorosi) August 19, 2016

I’ve also heard him connected to the Mets. I’m sure this will shock you, given the history at play here, but it seems like they’re waffling on whether or not they want to add Gomez:

Mets "Open" To Adding Carlos Gomez https://t.co/eoDy9uYcki pic.twitter.com/9v2VgkRAly

— MLB Trade Rumors (@mlbtraderumors) August 10, 2016

Mets Not Showing Interest In Carlos Gomez Trade https://t.co/G8Pu2j10NV pic.twitter.com/3pQZ6vdhNI

— MLB Trade Rumors (@mlbtraderumors) August 16, 2016

NEW: Carlos Gomez Officially Released by Astros, Marlins, Mets Interested https://t.co/XqnV3L8FoS

— RotoBaller (@RotoBaller) August 19, 2016

And if that wasn’t enough, a Brewer fan’s worst nightmare almost came to pass:

The Cardinals are looking into a trade for Carlos Gomez, according to a report https://t.co/zLlwrHJBPg pic.twitter.com/n6Be0UincH

— Sports Illustrated (@SInow) August 12, 2016

Granted, the latest reports are that the Cardinals are “out on Gomez.” But need I remind you that they were saying that about the Mets days ago, and now the Mets might be back in play? Or maybe not? It’s hard to keep abreast with all of this movement. But that brings me to my next point–where is the movement on the part of Milwaukee? Other than idle banter from non-team sources it’s been radio silence.

I shouldn’t need to “convince” you to take a flier on this guy. Just two years ago, he was a five-win player in this very ballpark. Sure, he’s been terrible since we traded him away–but isn’t there something to be said for the fact that he’s more or less pulled a skills-reversal with Jonathan Villar, who moved in the opposite direction? I’m not crazy to think that, of all the buy-low fliers this team has taken, Gomez brings the most upside and makes the most sense? But, alas, here we are. And since you guys seem extra lethargic–hung over from the trade deadline, perhaps?–I’m going to motivate you in the best way possible: through song.

He holds a special place in our hearts
And talk of bringin’ him back has got to start
The Cards might try for the same
And if he bounced back with them it would be so lame

But something’s bugging me
I’m far from cocky
‘Cause the Gomez rumors omit Milwaukee
Of his old self, they say he’s a shell
But that’s just a small sample size, bring him back, what the hell?!

Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
‘Cause we’ve had such good luck with former Astros
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
He’s gonna bounce back nice and crush the ball
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
It’s not like Nieuwenhuis’ numbers say “no”
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
Excite Milwaukee this fall
With catches at the wall!

The change of scenery made him a waste
But Houston dropped him with way too much haste
His bat’s been bad, and so has his glove,
But he still owns those skills you’ve got to love.

If he should rebound his best chance is here
Playing for the team that’s named after beer
It’s not like we don’t have the money to spend
To bring him back and play him ’til the season’s end!

Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
‘Cause we’ve had such good luck with former Astros
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
He’s gonna bounce back nice and crush the ball
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
It’s not like Nieuwenhuis’ numbers say no
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
Excite Milwaukee this fall
With catches at the wall!

(cue up the horn section, it’s time for the bridge!)

One bad year, and his stock is low
But he still owns great skills–that, we all know
If it helps, and I think this will
Just think of it like what we did with Aaron Hill!

Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
‘Cause we’ve had such good luck with former Astros
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
He’s gonna bounce back nice and crush the ball
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
It’s not like Nieuwenhuis’ numbers say no
Wake up Stearns, and bring back Go-Go
Excite Milwaukee this fall…

Related Reading:
The Almost-Trade of Carlos Gomez
Brett Phillips: Newest Future Brewer
An Ode to the Uniquely Bright Carlos Gomez
All-Aboard the Jungmann-Santana Express
The Player-Hader’s Ball

Keeping this in mind, it is worth looking at the development of each player involved in the Mets’ and Astros’ bids for Carlos Gomez in 2015. The Mets non-trade for Gomez gave fans a rare look into the different types of offers that front offices can field for a player (or set of players), highlighting the difficulty of determining the most valuable trade in an industry where value can move in many different directions. Yet if this lesson was instantly available in 2015, the trade also offers even more intriguing lessons one year later. Even if a team executes a solid trade, they may need patience to await results that match the expected value of that trade. With that in mind, it is worth analyzing the 2016 campaigns of the Gomez trades.

