When I profiled free agents to begin the season, Lorenzo Cain graded as the best available position player free agent with a $71.5M three-year depreciated surplus. Given that the Brewers landed Cain for $80 million over five years, the Cain deal grades as close to an absolute steal. Cain’s surplus grades out to approximately $120.0M over five years, which means that at a $16.0M/year rate the Brewers basically received two free years on Cain’s deal. Basically, Cain should be able to deliver value on this contract in nearly every scenario short of catastrophic injury.

Contrary to the common line that the Brewers basically acquired Cain for market value, it is arguable that the club attained the center fielder’s services for quite a valuable deal.

What is thrilling about the Yelich deal is that it is not a steal. It is not a value move. The Brewers exhausted the full value of Yelich by trading three of their top six prospects. However, this is not problematic because Yelich’s surplus value is almost comical; he’s a young, budding superstar who has already proven a floor somewhere between 2.5 WARP and 5.0 WARP as he enters his prime age seasons. Tracking surplus value is important here because one can use the idea of organizational surplus value to assess when and how a team is extracting wins from their players.

Surplus Value Pricing
Refining WARP & OFP Pricing
Translating OFP
OFP and Minor League Pay
Revisiting the CC Sabathia Trade
Cashing Out OFP 2
Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades
Historical WARP and OFP

Had the Brewers kept Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto, they would have indeed retained those prospects’ surplus value (defined here by their potential MLB ceilings, or Overall Future Potential (OFP), and their risk floor) while also carrying all of the risk of developing them year-to-year. This development risk was especially present with Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto, who are a couple of professional levels away from the MLB, but it was also somewhat present in Brinson’s profile should the center fielder never adjust his hit tool to MLB pitching. An elite fielding, speedy center fielder with some power but contact issues at the plate is not a bad MLB profile, but it’s not a superstar profile.

I began tracking Brewers surplus value during the club’s rebuild as a way to understand the success of a rebuild. What I found problematic about analyzing a rebuilding club was determining when and how a rebuilding team would achieve success. Since a rebuilding team is by definition “cashing out” its potential to win ballgames far down the road, there must be interim metrics used to judge a front office’s success. I use surplus value to assess MLB players by judging “production” (how well a player plays) and “scarcity” (how the player’s contract is structured) to express Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) in monetary terms. Since risk can be priced, prospect OFP can be assessed in monetary terms as well, either by assessing the scarcity of certain grades and profiles or by historically analyzing production by prospect classes. By using these methods, MLB players and prospects can be evaluated on the same terms, which is a necessary task since MLB players are often traded for prospects; this method can also help one assess the success of a rebuild.

While there will be issues with designing any surplus value system for assessing MLB players and prospects, I maintain that working toward such a pricing system is necessary because MLB teams trade prospects for MLB players all the time.

The trouble with a player like Christian Yelich is that because he is cost-controlled by a $50 million contract (plus an option), his top surplus grade is extremely high. Over the course of the remaining five-years, extrapolating Yelich’s best WARP (5.3) yields potential production value worth $185.5M; even harshly depreciating Yelich’s 2015-2017 production yields potential value worth $93.1M. The reason Yelich’s surplus value runs so high, however, is that Yelich can also be graded by the cost of his contract against his production value; with $58.3M remaining over five years (if the Brewers exercise Yelich’s option), Yelich’s contractual surplus is at least $34.8M, and could be as high as $127.2M should his superstar potential continue to materialize.

Simply stated, Yelich is an absurdly valuable MLB player; he’s about as valuable as it gets. What is fascinating about Yelich’s value is that one would expect that he is nearly untradeable because of his value. Basically, there is no single prospect who will ever be worth Yelich, and this is why the Marlins’ reported demand of Braves prospect Ronald Acuna (arguably the very top prospect in the game) was not ridiculous or even audacious. Thus, it should make sense that the Brewers traded three high-ceiling prospects and one intriguing pitching flyer for Yelich: where one prospect cannot exhaust the value of an MLB player, many prospects must be used to form a transaction worth completing.

Using historical OFP pricing, one can see that a prospect package of Brinson, Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto very nearly exhausts Yelich’s highest surplus pricing. This is not necessarily a problem, given that Yelich is such a valuable player one should not have (reasonably) expected anything lower. For example, once the Miami Marlins reached their threshold to fund their 2018 payroll, they could demand pure talent in return for Yelich, rather than talent and payroll relief. The “lowest” possible deal for Yelich, which would have priced the left fielder at his depreciated value over four years, would have roughly required Brinson and Diaz in return; but once the Marlins were able to demand talent alone, that type of price would not have been attainable by Milwaukee. Given that the Brewers had a deep farm system, especially at center field, the Brewers front office correctly ascertained that the Marlins would be pricing out Yelich at his highest possible value. With both Yelich and Lorenzo Cain sliding into outfield slots for five years, many have noted that the actual prospect hit is lessened for Milwaukee.

Of course, it must be stated that a player’s MLB potential ceiling is a dynamic phenomenon, and OFP only measures a player at one static point in time. Take Isan Diaz, for example; the second base prospect attained a higher OFP ranking entering the 2017 season, and a rough injury-riddled year dented that a bit. Jordan Yamamoto is almost impossible to price, as scouts that like the righty have recognized potential areas for the youngster to succeed as a rotation arm, but his development profile still carries a high amount of risk to reach that level. It is plausible that the Marlins priced out Diaz at a range potentially higher than the OFP published above, simply because his full prospect profile suggests that Diaz can once again reach that higher ceiling should he mend a few weaknesses as he reaches the advanced minors.

From the Brewers’ perspective, the front office surrendered much potential starpower, but they transferred all of the development risk to the Marlins. It should not be assumed that any of these prospects will be the same player in both locations: perhaps Lewis Brinson receives advice on a mechanical adjustment in Miami that the Brewers Player Development would have overlooked; perhaps each of these prospects receives enough time to adjust at the MLB level in the pressure-free environment of Miami, whereas a contending Milwaukee club may have had less patience for shortcomings at the MLB level.

Additionally, trading Brinson and Diaz essentially “completes” the Jean Segura deal, and realigns the Jonathan Lucroy deal. When I last checked in, the Segura trade remained Stearns’s worst deal (in terms of assessing day-of and post hoc surplus value), while the Lucroy deal remained his best.

