However, one can argue that the position of MLB ownership is certainly logical, and even to be expected, given their sole purpose: sell cable and media subscriptions, and keep as much of the money as possible. Riffing on the regrettable but astute statement by the Atlanta Braves ownership, MLB is now a fairly major media enterprise as opposed to just a baseball league. This has been the operating mode since a major cable bubble in the late 1980s, and especially since the 1994 strike and ensuing “Steroid Era” popularity surge and cable television price bubble.

Following this train of thought, it is worth arguing that the MLBPA response to the MLB position is even more noteworthy, and perhaps exceptionally more problematic than the ownership response. The MLBPA is acting as another impediment to fair wages and benefits for Minor League players. The players’ union spoke to the importance of labor laws, but issued a relatively weak statement on Minor League pay (really, they failed to issue much of a statement whatsoever):

“The Major League Baseball Players Association believes that all workers, including athletes who are directly employed by the Major and Minor League clubs, are entitled to the statutory protections afforded them by all of the employment laws of the United States and the various states and municipalities, including the protections for both minimum wages and overtime work.”

It is a non-event when ownership decides to keep revenue away from labor; the Players Association should be scrutinized, then, in this battle, since one can expect that their own motives for selling minor leaguers up the creek is to improve their own chances of (1) grabbing back revenue shares, and (2) ensuring that the largest possible share of that revenue reaches each member of its protected class. Here, the MLBPA finds themselves in the unenviable position of addressing the problem of underpaid MLB players (a legitimate problem) while effectively arguing against the labor rights of their potential future members, thereby remaining silent on the expansion of professional labor representation throughout the entirety of the MLB monopoly.

The position of the MLBPA is undoubtedly one that has formed out of six decades of polishing the professional status of MLB players. MLB players have not always been professionals in the sense of maintaining an unchallenged claim on a body of knowledge and using their unique body of knowledge to create social stratification or prestige for their body of members. As late as the 1950s, the Pacific Coast League was an open league that featured independent players that played an extremely high level of baseball without always reaching the MLB; this was an extension of some glory year stars from the 1930s and 1940s. The PCL is only one such example of an independent “minor” league that succeeded to produce stars. For reasons of institutional sexism and racism, respectively, the Negro National League, Negro American League, Mexican League, and All-American Girls Professional Baseball League, among others, also functioned as popular professional leagues apart from the MLB well into the 1950s. Former United Steelworkers negotiator and economic advisor Marvin Miller helmed the most successful iteration of an MLB players union, which won crucial working condition gains by organizing and drawing on the potential of a professional baseball class.

One could write volumes on the impact of professionalism in baseball, which (depending on who you ask) diminished some of the “character” of the game, created a schism between the press and the players, increased the sense of professionalism among other classes of people in the game (from managers to scouts to analysts to broadcasters, and others still), removed MLB players from any previous recognition of their relatively “blue collar” status, all of which occurred in perfect tandem with (or were bolstered by) the explosion in television and electronic media revenues throughout the last thirty years (at least). Ironically, the professionalization of ballplayers shifted the claims of empowerment from a class of ballplayers that legitimately needed improvements in stadium conditions, pay, retirement benefits, etc., to a class of owners that have increasingly used recent revenue gains to wrest a larger control of the game from the players themselves. Unionizing and creating a professional elite among MLB players alone insulated both the MLB and MLBPA from larger institutional concerns regarding professional baseball.

In retrospect, the MLB Players Association could have potentially landed a larger share of future revenue for their ranks had they extended their bargaining to include minor leaguers. This could have been especially helpful during an era of stagnating integration among Minor League clubs in the southern USA, where official segregation still was a reality in many baseball affiliates. Issues with working conditions extended into the Minor Leagues at the same time that MLB players were fighting for their own gains. While Miller and many of the player representatives were visionaries of professional ball, their vision did not extend to the largest possible labor class involving professional ballplayers.

However, one might be inclined to argue that some of the “old west attitude” of the Minor Leagues lingered well into the MLBPA’s organizing years. There were plenty of Minor League teams, but they were scattered into relatively small leagues. For example, in the MLBPA organizing year of 1966, there were at least 22 affiliated minor leagues including 156 teams (two AAA leagues, four AA leagues, eight A leagues, two short season A leagues, three rookie leagues, and three winter instructional leagues). By contrast, including the Dominican Summer League, there are 18 affiliated Minor Leagues with 233 teams operating in 2016. While MLB management of affiliated ball has consolidated Minor Leagues themselves, the number of teams has greatly expanded (incidentally, as MLB professionalism and revenue grew, as well). Of course, there were also 20 MLB teams in 1966, so the proliferation of leagues in that year arguably looks more extreme than in 2016 (incidentally, the rate of minor league affiliates per MLB club remains unchanged, however).

