Last year, the PTBNL bug also bit Brewers fans in the Jonathan Lucroy – Jeremy Jeffress deal, as fans allowed their imagination to run wild with apparently leaked scouting assignments of Texas Rangers prospects and dreams of landing another top prospect (the club landed useful outfield / utility depth in Ryan Cordell, who was shipped to the White Sox to acquire Anthony Swarzak). Obviously this time around Brewers fans are not dreaming of the top ten prospect that might head to the Mets, as almost everyone expects GM David Stearns to have landed the veteran Walker for next to nothing. This is a faulty expectation.

What complicates the deal is the fact that the Mets are sending an undisclosed amount of cash to the Brewers, which could sweeten the prospect return from Milwaukee. This is a logical assumption, as MLB teams frequently demonstrate that cash and prospects are transferable, and one can deduce that there is an exchange rate for prospects and cash within each front office. However, the haziness does not end here for two reasons: (1) Walker demonstrates wild discrepancies between past and present value, and (2) there is a perception that the trade market for position players is currently depressed.

First, consider point (1) with the assumption that the Mets covered approximately half of Walker’s contract in the trade. In the abstract, assessing Walker by considering WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player), cash, and Prospect Overall Future Potential (OFP) as interchangeable by monetizing each value yields several potential categories of value:

Already one should see that there is plenty of wiggle room for assessing Stearns in this trade. While fans know a name like Mauricio Dubon and would feel upset to see the young infielder leave the Brewers system, such a trade would match the high end of Walker’s value (plus cash). A more interesting idea is seeing an injured prospect head out of Milwaukee’s system, which could perhaps explain the time lag necessary to call the return a “Player To Be Named Later,” as scouting the progress of an injury return prospect could make all the difference in determining the deal. A hurler such as Nathan Kirby could fulfill the top end of this deal, and would be an interesting case of transferring extreme injury risk out of the system in a gamble for immediate wins. Should Milwaukee reach the League Divisional Series in the playoffs, this deal would be immediately paid off. Obviously, fans dream of sending nobody important to New York, but that’s not how trades work.

To this last point, (2) is worth further investigating. While front offices do not use WARP to calculate trades, I use a WARP / OFP / cash model to easily allow various areas of the game to speak to one another in order to determine value for an organization. This can also be a useful scale to view trades en masse; for example, let’s look at a few key trades from the 2017 deadline and August waiver trade period. In this table, I also added a Playoff Assessment to the trade, where potential advances in playoff revenue are considered as trade motivation as well (see additional table below, and linked article).

Once one gets past the initial fact that the biggest trade returns indeed occurred when pitchers were grouped with position players, there are some solid deals in this group of position player transactions. While fans might find easy excuses to write off a prospect like Boog Powell, given Yonder Alonso’s track record that’s quite a solid return for a rental. Sean Rodriguez and Jonathan Lucroy deals represent the Hail Mary attempts by the Pirates and Rockies, respectively, and neither team will be expected to face playoff pressure for either deal (rather, both deals are clearly supplemental). The Tim Beckham and Jay Bruce deals might be the most interesting, as the Rays and Mets respectively gambled on extremely inexperienced arms with unknown potential. Yet, draft day assessments and initial prospect reports could allow both those prospect packages to be viewed as intriguing projection gambles, and the Bruce deal especially could look like a brilliant move by the Mets in five years.

This prospect return landscape does not provide much help to determining the gray areas of which type of prospect might leave the Brewers system. The Bruce deal hints that someone like Carlos Herrera or Trey Supak could be the one to leave; the Alonso deal could support sending anyone from Dubon to an Advanced Minors outfield depth option. Walker’s value is most comparable to both Bruce and Alonso, and both of those deals showcase scenarios in which the trading club received solid or intriguing prospect returms. What this chart should hopefully show is that position players have not necessarily been undervalued; rather, the position players reflected here represent relatively spotty production records, which impacts that type of prospect one should expect to be involved in those deals. But, even with that caveat in mind, the prospects involved in these deals were solidly priced overall.

