Using Baseball Reference multiyear park factors, the Brewers offense finished nearly 30 runs better than their league environment, and Baseball Prospectus park factors have the club performing even better; by True Average, the Brewers are tied with Houston as the fourth best offense in the MLB. According to Baseball Prospectus Batting Park Factor, the actual mix of parks the Brewers batted in was fourth toughest in baseball, meaning that the Brewers were likely to play in environments suppressing runs by approximately five percent.

Like 2018, the Brewers head into next season with a seemingly clear set of positions to improve, and seemingly clear prospects or internal development options to accomplish that goal.

• Orlando Arcia features prominently in calls for offensive improvement, as the elite gloveman suffered serious setbacks at the plate prior to his Triple-A demotions. Arcia’s glove makes roster decisions truly difficult, as the shortstop has impacted the game on the defensive end from the time he reached the MLB. If he bats anywhere near his second half line of .290 average / .320 on-base percentage / .396 slugging, the glove will play (for reference, the eighth batting order spot hit .229 / .304 / .357, so second half Arcia would easily clear that hurdle).

• Second base is a roster challenge, as Noah Nofz highlighted earlier today. It’s easy to dream on the future in terms of Keston Hiura’s potential, but it’s also worth remembering that the Brewers needed to improve center field for 2018 and still traded away their best development options there (Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison). A trade of Hiura is not out of the question should Slingin’ Stearns get requisite return. The trouble is how the Brewers juggle additional roster elements and free agents there, as opposed to the development pains (or pay offs) of sticking with Hiura.

• Catcher is probably the most popular fan option for improving the club, because it offers the flashiest trade opportunity (J.T. Realmuto) and a couple of the best free agents in the 2019 class (e.g., Yasmani Grandal). Yet, it is worth emphasizing the strength of the Brewers’ fielding behind the dish in 2018, in order to frame offensive performance. Neither Manny Pina nor Erik Kratz were that bad at the plate in 2018, and both were exceptional defenders. Using Adjusted Fielding Runs Above Average, which is a fielding statistic adjusted to assess the nuances of throwing, blocking, and framing for catchers, Kratz (11.1, eighth best) and Pina (6.3, nineteenth best) produced plenty of defensive value for the Brewers. Of course, Grandal is the rare free agent catcher that can produce both excellent offensive and defensive value….

• Right field is a difficult position to assess because it’s become quite barren behind Domingo Santana for multiple reasons. First, midseason trades included Brett Phillips, who would have been an excellent candidate for a glove-first, power-speed fourth outfielder to help boost that corner position. Next, Christian Yelich does not produce good defensive value off of left field, which raises questions about Ryan Braun’s future role (in left field) and the value of keeping Yelich’s bat in the order at any defensive cost (September-level production rendered that question moot for the time being). Furthermore, there are not necessarily advanced outfield prospects that would be considered strong enough to knock Santana off of right field. All this either makes right field the perfect position for an external acquisition, or for staying put with Santana.

The trouble, of course, is that should the Brewers simultaneously develop Arcia and Hiura at the MLB level, and keep Kratz and Pina, this entire series of completely justifiable roster moves could produce an offensive black hole in the 6th / 7th / 8th batting spots when things are going rough (or, in Hiura’s case, just getting started). This is where the Brewers’ most important wager occurs: they must weigh the long-term development plays (both Arcia and Hiura have clear “role ceilings” that are better than average at the MLB level) against the need to contend in 2019 (and produce runs to do so). All of this is potentially compounded when one reasonably figures that Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich cannot possibly be expected to be as good as they were last season; obviously this does not mean that they cannot maintain performance or even improve, it just should not be viewed as a certain outcome.

Baseball Prospectus True Average is an effective statistic because it weighs and combines a more complete picture of offensive production than other metrics, and presents the result in an intuitive number similar to batting average. A player with a .260 TAv is an average player. Aspects included in TAv that are not included in some other metrics are situational hitting and errors, plus alternative weights on strike outs and bunts, among other elements. So, let’s use TAv to assess the Brewers offense: with the descriptions above in mind, how do the elements of the club compare to the MLB positional landscape? What is the positional landscape?

Not unlike pitching staffs, positional ranks across the MLB are split among groups of players for each team. The ideal of plugging in a starting player at each position was always just an ideal, as injuries and platoon strategies have been widespread since the early 20th century ballgame; now, MLB front offices may simply be even more willing to try bizarre positional formats (such as the Brewers’ positional flexibility) and substitution patterns (think 2018 L.A. Dodgers, here). Thus, the split between players with 300 (or more) plate appearances and those working below that threshold is quite large.

It should be noted that outside of the corner infield positions, there are no other positions on the diamond where the median player and the regular player are better than average according to TAv. This should be intuitive in some sense, underscoring the importance of teams finding players that can work at least 300 plate appearances in a season. Of course, the median playing time at each position should demonstrate the difficulty of assembling even a group of players that can work 300 PA at a position; often teams will need to rely on a group of players that fall short of even that mediocre playing time threshold. This uneven playing time environment, set against a foundation that establishes the importance of finding a batting order full of regular players, should demonstrate why and how teams can make wagers or trade-offs with their players (for example, the club can weigh Arcia’s shortstop defense against the value of piecing together a couple of other options at the position; that’s just one example).

With this background in mind, let’s compare major 2018 Brewers batters to the median playing time and regular TAv for their respective positions (as grouped by Baseball Prospectus. Note: I have no idea where Eric Thames went in these CSV):

Milwaukee effectively gambled on both Cain and Yelich, who were team leaders in production and playing time beyond the league median. Yet this dynamic top of the order duo hardly exhausted the positions at which the Brewers effectively stacked regulars. Travis Shaw, Ryan Braun, and Jesus Aguilar were each fantastic compared to their respective positional leaguewide performances; Hernan Perez and Manny Pina were not necessarily as far from “average” batting production as most fans think. Outside of regular workloads, Domingo Santana and Mike Moustakas turned out to be crucial depth players, albeit for different reasons. Retaining contractual rights to Aguilar, Braun, Cain, Shaw, and Yelich should be viewed as extremely positive news for the 2019 club, even with all the caveats about regressing performances, etc.

On this model, the benefits of “standing pat” in free agency and trade markets should have some appeal, as one can see that weighing the defense at catcher and shortstop, or simply waiting for Keston Hiura and(or) Mauricio Dubon to arrive at second base need not be viewed as a drag on the offense. In fact, Hernan Perez can probably cover second base in an effective manner to open the season, allowing the Brewers to free up cash and prospect resources to double down on their pitching staff. Right field becomes an interesting question, as Santana’s closing month produced a final True Average that held up against regular MLB right fielders.

Of course, one can expect that David Stearns will not simply stand pat this offseason. The point, then, is to understand that there is no linear narrative about the Brewers bats improving in 2019. This group of players surged to close 2018, made some crucial developmental strides (in the case of Arcia) and mechanical tweaks (in the case of Braun) that could bode well for future performances. There is no clear path to improving the offense without spending significant cash or prospect resources.

