Yet, if anything the 2017-2018 Brewers have also proven that developmental time is not linear at the MLB level, and furthermore, GM David Stearns has not been afraid to deal from stockpiles of future high floor roles to improve the club. Most prominently, Stearns traded center field prospect Lewis Brinson, many fans’ and analysts’ projected 2018 MLB starter, as a part of the package to acquire Christian Yelich, despite center field being a position of need. Now the Brewers have a need to improve second base, and another clear-cut top prospect at the position (Keston Hiura, and Mauricio Dubon behind him); simply judging Stearns’s past, one should not rule out a trade involving Hiura should the price be right and the return bolster a position of strength.

On the opposite spectrum for the Brewers is left-handed starting pitching, which is arguably the sole position on the roster decimated by both injury (Brent Suter) and free agency (Gio Gonzalez, Wade Miley). Worse yet, unlike a position such as second base (which is a clear position of need), left handed starting pitching was a relative strength for the Brewers in 2018. Unlike second base, there’s no notable southpaw prospect ready for the rotation.

• Suter scouts as a prototypical depth player, but his full-time fastball approach, wicked tempo, and strange angles arguably helps his stuff “play up” at the big league level; by no means was Suter great, but he certainly did not sink the club, and was one of the reasons that the “replacement by design” rotational shuffle of interchangeable pitchers could work.

• On the other hand, Gonzalez served as a crucial replacement for the Brewers, indeed producing exceptional value on any rotational assessment despite having only been acquired after August 31.

• Similarly, Wade Miley could arguably be listed as the “Ace” of the club, and certainly stands as one of the team’s developmental successes. Even if Miley had discovered his cutter by the middle of 2017 with Baltimore, the Brewers recognized his pitch development and helped the southpaw double down on his approach and command the strike zone.

Milwaukee boasts significant pitching depth entering the 2019 season, arguably forming the strength of the organization through their run prevention system. Yet left-handed starting pitching is a weakness even given the context of this particular organization. There are no notable left-handed starting pitching prospects that are near reaching an MLB-ready floor for 2019, and there is little in the way of organizational depth behind Brent Suter (who, given the nature of Tommy John surgery, may not be ready to pitch until very late in 2019). Thus Brewers fans looking for the club to make a splash in free agency could reasonably look at southpaw starters.

There are arguably three particular classes of pitchers among the “true” left-handed starting pitching free agents in 2019. (Here I’ve excluded elite arms like Clayton Kershaw and David Price, who could choose to opt out of contracts, but only would do so on the sense that they could best $35 million Average Annual Value (AAV), which would be the required level to beat their current deals). Cot’s Contracts and Sportrac Data were used to construct a free agency list.

• Elite 2018 or Notably Better than Average Pitchers (by WARP and Runs Prevented): Patrick Corbin, Dallas Keuchel, J.A. Happ, and Hyun-jin Ryu

• Very Good Pitchers (by either WARP or Runs Prevented): Gio Gonzalez, CC Sabathia, Brett Anderson, and Wade Miley

• Depth Pitchers: Drew Pomeranz, Francisco Liriano, Jo-Jo Reyes, and Ross Detwiler.

The following table is one method of conveying player value for this lefty free agency class into monetary terms. I’ve used a three-year depreciation model, reflecting the fact that over time players typically lose value from their current performances (this is also a means of presenting relatively conservative contract projections). I’ve updated previous surplus assessments by presenting a rolling assessment of three-year models (2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018), plus a “maximum” projection based on full 2018 performance. This number can be compared against the general “Three Year Trend” to determine whether a pitcher is on an upward or downward trajectory (equally tough cases here are Keuchel and Corbin, for completely different directions of performance).

• Depreciated1, Depreciated2, Depreciated3: three-year surplus value salary estimates, based on WARP from 2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018 (in order).
• ThreeYear: this demonstrates the relative change in contractual value from 2016-2018 to 2014-2016. This is a rough estimate of a pitcher’s contractual “trend.”
• Immediate: this is a three-year surplus value salary estimate based solely on 2018 performance without any depreciation. It should be read as some type of ultimate “short term bias” value (i.e., the most biased observer from 2018 would offer Patrick Corbin a 3-year contract worth more than $120 million).

