Yet, for all its logic (if you’re not going to contend, you might as well lose and sign a lot of talent in the next draft), this rebuilding argument paints over the relative lack of productivity teams gain through the draft. It also glosses over the extent to which most drafted talent does not make the MLB with their original club, and the extent to which many of the drafted, developed “organizational players” that do reach the MLB and stay with their original club are typically replacement players (rather than stars). For every Clayton Kershaw or Evan Longoria, there are throngs of Chris Marrero, Ryan Adams, Alex Sanabia, Chris Petit, Nick Buss, Tobi Stoner, Brett Sinkbeil: the “September call-up” is a more common “organizational draft outcome” than the superstar. If this seems self-explanatory (because, duh, there are very few superstars), it deserves investigation as clubs embark on purposefully noncompetitive seasons to ostensibly gain the benefits of the draft. My survey in this post focuses on one draft (2006), and serves as one addition to a set of recent BPMilwaukee features on the draft and rebuilding.

Related Content:
The Draft is Only a Tool in the Rebuilding Process
The Lessons of the Astros’ 2016 Backslide
The Macro Draft

Brewers fans are especially vulnerable to this type of logic after the much-maligned drafting record produced by Jack Zduriencik and Bruce Seid from approximately 2006-2010. While some of those drafts have highlights like Seid’s unbelievable 2009 depth (saving that draft entirely), or Zduriencik’s pieces to the CC Sabathia, Shaun Marcum, and Zack Greinke trades, they are largely void of contending organizational depth. As a result, the Brewers arguably had less ease in reaching for stopgaps, bench players, and other useful fill-ins during their serious contending attempts from 2011-2015. A common refrain among the fans is that the bigtime trades ruined the Brewers’ farm systems, but the simple fact is that the Sabathia / Greinke / Marcum moves were great transactions that lacked significant MLB impact from a series of drafts.

This general point should not be construed as an argument that each Brewers draft during this five year stretch was bad; the verdict remains “out” on the 2010 draft, and the exceptional depth of the 2009 draft class produced median value for the Brewers. It’s simply an acknowledgment that the timing of trades and organizational development from these drafts did not produce a regular contender; sometimes players need to develop with a different organization (see Lawrie & Odorizzi, for example); and, even roster core stars at key positions (like Lucroy) are not always enough to contend regularly.

Fans that are yearning for a better draft return from that era can begin with the 2006 draft, which is conveniently a decade past and (also conveniently) a fascinating demonstration of the MLB draft’s strengths and weaknesses. The 2006 draft produced Kershaw and Longoria, two elite players that epitomize the dreams of organizational anchors and stars produced from that amateur talent pool. However, those superstars overshadow the fact that of the approximately 220 players that made the MLB in that draft pool, nearly 170 left their original organization in some way, shape, or form; the teams’ margins for error were further reduced due to the fact that approximately 20 percent of those MLB players were not even signed from the 2006 draft. This chart highlights the basic draft outcomes by including:

• Players that remained with their original club through free agency or their final MLB game.
• Players that were traded at any point by their original club (here a trade as a prospect is equal to a midseason trade from an MLB roster, for classification purposes).
• Players that were lost through many means (unsigned from the draft, lost via waivers, rule 5 draft, MiLB free agency, release, etc.)
• General player value produced by those that remained with their original club (or produced prior to leaving via trade. I did not include waived / released, etc., players here, because those players had negligible value stats as a rule).

All stats compiled Thursday and Friday, May 19-20.

Milwaukee’s draft exemplifies the difficulties of returning a shallow talent pool, but the club also represents one of the best trades produced from the 2006 draft. Incidentally, the Greinke trade lineage continues in Milwaukee, first through Jean Segura’s time in the organization, and now through Aaron Hill and Chase Anderson (and eventually, potentially, Isan Diaz). It’s obviously difficult to fully categorize the value of many trades for the reason that some trades “keep going” by beginning a string of transactions and multifaceted acquisitions (such as the MLB-established Anderson and Hill, alongside the highly touted prospect Diaz). However, considering the outcome of the Greinke trade should at least be evidence enough that measuring on-the-field, organizational value from the 2006 Brewers draft is difficult and incomplete.

Notably, the teams that produced the most valuable on-the-field, organizational production from the 2006 draft show that there is no correct way to maximize draft value. My favorite illustrations: the Yankees established a substantial back-end bullpen; the Rays produced members of a positional core; the Dodgers landed one of the greatest pitchers in baseball history; the Cardinals employed members of a Championship core before shrewdly trading them away; and, the Athletics traded two pitchers at the (arguable) peak of their value. Each of these teams supplies lessons for the Brewers: assess and keep the very best talent from a draft class, but don’t rule out trading a player while they’re valuable, and don’t necessarily rule out relievers as a source of value (among other lessons).

The list of organizational players supports arguments in trading draftees, rather than relying solely on developing MLB mainstays. More than 40 percent of these organizational players served only one or two years with a club, and nearly 60 precent never reached 100 games played with their original organization, which shows that over several seasons, these players were largely relegated to depth roles:

While not all of the trades resulting from 2006 draftees were productive, many of the ’06 class served as foundational or supplemental parts of some of the recent MLB blockbusters. Along with Greinke, the 2006 draft class was involved in trades for Jake Arrieta (Steve Clevenger), Manny Ramirez (Bryan Morris), Wandy Rodriguez (Rudy Owens), and a substantial percentage of the contending Phillies rotation (Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay, and Joe Blanton, thanks in part to Jason Donald, Kyle Drabek, and Adrian Cardenas). Other trades involving the 2006 draft class netted Felipe Lopez to the Brewers, Dee Gordon to the Marlins, Johan Santana to the Mets, Josh Hamilton and Geovany Soto to the Rangers, and Damaso Marte and Xavier Nady to the Yankees (among others still). Teams should not shy away from using drafted talent to acquire valuable big leaguers or supplant contending aspirations.

