That should be fun. And once it’s over, on the morning of Thursday, December 14, there’s the Rule 5 Draft. Few things are so absurd and delightful. As everyone is packing their bags and returning to the regularly-scheduled offseason, teams will quietly pay $100,00 to try to steal another team’s prospect. The catch: Said prospect must stay on the purchasing team’s 25-man roster for the duration of the following MLB season, or he’ll be offered back to their original organization for $50,000.

Unsurprisingly, most Rule 5 selections don’t pan out, and results like Colin Walsh’s .085 batting average in 2016 or Wei-Chung Wang’s 10.90 ERA in 2014 are the norm. But every now and then, there’s an Odubel Herrera or a Joe Biagini or even a Johan Santana sprinkled in among the roster filler to keep things tantalizing.

The Brewers have the 21st selection in this year’s Rule 5 draft. David Stearns and the rest of the Brewers front office will have to dig deep to find an impact talent. Happily, there are plenty of intriguing names available in this year’s draft-eligible class. Here are a few of my favorites.

Travis Ott, LHP, Tampa Bay Rays
Ott, a 6’4” lefty with an exaggerated leg kick who turns 23 in June, is one of a handful of interesting Rays prospects left exposed by a 40-man roster crunch. Formerly property of the Washington Nationals, Ott arrived in Tampa along with Steven Souza Jr. in the three-team trade that netted the Nats Trea Turner and sent Wil Myers to San Diego.

The Rays have been slow to move Ott up the ladder. The lefty spent all of 2015 and 2016 in Class-A ball before reaching Class-A Advanced Charlotte last season. Ott slings a fringy, low-90s fastball across his body from a 3/4 slot, but there’s enough projection left on his frame to hope that the heater kicks up a few ticks. Of his secondaries, a mid-70s curveball flashes more potential than his changeup or slider. Across 118 innings and two levels last year, Ott struck out 132. His career ERA in the minor leagues is 2.72, and he worked to a 67.4 DRA- in Charlotte. It’s not the most electric profile, but there could be a big league arm in there and lefty relief options are always popular come Rule 5 time.

Adam Cimber, RHP, San Diego Padres
At 27 years old, Cimber is no longer a conventional prospect. On the other hand, he just recorded a 21.0 strikeout percentage against a negligible 3.2 walk percentage in AAA. His 55 percent groundball rate was nothing to sneeze at, either. Cimber utilizes an uncommon sidearm delivery, whipping the ball to the plate from the vicinity of his kneecaps. His command profile alone makes him worthy of a look in Spring Training. After all, playing for Milwaukee could be Cimber’s destiny; his first grade teacher was named Mrs. Brewer.

Nick Burdi, RHP, Minnesota Twins
A second-round pick in 2014, Burdi pitched just 17 innings in 2017 before undergoing Tommy John surgery. The year prior, a bone bruise brought about by a high-stress delivery limited the promising hurler to just three appearances.

Still, Burdi’s fragile arm possesses elite upside. In the past, he’s thrown a dominant fastball that can touch triple digits and hard, plus slider that’s been clocked as high as the mid-90s. Though iffy command further clouds his future, he could become a potent bullpen arm if his elbow doesn’t spontaneously combust. In any case, Burdi’s recovery is likely to eat deep into the 2018 season.

Nick Ciuffo, C, Tampa Bay Rays
Ciuffo was a first-round pick for the Rays in 2013. While he hasn’t hit as hoped, it still isn’t difficult to see why the Rays thought so highly of the budding backstop. He’s an advanced defender with viable receiving skills and a plus arm (he’s thrown out 42 percent of would-be base stealers throughout his minor league career).

Dig a little deeper, and the struggles with the stick don’t seem quite so worrisome, either. In 2014, Ciuffo dropped weight while battling a virus. His offensive production lagged, and it’s conceivable that his mechanics got out of whack while his body recovered. He’s always had a good eye, and ran a .266 TAv in AA last year as a 22-year-old catcher. Better still, Ciuffo got stronger as the season wore on. From July 1 through the season’s end, he batted .279/.368/.424 with 15 doubles and 25 walks against 33 strikeouts over 190 plate appearances.