Depending on which moves David Stearns and company make this offseason, and how and where Travis Shaw fits into the equation, the middle of the infield figures to be an area of special interest. Young and intriguing players abound, with still more waiting in the wings. Highlighted below are a few of the players most likely to impact up the middle next season.

Major Leagues

Orlando Arcia, SS

Arcia arrived in 2016 shouldering high expectations. He was Milwaukee’s best prospect since Ryan Braun came along in 2007 and changed the history of the franchise. Arcia produced a very nice age-22 season in 2017, finishing with 3.4 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) and vaulting to the top of Milwaukee’s list of talents aged 25 and under, just ahead of Domingo Santana. Times have changed.

Arcia regressed to a .214 True Average (TAv) and 0.0 WARP in 2018, losing playing time to a handful of low-profile players and heading into the All-Star Break below the Mendoza line. After some time sorting out his swing in the minors, he roared back to life in the second half, clawing playing time back from the just-imported Jonathan Schoop and helping to lead the team through their playoff charge.

Arcia is still just 24 years old, is a ton of fun to watch on the infield, and has offered fans glimpses of his offensive potential over the last two years. He’ll be starting at shortstop next spring, perhaps with a somewhat shorter leash than he had at the start of 2018.

Travis Shaw, 2B

Shaw famously crossed over to the right side of the infield at the trade deadline, freeing up the hot corner for Mike Moustakas. He’s 6’4” and 230 pounds, but showed solid glove work and good instincts at the keystone, especially for someone learning on the fly. As lines between positions blur around the league, the big man could see more time at second base in 2019.

Shaw recorded 32 home runs in just under 500 at bats in 2018, marking his second year in a row reaching that milestone. He showed a nice approach at the plate, drawing 78 walks to offset his 108 strikeouts. He also topped the 4-WARP plateau for the second straight season, making him the kind of cheap, under-the-radar star that franchises like Milwaukee need in order to sustain success.

There may be more in the tank. Shaw is still in the midst of his physical prime, and recorded an average exit velocity in 2018 that was right in line with his career norms. Even so, his BABIP dipped 70 points from 2017. Some of this can be attributed to an uptick in fly balls. But if Shaw can add back a few points to his batting average, and perhaps decrease his reliance on pulling the ball in certain counts, 2019 could be the year that he breaks out as one of the better-rounded sluggers in the league.

Jonathan Schoop, 2B/SS

Schoop enjoyed a monster 2017 in Baltimore, accumulating 4.7 WARP and whacking 32 home runs while providing surprisingly good defense at second base. 2018 didn’t go as well, particularly after the trade that sent him to Milwaukee in exchange for Jonathan Villar (still hurts), Luis Ortiz, and Jean Carmona. That’s a bit of a haul, but Schoop was hot, and he’s been a special bat in the past. Milwaukee didn’t get that player; Schoop struggled to a .202/.246/.331 line in 46 games for the Brewers.

Schoop is controllable for 2019, though it’s less clear whether Milwaukee intends to offer him a contract. MLB Trade Rumors pegs his salary at $10.1 million in his final year of arbitration, a hefty sum for a small market team to spend on a player with plenty of question marks. Never a patient hitter, Schoop relies on the quality of his contact to generate value with the bat. Worryingly, his exit velocity, launch angle, hard hit percentage, and barrel percentage were all down in 2018, per Statcast; Schoop actually outperformed his Expected Weighted On-Base Average (xWOBA).

Losing three players for a few weeks of sub-replacement performance would hurt; so would paying $10 M for a player who could end up on the bench. 2019 will be a crucial year for Schoop, no matter whose jersey he ends up wearing.

Hernán Pérez, UTIL

Pérez, 28 next Opening Day, continued to slip a little after an exciting 2016 campaign. Even so, he provided average offense (.258 TAv) and credible defense at seven different positions. There’s value in that. Pérez didn’t manage quite as much power in 2018 as he did the previous two seasons, and his K/BB ratio is as unseemly as ever. He shouldn’t be anyone’s idea of a starting player on a playoff-caliber team at this point, but he’s a fine option to have around in case of injury or early-season ineffectiveness. Projected at a reasonable $2.7 million next year by MLB Trade Rumors, he’s a good guy to have around the back end of the roster.

Tyler Saladino, UTIL

Saladino made some noise upon his initial promotion to Milwaukee, batting .298 in the first half of the season. But he was injured in May, missed all of June, and looked fairly awful in July and September. So in the end, he wound up with a pretty Saladino-esque line of .246/.302/.398. He’s 29 years old, and is projected to make $1.0 million next year by MLB Trade Rumors. He had a nice year in 2016, running up 1.4 WARP in half a season with the White Sox. That’s looking like the peak of his big league career at this point.

Minor Leagues

Mauricio Dubon, 2B/SS

The 2018 season could have gone very differently for Mauricio Dubon. The young infielder tore through his first 27 games in Triple-A, batting .343/.348/.574 with some nice doubles power and not too many whiffs. Then he tore through his ACL, and missed the rest of the season. It was a case of bad timing for Dubon and the Brewers; Orlando Arcia and Eric Sogard were struggling with the big club, and Dubon might have been the first man up. Instead, he’ll aim to occupy that position in 2019.

Dubon makes a lot of contact, and routinely runs strikeout rates in the low-to-mid-teens. He’s quick on the base paths, though not a tremendous threat to steal. And he’s teased some intriguing power at various points in his minor league career, though it tends to come and go. Dubon is a capable defender at shortstop, though he fits better at second base long-term. One knock on his game: He doesn’t walk much. Even so, the floor here is something like Hernán Pérez, perhaps with less ability to roam the outfield grass (though it wouldn’t surprise me to see him shagging some extra fly balls in spring training). As for the ceiling? Well…

Keston Hiura, 2B

Keston Hiura is looking more and more like a blue-chip prospect at the keystone. There’s little remaining doubt about his bat, though he’s oddly susceptible to strikeouts for someone who projects as a Grade 60 or better hitter (on a scale where 50 is average). As many of you know, Hiura combined for a .293 batting average, 13 home runs, and 34 doubles in his first full minor league season, reaching Double-A along the way. Were it not for a minor thumb injury suffered in July, those numbers all may have been better; Hiura’s performance dipped considerably in late July and August. Currently, he’s smacking the ball around to the tune of a .333 average and 30 RBIs in the Arizona Fall League. It’s been said that the man can hit.

Happily, he’s answering questions about his work in the dirt, too. Through last season and into the AFL, Hiura has looked like an average defender at second, maybe a tick below. That’s a great outcome for someone who’s missed so many reps. If Hiura continues to progress at all defensively, he should be able to handle himself just fine at the keystone.