Granted, Miller had a difficult time winning over many players to the benefits of unionization, and the early MLBPA fights with ownership were tenacious at their easiest level. The MLBPA also clearly benefited by defining their membership in a specific, exclusive manner; if the players capped their membership in a particular manner, they would conceivably be able to distribute larger revenue shares among their membership, and also more effectively define an agenda and win clear concessions from ownership. It could be argued that adding minor leaguers to their ranks would potentially water down the bargaining aims of labor at the highest levels, while almost certainly decreasing the redistribution of revenue among a larger pool of players. (One can certainly imagine that many contemporary MLB players are not champing at the bit to add 7,200 “seasonal apprentices” to their elite professional ranks).

The undeniable outcome of the MLBPA’s historical development is clear stratification within one class of a profession. Minor leaguers are as much professional as MLBers; they enter the MLB structure through the same means (draft, international free agency channels, and undrafted free agency channels), they have their livelihood provided by the same infrastructure, and there is a clearly defined developmental pattern for each player. Yet, minor leaguers share little of the elite status with their MLB brethren, as they are often touted as “developing” or “projectable” potential as they hone their tools. Of course, this is a flaw in language and ideology that suggests that players cease developing at the MLB level, which is patently absurd (witness, on the Brewers alone, Carlos Gomez’s power and discipline explosion, Ryan Braun’s extreme plate approach shifts, Jimmy Nelson’s addition of a curveball and honing of a change up, etc.). By unionizing MLB players, the MLBPA created the structure for potential stratification (and therefore potential control over revenue and knowledge), and the concurrent development of television and other media forms delivered the revenue gains necessary to reify that structure.

Unfortunately, the MLBPA maintains considerable control over Minor League players. Terms of Minor League assignments are negotiated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement; contractual terms are negotiated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (including split contracts); termination pay is negotiated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement; and even living expense reimbursements are negotiated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (including Article VIII.C, which stipulates that players assigned to the MLB roster after September 1 cannot elect to be reimbursed for moving costs or living costs, which on the letter robs Minor League call-ups a chance to cover their previous expenses incurred en route to the MLB). There is no question, in this regard, that Minor Leagues are indeed professional leagues, for the reach of a Basic Agreement between the MLB and MLBPA into the minors validates the professional status of those leagues. There is no doubt that MLB players can use such negotiation terms to maintain their elite share of knowledge and revenue by excluding minor leaguers from these terms.

Through this lens, even elements of the Basic Agreement and league structure that ostensibly empower labor are elements that enhance and protect the elite status of MLB players against Minor League players. This double lens can be used to criticize the MLBPA, while also holding the centrality of these practices to their modern labor movement:

• The 40-man roster is ostensibly a tool that keeps MLB teams from hoarding Minor League players, thereby exposing unprotected players to the Rule 5 draft and potential movement into advanced roles. However, this tool is also the locale for collectively bargained changes in pay, benefits, and other protections that categorically exclude Minor League players. This is one basic tool for stratification.
• The Rule 5 draft is ostensibly a tool that forces MLB teams to quickly and swiftly assess and move Minor League players on a clear path to the MLB. However, the draconian requirements to keep Rule 5 draftees on the MLB roster for the entire season effectively deter teams from selecting many draftees, thereby creating a class of advanced minor leaguers that is clearly distinct from their protected MLB organizational depth counterparts.
• Salary arbitration is ostensibly a tool that allows an MLB player to dispute his team’s suggested salary, in order to seek a raise congruent with industry standards. This labor tool is held unavailable to Minor League players, which solidifies their legal inability to challenge their employer for better wages. (By contrast: Minor League players should be eligible for salary arbitration on an annual basis).
• Free agency is ostensibly a tool that allows MLB players to seek employment at the highest possible wage (or in their most desired role or locale). Through this double lens, Minor League service requirements of seven years prior to free agency obstruct the swift movement of prospects either to the MLB, or to suitors that would place them on a more desirable developmental path (By contrast: Minor League players should be eligible for free agency after three or four seasons, not seven).

