Yet, if anything the 2017-2018 Brewers have also proven that developmental time is not linear at the MLB level, and furthermore, GM David Stearns has not been afraid to deal from stockpiles of future high floor roles to improve the club. Most prominently, Stearns traded center field prospect Lewis Brinson, many fans’ and analysts’ projected 2018 MLB starter, as a part of the package to acquire Christian Yelich, despite center field being a position of need. Now the Brewers have a need to improve second base, and another clear-cut top prospect at the position (Keston Hiura, and Mauricio Dubon behind him); simply judging Stearns’s past, one should not rule out a trade involving Hiura should the price be right and the return bolster a position of strength.

On the opposite spectrum for the Brewers is left-handed starting pitching, which is arguably the sole position on the roster decimated by both injury (Brent Suter) and free agency (Gio Gonzalez, Wade Miley). Worse yet, unlike a position such as second base (which is a clear position of need), left handed starting pitching was a relative strength for the Brewers in 2018. Unlike second base, there’s no notable southpaw prospect ready for the rotation.

• Suter scouts as a prototypical depth player, but his full-time fastball approach, wicked tempo, and strange angles arguably helps his stuff “play up” at the big league level; by no means was Suter great, but he certainly did not sink the club, and was one of the reasons that the “replacement by design” rotational shuffle of interchangeable pitchers could work.

• On the other hand, Gonzalez served as a crucial replacement for the Brewers, indeed producing exceptional value on any rotational assessment despite having only been acquired after August 31.

• Similarly, Wade Miley could arguably be listed as the “Ace” of the club, and certainly stands as one of the team’s developmental successes. Even if Miley had discovered his cutter by the middle of 2017 with Baltimore, the Brewers recognized his pitch development and helped the southpaw double down on his approach and command the strike zone.

Milwaukee boasts significant pitching depth entering the 2019 season, arguably forming the strength of the organization through their run prevention system. Yet left-handed starting pitching is a weakness even given the context of this particular organization. There are no notable left-handed starting pitching prospects that are near reaching an MLB-ready floor for 2019, and there is little in the way of organizational depth behind Brent Suter (who, given the nature of Tommy John surgery, may not be ready to pitch until very late in 2019). Thus Brewers fans looking for the club to make a splash in free agency could reasonably look at southpaw starters.

There are arguably three particular classes of pitchers among the “true” left-handed starting pitching free agents in 2019. (Here I’ve excluded elite arms like Clayton Kershaw and David Price, who could choose to opt out of contracts, but only would do so on the sense that they could best $35 million Average Annual Value (AAV), which would be the required level to beat their current deals). Cot’s Contracts and Sportrac Data were used to construct a free agency list.

• Elite 2018 or Notably Better than Average Pitchers (by WARP and Runs Prevented): Patrick Corbin, Dallas Keuchel, J.A. Happ, and Hyun-jin Ryu

• Very Good Pitchers (by either WARP or Runs Prevented): Gio Gonzalez, CC Sabathia, Brett Anderson, and Wade Miley

• Depth Pitchers: Drew Pomeranz, Francisco Liriano, Jo-Jo Reyes, and Ross Detwiler.

The following table is one method of conveying player value for this lefty free agency class into monetary terms. I’ve used a three-year depreciation model, reflecting the fact that over time players typically lose value from their current performances (this is also a means of presenting relatively conservative contract projections). I’ve updated previous surplus assessments by presenting a rolling assessment of three-year models (2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018), plus a “maximum” projection based on full 2018 performance. This number can be compared against the general “Three Year Trend” to determine whether a pitcher is on an upward or downward trajectory (equally tough cases here are Keuchel and Corbin, for completely different directions of performance).

• Depreciated1, Depreciated2, Depreciated3: three-year surplus value salary estimates, based on WARP from 2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018 (in order).
• ThreeYear: this demonstrates the relative change in contractual value from 2016-2018 to 2014-2016. This is a rough estimate of a pitcher’s contractual “trend.”
• Immediate: this is a three-year surplus value salary estimate based solely on 2018 performance without any depreciation. It should be read as some type of ultimate “short term bias” value (i.e., the most biased observer from 2018 would offer Patrick Corbin a 3-year contract worth more than $120 million).

It is tempting, giving the success of pitching coach Derek Johnson in Milwaukee, as well as the success of the fielding efficiency, front office analysis, and general pitching player development, to assess the offseason free agents by looking for “The Next Wade Miley.” But this is suspicious thinking for at least two key reasons: first, many players in the MLB change their pitching approaches and development without the success of Miley; second, the Brewers simply have the opportunity to re-sign Miley from the free agency pool if the club believes that his development pattern is sustainable and he can continue to provide rotational depth. There is nothing wrong with doubling down on a successful system when the same reasoning and critical measures are used to assess that system the second time around.

To demonstrate the extreme nature of what Miley accomplished in Milwaukee, witness his progression from bread-and-butter southpaw in 2016 to his current format of pitching:

According to Brooks Baseball, Miley was already morphing his pitching approach in 2017, and that does not simply involve his insistence on incorporating the cutter after July 2017. Miley switched from his “primary” rising fastball to his “secondary” running-and-sinking variation, which took selections away from his change, slider, and curve in 2017. The veteran lefty was basically becoming an all-forms fastballer, blending three fastballs at the expense of off-speed and breaking offerings. 2018 reversed that to a stunning extent, as Miley reduced the total percentage of primary, secondary, and cut fastballs he threw, and completely reorganized his secondary stuff around the cutter. What is interesting about Miley is that he traded groundballs for whiffs with the cutter, while whiffs “played up” with other pitches once he focused on the cutter. This is the fantastic accomplishment of Miley’s 2018: not simply the development of a new prominent pitch, but the systemic development of that pitch in a manner that improved his other offerings. It would be foolish to suggest that most pitchers could be expected to thrive with such a reinvention.