It is tempting, giving the success of pitching coach Derek Johnson in Milwaukee, as well as the success of the fielding efficiency, front office analysis, and general pitching player development, to assess the offseason free agents by looking for “The Next Wade Miley.” But this is suspicious thinking for at least two key reasons: first, many players in the MLB change their pitching approaches and development without the success of Miley; second, the Brewers simply have the opportunity to re-sign Miley from the free agency pool if the club believes that his development pattern is sustainable and he can continue to provide rotational depth. There is nothing wrong with doubling down on a successful system when the same reasoning and critical measures are used to assess that system the second time around.

To demonstrate the extreme nature of what Miley accomplished in Milwaukee, witness his progression from bread-and-butter southpaw in 2016 to his current format of pitching:

According to Brooks Baseball, Miley was already morphing his pitching approach in 2017, and that does not simply involve his insistence on incorporating the cutter after July 2017. Miley switched from his “primary” rising fastball to his “secondary” running-and-sinking variation, which took selections away from his change, slider, and curve in 2017. The veteran lefty was basically becoming an all-forms fastballer, blending three fastballs at the expense of off-speed and breaking offerings. 2018 reversed that to a stunning extent, as Miley reduced the total percentage of primary, secondary, and cut fastballs he threw, and completely reorganized his secondary stuff around the cutter. What is interesting about Miley is that he traded groundballs for whiffs with the cutter, while whiffs “played up” with other pitches once he focused on the cutter. This is the fantastic accomplishment of Miley’s 2018: not simply the development of a new prominent pitch, but the systemic development of that pitch in a manner that improved his other offerings. It would be foolish to suggest that most pitchers could be expected to thrive with such a reinvention.

Among these pitchers, there is no “next Miley,” unless you want to lean heavily into suggesting the Brewers acquire Jo-Jo Reyes and Ross Detwiler as potential depth contracts (Detwiler has the “Brewers pitches” necessary to pique interest here). But that does not mean that the Brewers should not seek any of these southpaw free agents:

• Patrick Corbin is on the frontier of baseball as a slider-first pitcher, which is crucial in a game where the slider determines leverage in many cases (including diminishing a key divisional rival for the Brewers). Signing Corbin could be a huge deal for the Brewers, both for keeping the lefty away from divisional rivals looking to improve pitching (the Reds could certainly gamble here, given their excellent batting group and lack of arms, as well as the contending Cubs). If there’s anywhere that Corbin’s margins-of-the-strike-zone approach could succeed, it’s Milwaukee, although that doesn’t necessarily mean his profile is less risky overall. The Brewers could take the next step of working with Corbin to balance his new curveball with his slider. Ideal Contract: 3-years, $100 million. Maximum deal: 4-years, $150 million. (If the rumored contract ranges around 4-years and $120 million are true, I would call Corbin a potential bargin, even).

• Dallas Keuchel is an interesting pitcher insofar as he remains relatively consistent as he ages, even though his surplus grade demonstrates a harsh decline due to falling off from previously elite seasons. Even without being an elite pitcher, Keuchel remains quite good, and he’s tinkering with his approach to move away from his “true” sinking fastball and toward a cutter-offspeed approach. Keuchel’s potential knock working in Milwaukee would be using a relatively extreme groundball approach in front of an aggressively unorthodox defense, which would mean the Brewers would need to truly sell the veteran on their fielding approach. A Keuchel deal could be the most likely to end up “sideways” due to this profile.  Ideal Contract: 3-years, $75 million. Maximum deal: 4-years, $100 million.

• Wade Miley is entering his age-32 season having completely revitalized his pitching approach; by all appearances seems to be a likable and supportive teammate in Milwaukee; and against the Dodgers even flashed a hard fastball that demonstrates that his approach could continue to morph in 2019. It would not surprise me if the Brewers have an arsenal plan with Miley to take additional steps beyond the cutter, and I’d sign Miley before any of these guys due to that likely fact. Additionally, as the Brewers mature into perennial contenders (hopefully), they would do well to prove to players that they will turn some rehabilitation projects / value-depth plays into hard cash deals. There will be a time when value signings refuse to come to Milwaukee if their value produced never materializes into bigger cash. Start here. Ideal Contract: 2-years, $20 million, with a third-year option. Maximum: 3-years, $36 million.

