In that last category stood Prince Fielder, who elicited tears of joy from a Brewers fanbase ready to watch Fielder and former teammate Ryan Braun get back to basics with that 1-2-punch celebration. Little did we know, we were watching the most valuable Brewers batter throw to another franchise great.

[/wipes back those tears]

It’s easy to enjoy Prince Fielder’s return to Milwaukee, first and foremost because the slugger was always a joy to watch and one of the club’s best prospects to translate on an MLB diamond. Make no mistake about it, Fielder was an elite slugger with exceptional plate discipline, traits that were often underplayed by fans due to his size and defensive performance. Given that Fielder retired due to an injury, and indeed survived an injury that could have taken a much larger toll on his body, there is a sense with the former slugger that it’s great to see him healthy, happy, and now having a chance to tour his home organization with a victory lap.

Yet, it was not always so rosy with Brewers fans and Prince Fielder. Because of the slugger’s defense, rated approximately 39 runs below average according to the Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) stat, and aforementioned size, there was frequent debate a decade ago among Brewers fans about when the Brewers should trade Fielder. Of course, there’s always this type of talk among fans, so some of it should be dismissed as common fan banter (we’re casually debating whether Jesus Aguilar or Domingo Santana should be traded on #BrewersTwitter this year, among other things, so, you know…); but recalling those halcyon days of the SportsBubbler (RIP!) and Journal-Sentinel Online boards, there seemed to be a different edge about Fielder trade talks. Thus, there was a sense, even during Fielder’s most elite seasons in Milwaukee, that many regular, diehard fans underappreciated the patient, disciplined hitter. It was as though, for some odd reason, Brewers fans needed to choose between Braun and Fielder, that the two couldn’t simply coexist as one of the most amazing 1-2 punches in franchise history; indeed, the most valuable 1-2 punch in franchise history.

For a time, it seemed justifiable to knock Fielder down a rung. For one, Fielder exercised his free agency rights by securing a gigantic contract with the Detroit Tigers, and thus had fewer years with the Brewers organization than some of the other franchise greats. Assessed by aggregating Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP), which assesses a player’s batting and fielding performance against the typical “next man up” from the minor leagues, Fielder is a Top 20 Brewers player, but more like Geoff Jenkins than Robin Yount. This summer, here’s what we (thought we) knew about Fielder’s career:

If we recognize that WARP penalizes Fielder (unjustifiably) for leaving Milwaukee and (justifiably) for his fielding, one can rank offensive performance on a season-by-season basis to find the best performers in franchise history.  I constructed a Milwaukee Brewers baby-database during the summer of 2018, so I have relatively recent True Average calculations during this DRC+ release week. True Average (TAv) was the old comprehensive offensive metric by Baseball Prospectus, where .260 represented an average performance and the higher the number, the better; it incorporated all sorts of elements of batting performance, but used different weights for situational hitting, parks, strike outs, and other elements than other linear weights methods. Offensively, Fielder stands out much more among the greatest Brewers of all times:

Even by TAV, Fielder’s greatness might be undermined by the general dominance of Ryan Braun and Paul Molitor in the Brewers Top 20 (four appearances each); Fielder (three appearances) is tied with Robin Yount, which is quite good; Cecil Cooper, Braun, Fielder, Molitor, and Yount comprise 16 of the Top 20 Brewers offensive seasons by TAV.

Deserved Runs Created Plus (DRC+) comes to the rescue and restores Prince Fielder to his rightful place atop Brewers offensive seasons. DRC+ is read on a scale where 100 is average, and the higher the number, the better; 80 means a batter is approximately 20 percent below average, 120 means a batter is approximately 20 percent better than average.

First, let’s take a step back: what is DRC+? DRC+ is the new Baseball Prospectus comprehensive batting metric, which is designed as a sort of “inverse” to Deserved Run Average (DRA), BP’s comprehensive pitching metric. Baseball Prospectus features numerous articles introducing the stat, including this description, and a few advanced discussions of why it should be used (this is good, too. Read everything by Jonathan Judge). The gist of DRC+ is this: once you focus on what is expected at the plate, instead of constructing a basic average of outcomes, you can model run production in a manner that is more accurate, descriptive, and predictive than other metrics. What is interesting is that the batting metrics correlate in many cases, which means that where there are outliers with DRC+, the focus on expected outcomes, different park factors, and other contextual elements could lead to valuable insights into a player’s batting performance.

So back to Fielder, DRC+ launches Fielder to the top of the Brewers franchise, and it’s a rout. By TAV, Fielder was competing with a handful of other batters; with DRC+, he’s competing with himself, clearly a step above all other comers as most valuable bat. What is especially interesting about this new offensive ranking is that the “shape” of the organization’s most elite seasons changes considerably; Fielder now has four Top 20 appearances, which is better than Braun (2), Molitor (2), Yount (2), and (now!) Gorman Thomas (2); Thomas, that Prodigal Wallbanger, did not appear in the Top 20 by TAV, whatsoever, so the DRC+ develop calibrates his career as well.

