Using Baseball Reference multiyear park factors, the Brewers offense finished nearly 30 runs better than their league environment, and Baseball Prospectus park factors have the club performing even better; by True Average, the Brewers are tied with Houston as the fourth best offense in the MLB. According to Baseball Prospectus Batting Park Factor, the actual mix of parks the Brewers batted in was fourth toughest in baseball, meaning that the Brewers were likely to play in environments suppressing runs by approximately five percent.

Like 2018, the Brewers head into next season with a seemingly clear set of positions to improve, and seemingly clear prospects or internal development options to accomplish that goal.

• Orlando Arcia features prominently in calls for offensive improvement, as the elite gloveman suffered serious setbacks at the plate prior to his Triple-A demotions. Arcia’s glove makes roster decisions truly difficult, as the shortstop has impacted the game on the defensive end from the time he reached the MLB. If he bats anywhere near his second half line of .290 average / .320 on-base percentage / .396 slugging, the glove will play (for reference, the eighth batting order spot hit .229 / .304 / .357, so second half Arcia would easily clear that hurdle).

• Second base is a roster challenge, as Noah Nofz highlighted earlier today. It’s easy to dream on the future in terms of Keston Hiura’s potential, but it’s also worth remembering that the Brewers needed to improve center field for 2018 and still traded away their best development options there (Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison). A trade of Hiura is not out of the question should Slingin’ Stearns get requisite return. The trouble is how the Brewers juggle additional roster elements and free agents there, as opposed to the development pains (or pay offs) of sticking with Hiura.

• Catcher is probably the most popular fan option for improving the club, because it offers the flashiest trade opportunity (J.T. Realmuto) and a couple of the best free agents in the 2019 class (e.g., Yasmani Grandal). Yet, it is worth emphasizing the strength of the Brewers’ fielding behind the dish in 2018, in order to frame offensive performance. Neither Manny Pina nor Erik Kratz were that bad at the plate in 2018, and both were exceptional defenders. Using Adjusted Fielding Runs Above Average, which is a fielding statistic adjusted to assess the nuances of throwing, blocking, and framing for catchers, Kratz (11.1, eighth best) and Pina (6.3, nineteenth best) produced plenty of defensive value for the Brewers. Of course, Grandal is the rare free agent catcher that can produce both excellent offensive and defensive value….

• Right field is a difficult position to assess because it’s become quite barren behind Domingo Santana for multiple reasons. First, midseason trades included Brett Phillips, who would have been an excellent candidate for a glove-first, power-speed fourth outfielder to help boost that corner position. Next, Christian Yelich does not produce good defensive value off of left field, which raises questions about Ryan Braun’s future role (in left field) and the value of keeping Yelich’s bat in the order at any defensive cost (September-level production rendered that question moot for the time being). Furthermore, there are not necessarily advanced outfield prospects that would be considered strong enough to knock Santana off of right field. All this either makes right field the perfect position for an external acquisition, or for staying put with Santana.

The trouble, of course, is that should the Brewers simultaneously develop Arcia and Hiura at the MLB level, and keep Kratz and Pina, this entire series of completely justifiable roster moves could produce an offensive black hole in the 6th / 7th / 8th batting spots when things are going rough (or, in Hiura’s case, just getting started). This is where the Brewers’ most important wager occurs: they must weigh the long-term development plays (both Arcia and Hiura have clear “role ceilings” that are better than average at the MLB level) against the need to contend in 2019 (and produce runs to do so). All of this is potentially compounded when one reasonably figures that Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich cannot possibly be expected to be as good as they were last season; obviously this does not mean that they cannot maintain performance or even improve, it just should not be viewed as a certain outcome.

Baseball Prospectus True Average is an effective statistic because it weighs and combines a more complete picture of offensive production than other metrics, and presents the result in an intuitive number similar to batting average. A player with a .260 TAv is an average player. Aspects included in TAv that are not included in some other metrics are situational hitting and errors, plus alternative weights on strike outs and bunts, among other elements. So, let’s use TAv to assess the Brewers offense: with the descriptions above in mind, how do the elements of the club compare to the MLB positional landscape? What is the positional landscape?

Not unlike pitching staffs, positional ranks across the MLB are split among groups of players for each team. The ideal of plugging in a starting player at each position was always just an ideal, as injuries and platoon strategies have been widespread since the early 20th century ballgame; now, MLB front offices may simply be even more willing to try bizarre positional formats (such as the Brewers’ positional flexibility) and substitution patterns (think 2018 L.A. Dodgers, here). Thus, the split between players with 300 (or more) plate appearances and those working below that threshold is quite large.

It should be noted that outside of the corner infield positions, there are no other positions on the diamond where the median player and the regular player are better than average according to TAv. This should be intuitive in some sense, underscoring the importance of teams finding players that can work at least 300 plate appearances in a season. Of course, the median playing time at each position should demonstrate the difficulty of assembling even a group of players that can work 300 PA at a position; often teams will need to rely on a group of players that fall short of even that mediocre playing time threshold. This uneven playing time environment, set against a foundation that establishes the importance of finding a batting order full of regular players, should demonstrate why and how teams can make wagers or trade-offs with their players (for example, the club can weigh Arcia’s shortstop defense against the value of piecing together a couple of other options at the position; that’s just one example).

With this background in mind, let’s compare major 2018 Brewers batters to the median playing time and regular TAv for their respective positions (as grouped by Baseball Prospectus. Note: I have no idea where Eric Thames went in these CSV):

Milwaukee effectively gambled on both Cain and Yelich, who were team leaders in production and playing time beyond the league median. Yet this dynamic top of the order duo hardly exhausted the positions at which the Brewers effectively stacked regulars. Travis Shaw, Ryan Braun, and Jesus Aguilar were each fantastic compared to their respective positional leaguewide performances; Hernan Perez and Manny Pina were not necessarily as far from “average” batting production as most fans think. Outside of regular workloads, Domingo Santana and Mike Moustakas turned out to be crucial depth players, albeit for different reasons. Retaining contractual rights to Aguilar, Braun, Cain, Shaw, and Yelich should be viewed as extremely positive news for the 2019 club, even with all the caveats about regressing performances, etc.

On this model, the benefits of “standing pat” in free agency and trade markets should have some appeal, as one can see that weighing the defense at catcher and shortstop, or simply waiting for Keston Hiura and(or) Mauricio Dubon to arrive at second base need not be viewed as a drag on the offense. In fact, Hernan Perez can probably cover second base in an effective manner to open the season, allowing the Brewers to free up cash and prospect resources to double down on their pitching staff. Right field becomes an interesting question, as Santana’s closing month produced a final True Average that held up against regular MLB right fielders.

Of course, one can expect that David Stearns will not simply stand pat this offseason. The point, then, is to understand that there is no linear narrative about the Brewers bats improving in 2019. This group of players surged to close 2018, made some crucial developmental strides (in the case of Arcia) and mechanical tweaks (in the case of Braun) that could bode well for future performances. There is no clear path to improving the offense without spending significant cash or prospect resources.

The common dismissal of Cain takes two forms, both of which are worth evaluating if we are to take the idea of “Value” seriously (or, they’re just plain fun to consider, if you like baseball):

• Lorenzo Cain is a great player, but he is not worthy of MVP discussions because he’s not a “traditional” candidate, as his candidacy depends on Wins Above Replacement (WAR) stats.

• Lorenzo Cain is a great player, but his value depends far too much on fielding statistics, which are quite uncertain and therefore cannot be relied upon for MVP debates (plus, a defensive candidacy also makes Cain a “new-school” candidate, and therefore much-less attractive than an old-school all-hit, no-field candidate like Yelich).