Ciuffo is a much surer thing to stick behind the plate than fellow catcher Max Pentecost, who will likely be gone by the time the Brewers make their first selection. If Stearns and company trust Manny Piña to handle everyday duties behind the dish, Ciuffo could slide onto the roster in place of Stephen Vogt and soak up Piña’s thirteen-plus years of catching expertise.

Travis Demeritte, IF, Atlanta Braves
The Brewers have a need at second base, and Demeritte, a first-round pick of the Rangers in 2013, offers an interesting blend of risk and reward. On the “reward” side, Demeritte is a slick defender at both second and third base equipped with plus raw power and a keen eye for walks.

Then there’s the risk. A positive test for performance enhancing drugs in 2015 took some of the luster off Demeritte’s rising star. He also has a long swing. 2017 was his first full professional season with a strikeout rate below 30 percent. Additionally, Demeritte hit just .231 for a .267 TAv last year in Class-AA ball. Contact issues aside, the collection of average-or-better tools could at least turn the 23-year-old Demeritte into a valuable utility man with uncommon pop.

Victor Reyes, OF, Arizona Diamondbacks
Rule 5-eligible for the second year in a row, the 23-year-old Reyes is an average runner with a decent glove and a serviceable arm. A switch-hitter, he’s a career .298 batter in the minors thanks to a smooth, line-drive swing that generates lots of contact. He doesn’t walk a ton, but he doesn’t strike out much, either. Last year in AA, he turned in a characteristic .292/.332/.399 batting line.

That all sounds like a typical fourth outfielder, and Reyes might be just that. But if he develops his lagging power, he has a chance to be much more. Good news on that front: Reyes whacked 29 doubles last year, easily a career high. If he continues to make strides in that department, he could blossom into a regular corner outfielder who can play center in a pinch. His swing and approach give him perhaps the best chance of any player on this list to actually hit major league pitching next season.

Jason Martin, OF, Houston Astros
Martin offers a rare Rule 5 opportunity: Five tools that could be average or better. He features a compact left-handed swing that he uses to spray line drives across the field. The power is coming along, as Martin has posted back-to-back years of Isolated Slugging over .200 and his 18 home runs across Class-A Advanced and AA last year were joined by 35 doubles and 5 triples.

On the defensive side of the spectrum, Martin’s routes in the outfield could use refinement and some extra zip to his throwing arm would ease worries about his long-term home. Tighten the routes and he could be an everyday centerfielder. Otherwise, he could be a fringe-regular in left.

Big league pitching may be a problem for Martin at first, as his move to AA last year was accompanied by a spike in strikeouts and a precipitous drop in walks. On the plus side, Martin played most of last season as a 21-year-old. He has plenty of time to adjust.

Entering the 2017 season, the Washington Nationals seemingly solidified their batting order by acquiring Adam Eaton, the second-best position player from this prospect class in 2016 (Nolan Arenado was best). Eaton was promptly injured to start the season, ending his potential run at matching his incredible 2016 value, but teammate Anthony Rendon was ready to step up (in 2017, Rendon would be second-best to Arenado). Corey Seager and the aforementioned Arenado both worked to lead their respective teams to the playoffs. Alongside those expected stars, Jose Ramirez joined his teammate Francisco Lindor to lead Cleveland in an effort to defend their American League pennant. The playoffs teams are loaded with the who’s who of this prospect class; Gary Sanchez (5.3), Carlos Correa (4.6), Didi Gregorious (4.3), George Springer (4.2), deadline trade Sonny Gray (4.2), Byron Buxton (4.1), and Yasiel Puig and Alex Wood (3.6 each) all produced strong Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) value for their respective playoff clubs.

