This is a fascinating development for a franchise that has not been known for pitching, and fans and analysts may have to get used to this scenario: the arms are ahead of the bats across the system. In 2017, while consecutive first round draft picks Corey Ray and Trent Clark backpedaled, pop-up pitcher Corbin Burnes posted a phenomenal year and saw his stuff tick ahead after noted mechanical adjustments in his delivery. But the pitching development hardly ends with Burnes, who exemplifies the current stock of middle-to-back end rotation starting pitching prospects that grade out as thoroughly solid quality within that role; reports cooled on Cody Ponce, but he had a ho hum innings building season, as did Luis Ortiz at Class-AA; Freddy Peralta was chasing Burnes for most impactful pitching season within the minors; his trademate Carlos Herrera took a big step forward in full season ball; and behind these quality depth options, Trey Supak, Josh Pennington, and others still had quite fine seasons.

Related Reading:
2017 Brewers Minors: Bats

There is a type of depth with these pitchers that simply cannot be matched by the current bats in the Brewers system. Currently, the bats feature multiple risk factors, especially in terms of developing hit tools. This profile not only suits graduates Lewis Brinson and Brett Phillips, but also the aforementioned Clark and Ray, among others. Perhaps the selection of Keston Hiura in the 2017 draft is most important to counteract this risky trend, although Hiura simply reapplies that risk in a different area of the game. If the Brewers bats currently fit the profile of “could be big tools impact” / “might not make it out of a bench role,” the arms are quite the opposite, with no true top-end pitching prospect in the system. It’s a beautiful thing: not one ace. But among those non-aces, perhaps a number of starters that could prove as “boring” as Zach Davies, or have question marks answered like Chase Anderson or even Jimmy Nelson.

One gets the sense that these Brewers arms could be plugged in the rotation any which way, which should be considered an exciting affair given the recent hype of pitching coach Derek Johnson’s blank-slate, situational-personal coaching approach. It should also be mentioned that in an era of velocity, the top Milwaukee arms are hardly flamethrowers, which adds an interesting question about whether the Brewers are exploiting undervalued aspects of the game (I know that’s a played out question by now, but still…), or simply whether the Brewers have found a profile of arm that fits their system or organizational approach.

To accompany the statistical index of 2017 Brewers minor league bats, I have prepared an index of statistics for the 2017 arms in the affiliated ranks. To provide basic consistency with the survey range for the bats, I translated the initial scale of 50 batting PA to 16.7 pitching IP for assessing seasons. This largely produced a similar number of players across leagues, which also means that league median statistic figures should have a solid range to reflect statistical context.

I choose the method of indexing statistics because it is relatively straightforward in terms of user interface: every metric can be measured against a “constant” or comparison variable, such as “Player Total Average (TAv)” versus “League TAv.” In an index, 1.00 can basically be read as “average,” for it means that a player’s metric perfectly matches the comparison metric. For example, righty Eric Hanhold played his age-23 season at Class-Advanced A Carolina, where the median age was also 23; his index is therefore 1.00 for that statistic.

It should be noted that I calculated the index in a different way for pitching prospects in order to remain consistent with the batting index. This means that an overall index greater than 1.00 suggests that a pitcher’s OPS-allowed was better than the average contextual indicators in the league, and that an index below 1.00 means that pitcher was below average given the context of the league. In order to provide additional context to an index that only weighs age, park factor, and opposing OPS alongside OPS-allowed, I added a Deserved Run Average (DRA) index so that readers can compare outcomes and reflect on the validity of the OPS-allowed index.

This index is slightly different than the batting index, since there are different OPS values for pitchers and their opponents (for example, a batter is facing tougher opposition if the opposing OPS is lower; for pitchers, tougher opposition means higher OPS from opponents). For this reason:

+1.00 Age Index means “younger” than league average age.

+1.00 oppOPS Index means better than average opponents (compared to the league).

+1.00 Park Index means hitter’s park.