Hiura looks like a threat to hit .300 with 20-25 home runs and a mess of doubles. Even now, he could probably muster a decent-enough slash line against big league pitching. He’ll be up soon; how long the Brewers wait on a promotion may ultimately depend on how well whoever’s making the majority of big league starts is performing.

Free Agents

There are a number of interesting names on the free agent market that could help shore up Milwaukee’s infield depth. That’s particularly true if the Brewers buy into Travis Shaw at second and cast around for upgrades at third. Mike Moustakas is a natural target there, as he performed ably for the Brewers down the stretch and quietly offers average skills on both sides of the ball. He’ll likely get a multi-year deal this time out, but the commitment shouldn’t be too costly, in either dollars or years.

Jed Lowrie, Marwin Gonzalez, Josh Harrison, and Neil Walker could all help at either second or third base. Any of those names could sign for between two and four years, with Gonzalez probably representing the best and most expensive option. But even Josh Donaldson may not be out of reach, depending on how leery teams are of his age and injury history.

Should the Brewers feel that Hiura will be ready to make an impact by mid-season, they could be tempted to simply bridge the gap with a cheap one-year deal. The most logical name, in that case, may be Ian Kinsler’s (Kinsler was also mentioned as a possible target by Andrew Salzman in a piece earlier this month.) Kinsler doesn’t offer too much with the bat anymore, but he still provides solid defense. He turns 37 next year, and will likely settle for a one-year deal.

The Brewers are sending the customary eight delegates to the Fall League this year, mixing well-known names with a few under-the-radar selections. Most fans are familiar with top prospect Keston Hiura, former first-round pick Trent Grisham, and young catcher Mario Feliciano. Bubba Derby, many will remember, was part of the trade that sent Khris Davis to Oakland. That quartet  headlines the group of prospects on their way to Arizona, where they’ll be joined by relievers Miguel Sanchez and John Olczak, both of whom have been covered on the site in recent weeks, and Daniel Brown. That leaves corner utility player Weston Wilson as the eighth man in.

Wilson enjoyed a nice campaign with the bat this year, producing a combined 270 batting average /.326 on-base percentage /.434 slugging percentage between two levels. The majority of that damage came in the Carolina League, where he played 105 games as a Mudcat and hit .274/.330/.446 for a healthy True Average (TAv) of .273 before a late-season bump to Biloxi. That continues something of a trend for Wilson, who split the 2017 season between Wisconsin and Carolina, hitting quite well at the former and scuffling some upon his promotion. The optimist’s view here is that Wilson makes adjustments as he develops, enduring some early struggles only to emerge a stronger, smarter ballplayer the following year. Someone less inclined to rose-colored glasses may point out that Wilson, a 16th round draftee out of Clemson in 2016, has always started the year a little old for his level, and simply performed in the low minors much as a decent college hitter should. Neither is a bad thing, really. But as a point of comparison, bear in mind that Wilson was drafted the same year as Ronnie Gideon, and signed for a similar bonus. Both hitters destroyed Rookie League ball in 2016, but their paths diverged after that: Wilson hit well for the Timber Rattlers, conquered the Mudcats, and has advanced to Double-A; Gideon struggled in Appleton for a full year, failed to do much for Carolina, and was released mid-season. Wilson may not be a highly-touted prospect, but he is separating himself from his peers in that particular cohort.

Something else to endear Wilson to the Milwaukee faithful: He’s capable of playing all over the field. Wilson started games at first, second, third base, and shortstop, as well as in left and right field this year, racking up most of his innings at first, third, and in left. The eye test reveals at least an average defender; Baseball Prospectus sees his defense as a potential plus. Wilson accumulated 7.3 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) in the minors this year, a strong mark for any player. That’s a bit out of tune with his earlier defensive value (1.8 FRAA in 2017, -3.1 FRAA in 2016), but certainly enough to suggest a competent fielder. As positional labels begin to lose meaning across the league, Wilson’s comfort with moving around the diamond could become a true asset.

Monitoring Wilson’s development in Arizona and beyond should provide plenty of interest. His 2018 season was carried by a monster month of July, wherein he hit .436/.481/.681 across 27 games and 106 red-hot plate appearances. That came after a putrid June which saw him bat .176/.220/.253 in a similar amount of playing time. Ideally, he’d smooth over those kinds of extreme streaks in the future. He’ll also have to prove that he’s capable of handling advanced pitching at the Double-A and Triple-A levels. Happily, there’s some indication that he’s already begun that journey. Though he finished the regular season hitting .239/.286/.326 (.238 TAv) in a dozen games for the Shuckers, he caught fire in the postseason, going 10-for-27 with a pair of doubles for a .370/.452/.444 line in eight games. Fold that into his regular season work, and he hit .288/.342/.370 wearing a Shuckers uniform. Not shabby for a super-utility sort.

Prior to 2018, Wilson was best known as the prospect who proposed to his girlfriend after she threw out a ceremonial first pitch (incidentally, the video clip in that link suggests that Wilson could bring considerable value as a pitch framer, should he ever encounter the tools of ignorance). Another season like his last could change that in a hurry, especially if he shows well in Arizona next month. Should Wilson continue to develop as he has, he could be manning the diamond Hernán Pérez-style with fellow 2018 Shucker (and partner-in-rhyme) Keston Hiura for years of competitive Brewers baseball to come. Don’t be surprised if you start to see a #FreeWestonWilson campaign start to crop up next year or the year after, and be sure to check out Wilson this fall if you have a chance.

Related Reading:
Who is Hernan Perez? || What is Hernan’s Value?

An Ode to Chumps || Channeling Cleveland

On the face of it, Hernan Perez looks like a potential non-tender candidate. If one cites the “bubble gum slash” of batting average (AVG) / on-base percentage (OBP) / slugging percentage (SLG), Perez’s .267 / .301 / .424 line looks like relatively easy production to replace. According to the Baseball Prospectus Team Audit, Perez’s True Average (TAv) of .276 ranks sixth among players with more than 200 plate appearances. By total Wins Above Replacement Player (1.1), Perez’s overall batting and fielding production ranks sixth on the team. When one assesses his three-(and a half)-year WARP profile against his remaining two years of salary arbitration, Perez exhibits a depreciated surplus of approximately $14 million and a maximum surplus of approximately $17 million. In short, taking into consideration park context, league context, fielding context, and long-term production makes Perez’s profile look better than his surface statistics, but the superutility player hardly appears to be indispensable (for example, Scooter Gennett boasted a depreciated surplus of approximately $11 million and maximum surplus of approximately $15 million when the Brewers released him). Now, there are more data to reassess the valuation of perhaps the best rag-tagger among our Beloved Milwaukee Nine.

As I’ve written in the past (see above links in “Related Reading”), the value of Hernan Perez goes well beyond simple replacement player theory and surface statistics. Specifically, the fielding flexibility profile of Perez is historically singular, which should not be viewed as mere trivia. My past arguments about Perez can be summarized in such a manner: while Perez may not be viewed as a true starting player, he fills the gap between minor-league replacements and short-term, part-time roster filler in a manner that significantly improves his value. Basically, manager Craig Counsell can trust Perez to be relatively competent at the plate, surely better than nearly any organizational depth minor-league call-up, while also provided decent infield defense and excellent outfield defense (including a rather solid right field arm).