Related Reading: Refining WARP and OFP Pricing

Together the organizational Top 10 from 2013 produced 216.3 WARP in 2017, which was good for approximately 22 percent of MLB production for the season. What is rather interesting about this class is that five seasons in, the number of MLB players dipped from 178 in 2016, to 175 in 2017. Alongside the “who’s who” above, there’s quite a blast from the past in the “yet to reach the MLB” side of this prospect class: Bubba Starling, Clint Coulter, Courtney Hawkins, Duane Underwood, Kyle Zimmer, Stryker Trahan, Victor Roache, Austin Wood, Hak-Ju Lee, and Tyrone Taylor are just a few of the names that fans (especially Brewers fans) might recognize. Of course, some members of the class are just reaching the MLB, as Josh Hader and Lewis Brinson did for Milwaukee in 2017. Max Fried, Nick Delmonico, Jorge Bonifacio, and Lucas Sims were other 2017 debuts from this prospect class.

As a group, these prospects have produced more than 760 WARP at the MLB level during their respective careers.

As some of these prospects work to build or expand their legend through (hopeful) playoff success, it is worth looking into the completed 2017 season by these prospects in order to learn how a prospect class progresses over time. By tracking this class over five seasons, one can ask, “How do young prospects perform during their initial seasons?,” and additionally, “How likely are prospects to improve once they reach the MLB?,” or simply, “How many prospects become good MLB players?” These are crucial questions for the Brewers as they exit their rebuild and enter the stage of truly developing their youngest, (hopefully) most impactful potential at the MLB level:

What should be expected of the Brewers’ 2017 top prospect class as they develop at the MLB level?

First and foremost, what is telling about the 2013 prospect class is how quickly many prospects reach the MLB and exit the MLB. From this prospect class, 232 players reached the MLB at some point over the last five seasons. However, as mentioned above, only 175 players from this prospect class worked in the MLB during the 2017 season. So, it must first be emphasized that while the Top 10 organizational prospects as a group are the most elite prospects, within the top 5 percent of all minor leaguers, many of these players will not have long or impactful careers. This should not necessarily be surprising, as according to Baseball Reference Play Index the vast majority of MLB players hardly achieve 1.0 career WAR (1.2 WAR places batters and pitchers within the top third of all-time players); but, it should be underscored as a requisite warning against prospect list hype. Brewers fans will recognize Johnny Hellweg, Sean Nolin, and Garin Cecchini as Top 10 2013 prospects that fit this mold. Top 10 organizational prospect status is not a guarantee for a long career, or even anything more than a cup of coffee in some cases.

Second, while the number of 2013 Top 10 organizational prospects working in the MLB declined in 2017, the average WARP for these MLB players also declined. Granted, the decline in WARP was from 1.3 to 1.2, which basically means that the level of performance for these players largely remained the same from year-to-year. Basically, what ought to be read into this statistic is the fact that there is no clear narrative about improvements as a group for these prospects. Once in the MLB, there is no clear path for Top 10 prospects to continually improve or expand their WARP; roles fluctuate, injuries and ineffectiveness occur, and in some cases performance levels simply fluctuate. Viewing the time-series shifts for these players can demonstrate the volatility of year-by-year performance upon reaching the MLB.

The following table tracks the largest year-to-year WARP declines from 2016 to 2017 for prospects from the 2013 organizational Top 10:

This is not necessarily a case where the volatility can be explained away as a function of young and inexperienced players finding their respective paths within the MLB. The average 2013 Top 10 organizational prospect that has reached the MLB already has more than three seasons of play under their respective belts. Granted, this counts partial seasons the same as full seasons, but the point remains that volatility is not simply an aspect of inexperience for this cohort. Certainly, the largest declines in 2017 performance can be explained by injury in many cases (Adam Eaton, Noah Syndergaard, Aaron Sanchez, and Joc Pederson), but there are also players like Jonathan Villar, Jackie Bradley, Gregory Polanco, Maikel Franco, and Christian Yelich high on the volatility list. Yet even if “injury volatility” is viewed as somewhat more “legitimate,” or perhaps outside of the control of the player, it nevertheless remains a serious aspect of volatility and should be considered when fans, analysts, and teams are assessing prospect classes.