Now these deals look like this:

It is nearly impossible to effectively apportion surplus from a four-player trade package across two previous trades, but the basic story is that Stearns has improved his trading record. By extending Chase Anderson and trading away Isan Diaz and Aaron Hill, Stearns has basically completed the Segura deal. In terms of the original Lucroy deal, the remaining player development task is Luis Ortiz, although the young righty is also prime trade potential due to his current innings pitched ceiling and flyball profile (36 percent groundball rate in 2017).

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

Last year, the PTBNL bug also bit Brewers fans in the Jonathan Lucroy – Jeremy Jeffress deal, as fans allowed their imagination to run wild with apparently leaked scouting assignments of Texas Rangers prospects and dreams of landing another top prospect (the club landed useful outfield / utility depth in Ryan Cordell, who was shipped to the White Sox to acquire Anthony Swarzak). Obviously this time around Brewers fans are not dreaming of the top ten prospect that might head to the Mets, as almost everyone expects GM David Stearns to have landed the veteran Walker for next to nothing. This is a faulty expectation.

What complicates the deal is the fact that the Mets are sending an undisclosed amount of cash to the Brewers, which could sweeten the prospect return from Milwaukee. This is a logical assumption, as MLB teams frequently demonstrate that cash and prospects are transferable, and one can deduce that there is an exchange rate for prospects and cash within each front office. However, the haziness does not end here for two reasons: (1) Walker demonstrates wild discrepancies between past and present value, and (2) there is a perception that the trade market for position players is currently depressed.

First, consider point (1) with the assumption that the Mets covered approximately half of Walker’s contract in the trade. In the abstract, assessing Walker by considering WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player), cash, and Prospect Overall Future Potential (OFP) as interchangeable by monetizing each value yields several potential categories of value:

Already one should see that there is plenty of wiggle room for assessing Stearns in this trade. While fans know a name like Mauricio Dubon and would feel upset to see the young infielder leave the Brewers system, such a trade would match the high end of Walker’s value (plus cash). A more interesting idea is seeing an injured prospect head out of Milwaukee’s system, which could perhaps explain the time lag necessary to call the return a “Player To Be Named Later,” as scouting the progress of an injury return prospect could make all the difference in determining the deal. A hurler such as Nathan Kirby could fulfill the top end of this deal, and would be an interesting case of transferring extreme injury risk out of the system in a gamble for immediate wins. Should Milwaukee reach the League Divisional Series in the playoffs, this deal would be immediately paid off. Obviously, fans dream of sending nobody important to New York, but that’s not how trades work.

To this last point, (2) is worth further investigating. While front offices do not use WARP to calculate trades, I use a WARP / OFP / cash model to easily allow various areas of the game to speak to one another in order to determine value for an organization. This can also be a useful scale to view trades en masse; for example, let’s look at a few key trades from the 2017 deadline and August waiver trade period. In this table, I also added a Playoff Assessment to the trade, where potential advances in playoff revenue are considered as trade motivation as well (see additional table below, and linked article).

Once one gets past the initial fact that the biggest trade returns indeed occurred when pitchers were grouped with position players, there are some solid deals in this group of position player transactions. While fans might find easy excuses to write off a prospect like Boog Powell, given Yonder Alonso’s track record that’s quite a solid return for a rental. Sean Rodriguez and Jonathan Lucroy deals represent the Hail Mary attempts by the Pirates and Rockies, respectively, and neither team will be expected to face playoff pressure for either deal (rather, both deals are clearly supplemental). The Tim Beckham and Jay Bruce deals might be the most interesting, as the Rays and Mets respectively gambled on extremely inexperienced arms with unknown potential. Yet, draft day assessments and initial prospect reports could allow both those prospect packages to be viewed as intriguing projection gambles, and the Bruce deal especially could look like a brilliant move by the Mets in five years.

This prospect return landscape does not provide much help to determining the gray areas of which type of prospect might leave the Brewers system. The Bruce deal hints that someone like Carlos Herrera or Trey Supak could be the one to leave; the Alonso deal could support sending anyone from Dubon to an Advanced Minors outfield depth option. Walker’s value is most comparable to both Bruce and Alonso, and both of those deals showcase scenarios in which the trading club received solid or intriguing prospect returms. What this chart should hopefully show is that position players have not necessarily been undervalued; rather, the position players reflected here represent relatively spotty production records, which impacts that type of prospect one should expect to be involved in those deals. But, even with that caveat in mind, the prospects involved in these deals were solidly priced overall.

With this in mind, Brewers fans should be ready for Stearns to continue to deal from prospect depth, as this is the true benefit of having this type of system in Milwaukee. There will be prospects who, as much as we love to follow them as fans, will be used to attempt to maximize immediate MLB wins for the franchise. Should a prospect that seems rich for your blood end up in the Neil Walker deal, remember that not only does this price probably suit the current trade environment, but it also helps attain the goal of winning MLB games. Even better, the Brewers are winning MLB games and expending prospect resources sooner than expected, which are both facts that should be celebrated.

Appendix: Playoff and Prospect Conversion Chart:

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

Related Reading:
Scalp / Spread Strategies
Bandy-Maldonado

Here, following the offseason treatment, I am including major deals from July 2015 (the arguable start of “Rebuilding”) through the present day, meaning that these moves are not entirely Stearns’s trades. Indeed, the Zach Davies / Gerardo Parra trade and the Carlos Gomez & Mike Fiers return remain two reasons that the Brewers did not need to “tank” and design a “scorched earth” rebuild that completely reconstructed the organization. Coupled with draft signings by the late Bruce Seid (such as Jacob Barnes and [soon] Brandon Woodruff), as well as graduated top prospects like Orlando Arcia, and superstar Ryan Braun, the “rebuilding” Brewers have remained competitive due to several different talent streams entering, remaining, and graduating through the system.

Trade Surplus Depreciated WARP & OFP Summary:

As a reminder, I will be following the historical model of Overall Future Potential (OFP) production drawn from the history of MLB performances. Scaled for prospect risk, here’s how those prospect levels can be valuated, with 50 OFP being an “average” MLB player:

Last check-in, here’s how the Brewers’ trades looked. Given Zach Davies’s quick ascent to the MLB, I forgot to add him in this list, so his trade will be featured below.