Among these pitchers, there is no “next Miley,” unless you want to lean heavily into suggesting the Brewers acquire Jo-Jo Reyes and Ross Detwiler as potential depth contracts (Detwiler has the “Brewers pitches” necessary to pique interest here). But that does not mean that the Brewers should not seek any of these southpaw free agents:

• Patrick Corbin is on the frontier of baseball as a slider-first pitcher, which is crucial in a game where the slider determines leverage in many cases (including diminishing a key divisional rival for the Brewers). Signing Corbin could be a huge deal for the Brewers, both for keeping the lefty away from divisional rivals looking to improve pitching (the Reds could certainly gamble here, given their excellent batting group and lack of arms, as well as the contending Cubs). If there’s anywhere that Corbin’s margins-of-the-strike-zone approach could succeed, it’s Milwaukee, although that doesn’t necessarily mean his profile is less risky overall. The Brewers could take the next step of working with Corbin to balance his new curveball with his slider. Ideal Contract: 3-years, $100 million. Maximum deal: 4-years, $150 million. (If the rumored contract ranges around 4-years and $120 million are true, I would call Corbin a potential bargin, even).

• Dallas Keuchel is an interesting pitcher insofar as he remains relatively consistent as he ages, even though his surplus grade demonstrates a harsh decline due to falling off from previously elite seasons. Even without being an elite pitcher, Keuchel remains quite good, and he’s tinkering with his approach to move away from his “true” sinking fastball and toward a cutter-offspeed approach. Keuchel’s potential knock working in Milwaukee would be using a relatively extreme groundball approach in front of an aggressively unorthodox defense, which would mean the Brewers would need to truly sell the veteran on their fielding approach. A Keuchel deal could be the most likely to end up “sideways” due to this profile.  Ideal Contract: 3-years, $75 million. Maximum deal: 4-years, $100 million.

• Wade Miley is entering his age-32 season having completely revitalized his pitching approach; by all appearances seems to be a likable and supportive teammate in Milwaukee; and against the Dodgers even flashed a hard fastball that demonstrates that his approach could continue to morph in 2019. It would not surprise me if the Brewers have an arsenal plan with Miley to take additional steps beyond the cutter, and I’d sign Miley before any of these guys due to that likely fact. Additionally, as the Brewers mature into perennial contenders (hopefully), they would do well to prove to players that they will turn some rehabilitation projects / value-depth plays into hard cash deals. There will be a time when value signings refuse to come to Milwaukee if their value produced never materializes into bigger cash. Start here. Ideal Contract: 2-years, $20 million, with a third-year option. Maximum: 3-years, $36 million.

• Gio Gonzalez is slowly morphing into a potential change-up first pitcher, making him a true veteran “junkball” option. Ideal Contract: 3-years, $36 million. Maximum deal: 3-year, $45 million.

• Given J.A. Happ’s age, the southpaw could potentially be a short-term deal with beneficial playoff experience and a fastball-first approach that could fit some aspects of Brewers pitching strategy (notable fastballers Freddy Peralta and Suter come to mind, for example). One-year contract between $12 million and $17 million.

• If you’re obsessed with the idea of making “the next Wade Miley” work in Milwaukee, Drew Pomeranz could be the biggest name among southpaws to make that work. Pomeranz struggled through 2018 as a bigtime fastball-curveball approach. In fact, the cutter even featured more prominently during Pomeranz’s successfuly 2016 season. Unfortunately, the groundballs and whiffs simultaneously dissipated, leaving this lefty a potentially expensive gamble with an arsenal, approach, and batted ball in flux. Pomeranz is a potential project. One-year, $10 million.

• It is not clear that Hyun-jin Ryu or CC Sabathia would be likely to come to Milwaukee given their recent roles in big markets (for quite some time) and playoff team roles. Francisco Liriano had a tough year in Detroit, and I unfortunately think there are better contracts offered to the other pitchers on this list.

• No lie, I’d hand out a minor league deal to Ross Detwiler, too, if he would be willing to work within the Brewers pitching development system. This southpaw is another potential “true junkball” lefty, but along with heavy change up usage Detwiler has also added a cutter, and could move away from his sinking fastball to his rising-riding primary variation.

The Brewers need starting pitching help. The Brewers need an ace.

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┻┳| •.•) #Brewers didn’t need a SP
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— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) July 31, 2018

Of course this would be the return line for the 2018-2019 offseason, because the line never went away during the season. A large faction of fans were dissatisfied with the starting pitching in April; they were satisfied with the starting pitching in May, “but can this staff beat ‘a dude’ in the playoffs?” (Yes!, it turns out); they were particularly dissatisfied with the starting pitching when the season ended in June and July, and again they were dissatisfied with the starting pitching at the trade deadline. This debate was simply never going to be won, because there is a contingent of baseball fans that refuse to either understand or accept what GM Stearns, pitching coach Derek Johnson, systemwide player development, and the front office are trying to accomplish. For arguably the first time in Brewers franchise history, certainly for the first time in a generation, the Milwaukee system strength is pitching, and not of the sort of high octane, all-risk dreamy profiles that flamed out at the turn of the 21st Century; this is a system that is built on turning a fabulous diversity of pitching profiles into potentially successful MLB profiles (witness the scouting range between Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes, for example).

When the dust settled, the system worked. The Brewers rotation was good. It was good any particular way you measured it; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on overall Games Started and workload measurements; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on true rotational scarcity (i.e., comparing each spot across the MLB); and it was a good rotation if you separate pitching classes into “true starters” and “replacements,” and measure each set of pitchers against different “spots” or “workloads.” The pitching staff was good if you believe in “Aces,” and it was good if you don’t believe Aces exist.

The Brewers rotation was good by every measurement except DRA, which should be the significant focal point of 2018-2019 offseason analysis in an effort to understand how Milwaukee assembled an elite fielding component in order to prevent runs.

If you do not wish to read the details, the table above summarizes the comparative results from each model. Each Brewers starter was assessed according to their relevant spot, and then compared by Innings Pitched (IP), Deserved Run Average (DRA), and Runs Prevented.

Rotation One: By Games Started
One way to assess a starting rotation is by ranking pitchers according to games started on a leaguewide basis. This ranking method is effective because it approximates the scarcity of both MLB resources (there’s not a whole lot of pitchers that can work full seasons) and roster construction. One benefit of focusing on games started instead of another performance metric is that analysts can reflect the success or failure of an MLB club across games started totals; for example, it matters that Gerrit Cole and Lucas Giolito both started 32 games despite widely divergent performances. The distance between Cole and Giolito is approximately 65 runs prevented, even though they worked the same number of starts, which raises an important question about how different teams assess the importance of effective starters versus soaking up innings. In fact, had Brent Suter and Zach Davies not faced injuries in 2018, they may have forced this question with the Brewers front office, and Freddy Peralta also arguably faced this (along with innings workload concerns) down the stretch run.