Why does DRC+ “love” Fielder so much? Let’s look under the hood at those absurd 2007, 2009, and 2011 campaigns. BP publishes DRC+ Run Values, which assess a player’s Runs Above Average (RAA) according to each major batting component that is an element of the DRC+ model. This is a supreme tool, and should be used alongside the basic surface DRC+ statistic!

So, the obvious, first: Prince Fielder hit some of the most majestic home runs I ever saw, and he also hit some of the hardest laser beams out of Miller Park. But I wish fans took the eye test away from the waistline a bit and watched his batting approach more carefully, for Fielder’s plate discipline was awe-inspiring. Fielder would never get cheated on his first two swings; good grief, it would be difficult to find someone who swung harder on strikes one and two. But don’t mistake those gigantic swings for a lack of discipline, for Fielder also dug in and made pitchers work, and had no trouble waiting for his pitch to drive. To my astonishment, not only does this show up in Fielder’s valuable walk totals (BB RAA), but I also hypothesize that this helps to drive his strong Ball-In-Play Outs (BIP Outs RAA) performance.

Let’s compare Fielder’s very best seasons to those of his contemporary, Braun:

Unlike Fielder, Braun derived more of his run production during his elite seasons from singles, doubles, and triples, rather than home runs and walks. This has a curious outcome on BIP Outs, but it stands to reason that by controlling the strike zone more, limiting balls in play, and maximizing slugging outcomes, Fielder would be able to produce value in that contrarian way (namely, avoiding the batted ball in play). This last line is speculation on my part, and not a reflection of the DRC+ stat, and certainly an avenue for further research (to my mind, the BIP Outs RAA stat is a fascinating aspect of this new stat).

Let’s step back from the numbers: why does any of this matter? If you’re unconvinced about the new stat, think about the eyeball test you used with Fielder during his prime years. How often did you call him a better hitter than Ryan Braun? How often did you compare him favorably to Paul Molitor? How often did you place his elite offensive production at the top of the franchise? DRC+ certainly provides the statistical background to address these questions, and in being openly situated to offensive production through a different lens than other prominent stats, we can revisit our blindspots and perhaps find value that we previously missed. It turns out that Brewers fans may have had Prince Fielder all wrong. Even if your measurement for a baseball stat is to confirm what you already know in most cases, or even if you previously believed that Prince Fielder was an elite batter, there’s room to marvel at just how great he was once more. Take the chance to dig into Fielder’s career again, and maybe revisit some other careers, as well: DRC+ gives us the chance to find some of our other blindspots.

Finding Fielder’s reappraisal is especially sweet because it places an exclamation point on one of the best competitive periods in Brewers franchise history. Fielder sure did the big things loudly, but he also did a lot of things to quietly bolster his production.

Photo Source.

The problem with this method is that one can choose any random year and make it say whatever. For example, looking at three-year “peaks” will be different from the data of four-year “peaks” or five-year “peaks” and so on. The problem in identifying which player had the greatest “peak” is identifying what “peak” means or, more helpfully, what it should be telling us.

We don’t often think of a player’s peak as being the greatest single season of all time. It’s a range of years, an average performance within set parameters. But taking a literal definition would suggest that “peak” is the highest or greatest point in a player’s career. Even if a player, let’s call him X, had a better three-year peak (by WARP measures) than player Y, it doesn’t actually mean that player X had a greater peak. If player Y, for example, had a better single-season WARP than any season compared to player X, then technically that player had a greater peak, according to the more literal definition. With that said, it would also mean that player Y didn’t have as long of a peak as player X.

The word peak isn’t typically thought of in terms of height and length, but maybe we should start doing that. Some players may have reached huge heights, even if it was for a brief amount of time, while some achieved a more sustained peak throughout their careers. Both are legitimate uses of the term.

When it comes to the Brewers, though, this type of discussion seems to be superfluous. Looking at the Brewers BWARPs and PWARPs, it’s pretty clear that Robin Yount had the greatest peak in Brewers history, no matter how one cares to define what they mean by peak. (Min 100 PA and min 50 IP, which is why you don’t see Molitor’s 1984 season.)

Even if one chooses to cherry pick the data, it would be very hard to make the case for anybody else.

Paul Molitor, another Brewers great, is a little more of a question mark. Molitor didn’t enjoy the same kind of career that Yount did, at least with the Brewers. He finished with a higher total WARP than Yount, but if one compares the years in which they both played for the Brewers, Yount clearly had the better career with the Brew Crew.