Following this set of deals, it should be interesting to note that while the Brewers system prospects have had ups and downs, the players traded away have exhibited true depreciation within one year. This should demonstrate one benefit of using a depreciation model to assess future player value, which is the model I have been working with throughout the offseason; players do depreciate in terms of production. Jonathan Lucroy, Jeremy Jeffress, Gerardo Parra, Carlos Gomez, Mike Fiers, Adam Lind, and Jason Rogers all demonstrate this, and it should be noted they demonstrate this without completely crashing their value in the meantime (especially in the case of Lucroy). Khris Davis is perhaps the worst counterexample, as Stearns almost certainly sold low on the slugger, who also deserves credit for making adjustments and shifting his approach in Oakland.

A few quick notes:

• The Lucroy-Jeffress and Gomez-Fiers deals shifted value for completely different reasons. The former relies fully (thus far) on problematic performances by the players the Brewers traded away, while the latter is improving in value both due to struggles by Gomez and Fiers and improvements by Domingo Santana. The Gomez-Fiers deal remains one of the strongest deals to build the Brewers system, even with Josh Hader’s recent struggles, and Brett Phillips’s graduation solidifies at least the 45 OFP grade (which is not nothing), while the ceiling remains to be seen.

• Hidden in the middle of this table is the Francisco Rodriguez trade, which was one of Stearns’s worst trades on the day it occurred. But thankfully, trades are not solely graded on the day-of, and post hoc analysis loves Manny Pina’s development into (at least) a split time catcher at the MLB level. K-Rod has not been terrible, for what it’s worth, but when that contract winds down to its last year the surplus value really depends on short-term production rather than longterm outlook. This hurts the K-Rod score as much as it hurts Lucroy’s assessment in Texas.

• Let it be stated that the Khris Davis trade return was solid (if not spectacular) on the day-of. But it’s great to be reminded that prospect stock can depreciate, too. Fortunately, scouting reports suggest that Jacob Nottingham can remain behind the plate, answering one previous question. But if that power (and bat) does not come around, it may not matter as much; it is getting more appropriate to highlight, say, the 40-45 end of Nottingham’s grade (still means he reaches the MLB) than the 55 end that helped him reach Oakland’s Top 10. Of course, remember that Manny Pina was probably a 40-45 grade minor leaguer when Milwaukee acquired him, so…you know the rest.

• I believe there could be some reason to reassess prospects like Freddy Peralta or Ryan Cordell, who I would rate as valuable depth options for the system. However, for the purposes of this exercise, there is not necessarily enough non-statistical information to fully develop a new scouting grade. So perhaps a few prospects in this table deserve an asterisk next to their grade.

Turning from the “earlier” trades to the 2017 offseason, one can see how Stearns developed the surprising 2017 contender. It is interesting to note that for the offseason coverage of the club, so many of us (myself included) completely failed to properly price the GM’s immediate value for these trades.

For example, Mauricio Dubon was never (and probably will not be) the prime value of the Thornburg deal. What makes the Thornburg deal so amazing is that, given Thornburg’s career development, a straight-up Dubon-for-Thornburg deal would have been solid. Yet, Stearns did not stop there; the GM managed to return not just Dubon, but also a legitimate MLB asset in Travis Shaw, as well as two total lottery tickets (exemplified in Yusion Coca, the Player-To-Be-Named-Later who completed this deal). This trade should continue to “give” to the organization, whether it is in the form of Josh Pennington or Coco being included in a future trade (they are sufficiently far from the MLB to be traded once more), or Dubon working in a utility role or second-tier MLB starting role.

A quick word: These numbers are indeed abstract! The Brewers claim approximately $472.2 million in depreciated surplus value from these trades, which roughly translates to 67 WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player) within the system. These 67 WARP could be maximized and turned into 87 market-rate WARP, they could remain steady over time, or they could further depreciate to 49 WARP. These figures are abstract, of course, because they incorporate risk into the system, and can be cashed out any which way; if Stearns cashes out 87 WARP within the next two years, the Brewers will have quite a competitive team; if these players remain merely competitive or decline further, it will be questioned whether more trades were necessary. The players could continue to depreciate, and many could fail to reach the MLB (if they are prospects). Stearns can cash out surplus through trades or development. So these numbers should not necessarily be interpreted to apply to any timeframe; that’s up to the GM to determine.

Since I’ve already focused specifically on the Jett Bandy-Martin Maldonado deal recently, I will not dive deeper into that deal except to emphasize the importance of post hoc trade analysis. Returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is not simply “using hindsight,” but rather healthy Benefit-Cost Analysis. Moreover, returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is an opportunity to potentially sharpen those analytical tools in order to provide better day-of trade analysis. But of course, the Bandy trade is not yet complete, nor are most of these deals, really. So, by returning to these trades with analytical methods over time, one can come to understand organizational value as a malleable entity that is never truly solidified at one point in time. This is arguably yet another reason to oppose “rebuilding,” or to opposing “winning now,” or any extreme organizational strategy; it is also possible to never build an organization, or to build an organization through contrarian means (as Stearns is doing). There should be no reason for an MLB club to fail to simultaneously build for the present and future, save for a lack of creativity.

“I think that people here, at least most of them, recognize there is at least a chance that today is my last home game as a Brewer,” Braun said in the wake of a 4-2 loss to the Reds. “I don’t think there is a great chance, but certainly a higher chance than at any point in the 10 years that I’ve spent here.”

Brewers fans have gotten awfully good at ovations like this over the last six years, dating back to the ovation fans gave Prince Fielder at the close of the 2010 season when it appeared all but certain Fielder would be dealt before he had the chance to test the free agent market the next season. We understand that the few established stars we’re lucky enough to watch in Milwaukee will be heading for greener pastures at some point. Fielder received another ovation during the 2011 NLCS, his actual last game as a Brewer. And this season, Jonathan Lucroy received an ovation before the trade deadline. If you were to point to any three Brewers who were the core of the club’s recent successes, it would be clearly be those three.

It’s unfortunate that this scenario keeps popping up, and that Brewers fans are so used to talented players leaving the city that we have this ritual already prepared. But it is wonderful to see the appreciation Brewers fans have for these stars, and it’s clear that the appreciation is reciprocated. All those players have in some form declared their love for Milwaukee’s fans, and I think it’s in no small part due to the consistent love we show for the players.