According to this measurement, there are approximately 10 rotation spots discernible by workload throughout the 2018 MLB, as well as emergency starters (who started one game; I will always assess emergency starters as their own category). On the surface, this is a pleasing model; the top starters by workload typically are the best starters in the game, even if there are differences between guys like Cole and Giolito, as discussed above.

On this model, it is clear that the Brewers succeeded because of their depth. A critique about the top of the rotation could be true in terms of DRA, as the contextual performances of Jhoulys Chacin and Chase Anderson were not comparable to top workload pitchers across the MLB. The importance of the depth should not be understated, from Wade Miley and Peralta to Brandon Woodruff and even Gio Gonzalez. If you’re reconsidering Gonzalez’s trade cost, not only should the veteran lefty’s surface performance be assessed, but one should not that, marginally, he was worth seven runs better than his median workload.

Another benefit of using this model is that analysts can assess “phantom” runs prevented where teams “miss” particular spots. For example, Chacin may not measure up to the median Top Spot prototype, but having his performance was better than not having a heavy workload pitcher whatsoever (in theory; Giolito’s performance would obviously have not validated a heavy workload benefit for the Brewers). If a team was missing a Top Spot, they theoretically would be punished 16-to-17 Runs Prevented. Milwaukee did not use a Five, Seven, Eight, or Ten workload, each of which approximately ranged from 2 to 4 runs below average; one could argue in this way that the Brewers also received 10 “phantom” Runs Prevented by avoiding these typical workloads.

This should help to validate the ideal that there are a couple of different ways to construct a rotation. A team could indeed bank on a Jacob deGrom type atop the rotation, and seek a 30 run advantage from their top workload. One must be careful of the cost for this type of pitcher, however, as if considerable resources are spent at the top of the rotation, they may be diminished at the bottom of the rotation. The Brewers demonstrated the “bottom-up” approach: they lost out on the Yu Darvish sweepstakes, and Alex Cobb did not bite on a one-year deal, so they proceeded with Chacin and Miley, plus their developmental pipeline. That internal pipeline was worth approximately five runs (better than their median workload) to the 2018 Brewers, while external candidates were worth more than 15 runs (better than their median workload). It was not flashy, there were no “dudes” on the marquee, but it worked.

Rotation Two: By Team

Of course, even the preceding model is relatively clean or “idealistic,” for MLB teams do not necessarily construct their rotations according to the same ideal. An additional method for assessing rotations is to judge each team’s rotation spot by turn; since two pitchers literally cannot start the same game, this method goes spot-by-spot, start-by-start for each MLB team. The benefit of this method of rotational assessment is that it reflects team preference, or injury and ineffectiveness circumstances, across the league. Some teams attempt to duct tape 13- or 14-pitcher rotations together, whether they are contending or tanking, while others attempt to yield more mileage from each spot. By giving each team one exclusive spot for each turn (until their pitchers run out), this type of rotational model can allow teams to be analyzed against attrition across the league.

Every team in the MLB required at least six rotational turns throughout the season, but this model demonstrates the divergence of team strategies one they hit six starters. Some teams preferred to give replacement starters two or three starts each, while others leaned on emergency starters.

The Brewers front office, coaching staff, and pitchers did a fantastic job weathering 162. They hit the right buttons in replacing some starters at certain points in time (such as resting Peralta down the stretch, or [arguably] “shuttling Woodruff between Triple-A and MLB), while giving starters room to breathe at others point in the season (this also applies to Peralta, who was given some time to adjust from rough starts, as well as Junior Guerra). By spitting on rotation spots 10 through 14, the Brewers also arguably saved 16 “phantom” runs, as the club would not have found effective pitchers (on average) digging that deep into league or organizational resources. (This line could be argued with further research, however, as one could note that someone like Corbin Burnes could have been effective in two starts, for example).

Rotation Three: By Type
During my time writing at Sportsbubbler (RIP) and Disciples of Uecker, I published annual starting pitching rotation rankings based on the decision point of 100 IP. If a pitcher worked 100 or more innings with 50 percent of their games as starts, they were a starting pitcher; if not, they were replacement depth. On this model, I attempted to assess pitchers according to Runs Prevented, with the ideal that (a) working a lot of innings should be worth more as a starter, and (b) rotation spots could be designated based on the resulting Runs Prevented rankings. I’m no longer certain of this method’s veracity, as I believe there are better ways to assess rotational scarcity and usage across the MLB. But, here we are, testing the Brewers 2018 rotation, so let’s assemble the pitchers.

Wouldn’t you know it, the 2018 MLB did not have many “true” rotation spots: there were only 129 pitchers across 30 teams that fit the first criterion listed above. This is not enough pitchers to fill a true five man rotation, and it’s hardly enough to fill a four man turn.

Yet, those Runs Prevented totals present some order to the universe. There are aces, even if there’s only a couple of them. There are nice middle of the rotation “dudes” that you can really sink your teeth into; 150 IP and 2 Runs Prevented feels like a solid effort for a team. Every contender would accept that workload (every MLB team would, for that matter).

Where there are not full-time starters, replacements are necessary, and MLB really dug deep in 2018: there were 227 replacement starters, including 57 Emergency Starters, across 30 MLB teams in 2018. Basically, on average, MLB teams were using more replacements than they were using regular starters. The Brewers are no different here, and in fact, that’s partially how they gained their value. Viewing the range of Runs Prevented across each of these roles should demonstrate the importance of having a solid organizational pitching strategy; replacement starters need not simply be the pitching equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall. Tampa Bay demonstrated this with their genius “Opener” strategy, and they produced one of the elite Runs Prevented units in baseball. The Brewers accomplished their success by using long-term replacements like Miley and Peralta, but they also received value elsewhere across their high-floor organizational depth.

If you previously thought the idea of “Phantom Runs Prevented” by not using a rotation spot was a suspect idea, this seems to be your chance to pounce on the Brewers for not using an “Ace” or true “Number One” starter. By this model, the Brewers were gutsy, punting nearly 63 runs prevented at the front end of the rotation. Yet, the club also did not use a true “Number Four” or full-time starter that should have been replaced, which bought the club another 43 runs prevented. All told, the Brewers rotation of regular starters lost the club approximately 19 runs here, thanks to their cavalier strategy.