The Trade Assets
Both Carlos Gomez and Mike Fiers underscore the reality that established MLB players can also have rough years,and non-linear paths to success. In 2016, Fiers and Gomez are each having rough years for the Astros, although both for different reasons. Be it for injury (Gomez) or inconsistency (Fiers), the headliners of the Brewers’ biggest 2015 trade exemplify the struggles of the prospects and other players involved, for both the Mets and the new Brewers farmhands. Almost everyone involved in either version of the Gomez deal is worse off in 2016, which is a great opportunity to showcase the difficulties involved with player development.

For Gomez, the elite power/speed centerfielder is finally warming up after an injury-plagued early season. Gomez landed on the disabled list with a ribcage injury, although he was ailing prior to that, too. His .185 / .246 / .250 batting line entering June does not tell the full story for Gomez. Since returning, Gomez has flashed some of those tools that make him an elite threat, posting five homers and five stolen bases over his last 169 PA. However, Gomez is not otherwise hitting the ball, as the veteran is struggling with a .230 AVG and 47 strikeouts over that same time period. One can squint and see the old Gomez building back up, however, and as Gomez continues to get back into his groove, he can build on his power, speed, and walks.

Fiers has shifted his approach toward off-speed pitching in 2016, after earning his name as a one-of-a-kind fastballer. According to Brooks Baseball, Fiers selected his rising or cut fastball more than 65 percent of his 2015 pitches; that rate is down below 55 percent this year. In place of the rising and cut fastballs, Fiers has doubled his slider usage and significantly increased his change up selections. Almost across the board, Fiers is allowing more groundballs, line drives, and fly balls within in repertoire, in place of the whiffs he saw in 2015. It’s tough to pick a culprit for his increased home run rate, as his homers are up on the primary fastball, cutter, slider, and change. It’s not as though Fiers has been bad across the board, however, as the righty is managing to shift between quality and rough outings. His 5.05 DRA paces him approximately five runs below average for Minute Maid Park, which is still respectable for a back rotation profile.

The Mets Players

RHP Zack Wheeler
The New York Times published a detailed discussion of Zack Wheeler’s elbow surgery rehabilitation over the weekend. Wheeler was to be the prize of the Brewers / Mets version of the Gomez trade, a high-rotation potential that would be worth the injury risk and (hopefully) offering much more immediate value than a pitching prospect. Despite a March 2015 surgery date, Wheeler has yet to work in a game in the Mets system during 2016, and only has a few bullpen sessions to his name.

For that potential, one dreams on the running 95-96 MPH fastball and deep breaking pitch repertoire, which helped land Wheeler atop the stacked Mets organizational chart for Baseball Prospectus in 2013. Wheeler, once lauded as one of the best right-handed pitching prospects and a Top 5 overall prospect, now has the risk side of that gambling equation speak louder than the potential reward. Yet, the Mets eagerly await his return, as the righty could serve as a valuable stretch addition for an injury-plagued rotation if he returns to games in time.

• 2016 Impact: N/A (Yet to pitch).
• Future Impact: 3 years arbitration control; Role unknown

UTIL Wilmer Flores
In the middle of May, it looked like Wilmer Flores might join his teammate in the category of “Injured Potential.” The flexible infielder suffered a hamstring injury, and was batting .180 / .255 / .280 when he hit the DL. Since arriving from the disabled list, however, Flores has turned around his performance for the Mets while also serving a crucial role as a utility starting infielder. This rare role has produced a -2.5 FRAA, but one might place an asterisk next to that number to note the fielder’s positional flexibility.

At the plate, Flores is maintaining a strong contact and discipline profile since his injury. With 11 walks and 15 extra base hits (nine homers) in 145 plate appearances, Flores is further strengthening that .282 AVG. This stretch of improvement has resulted in Flores’s most valuable offensive season of his career with a .314 TAv. BaseballProspectus noted that Flores could have heavy pressure on his bat if he landed at 1B, but the 2013 #5 Mets prospect may now possess that elusive above average in-game power.