Jonathan Lucroy probably put it best after receiving his ovation this July. He told the AP:

“The fans here are awesome. They’ve always treated me great, and I’m very blessed to be able to grow up in front of fans like this. The fans have treated me really well. They have shown me nothing but love and respect — and that’s all you can ask out of your home fans. There are not a lot of home teams that can say that. We have fans here that love you no matter what. I can’t even remember the last time we were booed here — so it’s pretty impressive with our fan base how positive and loving they are.”

Carlos Gomez’s exit from the Brewers wasn’t quite as telegraphed, and there wasn’t an ovation for him before the trade deadline in 2015, as he still had some time remaining on his contract. But nonetheless, he expressed similar sentiments when he told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “”I have a lot of respect for this organization. They gave me the opportunity to be the way I am right now. And the fans are passionate and they are always there for you, when you’re good or you’re bad. I feel like I’m home.”

The fact that Brewers fans could help make Milwaukee, Wisconsin feel like home for Gomez, a native of the Dominican Republic, practically half a world away, is remarkable. It speaks to the power of a fanbase that can make its players feel loved and appreciated, and I hope the fans at Miller Park never lose that joy and respect for the players that make the ballpark worth coming to even when the club isn’t racking up wins like we would want.

The 24 year old Cordell was not ranked in the preseason top 10 Rangers’ prospects according to BP, but he was mentioned as a player to watch in the Texas League back in April. The 6’4″ and 195 lb outfielder was the Rangers’ 11th-round draft pick out of Liberty University in 2013. He bats and throws from the right side.

According to Kit House from a BP Ten Pack earlier this season, “Cordell was an interesting toolsy college player before he posted a .914 OPS in 2014, his first full professional season. Then he got a promotion to Double-A, struck out like he was at a middle school dance, and baseball could almost cross off at least one more fourth outfielder-type.” Indeed, Cordell got off to a rather fast start in his career, batting .318/.385/.530 with 13 home runs and 21 steals in 89 games in 2014 between low-A and high-A, and then hitting .311/.376/.528 in 68 games with High Desert to start the 2015 season. As House alluded to, however, Cordell struggled mightily during his first exposure to AA, managing only a .217/.263/.335 slash with five home runs and 10 steals in 56 games. He struck out in 30.2 percent of his plate appearances while walking at just a five percent clip.

Cordell rebounded in a big way in 2016, however. After heading back to the Texas League for a second go-around, Ryan slashed his strikeout rate down to 21.8 percent (more in line with his 20.8 percent MiLB career rate), upped his walk rate to 7.2 percent, and posted a comfortably above-average .264/.319/.484 slash line in 445 plate appearances for a .279 TAv. He stole 12 bags and slugged 19 home runs, which tied for the eighth-most dingers in the league. He was also one of only six players in the Texas League to record a 10+ homer, 10+ steal season.

According to House, Cordell has a “workable” swing that he uses to generate a significant amount of hard contact. He did add that Ryan is unlikely to ever display more than average contact skills or power. Beyond his ability at the plate, however, House felt that his defense could already play at the big league level. He noted that Cordell could become a “very good outfielder” and possesses the “arm of a college pitcher.” Cordell’s plus speed has obviously helped him become a stolen base threat on the base paths, and it also allows him handle capably all three outfield positions. He has experience in the infield, as well, but Brewers GM Slingin’ David Stearns told reporters that the club views him strictly as an outfielder.

Cordell’s overall skill set makes him an intriguing player overall, one whom Fangraphs’ editor Carson Cistulli says is not all that dissimilar from Keon Broxton or Domingo Santana. Cordell has the tools to become a perennial 15+ home run, 15+ stolen base threat with above-average defense in an everyday role at the MLB level. He simply needs to make enough contact in order to effectively tap into those tools. Ryan did miss time with a high-ankle sprain this season, though he’s reportedly near 100% healed from that injury and will play instructional ball this fall to make up for the lost time.

The addition of Ryan Cordell adds yet another name to the increasing log-jam of near MLB ready outfielders within the Brewers’ minor league ranks.  It will certainly be interesting to keep an eye on how Stearns sorts through all those candidates; who will be traded, who will flame out, and who will earn a role with the big league club going forward?

Milwaukee added some potential high-impact talent to a minor league system that is now rated as the best in baseball according to at least one outlet. Here are Baseball Prospectus scouting reports on the newest future Brewers.

Rangers Trade Return:

CF Lewis Brinson
6’3″ || 195 lb || B/T: R/R || Age: 22

Hit: 55 || Power: 55 || Speed: 60 || Arm: 60 || Glove: 70 ||

Future Role: 60 – first division starting center fielder

Report: There’s the potential for five above-average tools, which wasn’t the case in 2014. He now shows a shorter stroke capable of hard contact to all parts of the field, along with a more advanced approach. There’s always been plus raw power, and that pop shows up in games thanks to his strong wrists and his ability to use the lower half to create leverage. If there’s a concern offensively it’s that he still gets pull-happy, and while the strikeout rates have dropped each year, this is still the type of player who is going to swing and miss. A lot.

Brinson’s offense hasn’t caught up to the defense, but that’s a compliment to the glove rather than an insult to the bat. His plus speed helps him get to pretty much everything in center field. He has the type of arm strength you’d love to see in your right fielder, and swoon for when you see that it plays in center.

There were only a handful of players more impressive than Brinson in the Arizona Fall League, and it helped confirm what those who saw him all year had been saying. Even with the strikeouts, this is player who can impact the game in essentially every realistic way you could ask for.  – Chris Crawford

2016 Statistics:

AA Frisco – 326 PA, .236 TAv || .237/.280/.431 || 11 HR || 11 SB || 19.6 percent K || 5.2 percent BB
AAA Colorado Springs – 13 PA, .585 TAv || .615/.615/.923 || 1 HR || 2 SB|| 15.4 percent K || 0 percent BB

RHP Luis Ortiz
6’3″ || 230 lbs || B/T: R/R || Age: 20

Fastball: 65 || Slider: 60 || Changeup: 45 || Command: 55

Future Role: 60 – #3 starting pitcher

Report: Not only do some prefer Ortiz over (Dillon) Tate, but there are those who believe Ortiz has the highest ceiling of any prospect in the (Rangers’) system. He gets his fastball into the mid 90s consistently from an easy arm action, sitting 93-95. The slider is his go-to out pitch. It doesn’t have as much depth as Tate’s, but it has more deception because the tilt comes so late. The only thing keeping him from projecting as a frontline starter right now is the lack of a quality third pitch, as both his curveball and change are closer to 40 than 50. Even without an average third offering, he has a chance to start because the command is so advanced. He repeats his delivery as well as you can expect a teenager to repeat things, and he not only throws strikes with all four pitches, he locates them to any part of the plate.