At Baseball Prospectus, Russell A. Carlton recently provided defensive data to analyze replacement fielding depth across the league, in order to address concerns about how to value fielding in the “Wins Above Replacement Player” model. Carlton’s feature is necessary reading to get into the “guts” of fielding, especially to answer the question of how good, or bad, a player might be expected to be if they simply move to a new fielding position. If I may expand on Carlton’s argument, I believe this defensive analysis can further improve claims about Perez’s fielding value: basically, hardly anyone across the league is able to provide consistent, quality, flexible defense, especially not when they are moved to new fielding positions (on average). This amplifies Perez’s value because it suggests that the “replacement cost” for “oh crap, I need a right fielder” (or “oh crap, I need a second baseman”, or “oh crap, I need [insert any other fielding position here]”) is much higher than the seemingly minimal cost of expending a 40-man roster spot and prorated league minimum salary (e.g., prorating the league minimum salary to the number of days needed at a given position). Hernan Perez provides two clear advantages to Counsell (and Stearns): he’s now a known quantity at every defensive position except catcher, and he’s already on the roster every. day. of. the. season. This cost certainty and role certainty should not be underrated.

To expand on this logic, I assembled two “back-of-the-envelope” analyses of Perez’s profile. First, I sought to assess his fielding profile in comparison to other part-time fielders across the league. These players were limited in two ways: on the one hand, I analyzed players with fewer than 75 percent of their fielding games at a position serving as starts (this arguably seeks out flexibility and in-game substitutions). On the other hand, I analyzed players within a certain threshold of Hernan Perez’s games at a given position (ranging from 40 at second base to fewer than 10 games at first base and center field). This amounted to more than 130 second basemen, 150 right fielders, 120 third basemen, 150 left fielders, 70 short stops, 100 first basemen, and 75 center fielders. These numbers alone should begin to demonstrate Perez’s value, and using the scouting-based Baseball Info Solutions Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) statistic underscores Perez’s value across each position:

On the whole, Perez is at least one run better than the average fielding player making less than 75 percent of their starts at the positions he plays, and he’s at least three runs better than the average fielding player working a comparable number of fielding games at each position. This type of profile should be compounded, however, when one considers that in each “replacement case” (i.e., each time Counsell and Stearns need to produce a RF, 2B, SS, 3B, LF, 1B, CF), the Brewers could have implemented another substitution or roster strategy requiring multiple players. Instead, the Brewers employ one player who is not materially worse than the average MLB comparison at each position, and who is in many cases better than the average MLB comparison at each position. Milwaukee has somehow landed on the flexible defensive roster replacement that they can employ throughout the season and receive overall quality play across the board.

My second question was simple: how do these players bat? Here I collected the batting stats of each individual player involved at these fielding positions, and assessed average, median, and <300 PA (comparable to Perez’s workload at the plate) batting statistics. For ease of calculation, I used basic Runs Created per Plate Appearance, which leans heavily on hits, walks, and total bases without sweating the small stuff. The table below summarizes these analyses, focusing on the basic slash line (AVG / OBP / SLG), Runs Created, and Power Speed number (PwrSpd), which I included because Hernan Perez is fighting to finish 2018 as a Top 50 Power Speed player (which takes the harmonic mean between Stolen Bases and Home Runs, or [(2*HR*SB)/(HR+SB)]).

Any sense that Perez is a liability at the plate ought to be called into question when compared with the batting production of relevant replacements. First and foremost, the Power Speed profile should not be underplayed, as that is a key area of the Brewers’ team batting identity and thus Perez’s value is amplified by meeting several important criteria for their run production (e.g., he can hit homers and steal bases). Second, the comparable players that the Brewers could employ to meet Perez’s defensive workload at each position….are not very good on the whole. Thus Perez is anywhere from one-to-eight runs better than his potential replacements, depending on how one prorates their batting production.

On the whole, Hernan Perez remains a singular player in the history of baseball. As more teams work to employ positional-flexible players, it will always be worth questioning the importance of Perez is demonstrating that that type of role can be truly playable in the MLB. It must be the case that as opposing GMs and managers watch the Brewers over the years, they wonder “How can I get my own Hernan?” Additionally, Perez can play nearly every position on the diamond with passable-to-good defense, while out-producing his potential replacements when he enters the batter’s box. As a bonus, Perez employs a dynamic offensive profile, meaning that he can hit the ball far when he runs into one, and he can cause some amount of trouble on the basepaths.

When the roster crunch comes this winter, do not pencil Hernan Perez into the “non-tender” category based on his surface performance and the fact that he is a “bench player.” In fact, much like other oddly-profiled players making a name for themselves in Milwaukee (everyone from Junior Guerra and Manny Pina to Josh Hader and even Jesus Aguilar come to mind here), there is a chance that Perez is one of the underrated reasons this whole operation works. Indeed, the team-building success in 2017 and 2018 demonstrates that there is a certain class of profiessional that is, simply, “a Brewers player.” I would even argue that given the future potential costs of developing this type of player, or replacing them, the Brewers ought to offer a contract extension to Perez. The Brewers’ superutility player could easily be worth a three-year, $20 million contract range, and if the club leverages Perez’s arbitration status for a lower contractual figure it should be viewed as a significant bargain.

New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KBQ19VcMZ4g7oW1jkGiYwxCadqjw3rYXkqN200f4lHc/edit?usp=sharing

This is not even some “to-be-expected” regression, as even if one wishes to look at Deserved Runs Average (DRA) throughout the season as a “true” measure of the Brewers talent (which should be cautioned), the Brewers would have been expected to allow anywhere between 23 and 30 fewer second half runs than they actually have allowed.

This is unforeseen and catastrophic.

The blame can be spread around to everyone, from the post-forearm injury Junior Guerra (10 IP, 9 runs on July 24 & 29), injured reliever Matt Albers (1.7 IP, 10 R), former? closer Corey Knebel (9.3 IP, 8 R entering Sunday), and even rookie rotation depth Freddy Peralta (19 IP, 17 R since the break). Worse yet, there is a sense of adding insult to injury, as newly acquired Joakim Soria hit the disabled list promptly after surrendering a grand slam home run in a devastating loss to San Diego, and quietly effective Taylor Williams hit the disabled list with an elbow injury. While fans will feel less sympathy for Matt Albers, who had a couple of different bouts of ineffectiveness surrounded by separate disabled list stints, the veteran righty was crucial to early season success (25 IP, 4 R through the end of May) and each day his injury status and effectiveness is not answered is a day that manager Craig Counsell must carefully ration Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader with little back-up. The same goes for Williams, and now Soria; while Jacob Barnes was previously an impact reliever and boasts solid peripherals and a 2.99 Deserved Run Average (DRA), his runs prevention performance in 2018 has not been to the level of that injured trio, and now it’s Barnes, Corbin Burnes, and Jordan Lyles trying to nail down the quietly effective support roles.

