Yet, for all its logic (if you’re not going to contend, you might as well lose and sign a lot of talent in the next draft), this rebuilding argument paints over the relative lack of productivity teams gain through the draft. It also glosses over the extent to which most drafted talent does not make the MLB with their original club, and the extent to which many of the drafted, developed “organizational players” that do reach the MLB and stay with their original club are typically replacement players (rather than stars). For every Clayton Kershaw or Evan Longoria, there are throngs of Chris Marrero, Ryan Adams, Alex Sanabia, Chris Petit, Nick Buss, Tobi Stoner, Brett Sinkbeil: the “September call-up” is a more common “organizational draft outcome” than the superstar. If this seems self-explanatory (because, duh, there are very few superstars), it deserves investigation as clubs embark on purposefully noncompetitive seasons to ostensibly gain the benefits of the draft. My survey in this post focuses on one draft (2006), and serves as one addition to a set of recent BPMilwaukee features on the draft and rebuilding.

Related Content:
The Draft is Only a Tool in the Rebuilding Process
The Lessons of the Astros’ 2016 Backslide
The Macro Draft

Brewers fans are especially vulnerable to this type of logic after the much-maligned drafting record produced by Jack Zduriencik and Bruce Seid from approximately 2006-2010. While some of those drafts have highlights like Seid’s unbelievable 2009 depth (saving that draft entirely), or Zduriencik’s pieces to the CC Sabathia, Shaun Marcum, and Zack Greinke trades, they are largely void of contending organizational depth. As a result, the Brewers arguably had less ease in reaching for stopgaps, bench players, and other useful fill-ins during their serious contending attempts from 2011-2015. A common refrain among the fans is that the bigtime trades ruined the Brewers’ farm systems, but the simple fact is that the Sabathia / Greinke / Marcum moves were great transactions that lacked significant MLB impact from a series of drafts.

This general point should not be construed as an argument that each Brewers draft during this five year stretch was bad; the verdict remains “out” on the 2010 draft, and the exceptional depth of the 2009 draft class produced median value for the Brewers. It’s simply an acknowledgment that the timing of trades and organizational development from these drafts did not produce a regular contender; sometimes players need to develop with a different organization (see Lawrie & Odorizzi, for example); and, even roster core stars at key positions (like Lucroy) are not always enough to contend regularly.

Fans that are yearning for a better draft return from that era can begin with the 2006 draft, which is conveniently a decade past and (also conveniently) a fascinating demonstration of the MLB draft’s strengths and weaknesses. The 2006 draft produced Kershaw and Longoria, two elite players that epitomize the dreams of organizational anchors and stars produced from that amateur talent pool. However, those superstars overshadow the fact that of the approximately 220 players that made the MLB in that draft pool, nearly 170 left their original organization in some way, shape, or form; the teams’ margins for error were further reduced due to the fact that approximately 20 percent of those MLB players were not even signed from the 2006 draft. This chart highlights the basic draft outcomes by including:

• Players that remained with their original club through free agency or their final MLB game.
• Players that were traded at any point by their original club (here a trade as a prospect is equal to a midseason trade from an MLB roster, for classification purposes).
• Players that were lost through many means (unsigned from the draft, lost via waivers, rule 5 draft, MiLB free agency, release, etc.)
• General player value produced by those that remained with their original club (or produced prior to leaving via trade. I did not include waived / released, etc., players here, because those players had negligible value stats as a rule).

All stats compiled Thursday and Friday, May 19-20.

Milwaukee’s draft exemplifies the difficulties of returning a shallow talent pool, but the club also represents one of the best trades produced from the 2006 draft. Incidentally, the Greinke trade lineage continues in Milwaukee, first through Jean Segura’s time in the organization, and now through Aaron Hill and Chase Anderson (and eventually, potentially, Isan Diaz). It’s obviously difficult to fully categorize the value of many trades for the reason that some trades “keep going” by beginning a string of transactions and multifaceted acquisitions (such as the MLB-established Anderson and Hill, alongside the highly touted prospect Diaz). However, considering the outcome of the Greinke trade should at least be evidence enough that measuring on-the-field, organizational value from the 2006 Brewers draft is difficult and incomplete.

Notably, the teams that produced the most valuable on-the-field, organizational production from the 2006 draft show that there is no correct way to maximize draft value. My favorite illustrations: the Yankees established a substantial back-end bullpen; the Rays produced members of a positional core; the Dodgers landed one of the greatest pitchers in baseball history; the Cardinals employed members of a Championship core before shrewdly trading them away; and, the Athletics traded two pitchers at the (arguable) peak of their value. Each of these teams supplies lessons for the Brewers: assess and keep the very best talent from a draft class, but don’t rule out trading a player while they’re valuable, and don’t necessarily rule out relievers as a source of value (among other lessons).