The concerns with Ortiz don’t come from stuff or an inability to throw strikes, but whether or not he’ll be able to hold up during a season. He’s burly—to put it nicely—and he’s missed time in each of the past two years, ending his 2015 season with elbow tendinitis. If he can stay healthy and keep the weight in check, he could be an innings-eater who misses bats, but there’s more volatility here than the stuff might suggest.  – Chris Crawford

2016 Statistics:

A+ High Desert – 27.2 IP, .216 TAv || 2.60 ERA || 4.20 FIP || 25.5 percent K || 5.5 percent BB || 51 percent GB
AA Frisco – 39.2 IP, .256 TAv || 4.08 ERA || 3.32 FIP || 19.5 percent K || 4.0 percent  BB || 47 percent GB

(Note: Player to be named later won’t be announced until after the completion of the minor league season.)

Giants trade:

RHP Phil Bickford
6’4″ || 200 lbs || B/T: R/R || Age: 20

Fastball: 65/70 || Slider: 50 || Changeup: 40 || Command: 50

Future Role: 45 – back end starter/high-leverage reliever

Report: Bickford’s stuff profiles best in a late-innings relief role. He has the body and arm to work multiple times through a lineup, and he features a deceptive fastball with late life up that generates swings and misses, but he lacks a third pitch and struggles commanding within the zone. His slider can change multiple grades from one start to the next but is something that can be masked in short stints. Bickford’s best-case scenario is a two-pitch starter with a back-end rotation spot. A high-leverage reliever is the safe bet.  -David Lee

Report: Bickford’s arm strength is elite, and when he’s working in short spurts, he’ll touch the high 90s with a four-seam fastball that has late life. His slider is maddeningly inconsistent; he struggles to repeat his three-quarters arm slot, and it will vary from a 40 pitch that he can’t locate to a 60 with hard tilt. The change is very much a work in progress, and like the slider its grade varies wildly from appearance to appearance. The control is ahead of the command, but he does a good enough job filling the strike zone that he should be able to start. However, because the stuff is so much better in shorter outings, it shouldn’t surprise anyone if he ends up making his living as a reliever.  – Chris Crawford

2016 Statistics:

A Augusta – 60.0 IP, .233 TAv || 2.70 ERA || 2.44 FIP || 28.3 percent K || 6.1 percent  BB || 34 percent GB
A+ San Jose – 33.0 IP, .214 TAv || 2.73 ERA || 3.97 FIP || 27.9 percent K || 9.3 percent BB || 35 percent GB

C Andrew Susac
6’1″ || 215 lbs || B/T: R/R || Age: 26

Hit: 50 || Power: 60 || Speed: 30 || Arm: 55 || Glove: 50

Future Role: 55 – above-average MLB starting catcher

Report: Advanced approach with good feel for zone; solid plus power plays in game at present; good strength; balanced swing stays on plane and allows for hard contact pole to pole; natural backspin and carry; improving actions behind the plate; capable defender who could refine to average overall producer with glove; above-average arm with solid release and accuracy. Average bat speed and coverage holes; can be beat by sequencing and elevated heat; danger that overexposure at big-league level will eat into contact and power utility once book gets out; well below-average runner; likely tops out as average defender.  – Nick J. Faleris

Fantasy Impact: Given a full complement of at-bats, Susac could hit .260 with 20 homers, making him a potential top-10 catcher.  – Bret Sayre

MLB Career Statistics (2014-15):

San Francisco – 243 PA, .268 TAv, -1.3 FRAA || .240/.309/.407 || 6 HR || 0 SB || 29.2 percent K || 8.6 percent BB

2016 Statistics:

AAA Sacramento – 239 PA, .302 TAv || .273/.343/.455 || 8 HR || 0 SB || 18.8 percent  K || 10 percent BB
AAA Colorado Springs – 9 PA, .030 TAv || .111/.111/.111 || 0 HR || 0 SB || 33.3 percent  K || 0 percent BB

This isn’t a new phenomenon. In the offseason a couple of trades involving relief pitchers had the internet shaking their heads. Those were the Craig Kimbrel and Ken Giles trades. (Kimbrel was sent from the Red Sox to the Padres for Manuel Margot, Javier Guerra, Logan Allen, and Carlos Asuaje. Giles and Jonathan Arauz were sent from the Phillies to the Astros for Vincent Valasquez, Brett Oberholtzer, Thomas Eshelman, Mark Appel, and Harold Arauz.)

Not only were these trades weird, for some they were unfathomable, especially by the Astros. The Red Sox had just hired Dave Dombrowski, who’s garnered quite the reputation for trading his prospects. Luhnow is the antithesis of that narrative. He’s the young and progressive GM: the one with the huge database, the one who knows that relievers aren’t that valuable. Yet, Luhnow paid a hefty price for Giles.

Some, therefore, started suggesting that there was a divide between the way front office members and we the public value relievers, also noting that WAR may not be the best measurement of the trade. Russell Carleton wrote about this in an article entitled, “The Kimbrel Gambit”. Carleton stated that WPA was a better way to evaluate relief pitchers.

Then the 2016 trade deadline arrived and, as a number of people noted, the reliever market was nearly unbelievable. Deals for Aroldis Chapman, Will Smith, and Andrew Miller were all seen as overpays. I mean, Miller was traded for Clint Frazier, Justus Sheffield, Ben Heller, and J.P. Feyereisen. A huge haul, but perhaps most surprising is that the Indians gave up a bigger hall to get Miller than the one for Lucroy.

Sure is something when teams have to pay more for elite relievers than elite catchers.

— J.P. Breen (@JP_Breen) July 31, 2016

Now, Lucroy ended up vetoing the deal, but it was still surprising and befuddling to see this.

All of this culminated into the idea that there is a disconnect between the way the public and the front office values relief pitchers.