It’s as simple as this: the Brewers’ bullpen has two truly fantastic options in Jeffress and Hader, and those options will be great regardless of their surrounding cast. For the purposes of contending, however, this duo is amplified when Stearns’s excellent depth picks (Albers, Williams, even Corbin Burnes), closer (Knebel), and additional acquisitions (Soria) are performing well. Jeffress and Hader cannot do it themselves.

Injuries have also trimmed the rotation, as Brent Suter’s torn elbow ligament and Zach Davies’s back ailments have limited the Brewers’ effective rotational depth. Using Baseball Reference Three Year Park factors, both Suter and Davies combined for 18 Runs Prevented over 273 innings in 2017, offering excellent middle and replacement rotation depth. That level of impact depth performance will not be matched by the duo in 2018. Additionally, even if one could have argued that the club might not have expected Jimmy Nelson to return from his shoulder injury in 2018, having that materialize as a likely injury-scenario reality in 2018 is quite another ballgame. Consider this as Freddy Peralta meets a likely innings limit, Chase Anderson continues an uneven season, and Brandon Woodruff finds himself without a rotational role: #TeamDepth is now basically #TeamNecessity in terms of rotation building.

There’s no need to state it any other way: as much as one would like to criticize the Brewers pitching staff, and GM David Stearns for his failure to build a staff, the club is now to the point where injuries are diminishing even his strongest moves. The Soria trade looms loudest here, as the Brewers grabbed a legitimate high leverage, veteran reliever at the trade deadline and did not get six innings from his right arm before he hit the DL with a groin injury; Albers and Williams could be fan whipping posts when they were ineffective, but the Albers free agency deal looked like a brilliant low-cost gamble early in the season while Williams seemed poised to catapult himself into the high leverage workload discussion (Williams worked a 17.3 IP, 5 R stretch, Holding three leads, from June until the All Star Break).

Citing injuries to the pitching staff is not an “excuse” for the poor performance.

It would have been enough to deal with this group of recent injuries and setbacks, but the Brewers also simultaneously were gifted with a set of role reversions on the pitching staff. Corey Knebel’s descent from excellent closer in 2017 cost the Brewers a chance at a truly elite relief corps; according to Baseball Reference Three Year Park Factors, Knebel prevented nearly 25 runs in 2017. Even a 50 percent regression from that performance level would fit nicely with Jeffress and Hader, who have both been consistent Top 25 pitchers in the 2018 MLB. Add in the aforementioned struggles of Peralta, Barnes, and a bit of stalled usage from the shuttled Houser (he’s only worked two MLB appearances from July onward), and Counsell’s strategic options are looking much more thin while they are also being exasperated by some ineffective starts.

Beyond these role question marks, it is worth questioning the timing of the inclusion of Jorge Lopez in the Mike Moustakas trade. Since Lopez has served the season as an up-and-down member of the Triple-A / MLB “shuttle team” relief squad, discussions of the quality of Lopez’s performance were largely nonexistent at the trade deadline (I’m also guilty of this charge). But, it is worth emphasizing that as a back-roster depth strategy, the “shuttle team” prevented runs at a solid clip, especially when one considers the nature of this replacement role and the likely quality of other replacement pitchers to be acquired in their place.

In fact, these shuttle relievers combined to produce near-average aggregate performance for the Brewers, which leads one to question why Stearns traded Lopez and simultaneously decided to keep Brandon Woodruff at the Triple-A level to serve as replacement starting pitching depth. With Lopez in the Royals system and Woodruff now serving as starting pitching depth, the revolving door relief strategy is effectively dead at what could be the worst time of the season. Given that Woodruff boats a 3.55 DRA at the MLB level to accompany a 52 percent ground ball rate, while also demonstrating an average DRA at Colorado Springs with a consistent ground ball rate there, it is worth questioning why Stearns has not simply replaced Peralta with Woodruff (on the one hand) or simply promoted Woodruff to a steady MLB relief role (on the other hand). According to Brooks Baseball, the relief role is agreeing with Woodruff, who is throwing a sizzling 95-to-96 MPH fastball with more armside run than his 2017 variation, complete with steady change up and slider usage (both with more whiffs than in 2017, too).

This is not a bottomless pit (yet). That the Brewers remain the 12th best pitching staff in the MLB, within one standard deviation of the 10th spot, and sixth best pitching staff in the National League, should demonstrate just how good the club has been for most of the year. Indeed, this pitching staff has fallen off, and it’s important to underscore that it’s not simply “regression,” but a bad combination of regression, injuries, and strategic missteps at the worst possible time. But there could be a quick way out of this issue for the club:

• Get Zach Davies healthy, without any further setbacks, and use him to replace Freddy Peralta in the rotation.

• Develop an MLB role for Brandon Woodruff; preferably this would be a rotational role to spell another ineffective starter down the stretch (or add a sixth man for September), but even a well-defined one-inning bullpen role could be extremely helpful at the moment.

• Re-evaluate depth roles for Ariel Hernandez, Jordan Lyles, Alec Asher, and Aaron Wilkerson, and make any necessary waiver trades to boost the pitching staff. E.g., is Jordan Lyles the right arm to work in the shadow of the successful Triple-A shuttle crew? Is now the best time to make a potential long-term development play for Ariel Hernandez?

• Reconsider Adrian Houser’s shuttle role in favor of a regular one-inning role.

With the assumption that some combination of Soria, Albers, and Williams can get healthy for the stretch run, and that some of the “role regression” pitchers can make adjustments at the MLB level once again, this is a pitching staff that can improve quickly and regain its flexible frontier of roles and runs prevention that were celebrated in April and May. With Zach Davies healthy, a waiver trade acquisition (or two), and potentially prominent roles for two righties that can rush it up there (Woodruff and Houser), this pitching staff can rebound. Now we wait and watch.

Earlier this offseason, second base was a primary concern for Brewers fans. Most assumed that GM David Stearns would bring back midseason acquisition Neil Walker. That hasn’t happened yet, and although Walker is still a free agent, it seems the team is content rolling with the pieces they’ve got at the position: Jonathan Villar, Eric Sogard, and Hernan Perez.

This Spring will determine who will be the Brewers starting second baseman on March 29th.

If a decision were to be made based on the 2017 season alone, the thirty-one-year-old Sogard would be the obvious choice. Sogard enjoyed a .393 on-base percentage (OBP) over 299 plate appearances in 2017, thanks in large part to his walk rate of 15.1 percent. He was one of just three batters with over 190 plate appearances with a walk-to-strikeout ratio above 1, joining Joey Votto and Justin Turner.

However, Sogard hasn’t always been an on-base machine. In 1,327 plate appearances over six partial seasons prior to 2017, he had an OBP of .296 and a walk rate of 6.9 percent.