This index should not be read as a significant, be-all / end-all assessment of pitching performance. Instead, it should be read alongside other statistics and scouting reports as an indicator of the context in which the pitcher performed, as well as how their advanced performance (via DRA) compared to the league.

A few observations:

• Like the batting index, the “non-prospects” immediately dominate this pitching index. Trey Supak has been a deep cut since the Brewers acquired the projection-upside play in the Jason Rogers trade, and the righty worked what finally would be his first full season….at age 21. Taylor Jungmann is hardly even old for Class-AAA Colorado Springs as an organizational depth option. Quiet relief prospect Bubba Derby, a member of the Khris Davis trade, worked a season that matches the “contextual” aspects of Corbin Burnes or Supak (his trademate Jacob Nottingham also had a fine season on the batting index). Freddy Peralta looks like loads of fun, bringing numerous fastball and off-speed / breaking ball offerings and a funky delivery to keep hitters off balance. In this case, the command aspects (and delivery repetition due to a crossfire set-up) of the scouting report should be read alongside the index to round out future role and expectations, but it is undeniable that Peralta placed himself on the radar of quality organizational depth (at worst) in 2017.

• Cody Ponce had quite an interesting year in terms of DRA deviating from his other contextual factors. In terms of OPS, age, and park factors, Ponce scored well in both Carolina and Biloxi. Yet, the righty’s DRA did not stack up against either league, with DRA index of 0.86 and 0.97 in both assignments, respectively. The big righty is making his way up the organizational ladder, however, and it’s tough not to dream on that cutter or fastball at least helping Ponce secure a solid bullpen role of some sort.

• BP scouting team member James Fisher provided a detailed description of Jordan Yamamoto for last season’s midseason prospect feature, noting that delivery refinements and stuff progression drove the righty’s stock. Yamamoto continued to build on that 2016 notice with an excellent 2017 campaign, arguably putting together the most interesting pitching season in the organization (Burnes received the hype, but Yamamoto could have defined a role).The righty was extremely young for the Carolina League, and if the progression continues, the youngster could be primed to expand on a 140+ IP floor during his age-22 season at Class-AA Biloxi. It is worth noting that Yamamoto did not face tough competition in Carolina, although the funky park factors and his age did mightily correct for that indicator. If you’re skeptical about the index, DRA likes Yamamoto even more.

• Additional potential 2018 pop-ups / projection guys who posted better than average contextual index and DRA scores: Zack Brown, Josh Pennington, Braden Webb, and Thomas Jankins. Keep an eye on: Parker Berberet (!!!), Luis Ortiz, Jorge Lopez, Matt Ramsey, and Jon Perrin.

Like any good bargain-hunter, Stearns likes to buy in bulk. On one hand, this is exciting. There’s a constant stream of new faces entering the organization at every level. But the acquisition volume is so high that even the most ardent follower is bound to miss a transaction or two. After all, the Brewers organization has undergone a sea of change in the last two years – it’s only natural that a few moves have disappeared into the greater talent pool, dissolving without a splash like so many drops in a bucket.

Several such transactions occurred last December 8. If fans remember the day at all, they remember it as the one in which Miguel Diaz went full fathom five to A.J. Preller and the San Diego Padres with the first pick of the Rule 5 Draft. But the Brewers actually commensurate bullpen talent that day. Right-handed pitcher Matt Ramsey, one of the club’s two selections in the draft’s minor lead phase, has every bit as much potential to make a splash for the Brewers as Diaz does for the Padres.

Don’t fret if the name doesn’t ring a bell. Ramsey isn’t under the radar so much as he’s off of it entirely. Like so many pitchers before him, Ramsey has his health to thank for that. The stout, 5’ 11” hurler missed all of the 2015 season with an undisclosed injury, and came back in time to work only 22.7 innings across three levels in the Miami Marlins organization in 2016. Now 27, the power righty is in the midst of his third year at Class-AA, and is pitching for his third club. That’s not a profile that’s likely to attract very much attention.