• Gio Gonzalez is slowly morphing into a potential change-up first pitcher, making him a true veteran “junkball” option. Ideal Contract: 3-years, $36 million. Maximum deal: 3-year, $45 million.

• Given J.A. Happ’s age, the southpaw could potentially be a short-term deal with beneficial playoff experience and a fastball-first approach that could fit some aspects of Brewers pitching strategy (notable fastballers Freddy Peralta and Suter come to mind, for example). One-year contract between $12 million and $17 million.

• If you’re obsessed with the idea of making “the next Wade Miley” work in Milwaukee, Drew Pomeranz could be the biggest name among southpaws to make that work. Pomeranz struggled through 2018 as a bigtime fastball-curveball approach. In fact, the cutter even featured more prominently during Pomeranz’s successfuly 2016 season. Unfortunately, the groundballs and whiffs simultaneously dissipated, leaving this lefty a potentially expensive gamble with an arsenal, approach, and batted ball in flux. Pomeranz is a potential project. One-year, $10 million.

• It is not clear that Hyun-jin Ryu or CC Sabathia would be likely to come to Milwaukee given their recent roles in big markets (for quite some time) and playoff team roles. Francisco Liriano had a tough year in Detroit, and I unfortunately think there are better contracts offered to the other pitchers on this list.

• No lie, I’d hand out a minor league deal to Ross Detwiler, too, if he would be willing to work within the Brewers pitching development system. This southpaw is another potential “true junkball” lefty, but along with heavy change up usage Detwiler has also added a cutter, and could move away from his sinking fastball to his rising-riding primary variation.

The Brewers need starting pitching help. The Brewers need an ace.

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— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) July 31, 2018

Of course this would be the return line for the 2018-2019 offseason, because the line never went away during the season. A large faction of fans were dissatisfied with the starting pitching in April; they were satisfied with the starting pitching in May, “but can this staff beat ‘a dude’ in the playoffs?” (Yes!, it turns out); they were particularly dissatisfied with the starting pitching when the season ended in June and July, and again they were dissatisfied with the starting pitching at the trade deadline. This debate was simply never going to be won, because there is a contingent of baseball fans that refuse to either understand or accept what GM Stearns, pitching coach Derek Johnson, systemwide player development, and the front office are trying to accomplish. For arguably the first time in Brewers franchise history, certainly for the first time in a generation, the Milwaukee system strength is pitching, and not of the sort of high octane, all-risk dreamy profiles that flamed out at the turn of the 21st Century; this is a system that is built on turning a fabulous diversity of pitching profiles into potentially successful MLB profiles (witness the scouting range between Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes, for example).

When the dust settled, the system worked. The Brewers rotation was good. It was good any particular way you measured it; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on overall Games Started and workload measurements; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on true rotational scarcity (i.e., comparing each spot across the MLB); and it was a good rotation if you separate pitching classes into “true starters” and “replacements,” and measure each set of pitchers against different “spots” or “workloads.” The pitching staff was good if you believe in “Aces,” and it was good if you don’t believe Aces exist.

The Brewers rotation was good by every measurement except DRA, which should be the significant focal point of 2018-2019 offseason analysis in an effort to understand how Milwaukee assembled an elite fielding component in order to prevent runs.

If you do not wish to read the details, the table above summarizes the comparative results from each model. Each Brewers starter was assessed according to their relevant spot, and then compared by Innings Pitched (IP), Deserved Run Average (DRA), and Runs Prevented.

Rotation One: By Games Started
One way to assess a starting rotation is by ranking pitchers according to games started on a leaguewide basis. This ranking method is effective because it approximates the scarcity of both MLB resources (there’s not a whole lot of pitchers that can work full seasons) and roster construction. One benefit of focusing on games started instead of another performance metric is that analysts can reflect the success or failure of an MLB club across games started totals; for example, it matters that Gerrit Cole and Lucas Giolito both started 32 games despite widely divergent performances. The distance between Cole and Giolito is approximately 65 runs prevented, even though they worked the same number of starts, which raises an important question about how different teams assess the importance of effective starters versus soaking up innings. In fact, had Brent Suter and Zach Davies not faced injuries in 2018, they may have forced this question with the Brewers front office, and Freddy Peralta also arguably faced this (along with innings workload concerns) down the stretch run.