Of course, the Brewers used every Replacement typology except a “true swingman,” and this is where the club torched the league. Gio Gonzalez and Wade Miley covered the lack of an “Ace” or “Number One” starter, and demonstrated the value in not having a Regular Four, either. Peralta, Dan Jennings (yes, Dan Jennings), and Woodruff gained significant Runs Prevented advantages in the replacement ranks as well. On top of these depth successes, the rotation was not bad overall; Suter and Guerra were close to true Number Three starters, and Anderson was close to a true Number Two starter. Chacin was better than a typical Number Two starter, boasting a Runs Prevented performance that almost placed him in a phantom “Number One” role for the club.

What is startling on this model is that the Brewers typologies also worked according to DRA. Once an analyst accepts that the club did not have a True Ace or True Number One starter, the threshold for assessing DRA is lowered significantly. Witness Chacin, for example, who was assessed against DRA that were significantly better than 4.00 on the first two models; his DRA performance looks much better on the final model, because once you stop comparing him to Aces, the comparison becomes more realistic. The Brewers deep organization also performs very well against median DRA requirements on this model, which raises a question about which model’s expectations one should use going forward.

The last remaining criticism for fans and analysts rests on how one interprets Deserved Run Average results for the Brewers rotation. On any model one chooses, be it based on Games Started, Team Rotational Turns and Scarcity, or Actual Runs Prevented performance, the Brewers’ rotation was good in 2018. Now it is worth digging through these models during the offseason, in order to gain important lessons for Corbin Burnes, Woodruff, and Peralta during their potential first full workloads in 2019, and even for reworking Jimmy Nelson. Milwaukee has proven the success that can come with aggressive rotational swings and an organizational pitching strategy, coupled with elite, efficient fielding.

An underrated 2018-2019 offseason would find David Stearns making moves to further improve the fielding (such as improving Right Field, and then working Christian Yelich primarily as a Left Fielder), which should in turn help boost the pitching depth strategy going forward. As it stands, the Brewers do not even need an external pitching move; this makes potential offseason moves even more interesting for speculation.

As such, there is no one more fitting than Miley to lead the Brewers into Wrigley Field. The Brewers are likely to face another lefty-heavy series against the Cubs, potentially including exact rematches (either Montgomery versus Miley or Quintana versus Chacin, depending on how the Cubs rearrange their rotation after Sunday’s postponement in Washington, D.C.). Known for his redeveloped cutter as a means for 2018 success, Miley presented that profile to the extreme in his last outing against the North Siders. The Lakeview club saw nearly 50 cutters from the southpaw on September 4, and otherwise Miley basically balanced his curve and change, shelving his remaining arsenal.

While the cutter gets top billing, the Cubs bats could not solve Miley’s curve and change, so it is worth watching to see if the wily veteran doubles down on the soft stuff.

During Zack Greinke’s rough stretches of 2011, a friend of mine once questioned whether the righty’s stuff moved too much. It’s an interesting concern to consider: typically, a pitcher might like as much movement as possible on pitches, in order to induce weak contact by keeping batters off balance (or unable to square pitches on the bat). I keep this idea in mind with Jhoulys Chacin, who throws a baffling array of wiggles and dips. During his recent stretch of five consecutive quality starts, Chacin whittled down his arsenal to a sinker (34 percent) and slider (50 percent), with his split and primary fastball balancing the remaining offerings. In his last outing against the Cubs, Chacin doubled down on the sinker, moving slightly from his successful August recipe. Which way will Chacin wiggle this time? His selections could not only help bolster a division run, but more importantly get the righty back on track to his August success.

On a more serious note, if a “true” junkball pitcher is one that throws a change up more frequently than any other pitch, what is a slider-first pitcher? Is a slider-first thrower merely a variation of a junkballer, or another type of pitcher altogether?

Meanwhile, Chase Anderson has not faced the Cubs since June, battling a couple of stretches of rough starts following his exceptional seven scoreless at Miller Park on June 12.

After allowing eight runs in 8.7 innings during two starts in the middle of August, Anderson has roughly produced league average starts for the Brewers, a crucial correction leading to a 3-1 team record during those outings that forcefully snapped a three-start team losing streak for the 2017 Ace. I presented both Brooks Baseball tables above because although it’s often tempting to look for pitch selection adjustments to help explain success, it’s worth emphasizing that Anderson has basically kept the same profile for his recent success that he was working with during some of his June-through-August rough stretches. What is key, however, is that Brooks Baseball strike zones demonstrate that Anderson is migrating from armside-upper zone (in on righties) locations to glove-side lower zone locations (away from righties). While the shift is not inducing more whiffs (yet), Anderson is yielding more ground balls without a notable arsenal rearrangement.

Most importantly, for the coming series, the weather in Lakeview should hopefully hold:

According to the National Weather Service, this Chicago outlook appears much better than the battered mid-Atlantic, where the Cubs and Nationals may have postponed Sunday’s game for nothing other than a chance for more rain:

With a potentially strong Hurricane reaching land in the mid-Atlantic and potentially forecast to stall during the week, one is inclined to question why MLB, the Nationals, and the Cubs did not simply attempt to postpone the Sunday contest until the end of the season (if it proved necessary to define the playoff race). As much as Brewers fans might enjoy sending shade over the wicked travel schedule for the Cubs, the safety of the players and personnel associated with both teams should be fully considered in this case. In this case, a divisional race during the first three days of this week should make for a delightful end-of-summer vacation at Wrigley Field.

Like the July deadline, David Stearns is giving Brewers fans transactions that can be viewed from many standpoints:

• Stearns is improving both key roles and marginal roles through both deadlines.

• Stearns is arguably stockpiling as much talent as is physically possible (within the constraints of the 40-man roster).

• The GM is dealing prospects with lofty Overall Future Potential (OFP).

• The GM is dealing ultimate roles that may be blocked (Brett Phillips), uncertain (Jorge Lopez), or years away from fruition (this can apply to everyone from Jean Carmona to Orimoloye, Lara, Connell, Dominguez, and Harrison).

• Stearns is looking toward potentially longer outlooks by acquiring several players with 2019 options or roster reserve rights.

