Baseball Prospectus published its trademark Transaction Analysis on the main site, featuring our own Ryan Romano and others. Be sure to read the entire TA to get analysis from multiple angles. In my opinion, those types of articles are worth the monthly subscription price on their own, so it’s quality stuff.

I have my own thoughts on the trade, though, and I want to utilize this space to pull apart multiple aspects of this trade from the Milwaukee Brewers’ perspective. This isn’t a simplistic trade. It’s quite clear that general manager David Stearns and his staff agreed to this move for a few reasons: (1) they believe Chase Anderson has some sneaky value over the next few years; (2) they adored 19-year-old Isan Diaz and were willing to pay $5.5 million of Aaron Hill’s salary to acquire the young middle infielder; and (3) hope.

RHP CHASE ANDERSON

Anderson posted a pedestrian 4.30 ERA for the Arizona Diamondbacks last year with a 4.16 FIP and was a 1.4-win player. That’s a decent back-end starter, all things considered, but it’s unclear that the Brewers should really be trading someone like Segura for a 28-year-old fifth starter. Even though the club has to like that Anderson has five years of team control remaining, two of which are at the league minimum, the move has to be something more than that. The Brewers must believe the right-hander brings something legitimate to the table — either so they can profit via the trade market or so Anderson can provide value in the win-loss column going forward.

The former Oklahoma Sooner enjoyed a solid first half in 2015. He compiled a 3.91 ERA before the All-Star Break, but that’s only part of the story. Anderson landed on the DL with triceps inflammation and missed the better part of a month. In the five starts prior to his stint on the disabled list, he gave up a total of 27 runs in 25.2 innings (9.12 ERA). It’s dangerous to dismiss a handful of starts as non-representative, I know, but it is notable that Anderson’s 2015 ERA was 3.26 without the five starts running up to his time on the DL.

It should also be noted that Chase Anderson saw his velocity jump after he returned from his arm injury. And not by a small amount, either. The right-hander started to throw harder than he has in the past two years:

It’s no surprise that Anderson saw his strikeout rate jump from 15.4 percent during his pre-DL starts to 21.1 percent afterward. Of course, he did also struggle in September, posting a 4.91 ERA in four starts; however, that was mostly soured by a single bad outing on September 8. His final two starts saw him surrender only two earned runs in 10.1 innings while striking out 14.

All of this isn’t to suggest that Chase Anderson is about to breakout with the Brewers. Changeup specialists with mediocre fastballs aren’t world-beaters. We know this too well in Milwaukee. What all of this does suggest, though, is that Anderson is interesting and there are reasons to believe his 4.30 ERA from 2015 isn’t completely representative of his talent. If he can carry over his velocity gains to 2016, perhaps we’re looking at a different pitcher. If much of his season was masked by triceps inflammation that torpedoed the middle part of his campaign, we should see better overall results in the future.

And those question marks are what Milwaukee is searching for during their rebuild. The club is desperately searching for cheap/inexpensive options who have opportunities for improvement. Anderson will make the league minimum for the next two years and will not be eligible for free agency until the 2022 season. If he cobbles together a useful — it doesn’t have to be great — 2016 season, one can easily imagine him fetching an interesting prospect or two on the trade market. Or maybe he’s a competent back-end starter for the Brewers as they start to creep toward contention in 2018, as he’ll only be 30 years old.

We’re asking questions and we’re seeing signs hinting that Anderson could be something more than his overall stat line suggests. And, yes, we’re being optimists and ignoring the potential downside. During a rebuild, though, I’m not convinced that downside represents any risk whatsoever, so I’m not sure that matters too much.

SS/2B ISAN DIAZ

Most baseball fans hadn’t heard of 19-year-old Isan Diaz before the Brewers traded for him on Saturday. The Diamondbacks drafted him in the second round of the 2014 draft — and many scouts raved about his upside — but he only hit .187/.289/.330 in his professional debut. People quickly forget about guys who can’t eclipse the Mendoza Line in the AZL.

All of that changed in 2015. The 5-foot-10 infielder demolished the Pioneer League, posting a herculean .360/.436/.640 slash line with 13 homers and 12 stolen bases in just 312 plate appearances. He won the Pioneer League MVP, and many scouts returned to their pre-draft notes and started salivating over what he could become in the future. In fact, FOX Sports’ Ken Rosenthal reported this week that the Atlanta Braves also coveted Diaz and were actively working on a deal to acquire the youngster. Fortunately for the Brewers, though, the Diamondbacks needed help at shortstop and valued Jean Segura over anything the Braves could offer (likely Erick Aybar).

I reached out to a few non-Brewers industry contacts, and the response was almost universally positive. One person opined that we’ll look back at this deal in a few years and think that Milwaukee “fleeced” Arizona. The same individual said that his organization loves Diaz and that he personally believes the young man to have “elite ceiling,” even if he makes the assumed defensive move to second base. Another scout dropped the seemingly omnipresent comp to a young Robinson Cano and raved about Diaz’s “fantastic bat speed.” A third person in the industry suggested that Diaz is one of the unheralded gems in the game and praised Stearns and his staff for acquiring him.

Of course, it wasn’t all positive. Another individual said that he likes the bat speed, but wants to see it at the full-season level before he forgets about the struggles he witnessed in the Arizona League. That same person says his lack of foot speed will make him a liability defensively and that his bat will have to carry a lot of the value. At 19 years old, the ceiling is tantalizing, but it’s disingenuous to ignore the holes in his long-term profile just because he lit up a offensive-friendly league, like the Pioneer League.

It’s clear the Milwaukee Brewers fall on the optimistic side of the spectrum, though, and built this entire deal around acquiring him.

2B AARON HILL

This is the “hope” I mentioned above. The Milwaukee Brewers took on $5.5 million of Hill’s contract in order to get Isan Diaz in this trade, as the Diamondbacks are still desperate to clear payroll space for some unknown reason. But it’s not difficult to understand why the D-Backs don’t have room for Hill on the roster. He’s about to turn 34 years old and hasn’t been productive for over two years. In fact, he hasn’t even been worth +1.0 WARP in the past two seasons combined.

And there’s not much to statistically suggest that Hill will turn it around, either. His power numbers have fallen. His BABIP has plummeted as his batted-ball velocity has gotten weaker. Hell, even Madison Bumgarner hit the baseball as hard, on average, than Hill in 2015 (88.86 mph). He’s responded by trying to become more selective at the plate, but that success has been uneven.

The Brewers acquired Hill so they could get Diaz. They also are hoping that he can dip his bat into the fountain of youth, so they can recoup some value on him in the summer. But that’s all it is. Hope. There isn’t much to indicate that Hill is a useful major-league player at this point in his career. But the Milwaukee Brewers are in a perfect situation to play him without too many repercussions. If he can turn back the clock, the move seems utterly brilliant. If not, the Brewers have other options at third base and second base, and the trade wasn’t even about him in the first place.