• 2016 Impact: 1.3 WARP (.314 TAv, -2.5 FRAA)
• Future Impact: 3 years arbitration control; power bat infielder/1B.

The Astros Return

RF Domingo Santana
The biggest contrast between the Mets and Astros package was the future-oriented aspect of the Houston offering (with much less immediate access to that potential). In the context of that package, Domingo Santana was the least risky trade return, in the sense that the powerful right fielder had already cracked the big leagues. However, the MLB future of Santana had many question marks, especially in terms of Santana’s contact within the strike zone. Upon entering Milwaukee’s batting order, Santana instantly won admirers with a .299 TAv and enough walks to offset those strike outs. Santana had nothing left to prove at AAA, so the Brewers traded established left fielder Khris Davis to Oakland to open a roster spot for Santana (thereby doubling down on organizational future potential).

Unfortunately, Santana has struggled with injuries throughout the bulk of the 2016 season. These struggles include a recent setback that truncated Santana’s rehab stint. On the field, the right fielder continued the extremely high walk and strike out profile at the plate, but lacked the home run punch in irregular playing time. Still, a .278 TAv is not dreadful, especially as one considers that the 23 year old’s longest stretch of uninterrupted starts yielded only 100 PA. One could be inclined to argue that Santana’s injury riddled season hurts the Brewers in the sense that Milwaukee still has to answer his question mark in 2017, but that’s hardly a complaint given Santana’s positive bursts since coming to Milwaukee.

• 2016 Impact: 0.5 WARP (missed 56 team games thus far)
• Future Impact: Remains under reserve (approximately 1 year, 79 days service after 2016); Three True Outcomes starting right fielder

CF Brett Phillips
If Santana was the least risky prospect returned in the trade, Phillips was arguably the headliner, as the athletic CF annihilated Advanced A ball and had already earned a promotion to AA within the Astros system. 2015 BaseballProspectus scouting reports of Phillips generally painted a potential five average tool (at least) profile, even though both observers disagreed about the potential hit and power tools (50 / 50 vs. 55 / 45). Phillips’s glove and arm drove the outfielder’s value, however, largely leaving most to believe that he could start in centerfield.

Phillips’s 2016 campaign at AA Biloxi is not as thrilling as his 2015 efforts for that club, as the left-handed bat has found his game power and maintained his walk profile while also enduring a brutal slump. Over the weekend, Phillips snapped a nine game hitless streak, which was part of a prolonged .143 / .271 / .275 slump over 109 PA. Even during that slump, Phillips’s bright spots shone, as the 22 year old collected seven extra base hits and 16 walks. Now, Phillips has a chance to show that he can endure professional difficulty and respond by making adjustments and showcasing that hit tool along with his others.

• 2016 Impact: 1.52 WARP (.273 TAv, -2.6 FRAA. Overall 37th of 81 200+ PA Southern League)
• Competition: Youngest 30 percent of Southern League regulars (200+ PA median age 24); Top 40 percent competition (.690 opposing OPS). [Translation: Phillips is notably young for his league and is facing relatively tough competition.]
• Future Impact: Full reserve control; Toolsy starting centerfielder.

LHP Josh Hader
There is an argument to be made that Josh Hader was the biggest riser among the Brewers prospects returned in the Gomez / Fiers deal, given the lefty’s 50 K / 11 BB / 3 GR performance over his seven games in Biloxi during 2015. The debate about Hader is well-known to BPMilwaukee readers by now: despite a legitimate high velocity fastball from the south side, some combination of off-speed stuff, command, and/or delivery (arm slot) caused many to question whether Hader will be a starter or elite reliever.

Hader has hit some road bumps since earning his 2016 promotion to AAA Colorado Springs, but the southpaw still looks like someone who may force their way into a September call-up. Of course, the youngest age of any Pacific Coast League regular pitcher (50+ IP) in 2016 is 23, so the 22 year old Hader is almost absurdly young for that advanced league. The strike out profile has not left in this advanced league, either, even if Hader is showing some issues with command while pitching in the Rockies. Even if the role is not predetermined, Hader will probably receive every chance to start with the rebuilding Brewers.