I'm not even really disagreeing that the price for relievers seems really high. I'm just saying it's pretty clear there's a disconnect here.

— Sahadev Sharma (@sahadevsharma) July 29, 2016

But does this make sense? More precisely, does it make sense that we are basically re-thinking the way we evaluate relief pitchers based on trades?

The answer to this is not entirely. Yes, if teams didn’t think relievers had some value, then they probably wouldn’t trade valuable assets for them. WAR, as Carleton demonstrated, is also probably not the best way to evaluate relief pitchers. Each team also has their own analytics department, and it’s very possible that they have different and better metrics to value relievers.

But, the biggest problem is that we are only looking at one element in these trades, and that is the value of the relief pitcher.

The reason, a number of people get befuddled by these trades is because of the return. But, maybe we need to reevaluate the value of the return. In all of these takes and analysis, no one has stopped to ponder on the value of prospects. Maybe it’s not that relievers are netting necessarily a higher return, but that prospects in general aren’t being valued as highly. More precisely, over the past year, teams seem to have been more willing to part with their prospects. It’s possible that teams, in general, are realizing that holding onto prospects is a risky proposition. This can work out very favorably, but can also bite you in the butt especially if the prospects don’t work out.

Let’s use the Red Sox as an example. When Ben Cherington was in charge, the media went after him hard for his unwillingness to part with his prospects. And, in some cases, Cherington was right: just look at Jackie Bradley Jr., Xander Bogaerts, and Mookie Betts. These three prospects swarmed the baseball sphere in trade rumors, but they became very valuable pieces to this year’s team.

Then, however, there’s the other side. The Red Sox held onto prospects such as Deven Marrero, Henry Owens, Brandon Workman, Allen Webster, Garin Cecchini, and more. None of these players worked out, at least not as they’d hoped, and basically went from highly touted prospects to busts who don’t have a lot of value. This is basically the risk.

It highlights that for teams who are looking to acquire big league talent, it’s not necessarily about keeping or trading prospects, but knowing which prospects to trade. Knowing that you should hold onto Betts, Bogaerts, and Bradley, but at the same time, know to trading Webster, Cecchini, Owens etc. Maybe teams are starting to figure that out, which is why we are seeing more prospects being traded.

Changing the way we value relief pitchers based on trades also ignores the market. If we simply assume that since relievers are garnering a greater return than before, then relief pitchers are more valuable than before, then we must assume that Andrew Miller is, in fact, more valuable than Jonathan Lucroy. The Indians traded for both players, and in many scout’s eyes, the return for Miller was better than the one for Lucroy.

But, this ignores the external factors of these deals. The market for relief pitchers seemed absurd because many teams needed pitching. In fact, every contending team needed pitching. That’s the thing about trading pitchers. It’s that no matter the market, teams can always use more pitching because there are twelve pitchers on a team compared to only two catchers. Lucroy might not have provided a big upgrade for some contending teams, but Andrew Miller would have provided a big upgrade for every team. Because at the end of the day, Miller is much better than the twelfth best pitcher on your team. While Lucroy isn’t necessarily that much better than the best catcher on your team.

The Brewers also seemed to have more urgency than the Yankees. Even after the deal fell through Rosenthal wrote, “Oh, he will be traded, most likely to the Rangers, a team that can acquire him without his permission.” The Brewers could have kept Lucroy until the offseason, but that would have hampered his value. The Yankees on the other hand were in no rush to trade Miller. Meaning that they could sit back and wait until a team met their price. The Yankees could be irrational with their demands, while the Brewers had to be more reasonable.

Finally, we assume that the people making these deals are acting like rational beings when in reality emotion and competitiveness play a factor. The deal for Chapman was probably an overpay. But, the Cubs haven’t won the World Series in more than 100 years. No living member of the organization has seen a Cubs World Series and this might be their best chance. The Cubs decided to give up some of the future, future that is unknown, to improve the one spot that needed to be improved, the closer role. Some of the Cubs front office members won’t be there when Torres reaches the majors. Some of them won’t be there next year. The Cubs move, while being an overpay, was done to win now because the Cubs are in a great position to win now, a position that isn’t necessarily going to re-occur.

The same thing can be said for other clubs. These were trades being made by humans, and even though humans are very smart, they are also often driven by emotions.The idea isn’t that we are underselling or overselling relievers. The idea is that coming to that conclusion based on trades is problematic and ignores other factors that could be influencing a team’s decision in making a trade.

Reportedly, there were two main issues driving Lucroy’s desire to veto the trade. First of all, Lucroy wanted Cleveland to promise not to pick up his $5.25 million team option for the 2017 season, and secondly, he wanted a promise that he, not Yan Gomes, would be Cleveland’s starting catcher next season if that option was picked up. Cleveland declined on both fronts, and thus Lucroy remained a Brewer, at least for another day.

Beyond his obvious talent, Lucroy’s contract is one of the reasons he is such a sought after target in this year’s trade market. He will earn just about $2 million for the rest of 2016 and has a team option for next year at a bargain basement $5.2 million. Lucroy has already been worth 3.0 WARP this season and is projected to finish at 4.6, making him an All-Star level performer at a utility man price.

Lucroy signed a five-year, $11 million contract in spring training of 2012, after he hit an underwhelming .265/.313/.391 in 2011’s National League Central championship season. He had yet to develop into the MVP candidate we’ve seen him play like in 2014 and 2016, but his defense and youth combined to make him a valuable asset for the Brewers. The Brewers were betting on Lucroy to stay relatively healthy and continue improving. Lucroy, in exchange for his signature, received financial security and certainty at the expense of the chance to earn bigger contracts in salary arbitration over these past few seasons.

For roughly $9 million, Lucroy has provided the Brewers with 34.1 WARP, which even by the most conservative estimates comes out to over $150 million worth of value for the club. A big reason the Brewers — and the many teams who have profited in big ways off similarily negotiated pre-arbitration contracts — is the unbalancd stakes at play in the negotiation. Lucroy was under the Brewers’ control for six years no matter what happened. On Lucroy’s side, however, he had to weigh the possibility of injury or an otherwise unexpected sharp decline prematurely ending his career before he made it to his first arbitration season, his first chance to make substantially more than baseball’s $424,000 minimum salary in 2011.