The results, though? The results demand attention. Over the course of his minor league career, Ramsey has worked to a glittering 2.12 ERA while striking out 10.6 batters per nine. His 2.53 ERA this year in Biloxi is a near-perfect match for his 2.51 DRA. Ramsey’s current WHIP of 1.22 is consistent with his career results, as he’s held Southern League batters to fewer than one hit per inning. His fastball runs into the mid-90s, and he pairs that pitch with a sharp curveball that generates plenty of swing-and-miss.

But then there’s the command. Ramsey’s BB/9 through small samples at various minor league stops has rollercoastered from 1.3 all the way up to 6.1, and one gets the impression that his feel for the zone wavers from game to game. He’s made strides with the Shuckers, though, running a 2.5 BB/9 through 21.3 innings. Combined with his penchant for punch outs and his ability to limit contact, that number is more than sufficient.

The only thing left to determine is how those numbers translate to higher levels. It’s not clear to what extent the rarefied air of Class-AAA Colorado Springs factored into Ramsey’s assignment to the Southern League. Brewers brass may have wanted to ease his arm back into full-season action in a pitcher-friendly environment. It could also be that Ramsey is simply buried on the organizational depth chart, a casualty of the depth of the improved Brewers system. But it’s clear that Ramsey can retire AA hitters. The Brewers saw enough to add him to their stable. If he keeps performing at his current level, the club will have little choice but to demonstrate their commitment with a promotion.

At 27 years old and coming off a serious injury, Matt Ramsey no longer fits the mold of a conventional prospect. But David Stearns and the Brewers are unafraid to cut against the grain: look no further than the dynamic battery of Junior Guerra and Manny Piña for proof of that. Ramsey has the tools to neutralize batters and stabilize a bullpen. He only needs health and opportunity. So far this year, he’s proving his health. He can only hope that opportunity will follow.

Let’s have a look at where the system stood for the previous update:

Now, here’s the competition through May 12:

There are a few things worth noting here:

• Brandon Woodruff is whipping the Pacific Coast League, but he’s faced one of the easiest opposing OPS among regular pitchers. It is still worth digging into Woodruff’s solidly above average strikeout and walk rates, and also emphasizing that Woodruff has maintained his 48 percent groundball: 52 percent flyball ratios established at Class-AA Biloxi last season. Everyone is excited to see Woodruff take the next step to Milwaukee, but as with Lewis Brinson, take that shiny surface statistical performance with a grain of salt and expect a slightly more average MLB role.

• On the contrary, what role can one present for age-30 phenom Paolo Espino? In terms of scouting stuff, no one would place Espino ahead of Woodruff. Espino seems like a pitchability-supreme guy. And so he is, outpitching Brewers fans’ current favorite pitching prospect while facing significantly tougher opponents (.756 oppOPS to Woodruff’s .724 mark). With Junior Guerra returning from the disabled list, and a series of rotating improvements among Brewers starters, Espino may find it easiest to sneak into an MLB bullpen role. But, handling a tough PCL does lead one to wonder whether Espino could start; we’ll split the difference and call him a pitchability swingman for 2017.

• We await scouting updates on Trey Supak, but as recently featured on BPMilwaukee, the young righty is maximizing his time in the Midwest League. Supak is posting the best strikeout-to-walk ratio among Wisconsin starters. For the future, watch his flyball rate (currently 66 percent) and look for scouting updates on Supak’s third pitch.

• Might we praise the 19-16 Biloxi Shuckers, those Shuckers outplaying a sub-.500 run differential in an extremely tough environment? The Shuckers, the gem of the Brewers system breakout in 2015, are the forgotten affiliate in 2017, as the in-between prospects from last year’s forgettable Brevard County club and the remainder of 40-man roster depth and advanced minors veterans forge a supreme sub-hype crew. Shuckers bullpen leaders Matt Ramsey, Nick Ramirez, Taylor Scott, Forrest Snow, and Bubba Derby have a lot to say about that, with a cumulative 102.3 IP, 104 K / 46 BB / 7 HR (0.20 Fielding Independent Pitching ratio), and 32 runs allowed (2.82 runs average against an approximate 3.71 park-adjusted run environment, good for 10 runs prevented).