The 29-year-old slugger hit .199/.307/.427 with 24 homers for the Houston Astros in 2015. He’ll add significant power to the middle of the Brewers’ batting order, but obviously not without his warts. Carter struck out in 32.8 percent of his plate appearances a year ago and failed to eclipse the Mendoza Line. Although his power production and walk rate kept him from dipping below the replacement-level mark, he was still, broadly speaking, a replacement-level-type player at a premium offensive position. Of course, it’s not that his extreme offensive profile can’t provide value. He’s only a year removed from hitting 37 homers and posting a +2.6 WARP, so we can assert that Carter comes with some pedigree.

The Stearns-Astros connection should be acknowledged, too, which is why Carter may have chosen the Milwaukee Brewers over another big-league club and why Stearns felt more comfortable with Carter than other free-agent first basemen.

The former 15th-round draft pick of the White Sox offers two other benefits over someone like Pedro Alvarez. First of all, Carter has two arbitration years remaining, which means the Brewers own his rights for the next three seasons, despite ostensibly signing him to a one-year deal. This means that Carter could serve as a low-cost, multi-year solution for Milwaukee; however, it also means any potential summer trade partner won’t necessarily be shopping for a rental, which should hypothetically increase his trade value. The multiple control years — assuming he plays well enough to warrant exercising them — are a significant benefit compared to many of the available first-base options on the market.

Secondly, Carter should cost significantly less than Alvarez, freeing up funds to allocate elsewhere. Although it appears that the Brewers are effectively done shopping in free agency, the organization can (and should) spend extra money on their farm system. That could mean overspending in the international market, using the banked money to buy high-end talent and pay overage penalties. That could mean overspending in the 2016 MLB Draft, being one of the first franchises to blow their bonus budget out of the water in this format and pay a similar overage penalty. That could even mean hiring more minor-league coaches or siphoning more resources of any kind to the farm system. No matter what, saving money at the Major League level can benefit the rebuilding process, as long as that money is actively spent elsewhere and not just pocketed. Signing Chris Carter and not Pedro Alvarez affords the Brewers an opportunity to do this.

Overall, though, Chris Carter continues a marked shift in strategy for the Milwaukee Brewers under David Stearns. Aside from positional versatility, which he has in a limited way, Carter shares one trait with almost all of the players the club has acquired this offseason: a massive walk rate. Carter’s 12.4 percent walk rate in 2015 was almost double the Brewers’ team walk rate (6.8 percent). In fact, of every player acquired this winter, only Will Middlebrooks had a walk rate below the Brewers’ team walk rate from 2015.

The above numbers were taken from the level at which these players spent the majority of their time in 2015, but the overall trend is crystal clear. The Milwaukee Brewers are loading up on players who walk at an above-average clip. This can only mean Stearns and his staff desperately want to see the Brewers increase their overall on-base percentage next year. It was one of the club’s biggest weaknesses in 2015 — a weakness that former GM Doug Melvin readily acknowledged before the year even began — and it should improve with the players being added this offseason.

In terms of on-the-field production, that’s what Chris Carter represents to the Milwaukee Brewers: more walks and more power. But we can’t be naive and pretend that Stearns signed Carter with an eye toward the 2016 season. He acquired Carter because, with a hot three months, the first baseman could fetch a solid return on the trade market. And that’s how the organization should be utilizing free agency, as a place to buy potential trade chips on team-friendly deals. That has the added benefit of improving the on-field product in the process, though, so it can be perceived as a positive scenario for the fans.

Don’t construe any of this to be suggesting that Carter is a slam-dunk signing or a no-risk signing. He’s severely limited in his offensive abilities, due to massive holes in his swing that have regularly been exploited at the Major League level. Instead, I’m stressing the positive strategy behind the Carter deal, the strategy that potentially addresses key needs for the club. And why not focus on the pay-off, regardless of the likelihood of it? The downside is a couple more losses during a rebuilding year and $2.5 million of ownership’s money down the drain. That’s nothing to worry about.

*****

The mark of a successful general manager is often executing the necessary moves with aplomb. Trade near free agents for prospects. Sign bounce-back candidates on minor-league deals. Throw money at the occasional top-end free agent when amidst one’s competitive window. Cobble together a package of prospects to acquire an impact rental at the July trade deadline. If a Major League GM hits paydirt on enough of these types of moves, he or she will almost assuredly boast a respectable career. If he or she can string a few together in succession, the big-league club may claim a pennant or two.

I wrote in October that David Stearns needs to be special to build a consistent winner in Milwaukee. More loosely, he needs to be the Next Big Thing in baseball. I wrote:

The challenge for Stearns and Arnold, though, isn’t going to be whether the club can emulate successful rebuilds like the one in Houston or the one in Chicago. The real difference maker in Milwaukee will be discovering the next competitive advantage that no one has exploited, the next market inefficiency, if you will. Simply using mountains data on framing, spin rates, defensive efficiency, and the like to drive coaching methods and roster decisions won’t be enough. Houston is doing that. Los Angeles, Boston, and Chicago are doing that. The Brewers must catch up in this area, sure, but the organization must employ something new. Because all things being equal, if the Brewers simply catch up and start doing what the successful organizations are doing, the organization’s small-market status will always keep them from reaching the levels they hope to achieve. All things being equal, the four clubs mentioned above (among others) will always be able to outspend Milwaukee. That will always be the competitive advantage that trumps all when everything else is equal.

With that said, I do not mean to insinuate that Stearns has unlocked some new market inefficiency by trading 27-year-old Jason Rogers to Pittsburgh for a pair of intriguing prospects. Rogers hit .296/.367/.441 in a brief Major League cameo in 2015 and has six control years remaining, but lacks the traditional power profile of a first baseman and may be functionally limited to a platoon role. That’s valuable to the Pirates in their current context. And given their extreme organizational depth in the outfield, their competitive window, and their pitcher-friendly home park, parting ways with Keon Broxton and Trey Supak won’t hurt the Pirates too much.

It’s not a groundbreaking trade by any means. However, this move remains notable — and perhaps encouraging — for two different reasons:

(1) David Stearns is showing a willingness to be creative with his roster construction. He’s not holding tight to cost-effective options with control years remaining while dealing away only aging veterans and upcoming free agents. Jason Rogers could’ve been perfectly productive for the Milwaukee Brewers over the next couple seasons and it would’ve been at the league minimum. There’s no chance that Doug Melvin makes this move for those two reasons and those two reasons alone. Stearns is willing to eschew financial prudence (likely moreso by signing a free agent to a multi-million-dollar deal rather than play Rogers at the league minimum) to acquire more young talent for the farm system. That kind of creativity and non-purse-clutching is crucial.

(2) David Stearns is prioritizing the rookie levels of the minors. Just over a week after trading Adam Lind for a trio of teenage pitchers, the new Brewers’ GM went back to the well and acquired Trey Supak, a 19-year-old hurler who hasn’t reached full-season ball. The Pirates drafted him in the second round of the 2014 Draft — meaning he’s coming to Milwaukee with some pedigree — and he has only thrown 52.1 innings in his professional career. The Brewers are clearly trying to bring the Houston Playbook to the Midwest, in which the club targets rookie-ball guys before they have a chance to breakout and see their value skyrocket. Houston accomplished this with Francis Martes and David Paulino in recent years and did so once again with Jonathan Arauz in the Ken Giles trade. Stearns is employing a similar strategy with his new club, too.