This is a lot to take in, and frankly it’s made it difficult to write about the trade deadlines in one swift motion. For on the one hand, by estimating long term value of some of the roles traded away, it appears that Stearns truly did overpay in several deals in order to succeed within a short window. Yet, it’s not entirely clear that Stearns traded away anyone that was fitting into Milwaukee’s immediate window. It pains me to say this even with strong prospects like Brett Phillips, or serviceable roles like Jorge Lopez (one of my favorite pitchers in the system for a long time). As much as I love to use depreciated surplus value to assess trades, since it is a tool that attempts Benefit-Cost Analysis on players’ production and contract, Stearns is providing a clear template for critiquing moves outside of any WARP/$ framework.

Specifically, by moving clear MLB players from a small market club that ostensibly requires cost-controlled, easily reserved talent to win, Stearns’s deadline provides an excellent opportunity to survey the uneven landscape of player development. In this regard, it is worth noting that no trade can truly meet WARP/$ standards, because in the universe of player development a pitcher can add a new pitch or rework their mechanics, a batting can revise a timing mechanism or refine a swing, a player can fall under the influence of a new coach (for better or worse), or a player can simply experience a new environment in which opportunities shift. Information asymmetry is the landscape of player development, and thus MLB transactions, and in this regard no deal can ever reach equilibrium between parties, as both teams involved in a given trade will arguably be assessing players through different environments (this argument has hidden behind my work on depreciated surplus, but surfaced in a demonstration with the Brian McCann trade).

On Tuesday, another one of the prospects dealt away from Milwaukee acquired a true MLB floor as well, as the Baltimore Orioles selected the contract of RHP Luis Ortiz (traded away as the lead prospect in the Jonathan Schoop deal). Now, the “surefire” MLB players that one could have assessed from the July deadline deals are all in The Show (Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez are in Kansas City, and Ortiz is now in Baltimore). I will not be focusing extensively on Phillips’s case here, as he is doing pretty much what could have been expected on the day of the trade: starting in center field (21 of 26 games) and right field (4 of 26 games). Lopez and Ortiz, however, offer completely asymmetrical development from the Brewers’ system, and this is worth investigating because the Brewers have what is justifiably regarded as a strong pitching program, due to their track record in 2017 and 2018 (yes, in 2018!), oft-praised coach (Derek Johnson), and their unorthodox pitching acquisitions that appear to follow very specific profiles (this applies to everyone from Oliver Drake to Chase Anderson and Zach Davies, among others). Answering questions about Lopez and Ortiz may help to address other bizarre roles in the 2018 pitching system, most notably involving Brandon Woodruff, Adrian Houser, and even (arguably) Corbin Burnes.

First, let’s establish two role discrepancies that may be the result of different organizational interpretations of information:

• Jorge Lopez has already started four games for the Kansas City Royals, boasting an 18 strike out / eight walk / two homer / 37 percent ground ball profile (4.86 Deserved Run Average). He has alternated good and bad starts thus far. However, the Brewers failed to use Lopez as a starter in 2018, instead employing Lopez as a successful member of the Triple-A shuttle team between Milwaukee and Colorado Springs; this mirrors Lopez’s 2018 minor league role (reliever) and follows his organizational shift to relief role in 2017. Despite what may be viewed as a spotty command profile and a lack of a deep pitching arsenal, the Royals promptly started Lopez and have him shifting sinker / riding fastball and slider offerings to “re-balance” his approach.

• Luis Ortiz battled some injuries and stamina concerns during his time in the Milwaukee organization, which spanned 44 games at Double-A Biloxi across parts of three seasons. Ortiz was mostly a starter in the Milwaukee organization, building his innings pitched total to career highs in three consecutive seasons; the righty is now at 99.7 innings and counting upon entering the MLB. Upon acquiring Ortiz, Baltimore assigned him directly to their Triple-A Norfolk club, and now are selecting his contract for a September showing. One might surmise this is to help boost his innings pitched total closer to 120.0 IP by season end, setting the youngster for a perfectly respectable workload floor for 2019.

Since I do not have additional, unpublished scouting information on Ortiz from his short time in the Baltimore organization (and there do not appear to be any updates from Norfolk), I am going to simply note that according to his minor league game data, there is no discernible statistic that demonstrates why the Orioles might recall the prospect. Alternately, there is equally no discernible argument as to why the Brewers did not view Ortiz as an immediate depth option to potentially bolster a contending pitching staff (and their aggressive handling of Freddy Peralta supports that question).

On Ortiz, the following table is from Baseball Reference CSV:

I would like to reject the “Orioles have nothing to lose” argument for recalling Ortiz, and I’d apply that same reasoning to the Royals, as well. For example, the Brewers apparently have everything to lose in 2018, and they entered the season with Jhoulys Chacin, Yovani Gallardo, and Wade Miley as their major pitching acquisitions for a year in which they probably suspected Jimmy Nelson would miss substantial time. The point being, “having something to lose” has not kept the Brewers from making unorthodox development moves and acquisitions, and that applies equally to starting Freddy Peralta ahead of top pitching prospect (and much clearer starting role) Corbin Burnes as it does to Chacin, Gallardo, and Miley. For goodness sake, the club just recently acquired veteran southpaw Gio Gonzalez, a starting pitcher by trade, and then mentioned that they might not use him as a starter. So, it is clear that “having something to lose” is no motivator for the Brewers to make “expected” or orthodox pitching moves; relative position in the standings should not explain these player development moves.

The flipside of this argument, I will add, is that this should not be taken as a “Derek Johnson is magic” argument, either. I do not believe that Brewers fans and analysts should fall back on that argument, because it basically substitutes a new type of devotional thinking about pitching development for previous orthodox thinking about pitching roles, and solely using a coach’s successful cases for transactional justification is a bad thing. Those of us relying on public knowledge will not understand or know any of Johnson’s potential “failures” in terms of mechanical or arsenal adjustments among Brewers pitching. Furthermore, this type of magical line of argument about Johnson’s skills could thus theoretically justify any pitching acquisition, which should be viewed as ridiculous on the face of it. For example, none of us should be rummaging the lowest DRA of 2018 simply to argue “x, y, and z should be Brewers targets because of Wade Miley and Derek Johnson,” and that’s not meant as a knock on either Johnson or Miley.

Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, has provided new data as a member of the Royals, and the righty is demonstrating a complete shift in his arsenal. Brewers fans will recall that Lopez used his big, tall frame to generate a fairly traditional rising fastball, curveball, change up arsenal. During Lopez’s time in Milwaukee in 2018, the Brooks Baseball classification system captured a “sinker,” which might also be called a riding / running fastball (although the vertical movement readings on the pitch hint that it may actually be a sinker). Lopez also introduced some variation of a slider:

Thus far in Kansas City, Lopez has reoriented this arsenal by reducing his “primary fastball” in favor of his sinker and slider. Along with these noticeable moves, Lopez is also ticking up his change and curve slightly.

Lopez has had two rough starts, but his most recent start against the Orioles was the best of his young career. In this start, perhaps Lopez cashed out the most extreme version of his arsenal adjustment, working sinker or slider for nearly 55 percent of his deliveries. Yet that curve still figures prominently at 21 percent of his overall selections, meaning that Lopez could also be called a sinker-curve guy.

This new arsenal is a fantastic look for Lopez, and it raises a difficult question that is worth asking, but must be asked in the proper critical mindset and organizational vantage point: when is a pitcher simply a new pitch, or a re-balancing of their arsenal, away from success? When is a pitcher simply in need of an opportunity? I hinted at this question following the July trade deadline, as the Brewers traded a pitcher who might be dismissed as “merely serviceable” at a time of increased need for quality depth due to injuries and ineffectiveness. Yet the Brewers did not give Lopez a start, nor did they keep him as a fixture in the bullpen, perhaps as a multi-inning guy. I don’t mean this as a criticism of the Brewers, however, because one could have reasonably asserted at the time that previously lofty goals of Lopez’s rotational Overall Future Potential were a thing of the past; here we are, though, with the tide potentially shifting within the Royals rotation.

The least satisfactory answer is that the Brewers simply missed on Ortiz and Lopez. Perhaps they were so cautious with Ortiz as to miss the potential upside (or even the current MLB floor!) in his profile. One could have said on deadline day that Luis Ortiz was maybe two or three years away from being a true impact, Number Two starter (if he were to reach his ceiling); perhaps that logic misses the value of how good a low rotation floor can be on many days in the MLB (cf. the 2018 Brewers, from Wade Miley to Freddy Peralta and, yes, even Junior Guerra most days). A more realistic answer, and perhaps the Lopez development supports this, is that maybe Milwaukee simply was not the place for these developments; even the acquisition of Jake Thompson and Jordan Lyles suggests that Stearns may have already found other development projects that better fit the organizational plan.

It is interesting to work with these unsatisfactory, vague conclusions while designing a framework for assessing Brandon Woodruff’s future with the organization, or even the potential future role for someone like Wade Miley:

• Is Miley a Brewers pitcher now, worth a contract extension and a trip back to the well, a celebration of a job well done and certainly a job worth tens of millions of dollars?

• Is Woodruff, about as bread-and-butter middle rotation starter / potential impact relief profile as one could ask for, a pitcher with a steady rotation or bullpen future in Milwaukee?

• With the continued development of Adrian Houser as a starting pitcher in the minor leagues, is Houser already poised to become the MLB starting role recovery for the Brewers that Jorge Lopez was not?

The trouble with these questions is that they could be answered in different ways for different organizations, but the benefit is that the Brewers currently reserve an crucial opportunity to learn from their recent transactions and maximize their development approach with each of these pitchers.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

Miley, at first blush, was low-hanging fruit for this kind of punchline. The southpaw’s 2017 season was an inescapable disaster, and his 5.61 ERA / 5.27 Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP)/ 7.61 Deserved Run Average (DRA) cocktail suggests that no amount of bad luck was to blame for his misfortune (his 5.3 walks per nine innings could have told you that, too). It was an ugly season, any way you slice it. If that were Miley’s line this year, he’d absolutely be the first man sent to the ‘pen.

Of course, that’s not Miley’s line this season. By the most basic (and, to a contending team, arguably the most important) of standards, 2018 Wade Miley has been quietly excellent: His results are beyond reproach. In 11 games started for Milwaukee spanning 57.7 innings (and including an injury-shortened one-out effort against Cleveland in May), Miley has pitched to an astonishing 2.18 ERA. He’s allowed three earned runs once this season, in a five-inning effort that resulted in a no-decision. Every other time out, he’s held his opponents to two earned runs or fewer.

Dip below the surface and the picture isn’t quite so rosy, true. But it’s rosy enough. Miley’s FIP for the year is a strong 3.72, and his DRA is 4.24, both bests since 2013. He’s striking out only around six batters per nine innings, which is a career low among full seasons, but not too out of the ordinary. Miley has never relied on blowing hitters away with elite velocity or ridiculous breaking balls.

Rather, when he’s at his best, Miley uses pinpoint control to compensate for middling stuff, giving him the results of a mid-rotation starter despite a repertoire that suggests a back-end or swing role. Never was this more evident than in his terrific rookie season for the Diamondbacks in 2012, when Miley spun 194.7 innings of 3.33 ERA / 4.18 DRA ball and rode his 1.7 BB9 to an All-Star nod and a second-place finish in Rookie of the Year voting (he finished just seven points behind Bryce Harper). He’s never quite equalled that output, but he’s come close, with a 4.23 DRA the following year and a 4.39 mark in 2014.

This season represents a welcome step back in that direction. Fans can thank the cutter, a pitch that Miley dabbled with only on occasion before deploying last year with 11.8 percent frequency. This year, that number is up to 38.5 percent, trading places and then some with his so-so sinker. The cutter finally gives Miley a viable weapon against right-handed hitters, who have hit Miley for a .775 OPS on his career. Perhaps it’s the novelty of the new pitch (and new division), but righties are batting just .160 against the cutter this year, which Miley likes to ride low and in. Miley has also wrangled his free passes down to a respectable 3.4 per nine innings, and he’s been even better lately: Over his last five starts (28.3 innings), that number is down to 2.2; over his last three, it’s sitting pretty at 1.6.