Incidentally, the players lost by their parent organizations serve some crucial lessons about marginal roster value, as well. While many of these players may be regarded as “replacements” at best, there are several players that produced depth value after their parent club exposed them to waivers, released them, or allowed them to walk via Minor League free agency:

These moves, taken as a whole, signify the element of timing that lurks behind player development and roster building. Even where draft picks work out (each of these players are MLBers, even if they are marginal value players), an organization may not be able to coax their best value on the field, or translate perceived value into a trade. As a result, one may scrutinize the draft-oriented focus of tanking as a misguided understanding of “getting the time right;” there is no guarantee that an organization will develop the right players from the right rebuilding draft at the right time, just as there is no guarantee that a team looking to contend will get that same development equation correct (cf. 2012-2015 Brewers). While tanking to get a larger draft bonus pool, one must question whether a team is missing other opportunities to acquire talent with the players they have currently developed (even marginal roster depth).

A simple corollary question can summarize this meandering stroll through the 2006 draft: which current Brewers prospects and organizational depth players can Milwaukee trade to maximize their value? Which is to say, if hardly 25 percent of any given draft will stay with the organization, who are the stars that the Brewers absolutely must keep from their 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 drafts? Who are the players that the Brewers can employ and trade at peak value? By addressing these questions, one can engage in counterbuilding, or the act of strategizing roster acquisitions that are apparently contrary to a team’s given aims (such as acquiring MLB talent by trading prospects during a supposed-rebuilding year). The basic point is that an organization should not ever enter into a one-dimensional roster-building phase such as a tank or win-now extreme — or, if they do, they had better tread carefully and get their timing right.

Milwaukee can use 2016 to work with players like Jonathan Villar, Chris Carter, Kirk Nieuwenhuis, Chase Anderson, and others still, to define and refine the roster depth necessary for contending in the very near future. While they align these players within the organization, they can begin to play some of their best prospects at the MLB level, hastening and emboldening the next step of sifting those talent to keep as contributors, or trade for better MLB players. In an environment where several National League teams are already trending downward into basement-level tanking, such a contrarian roster building strategy could provide the perfect opportunity to contend much faster than anyone currently expects.

The Brewers will have the benefit of a high pick in the 2016 draft, and they should at least draft within the Top 10 of the 2017 draft as well. With these facts in mind, the front office can maximize a contrarian position regarding current draftees and organizational depth: as Milwaukee’s farm system ascends to the top of the league, it is time to use that depth to begin supplanting and improving the MLB roster via trades, alongside the hopeful stars that the organization will decide to keep. This is no small decision, as the Brewers cannot use a large TV revenue wallet to cover-up their mistakes as easily as other MLB clubs. It is also a matter of timing the moves right, which is why the Brewers should not waste time on a multi-season rebuilding campaign. A non-competitive 2017 MLB season is as much of a waste for the Brewers as making a mistaken trade.

Taking into consideration the arbitration cases and the league-minimum salaries, we can comfortably say that Milwaukee is slated to have a payroll that is at least $40 million under last year’s budget. What a difference a year makes.

Two important points: (1) I am fully aware that the organization must make a profit and should expect revenue to decrease, due to the club being non-competitive; and (2) I am not criticizing the front office for skimping on the free-agent market or avoiding new contract extensions for players under team control. This is a rebuilding club with many young players who are fighting for playing time at the league minimum. That’s fine. The team should absolutely avoid handcuffing itself financially through long-term contracts and/or extensions.

But it’s imperative to note that a low Major League payroll is not the only place to spend money. It also must be stressed that the Milwaukee Brewers will still benefit from revenue sharing, their own television contract, and all the normal revenue streams that have allowed them to spend $98-plus million in three of the past four years. Thus, if the club (understandably) fields a low-cost Major League roster and the differential is not spend elsewhere within the organization, ownership will simply pocket the extra excess money. And, it seems to me, there’s no reason why a non-competitive stretch should be frustrating for fans and line the ownership’s pockets a bit more than normal.

Fortunately, there are plenty of places for a Major League organization to spend money, namely on the farm system. And given the fact that Milwaukee is focusing on the future, that seems to be the perfect place to allocate more funds than normal. If the goal is really to shorten the rebuild and to construct a perennial contender, the club should welcome investing more in their minor-league system.

The Brewers can throw gobs of cash in both the international market and the 2016 MLB Draft. Granted, Major League Baseball has worked diligently to limit the amount of money given to amateur players by instituting a complicated set of “bonus pool” allotments that have strict penalties for exceeding them. But as we’ve seen teams like the Yankees, Dodgers, and Rays do on the international market, there’s nothing stopping organizations from spending more money — as long as they’re willing to pay the penalties.

Back in 2014, Craig Goldstein outlined the penalty structures for exceeding the signing-bonus pool limits. In short, overages are taxed at 100 percent — so a team effectively has to pay double when they’re spending over their limit — and teams are ineligible to sign players for more than $500K or $300K for a year or two, depending on how much a club blows past their limit. For example, from July 2, 2014, to July 1, 2015, the New York Yankees exceeded their limit by at least 610 percent! They signed 10 of the top-30 international players on the market and had to pay an estimated $13.4 million in overage taxes, but the club is hoping that the investment pays off handsomely in the coming decade.

Baseball America’s Ben Badler opines that 2016 is a perfect year to ignore the bonus-pool limits. With the Collective Bargaining Agreement ending soon and the specter of an international draft making some of the overage penalties questionably effective, the 2016 season represents a perfect storm, of sorts. Not to mention a wealth of young Cuban talent is poised to become available, too, and only teams willing to outspend their bonus pools will likely have an opportunity to sign those players.