Both of these complaints are quite worthwhile, even where they exhibit ideological shortcomings about measuring baseball, for they tackle the issues of “concept validity” and “false certainty” for the so-called “analytics movement.” Concept validity is, roughly, the idea that when a descriptive or analytical measurement is constructed, it actually captures what it purports to measure. This is one of the most difficult analytical foundations to adhere to when measuring phenomena. In terms of baseball analysis, the common complaint that WAR stats do not measure value is actually a type of complaint about concept validity, even if some of the folks muttering that complaint would scoff about entering into a methodological argument. But it’s worth taking up that claim, to some extent, because if one can discern that WAR does not actually measure what it claims, there is a legitimate cause to examine its use in MVP debates. Additionally, it is possible that WAR measures exactly what it claims and yet still does not serve the task of determining Most Valuable Player, which shifts the debate to the concept validity of an MVP.

False certainty is a much easier claim to assess, especially in the context of WAR stats that have not uniformly reported margins of error, and therefore present an impression that each player is some well-defined distance away from every other player (for example, by Baseball Prospectus Wins Above Replacement Player, Christian Yelich is the best player in the NL at 6.52, approximately 0.20 “wins” better than Marlins catcher J.T. Realmuto and 0.78 “wins” better than teammate Cain). Baseball Prospectus does report uncertainty for many of their statistics, which will hopefully begin a trend of other websites doing the same, and an expansion of uncertainty reporting for the most commonly-used stats. This is simply an area for more work, and there are excellent analysts leading the call for including uncertainty in the publication of baseball stats.

What is curious, to my mind, is that Lorenzo Cain has faded in National League WARP standing (he’s now approximately seventh best among players with 500 PA), but that has not fully impacted his case for Most Valuable Player. As cited above, Cain’s rank for Batting Average, On-Base Percentage, and Stolen Bases are stellar, and if one moves away from those standard statistics, baserunning metrics also point to Cain as an elite player, and Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) places Cain better than the median NL player with 500 PA. The largest complaint one can make about Cain is his slugging percentage (which at .425 is notably better than average, anyway), and this is typically the argument that most fans and analysts are really making about Christian Yelich when they uphold his MVP candidacy: he is currently out-slugging all NL players thanks to his torrid second half.

It is worth emphasizing that if one views the MVP award as a “Best Hitter” award, and defines hitting solely on the basis of batting performance, Christian Yelich is a great candidate for MVP; his True Average (TAv) leads NL players with 500 PA (at .346), matching his top Batting Average and Slugging Percentage. But how close is Yelich to other offense-first candidates? Yelich is one of six National League players with 500+ PA and a TAv above .320, and to demonstrate uncertainty, here’s how close they are in key categories:

This is an excellent group of batters, including several (Yelich, Paul Goldschmidt, Freddie Freeman, and Anthony Rendon) that demonstrate excellence across the AVG / OBP / SLG spectrum. These are complete hitters (and that’s not to take away from Freeman with the glove, who trounces these other hitters in terms of FRAA), and in some cases Yelich will win because he got hot at a crucial time and edged out the others. That’s not a knock on his talent, just like losing out to Yelich would not be a knock on any of these other hitters.

Demonstrating the proximity of these players in terms of counting stats and overall batting ratios should enter some uncertainty in terms of using batting statistics to define an MVP candidate: basically, with this group of players, everyone is splitting hairs (and I’m glad I do not have an MVP ballot, for this reason).

Lorenzo Cain finishes ninth in TAv (.313) among NL batters with 500+ PA; to demonstrate the strength of that production, he’s shades worse than Bryce Harper (.318) and tied with teammate Jesus Aguilar (.313) for overall offensive prowess. Javier Baez has fallen to 13th on this list (.309), and to gauge his overall production, he’s roughly as good as Travis Shaw at the plate (.307!). Thus, it is worth noting that one must ask, “Is an MVP solely judged by batting performance?”, in order to consider guys like Cain and Baez in the MVP race. But this should hardly be viewed as a detrimental assessment of these players, and more of a crucial discussion about the concept validity of “MVP” and the uncertainty of the statistics involved. If this second tier of batters falls below the first, it’s not by much.

This meandering discussion takes leads to a necessary assessment of fielding statistics. What is particularly difficult about fielding statistics is that most fans and analysts have taken to the idea that since fielding statistics do not align across sources (such as FanGraphs, Baseball Reference, The Fielding Bible, MLB Advanced Media, and Baseball Prospectus), they are therefore not valid stats. This is another way of saying that, apparently, because different fielding statistics use different assumptions to assess fielding, they are not valid or dependable as a group (it should be noted that the validity and dependability of a statistic would then be assessed on its own merits of construction, data inputs, and methodological assumptions and corrections, not its ability to corroborate other measurements). Yet consider the difference between Batting Average, On-Base Percentage, and Slugging Percentage, for example; completely different players could rank in completely different ways for each of these stats, but none of those facts would invalidate the individual stat (this would be like saying, “because Slugging Percentage says Khris Davis is great but Batting Average says Khris Davis is not, we cannot trust Slugging Percentage as a stat”). In short, it is worth questioning the motivation and validity of commonly stated concerns about fielding statistics, and each fielding statistic should be assessed against its own internal construction and assumptions.

If batting performance is used as the gate for MVP discussions, and fielding statistics are used to provide comprehensive performance assessments, there are several ways that one can assess MVP candidates. For example, among NL non-catchers with 500+ PA, the only player in the Top Quarter of both TAv and FRAA is Freddie Freeman; J.T. Realmuto’s Adjusted FRAA rates him among the Top Third of all MLB catchers, which severely boosts the value of his excellent batting performance. If one ranks the top NL TAv performers by FRAA, the top five players are Freddie Freeman, Javier Baez, Jesus Aguilar (a seriously underrated defensive first baseman), Paul Goldschmidt, and Lorenzo Cain. Travis Shaw, Matt Carpenter, and Brandon Nimmo round out the top batting producers that are also average-or-better fielders.

This type of discussion narrows a list of “all-around” MVP candidates quite well, but it raises another series of problems that WAR purports to solve: how does one assess the excellence of Yelich’s batting performance against the overall package of Cain’s baserunning, fielding, and offensive production? To this observer, reducing this debate to a “new school” problem is ridiculous, simply because the pure baseball skills and role demonstrated by Cain would play in any era, as would Yelich’s classic high-AVG, high-SLG, high-RBI knock out punch at the plate.

This is perhaps what makes Cain/Yelich such a fun one-two punch for the Brewers, as they exhibit completely opposing and yet complementary skills on the diamond, without sacrificing aesthetically pleasing and productive traits like a .300 AVG. Viewing this complementary nature is one reason that narrowing an MVP discussion to Baez versus Yelich is maddening, as it is not entirely clear that Baez is the best of the “all-around” MVP candidates, and it is not clear that if one were to choose to isolate a single representative from the Brewers, Yelich resoundingly beats out Cain.

Add in a group of first basemen that excel with the glove, and a truly elite catcher, and this MVP race should be used as a proving ground for celebrating the uncertainty of concepts like “Value” while also working to assess their concept validity. So too is this an excellent opportunity to turn away from the false certainty provided by each type of baseball metric, and imagine constellations in which the assembly of each of these elements help to define why one player in this crowded NL MVP field is most deserving of the award. Insofar as I am not yet ready to abandon Cain-for-MVP arguments, it is worth emphasizing the conundrum of this crowded, talented pack.

Cain has been one of the best players in baseball over the last few years, but he has crossed the dreaded age-30 threshold so there were worries he would slow down.  His relatively slow market this past winter suggested that teams were in fact concerned about his age and injury history, but so far the Brewers have not regretted signing him up to play center field every day.