Of course, running the ball over the plate with greater consistency comes with its own inherent set of risks. But Miley has a much better defense behind him in Milwaukee than he did in Baltimore. Despite a greater number of balls in play, his Walks and Hits per Inning Pitched (WHIP) is down almost half a point from its ugly apex. Miley continues to be a solid ground ball pitcher, but his excellent 0.47 HR9 number is unsustainably low, as is the career-best .269 Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP) allowed. He’s stranding over 80 percent of runners on base. Many of these numbers scream regression. Crucially, though, they doesn’t scream regression to “horrible.” Just to somewhere in the vicinity of that 4.24 DRA.

Miley is pitching well at the right time for Milwaukee. (Paradoxically, his injury-shortened season may have something to do with that. Miley has historically run out of gas in September, with a 5.08 ERA in just shy of 200 autumn innings. This year, he’s fresh.) He’s not the sort of pitcher you’d want starting a Wild Card game, never mind this year’s sterling bubble-gum stats. But he’s not exactly a liability of the “I can’t believe a contending team is giving this guy the ball” variety, either. He’s rediscovered his command with the Brewers and has experienced a good amount of luck. The result is an average pitcher, just as he’s been for much of his career. That makes him a perfectly fine bet to keep the team in the game for fifteen or so outs. Even as Gio González warms the bullpen bench, Miley has earned the right to soak up some more innings down the stretch. And with Junior Guerra struggling and Zach Davies something of an unknown after his return from injury, González will get his chance, as well.

Photo: Jeff Hanisch, USA Today Sports Images

New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KBQ19VcMZ4g7oW1jkGiYwxCadqjw3rYXkqN200f4lHc/edit?usp=sharing

With this in mind, it is worth previewing the Brewers and Cubs series by highlighting Chicago’s superior playoff rotation. One of the most common questions that appeared throughout the offseason, and sometimes during regular season chats on @bpmilwaukee Twitter, is whether the Brewers have a rotation that matches the Cubs. After nearly 75 percent of the season, there is a definitive answer to this question:

And I’m not being disingenuous about this: I understand how one can scout the set of Kyle Hendricks, Jose Quintana, Jon Lester, and now Cole Hamels, in terms of stuff and experience, and label them an exceptional rotation that is set to demolish the upstart Brewers. I understand that completely. These are proven guys, too, as Jon Lester has a 1.77 ERA in six World Series games, Cole Hamels has a 3.48 ERA in 16 (!) career playoff games, and the unsung hero Kyle Hendricks has a 2.88 ERA across the Cubs’ recent playoff runs. In fan consciousness, these are the types of pitchers that teams need in order to succeed.

So, the Brewers’ excellent team defense (.722 defensive efficiency according to Baseball Prospectus) leading a lovable, motley crew of rotational ragtaggers hardly seems fun when you could string together a rotation that cost around $100 million annually plus prospects like Eloy Jimenez and Dylan Cease. This price was underscored at the deadline, when Stearns presumably refused to send talent like Corbin Burnes and Keston Hiura to Tampa for a pitcher like Chris Archer, or a pitcher like Josh Hader to New York for one of the Mets aces. It’s rarely stated out loud, but one has to guess that the Cubs’ ability to afford a legitimate sticker shock rotation informs at least part of the jealousy in the hearts of Brewers fans.

Yet here we are: the Cubs have the worst rotation among NL division leaders, and the only contending club with a rotation in worse shape is in Pittsburgh.

One of the common complaints I see in debates about the pitching staff is that the Brewers solely have a great rotation for weathering the regular season. This is typically meant to be an indictment of their lack of playoff talent, while still recognizing that indeed the Brewers prevent runs. But, I do not think that the general paucity of quality MLB starting pitching is understood.

For example, take a look at how MLB starting pitching categories rank by Games Started:

If MLB pitchers were evenly distributed and then ranked solely by games started workload (which is essentially “times through the rotation”), by SP #91 the average workload is approximately 70 percent of the size of the first starter; by SP #121 the average workload is just about half the workload of the first starter; and so on. This table should explain the need to design a pitching rotation with more than five spots, which to my mind vindicates the manner in which David Stearns constructed his rotation (see Zach Davies, Brent Suter, and of course, Jimmy Nelson, alongside other in-season injuries suffered).

Ranked by Runs Prevented, it should be striking how quickly the #2 spot falls off from the top slot, and the sheer volume of innings pitched worked by replacement types. This table should demonstrate the baffling inefficiencies in assembling an MLB rotation (evident prior to 162 games, even!), and the extent to which an uneven distribution of talent can be assumed and exploited by front offices. This should help to underscore the strength of Stearns’s rotation building strategy in 2018.

What you will undoubtedly notice is just how good the top of the Brewers rotation has been, relative to the remaining MLB teams, in terms of Runs Prevented: they do not have a #1 starter, but did feature three #2 starters entering Sunday (Junior Guerra, Wade Miley, and Chase Anderson). This sounds like the beginning of a riddle: would you rather have a rotation with a true #1 and a true #9 or #10? Or a rotation with a bunch of #2s and #4s?

Are there other “Playoffs Rotations”? Let’s have a look across the National League, and also survey three phenomenal AL clubs. How many clubs actually have top rotations suitable for the playoffs?

(1) Cardinals and Pirates: Lately, the Cardinals and Pirates have come on strong in the Wild Card race, and both clubs have rotations that would have to stretch to fit a “Playoffs Ace” mold. Miles Mikolas had not even pitched stateside over the last three seasons, and the righty is leading the Cardinals rotation along with rookie Jack Flaherty; Jameson Taillon is almost certainly an “ace” by the definition of some, but Joe Musgrove arguably was not viewed as a potential improvement upon Gerrit Cole when he was acquired (surprise!).

(2) National League East Leaders: In the National League East, the race between the Phillies and Atlanta is fun because both rotations are lead by young or up-and-coming starters. Plus Anibal Sanchez, which has to be one of the best acquisitions for 2018.

(3) National League West is the Ace Race!: The Diamondbacks and Dodgers get us into “Playoffs Ace” territory, with both Zack Greinke and Clayton Kershaw serving key rotational roles. But even here, one should notice the bizarre assemblages of rookies, upstarts, and comeback candidates gracing both rotations. Two of the best rotations in the MLB certainly have their top rotation types, but after that, it drops off quickly.

Can we appreciate that Clayton Kershaw is having his worst season in a decade, and has prevented 16 runs?