• 2016 AA Impact: 2.14 FIP (top among Southern League regulars [45+ IP])
• AA Competition: Youngest 25 percent of Southern League regulars (45+ IP median age 24); second-weakest competition (.662 opposing OPS). [Translation: Despite being notably young for his league, Hader faced weak competition.]
• Future Impact: Full reserve control; High octane lefty.

RHP Adrian Houser
Adrian Houser was the least hyped among the prospects returned, but the righty earned a quick call-up to Milwaukee and Arizona Fall League placement (along with Hader). Last Friday, BPMilwaukee’s Kyle Lesniewski featured Houser in detail in his weekly prospect feature. Lesniewski highlights Houser’s “under the surface” improvements that preceded the righty’s Tommy John surgery.

• 2016 Impact: 3.67 FIP median among Southern League regulars (45+ IP median FIP of 3.66)
• Competition: Youngest 45 present of Southern League regulars (45+ IP median age 24); Top Third opposing difficulty among Southern League regulars (.695 opposingOPS). [Translation: Houser was near median age for his league, but faced notably difficult competition.]
• Future Impact: Injury risk increased; Role Unknown.

That said, Gomez had a couple of amazing seasons with the Brewers. It took him a few years to settle in, but once he did, he became one of the best players in baseball. What made Gomez so unique was his ability to hit for power and his speed. There simply aren’t many players in baseball who possess that lethal combination.

Normally, if you’re a big power hitter, such as Chris Davis or Jose Bautista, you’re not also blessed with blazing speed. That skill is reserved for slap hitters such as Dee Gordon, who aren’t blessed with great strength but can make their living on good contact ability and speed.

When Gomez hit his prime, from 2012-2014, his ability to combine those two elusive and rare skills made him one of the best players in baseball.

Fortunately, there’s also a way to quantify this. In fact, you guessed it, Bill James created a metric called PwrSpd (Power-Speed). The formula is quite crude and as noted on Baseball Reference has little analytical value. It was essentially a way to quantify the idea of the 40-40 club. Here it is:

(2 x HR x SB) / (HR+SB)

Think of this as a fun metric. A metric that puts a number on the idea of which players had the best Power and Speed combination, but at the same time don’t look for it to have any sort of predictive value.

My next step was to examine where Gomez ranked according to this metric, historically (min 300 PA).

With this metric, Gomez led the league in 2013 and 2014. In 2013 Gomez hit 24 home runs and stole 40 bases, and in 2014 he hit 23 home runs and stole 34 bases. Gomez displayed his full potential those years and personified the identity of the power-speed player. Those were also his best seasons production-wise. The free swinger never raked up great walk rates, but he consistently hit the ball hard and combined with his blazing speed, it allowed him run above average BABIP numbers. Gomez also played sensational defense those seasons, especially in 2013, when just about every defensive metric loved him.

The other Brewer of noteworthiness on this chart is Ryan Braun. Braun isn’t usually thought of as a great power and speed hitter, at least not anymore. These days, especially, I think of Braun as a slow corner outfielder that can still provide a lot of value with his bat. But, in Braun’s prime, he was the biggest dual-threat the Brewers franchise ever had.

In 2011 and 2012 Braun was a 30-30 guy. Actually, in 2012 Braun was a 40-30 guy, as he hit 41 home runs and stole 30 bases. His 2012 season was the best in Brewers history by the PwrSpd metric, better than any of Carlos Gomez’s seasons even though Gomez is traditionally associated with the power and speed combination.

I’ve never thought of Braun as a speed threat, and maybe he isn’t, but he definitely has an ability to steal bases. His average stolen base percentage in those seasons was 76%. Meaning, that Braun wasn’t exactly hurting the team by swapping all of those bags. He wasn’t Shin-Soo Choo in 2013 when Choo stole 20 bags but got caught 11 times. At that rate, a runner is better off not stealing bases.