According to this measurement, there are approximately 10 rotation spots discernible by workload throughout the 2018 MLB, as well as emergency starters (who started one game; I will always assess emergency starters as their own category). On the surface, this is a pleasing model; the top starters by workload typically are the best starters in the game, even if there are differences between guys like Cole and Giolito, as discussed above.

On this model, it is clear that the Brewers succeeded because of their depth. A critique about the top of the rotation could be true in terms of DRA, as the contextual performances of Jhoulys Chacin and Chase Anderson were not comparable to top workload pitchers across the MLB. The importance of the depth should not be understated, from Wade Miley and Peralta to Brandon Woodruff and even Gio Gonzalez. If you’re reconsidering Gonzalez’s trade cost, not only should the veteran lefty’s surface performance be assessed, but one should not that, marginally, he was worth seven runs better than his median workload.

Another benefit of using this model is that analysts can assess “phantom” runs prevented where teams “miss” particular spots. For example, Chacin may not measure up to the median Top Spot prototype, but having his performance was better than not having a heavy workload pitcher whatsoever (in theory; Giolito’s performance would obviously have not validated a heavy workload benefit for the Brewers). If a team was missing a Top Spot, they theoretically would be punished 16-to-17 Runs Prevented. Milwaukee did not use a Five, Seven, Eight, or Ten workload, each of which approximately ranged from 2 to 4 runs below average; one could argue in this way that the Brewers also received 10 “phantom” Runs Prevented by avoiding these typical workloads.

This should help to validate the ideal that there are a couple of different ways to construct a rotation. A team could indeed bank on a Jacob deGrom type atop the rotation, and seek a 30 run advantage from their top workload. One must be careful of the cost for this type of pitcher, however, as if considerable resources are spent at the top of the rotation, they may be diminished at the bottom of the rotation. The Brewers demonstrated the “bottom-up” approach: they lost out on the Yu Darvish sweepstakes, and Alex Cobb did not bite on a one-year deal, so they proceeded with Chacin and Miley, plus their developmental pipeline. That internal pipeline was worth approximately five runs (better than their median workload) to the 2018 Brewers, while external candidates were worth more than 15 runs (better than their median workload). It was not flashy, there were no “dudes” on the marquee, but it worked.

Rotation Two: By Team

Of course, even the preceding model is relatively clean or “idealistic,” for MLB teams do not necessarily construct their rotations according to the same ideal. An additional method for assessing rotations is to judge each team’s rotation spot by turn; since two pitchers literally cannot start the same game, this method goes spot-by-spot, start-by-start for each MLB team. The benefit of this method of rotational assessment is that it reflects team preference, or injury and ineffectiveness circumstances, across the league. Some teams attempt to duct tape 13- or 14-pitcher rotations together, whether they are contending or tanking, while others attempt to yield more mileage from each spot. By giving each team one exclusive spot for each turn (until their pitchers run out), this type of rotational model can allow teams to be analyzed against attrition across the league.

Every team in the MLB required at least six rotational turns throughout the season, but this model demonstrates the divergence of team strategies one they hit six starters. Some teams preferred to give replacement starters two or three starts each, while others leaned on emergency starters.

The Brewers front office, coaching staff, and pitchers did a fantastic job weathering 162. They hit the right buttons in replacing some starters at certain points in time (such as resting Peralta down the stretch, or [arguably] “shuttling Woodruff between Triple-A and MLB), while giving starters room to breathe at others point in the season (this also applies to Peralta, who was given some time to adjust from rough starts, as well as Junior Guerra). By spitting on rotation spots 10 through 14, the Brewers also arguably saved 16 “phantom” runs, as the club would not have found effective pitchers (on average) digging that deep into league or organizational resources. (This line could be argued with further research, however, as one could note that someone like Corbin Burnes could have been effective in two starts, for example).