• And yet they win, lead by Jorge Lopez and Luis Ortiz. Lopez and Ortiz have both faced notably tougher-than-median opponents, and within this duo Ortiz has faced even significantly tougher opponents still. But no sweat, as the median-age Lopez and very-young Ortiz are posting strong K:BB ratios. From here out, keep an eye on the flyballs, as both righties have flyball rates above 60 percent; this figure may fly in the suppressed environment of Biloxi, but could be very problematic at Miller Park (currently playing a 102 pitching park factor over thee years, according to Baseball Reference).

(1) Grading Thames
Several sources of projection have outlined expectations for Eric Thames in Milwaukee, so I’m not going to attempt to project Thames’s statistical performance in Milwaukee. Instead, I want to look at the opportunity cost of Thames, as well as the potential value from his scouting profile. Really, my analysis of both Thames and Thornburg will depend on your feelings of WARP; whether or not you believe that WARP adequately captured Chris Carter’s value to the Brewers is going to be a factor that impacts how you view the slugger’s surplus value, for instance (a similar issue will arise with Thornburg below).

In my last analysis, I estimated that in terms of contractual value and production, Carter was worth between $18 million and $25 million to the Brewers (the main focal point here is not to consider the fact that he may have cost between $8 million and $10 million in salary arbitration, but that the Brewers could release Carter without spending a dime [and they did just that], which frames his contractual value). The most interesting note on Thames is that the slugger has changed his approach and mechanics while working in the KBO, which places a different lens on his outburst in that league, and also changes his scouting outlook in the USA. Beyond the Box Score features a detailed look at Thames’s swing in the KBO, which shows some development from his MLB swing.

If one attempts to balance Thames’s winding career path with his recent KBO superstardom, a “punt” scouting grade of 45-50 may be in order for the age 30-33 first baseman’s contract. Yet, visions of Jose Bautista come to mind whenever someone says “late 20s mechanical adjustment,” as the Blue Jays’ iconic slugger was little more than a .239 / .324 / .398 slasher through 2008 when Toronto acquired him. The idea that a player can unleash his power after his prime development years is not implausible, and indeed some of those players become superstars (Edwin Encarnacion, Bautista’s teammate, is another example).

In 1,000 scenarios, imagine that Thames reaches 40 OFP 900 times ($1,800M), 50 OFP 80 times ($2,976M), 60 OFP 19 times ($1,452M), and Jose Bautista once ($218M): the Brewers still come out ahead, even if in 90 percent of scenarios Thames effectively busts (0.93 WARP over four seasons). Their total surplus, in this scenario, would be approximately $2.8M. So, the Thames contract is a wash at worst, and at best a fantastic opportunity to sign a foreign league superstar that was simply a late bloomer. Now the only question is if Thames ends up closer to the 0.1 percent odds of breaking out as an MLB superstar on the strength of his KBO adjustments.
Surplus Value: Approximately $2.8M if assumed 40 OFP in 90 percent of outcomes.

(2) Trading Thornburg
How does one grade the Thornburg trade? In my previous grading of current assets, Thornburg’s three-year performance weighed down his significant gains as a reliever. Boston obviously traded for Thornburg with the idea of building on his season as an excellent high leverage relief option, and whether or not Thornburg is a closer, there is a chance that he will provide excellent value to their roster if given the chance to prove himself in the late innings over another season. The best aspect for the big market Red Sox is that they now reserve arbitration rights for Thornburg for three seasons, meaning that there is plenty of time for Thornburg to move within different high leverage roles, struggle, iron out any issues, even weather an injury. In this case, a study of the McCann trade, which caused me to reconsider using depreciation-models to assess trade value, one would do well to assess Thornburg in the most robust manner, certainly weighing his 2016 improvements much more heavily than his previous struggles.