The list of organizational players supports arguments in trading draftees, rather than relying solely on developing MLB mainstays. More than 40 percent of these organizational players served only one or two years with a club, and nearly 60 precent never reached 100 games played with their original organization, which shows that over several seasons, these players were largely relegated to depth roles:

While not all of the trades resulting from 2006 draftees were productive, many of the ’06 class served as foundational or supplemental parts of some of the recent MLB blockbusters. Along with Greinke, the 2006 draft class was involved in trades for Jake Arrieta (Steve Clevenger), Manny Ramirez (Bryan Morris), Wandy Rodriguez (Rudy Owens), and a substantial percentage of the contending Phillies rotation (Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay, and Joe Blanton, thanks in part to Jason Donald, Kyle Drabek, and Adrian Cardenas). Other trades involving the 2006 draft class netted Felipe Lopez to the Brewers, Dee Gordon to the Marlins, Johan Santana to the Mets, Josh Hamilton and Geovany Soto to the Rangers, and Damaso Marte and Xavier Nady to the Yankees (among others still). Teams should not shy away from using drafted talent to acquire valuable big leaguers or supplant contending aspirations.

Incidentally, the players lost by their parent organizations serve some crucial lessons about marginal roster value, as well. While many of these players may be regarded as “replacements” at best, there are several players that produced depth value after their parent club exposed them to waivers, released them, or allowed them to walk via Minor League free agency:

These moves, taken as a whole, signify the element of timing that lurks behind player development and roster building. Even where draft picks work out (each of these players are MLBers, even if they are marginal value players), an organization may not be able to coax their best value on the field, or translate perceived value into a trade. As a result, one may scrutinize the draft-oriented focus of tanking as a misguided understanding of “getting the time right;” there is no guarantee that an organization will develop the right players from the right rebuilding draft at the right time, just as there is no guarantee that a team looking to contend will get that same development equation correct (cf. 2012-2015 Brewers). While tanking to get a larger draft bonus pool, one must question whether a team is missing other opportunities to acquire talent with the players they have currently developed (even marginal roster depth).

A simple corollary question can summarize this meandering stroll through the 2006 draft: which current Brewers prospects and organizational depth players can Milwaukee trade to maximize their value? Which is to say, if hardly 25 percent of any given draft will stay with the organization, who are the stars that the Brewers absolutely must keep from their 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 drafts? Who are the players that the Brewers can employ and trade at peak value? By addressing these questions, one can engage in counterbuilding, or the act of strategizing roster acquisitions that are apparently contrary to a team’s given aims (such as acquiring MLB talent by trading prospects during a supposed-rebuilding year). The basic point is that an organization should not ever enter into a one-dimensional roster-building phase such as a tank or win-now extreme — or, if they do, they had better tread carefully and get their timing right.

Milwaukee can use 2016 to work with players like Jonathan Villar, Chris Carter, Kirk Nieuwenhuis, Chase Anderson, and others still, to define and refine the roster depth necessary for contending in the very near future. While they align these players within the organization, they can begin to play some of their best prospects at the MLB level, hastening and emboldening the next step of sifting those talent to keep as contributors, or trade for better MLB players. In an environment where several National League teams are already trending downward into basement-level tanking, such a contrarian roster building strategy could provide the perfect opportunity to contend much faster than anyone currently expects.

The Brewers will have the benefit of a high pick in the 2016 draft, and they should at least draft within the Top 10 of the 2017 draft as well. With these facts in mind, the front office can maximize a contrarian position regarding current draftees and organizational depth: as Milwaukee’s farm system ascends to the top of the league, it is time to use that depth to begin supplanting and improving the MLB roster via trades, alongside the hopeful stars that the organization will decide to keep. This is no small decision, as the Brewers cannot use a large TV revenue wallet to cover-up their mistakes as easily as other MLB clubs. It is also a matter of timing the moves right, which is why the Brewers should not waste time on a multi-season rebuilding campaign. A non-competitive 2017 MLB season is as much of a waste for the Brewers as making a mistaken trade.

For demonstration, take Bruce Seid’s 2009 draft, which was driven (according to popular arguments) either by great late round value or astonishing early round missteps. Any way one slices it, Seid ended up with three 2.5+ WARP players (“Fastballer” Mike Fiers, “Khrush” Davis, and Scooter “Scoots McGee” Gennett. Incidentally three of my favorite Brewers). That former GM Doug Melvin was unable to transform the 2013-2015 Brewers into strikingly consistent contenders with this supporting cast is less an indictment of these players than an indictment of the front office’s miscalculations (or failures of imagination) during those years. Complain all you like about the early round failures, that’s an astonishingly good draft (interestingly enough, the draft return will be even better once one incorporates the trade returns for deals involving Fiers and Davis, respectively).