In 2015, Cain played 140 games and ranked ninth in position player WARP.  In 2017, he played 155 games and ranked eighteenth.  So far this year, he has played 119 of 139 games and ranks fifteenth.  The veteran did play only 103 games in 2016, but he has shown the remarkable ability to generally age out of injury concerns while at the same time developing into one of the game’s most consistent offensive performers.

Although Cain’s defense has declined as he has aged, his overall performance generally has not because he has improved as a hitter.  It is no surprise that his defensive metrics at 32 are not as good as they were in the past (his 0.7 FRAA this year is his lowest full-season mark), but he is posting the best offensive numbers of his career to make up for that minor deficiency.  He remains an average defender at a premium position, so he is still providing positional value.  At the same time, though, he has become a very good hitter whose .314 TAv ranks sixteenth in the majors this year.

Yelich’s brilliance and Jesus Aguilar’s miracle season have overshadowed Cain somewhat, but he deserves all the credit he receives.  His durability has been important this season for a team that has had to rely on its top-level performers; somehow, with as well as Yelich, Cain, and Aguilar have all played, the Brewers are only seventh in the National League in runs scored.  The offense has thus needed the production Cain has provided, and the potential drop-off to Keon Broxton or Domingo Santana is steep enough that an extended Cain absence might very well be the difference between the Brewers earning a playoff spot and missing out.

Cain is also a fun player to root for on his second go-round with the club.  As with Jeremy Jeffress (twice), it is fun to see a player return to his original organization and thrive, and Cain has certainly done that thus far.  His story of arriving to baseball late is well-documented, but it is nonetheless still exciting and fun.  I find it difficult to watch Cain without appreciating the joy he exudes while playing, and that combines with his talent to make him an easy fan favorite.

We cannot know what the future will hold for this Brewers team or for Cain.  This may be the Brewers’ best shot to make a run in the playoffs if Jimmy Nelson doesn’t return healthy and Jesus Aguilar regresses, but being a baseball fan doesn’t have to involve constantly worrying about the future.  We can instead focus on enjoying the present.  The Brewers are in a true playoff race again, and competitive baseball games are fun.

So too is watching Lorenzo Cain.  This contract may not age well, as Cain may return to his injury-prone ways or age particularly poorly.  I don’t have a crystal ball to tell me what will happen.  I do know, though, that Cain is a key contributor for a fun 2018 Brewers’ team.  Whether they make the playoffs may not rest solely on his shoulders, but he will certainly be a contributing factor should they make it.  We should not let his performance slip under the radar.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Baseball Prospectus: Milwaukee Brewers Team Audit

Make no mistake about it, Brewers fans and analysts, this is a trap. It’s so easy to polish off phenomenal expectations at a time like this, and rejoice that the Brewers get to play an apparently easier stretch of schedule entering the break. But the team is experiencing some injuries of attrition in the field, just as the offense has finally produced a stretch of 30 games averaging better than 2018 NL / Miller Park runs scored (more on that later). The rotation has done a fantastic job, as has the elite bullpen, which are only getting attention due to a couple of recent blow-ups and blown leads….mostly occurring in games where the batters still cannot get it together.

So in honor of this schedule, which is certainly a trap, let’s have some fun with 21 statistics that are neither here, there, nor anywhere for what will certainly Attrition Central for #TeamDepth. If the Brewers can escape this stretch of play with a 9-12 record, that’s probably correction enough for the run differentials and a sign that the war of attrition did not go terribly wrong.

Ten
Ryan Braun is having a somewhat tough year balancing some new fielding assignments, relatively part time play, nagging injuries once again, and hard-hit batted balls with relatively bad luck. But it’s not all bad for the face of the franchise: in 9.7 percent of his plate appearances, Braun has hit for extra bases (12 doubles, one triple, and eight home runs). By comparison, the average National League bat hits for extra bases in approximately 7.6 percent of plate appearances.

Twelve
For the season, much has been made of the Brewers batters’ ten shutouts. In fact, this is quite an important number for Milwaukee batters, as the total Runs Scored “zero” has appeared more frequently than all but one run total: two runs.

For the 2018 campaign, the Brewers have scored two runs more frequently than any other outcome by the offense. What’s worse is that this number is not really accompanied by very good run totals, either; five runs is very nice, and it’s good to see that number tied with “0” for second place, but after that both of “3” and “1” are below average run totals.

Sixteen
For all the criticisms that Brewers baserunners have faced for their aggressive style over the years, it seems that the exceptional baserunning performance of Milwaukee has mostly escaped fan consciousness. Undoubtedly this is due in part to the fact that the Brewers are not scoring runs at an average clip. But, according to Baseball Prospectus Baserunning Runs, the Brewers are the third best team in the MLB in terms of baserunning production. Translating this to stolen bases, Lorenzo Cain leads the team with 16 steals in 19 attempts, ahead of Jonathan Villar (10 / 12), Christian Yelich (9 / 10) and Ryan Braun (7 / 9). In fact, Milwaukee is the second best team in the National League in terms of stolen bases (58 of 71 attempts). Run, run, run!

Twenty
Only the New York Mets have attempted fewer sacrifice bunt attempts than the Brewers in 2018. Milwaukee has attempted 20 bunts thus far, with successful sacrifices 14 times; this is good for a success rate that is higher than the league average. Ironically, for the lack of runs scored, Milwaukee is not only a great base running team, but they are also posting average or better situational hitting statistics according to Baseball Reference. This occurs across categories: sacrifice bunts, productive outs, baserunners scored, and advancing baserunners (with less than two outs at third base and zero outs at second base). The problem for the Brewers is simply that they do not get enough batters on base frequently enough…

Thirteen
….and when the Brewers do get baserunners on, their tendency to hit ground balls results in the highest percentage of ground ball double plays in the National League (13 percent of GIDP opportunities). This is notably worse than the NL average of double plays produced in ten percent of opportunities. So much for strike outs being a bad thing!

Four
One wonders if the defensive flexibility of the ballclub might actually explain some of the troubles the club has in terms of scoring runs…the Brewers only have four players with more than 50 starts at one position (Lorenzo Cain and Travis Shaw lead as the most regular regulars with 70 starts, followed by Villar (55) and Arcia (53) in the middle infield). Jesus Aguilar does not even have 50 starts at first base this year; Christian Yelich’s most regular position is left field…for 32 games, and catcher and right field have also been impacted in the games started department (probably due to the respective performances of Manny Pina and Domingo Santana more than strategy).

I was certainly in the camp that expected defensive flexibility to be a strength for these Brewers, and I certainly do not think it is a downright liability given the performance of the fielders. But given the performance of the offense, I think it is worth questioning whether flexible defensive roles have an impact on batting performance for these players.

Nine
Why are the Brewers pitchers so good? Their groundball percentage is fading to the middle of the pack, minimizing their ability to produce double plays as well. However, Milwaukee arms excel at limiting fly balls, and their 9.46 percent pop-up rate is the best in the MLB according to Baseball Prospectus.

Five
For all the rumblings about the Brewers relief pitching hitting their regression to the mean, it’s worth noting that the pitchers are not terribly far above average in some stats to begin with. For instance, the Brewers rank fifth in the National League with 32 percent of their Inherited Runners Scored, despite inheriting fewer runners than the league average (100 versus 106 for the typical NL team). This is an indication of how the club is quite good with inherited runners scored, but not necessarily perched atop the league.

4.3 at 23
It’s too bad that the Brewers pitchers are not yielding more ground balls, because Orlando Arcia remains one of the best shortstops in baseball despite his lack of playing time. Arcia has the fewest games played of any SS in the Top 10 for Fielding Runs Above Average. Yet, the 23-year old glove-first fielder ranks sixth in FRAA with his 4.3 mark. Another statistic worth remembering: at 23, Arcia is tied for Carlos Correa as the youngest elite defensive shortstop, and among shortstops with at least 60 games only Ahmed Rosario of the Mets is younger (but he’s nowhere near as good defensively). If you like more straightforward statistics, according to Baseball Reference Arcia remains one of the very best MLB shortstops with 10 Defensive Runs Saved; only Freddy Galvis and Addison Russell are better in the NL.