Rotation Three: By Type
During my time writing at Sportsbubbler (RIP) and Disciples of Uecker, I published annual starting pitching rotation rankings based on the decision point of 100 IP. If a pitcher worked 100 or more innings with 50 percent of their games as starts, they were a starting pitcher; if not, they were replacement depth. On this model, I attempted to assess pitchers according to Runs Prevented, with the ideal that (a) working a lot of innings should be worth more as a starter, and (b) rotation spots could be designated based on the resulting Runs Prevented rankings. I’m no longer certain of this method’s veracity, as I believe there are better ways to assess rotational scarcity and usage across the MLB. But, here we are, testing the Brewers 2018 rotation, so let’s assemble the pitchers.

Wouldn’t you know it, the 2018 MLB did not have many “true” rotation spots: there were only 129 pitchers across 30 teams that fit the first criterion listed above. This is not enough pitchers to fill a true five man rotation, and it’s hardly enough to fill a four man turn.

Yet, those Runs Prevented totals present some order to the universe. There are aces, even if there’s only a couple of them. There are nice middle of the rotation “dudes” that you can really sink your teeth into; 150 IP and 2 Runs Prevented feels like a solid effort for a team. Every contender would accept that workload (every MLB team would, for that matter).

Where there are not full-time starters, replacements are necessary, and MLB really dug deep in 2018: there were 227 replacement starters, including 57 Emergency Starters, across 30 MLB teams in 2018. Basically, on average, MLB teams were using more replacements than they were using regular starters. The Brewers are no different here, and in fact, that’s partially how they gained their value. Viewing the range of Runs Prevented across each of these roles should demonstrate the importance of having a solid organizational pitching strategy; replacement starters need not simply be the pitching equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall. Tampa Bay demonstrated this with their genius “Opener” strategy, and they produced one of the elite Runs Prevented units in baseball. The Brewers accomplished their success by using long-term replacements like Miley and Peralta, but they also received value elsewhere across their high-floor organizational depth.

If you previously thought the idea of “Phantom Runs Prevented” by not using a rotation spot was a suspect idea, this seems to be your chance to pounce on the Brewers for not using an “Ace” or true “Number One” starter. By this model, the Brewers were gutsy, punting nearly 63 runs prevented at the front end of the rotation. Yet, the club also did not use a true “Number Four” or full-time starter that should have been replaced, which bought the club another 43 runs prevented. All told, the Brewers rotation of regular starters lost the club approximately 19 runs here, thanks to their cavalier strategy.

Of course, the Brewers used every Replacement typology except a “true swingman,” and this is where the club torched the league. Gio Gonzalez and Wade Miley covered the lack of an “Ace” or “Number One” starter, and demonstrated the value in not having a Regular Four, either. Peralta, Dan Jennings (yes, Dan Jennings), and Woodruff gained significant Runs Prevented advantages in the replacement ranks as well. On top of these depth successes, the rotation was not bad overall; Suter and Guerra were close to true Number Three starters, and Anderson was close to a true Number Two starter. Chacin was better than a typical Number Two starter, boasting a Runs Prevented performance that almost placed him in a phantom “Number One” role for the club.

What is startling on this model is that the Brewers typologies also worked according to DRA. Once an analyst accepts that the club did not have a True Ace or True Number One starter, the threshold for assessing DRA is lowered significantly. Witness Chacin, for example, who was assessed against DRA that were significantly better than 4.00 on the first two models; his DRA performance looks much better on the final model, because once you stop comparing him to Aces, the comparison becomes more realistic. The Brewers deep organization also performs very well against median DRA requirements on this model, which raises a question about which model’s expectations one should use going forward.

The last remaining criticism for fans and analysts rests on how one interprets Deserved Run Average results for the Brewers rotation. On any model one chooses, be it based on Games Started, Team Rotational Turns and Scarcity, or Actual Runs Prevented performance, the Brewers’ rotation was good in 2018. Now it is worth digging through these models during the offseason, in order to gain important lessons for Corbin Burnes, Woodruff, and Peralta during their potential first full workloads in 2019, and even for reworking Jimmy Nelson. Milwaukee has proven the success that can come with aggressive rotational swings and an organizational pitching strategy, coupled with elite, efficient fielding.