It is a real question to aks whether or how injuries between 2017-2021 to Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, Brandon Woodruff, Josh Hader, and other top Brewers prospects, will impact contending chances or roster-building strategies for Milwaukee (it may seem audacious to suggest, but indeed injury is an aspect of the game for which teams should prepare. For example, this is one reason Brewers fans should not be quick to trade away from the Ryan Braun, Keon Broxton, Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, and Domingo Santana outfield stockpile).

The following table exhibits the most volatile 2013 Top 10 organizational prospects by summing the absolute value of annual WARP shifts:

What is most intriguing about this group of prospects is that five seasons from the publication of these lists (2013-2017), the overall value expectations of each Overall Future Potential (OFP) category can be outlined. I published a discussion on this basic valuation on Sunday, in order to emphasize the usefulness of using WARP and OFP to interpret player value in monetary terms. I discussed the shortcomings of these statistics at length there.

Key conclusions:

• 70 OFP prospects can be defined as potential superstars that not only perform very well during their first MLB seasons, but also have significant ceiling yet to attain after those initial years. In this regard, though, this category is perhaps most risky in terms of cashing out their top ceiling value versus their more realistic, depreciated value.

• 60 OFP prospects can viewed similarly, although there is significantly less range between their initial MLB performance (within 5 years of their appearance in the organizational Top 10) and absolute ceiling.

• 50 OFP prospects are quite intriguing, as they are the riskiest in terms of returning prospects to the MLB, and also returning quality MLB performances. However, they are the least risky in terms of reaching ceiling at the MLB level (although the depreciation from “average MLB regular” grade as a prospect to “replacement role or quality depth” at the MLB level is quite steep)

In terms of judging one prospect class, it should be stated that the Baseball Prospectus team made largely and significantly correct evaluation decisions in grading players. If one wishes to protest the inclusion of Nolan Arenado as a 50 OFP, for example, it should be stated that Arenado’s class also includes prospects like Tyrone Taylor (athletic prospects with MLB roles fizzling out), as well as 35 players with negative MLB WARP and another 15 with WARP between 0.0 and 0.5 (i.e., 50 replacement players). One can also return to the original Arenado scouting profiles from 2013, and understand the context of a top prospect that was not necessarily living up to contextual expectations at that time (there are valuable lessons to be learned here, too).

There will indeed be some 50 OFP prospects that overcome their scouting shortcomings and play up to their strengths while adjusting at the MLB level, but the 50 OFP performance by the 2013 class should show why this is not a given; one needs to wade through 50 replacement players and 37 players yet to reach the MLB to land one Arenado from the 50 OFP class. By contrast, the 70 OFP prospect class is filled with fewer misses, as 28 of 29 prospects from this OFP rank reached the MLB already, with many quickly posting fantastic performances (see Carlos Correa, Carlos Martinez, and Francisco Lindor, with others reaching solidly above average performance levels (Gerrit Cole, Xander Bogaerts, among others, come to mind here).

Although it is tempting to hang on to the idea that players can transcend their OFP grades, it should be noted that while there are indeed cases of such transcendence, that transcendence comes at the cost of risky development across scouting categories. Furthermore, using time-series analysis and comparing OFP categories against average performance leaves clear conclusions about the general impact of certain levels of prospect talent. The benefit of working with these assumptions and data is that not only can the potential impact of prospects be estimated at the MLB level, but that level of performance can be calculated to assess the risk of developing that prospect as opposed to trading that prospect. Where players with clearer roles, potentially less volatile production, and otherwise favorable surplus value scenarios are available via trade, teams should not hesitate to trade prospects to secure that production. There is no “silver bullet” through which teams are developed by using prospects, save those prospects that are so impactful as to occupy the highest reaches of the scouting rankings.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images