Second Best at .336
Jesus Aguilar is having a fantastic season, boasting a .336 True Average (TAv) and 1.4 FRAA. That offensive performance is second only to Freddie Freeman among first basemen with 60 or more games played.

One
For their fantastic pitching staff, the Brewers only have one player in the top ten percent of all MLB, in terms of Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP). That player is lefty high leverage reliever Josh Hader, ranked as 40th (!) with 1.54 WARP. No full-time reliever ranks higher, and only one pitcher better than Hader is younger (Jack Flaherty).

Ten
Many Brewers fans are suggesting that the club needs an ace in their pitching rotation. When I host chats on BPMilwaukee Twitter (@BPMilwaukee), the most common questions since the off season typically concern the quality of the MLB rotation. Throwing out the extremely advanced stats, let’s look at games started and ERA+ (a contextual assessment of Earned Runs Average). Here we are, half way through the season, and only ten clubs have at least three starters with 10 GS and an ERA at or above league average: the Red Sox, Cubs, Cleveland, Tigers, Astros, Angels, Mets, Cardinals, Nationals, and Brewers.

Seventeen / 40 Percent
If you’re interested in an ace, though, using the colloquial definition of someone who can lead a rotation in terms of performance and starts, who would be better than Jhoulys Chacin? Sorting all MLB starting pitchers by games started and ERA+, Chacin meets the strongest definition of good performance in a heavy workload.

Of course, including advanced contextual statistics, it is worth questioning whether the club will see some course correction from the starting pitchers. Here, Junior Guerra’s 4.69 DRA is the best among Brewers starters with at least 60 innings pitched. That’s good for 71st in the MLB. Yet, once Guerra is working between the lines, his splitter remains one of the best in the game at inducing swings-and-misses; thus far Guerra is yielding nearly 40 percent whiffs-per-swing on the split (only slightly lagging his 2016 performance that put that pitch on the map).

Thirteen / Forty-Three
Overall, the Brewers pitching rotation forms quite a strong unit: the club’s starting pitchers have 13 Runs Prevented as a group. This performance helps the team maximize a phenomenal bullpen, as the Brewers can frequently keep the game close. With a bullpen that has prevented 43 runs, the starting pitchers are often handing close games to relief pitchers that are ready to help convert those games into wins.

Six
When is a better than average offense not really that good? Over the last 30 games for the Brewers, it turns out! Those big ticket runs totals against Philadelphia have gone a long way toward improving Milwaukee’s season long offensive figures….

….but for all that, over the last 30 games the most frequently Runs Scored total for the Brewers has declined from the season leading 2 RS. Twenty percent of the Brewers’ games since they returned from Minnesota have ended with 1 RS for Milwaukee. If you missed seeing 2 RS, do not worry, for that remained the second most frequent run total over that time.

Seventeenth in Right
Domingo Santana is a tough player to figure out right now. If someone had told Brewers fans that the right fielder would have -2.6 FRAA roughly halfway through the season, most would have expected that he would be in the running for one of the most valuable right fielders in the MLB. Alas, in True Average (TAv), Santana’s mark of .259 (i.e., roughly league average) ranks 17th of 24 MLB RF with 60 or more games played.

Fourteen
Perhaps Lorenzo Cain is able to produce so many stolen bases in part because he’s on first base so frequently: the Brewers Center Fielder is drawing walks in 13.8 percent of his plate appearances!

Nineteen (Two)
Without park adjustment, across the 2018 MLB the Brewers’ offense currently ranks 19th in terms of Runs Scored. Their pitching staff currently ranks 2nd in terms of Runs Allowed.

Photo Credit: Jeff Hanisch, USA Today Sports Images

On Sunday, Brent Suter pitching 5+ innings, allowing two runs on three hits and two walks, while striking out six. It was his fourth straight start where the lefty struck out six batters. Suter induced twelve whiffs off his four seam fastball, the third straight game in which there have been at least ten swings and misses on the pitch. In his twenty-two previous starts before this stretch, he’d only gotten ten whiffs on the fastball twice. Suter’s feat is amazing because he throws the slowest fastball in the majors.

Suter threw seventy-two fastballs against the White Sox, increasing his fastball usage even more. Suter has varied his pitch mix throughout his career, and in May he almost threw the pitch at his highest usage rate for a month in his career. In April 2017 he was a reliever, and he only had three starts in August 2017, so May 2018 was the most sustained usage rate as a starter of his career.

What’s driving the increased usage and success for what seems like it should be a mediocre pitch? Suter has seen a velocity bump. When he first broke onto the big league club, he was throwing the pitch at 83.5 mph, which is only slightly faster than Jamie Moyer at the end of his career, and not sustainable in the majors. While he could max out the pitch close to 88 mph, he didn’t sustain that level through an outing. This season, he’s throwing harder than before, including his bullpen stints. Suter’s history suggests that there probably isn’t much more room to grow, the closer he can sit to 90 mph, the more effective he can be. And ideally this would also help his changeup, since there’s more separation between the pitch speeds, but so far that hasn’t happened.

Aside from the velocity bump, Suter is also getting a little more movement on the fastball. There’s slightly more horizontal movement and the most vertical movement of his career. The combination of factors has lead to increased swing and whiff rates on the pitch when he’s throwing it to the top and above the zone. His already very high swing rate on high fastballs has increased in almost all of those upper zones this year. Swings on those high fastballs play into his plan. He gets most of his swings and misses on those pitches, and even when batters make contact, they don’t drive the ball well in that area.

Baseball history suggests that Suter is walking a fine line that is likely not sustainable. Fastballs that slow should be very hittable. According to DRA, he’s already outperforming his peripherals. However, if he can maintain the new and increased velocity level, then he has more breathing room for success. The Brewers are 5-3 when he allows less than four runs, which is achievable. With this bullpen, five solid innings is enough.

Over the weekend, Lorenzo Cain went 1-10 with three walks. In his age 32 season, he’s currently producing a .301 TAv, which would tie his career high, which was set back in 2015. His slugging numbers are slightly down from 2017, but his plate discipline has taken a massive step forward. Cain’s OBP has surged to .389, which would be a career high, because he’s walking more than ever. His increased selectivity at the plate is extraordinary.

Other than his first season with regular playing time in MLB, Cain has consistently swung at a higher rate than the league, and 2013 is his worst season by VORP. Somehow Cain has dropped his swing rate by nine percentage points, and now only thirty-two regulars swing less than he does.

Cain’s made improvements across the board. He’s cut his swing rate on pitches out of the zone from 30.3 percent to 20.2 percent, which would be the lowest rate of his career, including partial seasons. Looking broadly at pitch types, he’s swinging at career low rates against hard and breaking pitches, with a slight uptick on offspeed pitches as a result of swinging at more changeups.

When examining his zone profile from this season, Cain has made improvements in a few areas. It looks like he’s making a conscious effort to be more selective on pitches away, especially those out of the zone when compared with his career rates. He’s also laying off more pitches above the zone, with those takes increasing as the pitches move further away from him in the box. These are traditionally pitches where he’s not seen a great rate of success, so if these changes stick, Cain could produce the best season offensively of his career.

The Brewers have a rare two days off this week, as they have a break before and after their two game series in Cleveland, then go to Philadelphia to play the Phillies. When in Cleveland, the Brewers will face Corey Kluber and Carlos Carrasco. Even with Carrasco’s disappointing season, both starters have better DRAs then the current Milwaukee rotation and the Cleveland offense is 4^th best in MLB, scoring 5.02 runs per game.

