Recommended Reading:
True Outcomes (Jarrett Seidler, Baseball Prospectus)
Round Table: Short Hitter Stigma (Baseball Prospectus)
The May Promotions (Baseball Prospectus, Prospect Team)

In a way, I don’t need to write this article. So many minds are already made; I see it on Brewers Twitter everyday, that Keston Hiura is a slam dunk, guaranteed superstar prospect, and it does not matter where or how you look at it. Hiura should be untouchable in midseason trade talks; Hiura will be a guaranteed top of the order bat for the Brewers for the foreseeable future; when the Brewers’ impressive 40+ Wins Above Replacement (WAR) First Round Draft record was noted on draft day, it was easy for some to emphasize that Keston Hiura is next. Never mind that according to Baseball Reference, approximately 500 players in the entire history of baseball have reached this plateau, this next prospect is a certain thing. But my mind has waivered on Hiura, and I gather I’m not the only one who not only cringes at the unnecessary prospect hype (these will be the same people leading the torches to Miller Park should Hiura “settle” as a 5.0 WAR player or become a DH-trade asset, yet another unnecessary practice with judging MLB players), but who is genuinely perplexed about the issue posed by Hiura’s potential role. For it is easy to focus on the Top Percentile outcome, “Keston Hiura, All Star Second Baseman for the Brewers,” and end the dreaming there; if that’s your position, you probably do not need to read this article. Yet serious questions remain about how Hiura fits in the organization in his secondary, realistic risk roles of Left Field or Designated Hitter, and those questions are tied up in the thorny information asymmetry wrapped in the prospect’s throwing elbow.

It is obvious that none of us know who Hiura will be. One could look at his hitting mechanics and doubles-oriented pop and see a realistic chance that he sticks in the MLB regardless of his fielding role. His fielding roles might not be certain, or even linear; he could begin his career at second base in Milwaukee, fall off defensively, and move to designated hitter or left field. A development in his game could theoretically find him at a different position all together, especially given the flexibility-oriented mindset of many contemporary MLB teams (he could be a PH / DH / 2B / LF). He could fall off second base before even leaving the minors, but prove himself worthy of a shot in left field (this is the phenomenal Willie Calhoun role comp provided by Baseball Prospectus on their Top 10 list). All that is before considering any potential development courses derailed by the elbow injury. Yet even some members of the Baseball Prospectus prospect team have changed their public voice on Hiura, leading one to wonder whether the floor of that realistic / risk role is diminishing in likelihood.

This feature is meant as an exercise in probabilistic thinking, in which aspects of the historical record in MLB are used to define Hiura’s potential outlook using the structure of the game. The assumption is that because of MLB’s competitive organizational environment, including the quick learning of new strategies as well as the constant search for viable alternative or underappreciated strategies, there are legitimate organizational-structural constraints that define Player Development. This does not mean that history forms the future, but rather that the history of the game used in a narrow, comparative manner will provide some evidence that can inform projections about contemporary players. Here, I will focus on body type, pedigree, and defensive profile to outline just some of the extremely diverse futures that could greet Hiura.

Entering 2018, the PECOTA comparison system viewed Hiura as a bat-first prospect, and developed a projection that pegged the prospect as a replacement player second baseman for Milwaukee (a good thing). Hiura’s MLB batting line according to the March 23, 2018 PECOTA projection (CSV download, March 23, 2018) was .225 / .274 / .363, which is not bad for a prospect leaping to the MLB within a year of the MLB Amateur Draft. Much more interesting than the stats are the player comparisons generated by the underlying patterns and age curve recognized for Hiura.

PECOTA compared Hiura to three strong MLB role prospects. Matt Davidson ranked in the second tier of a stacked Arizona Diamondbacks Top 10 for 2012, with a clear bat-first role based on his power. Entering 2016, Dominic Smith ranked fifth in the New York Mets system with a 45 Overall Future Potential role as Second-Division Starter. Here the batting question awaited power at a limited defensive role. Jose Osuna was the only member of this trio unranked by Baseball Prospectus entering their age-21 season, although it’s worth emphasizing that this is not a knock against Osuna. The Pirates prospect was fighting within a system that saw Alen Hanson, Luis Heredia, and Harold Ramirez as prospects 8-through-10. Nevertheless, this trio provides interesting minor league statistical performances in their age-21 campaigns, drawing some comparison to Hiura in terms of relative discipline profile (here I am using strike outs (K) and walks (BB)), especially for both Smith and Osuna.