It’s encouraging to see the Brewers think outside the box. The first point above is undoubtedly good for the Brewers’ organization. Roster optimization breathes life into a small-market franchise. The second point, however, is a bit more controversial. The Astros seem brilliant because they unearthed a few gems that were mere afterthoughts in various trades. It’s a strategy that massively fails an organization if that club’s scouting department regularly misses on that young, volatile talent. So, in this way, if Stearns and the Brewers are going to cash in their big-league chips for teenage prospects, they’d better hit the nail on the head. Otherwise, it winds up being overly cute and a complete waste.

Numerous pundits have opined that Trey Supak is the key to this trade for the Brewers. He’s a 19-year-old hurler with a great frame and a fastball that can flash in the mid-90s. The curveball has promise, too. Supak posted a 6.67 ERA in eight starts for Bristol in the Appy League, but that’s grossly misleading due to the small sample size. The Texan never threw more than five innings in a game and had solid peripherals, including only five walks in those eight starts (and three of those game in a single outing). Stearns commented that the trio of teenage arms in the Lind trade were attractive because they already displayed an ability to work within the strike zone. I’m sure Supak’s four percent walk rate in 2015 impressed the Brewers’ scouting staff in a similar vein.

Center fielder Keon Broxton offers the speed/OBP combination that statheads adore. He compiled a .273/.357/.438 with 39 stolen bases between Double-A and Triple-A a season ago, and if one really wants to dream, Broxton could be a Jarrod Dyson type player with more power and swing-and-miss in his game. The latter piece has always kept scouts from believing in him at the Major League level. Kiley McDaniel, now with the Atlanta Braves organization, called him a “toolshed projection guy” (a great line) prior to 2015. His luster has dulled because he’s 25 years old; however, some in the industry were reportedly impressed with the Lakeland, Florida, native this past year. As the roster is currently constructed, he’ll step into spring training with arguably the best shot to be the Brewers’ everyday center fielder.

Ultimately, it’s difficult to overstate the amount of talent that’s flooding the Brewers’ farm system at the moment. And that’s with other possible trade targets — like Jonathan Lucroy, Jean Segura, and Khris Davis — still on the big-league roster. If David Stearns remains willing to wheel-and-deal this winter, I could easily see the Brewers comfortably having a top-five farm system in all of baseball, if not better. The Brewers’ new general manager has built a roster with flexibility and redundancy, and it’s clear that he’s willing to trade away controllable assets when getting adequate value in return.

They say that first impressions can be established in less than 30 seconds. I’m not sure how that converts to “baseball time,” but the initial impression given by David Stearns has been nothing but positive. He’s showing creativity and boldness. He’s putting his stamp on the organization, establishing a recognizable framework of doing business. I don’t think he’s separated himself from his previous employer, as he’s following the Astros’ playbook, but that’s not all together bad. It simply means Stearns will have to discover what makes him different, what makes him special, a bit farther down the road.

With that being said, new general manager David Stearns didn’t necessarily negotiate a poor return for a player who hit .277/.360/.460 in 2015 with 20 homers. The trade is just more difficult to understand because the assets in question are unknown quantities. Hell, even many within the scouting community have never heard of these players or have never seen them in person. As such, the long-term gain is too abstract to evaluate with any sense of certainty.

The Brewers obviously like the three pitchers they received in the deal. Right-hander Carlos Herrera (who just turned 18) spent last season in the Dominican Summer League, posting a 3.26 ERA with a solid strikeout-to-walk ratio (5.62 K/BB). He throws in the high-80s and low-90s with some projectability. A couple scouts told me that he’s the real prize in this deal, even if he’s a bit of a mystery. Daniel Missaki is another right-handed hurler (only 19 years old) who is best known for his time with the Brazilian national team. He’s currently rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, but reportedly has good feel for multiple pitches. Finally, Freddy Peralta (also 19) popped up on the prospect radar in 2014 when his velocity ticked upward into the mid-90s. The heater regressed this past season, though, and his 4.11 ERA won’t capture one’s attention. Still, the 8.38 strikeout-to-walk ratio is tremendous and eases some of the concern about his ugly run prevention.

David Stearns told Tom Haudricourt of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “Whenever you acquire players that are farther away, there is more variance….So, in a deal like this, we’re really targeting that variability to find an impact-type pitcher, even if it’s multiple years down the road.” This means that Herrera, Missaki or Peralta could flame out before Double-A or they could become useful Major League arms. And given the fact that we’re perhaps talking about another three-to-five years until the muddled picture becomes somewhat clear, this trade cannot possibly resonate with the vast majority of Brewers fans. It requires patience with absolutely no guarantee of any return on that investment.

That’s why the Adam Lind trade is best understood through its process, what acquiring three no-name teenagers can tell us about David Stearns and his overall strategy for the club.

It appears that Stearns is carrying over a key piece of the Houston Astros’ rebuilding playbook, in which a club cannot be afraid of targeting extremely young pitchers in the low minors — especially in return for non-elite Major League assets. The Astros, for example, got David Paulino for Jose Veras and Francis Martes as the “throw-in” in the Jarred Cosart deal. Both of those formerly no-name prospects are now two of the hottest prospects in the Astros’ farm system. It’s a conscious approach that Evan Drellich of the Houston Chronicle profiled in September. This Lind trade is an example of David Stearns trusting his scouting department, trying to bring unknown prospects into the Brewers’ system before they have a chance to mature and have a breakout season. Because after that hypothetical breakout, the Brewers would no longer be able to afford the asking price. The ultimate buy-low strategy, if you will.

Of course, this type of strategy puts a premium on scouting and player evaluation. They have to get it right enough to make it worthwhile. Fortunately, recent success in drafts leads one to believe that the Brewers’ scouting department has quality members who are capable of getting the job done well. Ray Montgomery and his staff have been aces over the past couple years.

All of this doesn’t mean Stearns and the Brewers will consistently eschew big-league players or guys in the upper minors. This simply indicates that the Brewers will not rely on Doug Melvin’s strategy of targeting players who have already found success in the Double-A level or above. Stearns already has seen this type of strategy work in Houston and appears to be transitioning it over to Milwaukee.

It is also important to recognize that quantity should not be ignored during a rebuilding process. The Milwaukee Brewers must stuff the farm system with as much talent as possible and across the minor-league spectrum. This isn’t just to spread out one’s hypothetical competitive window, nor is it some kind of “throw dozens of prospects at the wall and see who sticks” argument. Instead, I’m acknowledging the fact that Milwaukee needs excess minor-league talent. It’s not enough to have the next core of homegrown players in the minors. An organization must also have the depth necessary to trade for more Major League players. Just as the Chicago Cubs, Houston Astros, and Toronto Blue Jays are all beginning to flex their prospect muscles to maximize their windows of contention (which are of varying sizes), the Milwaukee Brewers must have the prospect depth to both develop a core and supplement it.