That said, a number of the Brewers’ players reached loftier heights. Molitor’s best season with Milwaukee came in 1989, when he amassed a 7.37 BWARP. That mark, however, was surpassed by Ted Higuera’s 1988 season, Ben Oglivie’s 1980 season, George Scott’s 1973 season, and most recently, Jonathan Lucroy’s 2014 season. Fun fact: Lucroy’s 2014 season was the second best in Brewers history, meaning that only Robin Yount performed better in a single season than Lucroy while in a Brewers uniform.

On the other hand, very few Brewers had more success over a longer period of time than Molitor. From 1985 to 1992, Molitor compiled an average BWARP of 5.09 and never had a season where his BWARP went below three, which for a seven-year stretch is amazing. Unfortunately, during the time Molitor played, we didn’t have the same type of statistical information we have today. With that said, one can look at Molitor’s BB% and K%. They show that Molitor possessed a great eye at the plate. In a number of seasons, Molitor had more walks than strikeouts, which would be a rare feat in today’s game. He coupled that with above-average power, making him arguably the second-best player in Brewers history.

As for Robin Yount, there’s probably little argument to be made about his greatness or even where he ranks in Brewers history. That is to say, it would be hard to argue that he isn’t the greatest player to ever put on a Brewers uniform. His peak can also be discussed outside the realm of the Brewers universe, though.

After making his major-league debut at the tender age of 18, Yount kept improving until he reached his peak in 1982, producing one of the all-time great seasons with a 9.96 BWARP. Yount was an above-average defensive shortstop at the time, but what separated that season from the rest was his ability to hit for power. In 1982, Yount hit 29 bombs and finished with a .247 ISO, which was the best mark of his career. Oh, and I almost forgot, that season Yount was not only a good defensive shortstop who hit for a lot of power, but he also rarely struck out with an 8.9 percent strikeout rate — a combination that would have any talent evaluator from any era salivating.

The discussion on what peak means, however, can be had with the Albert Pujols and Barry Bonds cases. While Bonds was a greater player for a longer period of time, he never reached the same heights that Pujols did. Since 1971, Pujols’ 2009 season stands alone. While there’s no argument to be made as to who was the better player, if we ignore PEDs, there’s still a viable discussion as to who had the better so-called peak.

If you are completely turned off by the PEDs, then one can talk about Mike Trout and Bryce Harper. Harper didn’t belong in the same conversation as Trout before last season. Yet, in 2015 Harper produced one of the greatest seasons of all time, even better than Trout’s 2015 season, which BWARP ranks as the best of his career. Conversely, it’s entirely possible, even likely, that Harper will never reach these levels again. Maybe going forward Harper will simply be a six-win player, which is nothing shameful, obviously, that’s a perennial all-star. And let’s say that Trout continues his historic excellence for a few more years. Then Trout’s peak will have been longer than Harper’s peak, but will never have reached Harper’s height.

It’s probably better to talk about peaks in terms of lengths and heights. I think these definitions serve as a better representation of the statements one is trying to communicate, most of the time. Simply suggesting a player had a better peak because he had the better three-year span, alone, is problematic. Therefore, in order to be less arbitrary, it would be better to have a more consistent description of the said peak — such as describing its height and length. This still can leave some arbitrary factor. Maybe, it would be best to simply go with the literal definition, but it’s often less fun and enriching to have those sorts of discussions.

Today, we’ll look at the 1984 and 1985 seasons — the initial low point after the 1982 World Series — and then we’ll jump ahead to 1993, which looked to be a transition year to a younger team.

1984

Team W-L: 67-94

Pythagorean W-L%: .438

After two-straight playoff appearances in 1981 and 1982 — which remains the only time the franchise has achieved such a feat — Milwaukee’s 1983 season started strong, but ended on a sour note. They still had the American League Eastern Division lead on August 25th. Then, they inexplicably lost 18 of their next 24 games and dropped out of the playoff picture, costing Manager Harvey Kuenn his job. Not unlike the 2014 club, to be fair.

With that bleak backdrop, the 1984 team lost its first five games and never could put it into gear. The squad brought back much of the same lineup as 1983, but they were getting old, regularly starting five position players on the wrong side of 30, and were no longer effective. Cecil Cooper was 34 and posted his lowest OBP (.307) and ISO (.111) since arriving in Milwaukee. Jim Gantner saw most of his power disappear. He managed to get three more hits in 1984 (173) than the previous year, yet his extra-base totals declined from 42 to 31. Depending on how seriously you want to take defensive metrics from the 1980s, he also posted the worst FRAA of his career at -15.5. Ben Oglivie’s TAv also declined from .302 to .266. I could go on from here, but there’s really no need. The offense lead the American League in runs in 1982, was sixth of 14 teams in 1983, and finished rock bottom in 1984. They were last in home runs, 11th in stolen bases, and 12th in walks. This offense was dreadful in contrast to the teams known as Harvey’s Wallbangers. To top off this sob story, Paul Molitor battled injuries and only saw action in 13 games.