The international market is one place where teams have already flirted with overspending and paying the overage penalties. No one has really done it in the MLB Draft. Teams once again are assigned bonus pools, depending on specific draft position and the number of draft selections, and have an aggressive penalty structure for exceeding those bonus pools. The strictest penalty is a 100 percent tax on the overages and the loss of first-round picks in the next two years’ drafts, and that’s for spending 15-plus percent over one’s bonus-pool allotment. That’s steep.

The 2016 draft class is not particularly strong at the top, but ESPN’s Keith Law and Eric Longenhagen suggest that it projects to be “teeming with prospects worthy of late-first or sandwich-round grades.” In other words, it has plenty of depth. And for a club looking to acquire extra amateur talent through the draft and is looking for high-priced youngsters to fall through the cracks due to bonus demands, depth is key. Depth is probably preferable to a draft that is top-heavy.

Since Ray Montgomery has become the Brewers’ amateur scouting director, the organization has been stellar at acquiring amateur talent. Their 2015 draft class was one of the best in all of baseball. Allowing Montgomery and his staff to be unburdened by money in the 2016 Draft, to simply identify and draft the best-available talent no matter the cost, seems to be a winning scenario for the Milwaukee Brewers. The only thing that is needed is extra money and a willingness to lose a first-round draft pick or two in the coming seasons.

Granted, it should be noted that the Brewers don’t project to be a quality Major League club for another couple seasons, which means any first-round pick they surrender would be a really good first-round pick. To make up for that, though, the club could focus on acquiring competitive balance picks via trade in 2016, as well as understanding that their second-round pick should be very high, too.

It’s a gamble for the Brewers to sacrifice future first-round picks. That’s undeniable. But, it’s also obvious that the Milwaukee Brewers have the means and the reason to ignore any monetary limitations on the amateur market and to spend big. Spend really big. Allocate that $40 million differential mentioned above on improving the future of the club, instead of simply becoming profit for ownership and the club. In my mind, if the real goal is to become competitive as quickly as possible and to sustain that competitiveness for as long as possible, the Milwaukee Brewers should put their money where their mouth is and blow the amateur market out of the water.

Many people the next day expressed their opinions on the deal, including Keith Law, who mentioned on ESPN that they (the Diamondbacks) were “nuts” to make this trade. However, that’s not the comment that caught my attention. He also mentioned that teams are getting better and better at selecting the number-one overall pick. He then cited examples such as Bryce Harper, David Price, and Stephen Strasburg as former number-one picks who have been successful. While those players are great, I still wondered if that statement was true — especially when one considers that Mark Appel was drafted just two years ago, and while his career has yet to come to a conclusion, he has had a number of struggles over the past few years. Then, there’s Brady Aiken who didn’t even sign with the Astros and the Tim Beckham debacle.

I, therefore, decided to set out and answer this question, and to be honest, I wasn’t able to come up with a satisfying answer. Here is a look at the trend, dating back to 1969.

Important note: The data was gathered from Baseball Reference, therefore, I used their WAR model. Baseball Reference also includes players who haven’t signed with the team, which caused me to manually take out the players who didn’t sign with the team. This was easy to do for the first overall picks considering only three players have not signed with their team. For the further studies, I did my best, but it was difficult and there may be some errors on my part, as it was done manually. That being said, I’m almost certain I didn’t make any egregious ones. Therefore, I don’t think the WAR number will be all out of wack. This list from Baseball America also helped a lot with this process. 

The trend, while giving us a sense of the situation, can be seriously misleading, mainly because it skews more heavily towards the older years. Those players have had a chance to finish their careers while players such as Bryce Harper, Stephen Strasburg, and David Price have yet to conclude theirs. One could then run a projection system to see how those players will likely perform throughout their careers, but, because there are so many factors to consider and players such as Harper and Strasburg are so young, there would be a ton of variance in the results, to say the least. Therefore, for this particular answer, I simply wasn’t able to come to any hard conclusions. Although I will mention that thus far the best first overall pick has been clearly Alex Rodriguez.

My next question, therefore, was how good have the Brewers been with their first overall picks? The Brewers, in their entire history, have only had one first overall pick. With it, they drafted (at the time of the draft) shortstop B.J. Surhoff. While not a star, Surhoff played nine seasons with the Brewers and finished his career with a 34.3 career WAR. Considering that on average the first overall pick averages an 18.9 career WAR (only including players who have finished their careers, so Alex Rodriguez is not involved in this analysis), the Brewers seemed to have done pretty well with their pick. This, however, is just another cruel reminder that prospects are fickle, and while having the first overall pick is good, the pick doesn’t always translate into a future star. That’s why it’s so important to stockpile prospects, and not simply the high-end ones.

This then led me to the question: How good have the Brewers been with their first-round picks? In the coming years, I suspect the Brewers will look to stockpile as many draft picks as possible in order to continue building their farm system. It is, therefore, extremely important for them to hit on their high-end picks as that is where most future stars come from. This isn’t to say that later rounds aren’t very important, but rather that most top end prospects come from the first round. This is where a lot of the top-end talent in their system will come from. So, let’s look at how they’ve done as compared to the rest of the league.

As you can see, since 1969, no team has had their first-round picks garner more overall WAR. The Brewers now seemingly have been the best team since 1969 with their first-round draft picks. That being said, if one looks at the bottom of the list, one can easily notice all the latest expansion teams. Looking at it on an overall level doesn’t exactly give those teams a fair shake, considering they haven’t had as many drafts as the Brewers and other teams. Therefore, I also looked at this information on a per average basis.