An underrated 2018-2019 offseason would find David Stearns making moves to further improve the fielding (such as improving Right Field, and then working Christian Yelich primarily as a Left Fielder), which should in turn help boost the pitching depth strategy going forward. As it stands, the Brewers do not even need an external pitching move; this makes potential offseason moves even more interesting for speculation.

Junior Guerra has had an up-and-down season, which will deserve more analytical scrutiny once the season closes. Brewers fans largely wrote off Guerra after the righty experienced a forearm injury in July (on DL July 14-24), which preceded a truly dreadful stretch of baseball. Returning from the disabled list, Guerra started eight games, ultimately working 37.3 innings while allowing 38 runs (!!!) and a 32 strike out / 16 walk / 8 homer / 1.08 Groundball:Flyball peripheral performance. At this point, the Brewers replaced Guerra in the rotation with newly acquired southpaw Gio Gonzalez, himself looking for some redemption in a new locale.

Guerra’s fall was shocking in part because the righty maintained solid Runs Prevented throughout the year. On May 31, the splitter pitcher averaged approximately Nine Runs Prevented; that swelled to approximately 11 Runs Prevented through July, before returning to approximately Nine Runs Prevented on August 12 and plummeting to -1.3 Runs Prevented by August 24. Guerra bottomed out at an average of -9.0 Runs Prevented on September 9, meaning that the righty boasts one of the Top 10 Runs Prevented “declines” during the 2018 season:

What is notable, however, is that despite Guerra’s large decline from May through September, the righty ultimately provided (approximately) average production throughout the season. Ironically, Gio Gonzalez matches this trend for Guerra as well, as the lefty averaged approximately Four Runs Prevented for the Nationals despite falling to below average production by the time he was traded to Milwaukee.

So, the Brewers entered a playoff stretch run by moving one formerly productive starting pitcher into the rotation at the expense of another formerly productive starting pitcher. Yet, Craig Counsell provided Guerra a couple of opportunities to define his relief role while working in close deficits on September 11 and September 15, and the righty also made another appearance during last night’s series closing victory against the Reds.

I’ve dreamed on a Guerra relief role since the beginning, considering the righty’s command stature and splitter as two of the reasons that the righty might morph from a starting pitcher into a reliever. What is fascinating, however, is that while Guerra is absolutely lights out over 3.7 relief innings thus far (5 K / 0 BB / 0 HR / 1.33 GB:FB), that formerly elite splitter is nowhere to be seen. In fact, according to Brooks Baseball, entering Wednesday night’s match-up against the Reds, the righty had almost exclusively worked fastball / breaking ball in relief. At the time of this writing, Brooks Baseball data had yet to reflect Guerra’s last outing, but raw Gameday Play-By-Play suggests that Guerra was once more a two-pitch pitcher.

What is especially stunning about Guerra moving to a fastball / breaking ball relief profile is that the hurler is not even using his slider. According to Brooks Baseball, Guerra’s velocity, vertical movement, and horizontal movement profile on his breaking ball matches his previous “curveball,” rather than his well-known “slider.” Here’s how Guerra’s pitch profile looked as a starting pitcher in 2018:

To emphasize just how different this new version of Guerra looks from the old Guerra, here’s how Brooks Baseball classified his relief work in September 2017:

While it is too early to make note of any velocity changes on the fastball based on standard deviation on Guerra’s September fastballs as a starter and a reliever, it is worth diving into the sharp arsenal change exhibited by Guerra. According to Brooks Baseball, Guerra’s fastball / breaking ball blend is producing more whiffs and groundballs on his fastball than his starting pitching usage of the pitch, while the “curveball” effectively is acting like a splitter in terms of whiffs and groundballs. Notably, this combination of pitches finds Guerra working in entirely new areas of the strike zone with his fastball compared to his previous usage, with the caveat that this is an extremely small number of pitches to draw any meaningful conclusions.