LESSON: Management can’t get complacent with the players they have and not look for upgrades. In this case, the team aged fast, lost its power, and had nothing to fall back on. We’ve seen this recently occur with the Philadelphia Phillies and earlier with the Houston Astros, where the clubs clung onto players from their glory years instead of trying to reload. Milwaukee management seemed to think replacing Kuenn would vault the team back towards the playoffs. The related lesson is to be wary of relying on aging players. The only under-30 position players worth anything on the Brewers in 1984 were Robin Yount, Paul Molitor, and Rick Manning. Even if Molitor had stayed healthy, he couldn’t have propped up that lineup. Dion James emerged and got regular playing time after April, but it was not enough for this team.

1985

Team W-L: 71-90

Pythagorean W-L%: .432

The 1985 season was another dreadful offensive year for the Brewers. The team finished 12th in the American League in runs scored, dead last in home runs, and dead last in walks. The aforementioned Dion James got hurt and barely played. The lineup didn’t get appreciably younger, though it should be mentioned that Ernie Riles stepped in to play shortstop as Robin Yount made his shift to the outfield. The team shuffled a lot of players in and out, the majority of whom were below average. Only five batters ultimately qualified for the batting title: Cooper, Molitor, Ted Simmons, Gantner, and Yount. They combined for an unimpressive 12.7 WARP.

Looking at the pitching staff, things weren’t much better. The staff finished 12th in the American League in runs allowed — which is at least symmetrical — aided by allowing the most home runs in the league. Pete Vuckovich returned from injury as nothing more than a shell of his former self, producing -0.3 WARP and a 5.51 DRA. Newly signed free agent Danny Darwin lead the staff with 217.2 innings pitched, making 29 starts and 10(!) relief appearances. He had a 4.42 DRA and saw his home run rate nearly double, going from 0.8 the year before in Texas to 1.4 in Milwaukee. The most notable pitching performance was the debut of Teddy Higuera. He finished second in Rookie of the Year voting, establishing himself as the best pitcher on the staff and posting a rotation-best 3.67 DRA.

LESSONS: Well, if you’re going to be bad, then at least Milwaukee made some shrewd moves to help the team progress towards its next contention cycle. Darwin was a fine signing to stabilize the rotation and soak up innings. Moving Yount off shortstop was a painful necessity, but by acknowledging the reality of his injuries, the team preserved his bat and found a viable fill-in for at least one year. Higuera got the call in late April, and the team stuck with him through his first two bad starts, instead of panicking and sending him back to the minors after allowing nine runs in 13.1 innings.

1993

Team W-L: 69-93

Pythagorean W-L%: .465

The 1993 campaign was an odd season for Milwaukee. Their record dropped 23 games from 1992, and they underplayed their Pythagorean projection by a half-dozen games. The biggest culprit for the struggles was the pitching staff. After allowing 604 runs in 1992, fewest in the American League, they allowed 792 in 1993, dropping to 10th in the league. Of course, Chris Bosio didn’t return from the end-of-the-season rotation, and though it would be reasonable to expect the team to have some difficulty replacing his 231.3 innings and 3.91 DRA, it shouldn’t be a disaster. But that’s what happened. Cal Eldred had a promising 14-start half-season the previous year, where he had a 2.94 DRA. In 1993, though, he made 36 starts and pitching 258 innings with an unsightly 4.00 DRA, as his HR/9 increased from 0.4 to 1.1 and his BB/9 rose to 4.2 from 3.2. Bill Wegman hurt his shoulder and hit the DL, but not before seeing his DRA rise from 3.99 to 5.23. Jaimie Navarro also backslid. His BABIP rose from .256 to .317, along with a DRA at 5.03. Ricky Bones was the only start to see a bump in his performance, and even then, his DRA was barely below 5.00 at 4.94, and he struck out two fewer batters in 40.3 more innings.

The Brewers scored 733 runs in 1993, only seven fewer than the previous season, but in a higher run-scoring environment, they dropped from fifth to ninth in the American League. The team transitioned to a younger core, with Yount the only starter over 30 in the lineup. Dave Nilsson, John Jaha, and Bill Spiers transitioned into starting roles, as the team didn’t resign Scott Fletcher, Paul Molitor, and Franklin Stubbs and traded Dante Bichette.

LESSONS: Young pitchers are volatile. Shocking, I know. But as the developmental process has come under more fan scrutiny over the past few years, I think most people have realized that young pitching is fragile and rarely develops evenly. There was nothing wrong with Milwaukee’s plan regarding its pitching staff in 1993. Young starters can fail. In that same vein, moving towards a younger lineup and looking to lay the foundation for another run at contention was also a smart plan. The 1993 season should remind fans and management of the need for patience with younger players.