Alternately, take Scoots McGee’s predecessor, Rickie Weeks, arguably one of the greatest Brewers of all time and (probably quite easily) the organization’s best second baseman. One of the commonly cited “Core Players” drafted by Jack Zduriencik, Weeks easily lands among the top third of MLB players from the 2003 First Round. The median player from that round (according to bWAR) was outfielder Mitch Maier (1.5 career WARP accumulated from 2006-2012). Of course, by now everyone knows that Weeks’s career was derailed by misguided prospect hype, which unfortunately makes the Brewers’ franchise second baseman a “bust” in many fans’ eyes. Nevermind that he’s nearly 12x more valuable than the median player drafted in the 2003 First Round; one of the very best players drafted in 2003 overall; or a better-than-median overall 2nd pick in the history of the draft: Many Brewers fans prefer to side with hype over their beloved power/speed franchise second baseman.

These drafts are merely two organizational examples of the extremes that populate draft analysis. One of the basic reasons that these types of analytical and narrative shortcomings exist is that fans and analysts alike “dismiss” as a truism the fact that the striking majority of players in every draft will never make the MLB: such a fact is taken to be so clearly true on the surface that its impact is not seriously considered.

To counter this analytical blindspot, one can simply look at the median player value for each round in each draft. For this exercise, I wanted to focus on drafts that are mostly “finished,” since more recent drafts would require judging players by value metrics, organizational depth charts, and prospect rankings. By beginning a decade out (with the fantastic 2006 draft), one can find a rather clear model for how player talent may populate the rounds of an MLB draft. To construct the chart below, I began in 1999 and stopped at 2008, since I understand that even aspects of the 2009 draft remain unsettled (take Davis, Gennett, and Fiers, for instance: their careers still hang in the balance, so it’s not really safe to say that their overall value can reasonably be measured).

The spoiler alert is that due to the overwhelming or daunting fact that most drafted players simply fail to reach the MLB, by the third round of the draft the solidly median player value is “Did Not Reach MLB” (DNRM for short). One should not necessarily dismiss this as nonsense, as one must consider that teams are still (mostly) drafting within the Top 100 in the third round. So, if a team is drafting median talent that fails to reach the MLB as early as the first, second, or third round, one can use that metric to evaluate draft day approaches, expectations, risk assessment and management, bonus assessment and analysis, player profiles, hype, etc. (that’s for another day). The purpose of this chart is to simply begin the analysis, starting with the first five rounds:

In the most straightforward terms, this chart means that for the first five rounds, at least 16 players (per round) fail to make the MLB.

Incidentally, the importance of the first round should not be understated: in recent drafts, it is likely that somewhere around 20 percent of all MLB players from a given draft will reside within the first round of that given draft. So, in this sense one can weigh first round misses much more heavily than others, since that is the most likely spot to find an MLB’er (like Rickie Weeks, even, as noted above).

This lends some credence to criticisms of Seid’s early drafts, although one still must deal with the pushback from that excellent late round value (some teams failed to land 10.0+ WARP in the entire 2009 draft, let alone after the fifth round, which should increase the considered value of Davis, Fiers, and Gennett). Successful depth drafting places Seid’s efforts in the top half of MLB draft value in 2009.

One should also note how the increase in supplemental first round picks (and therefore overall first round picks) spiked the MLB player totals (especially in the 2005, 2007, and 2008 drafts). It stands to reason that the basic institutional fact of higher draft bonuses in the first round accounts for those steep MLB player totals; judging by the sheer number of replacement level players available in the first round, one might question whether an 11th or 15th or 20th round organizational player would have an equal shot at reaching the MLB as replacement depth if their bonuses were as high as first rounders. Even a replacement player bumps a club’s first round efforts into “successfully produced an MLB,” which must be a much more favorable return on investment in the eyes of that organization.

Who are these median players? For fun, let’s highlight the best median talent from the first through fifth rounds of the 1999-2008 MLB drafts:

Building a narrative and analysis of the draft, one can take two steps.

• First, one must heavily weigh the “DNRM” reality and build a comprehensive analysis of scouting profiles, player backgrounds, player competitive levels, pre-draft hype, and various aspects of organizational ideologies (mechanical & statistical analytical tools, risk assessment, bonus pool strategies, etc.). There is one sense in which all players that fail to reach the MLB are equal, but the institutional factors of signing bonuses and scarcity of elite talent render first round failures more problematic than, say, 20th round failures.
• Second, one can mine the profiles, backgrounds, hype, and organizational ideologies involving successful “median” drafted players as well, in order to effectively recognize additional replacement talent within any given system, and ultimately build an effective account of how talent is dispersed throughout a draft. In this sense, the profiles of “median” first or second round players (like Eddie Kunz or James Darnell) can potentially serve as guideposts to other replacements or depth talent within an organization.

Of course, one might eventually opt to celebrate the careers of the likes of Josh Banks or John Mayberry, etc., in order to further appreciate the weight of reaching the MLB. Even at the margins of the draft, there is talent that can help an organization in some regard. Should organizations wish to push ahead with current cost-cutting measures, thereby enhancing and maintaining their revenue shares, and extract ultimate value from the draft, they may find valuable lessons by wading through the draft median and DNRM.