Sogard’s increase in walk rate can be attributed to a simple decrease in swings. He swing rate dipped just below 35 percent in 2017, after hovering around 40 percent prior to last season. He began swinging less frequently at pitches not only outside of the zone, but inside of the zone as well.

Sogard has always been regarded as a terrific infielder. If the veteran can somehow manage to maintain his elite walk rate, he will be the an above average starting second baseman and possibly hit towards to the top of the Brewers lineup.

But history shows Sogard has been a well-below average hitter throughout his career. If pitchers adjust and begin throwing him more strikes, he will be forced to put the ball in play and rely on his weak power profile. 299 plate appearances are not enough to conclude that Sogard is a completely different hitter, which is why the next couple guys are going to get their licks.

Jonathan Villar is the primary competition for Sogard. Villar himself is a testament as to why one season can’t be the end all be all when it comes future performance. Similar to Sogard, if a decision were to be made based on the 2016 season alone, Villar would be the obvious choice.

Villar dominated in 2016, stealing 62 bases and hitting 19 home runs, producing a .826 on-base plus slugging percentage (OPS). He was the obvious fit to start at second base prior to last season.

And then he struggled. Villar made 436 plate appearances and stole 23 bases while sporting an .665 OPS in 2017. His poor offensive output forced the Brewers to search for a replacement.

Villar comes into camp this year fighting for his job back. Even if he finds himself somewhere in between his 2016 and 2017 self, it’s easy to see him being a solid starting second baseman. He is still just twenty-six-years-old, which means there’s a possibility his best days are ahead of him.

The Brewers have stacked the rest of their lineup, particularly in the outfield, which means they can afford to run with Sogard or Villar at second base and running the risk that neither of them will be a true starting caliber player. The question then is, which one is going to garner the bulk of the playing time?

If the team was forced to choose, Villar, who has a much higher ceiling than the older, less athletic Sogard, should receive the bulk of the playing time.

Villar has the ability to push the Brewers’ offense to another level. Sogard, at his best, will just move the lineup along. It’s hard to see Sogard ever reaching double digit home run numbers in the major leagues. Villar has 20+ home run power on top of being one of best base stealers in the league when he’s healthy.

In reality, both players are going to receive their fair-share of playing time unless one sticks out. If one or the other can regain their career-year form, the Brewers won’t have a single hole in their lineup.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

These projections will not be perfectly accurate come season’s end, but they provide a good starting point for analyzing the Brewers’ upcoming season.  The Brewers will have a decent shot at making the playoffs, but whether that actually happens will (obviously) be determined by which players over- or under-perform their projections and by how much.  And as some players are more risky than others, who gets significant playing time can play a big role in whether a team significantly overshoots their projection.

PECOTA tells an interesting story for the Brewers, as the six-win gap to the Cubs seems as if it should be significant.  Because of the stratification of talent across the big leagues, however, that gap is by far the smallest between the top two teams in any division (the nine-win gap between the Yankees and Red Sox is next).  The Brewers and Cardinals are the teams most likely to “steal” a division title and earn their playoff spot without having to go through the wild card round, so they should see greater incentive than other potential wild card teams to close the gap between themselves and the Cubs.

Just because a division title is plausible does not mean the Brewers should mortgage the future to reach for that goal, though.  They are still early in their competitive cycle, so trading young talent for short-term upgrades does not make sense.  What could make sense, though, is spending money on shorter-term free agent deals that will improve the team now but come off the books before any long-term extensions are required.

But another way to impact playoff odds is through deciding what types of players to give playing time to.  The goal is always to put the best players on the field, but players have different risk profiles.  There is not a ton of difference between the projections for Jonathan Villar (.244 TAv) and Eric Sogard (.238 TAv), for example, but Villar is more likely to give you a three-win season than is Sogard.  Sogard, however, is probably less likely to be a negative.

Because Villar is a higher-variance option, he gives the Brewers a better chance at exceeding their projections than would someone like Sogard or Hernan Perez.  Whether the Brewers want this, however, is an open question.  They are closer to first place than any other second-place team, so one possible path is to play for as low-variance a season as possible and hope the Cubs disappoint again.  Another option would be to take advantage of how close they are and be more aggressive.

This impacts Villar because it dictates how long his leash should be.  If he starts the season as the everyday second baseman but struggles out of the gates, the Brewers could be tempted to replace him.  If they are willing to take on higher risk, though, they should continue to give him playing time because his upside is such (at least as compared to Sogard or Hernan Perez) that he could help them close the gap on the Cubs.

If the Brewers do choose this path, and Villar does not turn it around but is instead a replacement-level player and they miss the playoffs by a game, that does not necessarily mean that the team made a mistake.  Even with perfect information, which even major league baseball teams do not have, it is impossible to predict how any individual player will fare in a particular season.  When teams are deciding how to allocate playing time, risk profile should be one of the factors taken into consideration.

Because big-league teams have better information than we do as fans, a reasonable temptation is to ask them to be perfect and accurately predict what will happen with each player in the upcoming season.  They cannot do that, though.  Their models are probably more accurate than are the public ones, at least in part because they have access to more information and so their inputs are better.  But they still cannot perfectly predict player performance, as the continuing existence of free agent bargains indicates, so instead they are playing probabilities.

Villar is a good illustration of this type of player.  The Brewers cannot know exactly what they will get from him, but his 2016 performance shows that he can be a good player.  Whether that player will show up in 2018 is an open question, but the Brewers would be justified in letting him play to see whether he can be productive and push the team towards a potential division title.  Because the Cubs are a more talented team, the Brewers have to take some risks if they want to try and catch them.  Giving Villar an extended run at second base would qualify.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

In 2017, Jonathan Villar performed so badly that the club had to bring in Neil Walker to play second base while they pushed for the playoffs.  Although they fell short and missed the wild card game, Walker performed admirably.  In 38 games with Milwaukee, Walker posted a .305 True Average (TAv) and was worth 0.9 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP).  One win from Walker in a quarter of the season is a good output, as it represented an upgrade over Villar’s season-long .242 TAv and 0.8 WARP.

As we are all aware, though, the Brewers have not yet re-signed Walker.  The only infield transactions they’ve made have been re-signing Eric Sogard and adding Mauricio Dubon to the 40-man roster.  Both Sogard and Dubon profile as more utility types than everyday second basemen, though, so their presence should not preclude an actual upgrade.  Both are capable of playing the position, but neither is good enough that the Brewers—a team with playoff aspirations—should be satisfied.

Walker is the most obvious solution.  He is not a superstar, but he is a solid player, and he may be available on a shorter, one- or two-year deal because the free agent market has collapsed.  From 2013 through 2016, Walker had been worth between 2.9 and 3.5 WARP.  That is a valuable player, and that level of consistency would be useful for a team that will be relying on some high-variability players (Lewis Brinson, Orlando Arcia) for their playoff push in 2018.  Even during last season, which was a down year by Walker’s standards, was not actually that bad, as his cumulative 1.7 WARP still made him worthy of a roster spot.