In the end, this Adam Lind deal should be understood as an attempt to acquire quantity and quality. The latter is more abstract and won’t pay dividends for perhaps a half-decade, but it is clearly a conscious attempt at acquiring high-end prospects — just a year or two before they become high-end prospects. This is just more evidence that David Stearns and his staff are willing to be creative and patient, a highly desirable combination during a full-scale rebuilding process. Brewers fans should be happy, regardless of how the three young pitchers turn out.

By this point last year, the Toronto Blue Jays and Oakland Athletics had completed a deal that included Josh Donaldson. This isn’t used as a reason to trade Lucroy as early as possible, though — just the opposite. Donaldson ended up bringing in a pretty nice return for the Athletics, but one has to admit that it’s nothing that quite compares to acquiring the American League’s Most Valuable Player. The Athletics acquired Brett Lawrie, Kendall Graveman, Franklin Barreto, and Sean Nolin. While that may seem underwhelming to some, Barreto is now the 18th-ranked prospect in all of baseball by MLB.com and the seventh-best shortstop. In short, this trade is a long way from actually being decided.

However, the above anecdote serves a purpose. Billy Beane is a veteran general manager. He knows what it feels like to lose a trade. He knows what it feels like to win a trade. If new Brewers GM David Stearns opts to part ways with Jonathan Lucroy — a major face of the Brewers franchise for the past half-decade — it would have to be for the right package of prospects. One that would be easy to defend to the media.

Furthermore, the free-agent market at the time of the Donaldson trade had just dried up. Having been saturated with both Pablo Sandoval and Hanley Ramirez, the Blue Jays may have felt a knee-jerk reaction to close a deal for a different option. In some ways, a saturated market may actually help a player’s trade value. Well, at least a saturated market that suddenly becomes empty.

I know, that seems counter-intuitive in some ways. How could a player’s value increase when more options exist? Basic economic principles of supply and demand fly in the opposite direction. But trends may actually bend the other way.

For instance, take what is happening in the starting pitching market. The 2015 free agent class is one of the best we’ve seen and will be much, much better than 2016. But did this surplus hurt Jordan Zimmermann’s value? He’s got a freshly-inked deal worth $110 million. Does it seem to have hurt Shelby Miller’s worth? The Atlanta Braves are reportedly asking for an A.J. Pollock or a Matt Duffy. Will it hurt Zack Greinke’s worth? He was so confident in his value that he opted out of a deal that still had $71 million on it. Did this impending market seem to hurt David Price’s worth as a rental halfway through the year? The Detroit Tigers got Daniel Norris, Matt Boyd, and Jairo Labourt. Of course, value becomes different to a team in a playoff hunt, but similar logic can be assigned to Lucroy.

I will now pose to you my theory and it’s yours to accept or deny. Devoid of the fact that Donaldson went on to win the AL MVP, the Athletics got fairly good value for their star third baseman. Furthermore, the Donaldson trade was partially a product of the Sandoval and Ramirez signings. Alex Anthopoulos — the Blue Jays GM at the time — was fully aware of what Sandoval and Ramirez were worth on the open market. So too was Beane. If you are going to make your players available, it then bodes well to have players of the same position become unavailable recently. That is to say, you don’t necessarily want a barren market to drive value, but you want a very recent loss-of-value.

This theory revolves around only observed evidence. Whether it’s believable or not is largely incumbent on if general managers are as fickle as other members of society. Some of us just had the hellish nightmare pleasure of watching full-grown adults take items away from children just so that they could get the best deal on Black Friday. Do adults really want that item that bad? Or is it — at least partially — because that item is just flying off the shelves quickly? If general managers are exploring options at catcher and suddenly see their options disappear in front of them, then the likelihood that someone overpays to acquire Lucroy drastically increases.

So, you have a new GM — but by no means necessarily a tentative one — in Stearns, waiting for the right deal on Lucroy to insure both good value and future prosperity. Despite the fact that the Brewers seem to be in rebuild, Stearns really shouldn’t feel pressured to move Lucroy this offseason. Unfortunately for Stearns, you can’t just create a surplus in the catching market. While this trade may take a while to materialize largely, Stearns’ patience seems to bode well, despite Lucroy’s expiring contract. Keeping the 29-year old Lucroy on a rebuilding team is a good idea not only because of his elite talent, but also because it can’t hurt his value after a slightly-down 2015 season.

In general, a lot of things go into a trade. All potential trade partners have to be explored, the loss of that particular player has to be justified by the return for both parties, one owner may have to agree to take on extra salary, and scouts and analytics departments have to agree on the cost-benefit analysis of taking on a new player and all they bring to the table. That means having previously scouted the players yourselves and having near-exhaustive knowledge of their tools.

What’s really interesting though is the timing of the deal. It’s not as if an absolute smorgasbord of closers are reportedly on the market. There’s Aroldis Chapman. Maybe Ken Giles, if you’d like to already grant him the closer’s title. That’s it. Craig Kimbrel has already been dealt. It should be noted that perhaps the fact that Kimbrel has already been traded tells us that although it seems so publicly, the closer market isn’t so thin. Or the overwhelming return for Kimbrel made it too good to pass up. We don’t know. Stearns—or any front office person—would know this much better than us outsiders.

I don’t have any insider information here, nor do I mean to pretend to. However, let’s move forward assuming the closer market is actually more saturated than previously thought. It’s not even that much of a stretch, considering the fact that Andrew Miller is also rumored to be on the market. Say that, hypothetically, a lot of teams expect Darren O’Day to close as well. Frankly, those are very believable scenarios. It wouldn’t be too difficult to imagine a couple more of your own hypothetical situations. Kudos, then, goes to Stearns for being able to get a non-zero return for K-Rod.

But still, why now?

If O’Day is expected to close, that saga will end soon enough—the reliever market is stagnating until he signs as a free agent. If Miller gets dealt, the Yankees would reportedly be looking for a massive return. Despite playing the same position, the difference in quality between Miller and Rodriguez means we’re probably looking at a different market of teams. Add to the mix that the Cincinnati Reds are actively shopping Chapman and reportedly want him dealt this offseason. It seems that we have a curious case for trading away a second-tier closer before other, bigger chips fall into place and teams get desperate.

After all, what did the Brewers have to lose by keeping Rodriguez while other aspects of the team are addressed first? In fact, there’s a case to be made that trading away Rodriguez right now is selling as low as you can on a player. Nick Lampe wrote a great article over at Beyond the Box Score where he broke down the differences between offseason and trade deadline deals. His conclusion, while tentative, was that “there does appear to be some evidence that teams pay a significantly higher price … to acquire marginal wins at the trade deadline.”

If that’s true, though, why would Kimbrel have garnered such a huge return during the offseason? As Ben Carsley over at BP Boston wrote, the Red Sox “gave up two–two!–top-100 prospect types and two more lottery tickets for a relief pitcher.” That’s a huge return, no matter if you buy the ‘proven closer’ narrative or not. Perhaps a shift is beginning in how contending teams acquire elite relief pitchers. When Jonathan Papelbon got traded mid-season, it was for a Double-A prospect who lacks upside. Of course, it’s worth noting that Papelbon is considered to be overpaid and has a slew of clubhouse issues attached to him.