With this in mind, Brewers fans should be ready for Stearns to continue to deal from prospect depth, as this is the true benefit of having this type of system in Milwaukee. There will be prospects who, as much as we love to follow them as fans, will be used to attempt to maximize immediate MLB wins for the franchise. Should a prospect that seems rich for your blood end up in the Neil Walker deal, remember that not only does this price probably suit the current trade environment, but it also helps attain the goal of winning MLB games. Even better, the Brewers are winning MLB games and expending prospect resources sooner than expected, which are both facts that should be celebrated.

Appendix: Playoff and Prospect Conversion Chart:

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

Incoming GM David Stearns was aggressive with the utilityman entering his 25-year-old season, which seemed justifiable given that the book on Perez seemed to be published in stone: solid defensive glove with great flexibility to move around the diamond, and solid batting average skills rendered empty by a lack of power and discipline. After removing Perez from the 40-Man Roster, Stearns convinced Perez to stick around on a minor league deal, and the utilityman clawed his way back to MLB by the end of April, and a power surge and series of injuries helped Perez find his way to the starting line up on a regular basis. The plate discipline improved somewhat, power jumped off the charts almost seemingly out of nowhere, and Perez’s strong baserunning (10/13 stolen bases by the All Star Break) made him the perfect fit for a rebuilding club slowly finding its identity around speed and aggression.

The opportunity paid off: Perez became one of eleven expansion era players to work at least two games at 1B, 2B, 3B, SS, LF, CF, and RF in 300+ PA with 90 OPS+ or better. Just looking at that .272 / .302 / .428 batting line alone leaves something to desire, but it certainly doesn’t tell the full story; Perez packed a .273 Total Average (TAv) at seven different positions, and a 3.8 FRAA made that flexible glove quite valuable to Milwaukee. Historically, though, Baseball Reference Play Index shows that Perez has quite interesting company:

As an aside, even if 300+ PA, 90+ OPS+ seems like a strict guideline for judging players with at least two games at 1B-2B-3B-SS-LF-CF-RF, Baseball Reference Play Index shows that only 20 seasons have occurred where players worked 300 PA at such positions with any level of OPS+, and 33 such seasons have occurred where players have worked any number of PA and any level of OPS+ while playing at least two 1B-2B-3B-SS-LF-CF-RF games (if you’re wondering, only Shane Halter has played two games at C-1B-2B-3B-SS-LF-CF-RF, for the 2000 Tigers [0.5 WARP before becoming a 5.1 WARP primary 3B-SS in 2001-2002], which is why I excluded C from the search).

Any way you slice it, Perez is part of an elite segment of a rare group of baseball players. Not even Ben Zobrist has reached this level of positional flexibility and production! Moreover, Perez stands out in the group for his Power/Speed Number and Stolen Base prowess, both of which are comfortably the best among this group of players.

Looking at these careers, what one might expect from Perez?

• Jose Oquendo was famously flexible in his early seasons, before a .281 TAv and -1.1 FRAA drove St. Louis to play the utilityman much more exclusively at second base. Oquendo almost immediately dropped off entirely at that point, and he became a bench middle infielder by age 28. It is debatable whether great production forced Oquendo into one position that derailed his intriguing value as a superutilityman.

• Sean Rodriguez is now famous for signing a two-year, $11M deal entering 2017, thanks in large part due to a surging 2.3 WARP season as a SS-2B-RF (in terms of most games started) and fellow 1B-2B-3B-SS-LF-CF-RF club member with Pittsburgh. Prior to that, Rodriguez shifted around as an infield utility and corner utility player (2011-2015), during which time he posted a total of 2.5 WARP. Rodriguez is wildly interesting because (a) an MLB club appears to be cashing in on superflexibility with a strong cash offering, but also (b) Rodriguez struggled during 2011-2015 despite serving as a wildly flexible player, which seems to throw the Oquendo thesis (that Oquendo declined in performance in part because he was tied to fewer positions) into doubt.