In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura’s First Round, Ninth pick standard is quite interesting because this area of the draft begins to shift from “going for a clear superstar territory” to “gambling on many comparable ‘best player available’ types,” leaving an unclear expectation for the pick. Yet, according to Baseball Reference, 34 of 54 players have historically made the MLB from this draft slot, and that ticks up in the modern draft era (17 of 21 Ninth overall picks from 1995-2015 reached the MLB). These players are typically not superstars in the sense one would use to discuss the most elite players in the game. Of the 21 Wild Card era Ninth picks, Geoff Jenkins, Michael Cuddyer, and Mark Kotsay are the best retired position players, and Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ are just now establishing their careers. Historically, each Ninth pick is worth approximately 5.0 WAR with 62 percent odds of reaching the MLB, while more recently (1995-2015) each Ninth pick is worth approximately 7.0 WAR (and counting) with 81 percent odds of reaching the MLB (the standard deviation is 10.1, which demonstrates the absurd volatility of the MLB draft and MLB career trajectories). In other words, the baseline for Hiura’s professional career features quite strong odds of reaching the MLB (they are not set in stone) and a very solid average performance (5.0 to 7.0 WAR is nothing to sneeze at in terms of the grand scheme of baseball). In fact, in a crude sense, a 7.0 WAR performance would extrapolate Hiura’s 50th Percentile PECOTA over the course of approximately four seasons: a solid career, indeed, and potentially one that is viewed as reasonable by projection systems.

It is fun to see that, thus far, several of the active Ninth Pick players are playing in the National League Central, adding intrigue to the standard divisional competition. If Hiura wishes to make his mark on this Overall Pick, Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ could each impact Hiura’s potential assessment of greatness.

Keston Hiura is a relatively short ballplayer, and one can use his body type to investigate MLB roles as well. This is not an insult to Hiura; it’s simply a fact, as even on his own Double-A Biloxi Shuckers squad, 33 Shuckers taller than Hiura have played in 2018. Height has real world consequences in defining MLB roles, as Hiura may become less likely to play at first base than other bat-first prospects in search of a positional home; given that the arm may also keep Hiura off right field, the nomadic defensive spectrum speculation for Hiura’s future mightily limits the prospect’s path. This is not a problem, but it should help to round out some role risk probabilities. Height also affects Hiura’s positional future in left field, as Baseball Reference Play Index shows that Kiké Hernandez is the first 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player since 1989 to play Left Field while debuting at age-22; the last 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player to debut at Left Field during their age-21 season was Danny Heep in 1979. During the Expansion Era, only 94 MLB position players debuted at age-21 with a listed height of 5’11”, while only 134 MLB position players debuted at age-22 with a listed height of 5’11”.

The historical path to an early (age-21 or age-22) debut for a 5’11”, 182-200 pound player is much clearer at second base. Here, a fascinating range of roles emerge.

It’s impossible to unsee Pete Rose, and that’s just such an interesting comparison for a million reasons, not the least of which that Rose’s general lack of home run power in favor of a high average, doubles-oriented approach might actually fit Hiura’s batting profile in some ways. But I do not find it helpful to focus on 80 WARP players while discussing potential prospect roles; obviously that would be an “everything goes perfectly,” elite percentile prospect outcome that would challenge Robin Yount as the greatest player in Brewers history (in terms of WARP). Kiké Hernandez, Steve Sax, and Blake DeWitt are my favorites on this list in terms of rounding out potential role determinations or profiles.

• Hernandez is a positionally flexible player that showed an early career ability to hit (2015) prior to becoming a utility player;

• Steve Sax was a batting-average and doubles hitter that used those skills to drive valuable profiles even when the glove was not there (ultimately, Sax’s 23.1 career WARP occurred with -18.8 FRAA contrasted by a .260 TAv);

• DeWitt was a player that saw an early career (first year, actually!) surge coupled with some positional trouble and a steep, almost immediate drop off.