The first Deserved Run Average (DRA) statistics are available for the 2018 season, although they should be published with a grain of salt because the corresponding Run Elements are not yet posted on Baseball Prospectus. As always, the statistic was improved over the offseason, and a new article about the improvements is forthcoming at Baseball Prospectus (keep your eyes out for it, probably next week). In the mean time, as the U.S. Census says, let’s Compare With Caution!

So, obviously since DRA are available, it’s time to cue the time honored #WhyDoesDRAHateMyTeam? twice over, as both the Brewers and Cubs probable starters for this series have….suspect underlying performances thus far:

In the full extent of the Brewers pitching staff, the recent pitching surge that is basically keeping the club on a Playoff Contending pace can be called into question by both DRA and contextual Fielding Independent Pitching (cFIP) statistics. Below is a table of Runs Prevented estimates, using (1) Baseball Reference three-year park factors for Miller Park, (2) Deserved Run Average, and (3) cFIP averages scaled to the aforementioned park environment. For more on Runs Prevented, read this.

Milwaukee’s pitching staff is still expected to prevent runs at an above average rate for the season (probably a +14 RA season), but that’s quite a long distance from their current exceptional performance. What’s going on? Well, the early inefficiencies in the field have been nicely wrapped up, and now the Brewers couple one of the top ground ball pitching staffs in the MLB with one of the most efficient ground ball defenses in the MLB. In fact, only Cleveland is better thus far. In many ways, this should not be surprising, as one could have surmised that the offseason pitching acquisitions were largely designed to feed ground balls to an excellent ground ball defense. So here we are: Milwaukee is in an odd place for underlying run elements, as the pitching staff on the whole is not expected to be a strike out machine, and Miller Park will likely encourage walks and home runs from opposing bats. Given these elements, one might expect that the Brewers outperforming their peripheral numbers will be a story all year.

Entering Chicago, what is especially exciting is that the Brewers bats are heating up. One might readily attribute that performance to the return of Christian Yelich to the Brewers batting order, in order to form a killer 1-2 punch with Lorenzo Cain. Indeed, according to Baseball Reference the Brewers boast average lead off production (including the all-important .333 On Base Percentage [OBP]), and notably better than average production from the second spot (118 OPS+, including .342 OBP). But, the remainder of the Brewers order is starting to thaw out, which is allowing the club to produce runs throughout the batting order. These production types range from singles machine Jonathan Villar to mashers like Travis Shaw and Eric Thames.

Thus far, a few question marks remain across the diamond, specifically regarding right fielder Domingo Santana. Despite concerns about a lack of playing time for Santana after the Brewers acquired Cain and Yelich, the right fielder has played in 23 of the club’s 25 games thus far, essentially working as a starter (Santana has the third most PA among position players). But, Santana has yet to get going, basically producing at the same level as Orlando Arcia without the prime defensive position and production (Arcia at least has 2.3 Fielding Runs Above Average to his name, and serves a crucial function as one of the ground ball efficiency fielders for the Brewers infield). Arcia can be hidden at the bottom of the batting order for time immemorial so long as the glove continues to stick; to that end, Baseball Prospectus ranks Arcia as the third best fielding short stop in the MLB thus far in 2018 (after ranking fourth best in 2017). Santana remains one of the worst right fielders in baseball, which is fine when the bat carries the profile; one wonders with Jesus Aguilar smoking the ball around the ballpark whether the Brewers will continue to employ Braun / Cain / Yelich outfielders for the time being.

Entering Wrigley Field, the Brewers have their work cut out for them. The club is playing great baseball, even with the caveat that they’re playing poor teams. But that’s always a catch-22 for MLB clubs: if good teams fail to beat the bad teams, fans rail against them (“The Brewers play down to their competition!”), but if good teams whip bad teams, fans move to some other narrative (“The Brewers can beat bad teams but can they beat good teams?”). So, the excellent Brewers pitching staff squares off against the phenomenal Cubs bats, a true strength-versus-strength match-up. Milwaukee arms will attempt to coax Cubs bats to keep the ball on the ground and hopefully get some help from a Chicago that has yet to thaw out in 2018. Meanwhile, the scuffling Cubs arms are nowhere as good as many expected thus far, and they face a Brewers offense that is finally participating throughout the batting order. It’s never to early to begin testing assumptions, but it’s worth remembering that very little hangs on this series, save for the underrated good guys taking on the Evil Empire.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

Of course, these Brewers look very, very bad in some areas of the game. One can use Pythagorean W-L, or Run Differential (Runs Scored / Runs Allowed), to estimate a club’s expected record based on their underlying elements. In this case, the results are much uglier than .500. If one had told Brewers fans and analysts that their favorite club would be 4-8 after the first dozen games, that would probably cause a bit more pause than a .500 record. How did we get here?

• The starting pitching has been worse than many people expected, even worse than many naysayers could have imagined.

• Much of the bad starting pitching performance is due to poor fielding. While the Brewers starting pitchers are 11 runs below average thus far (!!!), these arms have also allowed four more runs than expected based on Fielding Independent Pitching (which is awful this early in the season). A 41 RS / 53 RA club might have been able to eat more innings, or given a few close games more breathing room.

• More importantly, the starting pitching’s poor performance has occurred early in games. Only Chase Anderson and Zach Davies have completed six innings of work thus far in the season, which means that in three additional turns through the rotation the bullpen has required (at least) another inning of work.

• Innings pitched workloads over nine inning games are one thing, but since the Brewers have played in so many close games, the workload has been compounded by extra innings games. Milwaukee has already played three extra innings games thus far in 2018; to put that in perspective, seventeen MLB teams have yet to play two extra innings games in this young season.

• The fielding really is bad. According to Baseball Prospectus Defensive Efficiency and Park-Adjusted Defensive Efficiency statistics, the Brewers fielding unit is easily in the bottom third of the MLB. This is somewhat surprising given that (a) the Brewers had a relatively middle-of-the-road fielding unit in 2017 and (b) the Brewers’ offseason moves largely were meant to improve the defense (see Eric Sogard, Lorenzo Cain, and Christian Yelich transactions as examples).

• Of course, the batting performances thus far have been terrible. In fact, based on the 2018 National League and three-year Miller Park factor, the Brewers have average nearly one run below average per game. The bats have scored five or more runs in 5 games thus far; the trouble is, when they are not scoring runs, they are not scoring runs. In this department, the Brewers have also scored two-or-fewer runs in 5 games thus far. You can say what you want about the pitching, but you’re not going to win many 0 run support games.

• Beyond the performances, the poor play on the field has been compounded by injuries. Currently, Christian Yelich and Corey Knebel have joined Jimmy Nelson, Boone Logan, and Stepgen Vogt on the disabled list. Meanwhile, Lorenzo Cain is also nursing a day-to-day injury, which produced the club’s listless batting order that appeared in last night’s loss in St. Louis. There’s no other way to say it: the Brewers have a pretty good team on the DL right now, which is certainly not an excuse for poor play (especially for a team that was supposed to call depth its strength), but is one explanation for the gloomy attitude among Brewers fans.

• Ultimately, there also seems to be this attitude among Brewers fans that since success was unexpected in 2017, every game in 2018 would be a referendum on those expectations. It is as though Brewers fans are simultaneously terrified and angry about the mounting poor play, while also angrily pounding their fists in vindication: “See, I told you the rotation was bad! See, I told you this wasn’t a good team! The front office was fooled by their 2017 team!” That sort of attitude does not help anyone, but in an era where fans identify more with roster-building and playing along as General Manager, rather than imagining themselves as ball players and aligning themselves with labor, this produces fan sentiments that are sensitive and easily bitter towards shortcomings on the field.