The only player to ever come close to Braun’s seasons was Tommy Harper who only played two years with the Brew Crew. Fortunately for them, one of those seasons was doozy. He hit 35 home runs and stole 38 bases finishing with an 8.5 WARP, the best mark of his career.

THE 40-40 CLUB
The point of the metric, however, is to quantify the notion of the 40-40 club, which is supposed to signify the pinnacle of power and speed. I’ve, therefore, labeled every member of that club, and Matt Kemp. Kemp, “tragically”, in 2011 fell just one home run shy of being the fifth member of the 40-40 club.

The best season, according to PwrSpd went to Alex Rodriguez in 1998 where he accumulated a score of 43.91. That year, Rodriguez hit 42 home runs and stole a career-high 46 bases. Ironically enough, that wasn’t even his best season. His defense, according to FRAA, was poor.

Barry Bonds was only the second player to reach the 40-40 club, and it also wasn’t his best season. In fact, his best seasons came later in his career when he started hitting for more power. The reason I included Bonds’ color scheme is because you can see the trajectory of a changed player. At the beginning of his career, Bonds’ game was about more than just hitting, it also included the ability to steal bases. He was more well-rounded.

Mike Trout is very similar in that regard. His best season by this metric was in 2012, the year he broke out. Trout’s first season was a beautiful mixture of speed and power as he stole 49 bases, hit 30 home runs, and played quality defense. Trout doesn’t steal that many bases anymore. In fact, his stolen base numbers have gone down every year since 2012, but Trout isn’t necessarily a worse player. He’s just a very different player, one that relies more on power than speed. The interesting part is that Trout is having these changes in his early 20s. Normally players in their early 20s don’t lose their speed, for power. If that adjustment happens, it usually does in a player’s late 20s and early thirties.

The next question is whether we’ll ever see another player reach that mark. There’s an influx of great talent in the game but, at this point, none of them have shown the ability to accomplish both tasks. If anyone could accomplish the task, I thought it would be Trout. That doesn’t seem all that likely anymore.

While the league-wide value of the metric isn’t trending downward, there’s a more condensed distribution. No one has sniffed the level of Trout’s 2012 season in the last three years. And, A.J. Pollock was the lowest leader in the category since 1981, a lockout-shortened season, which might mean that we won’t see another 40-40 player for a while. On the other hand, Soriano accomplished the task when he was 30, so maybe we just need to be patient and wait for one of these young studs to develop into their power.

The ultimate goal is to find the cheapest labor to produce the most wins possible, whether that means searching for efficient and flexible marginal roster depth or gambling on toolsy players to become multifaceted superstars. It should be no surprise that multiple estimates suggest that the MLB Players Association is losing their traditional share of revenue, even as television contracts and Advanced Media shares soar: through analysis, MLB teams can consistently move revenue shares upwards to management, development, or executive ranks (rather than downwards to players). This development extends from Carlos Gomez’s Brewers contract extension (an unbelievable bargain for an elite power/speed centerfielder) to Clayton Kershaw’s contract, and to many others still. It’s easy to pull over on fans: as real wages decline for a large percentage of the USA, who’s going to care that Gomez or Kershaw might be underpaid by at least $15 million annually?

Austerity may be the best possible term to define the American political malaise of the last 40 years. Alongside private efforts to consistently redistribute capital “upwards” (instead of downwards, to labor), the State has swiftly and effectively acted to erode infrastructure, services, and entitlements in order to disenfranchise labor. This effort for upward redistribution can be found across all levels of Federalism, which further renders labor-side counteractions ineffective, contradictory, or misdirected.

Incidentally, this development correlates with widespread professionalization that is also reflected in the MLB executive ranks, as well as most other aspects of society. Knowledge no longer needs to be “scientific” once each field of proprietary analysts and executives moves true scientific advances into the realm of bureaucratic measurements that self-sustain each industry.