• A “Steve Sax” career would be a phenomenal outcome for Hiura, which would also help Hiura contend with Geoff Jenkins as the best Ninth Overall position player (thus far); yet I think a “Blake DeWitt” career shows how a ballplayer can be a good prospect, produce MLB value, and also encounter some role shifts and decline at the MLB level while ultimately having a good career. To my mind, this is one way it might look if Hiura storms the MLB out of the gate at 2B, and then encounters some positional shift and offensive adjustment issues.

Figure One

One final role question concerns Hiura’s potential quality of defense at second base. Outside of the prospect’s own injury concerns, it is worth investigating the structure of the position: if Hiura’s concerns produce a below average defensive profile, will that stick as an everyday 2B? Second base is a strange position, as the progression of positional average performances during the Wild Card Era (1995-2017 for full seasons) suggests that teams are generally favoring glove-first players at second base. While True Average (TAv) is modestly improving over time for regular second basemen, Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) is significantly improving across the league (see Figure One, above). Yet, isolating the very best bats among second basemen shows that contemporary MLB teams are very tolerant of below average FRAA seasons when the bat is excellent. Recent seasons by Scooter Gennett (2017), Ben Zobrist (2016), Jose Altuve (2016, 2014), and Joe Panik (2015) show that imperfect second base defensive profiles can continue to play so long as they hit. In fact, for each five year period (or so) during the Wild Card Era, there are roughly four bat-first, poor glove 2B in the MLB at any given time. Thus, there should certainly be a future for Keston Hiura at second base if his injury does not diminish his ability to play the field, should his bat deliver at an excellent clip.

None of these structural aspects of the game impact assessments of Hiura’s mechanical and plate approach profile, which is another endeavor that can establish the right-handed batter’s risk, floor, and potential ceiling. But, these structural aspects can be used to place Hiura’s profile within the broader context of the game. Hiura is not simply a slam dunk prospect. Based on his size, if Hiura debuts in 2018 at second base, he will be a rather rare prospect and one without much historical understanding for paths to big league success. Here, a Steve Sax career is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura was not picked in a realm that generally produces game-changing superstars, instead presenting very solid regulars and All-Stars for the game. In this regard, a Geoff Jenkins profile is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. While assessing potential shortcomings in Hiura’s profile, especially at second base, it is worth emphasizing that a great-bat-bad-glove second baseman will work in the contemporary MLB. Here, the role ranges clearly from Scooter Gennett to Jose Altuve, rounding out a wide range of useful MLB potential futures.

None of these structural aspects of the game provide predictive insights for Hiura’s future. Rather, they can be used in order to help inform background expectations and probabilistic insights into the value of Hiura’s production should the youngster reach the MLB. Instead of attempting to view Hiura as an MLB slam dunk, it is worth meandering through these fields of potential roles in order to understand the wide range of success that could await Hiura. For MLB success is not simply stardom-or-bust, even for a prospect like Hiura.

References:

Baseball Prospectus. Individual Stats – Season Totals [CSV]. Parameters: 2B, MLB, All-Time.

Baseball Prospectus. Top 10 Prospects Landing Page.

Baseball Reference. MLB Draft. Ninth Overall Pick, and 2017 First Round.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Separate Age-21 and Age-22 Searches, separate searches for 2B, DH, and LF, each where height = 71 inches; weight >= 182 lbs; weight <= 200 lbs.

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Updated Cashing Out OFP
Market Trading Strategies
Redesigning Compensation

From an organizational standpoint, the Draft is frightfully inefficient, forcing clubs through 40 picks to potentially return two or three MLB players (which would be a moderately successful draft in most cases). In this regard, the Draft poses a paradox of sorts, for MLB teams have the advantage of underpaying talent in the draft while also being forced to sink significant resources in terms of research, humanpower, and organizational structure to see Draft Day surplus materialize on the field. Of course, any alternative solution (such as pure amateur free agency) is untenable without full revenue sharing across MLB clubs, so here we stand with an imperfect institution for filtering talent into the professional baseball ranks.