Now, while the Brewers aren’t ahead of everyone else on this list, they are by far the second-best team with their first-round draft picks. And it’s no surprise once one thinks about it. Robin Yount, Paul Molitor, Gary Sheffield, Ryan Braun, Prince Fielder, Ben Sheets, Geoff Jenkins, and more, were all first-round draft picks by the Brewers. While not all of these players compiled most of their value with the Brewers, they all went on to have very illustrious careers and proved to be well worth the first-round pick. Now, not all of the Brewers first-round picks have panned out, unfortunately. It’s the nature of the beast. What’s important to note, however, is that compared to the rest of the league, they seem to have done as good a job as any, which should give us hope going into the upcoming drafts.

I will also point out that this type of study has again a skewing effect. Teams who have done well in older drafts will have better results than teams who have done well in more recent drafts. The main reason the Seattle Mariners are so far ahead is thanks to Alex Rodriguez and Ken Griffey Jr. Both of those players are franchise-altering, which is sometimes all it takes to change the fortunes of a organization. It will be interesting to see how well the Nationals and Angels do once the career of Mike Trout and Bryce Harper are over.

The main point, though, is that the Brewers will need to keep up this type of success in the first round. Being able to hit on first-round prospects is a huge asset and will allow the Brewers to gain more high-end talent. And if any of the recent drafts are any indication, the Brewers are well underway. As J.P. Breen pointed out, “Ray Montgomery and his staff have been aces over the past couple years.” Just take a look at Trent Clark, who’s Troutian neck has already got many scouts buzzing. Baseball Prospectus has already ranked him as the number-four prospect in the Brewers system. This type of success in the first round will surely be welcome going forward, as the Brewers dive deeper into the dark and lonely ocean of the rebuild.

1) Houston Astros
2) Toronto Blue Jays
3) Texas Rangers
4) Kansas City Royals
5) Los Angeles Dodgers
6) New York Mets
7) Chicago Cubs
8) Other

Let’s get to this week’s stories:

Grantland || ALDS Preview: Breaking Down Rangers vs. Blue Jays and Astros vs. Royals

Brewers fans looking for a postseason rooting interest are likely to find it in the American League, where seven former Brewers are enjoying the postseason with their new teams. Besides being filled with former Brewers, the AL also features a variety of teams that aren’t the Cardinals. For Grantland, Ben Lindbergh breaks down the match ups in Junior Circuit.

FanGraphs || C.C. Sabathia and the Humanity of Athletes

Many words have been spilled on former Brewer CC Sabathia’s decision to enter a rehab facility for his alcohol problem this past week in advance of the Yankees’ first playoff appearance in three years, most of them rightly positive. It’s not easy for anyone to admit that there’s a problem, let alone a professional athlete living under the bright lights of New York City. As the product of a family that dealt with addiction, I have nothing but respect for Sabathia’s ability to put his own life, and his family, before his baseball career. But he hasn’t done anything heroic yet, and he has a long road ahead of him. I wish CC well as he walks the road to recovery.

Just A Bit Outside || Which Manager Had Most Success With Review System in 2015?

Owen Watson takes a look at the numbers behind managers challenges this year, a skill that Milwaukee’s managers ranked among the league’s worst in 2015 — though not as bad as Matt Williams, who was the worst by a large margin (as if any further justification was needed for his firing). At the top of the heap you’ll find a trio of playoff managers in Joe Maddon, Clint Hurdle and Ned Yost, though with just a few seasons of data with which to work, it’s impossible to say how big of an impact these managers’ challenges had on their teams’ playoff runs.

Brew Crew Ball || Brewers Get Fifth Pick in 2016 Draft

Derek Harvey takes a look at the silver lining for the Brewers after a disastrous 2015 season. Milwaukee will have the fifth pick in the draft next summer, giving the team to add even more to a drastically improved farm system that should jump from the bottom third to the top third in most system rankings this winter. Harvey points out that the last time the Brewers had a top ten pick was in 2007, when they selected Matt LaPorta, and though the former top prospect never made good on his potential, he was the key piece in the Sabathia trade that delivered the Brewers’ first postseason appearance in 26 years.

Reviewing the Brew || Milwaukee Brewers Make Wholesale Changes on Counsell’s Staff

Brewers’ new general manager David Stearns officially took over the front office this week as Milwaukee’s season came to a close, and while changes were expected, I don’t think anyone predicted the kind of turnover Milwaukee is in for as five of the team’s coaches were let go. Among the departed are Rick Kranitz, who had been the Brewers’ pitching coach since 2011, and Jerry Narron, who was the Brewers’ bench coach since 2010 and was responsible for the calligraphy on the Brewers’ iconic lineup cards. Surviving the fallout from Milwaukee’s most disappointing season in a decade were hitting coach Darnell Coles and Teflon-coated third base coach Ed Sedar, who has manned one base or the other from Milwaukee since 2007. While no annoucements regarding replacements have yet been made, it is widely assumed that Pat Murphy, whom the Brewers requested an interview with this summer prior to his being named interim manager of the Padres, is at the top of Craig Counsell’s list. If Brewers fans are looking for things to be afraid of this winter, erstwhile Nationals manager Williams’ name has also been bandied about as a potential add for the Crew; Williams and Counsell were teammates in Arizona.

Baseball America || Southern League Top 20 Prospects Chat   

I’ll leave you this week with the transcript of a chat Matt Eddy of Baseball America conducted on Wednesday regarding their most recent Top 20 prospect list for the Southern League, of which the Brewers’ prospect-rich Double-A Biloxi Shuckers were the runners-up. Several Brewers’ prospects are discussed throughout, notably Jorge Lopez, Michael Reed and Adrian Houser.