The no-trade clause Lucroy negotiated into his contract — that he earned through his minor league and major league performance through 2011, and his potential for growth — was one of his only ways to exert control over his career. He needed that to ensure he was in the best possible situation not only to play for a winner, but to set himself up in the best possible way for the big payday he delayed by agreeing to that contract in 2012.

With all that in mind, knowing that Cleveland wasn’t willing to decline his option or guarantee him the starting job in 2017, I find it very difficult to argue with Lucroy’s decision to veto the trade. His talent is so obvious that there will surely be other contending suitors to make a compelling offer (perhaps before this post even goes live).

It’s unfortunate for the Brewers, who have a short window with which to complete another trade. But it’s not Lucroy’s job to look out for the future of this club, and David Stearns and company knew heading into negotations that Cleveland was on Lucroy’s no-trade list and that a veto was a possibility.

Given Lucroy’s obvious talent, though, I don’t think Brewers fans even need to worry about this decision hurting the club’s future. Somebody will almost certainly make the Brewers a great offer, and even if they don’t, they have the full winter and another summer with which to figure out Lucroy’s future, whether via trade or contract extension. Lucroy exercised understandable control over his future with this decision, and the Brewers still have ample opportunity to make the most of the situation.

Over the next three years, his lowest TAv was .274, and the consistency he demonstrated year after year catapulted him into the discussion of best catchers in baseball. It was at this point that the value of a diverse skillset became clear; for those first five seasons, both his bat and glove saw some wild swings. His TAv ranged from .224 to .305, and his FRAA ranged from 45.4 to 16.9. And yet, the lowest WARP he posted in a full season was 5.7. He was able to weather slightly subpar performances (for his standards) at either the plate or in the field because he was so good at both aspects.

There are many ways to generate value and be a good baseball player. The obvious and safest way is to be good at a lot of different things, as this provides the most backup plans should some aspect of one’s skillset fail. It is for this reason that up-the-middle prospects are the most coveted. If a center fielder proves unable to hit, at least he can still play a premium defensive position. If he proves unable to play center field adequately, he can be moved down the defensive spectrum to a corner. There are simply more contingency plans and options when a player has a variable skillset.

During his prime, Lucroy mastered this. When his bat hadn’t yet arrived at the beginning of his career, his defensive value still made him an excellent player. And when his glove started to decline, his well-above-average bat kept him an excellent player.

But in the last two years, his glove has completely fallen off, at least according to FRAA. The decline began earlier in his career when he dropped from a peak of 45.4 to 16.9 in his seminal 2014 season. Last year, though, his FRAA was just 0.9, and this year it is stuck firmly at zero. So, while there is generally volatility in defensive numbers, two years of exactly the same evaluations suggests that we are truly seeing a declining skillset.

Even with this, Lucroy is a valuable player just because of his bat. His .301 TAv this year is well above his career mark of .275, but it is right in line with the upper limits of his performance and clearly within the bounds of what he has proven himself capable of—that is, this is not a fluke. He has 3.3 WARP through two-thirds of the season, which puts him on pace for about 4.5 wins. That is clearly an excellent player, but it isn’t quite the six-win level he was reaching previously.

It also puts him more at risk for a serious decline. With two elite skills, he was a much safer bet to perform year after year simply because if one disappeared he would still be good. One has disappeared now, though, so if the bat goes, he becomes much riskier very quickly.

However, it is also worth speculating about whether or not this decline in defensive performance is real. As is evident from the chart below, framing numbers make up the bulk of a catcher’s FRAA, and Lucroy’s have declined rapidly.

But it isn’t exactly clear why (at least to me, a non-expert in these matters). Presumably, Lucroy himself has gotten worse, but framing isn’t necessarily a skill that declines with age. Jose Molina was famously great at it until his bat forced him out of the league after 2014, and a quick analysis of BP’s statistics report of all big league catchers in 2016 shows a correlation of essentially zero (-0.01) between age and framing runs.

This fact makes Lucroy’s decline interesting, as the fact that there is little relationship between age and framing skill again raises the question of what exactly happened over these past two years. Notably, though, it does open the possibility that Lucroy returns to his former greatness.

Recently, basketball fans have been subjected to debate about who the best “two-way” shooting guard is. And in basketball, this concept matters—at least slightly. When building a team, front offices have to take into account how their players interact on both sides of the floor: a dominant offensive shooting guard who doesn’t play a lick of defense has to be compensated for in a way that someone who is very good on both ends doesn’t. Both players are considered excellent, but the way they generate their value is relevant.

In baseball, this is not the case as much. Value is value, because the players on the field simply don’t interact in the same way as they do in other sports. To quote Bill Simmons from 2009: “baseball is an individual sport masquerading as a team sport.” Players do their individual jobs, and—except for pitchers’ reliance on their catchers—they are not affected much by what anyone else on their team does.

Therefore, if Lucroy is a four- or five-win player, he’s great. It does not matter whether he does that by being good with both his bat and his glove or whether he does it by being excellent at just one. However, it’s easier to weather some decline if one has a diverse skillset. So while Lucroy is still an excellent player, the Brewers (and/or whomever his next employer is) would be thrilled to see his framing numbers rebound.

Teams are already beating a path to One Brewers’ Way, as Rosenthal reported earlier this month, and the list of players who could possibly find their way out of Milwaukee is long and varied: there’s the usual suspects, Jonathan Lucroy and Ryan Braun, but rival executives have also inquired about relievers Jeremy Jeffress and Will Smith, as well as several of the team’s young starters.

Smith and Jeffress are not exactly names you expect to come up in trade talks. Both are young, come with plenty of team control, and it’s hard to say that they’ve got any sort of problems the rest of the league is unaware of. During a normal trade season, they’d never be mentioned. But this is not a normal trade season. Over a dozen different teams could be saddling up to the counter, looking to solidify a playoff or championship push. Desperate times call for desperate measures, and no executive who values his job wants to be seen doing nothing as his team falls inches short of the postseason. Times could get desperate enough for the shopping contenders in the coming weeks that everybody short of Bernie Brewer is in play.