Last week, I analyzed the Brewers’ organizational surplus returned and developed from the major “Rebuilding Era” trades (roughly July 2015 onward). What is stunning about those trades is that the organizational surplus has appreciated significantly over a relatively brief period of time. While the MLB players (from Jonathan Lucroy and Carlos Gomez to Khris Davis and Francisco Rodriguez) and prospects (like Cy Sneed and Trevor Seidenberger) traded away from Milwaukee have depreciated in surplus value (overall), the Brewers have largely returned a group of talent that has appreciated (via trade). Here, one might think about Josh Hader (who marched from “just interesting” straight to the top ranks of the Baseball Prospectus Top Ten lists between 2016 and 2017) in terms of elite talent, to Ryan Cordell (who is perhaps solidifying a very clear floor for an MLB role, regardless of whether he delivers on a starting role ceiling) in terms of depth talent; and that’s before one even attempts to quantify the value of Freddy Peralta, Carlos Herrera, Josh Pennington, or Yeison Coca (who are probably a year away from clear valuation in public prospect analysis).

Naturally, the trade return surplus does not define the organization’s full surplus, as the team can also use the Draft and International signings to build a well-rounded club. So, how does the Brewers draft-and-develop surplus compare to the trade surplus?

This problem proved difficult to solve. There are at least two ways to assess draft talent once players are within the organization: (1) players can be judged against the historical value of their slot (this comparison would place a player’s Overall Future Potential (OFP) surplus against the depreciated historical MLB production from the draft slot, which means that the risk of a player reaching the MLB from the draft is taken into consideration when evaluating a player); (2) players can be judged against their own annual prospect evaluations (for example, Monte Harrison’s surplus could be assessed by comparing the fluctuations between his 2015 assessment as a “High 6 first-division regular/All-Star” and his 2017 assessment as a volatile potential five-tool centerfield package). Method (2) is quite tricky, however, because it includes a “Chicken and Egg” problem; for example, in the case of Harrison, if he materializes value as a 50-to-60 OFP MLB profile, was that initial assessment always his value, and was the fluctuation simply evidence of the time necessary to graduate a high school prospect to the MLB? Or was the fluctuation something real, actually placing the 60 OFP tag in doubt? It is not clear to me that I have the methodological tools or proprietary analytics available to answer these questions, so I am using method (1) to rather crudely assess a player’s OFP (or MLB production, once graduated) against their historical draft performance.

From the get go, there is one extreme bias built into this system, and that bias is “reaching the MLB.” This seems unavoidable, to my mind: as former President Doug Melvin said, “I’d rather make the cover of Sports Illustrated than BaseballAmerica” (interestingly leaving the question open about how he’d feel on the cover of the BP Annual…). Meaning, MLB teams do not draft and develop to possess 45 OFP, 50 OFP, 60 OFP, or 80 OFP prospects; they draft and develop to turn 60 OFP prospects into 60 OFP MLB players (or at least that’s the hope). That there are a full range of MLB performances between the extremes of a “prospective OFP” and “actual MLB floor or ceiling” does not render it more valuable to assess draft slots at their ability to produce prospect rankings. Prospect evaluations are held against the assumption that value is delivered at the MLB level (as a side note: this leaves a rather interesting question about trading prospects for MLB wins, which is another possible application of the MLB draft, and one that basically allows clubs to cash out variations of uncertain futures. Basically, a “long-term uncertainty” [the prospect] is turned into a “short-term uncertainty” [the MLB player], which hopefully delivers MLB wins).

In order to assess surplus, I divided the system into “earlier” and “later” drafts. The earlier drafts span 2010-2013, representing the last remaining prospects on the MLB 40-man roster (such as Yadiel Rivera), and the last Bruce Seid draft before the righteous strategy shift in 2014. The 2014 Seid draft, and 2015-2016 Ray Montgomery drafts, represent the “later” drafts. This is also convenient because the 2014-2016 drafts have not seen a system graduate to the Brewers (Brandon Woodruff is probably closest). Since each of these periods comprise around one hundred system players to track, I attempted to focus on top prospects, “interesting depth guys,” and (for the earlier draft) players who reached the Brewers club or were traded.