Moving even further, perhaps Stearns believes that selling a closer mid-season will become harder now that the outcome of the Papelbon deal has happened. That is to say, Papelbon’s post-trade antics have given a bad name to closers with tempers everywhere. Rodriguez doesn’t have Papelbon’s track record, but at the same time, he’s been known to get into some altercations of his own. K-Rod is hypothetically one outburst away from being much more difficult to trade. Furthermore, Stearns could just want the right-hander not involved in anything come spring training. Perhaps K-Rod had even privately expressed concern for closing for a losing team. Who knows what is happening on the inside? Nonetheless, J.P. Breen did a great job of breaking down why Stearns would want to be rid of Rodriguez sooner rather than later.

With all of that being said, the offseason still seems like an odd time to trade a non-elite closer. Rodriguez is a ‘proven closer’ (someone still believes in that, right?) on a contract that is pretty team-friendly. With his current deal technically expiring at the end of the 2016 season (though it does have a $8 million team option for 2017), Rodriguez would be one of the optimal ‘rental relievers for a pennant race team at the trade deadline’ candidates. Furthermore, the return of the trade is fairly comparable to the Papelbon trade who gets paid quite a bit more than K-Rod.

New Brewers prospect Javier Betancourt could have upside, but although he is still quite young, his bat has already had trouble adjusting at the High-A level. Stearns and his front office could be really high on Betancourt, however, there’s a large chance that at the 2016 trade deadline—at the very least—a similar deal would still be available. It’s perfectly conceivable that a better deal could have even come up, too. According to one report from The Detroit News, Betancourt’s future value is only 45 (not an everyday player). That’s a far-cry from the Andrew Miller trade that took place during the 2014 season in which the Red Sox acquired a prospect with a future value of 60 in Eduardo Rodriguez. Certainly K-Rod and Miller aren’t fully comparable pieces, however, Miller did end up being a rental pitcher for the Orioles.

The fact is that the move is by no means a bad one for Stearns. A closer on a team that isn’t expected to win a lot of games is a strange asset to keep. It’s just a weird time to pull the trigger on such a mediocre return. Kimbrel just got traded for two top-100 prospects. Chapman is going to fetch a similar return for the Reds perhaps shortly. O’Day could sign a deal that only the Dodgers will afford. Giles has been linked in rumors to two or three high-level prospects. That makes K-Rod a really unique asset. He’s second-tier compared to these guys which could have made him appealing to a much broader array of teams. Everyone can afford a K-Rod, not everyone can afford a Kimbrel or an O’Day. All the first-tier players could have settled into their own teams and it wouldn’t have affected Rodriguez’s trade value one iota.

In the end, this trade will likely be a footnote in Stearns’ tenure as Brewers GM. It won’t matter if Betancourt pans out or not, getting rid of Rodriguez was a good move. However, for one of his first moves, the timing didn’t exactly show patient baseball acumen.

Sneed, a 23-year-old starting pitcher, is not a very exciting prospect. He has posted decent strikeout and walk numbers in the low minors, but he was drafted out of college and isn’t particularly young for his level. BP’s own Mauricio Rubio described him as a “backend profile for sure” in a chat earlier this year, which is valuable, but not franchise-defining in any way. Also, of course, young pitchers carry their own additional risk even beyond the uncertainties all prospects carry; an ill-timed injury or stagnated development is a far bigger problem for a pitcher than it would be for a position player.

Villar, on the other hand, is already a proven big leaguer. He’s not a star by any means: In roughly a season’s worth of plate appearances over the last three years (658), he has been worth a total of 2.0 WARP, which makes him roughly an average player. Also, he is just 24 years old, meaning that he is — at least in theory — on the upswing of his career. Admittedly, he isn’t likely to get substantially better, as scouting reports from as far back as 2011 question his ability to hit. Not to mention the fact that his minor-league numbers from each stop along the way support that idea (career .723 minor league OPS).

If one is looking to be optimistic, though, signs abound. His .270 TAv in (just) 128 plate appearances in 2015 was by far the highest of his career, and this number was supported (and likely buoyed) by a career-high contact percentage. For someone with his speed, simply putting the ball in play has some value. He has also proven to be roughly an average defensive shortstop, which is obviously not spectacular but is perfectly serviceable. His career FRAA of 1.0 does not make him a defensive standout but indicates that he is perfectly capable of remaining at the position.

This trade, though, is not so much about Villar the player as it is Villar the asset. He has proven that he can be a big-league shortstop, which is not really the case for anyone else on the Brewers’ roster other than Jean Segura. Elian Herrera may be counted on to start at third base or in left field and only has 91 innings at shortstop in the majors anyway, and Luis Sardinas has a career .688 OPS in the minors and .543 OPS in the majors. Thus, Segura was the only viable shortstop the Brewers really had prior to this point.

But acquiring Villar gives the Brewers a lot more flexibility. Orlando Arcia is on the verge of the Major Leagues, and the Brewers will want to give him the opportunity to earn playing time in 2015. They will not, however, want to force it upon him, and trading Segura this offseason without acquiring a backup may have done that. But not trading Segura would have made getting Arcia regular playing time far more difficult. After all, Segura is at this point a slight disappointment after the smashing start his career got off to, but he is still a young, league-average shortstop under team control through 2018, and the Brewers won’t want to squander some of his trade value by moving him to second base too early.

Villar, then, gives the Brewers some much-needed flexibility. They can keep Segura if no other team offers the right package, but they are not under any obligation to do so in order to protect Arcia. If the Brewers do unload Segura, Villar is a quality shortstop who can absolutely start for a couple months (or longer) without embarrassing himself until Arcia is ready. If the Brewers decide to hold onto Segura, Villar can be a backup or play second base.

Thus, perhaps an additional benefit to the trade is that it further marginalizes Scooter Gennett. A couple months ago, I wrote about how the young second baseman was simply not good enough to be a necessary part of the Brewers’ future, and this trade goes a long way to upgrading his roster spot. Villar is probably not the hitter Gennett is — although Gennett’s .233 2015 TAv may prove that statement false in the long run — but he provides much more defensive value simply by being able to play a competent shortstop. So even if Segura remains on the team and/or Arcia arrives in the big leagues to play shortstop every day, Villar can still be in the lineup or be a valuable bench player, which is not something that cannot be said for Gennett.

Overall, this trade is a bigger win for the Brewers than it initially seems on the surface, as Villar is not a hugely impactful player on the field. However, he is a good acquisition for a team that needs middle infield depth and flexibility. He will stabilize their big-league roster for the next couple years by providing a consistent up-the-middle bench option, and he also allows the new front office to be creative in terms of handling their more valuable shortstops in Segura and Arcia.

The Brewers traded Francisco Rodriguez to the Detroit Tigers on Wednesday morning in return for infield prospect Javier Betancourt and a player to be named later.