But as I mentioned above, the offseason is coming to a close, and the Brewers are running out of time.  This doesn’t matter so much if Walker is the solution, because the free agent market as a whole is moving slowly.  But if Walker signs elsewhere, the late date in the calendar makes working on a contingency plan more difficult.  Free agents are likely to sign quickly once the dominoes start falling simply because of the lack of time left in the winter, and the second base free agent market is not that deep.  There just aren’t that many exciting options; Danny Espinosa is the only one who appears slightly intriguing.

This late stature in the offseason also matters because it decreases the amount of time for a potential trade.  I don’t know what the Brewers front office is working on, and I imagine they are working on upgrades at basically every position.  But they cannot be pursuing every angle at once, so if Walker is the first choice, then pivoting to finding trade partners will still take some time.

Spring training is quite long, so one could argue that there is no need to make a move in the next month anyway.  A spring training trade, or even an April trade, would bring in a player early enough that the Brewers’ overall season would not be impacted.  The front office does not stop working once spring training starts or Opening Day arrives, so whether reinforcements arrive on January 30 or March 30 may not matter all that much.  The timing of these moves do matter, though, because the Brewers are at a bit of a crossroads in terms of how willing they are to push for the playoffs this year.  If they are waiting until March or April to address this kind of need, then they are unlikely to also be investing resources in a starting pitcher.  Thus, while the timing of when exactly a new second baseman arrives is mostly irrelevant, it would be indicative of the club’s broader strategy.

This article works on the assumption that an upgrade is needed, and I think the club believes that as well.  David Stearns has proven himself too smart to think that Eric Sogard is a long-term option; despite his 1.257 OPS in May, he finished the year with an OPS of just .770.  Even this was over one hundred points higher than his career mark of .638.  Mauricio Dubon is unproven, and questions remain about his bat.  The Brewers seem to love Hernan Perez, but he has a career .244 TAv, and he backslid from his seeming improvement in 2016.  That leaves Villar, who had a disappointing year and appears to have lost the club’s trust.  Even though he ended the season well (.888 OPS following the Walker trade), he could not regain his playing time, as he got only 63 plate appearances in the last 42 games of the season.  Villar was given a long rope, as no move was made to replace him until mid-August, but the rope did look as if it ran out.

Craig Counsell’s use of Villar in August and September suggests to me that the club does not view him as a solution at second base.  If that is the case, then an external option must be in the cards.  Because of the glacial pace of the free agent market, though, if Neil Walker is not that player, the Brewers are running out of time to find a backup.

Photo Credit: Charles LeClaire, USAToday Sports Images

Those narratives will undoubtedly carry into 2018 guided by the very same contradictions: Milwaukee will indeed be developing many young players at the MLB level (including Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, and Brandon Woodruff), while the team also has several opportunities to improve with established players (either through trades involving their prospects, through free agency signings, or both).

To put it another way: GM David Stearns can take the roster in several directions, and certainly has the resources available to contend while continuing to develop some players.

One way to assess player value, and therefore roster needs, is to estimate the surplus value that each player (and their contractual situation) provides the team. Value is assumed to be production and scarcity, recognizing that a player is not simply valuable to a club based on production, but also based on cost and the general availability of that skill set within the MLB. Surplus is the difference provided between a player’s production and their contract, recognizing that these aspects can be double-counted (a team simultaneously receives a player’s production on the field and their production gauged against their contract). Based on these assumptions, I tracked the surplus value of the Brewers 40-man roster (as of October 20, 2017) by using harsh depreciation to reduce each player’s maximum value (recognizing that a player’s performance typically declines over time save for rare cases).

The following chart tracks changes in surplus entering 2017 to entering 2018, while also assigning an Overall Future Potential (OFP) role for each Brewers roster member:

What these surplus numbers can suggest, in the abstract, is the difference between “the number of the wins above replacement” a player will produce during their contract and the OFP a team might receive if they traded the player at this point in time (alternately, they might suggest a contract range; for example, if the Brewers offered Neil Walker a $30 million contract, they would likely retain some surplus value during that contract).

Using the extremely interesting and difficult case of Jonathan Villar to interpret this table, his 2016 campaign and contract control years still loom large enough to suggest that the Brewers should not move the infielder for cheap; but the shortstop-turned-bench/utility option does mean that Villar’s ultimate role is trending downward, meaning that if Milwaukee believes that role decline is real and will continue to materialize, moving Villar for less than his top value could offset the issues of rostering a declining role. This should outline the difficulty of making roster decisions: in the case of Villar, there is not necessarily a right answer.

I should add that surplus value is abstract in the sense that there is a point at which additional surplus does not provide a team transaction value. Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter should be the most specific examples of this phenomenon in recent Brewers memory, as both players retained solidly positive surplus value entering 2017, but were essentially unwanted on the trade market and therefore expendable for nothing. Following this example, a rule of thumb might be to expect any type of roster move once a player’s surplus value dips below $20 million (or, less than three wins above replacement). Looking at the table of the Brewers roster above, this fact should seem intuitive with many of the names on the list (for example, it is highly unlikely that the Brewers would be able to move a player like Andrew Susac or even Eric Thames for their maximal surplus value).

By averaging each player’s 2017, 2018, and OFP surplus value, and comparing that to their change in value over time, a rather intuitive 2018 roster emerges. In this case, I excluded each player with a Negative-50 percent change in value (ex., a 50 percent decline), which produced need at Catcher, Second Base, and Right-Handed Pitcher, with additional question marks about the Utility roles. This is a rather succinct picture of the actual needs for the 2018 Brewers, and it also shows that if a few key free agents are retained, or similar free agents from outside the organizational signed, the Brewers can assemble quite a good roster:

These tables need not force an analyst to rely on numbers alone in order to validate roster decisions. Compare the following descriptions of potential role upgrades for the 2018 Brewers with those players’ statistical trends, and find nearly 20 roster spots (on the 40-Man) that can be upgraded for 2018:

The benefit of this exercise is that additional roster functions can be analyzed, either through descriptive or analytical means. For example, one could compare some of the best Rule 5 Draft Roster Protection candidates with the players above in order to find the most salient moves for the future value of the organization. Via Brewerfan.net:

Once again, this should exhibit a rather intuitive process of evaluation. If the future value of a catcher such as Jacob Nottingham is better than either Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy (or all three players), it should not hurt to lose one of those players in order to roster Nottingham. Each of these catchers are good candidates for contractual non-tenders for this reason (and, indeed, catcher is a position that the Brewers can upgrade in terms of depth behind/alongside Manny Pina). Similarly, allowing Matt Garza to walk via free agency and rostering Marcos Diplan, Freddy Peralta, or Devin Williams in that place should improve the pitching surplus of the roster. Where it gets more interesting is considering a player like Mauricio Dubon, and whether he simply takes the spot of free agent Eric Sogard, or overtakes Villar or Hernan Perez.