This is hardly a new criticism on my part; it’s hardly new to BaseballProspectus, even, as Rian Watt’s take on sabermetrics and baseball writing shows. For example, Ivan Illich used the progression of “scientific advances” to “bureaucratic/professional monopoly” to undergird his scathing 1973 pamphlet, Tools for Conviviality. Illich used the advancement of medicine as his theoretical entry point, but his argument and method fits many professional fields:

“It is not strictly necessary to this argument to accept 1913 and 1955 as the two watershed years in order to understand that early in the century medical practice emerged into an era of scientific verification of its results. And later medical science itself became an alibi for the obvious damage caused by the medical professional. At the first watershed the desirable effects of new scientific discoveries were easily measured and verified….The positive contribution of modern medicine to individual health during the early part of the twentieth century can hardly be questioned.

But then medicine began to approach the second watershed. Every year medical science reported a new breakthrough…The practice of medicine became centered on the performance of hospital-based staffs….The irresponsible use of drugs spread from doctors to the general public. The second watershed was approached when the marginal utility of further professionalization declined, at least insofar as it can be expressed in terms of the physical well-being of the largest number of people. The second watershed was superseded when the marginal disutility increased as further monopoly by the medical establishment became an indicator of more suffering for larger numbers of people.” (Illich, 1973, 6-7)

One can extract from Illich’s case study two moments in the scientific and professional development of a particular field:

(1) The “first watershed” occurs when the scientific method provides solutions to specific problems, thereby creating new tools of knowledge within a given field.

(2) The “second watershed” occurs when trained professionals commandeer those tools and employ new forms of self-measurement to judge their respective performances.

If one critically engages with, and then sets aside, Illich’s bleak attitude about professional monopolies over knowledge, one can find an extremely useful tension between knowledge and power within many different professional fields. Even the “analysis movement” that developed over the last 40 years (or so) in professional baseball is not immune to this tension. What first began as outsider interventions based on hunches that the game was not being properly measured by traditional statistics fully developed into a professionalized field almost fully controlled by the MLB clubs and their elite analysts and executives. Even the story of Bill James seems impossible now, as the idea that a security guard at a pork and beans factory can provide legitimate insights into professional baseball is now commandeered and rendered illegitimate by Ivy League-trained economists. MLB further proved this development with the release of Statcast, which was kept under close wraps to forbid the big data breakthroughs that occurred with pitch f/x.

The trouble with these new proprietary developments is that MLB clubs will use their own metrics as a form of measurement for their own success, which extracts those measurements from the groundbreaking potential or critical eye of the scientific method. One might also expect MLB proprietary analysis to produce competitive stasis: as clubs subscribe to databases and also build their own algorithms to measure scouting, mechanical, medical, and statistical inputs, the “fields of market inefficiencies” will grow smaller, less predictable, and ultimately more expensive.

The coming battle for the MLB, then, reverts back to some typical fight between labor and ownership over television and media revenue. In some cases, MLB commentators are already seeing the writing on the wall and encouraging clubs to spend more money on players. BP Milwaukee‘s own J.P. Breen and Jack Moore have both treated labor issues in the Moneyball era, as one example. J.P. Breen covered this point in his newsletter, Crumbling Sandcastles (#3, April 12, 2016), arguing in favor of increased spending on minor league nutrition and training (and increased minor league pay, as well). Jack Moore has also extensively covered minor league wages. Here, the idea of exploiting market inefficiencies — essentially, exploiting the cheapest labor possible for maximal gains on the field — will be contradicted by a labor fight that necessitates redistributing revenue downward once again.

Fortunately, as Commissioner Rob Manfred also works to increase diversity within the MLB’s executive ranks, there is a chance that the analytical reins will be loosened (this could open quite a fruitful new era for MLB as salaries also increase). The era of Ivy League economists running MLB analysis and player development will eventually close as new viewpoints and diverse training backgrounds populate the MLB front offices. Here, again, the “next market efficiency” will be contradicted by professional developments that hopefully loosen the hold on this iteration of the proprietary information movement.

Brewers fans might be particularly interested in this development, as one might reasonably question whether Chairman and Principal Owner Mark Attanasio was too late to the game in hiring GM David Stearns. Jack Moore offered pointed commentary on this hiring here at BP Milwaukee, comparing the impressive MLB front office experience of Tyrone Brooks to that of Stearns. Perhaps as the need for a specific type of analyst to assemble and judge proprietary information becomes less valued or necessary by MLB clubs, MLB owners will be more compelled to populate the executive ranks with more diverse personnel (this is as intellectually important as it is socially/ethnically important). Stearns undeniably had a fine first offseason, or perhaps a first offseason without major complaint, which makes the question of his place within broader MLB hiring trends more intriguing and critical.