It hasn’t always been a perfect fit, but the right-hander has remained in Milwaukee for several reasons:

(1) He’s long been adamant that he prefers to close ballgames. Because the Brewers have historically struggled to develop high-end arms in their farm system, Milwaukee hasn’t had a closer-in-waiting to justify parting ways with Rodriguez. His clearest path to the ninth inning has been with the blue and gold.

(2) Doug Melvin and the coaching staff trusted K-Rod as a positive clubhouse presence. The 33-year-old mentored young Latin American players and displayed a strong work ethic that his fellow relievers could model. Numerous stories can illustrate Rodriguez’s positive affect behind closed doors; however, a recent tweet from Elian Herrera perhaps best sums up his clubhouse value. Although many fans dislike the unquantifiable nature of “clubhouse presence,” I’ve come to appreciate the importance of positive role models for young players. And that’s not uncommon in life. As children and young professionals, we all have benefited from mentors, as we all naturally seek to mimic the successful. K-Rod served that role beautifully for the Brewers during his time in the organization.

(3) The small and familiar market of Milwaukee allowed Francisco Rodriguez to hide his horrific history of domestic abuse accusations. The story benefited from a benign neglect in the Brewers’ media market — something that came up from time to time when trade rumors surfaced, but rarely discussed because it didn’t attract eyeballs. After all, the vast majority of Brewers fans knew about it and either chose to disgruntedly tolerate it or willfully forget about it. Moving to a new (especially larger media market) always risked the possibility that such a story caught national headlines and became a scandal. That was never a risk in Milwaukee.

In the end, though, Rodriguez kept re-signing with the Brewers because Doug Melvin valued him. The club’s former general manager believed in the right-hander’s ability to adapt to declining stuff and believed in his underlying peripherals. That trust paid off in 2013 when the Brewers were able to trade K-Rod to Baltimore for Nick Delmonico — which seemed like a solid return at the time — and did so again in 2015 when he saved 38 game and compiled a spectacular 2.21 ERA. As the rest of us (myself included) saw a pitcher declining, Melvin saw a pitcher evolving. I covered this more in-depth at Baseball Prospectus a couple weeks ago.

This long-standing relationship is likely why K-Rod continuously ended up back in Milwaukee and why the organization failed to trade him this past summer. The veteran reliever was more valuable to the Brewers organization than he was to any other organization in baseball. He had more than on-the-field value to the club and didn’t have the same off-the-field detractions that he would elsewhere. It’s overwhelmingly likely that the Brewers never received an offer they considered to be worth more than the value Rodriguez already provided.

The restructuring of the Brewers’ front office and the complete transition to David Stearns altered the calculus in this equation. I opined earlier this week that Stearns wouldn’t have the same loyalty to Francisco Rodriguez and may not value his clubhouse presence as highly as Melvin, all of which would probably lead to an offseason trade. That came to fruition on Wednesday.

In return, Milwaukee received 20-year-old Javier Betancourt, a middle infielder who hit .263/.304/.336 with the Tigers’ High-A affiliate, the Lakeland Flying Tigers. On Wednesday (by coincidence, surely) Baseball Prospectus rated Betancourt as the eighth-best prospect in Detroit’s minor-league system. The Tigers may have the worst farm system in all of baseball — which means such a high ranking isn’t much of a compliment — but the Venezuelan native does have some tools that could eventually push him to The Show.

Betancourt is a high-floor prospect with a fairly well-defined ceiling. Despite showing some barrel control that could give him a league-average hit tool, he’ll offer next-to-nothing offensively. The power projects to be non-existent, and he won’t walk much. He’s someone who could hit .270-.275 with a .310-.320 OBP and fewer than five homers. That’s essentially what Scooter Gennett did for the big-league club in 2015, and he was barely a replacement-level player. What differentiates Betancourt, though, is the glove. He can pass at shortstop in short bursts and is an above-average defender at second base, making him a potentially useful utility infielder.

Such prospects are unexciting. He doesn’t break the top-20 in the Brewers’ minor-league system, for me, and will need a lot to go right if he’s going to be anything more than a glove-first bench player. In a trade that effectively dumps $9.5 million and frees up a 40-man roster spot, though, someone like Betancourt is a nifty return. It adds youth and versatility. It adds a lower-risk prospect in a minor-league system that is flush with high-end, volatile players. Moreover, it provides depth in the middle infield, which is an under-appreciated luxury in today’s game. In short, Betancourt shouldn’t be penciled into any future Brewers’ roster, but he represents good business. That’s always commendable.

More importantly, trading Francisco Rodriguez to Detroit signals that David Stearns has assumed full control of the Milwaukee Brewers. He’s a general manager with no connections to the veterans of the big-league club and few connections to the minor-league system, which means he doesn’t have any favorites. He’s not afraid or unwilling to trade someone. He’s open-minded and simply focused on positive baseball value and acquiring as many young players as possible in the franchise’s current transition.

This should be a strong hint that past reluctance to discuss Jonathan Lucroy, Ryan Braun, or Adam Lind with other clubs is no longer applicable. David Stearns is his own man with his own staff and his own philosophies. Doug Melvin remains connected to the club as an advisor, but I believe this K-Rod trade illustrates the extent of the relationship between the two front-office members. The former GM has no residual power. He won’t be a shadow that looms over the Stearns regime. He’s precisely what his title implies: an advisor.

I don’t think that Francisco Rodriguez’s departure can be construed as proof of a “full rebuild” or the beginning of a true “fire sale” — whatever connotation one wants to place on those words — as this is a move that should have been completed a half-dozen months ago. Stearns simply changed the valuation calculus. Perhaps this will also prove true for players like Lucroy and Braun. I’m not sure. What this trade does symbolize, though, is that David Stearns is unquestionably in control of the Milwaukee Brewers franchise, and that’s a huge positive for the fan base. Power struggles in baseball front offices never end well for the on-the-field product. And if there was any lingering concern about that in Milwaukee, I think this clearly snuffs out the flame.

TRADING IN THE DIVISON

It’s a popular narrative and one that’s brought up just about every year. There’s a potential beneficial trade scenario between two teams within the same division and yet the trade doesn’t happen. The cause is, therefore, typically attributed to the idea that teams don’t like to trade within the same division. The narrative isn’t totally false. Since 1998, teams have traded with their divisional rivals only 10 percent of the time.

This year, as Mike Bates pointed out, the trade season started with teams making trades with their division rivals. The A’s sent Scott Kazmir to the Astros for Daniel Mengden, and Jacob Nottingham. And the Brewers shipped Aramis Ramirez to the Pirates for Yhonathan Barrios, a 5-foot-11 hard-throwing reliever who is currently in Double-A Biloxi and is sporting a 3.15 ERA in twenty innings.

One of the main reasons teams don’t often trade within their division is that most teams are afraid they’ll trade a young prospect, who will blossom with another organization. The fear isn’t without merit, as the GM could come under a lot of scrutiny if that player comes back to haunt him.

This year, as has already been noted, the Brewers haven’t been afraid to make those types of trades. They made the Ramirez trade, and at the trade deadline, they traded Jonathan Broxton to the Cardinals. Both teams who can easily fit the label as rivals. But the Brewers might not be done trading in the division this season.