Since Melvin has stepped down, a couple of pieces have been written about his overall legacy — including one by our own Michael Bradburn. Bradburn seemed to conclude that Melvin was an average GM, predominantly assembling mediocre, never great or never terrible, teams. He did, however, suggest that Melvin faired well in the draft. Dave Cameron, of FanGraphs, offered somewhat of a different take. Cameron cited that the Brewers faired well in their first round draft picks from 1999-2008. Perhaps this is a weird take considering Melvin’s first draft as a GM took place in 2003. He also stated that after 2009 the well started to dry up. From 2009-2012 the Brewers drafts weren’t very good. This was one of the three key elements that doomed Melvin’s tenure. Both takes, however, were mostly constrained to first round picks; therefore, I wanted to examine the issue a little further.

First, let’s acknowledge that Doug Melvin, while being the general manager, is far from the only person involved in the draft process. There are a number of scouts that work diligently all year to provide a myriad of scouting reports, so that when the draft clock starts to count down, the front office has the necessary information to make an informed decision on which players to draft.

Secondly, evaluating a team’s success in the draft can be difficult. Players drafted go into the minor-league system. After that, they become assets that can be used in various ways — becoming utility players, trade chips, or organizational players. Simply put, just because a player doesn’t have a major impact on the main roster, it doesn’t mean he wasn’t an important part of the organization, especially if he was a later-round pick.

That being said, unfortunately there are few ways of determining whether a GM or a team excels at drafting. One of them is looking at the number of players that teams drafted, and how many times those players made it into the big leagues. The data was mainly compiled at Baseball-Reference. I went back to 2003, since that was the first year Doug Melvin served as the general manager of the Brewers during a draft.

As you can see, I included the percentage of players that made the majors. In both cases, though, the Brewers were not among the league leaders in both categories — ranking 19th out of the 30 major-league teams in the percentage of players who made the majors and 22nd in the raw number of players who made it to the majors.

At the top are some of the usual suspects. The Cardinals, Dodgers, Giants, Rangers, Red Sox are all known for having great farm systems and producing a multitude of talented homegrown big leaguers. With that being said, the Padres and Tigers also rank highly on this list, which may mean this methodology is flawed. And of course it is. While a team may bring a lot of players to the big leagues, it doesn’t mean that they turned into great players or that they “won the draft.” Just look at the Pirates’ 2005 draft. Only four of the 50 players they drafted made an appearance in the big leagues, yet they drafted Andrew McCutchen with the 11th-overall pick. No sane person is going to argue that the Pirates had a poor draft.

When doing this sort of analysis, value obviously needs to be taken into consideration. Using Baseball-References’ draft database, I looked at the average rWAR of every team from 2003-2015. When doing this, I did find some errors in the database. For example, apparently the Brewers drafted Jake Arrieta and Andrew Bailey in 2005. This, of course, is technically true, but neither signed with Milwaukee. The Orioles drafted and signed Arrieta in 2007 and the A’s did the same with Bailey in 2006. I did my best to correct for every error I could find, but one should keep in mind that some slight ones may exist — although, I’m fairly certain I grabbed the egregious errors.

From 2003 to 2015, the Brewers averaged 12.8 rWAR per draft, which ranks fifth in all of baseball. During that time, the Brewers did well with their first-round draft picks, selecting players like Ryan Braun, Jeremy Jefferies, Rickie Weeks, and Brett Lawrie in the first round. But they also drafted quality big leaguers in the later rounds. Take, for example, the 2009 draft, where they drafted Khris Davis (7), Scooter Gennett (16), and Mike Fiers (22) in later rounds. All these players, while not stars, are quality major leaguers who have helped out the organization, even if they’re not part of the long-term plan.

The Brewers, therefore, have had good drafts during the Doug Melvin era. There are, of course, many other factors that must be considered to properly evaluate the Doug Melvin era in Milwaukee. He, for example, was never able to build a good pitching staff. Since he was named general manager of the Brewers, the Brewers never had a DRA- under 100 (100 is league average, lower is better), though Melvin was strapped with a small-market team. His payrolls and team salaries were generally low, which affected his ability to author big moves and sign top-tier free agents. But when it comes to the draft, Doug Melvin faired well — even though the team hasn’t drafted overly well in the past half-dozen years, he’s recently been able to revamp the system with a few creative trades this deadline. Melvin’s legacy will be mixed — that’s part of the business — but the drafts that happened under his watch should not be constituted for criticism.

Earlier this season, the Brewers relieved Ron Roenicke of his managerial duties. He had skippered the club since 2011, which saw him lead the Brewers into the postseason. In his place, the organization installed lifer Craig Counsell with a three-year contract and have since publicly backed him for the 2016 season and beyond.

These moves form what we now see as a series of significant changes — though they tragically began towards the end of the 2014 season. Long-time Brewers scouting director Bruce Seid passed away in September. Ray Montgomery, a former scout with Milwaukee, replaced him and headed what has been viewed as a successful 2015 draft.

With all of these changes, we are undoubtedly entering a new era of Brewers baseball.  This movement, at least for now, will be focused on the future of the team. However, with so much happening in the last eleven months, I want to look backward. I specifically thought it insightful to look back at the drafts Bruce Seid oversaw.

The Brewers appointed Seid as scouting director on November 11, 2008 — which means his first draft came in the summer of 2009. His final one was the 2014 draft. That provides a window of six drafts on which to focus. Obviously, the more recent drafts will be harder to evaluate. Most prospects take several years to work their way though the minors, and until they’ve had a chance to do that, it’s difficult to determine if a particular draft was successful.