If anything, this comparison should show that it’s extremely difficult to simply assess a trade based on one single model, or one assumption. The Brewers could assume that Thornburg’s troubles would weigh heavier, and they wouldn’t necessarily be wrong; the Red Sox could buy high and have a robust model for Thornburg, and be equally correct. I dare say there will be no equilibrium found for this deal, between either club. The deal is an immediate victory for the contending Red Sox, who bolster their bullpen with a hard throwing up-and-coming reliever that offers three years of arbitration reserve; the deal is an immediate victory for the Brewers, who turned a struggling swingman-at-best into a lights-out reliever and then sold at the best possible moment (it can be argued that even waiting to see if Thornburg could close for the first half of 2017 is too risky for the Brewers, since any issues in that regard would tank the value built during 2016).

Considering both conservative and aggressive estimates for the trade as currently constructed, it should not be outlandish to say that the Red Sox properly gambled that they can retain value with Thornburg’s contract (which can be non-tendered without cost prior to 2018 and 2019). If the PTBNL turns out to be a player with a pedigree other than organizational depth, that might push Thornburg into 2.0 WARP/year territory to regain value. Yet, given that the Red Sox are gambling for playoff spots, overpaying in a trade for a high leverage player is not necessarily a bad deal if the payoff is somewhere between $10 million and $30 million of playoff revenue. Adding together playoff revenue, playoff prestige, and potential flags flying is well worth a PTBNL. There is plenty of evidence to argue the trade a success for either team, which is a good sign that Milwaukee maximized their short-term closer’s value.

(3) Miguel Diaz’s Value
I previously called GM David Stearns’s refusal to protect top RHP prospect Miguel Diaz from the Rule 5 draft a “dreadful, terrible” move, but I think I emphasized the wrong reasons. As the Brewers potentially lost Diaz to the Padres (via the Twins), depending on how he fares early in the season and whether he sticks with San Diego, it is worth recasting the move as a failure even if Diaz does not reach the MLB or his gaudiest 60 OFP from summer 2016.

Imagine that Diaz follows the odds of reaching the MLB at approximately 20 percent; among those potential MLB futures, consider a 40 OFP / roster filler status as the vast majority (95 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 1.0 WARP over three seasons), a 50 OFP (4.5 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 4.0 WARP over three seasons), and 60 OFP in 0.5 percent of MLB futures (maybe reaching 7.0 WARP over three seasons). Spread over 1,000 potential futures, Miguel Diaz averages out to approximately 0.23 WARP, or someone worth between $0.500 million league minimum contract (replacement contract) and $1.61 million using the standard $7 million / WARP “market estimation.” This is the biggest problem with failing to protect Diaz: in the first place, he’s one of only a few true 50+ / 60 OFP prospects in the Brewers system. There are many 50 prospects in the system, and several 50+ prospects, even, but not many reached a 60 OFP grade in 2016. Diaz reached that level, and is therefore one of the best prospects even adding in all the risk one can find.
Value Lost: $1.6 million.

(4) Roster Summary
Here is a summary of notables trades, Rule 5 transactions (MLB and AAA), and free agency signings. Moves with 40-man roster impact are highlighted.

Thus far, the Brewers have added approximately $23.7 million in total surplus through 40-man roster transactions (this figure does not factor in full reserve control for minor leaguers, but instead focuses on OFP value). That is basically worth 1.7 WARP from a league minimum contract, or 2.75 WARP from Eric Thames (2.75 WARP is worth approximately $19.3 million, minus $15 million guaranteed). In total surplus value, Stearns has acquired approximately $63 million for the organization, which can be translated as approximately 4.5 total WARP from a league minimum salary, or acquiring approximately three 50 OFP prospects via trade.