With this curveball offering, however, Guerra has already thrown nearly as many pitches as a reliever compared to his entire time as a starter in 2018, and here it is worth noting that Guerra is scattering the pitch more evenly across the bottom of the strike zone while also moving it away from the upper-armside (inside against a righty bat) area of the zone:

Ultimately, I do not think assessing Guerra’s arsenal shift as a reliever is “much ado about nothing,” as the righty is suddenly answering a crucial question entering potential playoff series: who can help to stretch out close deficits? Granted, in the playoffs, pitchers like Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader will probably experience higher workloads. However, since the Brewers seemingly base Hader’s workload off of his recovery time, adding another reliever that can effectively work a couple of frames is extremely important (especially as starting pitchers work shorter outings as the season winds down). It cannot be understated that Guerra is also working for his future with Milwaukee, a club that is also arguably designing an unorthodox pitching staff that is based around systemic runs prevention rather than standard 1-through-5 starting pitching assessments. This is undoubtedly one reason Guerra had a job to begin with, and undoubtedly one reason the Brewers gave the righty every chance to succeed as a starter. Guerra the reliever could still potentially fit into a 2019 pitching staff that may double down on amorphous roles after general 2018 Runs Prevented success.

Now, perhaps it is time to dream bigger on that relief role for the stretch run, potentially the playoffs, and for 2019; in this regard, it is also time to scrutinize a relief role for Guerra. If it can be stated that Guerra exhausted the utility of his fastball / splitter / slider arsenal in Milwaukee, a new look at a hard, rising fastball and slightly slower curve combination could find the age-33 hurler staying on for at least one more go ’round. In this regard, it’s interesting to think about the pitchers in Milwaukee that have benefited from learning Guerra’s splitter, and now view the righty as a beneficiary of Pitching Coach Derek Johnson’s curveball instruction (recall that this is the pitch that revitalized Jimmy Nelson and Chase Anderson). When one role ends for a pitcher, a new pitch can present a new role; while this should not be viewed as magical thinking, nor a fail-proof development, for now it should be viewed as a new opportunity for Guerra to bolster Milwaukee’s high leverage relief group.

LHP Gio González was the most buzzworthy name acquired by the Brewers prior to the August 31 waiver trade deadline. The aftermath of the trade surprised some because out of his 308 career MLB appearances, only six have been in relief, yet the Brewers did not commit a rotation spot to the new acquisition. Before looking into his potential role in September and potentially beyond, I want to review his season to see what the team can expect.

Throughout his career, González has been a four pitch pitcher. At the time of his debut, the fourseam fastball was his primary pitch and he threw that pitch as well as his curveball on three-fourths of his selections. He rounded out his arsenal with a sinker and a changeup. As his career has progressed, that specific mix has changed, in particular as his average fourseam fastball velocity dipped from a high of 94.2 mph in 2012 to 90.8 in 2018. Now González throws the sinker most frequently, but his usage of all of his pitches has converged between twenty and thirty percent, as this year he is throwing a career low percentage for fourseam fastballs and a career high for changeups.

However, González’s new pitch mix has not produced good results. This season he has a 4.48 Deserved Run Average (DRA), which is his highest number since his late season debut in 2008. National League pitchers are striking out 8.5 batters per nine innings in 2018, up from 8.2 in 2017, yet González’s strikeouts per nine innings have dropped from the league average in 2017 to 7.8 this season. Among all MLB pitchers with at least 140 innings, González ranks forty-third out of sixty-eight pitchers in this ratio.

Naturally, whiffs are the first place to look to see if the veteran is not fooling batters anymore, but González’s swinging strike rate this season is 23.2 percent, slightly up from 2017 and only .6 percent off his career average. The lefty is getting a career low whiff rate on his curveball and his changeup whiff rate has declined for the fourth straight season, but his fastballs are in line with his career numbers. Maybe he should be throwing a few less curveballs when he has two strikes, but nothing in this pitch mix looks like it needs to be immediately corrected.

The usual indicators don’t show anything terribly off with González, yet batters are hitting him harder than before. Compared with 2017, his Statcast numbers have exponentially jumped. He was a top eight percent pitcher according to exit velocity and hard hit percentage last year. In 2018 he’s barely in the top seventy percent in both metrics.