Notable Names From 2009: RHP Eric Arnett (1st rd), OF Khris Davis (7th rd), SS Scooter Gennett (16th rd), RHP Tyler Cravy (17th rd), RHP Mike Fiers (22nd round)

The top of this draft has proven to be an absolute disaster. Of the thirteen picks the Brewers had in the first ten rounds, only two players remain in the organization and only Khris Davis has had an impact on the major-league roster. However, he is not the only member of this draft to reach the majors. Before being traded to Houston in June, Mike Fiers had been with the big-league club in some capacity since 2012. Scooter Gennett is the starting second baseman. He’s struggling this year, but has shown an ability to hit right-handed pitching in the past. Tyler Cravy has surpassed expectations and pitched in the majors.

The results are mixed. It’s painful to have so many picks in the top-ten rounds but only have one of them pan out. However, walking away from a draft with two starting position players and one starting pitcher with the chance of a second is actually quite good.

Notable Names From 2010: RHP Dylan Covey (1st rd), RHP Jimmy Nelson (2nd rd), RHP Tyler Thornburg (3rd rd), SS Yadiel Rivera (9th rd), 1B Jason Rogers (32nd rd)

Dylan Covey is the only first-round pick during Bruce Seid’s tenure not to sign. During his routine medical exam, it was discovered that he had Type-1 diabetes. Upon learning this, the right-hander understandably chose to stay near family and pitch at the University of San Diego in order to best learn how to manage his condition. Fortunately for Covey, it seems he has been successful in that, as he was later drafted by the Oakland Athletics, where still pitches.

The Brewers hit on their next selection in the draft, right-hander Jimmy Nelson. For most of his minor-league career, Nelson was something of an unheralded prospect. It wasn’t until the winter before the 2014 season that he finally made a Top-100 list, ranking 83rd. By July, he had rocketed to 38th on Baseball America’s mid-season list. This year, he has been the Brewers’ best starting pitcher and looks to be on the verge of taking another step forward.

An elbow injury has derailed Tyler Thornburg’s career. At one time, it seemed possible that he could stick in the rotation; however, the bullpen now seems more likely. Jason Rogers has made appearances with the major-league club, where he currently is. He hit all through the minors, but his likely role is a platoon or bench bat. Yadiel Rivera is an electric defender in the middle of the infield but has never hit much. If he can crack a major-league roster, it will likely be as nothing more than a utility infielder.

Again, these are mixed results. Fans cannot hold the Dylan Covey situation against the Brewers and Bruce Seid. And while Jimmy Nelson has the upside of a No. 2 starter, he appears to be the only starting-caliber player the Brewers drafted in 2010.

Notable Names From 2011: RHP Taylor Jungmann (1st rd), LHP Jed Bradley (1st rd), RHP Jorge Lopez (2nd rd), 1B Nick Ramirez (4th rd), OF Michael Reed (5th rd), RHP David Goforth (7th rd), LHP Mike Strong (10th rd)

Now we’re delving into territory where it’s hard to judge the draft. Taylor Jungmann and David Goforth have made their major-league debuts this year, but the book is very much out on them. The rest of the listed players could make their big-league debuts next year. Little is known about what role they could play or how good they could be.

Taylor Jungmann is a great example of this. Being their first pick in what was thought to be a stacked draft, expectations for him were likely set too high. I think fans expected an ace when he should’ve been viewed as a mid-rotation type. One thing upon which we can agree is that it took longer for him to reach the majors than expected. But he’s there now and looks like the mid-rotation starter it was hoped he would become.

Right-hander Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, was expected to take longer. He is currently enjoying an excellent season in Double-A Biloxi and looks like he might be taking a step forward in his development as a pitcher. He’s another guy that has mid-rotation potential.

If anyone in this group looks as if he could blow away the projections, it’s Michael Reed. He’s unlikely to be a superstar, but he’s gone from a relatively unknown prospect to potential starting right fielder. Squint a little bit and one can see a Nori Aoki-esque outfielder. That’s pretty good for a fifth-round pick

The feelings one has about this draft depend on how one evaluates players. If one looks at pure value, this draft stacks up pretty well. The team might have a pair of mid-rotation-caliber pitchers and a starting right fielder to go along with some bench players and relievers. If one puts it in context of a draft that had guys like Jose Fernandez and Sonny Gray available, then one probably thinks the return is a little light. I think that simplifies things a little too much, however, and relies too heavily on hindsight.

Notable Names From 2012: C Clint Coulter (1st rd), OF Victor Roache (1st rd), OF Mitch Haniger (comp rd), OF Tyrone Taylor (2nd rd), RHP Tyler Wagner (4th rd), RHP Damien Magnifico (5th rd), LHP Anthony Banda (10th rd)

This draft is very interesting. As yet, it’s impossible to accurately judge because none of these players have had a chance to play at the major-league level. Wagner made a spot start, but he is probably another year away from being ready. Also, two of these players have been traded.

Mitch Haniger and Anthony Banda were sent to the Diamondbacks for Gerardo Parra, who was in turn sent to the Orioles this year for Zach Davies. How does one factor that into the evaluation of this draft? I’m not sure. It’s hard to judge Haniger and Banda’s season, as they’re with a different club being coached and developed by different people.

Of the remaining group, Clint Coulter, Tyrone Taylor, and Ty Wagner stand above the rest. Coulter has been moved out from behind the plate to right field, but his bat looks like it can play there. Tyrone Taylor came into this season as the Brewers second-best prospect. Though his bat has stagnated, he’s young and projects to adroitly handle center field. Ty Wagner has done nothing except compile solid numbers in the minors and looks like he could stick in a major-league rotation as a back-end option.

Victor Roache has perhaps re-emerged as a legitimate prospect this year by mashing the ball at High-A and Double-A. Questions still remain about how his bat will play at the major-league level, though, and he’s limited defensively. There is a lot of power in that bat, so if he really has figured something out, it stands to reason that he could be a solid corner outfielder.

