This is a fascinating development for a franchise that has not been known for pitching, and fans and analysts may have to get used to this scenario: the arms are ahead of the bats across the system. In 2017, while consecutive first round draft picks Corey Ray and Trent Clark backpedaled, pop-up pitcher Corbin Burnes posted a phenomenal year and saw his stuff tick ahead after noted mechanical adjustments in his delivery. But the pitching development hardly ends with Burnes, who exemplifies the current stock of middle-to-back end rotation starting pitching prospects that grade out as thoroughly solid quality within that role; reports cooled on Cody Ponce, but he had a ho hum innings building season, as did Luis Ortiz at Class-AA; Freddy Peralta was chasing Burnes for most impactful pitching season within the minors; his trademate Carlos Herrera took a big step forward in full season ball; and behind these quality depth options, Trey Supak, Josh Pennington, and others still had quite fine seasons.

Related Reading:
2017 Brewers Minors: Bats

There is a type of depth with these pitchers that simply cannot be matched by the current bats in the Brewers system. Currently, the bats feature multiple risk factors, especially in terms of developing hit tools. This profile not only suits graduates Lewis Brinson and Brett Phillips, but also the aforementioned Clark and Ray, among others. Perhaps the selection of Keston Hiura in the 2017 draft is most important to counteract this risky trend, although Hiura simply reapplies that risk in a different area of the game. If the Brewers bats currently fit the profile of “could be big tools impact” / “might not make it out of a bench role,” the arms are quite the opposite, with no true top-end pitching prospect in the system. It’s a beautiful thing: not one ace. But among those non-aces, perhaps a number of starters that could prove as “boring” as Zach Davies, or have question marks answered like Chase Anderson or even Jimmy Nelson.

One gets the sense that these Brewers arms could be plugged in the rotation any which way, which should be considered an exciting affair given the recent hype of pitching coach Derek Johnson’s blank-slate, situational-personal coaching approach. It should also be mentioned that in an era of velocity, the top Milwaukee arms are hardly flamethrowers, which adds an interesting question about whether the Brewers are exploiting undervalued aspects of the game (I know that’s a played out question by now, but still…), or simply whether the Brewers have found a profile of arm that fits their system or organizational approach.

To accompany the statistical index of 2017 Brewers minor league bats, I have prepared an index of statistics for the 2017 arms in the affiliated ranks. To provide basic consistency with the survey range for the bats, I translated the initial scale of 50 batting PA to 16.7 pitching IP for assessing seasons. This largely produced a similar number of players across leagues, which also means that league median statistic figures should have a solid range to reflect statistical context.

I choose the method of indexing statistics because it is relatively straightforward in terms of user interface: every metric can be measured against a “constant” or comparison variable, such as “Player Total Average (TAv)” versus “League TAv.” In an index, 1.00 can basically be read as “average,” for it means that a player’s metric perfectly matches the comparison metric. For example, righty Eric Hanhold played his age-23 season at Class-Advanced A Carolina, where the median age was also 23; his index is therefore 1.00 for that statistic.

It should be noted that I calculated the index in a different way for pitching prospects in order to remain consistent with the batting index. This means that an overall index greater than 1.00 suggests that a pitcher’s OPS-allowed was better than the average contextual indicators in the league, and that an index below 1.00 means that pitcher was below average given the context of the league. In order to provide additional context to an index that only weighs age, park factor, and opposing OPS alongside OPS-allowed, I added a Deserved Run Average (DRA) index so that readers can compare outcomes and reflect on the validity of the OPS-allowed index.

This index is slightly different than the batting index, since there are different OPS values for pitchers and their opponents (for example, a batter is facing tougher opposition if the opposing OPS is lower; for pitchers, tougher opposition means higher OPS from opponents). For this reason:

+1.00 Age Index means “younger” than league average age.

+1.00 oppOPS Index means better than average opponents (compared to the league).

+1.00 Park Index means hitter’s park.