So what’s going right? According to Baseball Prospectus, first and foremost, the Brewers pitchers are yielding relatively high percentages of ground balls and pop-ups. This essentially means that the pitchers are doing their job of limiting hard contact and keeping the ball on the ground. Given the general career fielding profiles of the Brewers defense, one might expect the Brewers’ Runs Allowed profile to self-correct should Milwaukee arms continue to allow solid groundball and pop-up percentages. Additionally, although the Brewers rotation has not been designed to strike batters out (48 of 269 batters struck out thus far), they are limiting the walks (22 of 269 batters). While the home run total must come down, thus far the strikeout-to-walk ratio is a sign of success.

Of course, it is more difficult to see the silver linings with the Brewers offense. In fact, the Brewers bats have batted-ball statistics that their pitching staff would like to see: Milwaukee batters are thus far keeping the ball on the ground and popping up at strong percentages, which is not a good trend to see for an offense. Despite all this, it is worth noting that the Brewers True Average of .246 is basically around the league median; currently, a .258 TAv is a Top 10 performance among MLB teams, and six teams have TAv between .245 and .249. It is worth noting that, thus far, the Brewers batters have ended significantly more plate appearances after the first pitch in 2018 than 2017, but they are not succeeding in those plate appearances: their .305 / .317 / .441 batting average / on-base percentage / slugging percentage slash line is notably below average for first pitch plate appearances.

One key silver lining statistic that the “home run or nothing” vultures may be thrilled to see: the Brewers are significantly limiting their strike outs thus far (near 10 percent improvement), knocking the ball into play more frequently. Their home run rate has plummeted from 3.7 percent in 2017 to 2.1 percent in 2018 thus far, which is certainly something to continue watching. As Milwaukee continues to knock the ball into play more frequently, they must change their orientation away from a groundball and pop-up team. “Home run or nothing” is not a bad offense if the home runs mean a club is not grounding out and popping up.

As the season progresses, it is worth tracking home runs, fly balls, and runs scored per game across the MLB. Thus far, the run environment has deflated, which is another interesting element to consider regarding the Brewers’ roster construction. Compared to the run environment of 2016-2017, the Brewers pitching staff is even better than its current performance, but the deflation in runs scoring amplifies every shortcoming on the mound. Alternately, it is worth questioning whether a shift in the ball is affecting batter across the league. Given MLB efforts to speed up the pace of the game, as well as their ambivalent responses to the “bad press” of various (independent) corroborations of juiced baseballs during 2016-2017, it is plausible that MLB could have put the lid on the juiced ball.

Ultimately, this is not “small sample size” warning to throw out the analysis above: the Brewers have several shortcomings that cannot continue. The bats cannot continue to walk at low rates, or hit the ball on the ground, or pop up. Somehow, adjustments at the plate must center around maximizing patience and discipline to drive the ball around the ballpark. The fielding cannot continue their inefficient play, and this has nothing to do with errors; errors are one thing, but inefficiencies around the diamond are hurting a Brewers pitching staff that is meant simply to feed a defensive unit. In fact, the arms must continue to feed ground balls and pop-ups to their fielders…that’s one trend that should be maintained.

Yet, so long as Christian Yelich is injured, so long as Jimmy Nelson is injured, so long as Corey Knebel is injured, so long as Stephen Vogt and Boone Logan are injured, it is worth seeing a club scraping by at .500 as an extreme strength. #TeamDepth has already been tested, and the club is doing what many of us expected they would do anyway: they are playing in close games, night after night, and must use their strong bullpen and fielding to make that equation work. Now the equation of players executing that strategy have changed, which is not an excuse; indeed, that’s the whole point of #TeamDepth. It’s worth punting this 6-6 start, considering each .500 point as a 0-0 event from which the team can be newly evaluated. Put aside the 4-8 run differential, even: we know what adjustments the Brewers need to make, and we know they have one of the deepest clubs in the game to attempt to execute those adjustments. Now it’s time to see if it works.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USA Today Sports Images.

Baseball Prospectus:
Why PECOTA Hates Your Favorite Team
13 Noteworthy Projections

Since PECOTA is a probabilistic model, which means that it is designed to reflect the most probable outcome in a distribution of projected outcomes, Brewers fans should keep in mind that “84” is not some special or magic number. As demonstrated last season, a club that was expected (at best) to flirt with .500 surged ahead and competed for the playoffs, but that surge was not even greater than one standard deviation away from the projected win total. These Brewers could indeed use their strengths to once again push the club ahead of schedule by contending for a playoff spot or winning the division in 2018, or they could indeed sputter in development patterns or role depreciation and return closer to .500. What PECOTA reflects is that the Brewers’ big offseason moves (trading for Christian Yelich, signing Lorenzo Cain) did not guarantee them a playoff spot or even playoff contention, but instead, “more probable” competition or “more probable” playoff contention.

So, what’s going to make the Brewers “tick” in 2018? Here are my favorite picks from 2018 Brewers PECOTA:

PECOTA “punts” the Yelich Trade
Standing behind the curtain during some of the PECOTA work throughout the offseason, it was very interesting to see that the trade involving Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto for Christian Yelich….did not really “move the needle” on the Brewers’ 2018 expected win total. This is surprising given the court of public opinion, but there are two specific reasons that the trade does not immediately yield an absurd advantage for the 2018 Brewers: (1) Lewis Brinson’s high floor is real, and (2) Christian Yelich could experience some role depreciation. It’s always so easy to look at the best possible outcomes or potentialities in each trade; Brinson the future superstar, Yelich the 5.0 WARP player, but it’s also worth emphasizing Brinson’s risk in reaching his peak role and Yelich’s fluctuation between varying degrees of serviceable-to-great production.

Don’t get me wrong: Christian Yelich is a very good baseball player, and his contract makes him worth every potential prospect future that the Brewers surrendered. PECOTA thinks so, too, projecting Yelich primarily as a Brewers left fielder working a .279 TAv and serviceable fielding at a corner position. That’s good for 2.7 WARP, second only to Lorenzo Cain (3.5 WARP). But, remember that floor for Brinson? Even if the center fielder fails to reach his fullest and best hit tool (and therefore, fullest and best power) in the MLB, he’s still a speedy, strong defense, strong arm player in the center of the diamond. PECOTA projects Brinson at .262 TAv and an overall plus on defense for the Marlins, which is good for a club leading 2.5 WARP. This is great for both teams: the Brewers land a quality outfielder under control for five years who has already shown his developed peak abilities at the MLB level (while rounding out the club with a left-handed bat and better plate discipline), while Marlins fans immediately landed the face of their rebuild, the best player on their team, and (at best) someone who neutralizes the toxic offseason orchestrations of Project Wolverine.

Zach Davies and Orlando Arcia Remain Quietly Competitive
As mentioned, the Brewers contended in 2017 due to the “high floor” strengths of their youngsters: players like Orlando Arcia and Zach Davies were not set up to be immediate superstars, but still maintained quality, consistent MLB seasons that propelled the team along “behind the scenes.” PECOTA projects the same for 2018, although this time Zach Davies is leading the pitching staff with a solid 4.43 DRA over 170+ innings, good for a 1.6 WARP. Arcia sits behind Cain and Yelich in terms of overall WARP, but the young shortstop is projected to continue onward with excellent defense and a serviceable bat at shortstop. One could look at these players’ projections and emphasize that PECOTA sees them declining from their absolute 2017 WARP, but I don’t think the WARP is the point here. Instead, what matters is that this duo is still viewed as a quality backbone of the club, even with some attrition, which will undoubtedly serve crucial roles for grinding through 162.