A lot of people can’t get over the fact that the Brewers passed on Joey Gallo. But many teams did. There could also be factors behind the scenes about which we’re ignorant. One thing we do know is that Gallo signed for over $2 million which is much more than the Brewers spent on any single player in that draft. The Brewers probably just couldn’t afford Gallo.

The overall draft looks solid. With a fair amount of luck, the Brewers gave themselves the chance for a complete outfield (LF- Roache, CF-Taylor, RF-Coulter). They also got a solid starting-pitching prospect and had assets leftover to acquire Gerardo Parra.

Notable Names From 2013: RHP Devin Williams (2nd rd), SS Tucker Neuhaus (competitive-balance rd), RHP Taylor Williams (4th rd), OF Omar Garcia (7th rd), OF Brandon Diaz (8th rd), LHP Hobbs Johnson (14th rd), 1B David Denson (15th rd)

Bruce Seid was hamstrung with this draft. The Brewers signed Kyle Lohse over the winter, and because of the new free-agent-compensation rules, the Brewers forfeited their first-round pick. While that hurt, most experts seemed to agree that the Brewers did well to grab Devin Williams at 54th-overall. He has arguably the highest ceiling of any pitcher in the Brewers organization. However, he’s pitching for Low-A Wisconsin and likely won’t make his major-league debut until 2018 at the earliest.

Taylor Williams looked like he was going to make some waves this season, but unfortunately suffered an elbow injury. They tried rehab. Ultimately, he underwent or will undergo Tommy John surgery this week. It’s probable that he will miss all of next season, which is a huge blow after missing all of this year.

The leftovers in this group project as role players, at best. Hobbs Johnson could succeed as a back-end starter or swingman. If David Denson can figure out how to hit, he has the kind of power profile you want to see in a starting first baseman. Omar Garcia and Brandon Diaz are both speedy outfielders who have likely ceilings of a fourth outfielder. Tucker Neuhaus is gifted defensively at third base but hasn’t quite figured out how to hit. He is still young, though.

At this point, I’m not comfortable making any kind of judgement on this draft. The players are too far off, and there were extenuating circumstances — namely, the fact that Bruce Seid didn’t get a first-round draft pick.

Notable Names From 2014: LHP Kodi Medeiros (1st rd), SS Jacob Gatewood (competitive-balance rd), OF Monte Harrison (2nd rd), RHP Cy Sneed (3rd rd), OF Troy Stokes (4th rd), RHP David Burkhalter (6th rd), RHP Javier Salas (10th rd), RHP Jordan Yamamoto (12th rd)

This would end up being Bruce Seid’s final draft. Like 2013’s draft, it’s far too early to proclaim it a success or not. The early returns, however, are encouraging.

Most viewed Kodi Medeiros to be a reach. He has a slight build and unorthodox mechanics. This led many to peg him as a future reliever. The Brewers gave him an aggressive assignment this year to Low-A Wisconsin, instead of another season in rookie ball. Unlike his other draftees that were given the same assignment, Medeiros performed well enough to stay. It’s encouraging for several reasons, but it could also speed up his major-league debut by a year which is significant.

Monte Harrison was one of the players, along with Gatewood and Medeiros, to be assigned to Wisconsin. The position players struggled and wound up being demoted to Helena to work on things. That’s what Harrison seemed to be doing (.299/.410/.474) before suffering a broken ankle. He’s expected to make a full recovery in time for spring training next year. Entering the season, he had the highest ceiling of the Brewers’ outfield prospects and little has happened to change that view (outside of the additions of Trent Clark and Brett Phillips).

Cy Sneed is looking like he might be the sleeper in this group. Drafted out of Dallas Baptist, he’s on a more accelerated path through the minors. He started the year in Low-A Wisconsin but received a mid-season promotion to High-A Brevard County. He has pitched well at both levels and appears that he may have the stuff to remain in a major-league rotation.

*****

It’s hard to judge a draft. What is the criteria for success? Is it a success if you get one or two major-league regulars? If so, then the 2009 draft must be considered a success, despite the top of the draft not producing any major-league players.

Do you have to hold it in context of the total level of talent available that year? Because the 2011 might then not be considered a success. It looks like several major-league players will emerge from the draft. But that was a tremendous year for talent and the Brewers probably only got average to slightly above average major-league regulars instead of All-Star-caliber players.

How do you account for players traded? How much credit does Bruce Seid and the scouting department have to share with the player development staff when guys like Khris Davis, Mike Fiers, and Michael Reed surpass expectations? How do you account for injuries and the randomness of the universe? I don’t know the answer to all of these questions.

I do know that Bruce Seid did give the Brewers several major-league regulars over his six-year stint as scouting director. He also gave them some pretty high-ceiling talent in recent drafts. The dividends of those recent drafts won’t be seen for years to come, and I think a lot of people are going to overlook Seid’s contribution because of it.

The Brewers’ farm system is probably going to rank somewhere in the top half in offseason rankings. Not a small portion of that is due to a successful first draft for Ray Montgomery in addition to an active trade deadline. But a large portion of that is also due to the contributions of Bruce Seid.

To be clear, what follows will not aim to predict future drafts or future Brewers’ drafts. The goal will mostly be to analyze the Brewers’ draft trends in order to make sense of their 2015 draft.

In case you forgot, the draft happened on June 8th. The Brewers had the 15th-overall pick and selected Trent Clark, a prep outfielder from Richland High School in Texas. Baseball America had Clark going 12th overall, Baseball Prospectus projected him to go 13th overall, and FanGraphs had him being taken fourth by the Rangers. This isn’t to criticize the mock drafts, but rather to suggest that the Brewers picked someone who was thought to be out of their reach. For the most part, all the analysis seems to indicate that this was a good pick, or at least a tremendous value pick. But this wasn’t the Brewers only pick in the 2015 MLB draft. In total, the Brewers drafted 41 players — 31.7 percent of whom were high school picks and 68.29 percent of whom were college picks.