This index should not be read as a significant, be-all / end-all assessment of pitching performance. Instead, it should be read alongside other statistics and scouting reports as an indicator of the context in which the pitcher performed, as well as how their advanced performance (via DRA) compared to the league.

A few observations:

• Like the batting index, the “non-prospects” immediately dominate this pitching index. Trey Supak has been a deep cut since the Brewers acquired the projection-upside play in the Jason Rogers trade, and the righty worked what finally would be his first full season….at age 21. Taylor Jungmann is hardly even old for Class-AAA Colorado Springs as an organizational depth option. Quiet relief prospect Bubba Derby, a member of the Khris Davis trade, worked a season that matches the “contextual” aspects of Corbin Burnes or Supak (his trademate Jacob Nottingham also had a fine season on the batting index). Freddy Peralta looks like loads of fun, bringing numerous fastball and off-speed / breaking ball offerings and a funky delivery to keep hitters off balance. In this case, the command aspects (and delivery repetition due to a crossfire set-up) of the scouting report should be read alongside the index to round out future role and expectations, but it is undeniable that Peralta placed himself on the radar of quality organizational depth (at worst) in 2017.

• Cody Ponce had quite an interesting year in terms of DRA deviating from his other contextual factors. In terms of OPS, age, and park factors, Ponce scored well in both Carolina and Biloxi. Yet, the righty’s DRA did not stack up against either league, with DRA index of 0.86 and 0.97 in both assignments, respectively. The big righty is making his way up the organizational ladder, however, and it’s tough not to dream on that cutter or fastball at least helping Ponce secure a solid bullpen role of some sort.

• BP scouting team member James Fisher provided a detailed description of Jordan Yamamoto for last season’s midseason prospect feature, noting that delivery refinements and stuff progression drove the righty’s stock. Yamamoto continued to build on that 2016 notice with an excellent 2017 campaign, arguably putting together the most interesting pitching season in the organization (Burnes received the hype, but Yamamoto could have defined a role).The righty was extremely young for the Carolina League, and if the progression continues, the youngster could be primed to expand on a 140+ IP floor during his age-22 season at Class-AA Biloxi. It is worth noting that Yamamoto did not face tough competition in Carolina, although the funky park factors and his age did mightily correct for that indicator. If you’re skeptical about the index, DRA likes Yamamoto even more.

• Additional potential 2018 pop-ups / projection guys who posted better than average contextual index and DRA scores: Zack Brown, Josh Pennington, Braden Webb, and Thomas Jankins. Keep an eye on: Parker Berberet (!!!), Luis Ortiz, Jorge Lopez, Matt Ramsey, and Jon Perrin.

Related Reading:
Scalp / Spread Strategies
Bandy-Maldonado

Here, following the offseason treatment, I am including major deals from July 2015 (the arguable start of “Rebuilding”) through the present day, meaning that these moves are not entirely Stearns’s trades. Indeed, the Zach Davies / Gerardo Parra trade and the Carlos Gomez & Mike Fiers return remain two reasons that the Brewers did not need to “tank” and design a “scorched earth” rebuild that completely reconstructed the organization. Coupled with draft signings by the late Bruce Seid (such as Jacob Barnes and [soon] Brandon Woodruff), as well as graduated top prospects like Orlando Arcia, and superstar Ryan Braun, the “rebuilding” Brewers have remained competitive due to several different talent streams entering, remaining, and graduating through the system.

Trade Surplus Depreciated WARP & OFP Summary:

As a reminder, I will be following the historical model of Overall Future Potential (OFP) production drawn from the history of MLB performances. Scaled for prospect risk, here’s how those prospect levels can be valuated, with 50 OFP being an “average” MLB player:

Last check-in, here’s how the Brewers’ trades looked. Given Zach Davies’s quick ascent to the MLB, I forgot to add him in this list, so his trade will be featured below.