(4) The Rockies and Nationals are contending, too: Of course, the rotation most fans have in mind when they think of a playoffs rotation is the Nationals, who feature Max Scherzer, Stephen Strasburg, and Gio Gonzalez. Additionally, the Rockies are playing at the edges of the Wild Card race with Washington, and they may have the closest thing to a true five-man rotation on the Senior Circuit.

(5) Divergent Top Rotation Fates: Mets and Cleveland:It may be kicking someone while they are down, but prior to looking at the rotations of Cleveland, Boston, and Houston, it is worth looking at the Mets rotation to emphasize that top rotation talent does not always materialize in playoff contending teams, or even elite runs prevention. Noah Syndergaard has struggled with injuries, lagging behind his much-praised teammate Jacob deGrom; both are cited as aces that the Brewers would do well to acquire, even given the steep price.

Meanwhile, Cleveland’s rotation may better suit the “cost” at which the Brewers can comfortably acquire elite pitching. Trevor Bauer and Corey Kluber were both acquired in three-team trades, in which Cleveland surrendered Shin-Soo Choo and Jake Westbrook (respectively). Meanwhile, Carlos Carrasco was part of a relatively large rebuilding move (Cliff Lee and Ben Francisco), and Mike Clevinger was acquired in a depth move. This quartet of trade acquisitions and long development cycles is now worth 100 runs to Cleveland, without always having accompanying prospect hype associated with that type of runs prevention.

(6) The True Playoff Rotations?: Boston and Houston demonstrate two extreme ends of the spectrum of rotation building. The Red Sox feature high-cost aces (Chris Sale and David Price), as well as a couple of pitchers acquired in rebuilding or counterbuilding moves (Andrew Miller and Yoenis Cespedes trades, respectively). On the other hand, the Astros rotation demonstrates the acquisition of three varieties of stalled veterans (Charlie Morton, Justin Verlander, and Gerrit Cole) who fit profiles the Astros front office and coaching staff could work with, as well as a supplemental first round pick (Lance McCullers) and seventh round pick (Dallas Keuchel). If any team has a model for acquiring pitchers that fits Milwaukee’s budget, it’s the former team of GM Stearns.

While the tables above should demonstrate the wide ranging backgrounds, scouting pedigrees, and production demonstrated in contending rotations, I am presenting the following table as basic summary of the last three years of performance among the top Runs Prevented pitchers for current NL contenders (sticking with #1 and #2 starters). Once again, the point is to emphasize the relative variance in performance among these pitchers, as well as the number of newcomers leading these clubs.

Basically, the player development profile of the 2018 NL vindicates Stearns’s rotational vision: in a league run by newcomers, comeback players, and depth acquisitions, a league that requires nearly 10 starting pitchers per team to complete a season, building #TeamDepth was a viable playoff strategy. Stearns has constructed a rotation that compares well to the rookies and comeback kids leading many of the playoff clubs, while also giving fans the fun of rooting for the underdog when Milwaukee faces the few remaining aces in the league.

Taylor Williams appeared in two games over the weekend; in two innings pitched, he allowed seven runs on nine hits and three walks with two strike outs, while his Earned Run Average (ERA) jumped a full run. Williams is primarily a fastball/slider reliever, with the fourseam fastball as his primary pitch. Against left handed hitters, he starts off hitters with a fastball, then increasingly is willing to throw the slider, maxing out his usage rate for the pitch when the batter has two strikes, throwing it out the zone to generate swings and misses. When facing righties, there isn’t a particular sequence, other than that Williams prefers the fastball if he falls behind in the count. Overall, Williams is looking to keep the ball low and away from the middle of the plate to sustain his success. So what happened over the weekend?

Williams had some trouble with his location. On both plots, there are too many pitches up and over the middle of the strike zone. Considering he threw twenty sliders over the two outings, there are not enough pitches buried low. Interestingly, even with the lack of feel on the pitch, only two of the hits came against sliders which caught too much of the strike zone. Batters have swung at 44 percent of his pitches this season, yet in these two games they swung at 51 percent. The movement on his fastball also slightly changed. He got a little less horizontal break and a little more vertical break, which could explain why he was hitting so much of the plate on his pitches.

There was certainly some luck involved in each outing. Poor defensive play and an infield shift created runs out of two balls in play which should have been routine. The Dodgers also got some good swings on well-located fastballs, which is unfortunate but something that happens in baseball. In between his two terrible innings, it’s worth noting that Williams pitched a scoreless inning with two strike outs on ten pitches. It won’t provide much comfort to fans reeling from the past few weeks of baseball, but we probably don’t need to worry about Taylor Williams.

Wade Miley started on Friday night, the first game that Williams blew. In his second start since being activated from the disabled list, Miley pitched six innings, allowing one run on four hits and two walks, while striking out two batters. The low strike out numbers is buttressed by the anemic whiff totals, which are below his season (to date) numbers. Miley’s whiff rate for his career is only 21 percent, and his six percent whiff rate on Friday is not sustainable.

After using it sparingly in his first start off the disabled list, Miley brought back his cutter on Friday and used it more than any other pitch. However, it was only his featured pitch against right handed batters. Against righties, he had no fear with the cutter, using it most frequently when the batter was ahead, the count was even and with two strikes. However, against left handed hitters, he used his four seam fastball on more than half of his pitches and paired it with his slider, which he barely threw to righties. It’s not clear whether this is a new overall approach, or just a choice he made for the Dodgers’ lineup because he hadn’t pitched like that earlier this season. It’s also not clear whether Miley can sustain pitching with this approach. By Friday’s game plan, Miley was basically two pitchers: with a fourseam fastball or cutter paired with a slider or changeup as his primary options. Maintaining a feel for all of his pitches against an unbalanced lineup could be difficult. There’s also the pressing question of whether a pitcher with the lack of a proven track record should be experimenting with so many pitches rather than focusing on executing two or three. Regardless, for one night this worked, and it’ll be interesting to see how he game plans in the future.

The Brewers have a full slate of games this week. They play Washington in three games at Miller Park before heading to the west coast for four games in San Francisco. The Nationals have disappointed relative to preseason expectations, and they’ve underperformed their Pythagorean over/under by 3.6 games, which is 27^th in MLB. The Giants are 31-19 at AT&T Park, which is the third best home record in the National League, coincidentally a half-game ahead of Milwaukee.