Adam Lind could still prove to be an interesting fit for the Pirates at the end of the season. Sure, Michael Morse has hit well since joining the Pirates, but his BABIP is .464, which is obviously unsustainable and he should be in line for a lot of regression. Therefore, in the offseason the Pirates will yet again find themselves with a whole at first base, which could definitely be filled with Lind.

Now, while the Brewers made a couple trades with teams in their division, it doesn’t mean they’re likely or even willing to do it again. I, therefore, wanted to see how often the Brewers made trades in their own division, as compared to the rest of the league. For this I gathered the data at baseball reference, which as I’ve already noted does not include minors for minor’s trades. The data also does not include waiver claims or player signings. All it includes is trades and purchases. I also only went back to 1998 because before then the divisions were in a different format. The Brewers, before 1998, were actually in the American League and shared a division with the Royals, Indians, Twins, and White Sox. The Brewers now share a division with the Cubs, Reds, Cardinals, and Pirates. They did share a division with the Astros until 2012 when the Astros moved to the American League. I, therefore, only included the Astros trades with the Brewers and other teams in the NL Central from 1998 to 2012. After 2012, I counted the Astros trades with the AL West.

From 1998 to 2014, the Brewers made 20 trades within their own division, which ranks them fifth in all of baseball. The team that made the most trades within it’s own division, ironically enough is the Cubs, which whom the Brewers haven’t traded with since 2005. In fact, the only teams whom the Brewers haven’t traded with since 2005 are the White Sox, Rockies, and Marlins. That being said, the Brewers seem to be pretty progressive, as compared to the rest of the league when it comes to trading within the division.

But, there are problems with the methodology I used, in that I only looked at the overall trades teams made in the division. The main problem being, what if a team simply doesn’t make a lot of trades? If that were the case, then it wouldn’t be weird that the team in question didn’t make a lot of trades within its division. To account for this I looked at the team’s percentage of trades that they made inside their own division.

This makes the Brewers look even more progressive. At 15.87 percent, they’ve made the most trades in their own division dating back to 1998. Whether this is an organizational philosophy, I do not know. This also doesn’t mean that the Brewers will definitely make a trade in their division this upcoming offseason. Rather what this does suggest is that the Brewers should be open to the idea, or at least that they will be as open as any team in the bigs — even with the change in GM.

WHO DO THE BREWERS TRADE THE MOST WITH?

So often, when gathering data, one question will lead to another and then another. One question that arose from gathering this data was with which teams do the Brewers trade the most often. As I’ve mentioned before, teams will often be more comfortable trading with other teams based on several factors. Again, using the data from baseball reference I looked at which teams the Brewers made the most trades with from 1998-2014 and then again from 1969-2014.

Even though the Brewers haven’t traded with the Cubs since 2005, they’re the team they’ve had the second highest amount of trade transactions with since 1998. The Cardinals and Reds on the other hand are more in the middle of the pack, while the Astros and Pirates, with whom the Brewers have only made two trades since 1998, are near the bottom. (This of course does not count this year’s trades.)

Let’s now look at all the trades the Brewers made since they’ve entered the league.

They’re biggest trade partners have been the A’s and Royals. While they’re lowest trade partners have been the Rays, Marlins, and Diamondbacks. This may be due to the fact that all three of those teams are expansion teams. Therefore, the Brewers would have had less amount of time to trade with those teams.

Important to note, though, is that this data does not tell us the causality of these trades — meaning it doesn’t tell us why the Brewers have traded more with the A’s and Royals than any other team. It may be due to a similar philosophy (although the A’s and Royals typically aren’t associated with similar philosophies). It may be do to simple random chance, or simply that the A’s and Royals GMs got along with the Brewers GMs. Whatever the case may be it’ll be interesting to see, which teams the Brewers trade with next as the look to rebuild their team.

TRENDS:

Here is a visual look of the Brewers trades from 1998 to 2014 along with the league average.

This isn’t the first time I’ve shown this visual for the Brewers. Again they’re trending downward, when it comes to trades, while the league average is trending up. In 2014, the Brewers made five trades, while on average teams made 9.56 trades. This may be due to the number of new and younger GMs entering the league.

It’ll be interesting to see who Melvin’s successor will be, and if he will be more active than Melvin has been in the recent years.

The Brewers will also make a handful of promotions from the minors in September, though likely not immediately. The organization does not wish to interfere with Double-A Biloxi’s postseason run or deplete the ranks at Triple-A Colorado Springs; however, Zach Davies could eventually slide into the rotation and Luis Sardinas should see his fair share of playing time. Still, it’s unlikely that prized prospects Brett Phillips or Orlando Arcia get anything more than a token call-up, as they’d have to be added to the 40-man roster and don’t project to begin the 2016 season with the big-league club. That could leave the September call-up season a bit unfulfilling for many Brewers fans, who are desperate to glimpse the purported future of the franchise.

Attention could quickly turn to the winter trading season. Multiple media sources suggest that the Brewers will be active in the offseason, seeking to further build for a potential run at contention in as early as 2o17. In other words, fans should expect additional departures from the current major-league squad. The club is still unlikely to engage in a firesale — though the uncertainty at General Manager makes it difficult to say this with too much confidence — but multiple sources have indicated that Milwaukee would like to move another piece or two this winter.

Here are the five players that I consider to have the highest probability of being traded this offseason:

(1) SS Jean Segura

Although his trade value has fallen from its April and May levels, the 25-year-old shortstop still carries value and is most likely to be moved this winter. He’s failed to deliver consistency at the plate and has routinely slid back into bad habits as seasons progress; however, the Brewers should benefit from the overall paucity of talent at the shortstop position. Despite his struggles, Segura has the 14th-highest WARP in the majors. Guys like Alexei Ramirez (.240/.268/.345), Jimmy Rollins (.220/.274/.361), Marcus Semien (.252/.296/.391), Jordy Mercer (.243/.290/.313), Erick Aybar (.275/.310/.333), Alexi Amarista (.213/.265/.309), Starlin Castro (.242/.274/.317), J.J. Hardy (.222/.253/.315), and Didi Gregorius (.260/.306/.357) all have received at least 300 plate appearances. That isn’t the exhaustive list, either.

This comes on the heels of an offseason that saw Gregorius move to New York in a deal that included Shane Greene — pre-dumpster-fire version — and Robbie Ray. The 24-year-old Marcus Semien headlined the return for Jeff Samardizja over the winter. Hell, even Luis Sardinas (a potential utility infielder or second-division starter) was the core of the return for right-hander Yovani Gallardo. The idea that Jean Segura is not valuable or won’t have a market this winter seems off the mark, if one considers the most recent offseason.

Segura becomes expendable for several reasons: (1) it’s becoming less and less clear that he’s going to reach his offensive potential, which makes him, at best, a second-division shortstop; (2) Luis Sardinas hit .283/.321/.367 in Triple-A and should be able to handle the starting role for a season or two during a rebuilding stretch; (3) the future at the position is not Segura, but rather Orlando Arcia. These three factors should help convince the organization that he should be moved during the offseason. It wouldn’t be wise to expect a huge prospect package in return, though, unless the new GM brings a vastly different philosophy to the front office and wishes to put his stamp on the club. The Brewers have long prioritized players in the high minors or the majors, and with Melvin still in an advisory role and Attanasio still at the helm, it seems more likely that Milwaukee swaps Segura for a mid-tier young player in Double-A or Triple-A.