• Brock Holt joins Oquendo as the most interesting comparison for Perez, if only because he maintained solid production for two consecutive years at slightly older ages (26-27) than Perez (Oquendo accomplished his productive seasons at 23-24 as a superutility player). A mild concussion derailed Holt’s 2016 season for a month, and after July Holt lost regular starting status to boot (he closed July with a swift 26 plate appearance swoon).

• Jose Hernandez, Scott Brosius, and Joe McEwing are intriguing because they each served as superutility players during their peak prime age-28 seasons. Both Brosius and Hernandez would have a couple of solid seasons after their superutility years, and like Oquendo a successful campaign occurred alongside positional security (Brosius as a 3B, Hernandez as a SS with the 2002 Brewers). The success was fleeting for both Brosius and Hernandez, whereas McEwing would continue as a Mets utilityman without offensive success after his age-28 campaign. Let’s take a moment to appreciate Brosius as a 9.5 WARP player between 1996-1998, even including the 1997 hiccup that caused Oakland to send Brosius as the Player-To-Be-Named-Later in the deal for Kenny Rogers (!!!). By Baseball Reference WAR, Brosius is the third most valuable player on the absolutely stacked 1998 Yankees, which should be a Hall of Fame worthy feat in its own right.

• Cory Snyder was yet another superuility player whose success lead to a solid position (107 starts in right field for the 1993 Dodgers!). A -7.6 FRAA was not what was necessary to dress up a .258 TAv, and Snyder’s career was over shortly after his claim to superutility fame occurred.

• Along with Oquendo, Luis Salazar was the earliest superutility player on this list (1987-1988 for Oquendo, 1988 for Salazar), but both made their respective achievements at opposite ends of their careers. Salazar proved that one could carry useful positional flexibility relatively deep into their 30s, although 4.2 WARP between age-32 and age-36 means that the veteran was no Brosius (but then again, who is?). Denny Hocking dropped off entirely after his 90+ OPS+ / 300+ PA superutility year in 2000, as did Jolbert Cabrera. Hocking ultimately posted -0.4 WARP for the turn-of-the-century Twins, Rockies, and Royals, and Cabrera couldn’t catch on with the Mariners or Reds (although one wonders had fielding metrics been more advanced at that time whether Cabrera would have received another chance in Seattle after his excellent FRAA effort).

Ultimately these comparisons are not necessarily helpful, since (a) Perez is the youngest player apart from Oquendo to accomplish this superutility feat, (b) the MLB attitude toward positional flexibility is changing, and (c) the Brewers are fielding a young rebuilding club with several platoon opportunities and many players that have a couple of strengths waiting to see whether the weaknesses catch up. The long and short is, even if the sense is “Hernan Perez is a bench player,” Perez could be the type of bench player that can hold his own during a relatively extended stretch as a replacement starter, and could create many opportunities to start because of his flexibility. By working as a superutility player, Perez could be a bench player that challenges the team for 300-400 PA in a season: quite a valuable role to fill the slog of 162 games (resting Ryan Braun, Keon Broxton, Domingo Santana, Jonathan Villar, and Orlando Arcia, platooning with Scooter Gennett or Travis Shaw or Eric Thames, and covering for injuries yields many PA opportunities).

A more interesting question is whether Perez is the Oquendo varietal or the Brosius varietal, or something else entirely: if Perez succeeds with the bat once again, and forces his way into one starting position, will he be able to carry that position for an extended period of time (i.e., beyond one season)? Moreover, since Perez is among the youngest in this superutility group, his career also arguable has more potential routes to travel. Most interestingly, as Milwaukee gears up for a development-oriented season in 2017 and begins to field more competitive clubs thereafter, Perez also has a chance to become the first player in the expansion era to reach three consecutive 300+ PA, 90+ OPS+ seasons while serving as a superutility player; he is fighting Brock Holt and Sean Rodriguez for that title.

The most interesting idea is Perez forming a new brand of player all together: he’s not a Ben Zobrist, a consistently better-than-average bat that can also play several positions. Rather, one wonders if this new era of fielding analytical tools will allow Perez’s superutility ability to carry his MLB roster position and overshadow other shortcomings (such as lack of scouted power, or unsavory plate discipline).