So, by virtue of their position as sellers in the ultimate sellers’ market, the Milwaukee Brewers have a major advantage this summer. Then, you factor in the team’s payroll situation, and the picture gets even rosier. Milwaukee had exactly three players due to hit free agency this coming offseason: Aaron Hill, Chris Capuano, and Blaine Boyer. Capuano and Boyer are not pitching well enough to warrant consideration as trade bait. The other thirty-seven players on the roster are locked up through 2017, at least:

Sure, it might have been a week into the calendar, but July officially landed last Thursday. It was then that the Milwaukee Brewers made their first move of trade deadline season, flipping offseason acquisition Aaron Hill to Boston in exchange for A-ball second baseman Wendell Rijo and AAA starter Aaron Wilkerson.

Admittedly, the trade is not one to inspire large-scale celebrations in Wisconsin. Scouting reports on Rijo are heavy on the words “average” and “polished,” a combination of traits that usually lend themselves to utility infielderdom. Wilkerson is a 27-year-old who only made it to the AAA level just this season, labors to scrape 90 on the radar gun, and gets by on pitchability and guile. He’s an intriguing fringe prospect, and he just might be the next Mike Fiers or Junior Guerra–or, he might be a pitcher whose stuff isn’t good enough to get big-league hitters out consistently. He’s posted phenomenal walk and strikeout rates across two levels in 2016, and he’s done it with stuff that doesn’t look nearly as good as it plays on the stat sheet:

Neither acquisition is likely to set the Major Leagues on fire, but that’s not the point. Just seven months ago, the Brewers acquired Hill as a means to get a better prospect out of Arizona, in Isan Diaz–that is, he literally had negative trade value. Now, he’s worth two interesting–if not particularly shiny–prospects. On the whole, it was a coup. Hill was never going to fetch a top prospect, but the front office got something of value for him, and the Jean Segura trade somehow looks even better now.

If you're into trade-trees….#Brewers functionally moved Jean Segura for Chase Anderson, Isan Diaz, Aaron Wilkerson, and Wendell Rijo.

— J.P. Breen (@JP_Breen) July 7, 2016

And it could be that this is just the beginning.

But Ryan Braun and Jonathan Lucroy rank as two of the biggest trade chips on the market right now. That the Brewers have been actively shopping both players since December is no secret–but back then, nobody was interested in meeting the team’s asking price. Various rival executives commented anonymously to the media on how the Brewers wanted an “unreasonable return” for them. The front office maintained that they knew what their players were worth. Since then, both players have put together first halves that support the Brewers’ analysis of the situation amidst swirling trade rumors. Though the rumors have died down around both players in recent weeks, their production and pedigree mean the Brewers can demand a king’s ransom for them each.

Braun is hitting north of .320, and leading the team with his .315 TAv. Furthermore, the advanced metrics suggest that he’s starting to learn his way around left field. He’s still below average, but he’s much, much, closer to average than he was last year. Braun’s value is at its highest since he was suspended, and once Jay Bruce is off the market there isn’t really anyone comparable available to trade mid-season. Braun is 32 years old, making a case for a Silver Slugger award, and under contract through 2021. Trading him makes sense, since it’s hard to see his value doing anything but remaining steady or going down. But trading him for less than he’s worth makes no sense, ever–which is why he’s still a Brewer, even though the team is unmistakably rebuilding. If the trading deadline turns into a feeding frenzy, the team might get what they want for Braun. Otherwise, he’ll just keep on hitting.

Lucroy might be the most interesting man on the roster right now. He’s actually in a very similar position to Carlos Gomez last season at this point, a year and change away from free agency freedom while performing at a high level. If the Brewers deal Lucroy in the next few weeks, well, it’s clear they’ve got a strategy with this sort of thing. But Gomez’s track record of success a year ago was more solid than Lucroy, whose fluky-bad 2015 is still fresh in memory. The more distance he puts between himself and that level of performance, the more he’s worth to potential buyers. Lucroy could be far more valuable this off-season than he is in-season.

Then again, the Texas Rangers have gotten approximately .3 WARP from their catching troupe of Bryan Holaday, Brett Nicholas, and Bobby Wilson. Robinson Chirinos, the pre-season starter on the depth chart, made his return this past week–but he’s historically fragile, and he’s nowhere near Lucroy’s league offensively or defensively even when healthy. Almost six months ago I handicapped the respective Lucroy suitors, and the Rangers appeared to be in pole position. Today, that still looks to be the case. Back then, Texas was hesitant to part with any of their premium prospects–outfielders Joey Gallo, Nomar Mazara, and Lewis Brinson, or infielder Jurickson Profar.

The Rangers already have Shin-Soo Choo locked up long-term in one starting outfield role, and they’ve made overtures to extend leftfielder Ian Desmond’s contract in the past few days, so logic would follow that one of the outfielders is expendable. And now that they’re in the thick of a pennant race, they’ve gotten over their shyness–the most recent reports are that the Rangers are “plotting to acquire Lucroy.” The Brewers’ main priority is acquiring young pitchers but Gallo, Mazara, and Brinson are all potential superstars of the future, and it would be madness to pass up an offer with any one of them if the Rangers capitulated and included one as the headliner of a Lucroy package.

There’s no saying that a three-way trade couldn’t be worked out, either. Stearns hinted this past weekend that he would be open to adding starting pitching at the deadline–a curious position for a team ten games behind .500 and clearly building for the future. But when you look at the names floating around the market for starting pitching, it makes more sense. Atlanta’s Julio Teheran, Tampa Bay’s Jake Odorizzi, and Oakland’s Sonny Gray are both young and cost-controlled, and both have the potential to be true front-of-the-rotation starters–but because of the overflooded trade market, and their respective teams’ struggles, both have been hot commodities. In Junior Guerra, Zach Davies, and Chase Anderson, the Brewers have discovered a stable bunch of mid-to-back rotation starters, but the team lacks a true ace at this point. Any of those three names would fit the team’s M.O. perfectly with their age and contract, and the chance to bring one in could make the team competitive sooner than planned.

Of course, keep in mind: the extreme buyer’s market that helps the Brewers when trying to sell hurts them if they decide to pursue a big-league starter. The price tags on Teheran, Odorizzi, and Gray will be very high. Texas would have to give up a lot of minor-league talent, and probably some to Milwaukee in this hypothetical three-way deal too, in order to make it fly.

Still, stranger things have happened–and this trade deadline, which ends a full day later than normal since July 31 falls on a Sunday this year–is shaping out to be quite the strange one indeed.