Following this set of deals, it should be interesting to note that while the Brewers system prospects have had ups and downs, the players traded away have exhibited true depreciation within one year. This should demonstrate one benefit of using a depreciation model to assess future player value, which is the model I have been working with throughout the offseason; players do depreciate in terms of production. Jonathan Lucroy, Jeremy Jeffress, Gerardo Parra, Carlos Gomez, Mike Fiers, Adam Lind, and Jason Rogers all demonstrate this, and it should be noted they demonstrate this without completely crashing their value in the meantime (especially in the case of Lucroy). Khris Davis is perhaps the worst counterexample, as Stearns almost certainly sold low on the slugger, who also deserves credit for making adjustments and shifting his approach in Oakland.

A few quick notes:

• The Lucroy-Jeffress and Gomez-Fiers deals shifted value for completely different reasons. The former relies fully (thus far) on problematic performances by the players the Brewers traded away, while the latter is improving in value both due to struggles by Gomez and Fiers and improvements by Domingo Santana. The Gomez-Fiers deal remains one of the strongest deals to build the Brewers system, even with Josh Hader’s recent struggles, and Brett Phillips’s graduation solidifies at least the 45 OFP grade (which is not nothing), while the ceiling remains to be seen.

• Hidden in the middle of this table is the Francisco Rodriguez trade, which was one of Stearns’s worst trades on the day it occurred. But thankfully, trades are not solely graded on the day-of, and post hoc analysis loves Manny Pina’s development into (at least) a split time catcher at the MLB level. K-Rod has not been terrible, for what it’s worth, but when that contract winds down to its last year the surplus value really depends on short-term production rather than longterm outlook. This hurts the K-Rod score as much as it hurts Lucroy’s assessment in Texas.

• Let it be stated that the Khris Davis trade return was solid (if not spectacular) on the day-of. But it’s great to be reminded that prospect stock can depreciate, too. Fortunately, scouting reports suggest that Jacob Nottingham can remain behind the plate, answering one previous question. But if that power (and bat) does not come around, it may not matter as much; it is getting more appropriate to highlight, say, the 40-45 end of Nottingham’s grade (still means he reaches the MLB) than the 55 end that helped him reach Oakland’s Top 10. Of course, remember that Manny Pina was probably a 40-45 grade minor leaguer when Milwaukee acquired him, so…you know the rest.

• I believe there could be some reason to reassess prospects like Freddy Peralta or Ryan Cordell, who I would rate as valuable depth options for the system. However, for the purposes of this exercise, there is not necessarily enough non-statistical information to fully develop a new scouting grade. So perhaps a few prospects in this table deserve an asterisk next to their grade.

Turning from the “earlier” trades to the 2017 offseason, one can see how Stearns developed the surprising 2017 contender. It is interesting to note that for the offseason coverage of the club, so many of us (myself included) completely failed to properly price the GM’s immediate value for these trades.

For example, Mauricio Dubon was never (and probably will not be) the prime value of the Thornburg deal. What makes the Thornburg deal so amazing is that, given Thornburg’s career development, a straight-up Dubon-for-Thornburg deal would have been solid. Yet, Stearns did not stop there; the GM managed to return not just Dubon, but also a legitimate MLB asset in Travis Shaw, as well as two total lottery tickets (exemplified in Yusion Coca, the Player-To-Be-Named-Later who completed this deal). This trade should continue to “give” to the organization, whether it is in the form of Josh Pennington or Coco being included in a future trade (they are sufficiently far from the MLB to be traded once more), or Dubon working in a utility role or second-tier MLB starting role.

A quick word: These numbers are indeed abstract! The Brewers claim approximately $472.2 million in depreciated surplus value from these trades, which roughly translates to 67 WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player) within the system. These 67 WARP could be maximized and turned into 87 market-rate WARP, they could remain steady over time, or they could further depreciate to 49 WARP. These figures are abstract, of course, because they incorporate risk into the system, and can be cashed out any which way; if Stearns cashes out 87 WARP within the next two years, the Brewers will have quite a competitive team; if these players remain merely competitive or decline further, it will be questioned whether more trades were necessary. The players could continue to depreciate, and many could fail to reach the MLB (if they are prospects). Stearns can cash out surplus through trades or development. So these numbers should not necessarily be interpreted to apply to any timeframe; that’s up to the GM to determine.