This double lens exposes a clear categorization of professional baseball players that builds a well-defined elite class. A player can be a Minor League player, a 40-man roster member, a Rule 5 draftee, an Arbitration Eligible player, a Free Agent, etc. Each of these terms seeks to further distance the ranks of professional MLB service time from professional Minor League service (which is thereby unrecognizable within MLB and MLBPA bargaining arrangements).

One could conceivably use this double lens to address many other labor practices that are developed under the auspices of benefiting MLB players. Under this description, it should at least be more acceptable to shift the locale of the MLBPA from a previously righteous labor organization to an exclusive organization that has created an elite division and stratification of knowledge and resources between professional baseball players. That Minor League players are not assumed under the umbrella of protected interests within the MLBPA is a regrettable shortcoming of the contemporary game, and another burden in the fight for increased pay and benefits for Minor League players.

On the one hand, in their quest for increased pay and benefits, the Minor League players must fight the obvious interests of ownership to deter revenue from reaching labor. On the other hand, the Minor League players must fight for professional recognition against another class of workers within their own professional field. The MLBPA can rectify this situation; that they choose not to include Minor League players among their own protected ranks clearly outlines the extent to which labor and ownership collude to create a second class of players in the Minor Leagues. So too, the MLBPA might as well serve as an arm of Ownership for the purpose of subjecting Minor League players to substandard and potentially illegal labor conditions.

Resources:

Helyar, John. The Lords of the Realm. New York: Ballantine, 1995.

Macdonald, Keith. The Sociology of the Professions. London: Sage, 1993.

• It is worth noting that baseball may not fit “the professional project” in the manner defined by Macdonald (p. 1), but that MLBPA exhibits social class, bureaucratic, and asset formation practices that mirror the goals or outcomes of professional stratification (pp. 36-55).

MLB Advanced Media. 2012-2016 Basic Agreementm [MLB & MLBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement]. Accessed via PDF on July 17, 2016.

Mann, Samuel. “The Lawsuit Pitting 2,200 Minor Leaguers Against MLB.” BaseballProspectus, July 6, 2016.

Minor League Baseball. FAQs: The Business of Minor League Baseball. Minor League Baseball, 2016. Accessed July 18, 2016.

Morrell, Peter. “Some Notes on the Sociology of the Professions.” A Selection of Peter Morrell’s Work, June 2006.  Accessed July 18, 2016.

Morrison, Kate. “The 7,500 Apprentices.” BaseballProspectus, July 1 2016.

Morrison, Kate and Russell A. Carleton. “The Perils of MLB’s Sorting System.” BaseballProspectus, three parts, June 21-23, 2016.

Two congresspeople, Rep. Cheri Bustos (since rescinded) and Rep. Brett Guthrie, both of whom received donations from MLB’s Political Action Committee during the 2016 election cycle, recently introduced legislation H.R. 5580, dubbed the “Save America’s Pastime Act.” The bill officially exempts the MLB and Minor League Baseball from the requirements of the FLSA and denies their employees the rights afforded to them under the law.

Congressman Brett Guthrie and Congresswoman Cheri Bustos introduce the Save America's Pastime Act in House of Reps pic.twitter.com/AL8ohwqwuo

— Josh Norris (@jnorris427) June 29, 2016

Major League Baseball itself doubled down on the issue yesterday, releasing a statement yesterday referring to minor league baseball not as a career, but as a “short-term seasonal apprenticeship.” The MLB essentially claims that it subsidizes minor league baseball as some sort of charitable exercise so that folks living in smaller towns and rural America will still be able to have the privilege of seeing professional baseball being played.

MLB just released this statement on the Save America's Pastime Act. pic.twitter.com/pScjxtvCz8

— Big League Stew (@bigleaguestew) June 30, 2016

So, if playing minor league baseball is a “seasonal apprenticeship,”  how come players aren’t allowed to choose their employer and are instead subject to a draft? Why are they forced to sign seven-year minor league contracts that give them no control over their future? These “apprentices” don’t get to choose what city or even part of the country that they work in. Their apprenticeship could be transferred to another company and part of the country at any time without their prior knowledge or permission, should that player be traded. These apprentices aren’t paid during the offseason or spring training, yet are expected to keep in shape and made subject to random drug tests?

The suggestion by some that minor league teams have anything to do with how these players are paid is also laughable. Player salaries and bonuses are paid by the parent organizations and have nothing to do with the the minor league organizations that these players suit up for. Player development is one of the most essential aspects of an MLB organization; the MLB needs the minor leagues to train and develop future big leaguers. There is more of an emphasis on “young, controllable talent” today now more than ever.