Seems like they went college heavy, right? Since 1968, 46 percent of the players drafted by the Brewers have come from high school (54 percent college or junior college). But before making any steadfast claims, let’s look at the Brewers overall draft trends comparing high school and college players.

Important Note: The data gathered on the draft came from Baseball-Reference, which also includes players who have not signed; it contains all draft picks.

As you can see, earlier in the organization’s existence, the Brewers predominantly drafted high school players. This was not uncommon during that time, as most players who were drafted came out of high school. After 1977, though, the only year in which the Brewers drafted more high school than college players was 2004, when 56 percent of their picks were high schoolers. The Brewers especially went college-heavy in the 1980s. What is odd, however, is that in the early 2000s, when Moneyball came out, the Brewers began drafting a lot more high school players. This was unusual because, as displayed by Ben Lindbergh in his article “Get ‘Em Young, Get ‘Em Throwing: How Two Recent MLB Draft Trends Can Help Us Anticipate This Year’s Results,” the early 2000s produced an all-time low number of high school players drafted. The conventional wisdom during that era was that college players represented a safer bet, while high school players were more volatile and too risky.

As you can probably tell, a lot of variance exists in the year-to-year percentage, but expanding the time frame to 2000-2014, the Brewers selected 60 percent of their players from college and only 40 percent from the prep ranks. While the Brewers largely haven’t succumbed to conventional wisdom when it comes to high school athletes, drafting 68.29 percent of players from college does seem high. Lindbergh’s article does illustrate that high school players are trending up and it is now much closer to a 50/50 split. If we look at the Brewers trends over the last five years, though, they have had one uptick in high school players taken, followed by one downtick. I am, of course, describing normal variance, but the amount of prep players picked tends to trend around the 30-to-40 percent mark, which is perhaps what we should expect going forward for the Brewers.

Before continuing, you might have noticed that the data goes back to 1968, which is odd, because the Brewers first came into existence in 1970. However, the Brewers were initially the Seattle Pilots. The Pilots only had one season of existence (1969), before they relocated to Milwaukee and became the Milwaukee Brewers. The 1968 draft constitutes the expansion draft, which happens every time the league adds a new team or teams. This is why the data extends back to 1968.

Now, we’ll take a look at the trends by position that the Brewers have been drafting. Let’s get an overall sense of their situation.

The infielders are separated by their respective positions, while the outfielders are simply labeled, “OF”. The data from Baseball-Reference had the outfield data labeled as OF, while for the infielders it showed their actual position. Defining what is a CF, LF, or RF can be difficult, especially for players who have yet to be drafted, as the data on them is so limited.

One can see that the vast majority of players drafted are right-handed pitchers. This makes sense. Half of baseball rosters are compromised of pitchers and most of them are righties. As a whole, though, it seems the Brewers tend to lean more towards pitchers than any other position. What did surprise me was the low amount of second basemen drafted; they even lean more towards first and third baseman, as opposed to second base.

This seemed strange, until I read “KATOH Goes to College: Projecting College Hitters” by Chris Mitchell. In this study, Mitchell showed that collegiate second baseman rarely provide any value. In fact, if one looks at the graph he created, the second base position basically drops off the map, even before the DH and 1B positions. This could be an indicator as to why the Brewers haven’t drafted a lot of second baseman. After all, it’s much easier to shift a shortstop or third baseman to second than it is to find a collegiate second baseman with elite skill.

Let’s now look at their positional draft trends through the years and see if there’s anything that stands out.

What a mess. I was actually debating (with myself) whether to even show this, but at least you can see for yourself that little can be gleaned from this graph. What if, though, I combined all the infield positions and combined the LHP and RHP into a single pitching category? Hopefully, this will provide a clearer picture in order to sift through all the noise.

Ok, so this still isn’t pretty, but we do have a clearer picture to start making some observations. First, and this seems obvious, but pitchers rule the day. The Brewers are drafting more and more pitchers. What is also noticeable, though, is that the amount of infielders they are drafting is going down. The amount of infielders drafted was at an all-time high in 1977, when 39.11 percent of the players who were drafted were infielders, which was the only year where more infielders were drafted than pitchers. But since then, one can clearly see a downward trend in infielders being drafted. It’s unclear what is causing this trend, maybe it’s a change in organizational philosophy, but as an outside observer, I don’t have a great explanation for this internal trend. As for the catchers and outfielders, no distinctive trend seems to exist. For the most part, outfielders have hovered around the 20 percent mark and catchers have hovered around the 10 percent mark. Although, in 2011 there was a healthy upswing to 25.68 percent among catchers drafted by the Brewers.

This a clearer look at the Brewers trend in drafting more pitchers:

Finally, here is a look at the percentage of players drafted by their position, by the Brewers in 2015.

While predicting the draft is an impossible process, analyzing trends can give a sense of what a team prioritizes and it could also help explain why certain players were drafted by specific teams. In reality, it gives us an overview of the situation. For example, next year, I would expect that around 60% of the players drafted by the Brewers would be pitchers. While there may be some variance, the trend in pitching is clearly going up and I would be shocked if it drastically started to drop. Trends also help us look at the Brewers inclinations in drafting certain positions. And the overall picture predominantly illustrates that the Brewers, more often than not, draft shortstops and catchers over any other infield position. This was also evident in this year’s draft, where they invested heavily into catchers and shortstops.

Overall, the draft can seem to be a mess. Lots of variance exists and trying to accurately predict it is a fool’s errand. However, these trends hopefully provide us with some kind of baseline to help set expectations for the Brewers’ future draft strategy.