One might also consider the entrenchment of new analytical tools to be as faulty or misguided as the “old” statistical regime in the MLB. The point of using empirical evidence to describe and analyze baseball is to look for new ways to think about the game, and implement new strategies to gain competitive advantage. The point is not to create a powerful means of controlling information and strategy. As the use of high velocity pitchers or fielding shifts shows (to name two strategies), MLB personnel indeed prefer a type of professional orthodoxy (even while touting innovative analytical measurements to support those strategies). Needless to say, both Manfred and Stearns face tall demands for industry innovation, given these points of conflict.

Returning to Illich’s “two watersheds,” then, points (1) and (2) above will conflict wherever a group of professionals in an industry can corner specific tools to gain a competitive or financial monopoly (in the case of the MLB, increasing the share of revenue for ownership is probably the most crucial benefit of the analytical movement, from their point of view). Fans looking for the “next market inefficiency” can ultimately speed the next watershed, the next return to point (1), by eschewing analysis in favor of other narratives, tools, and methods. One of the first keys to accomplish this task will be to abandon the pro-ownership view of using market inefficiencies to acquire cheap players that benefit the roster greatly, in anticipation (and, hopefully, support) of the forthcoming labor battle. Brewers fans ought to be particularly invested in this next battle, as the actual television market disparities and subsequent need for absolute revenue sharing will become yet another subplot to the fights regarding labor/ownership and executive hiring trends.

References and Recommended Reading:
Breen, J.P. 2016. Crumbling Sandcastles. Self-published: Email newsletter.
Dickson, David. 1974. The Politics of Alternative Technology. New York: Universe.
Fainstein, Norman I. & Susan S. Fainstein. 1982. Urban Policy Under Capitalism. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews v.22. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Illich, Ivan. 1973. Tools for Conviviality. New York: Harper Colophon.
____________. 1996 [1978]. The Right to Useful Unemployment and its Professional Enemies. New York: M. Boyars.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1996 [1962]. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Macdonald, Keith M. 1995. The Sociology of the Professions. London: Sage.
Sawchik, Travis. 2015. Big Data Baseball: Math, Miracles, and the End of a 20-Year Losing Streak. New York: Flatiron.

*****

Most hitting changes are subtle and small. Even to the trained eye it can take time to notice a change a hitter may have made months ago. The emergence of Carlos Gomez, All-Star, goes hand-in-hand with a swing change he made at some point between July 6 and 23, 2012.

Before looking at those dates, let’s get familiar with Gomez as a player. He came into the league in 2007 with the Mets before being traded to the Twins in the Johan Santana deal. As a prospect, Gomez was a fascinating case study. I found reports going back to 2006 praising his raw natural power, but it simply never showed up in games. (E.g. “Power is not there now, but potential is there once he adds bulk to his long, lanky frame.”—Kevin Goldstein.) Where his power would take time his speed was immediate and his ticket into a big-league lineup. He never broke double digits in home runs in the minors but he stole over 100 bases combined his first two years on the farm. This was a guy seemingly built to lead off.

Except he wasn’t. Gomez has some superficial qualities of a leadoff hitter. His bat is quick and his speed should never slump. While the bat speed and the foot speed speak to hitting first in the lineup, his actual swing says otherwise.

*****

Please read the rest of the article — including in-depth video analysis — right here. Reminder: It’s completely FREE.

But it’s also that same passion, one might also call it flair, that has gotten Gomez into “trouble” a number of times throughout his career. Whether it was for a bat flip, staring at a home run for too long, or screaming at himself in the batter’s box, Gomez always seemed to get under the skin of many of his opponents.

Take an incident that happened just this past year. The Astros held a significant lead, beating the Yankees 9-0. Former Brewers hurler Chris Capuano then through a pitch, which Gomez popped up. As a result, the 30-year-old center fielder slammed his bat on the dirt in frustration. This unrestrained show of emotion then caused the Yankees to yell at Gomez, ultimately causing a benches-clearing incident. There was no fight and cooler heads prevailed, but the Yankees still had their feathers ruffled.