The Outfield Depth is a Problem
Projecting the Brewers’ outfield depth was a nightmare. I previously wrote about how a rotational system can make five outfield spots work for Yelich, Cain, Santana, Ryan Braun, and Brett Phillips, but it’s much more difficult to put those ideals into the mixer and dissect the potential probabilities. Probability #1, which PECOTA currently projects sans Santana trade, is that Ryan Braun plays right field, but only some first base and left field, and therefore loses all of his defensive value. Both Braun and Santana suffer in this universe, creating a total of 1.9 WARP (but 75 extra base hits!) and TAv below .280. Comparable players for Domingo Santana are Oswaldo Arcia, Jonny Gomes, and Joc Pederson, and his plate discipline regresses (98 strike outs and 36 walks in 315 plate appearances). Granted, I do think there is still a path of optimism about the current roster depth (perhaps Braun works 1B more frequently, and Santana receives more regular playing time across the outfield, interleague designated hitter, and pinch hitting roles), but I do not think that means PECOTA is categorically mistaken for the pessimistic trends for Braun or Santana. After all, the current roster mash up is designed in a way to particularly showcase flaws for both Braun and Santana, which does not mean they’re bad baseball players (in fact, their TAv are projected to contend for best overall offensive production on the club), they simply may be imperfect ballplayers for this current roster.

Chase Anderson is Chase Anderson
There are many good stories about the 2017 Brewers, but it’s tough to find one that’s better than Anderson’s arrival as an impact starting pitcher. Anderson resonated with Brewers fans not simply because he was a previous low-to-mid rotation depth option who arrived as one of the very best pitchers in the National League, but because he also vindicated the mechanical, analytical, and strategic approach of pitching coach Derek Johnson. In 2018, PECOTA projects some of 2016 Anderson to return, particularly in the shape of walks, hits, and home runs, without phenomenal gains in strike outs or ground balls. Underlying modeling views Anderson as one of the most likely pitchers on the Brewers to “collapse” in 2018, and less likely to “improve,” and it’s not hard to squint and see a scenario in which a comparable of Dustin McGowan is suitable for the righty’s age-30 campaign. Even with all of this noted, Anderson’s DRA is projected at 4.59 for the year, which should be a better than average performance if the offensive environment holds steady. There is value in that performance over 168.0 innings pitched, and this type of season still validates the contract extension that Anderson signed.

The Bullpen is Fantastic
As a group, the primary Brewers bullpen as currently constructed looks fantastic. Josh Hader and Corey Knebel are projected as the most likely relievers to improve in 2018, but Jeremy Jeffress, Boone Logan, and Matt Albers also receive relatively strong scores in the category. The current main group is projected to produce a DRA below 4.30, which should demonstrate the potential for average or better production in most offensive environments that the arms face in 2018. Some red flags float beneath the surface, however, as the walk rates are slightly worse than average for the relief group, and outside of Adrian Houser, Jeffress, Albers, and Jacob Barnes the group is projected to have relatively low ground ball rates. Yet, even outside of Knebel and Hader the relievers are projected as a strong strike out group, suggesting that some of the slider-heavy moves of the offseason should pay dividends in high leverage situations.

Prospects Begin Appearing on the Scene
One of my favorite aspects of digging into PECOTA projections is the appearance of new faces to the MLB. Caden Lemons, Keston Hiura, KJ Harrison, and Tristen Lutz are all listed as highly improbable MLB players by PECOTA, but their appearance on the radar after the 2017 draft means that the system is now generating comparable players for this group. Jacob Nottingham was added to the 40-Man Roster at the beginning of the 2017-2018 offseason, and one of the comparable names that popped up in his player line is Jonathan Lucroy, which is fascinating for many reasons (not the least of which is Lucroy’s general reputation as a defense-first catcher for the beginning of his career, and Nottinghma’s floor as a back-up catcher with pop). Mauricio Dubon appears as one of the more probable MLB prospects for the club, and his line is a very serviceable utility infielder (.250 batting average, .380 slugging percentage).

Brewers fans might be most excited to see Corbin Burnes at the bottom of the club’s starting pitcher list with three starts, as the pop-up righty prospect is given relatively favorable odds to reach the MLB and a set of comparable players that effectively grade out his reliever risk, reliever potential, and (most excitingly) his starting pitching potential. Additionally, Adrian Houser is given lower odds of reaching the MLB in 2018, but seeing the power sinker reliever in the mix leads to an exciting scenario where the entire Carlos Gomez / Mike Fiers trade return is potentially playing with the Brewers during the same season.

It’s a good reminder that even though common perception is that the Brewers system took a big hit with the Christian Yelich trade, there is still an intriguing group of prospects potentially knocking at the door for 2018. Add an asterisk to this potential 83-win season, as one that exhibits contending-ready talent and depth roles that are still developing for more future success.

Photo Credit: Ken Blaze, USAToday Sports Images

Edit: Updated at 7:15 AM to reflect updated win total, from 84 to 83.

When I profiled free agents to begin the season, Lorenzo Cain graded as the best available position player free agent with a $71.5M three-year depreciated surplus. Given that the Brewers landed Cain for $80 million over five years, the Cain deal grades as close to an absolute steal. Cain’s surplus grades out to approximately $120.0M over five years, which means that at a $16.0M/year rate the Brewers basically received two free years on Cain’s deal. Basically, Cain should be able to deliver value on this contract in nearly every scenario short of catastrophic injury.

Contrary to the common line that the Brewers basically acquired Cain for market value, it is arguable that the club attained the center fielder’s services for quite a valuable deal.

What is thrilling about the Yelich deal is that it is not a steal. It is not a value move. The Brewers exhausted the full value of Yelich by trading three of their top six prospects. However, this is not problematic because Yelich’s surplus value is almost comical; he’s a young, budding superstar who has already proven a floor somewhere between 2.5 WARP and 5.0 WARP as he enters his prime age seasons. Tracking surplus value is important here because one can use the idea of organizational surplus value to assess when and how a team is extracting wins from their players.

Surplus Value Pricing
Refining WARP & OFP Pricing
Translating OFP
OFP and Minor League Pay
Revisiting the CC Sabathia Trade
Cashing Out OFP 2
Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades
Historical WARP and OFP

Had the Brewers kept Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto, they would have indeed retained those prospects’ surplus value (defined here by their potential MLB ceilings, or Overall Future Potential (OFP), and their risk floor) while also carrying all of the risk of developing them year-to-year. This development risk was especially present with Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto, who are a couple of professional levels away from the MLB, but it was also somewhat present in Brinson’s profile should the center fielder never adjust his hit tool to MLB pitching. An elite fielding, speedy center fielder with some power but contact issues at the plate is not a bad MLB profile, but it’s not a superstar profile.

I began tracking Brewers surplus value during the club’s rebuild as a way to understand the success of a rebuild. What I found problematic about analyzing a rebuilding club was determining when and how a rebuilding team would achieve success. Since a rebuilding team is by definition “cashing out” its potential to win ballgames far down the road, there must be interim metrics used to judge a front office’s success. I use surplus value to assess MLB players by judging “production” (how well a player plays) and “scarcity” (how the player’s contract is structured) to express Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) in monetary terms. Since risk can be priced, prospect OFP can be assessed in monetary terms as well, either by assessing the scarcity of certain grades and profiles or by historically analyzing production by prospect classes. By using these methods, MLB players and prospects can be evaluated on the same terms, which is a necessary task since MLB players are often traded for prospects; this method can also help one assess the success of a rebuild.

While there will be issues with designing any surplus value system for assessing MLB players and prospects, I maintain that working toward such a pricing system is necessary because MLB teams trade prospects for MLB players all the time.