Using these analytical approaches should validate the fact that the Brewers are in a unique position entering 2018. They are a good team, indeed, that also features many up-and-coming players to develop at the MLB level and many declining roles that can be replaced. Where surplus value becomes useful is targeting particular trades, or simply determining when a player should be released or non-tendered.

A player like Keon Broxton, Perez, Susac, or Vogt should demonstrate this difficult decision-making process, and perhaps cause fans to realign their expectations that these types of players can receive impactful trade returns to Milwaukee. Given the packed outfield for 2018, the Brewers could conceivably release a player like Broxton should trade partners refuse to bite with a 45-to-50 OFP / quality depth trade (matching Broxton’s $11.5M-to-$19.8M surplus), for the trouble is that Broxton’s expected role is indeed declining (and any particular trade partner will also know that). This should not simply be viewed as picking on Broxton, as the point exists for Vogt and several other players on the roster.

“Slingin’ Stearns” earned his nickname for wheeling-and-dealing on the trade market during his first offseason in Milwaukee, but that reputation has calmed over time (not surprisingly, as the club completed their rebuilding process). Stearns did not show any hesitation in aggressively using waiver claims and releases to define his 2016-2017 offseason, and now the GM’s reputation may be defined by how effectively he clears roster space for what’s next: refined future development and improved MLB roles to contend in 2018.

The 2017 season proved that these goals can align and coexist within the same roster, so there are no excuses for failing to improve this strategy by learning from the 2017 progression.

Photo Credit: Jim Young, USAToday Sports Images.

That narrative started to change on March 28, when the Cincinnati Reds claimed Gennett off waivers. The loss barely registered on most fans’ radars. A blip of nostalgia, perhaps, but these were the rebuilding Milwaukee Brewers. We’re used to players coming and going. In actuality, Gennett’s sudden departure was the first in a series of unexpected events that engulfed second basemen throughout the Brewers’ system. (Perhaps the most unexpected? Scooter’s .308 Total Average (TAv) and 24 dingers in 435 plate appearances for the division-rival Reds.)

As 2017 winds down, it’s safe to say that the second base picture has grown considerably more murky. Here’s a brief overview of the state of the position up and down the organization.

Major Leagues
Jonathan Villar got off to a miserable start this season, hitting only .221 before the All-Star break and battling a lower back injury in June. Even before the injury, ineffectiveness cost Villar significant playing time. The Brewers summoned utility infielder Eric Sogard from Class-AAA in mid-May, and the diminutive veteran’s hot start in Milwaukee left Villar the odd man out. It was scarcely the follow-up the club had hoped for from Villar, who led the majors with 62 stolen bases and recorded a .826 OPS last year. Villar earned his long leash, but he deserved his reduced role this summer. He’s provided fans a glimmer of hope since the break, batting .288/.306/.415 while working at second and dabbling in center field.

Sogard, meanwhile, won hearts across Brewers nation with a monstrous first half, in which he batted .331/.438/.485. He, too, was bit by the injury bug this season, landing on the 10-day disabled list with a left ankle strain in early July. He hasn’t been the same player since making his way back to the active roster, as evidenced by a paltry .171/.276/.224 triple-slash in the second half. The 31-year-old is a free agent at the end of the season, meaning his days in Milwaukee blue may be numbered.

The versatile Hernan Perez has occasionally spelled Sogard and Villar this year, and he’s done so with aplomb. Brewers brass prefers Perez in a super-utility role, though, so he shouldn’t be considered a long-term solution at the keystone. The same goes for Yadiel Rivera, who made only one brief trip to the majors in his final option year, going hitless in a pair of plate appearances.

Dissatisfied with a slumping Sogard and inconsistent Villar, the Brewers acquired Neil Walker from the New York Mets on August 12 for a player to be named. Walker has been a steady contributor this year, amassing 1.3 WARP in just 380 plate appearances. He’s turned it up a notch since coming to Milwaukee, batting .279/.395/.485 in 22 games. But the 31-year-old is likely to command more in free agency this offseason than the Brewers will want to pay. With younger options already on the big league roster, Walker is likely a pure rental, to be enjoyed while he lasts.

Minor Leagues
Eric Sogard’s May promotion to the major leagues allowed Nate Orf to lock down the second base job in Class-AAA Colorado Springs. He hasn’t disappointed. Orf hit .320/.397/.507 in the thin air of the Pacific Coast League, flashing hitherto unseen power (his 9 home runs this year surpassed his previous career total). At 27 years old, Orf is an unconventional prospect. But he’s also an intriguing one. Orf draws plenty of walks (10.7 percent), and his solid hit tool allows him to avoid strikeouts (14.8 percent). He’s managed to keep the ball off the ground this year, too, and could be a sneaky-good major leaguer if ever given the chance. His .288 TAv in Colorado Springs indicates that he’s ready for that opportunity. Orf could crack the Opening Day roster as a utility man next year if he’s protected from the Rule 5 Draft this offseason.

Mauricio Dubon split time between second base and shortstop this year, reaching Colorado Springs for the first time on June 26. Dubon possesses a solid hit tool, but he failed to replicate the power he flashed last season with the Portland Sea Dogs. If he grows into some pop, he could be a nifty starter. Otherwise, he’s destined for a role as a utility player.

Isan Diaz came to Milwaukee in the Jean Segura trade, and won the organizational Minor League Player of the Year award in 2016 by way of a first impression. He socked 20 home runs and 34 doubles in the Midwest League last season, but took a step back in Class-Advanced A Carolina this year. Diaz struck out in 26.6 percent of his plate appearances en route to a .222/.334/.376 line for the Mudcats. A fractured hamate ended his season in late August.

With the ninth selection of the Rule 4 Draft, the Brewers nabbed California-Irvine standout Keston Hiura. Hiura’s a second baseman by trade, but acted as a strict DH throughout his final collegiate season amidst concerns over an injured elbow. Any worries about whether he could field were mitigated by the fact that Hiura can really, really hit. He walloped Arizona League pitching with a .425 TAv before moving up to Class-A Wisconsin and posting a .326 TAv in just over 100 plate appearances. Hiura returned to the dirt towards the end of the season and held his own at second base. He will push Diaz for superiority in the top prospect pecking order when he gets his first taste of the Carolina League next season.

2018 Outlook
Barring any significant off-season moves, Jonathan Villar is again the odds-on favorite to start at second on Opening Day. Should he stumble out of the gate, he could cede some playing time to Nate Orf, or to a random free agent signing. Mauricio Dubon could likely benefit from another year of AAA pitching, while the high-upside duo of Diaz and Hiura are set to slug it out for a promotion to Biloxi. Keep an eye on Dubon’s ISO, Diaz’s strikeout percentage, and Hiura’s work with the glove. Villar will reach free agency after the 2020 campaign. By this time next year, we should have a pretty good idea of his heir apparent.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images