(2) OF Khris Davis

Davis clobbered 10 homers in the month of August, firmly asserting his ability to hit for power at the major-league level. He remains an unheralded offensive asset. His .276 TAv is above the league’s average, and his 112 wRC+ indicates that his production at the plate is 12 percent better than average. Davis owns a career 116 wRC+, too, so it’s hardly convincing to suggest that he’s only been decent over the past month. He’s a player with holes in his game; however, in an depressed offensive environment around Major League Baseball, players like Khris Davis carry more value than we’re perhaps predisposed to think.

He’s only 27 years old and won’t be arbitration eligible until the 2017 season. These things are attractive to both the Brewers and other major-league clubs, yet the presence of Domingo Santana should present the organization an opportunity to capitalize on Davis’s trade value without creating a black hole in left field. The front office can shop Davis to both NL and AL clubs with the comfort that they have a very similar player in the wings. Granted, Santana has more swing-and-miss issues than Davis and may experience some growing pains in his first full season, but he’s the one who best profiles to play left field for Milwaukee during their next competitive window.

(3) RHP Matt Garza

It’s no secret that Milwaukee desperately wants to unload the remaining two years of Garza’s four-year, $50M contract. With a 5.56 ERA over 24 starts, that won’t be an easy task, but expect the front office to explore a myriad of ways to move the right-hander this winter. Perhaps it will be a bad-contract swap, with a couple teams taking a chance on change-of-scenery candidates, or a big-market team like the Dodgers could offer a no-name prospect or two in return for simply eating the contract. More likely than not, though, the Brewers will hope that the 31-year-old can begin the 2016 on a high note and move him as quickly as possible.

Some of the underlying numbers suggest Garza could bounce back next year. He didn’t experience any velocity decrease and didn’t have any wild fluctuations in his ground-ball rate. His .317 BABIP is also roughly 30 points higher than his career average, which could mean that he’s due for positive regression. Of course, I’d also argue that Garza’s BABIP and home-run rates are at or near career highs because his command has been dreadful, causing him to issue too many free passes and get obliterated when missing inside the zone. As the offseason approaches, it’s likely that the Brewers’ front office and the fan base will focus on the positive rather than the negative, as they seek to paint the rosiest picture possible — and I find it hard to blame anyone for that.

(4) 1B Adam Lind

The Brewers haven’t had a quality first baseman since Prince Fielder departed following the 2011 season, and with no ready-made replacement in the farm system, it’s understandable why the organization has been hesitant to trade Lind. He’s hitting .282/.362/.470 with a 122 wRC+ and has been solid defensively. At only $8M in 2016, the 32-year-old slugger continues to be attractive to any small-market club, the Brewers notwithstanding.

Still, he’s an aging slugger with perennial back problems and only one year remaining on his contract. At least the St. Louis Cardinals and Pittsburgh Pirates expressed interest over the summer, and more clubs could be in the market for an above-average first baseman over the winter. It’s unclear what the Brewers’ asking price has been or what it projects to be this offseason, but one figures that a two-win first baseman on a team-friendly contract should bring back a better return than what the Brewers had to pay prior to 2015 (Marco Estrada).

The question is whether Milwaukee has any desire to move Lind without any replacement lined up — and it should be noted that Jason Rogers doesn’t profile as an everyday option at first — remains to be seen. I am skeptical that the club would be willing to make such a move. As with all of this speculation, though, the uncertainty at General Manager makes such skepticism partially unfounded. Mostly, such an opinion is based off the presence of Mark Attanasio. His ultimate acquiescence of trading Mike Fiers alleviates my concerns a bit; however, the emergence of Taylor Jungmann as a legitimate major-league pitcher likely softened the blow and made him more receptive to such a move. Any trade of Adam Lind — barring any subsequent trade or free-agent signing — would mean Attanasio agreed to trade a cost-friendly player without any recognizable replacement in the wings. I’m not sure he has agreed to do that before as the Brewers’ owner and I’m not ready to assume he’ll do it now.

(5) RHP Francisco Rodriguez

This is complicated. Rodriguez is 33 years old and has at least $7.5 million guaranteed over the next two years — $5.5 million next year and a $2 million buy-out in 2017. He’s a highly productive reliever who has posted a 2.53 ERA with a 2.88 FIP. He has saved 31 games with only four “meltdowns” this season. He continues to transform himself as a pitcher, as he now throws his fastball just 45.9 percent of the time and has a 14.2 percent whiff rate, which is his highest mark since 2003. Although he prefers to close, the right-hander would be a quality addition to any bullpen, especially in an era in which organizations are beginning to assemble elite bullpens in an effort to lessen the negative impact of a mediocre starting rotation.

Despite all of this, K-Rod remains in Milwaukee. For four-consecutive offseasons, he has had the opportunity to sign with any major-league team, yet he’s ultimately returned to the state of Wisconsin. Part of this is surely tied to the fact that he’s always had a clear shot at the closer’s role with the Brewers, but that doesn’t seem to fully explain it. Plenty of teams across the majors have needed help in the ninth inning over the last four years. So why always Milwaukee? Part of this could be his history of domestic violence, something that has been somewhat of a non-issue — likely because the fan base has somewhat accepted, overlooked, or forgotten his history — but something that will absolutely rear its head in a new location, as members of the media would write their human-interest profiles over the winter.

It could also be that Milwaukee appreciates the way he works with their younger pitchers, as he’s a Spanish-speaking veteran who can help mentor younger Latin American pitchers in the ins and outs of big-league life. As the club promotes a greater number of young, homegrown arms, perhaps that carries greater weight with the organization. Yovani Gallardo could have carried out that role in previous years, but as he’s no longer with the club, it could be argued that K-Rod is one of the only veteran Spanish-speaking mentors the Brewers have on the roster. Although it’s unclear if that’s the ultimate reasoning, I could certainly understand the line of argument, as the behind-the-scenes portion of player development is often overlooked and poorly understood.

Whatever the reason, though, Francisco Rodriguez continues to don a Brewers uniform year after year. On paper, he appears to be an obvious trade candidate for the club. At this point, it’s clear that something unrelated to his performance, good or bad, is keeping him in Milwaukee.

[Note: To answer this question before it’s raised in the comment’s section, I do not consider it likely for Jonathan Lucroy to be traded this winter. The organization has repeatedly informed teams that he’s unavailable. A large reason for this probably has to do with his team-friendly contract and the club’s belief that they can push for contention as soon as 2017 — a time frame in which Lucroy could still be in position to add value to the club’s postseason chances. The pending GM change makes this a bit cloudier, to be fair, but with the information that we currently have available, it does not appear that Milwaukee has any intentions to trade Jonathan Lucroy prior to the 2016 season.]