2010-2013 Drafts: Of Devin Williams and Jimmy Nelson
While the early Bruce Seid drafts are generally know by Brewers fans for their inability to deliver impact MLB stars to the Brewers club, the drafts should be known for their fantastic depth trades. Witness the organizational players involved in impact moves for the Brewers, from the Gerardo Parra buy-in (yielding Zach Davies) made by Melvin to the Jason Rogers and Cy Sneed trades (to name a few) made by GM David Stearns.

It’s difficult to estimate whether surplus performance for this draft would have been better by assessing each prospect against their historical OFP progressions, rather than being assessed against the value of their respective pick. This is especially tough with someone like Jimmy Nelson, whose career is in progress and is essentially what a “middle rotation” report (from some of his middle year scouting reports) looks like at the MLB level. The 2011 First Round picks truly were as bad as advertised, costing the club approximately 5 WAR based on the historical value of those picks. However, one ought never assess a draft solely by the early rounds, as Jacob Barnes is poised to recover at least 2 WAR (and perhaps more, either through several seasons’ playing time or eventual trade return) thanks to his transformation as an impact reliever from the 431st pick. In terms of either MLB surplus or OFP, Devin Williams remains the most valuable player of this group (based on 2015-2017 assessments), even if the righty is currently injured and therefore has more risk in that profile.

2014-2016 Drafts: Brandon Woodruff and Cy Sneed
For all the clamoring about the 2015 and 2016 drafts, these prospects demonstrate simply how valuable reaching the MLB is, and how much less valuable OFP surplus is by comparison. Prospects like Lucas Erceg, Corey Ray, Trent Clark, and Cody Ponce (among others) may have great overall upsides, but the risk of failing to reach the MLB diminishes the polish from those OFP. Each of the aforementioned prospects reached the Brewers’ 2017 Baseball Prospectus Top Ten (the only players drafted by the Brewers to reach the Top 10), and their collective surplus compared to the historical value of their respective picks is $15.2 million (or roughly 2-to-3 WAR). Still, in terms of overall surplus, these three drafts are worth at least $120.7 million in depreciated surplus (which could reasonably be cashed into approximately 20 WAR via trade or successful development). Brandon Woodruff is the most valuable prospect among each of these drafts, another fantastic win for Bruce Seid’s last draft.

I want to use a prospect such as Mario Feliciano or Demi Orimoloye to demonstrate the sheer difficulty in assessing prospect ceilings. Orimoloye is known as one of the toolsheds from his draft, and the outfielder is putting it together at the plate during his first full professional season. There’s obviously a ways to go with Orimoloye, which was known from the start. Orimoloye is an extremely risky prospect, but one that could have a potential starting right fielder profile if everything breaks the right way. But at this point, with so few tools materializing (and rightfully so, it’s merely halfway through his first full season), is Orimoloye a 50 OFP (average MLB RF) profile? Does the promise of five potential tools make him a 60 OFP (impact RF) ceiling? I split the difference between Orimoloye and Mario Feliciano, who is a catching prospect working in his first full professional season. The idea that Feliciano could remain behind the plate makes him an immediately more valuable prospect, even with all the extreme risk considered. But there is a problem with the calculations here; shifting Feliciano from an “unknown” ceiling to a 50 OFP ceiling changes his surplus from approximately $0.1 million to $7.0 million, which is an extreme shift (basically one full WAR). The same issue exists with Orimoloye, who may have the surplus value most deflated by my approach. In this case, I’d rather err on the side of caution than hype, but I want to explain this issue to demonstrate and acknowledge that this is all quite subjective and ready to fluctuate.

Finally, I’d love to point out that although Milwaukee has failed to return surplus that matches historical value of the draft picks used in these 2014-2016 drafts, the Cy Sneed trade (for Jonathan Villar) has almost perfectly covered that deficit. This is an extreme argument in favor of trading prospects; there is a sense that cashing out the risk of developing organizational depth into immediate MLB wins will improve the overall value of the franchise. This is especially so because that traded surplus can be applied at the MLB level, immediately, and that’s the whole point: however it happens, via trade or development, the purpose of the MLB draft is to deliver MLB wins.