Since I’ve already focused specifically on the Jett Bandy-Martin Maldonado deal recently, I will not dive deeper into that deal except to emphasize the importance of post hoc trade analysis. Returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is not simply “using hindsight,” but rather healthy Benefit-Cost Analysis. Moreover, returning to a trade after the fact, with the proper tools, is an opportunity to potentially sharpen those analytical tools in order to provide better day-of trade analysis. But of course, the Bandy trade is not yet complete, nor are most of these deals, really. So, by returning to these trades with analytical methods over time, one can come to understand organizational value as a malleable entity that is never truly solidified at one point in time. This is arguably yet another reason to oppose “rebuilding,” or to opposing “winning now,” or any extreme organizational strategy; it is also possible to never build an organization, or to build an organization through contrarian means (as Stearns is doing). There should be no reason for an MLB club to fail to simultaneously build for the present and future, save for a lack of creativity.

(1) Grading Thames
Several sources of projection have outlined expectations for Eric Thames in Milwaukee, so I’m not going to attempt to project Thames’s statistical performance in Milwaukee. Instead, I want to look at the opportunity cost of Thames, as well as the potential value from his scouting profile. Really, my analysis of both Thames and Thornburg will depend on your feelings of WARP; whether or not you believe that WARP adequately captured Chris Carter’s value to the Brewers is going to be a factor that impacts how you view the slugger’s surplus value, for instance (a similar issue will arise with Thornburg below).

In my last analysis, I estimated that in terms of contractual value and production, Carter was worth between $18 million and $25 million to the Brewers (the main focal point here is not to consider the fact that he may have cost between $8 million and $10 million in salary arbitration, but that the Brewers could release Carter without spending a dime [and they did just that], which frames his contractual value). The most interesting note on Thames is that the slugger has changed his approach and mechanics while working in the KBO, which places a different lens on his outburst in that league, and also changes his scouting outlook in the USA. Beyond the Box Score features a detailed look at Thames’s swing in the KBO, which shows some development from his MLB swing.

If one attempts to balance Thames’s winding career path with his recent KBO superstardom, a “punt” scouting grade of 45-50 may be in order for the age 30-33 first baseman’s contract. Yet, visions of Jose Bautista come to mind whenever someone says “late 20s mechanical adjustment,” as the Blue Jays’ iconic slugger was little more than a .239 / .324 / .398 slasher through 2008 when Toronto acquired him. The idea that a player can unleash his power after his prime development years is not implausible, and indeed some of those players become superstars (Edwin Encarnacion, Bautista’s teammate, is another example).

In 1,000 scenarios, imagine that Thames reaches 40 OFP 900 times ($1,800M), 50 OFP 80 times ($2,976M), 60 OFP 19 times ($1,452M), and Jose Bautista once ($218M): the Brewers still come out ahead, even if in 90 percent of scenarios Thames effectively busts (0.93 WARP over four seasons). Their total surplus, in this scenario, would be approximately $2.8M. So, the Thames contract is a wash at worst, and at best a fantastic opportunity to sign a foreign league superstar that was simply a late bloomer. Now the only question is if Thames ends up closer to the 0.1 percent odds of breaking out as an MLB superstar on the strength of his KBO adjustments.
Surplus Value: Approximately $2.8M if assumed 40 OFP in 90 percent of outcomes.

(2) Trading Thornburg
How does one grade the Thornburg trade? In my previous grading of current assets, Thornburg’s three-year performance weighed down his significant gains as a reliever. Boston obviously traded for Thornburg with the idea of building on his season as an excellent high leverage relief option, and whether or not Thornburg is a closer, there is a chance that he will provide excellent value to their roster if given the chance to prove himself in the late innings over another season. The best aspect for the big market Red Sox is that they now reserve arbitration rights for Thornburg for three seasons, meaning that there is plenty of time for Thornburg to move within different high leverage roles, struggle, iron out any issues, even weather an injury. In this case, a study of the McCann trade, which caused me to reconsider using depreciation-models to assess trade value, one would do well to assess Thornburg in the most robust manner, certainly weighing his 2016 improvements much more heavily than his previous struggles.