His True Average (TAv)-against is .277, well above his career average of .253 and the highest full season number of his career. His Batting Average on Balls In Play (BABIP) is .319, which is twenty-four points above his career average but not a career high and he’s run much better DRAs in his other season above .300. He’s also right around his career average home run rate, so he isn’t encountering bad luck.

This is not the portrait of a savior for the pitching staff that is in desperate need of a course correction from a terrible August. However, there’s been some speculation that the plan is to use González as more of a long man, turning over a lineup once as a bridge between the brigade of five inning starters and the back end of the bullpen. This season, González has consistently allowed a lower batting average against and isolated slugging earlier in his appearances when compared with hitters’ second and third looks at him, and he gets more swings and misses.

2018 Batting Average Against Times through the Order vs. Overall

2018 Isolated Power Against Times through the Order vs. Overall

2018 Whiff Percentage Times through the Order vs. Overall

González doesn’t vary his pitch mix throughout his starts, which may hurt him as the outing goes on because he isn’t holding any pitch back and hitters are getting looks at everything the first time through the order. If he’s going to pitch this way, the numbers show that he is outperforming his seasonal stats in that first look at the order. González has not relieved since 2009, so asking him to come out of the bullpen is uncharted territory. However, he could be deployed effectively as an opener or as the first option out of the bullpen who can go for two plus innings, depending on where the batting order sits when he enters the game. This usage would make him a non-traditional acquisition, but it fits within the team’s overall strategy and pattern in looking outside the organization for help. The team needed innings, and there’s no reason why González can’t give them four to six effective innings a week, which would be better than ten mediocre innings in a traditional starter’s role.

Curtis Granderson was the lone bat acquired by the team last week, and he fills a narrow niche for the roster as well: lefty masher off the bench who can also spot start in each corner outfield position. As a team, the Brewers are slashing .253/.320/.425 against right handed pitchers, which is slightly above MLB-wide numbers against righties. Granderson’s unimpressive slash line of .245/.342/.430 improves around ten percentage points in each category when his twenty six plate appearances against left handed hitters are removed from his numbers.

Right handed pitchers are looking to locate low and away against Granderson, and a good amount of his five season high swing and miss rate of  27.6 percent is coming on low pitches out of the strike zone. Throughout his career, he’s generated the most power when he’s hitting higher pitches, and that pattern has continued in 2018.

The veteran is showing some age related decline as it appears his bat has gotten a little slower. Granderson has always performed well against fastballs, posting career Isolated Slugging Percentage (ISO) of .313, .250 and .282 against four seamers, sinkers and cutters from right handers, which are his best numbers against all pitches. Those numbers have fallen off this season, and his production has been buoyed by an uncharacteristic performance against split finger fastballs. In addition to catching up to fewer fastballs, Granderson is also whiffing more on breaking balls and offspeed pitches, which could be a sign that he’s cheating to try and catch up to velocity.

In Granderson’s limited role, the Brewers can hide his weaknesses and hopefully coax out a performance even higher than his current numbers against right handed hitters. He’s appeared in three games so far as a Brewer, with one start in between two pinch hitting appearances. That one start was against a pitcher who throws hard and mainly uses fastballs. He has one single and three walks in his six plate appearances. Hopefully his batting eye can be supplemented with some pop over the next month as he provides a breather for the outfield regulars.

The three-game series against the Cubs continues today, then the Brewers will host the San Francisco Giants over the weekend. Before yesterday’s game, the Cubs still had a ninety percent chance of winning the division, with the Brewers taking the crown in two thirds of the other scenarios. The two series against the Cubs and one against the Cardinals are the only head-to-head chances for Milwaukee to increase their odds the rest of the season. The Brewers have the best projected rest of the season performance out of Central division teams, but right now that’s not projected to overtake Chicago. San Francisco has had a disappointing season, which has seen them overperform their Pythagorean Record (estimated from Runs Scored and Runs Allowed) by 5.9 games, which is first in the National League and third in MLB. However, the team will play out September without two of their top three regular position players by TAv as Andrew McCutchen has been traded and Buster Posey is now on the sixty-day disabled list.