The trouble with a player like Christian Yelich is that because he is cost-controlled by a $50 million contract (plus an option), his top surplus grade is extremely high. Over the course of the remaining five-years, extrapolating Yelich’s best WARP (5.3) yields potential production value worth $185.5M; even harshly depreciating Yelich’s 2015-2017 production yields potential value worth $93.1M. The reason Yelich’s surplus value runs so high, however, is that Yelich can also be graded by the cost of his contract against his production value; with $58.3M remaining over five years (if the Brewers exercise Yelich’s option), Yelich’s contractual surplus is at least $34.8M, and could be as high as $127.2M should his superstar potential continue to materialize.

Simply stated, Yelich is an absurdly valuable MLB player; he’s about as valuable as it gets. What is fascinating about Yelich’s value is that one would expect that he is nearly untradeable because of his value. Basically, there is no single prospect who will ever be worth Yelich, and this is why the Marlins’ reported demand of Braves prospect Ronald Acuna (arguably the very top prospect in the game) was not ridiculous or even audacious. Thus, it should make sense that the Brewers traded three high-ceiling prospects and one intriguing pitching flyer for Yelich: where one prospect cannot exhaust the value of an MLB player, many prospects must be used to form a transaction worth completing.

Using historical OFP pricing, one can see that a prospect package of Brinson, Harrison, Diaz, and Yamamoto very nearly exhausts Yelich’s highest surplus pricing. This is not necessarily a problem, given that Yelich is such a valuable player one should not have (reasonably) expected anything lower. For example, once the Miami Marlins reached their threshold to fund their 2018 payroll, they could demand pure talent in return for Yelich, rather than talent and payroll relief. The “lowest” possible deal for Yelich, which would have priced the left fielder at his depreciated value over four years, would have roughly required Brinson and Diaz in return; but once the Marlins were able to demand talent alone, that type of price would not have been attainable by Milwaukee. Given that the Brewers had a deep farm system, especially at center field, the Brewers front office correctly ascertained that the Marlins would be pricing out Yelich at his highest possible value. With both Yelich and Lorenzo Cain sliding into outfield slots for five years, many have noted that the actual prospect hit is lessened for Milwaukee.

Of course, it must be stated that a player’s MLB potential ceiling is a dynamic phenomenon, and OFP only measures a player at one static point in time. Take Isan Diaz, for example; the second base prospect attained a higher OFP ranking entering the 2017 season, and a rough injury-riddled year dented that a bit. Jordan Yamamoto is almost impossible to price, as scouts that like the righty have recognized potential areas for the youngster to succeed as a rotation arm, but his development profile still carries a high amount of risk to reach that level. It is plausible that the Marlins priced out Diaz at a range potentially higher than the OFP published above, simply because his full prospect profile suggests that Diaz can once again reach that higher ceiling should he mend a few weaknesses as he reaches the advanced minors.

From the Brewers’ perspective, the front office surrendered much potential starpower, but they transferred all of the development risk to the Marlins. It should not be assumed that any of these prospects will be the same player in both locations: perhaps Lewis Brinson receives advice on a mechanical adjustment in Miami that the Brewers Player Development would have overlooked; perhaps each of these prospects receives enough time to adjust at the MLB level in the pressure-free environment of Miami, whereas a contending Milwaukee club may have had less patience for shortcomings at the MLB level.

Additionally, trading Brinson and Diaz essentially “completes” the Jean Segura deal, and realigns the Jonathan Lucroy deal. When I last checked in, the Segura trade remained Stearns’s worst deal (in terms of assessing day-of and post hoc surplus value), while the Lucroy deal remained his best.

Now these deals look like this:

It is nearly impossible to effectively apportion surplus from a four-player trade package across two previous trades, but the basic story is that Stearns has improved his trading record. By extending Chase Anderson and trading away Isan Diaz and Aaron Hill, Stearns has basically completed the Segura deal. In terms of the original Lucroy deal, the remaining player development task is Luis Ortiz, although the young righty is also prime trade potential due to his current innings pitched ceiling and flyball profile (36 percent groundball rate in 2017).

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

It is time to win. It is time to win now, it is time to win next year, and the year after that, and after those years, too. This is a thrilling feeling as a Brewers fan, especially as one who came of age as an everyday fan during the initial Doug Melvin rebuild. I gather this feeling is difficult for a fanbase that is so used to losing and disappointment so as to design defensive personalities toward the idea of going for it this year. But that’s over now: There’s never next year, not for the next five, and this completely reorients the Brewers organization. With Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto each head to Miami, clearing out three of the top ten spots (and two of the top three spots on the Baseball Prospectus 2018 Top 10). But that’s okay, take your pick: does RHP Freddy Peralta re-enter the top ten? 3B Lucas Erceg? C Mario Feliciano? RHP Marcos Diplan? OF Tristen Lutz? IF Mauricio Dubon? These are all prospects that did not reach the Baseball Prospectus Top 10 that still have Overall Future Potential (OFP) that are somewhere between “useful” and “interesting” MLB potential, and each has something to prove in 2018 (and more space within which to do so).

There will be more time to digest and analyze these moves, but now the Brewers faithful have immediately turned toward trading Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, and/or Keon Broxton. I am not simply playing the contrarian when I emphasize that the Brewers do not need to make such a move. First and foremost, each of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton remain under club reserve beyond the Ryan Braun era in Milwaukee, which means that the club can still play the long game with each of these players. It gets a little more difficult after Broxton will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2018, and Brett Phillips will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2019 (Brewerfan.net, 40-Man Roster).

But, the Brewers have a unique position of strength: first, they began a rest campaign for Ryan Braun in 2017, and there is no reason that the club cannot use a rest campaign for Lorenzo Cain as well. These players represent Milwaukee’s largest contracts, and the club has nothing to lose by remaining cautious with their health and playing time. By providing systematic rest to these veterans, the Brewers can gamble that these outfielders may be less susceptible to nagging injuries, and therefore maximize their potential production. It is worth it to Milwaukee to have the best possible versions of Cain and Braun available over the course of 162 and the playoffs. How can the club accomplish this and continue to win? By deploying some combination of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton between the bench and the minor leagues. Imagine these outfield sets:

Using a very basic assumption of four plate appearances per game for starters and one plate appearance for pinch hitters, these outfield schemes produce the following results:

This scenario obviously leans more on resting Braun than Cain, but more PA can be negotiated to maximize these scenarios. Phillips could serve as a defensive replacement for all three positions, and both Phillips and Santana could be used as late innings pinch hitters in various scenarios. Moreover, these scenarios are developed prior to considering injuries. Each of these players faces injury risks that could eat into playing time, which opens further opportunities for the next outfielder in line. If fans think about what it means to have an “analytic” front office, aggressive rest coupled with aggressive depth could be an important step in gaining an advantage over the 162 grind and the playoffs. In the World Series, after all, there will be a starting spot for three or four games for Braun, Cain, Yelich, and Santana; this is the type of long game that the Brewers can begin playing in rest strategies and roster building.

I am a proponent of the Brewers building the deepest team possible because the club needs every resource they can get in order to contend within their market. The club currently has enough cash to handle a signing of Cain and Yu Darvish or Jake Arrieta, so this is a real opportunity to build the best possible team for a half-decade span. At some point, trade returns for players like Santana, Phillips, and Broxton mean diminishing returns to the system. Neither Santana nor Broxton have enough of an MLB track record to yield impact prospect talent, and Phillips is in a strange in-between where he will neither be a likely trade destination for returning impact MLB talent or prospects. Holding steady with the outfield roster as is will work just fine; at worst, the club will run into a scenario in which players such as Hernan Perez, Stephen Vogt, Eric Sogard, or Jonathan Villar fail to make the MLB roster out of training camp. If that is the price to pay for significant outfield depth, that is a better price than to trade Santana, Phillips, or Broxton before necessary, and return a less attractive depth option at the first sight of injury or ineffectiveness during the season.

Photo Credit: Isaiah J. Downing, USAToday Sports Images