If anything, this comparison should show that it’s extremely difficult to simply assess a trade based on one single model, or one assumption. The Brewers could assume that Thornburg’s troubles would weigh heavier, and they wouldn’t necessarily be wrong; the Red Sox could buy high and have a robust model for Thornburg, and be equally correct. I dare say there will be no equilibrium found for this deal, between either club. The deal is an immediate victory for the contending Red Sox, who bolster their bullpen with a hard throwing up-and-coming reliever that offers three years of arbitration reserve; the deal is an immediate victory for the Brewers, who turned a struggling swingman-at-best into a lights-out reliever and then sold at the best possible moment (it can be argued that even waiting to see if Thornburg could close for the first half of 2017 is too risky for the Brewers, since any issues in that regard would tank the value built during 2016).

Considering both conservative and aggressive estimates for the trade as currently constructed, it should not be outlandish to say that the Red Sox properly gambled that they can retain value with Thornburg’s contract (which can be non-tendered without cost prior to 2018 and 2019). If the PTBNL turns out to be a player with a pedigree other than organizational depth, that might push Thornburg into 2.0 WARP/year territory to regain value. Yet, given that the Red Sox are gambling for playoff spots, overpaying in a trade for a high leverage player is not necessarily a bad deal if the payoff is somewhere between $10 million and $30 million of playoff revenue. Adding together playoff revenue, playoff prestige, and potential flags flying is well worth a PTBNL. There is plenty of evidence to argue the trade a success for either team, which is a good sign that Milwaukee maximized their short-term closer’s value.

(3) Miguel Diaz’s Value
I previously called GM David Stearns’s refusal to protect top RHP prospect Miguel Diaz from the Rule 5 draft a “dreadful, terrible” move, but I think I emphasized the wrong reasons. As the Brewers potentially lost Diaz to the Padres (via the Twins), depending on how he fares early in the season and whether he sticks with San Diego, it is worth recasting the move as a failure even if Diaz does not reach the MLB or his gaudiest 60 OFP from summer 2016.

Imagine that Diaz follows the odds of reaching the MLB at approximately 20 percent; among those potential MLB futures, consider a 40 OFP / roster filler status as the vast majority (95 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 1.0 WARP over three seasons), a 50 OFP (4.5 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 4.0 WARP over three seasons), and 60 OFP in 0.5 percent of MLB futures (maybe reaching 7.0 WARP over three seasons). Spread over 1,000 potential futures, Miguel Diaz averages out to approximately 0.23 WARP, or someone worth between $0.500 million league minimum contract (replacement contract) and $1.61 million using the standard $7 million / WARP “market estimation.” This is the biggest problem with failing to protect Diaz: in the first place, he’s one of only a few true 50+ / 60 OFP prospects in the Brewers system. There are many 50 prospects in the system, and several 50+ prospects, even, but not many reached a 60 OFP grade in 2016. Diaz reached that level, and is therefore one of the best prospects even adding in all the risk one can find.
Value Lost: $1.6 million.

(4) Roster Summary
Here is a summary of notables trades, Rule 5 transactions (MLB and AAA), and free agency signings. Moves with 40-man roster impact are highlighted.

Thus far, the Brewers have added approximately $23.7 million in total surplus through 40-man roster transactions (this figure does not factor in full reserve control for minor leaguers, but instead focuses on OFP value). That is basically worth 1.7 WARP from a league minimum contract, or 2.75 WARP from Eric Thames (2.75 WARP is worth approximately $19.3 million, minus $15 million guaranteed). In total surplus value, Stearns has acquired approximately $63 million for the organization, which can be translated as approximately 4.5 total WARP from a league minimum salary, or acquiring approximately three 50 OFP prospects via trade.