The game is more flush with money now than it has ever been before, as well. The MLB’s revenue last season increased by $500 million, to a total approaching $9.5 billion. Even the Tampa Bay Rays, the league’s least valuable team according to Forbes, brought in a revenue of $193 million in 2015. The idea that increasing minor league pay would lead to financial hardship for MLB organizations or the folding of minor league organizations is simply ludicrous. The MLB statement approximates that there are about 7,500 players in minor league baseball, or roughly 250 per MLB franchise. If an organization were to pay those players an average salary of, say, $25,000 (which would be two to three times more than most minor league players make currently), it would cost about $6.25 million. For reference, that’s slightly less than what the Diamondbacks are paying Aaron Hill NOT to play for them this year. That’s a little over half of the $10.1 million of dead salary that the Braves absorbed in the form of Tommy John patient Bronson Arroyo last year so that they could also acquire Touki Toussaint from Arizona. Jose Reyes and Carl Crawford were both recently released by their employers despite being owed $20+ million in guaranteed money.

Oh, and by the way, the MLB just agreed to a $3.5 billion deal with Disney for a stake in their Video Arm technology. According to Jon Heyman, the payout will be about $120 million to each franchise, or enough for each team to pay out the above-suggested minor league salary for 19 years.

This issue is something that’s unique to the MLB, as well. While football doesn’t have a similar type of minor league system, both the National Hockey League and National Basketball Association utilize lower level leagues for player development. In the American Hockey League, players earning the minimum salary of $42,375 are still pulling in a median US income while the average salary in that league is closer to $90,000. Players in the NBA’s Developmental League earn between $13,000-25,000 and also have housing provided. The players’ unions in those leagues have gone to bat for their minor league brethren to ensure that they aren’t struggling to survive.

Meanwhile, MiLB players are on a scale that pays them between $1,150-$2,150 per month, and only during the regular season. That does not include spring training or any instructional league play. Even draft or international signing bonuses do not typically provide financial security, as $130 million of the MLB’s $311 million bonus pool is allotted to merely 50 draftees; even the bonus slot system only covers 10 rounds, meaning that the vast majority of draftees receive paltry bonuses. Players are required to find their own housing, and as Brewers’ farmhand Chris McFarland recently shed light on, this can lead to situations like his where five players are sharing a two-bedroom apartment in Biloxi. While players are afforded a $25 per diem for meals when on the road, they are required to otherwise provide their own sustenance.  Teams are increasingly willing to spend millions on bonus payments to drafted players or international signees, yet they aren’t willing to invest in making sure these players are able to provide adequate shelter and nutrition for themselves?

The most common argument I’ve seen is that “no one is forcing these players to play minor league ball.” But how does that justify the extent to which minor league players are being taken advantage of? Try applying that to a different market. Because a person could go work at Culver’s or Burger King, should McDonald’s be exempted from the federal wage and hour guidelines and be allowed to pay their employees less than minimum wage? I don’t buy that for a second.

In the past few days since H.R. 5580 was introduced, there has been a significant and negative response from those around the game and beyond. After receiving feedback from her constituents, Rep. Bustos has since withdrawn her support for “Save America’s Pastime,” though perhaps she should have educated herself better before introducing the bipartisan legislation in the first place. The MLB Player’s Association, one of the strongest unions in America, has also voiced their support on an issue they’ve been mostly silent on over the years.

Fr #MLBPA50 statement:
All workers, incl athletes, entitled to statutory protections for minimum wages & OT work. pic.twitter.com/0ektlYRHhl

— #MLBPA50 (@MLB_PLAYERS) July 1, 2016

Hopefully this will foreshadow more sweeping changes across the league, perhaps as a part of the upcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations. You and I as fans can do our part, as well. Get in touch with your representatives and tell them to oppose H.R. 5580. Don’t allow the government to legislate corporate greed under the guise of “Saving America’s Pastime,” which serves only to benefit billionaire MLB owners and millionaire minor league owners. Saving our national pastime shouldn’t mean lining owners’ pockets while the minor league players they benefit from are left wondering if they’ll be able to make their rent or where their next meal will come from. No one is calling for these players to get rich, but they deserve the opportunity to at least make a living wage while being employed by a $9 billion dollar industry that owns a monopoly over professional baseball in the United States.