These sorts of incidences seem to happen just about every year. They are also quite ridiculous most of the time. The reasons for the other team’s anger is usually befuddling, but I think they usually happen due to faulty reasoning.

One of the reasons these incidences happen is because the opposing team — this time the Yankees — make a fundamental attribution error. This is actually a simple concept to get one’s head around. It’s “our tendency to explain someone’s behavior based on internal factors, such as personality or disposition, and to underestimate the influence that external factors, such as situational influences, have on another person’s behavior.” This is, of course, a basic definition. But, really, what one needs to understand is that it’s our tendency to attribute one’s behavior based on internal factors without taking into account external factors.

For example, if I was about to meet someone for the first time and he or she were late, I might assume that person is chronically late or that person neither really cares about my time nor meeting me. When in reality, they may simply be stuck in traffic due to an accident on the highway, or there might have been an emergency at home to which they needed to attend.

Now, another important note to remember is that I might be correct. That person might always be late. But it is important to remember that it is our tendency to make these false assumptions, and they often lead one into making false conclusions.

Back to the incident with Gomez and the Yankees. After the game, Joe Girardi said, “I just told him, ‘Play the game the right way.’ They are kicking our rear ends, show a little professionalism to the pitcher. I know you missed a pitch and you are frustrated by it. I just think it is a little too much.” The Yankees were essentially upset because Gomez showed too much emotion after his pop fly, plus the Yankees were getting shelled, so they got upset. They felt that Gomez wasn’t “playing the game the right way,” that Gomez was being disrespectful and showing them up. What they didn’t consider was that Gomez probably wasn’t trying to be disrespectful; rather, he had been struggling since joining the Astros, causing him to be extra frustrated when he missed a good pitch to hit. The Yankees, therefore, committed a fundamental attribution error, thinking Gomez was being disrespectful or, you know, “not playing the game the right way,” which caused them to be more upset than they really should have been.

These types of misjudgments will often lead players to feel as though they have been harmed. It’s the same issue with a seemingly exuberant bat flip or cadillacing a home run for too long. Most pitchers will assume a batter is showing them up. This happened all too often while Gomez played with the Milwaukee Brewers.

Another player who also often gets what I’m calling the “fundamental attribution error treatment” is Robinson Cano. Because the veteran second baseman doesn’t always run hard to first on ground balls, he often gets tagged as someone who is lazy or someone who doesn’t care. These are, of course, fundamental attribution errors. In reality, Cano is probably avoiding max exertion as a self-preservation technique. He has played in 155 or more games in every season since 2007. That doesn’t seem like someone who is lazy. The error here centers on the fact that that Cano chooses to not run out the bases because it’s a real strategy.

While constantly giving it 100 percent is great and noble, it might not be the best strategy in terms of staying healthy for a 162-game season. Just take a look at Dustin Pedroia. The Boston legend is someone who gives 100 percent on every play. He tries to run out every ground ball. Yet every season he seems to have some sort of nagging injury, and some years he has to miss numerous games due to injury.

One of the biggest external factors that seemingly generate these fundamental attribution errors seems to be the fact that most players who get chastised for playing the game the wrong way are not from the United States. Gomez, for example, is from the Dominican Republic, where it’s acceptable to flip one’s bat. It’s not seen as a sign of disrespect whatsoever. Players such as Gomez, Puig and others — who were raised in these non-American environments — grew up with bat flips and “pimping” home runs. Most pitchers don’t take that into account when they’re screaming at another Latino player for “pimping” a home run.

One of the ways, however, to counteract the fundamental attribution error seems to be to put oneself in the other player’s shoes. In other words, players should do a better job taking into account the external factors that help explain an individual’s behavior. Being mindful of Gomez’ prolonged slump or that Gomez inherently plays the game with ample emotion might help opponents better understand his behavior. He’s not trying to show anyone up. It’s the way he grew up playing the game, and he’s not going to change just to conform. Perhaps that should be celebrated, rather than chastised.