There are methodological shortcomings to both scouting and statistical reports. Scouting reports have shortcomings in terms of potential observer biases or preferences, limited looks (even some organizations draft a player after only one look), and privileged information (or, at times, even intentional asymmetrical information from clandestine “sources”); statistics are impacted by all the contextual factors present at the MLB level, but perhaps even moreso age, quality of competition, developmental cycle (i.e., first trip to a level), and proprietary development assignments that will typically be unknown to external observers. These factors diminish the meaning of minor league statistis.

BPMilwaukee benefits from work with the Baseball Prospectus scouting team, which consistently uses a radical “eyes in the field” approach to drive scouting reports that are therefore often divergent from, and perhaps less hype-worthy (a good thing), than many industry competitors. (One example here would be the 2016 approach to RHPs Brandon Woodruff and Phil Bickford, compared to sources like FanGraphs and BaseballAmerica). To supplement reports, which can be gathered from BP player pages and daily prospect summaries published on the website, statistical analysis can be applied to index contextual factors that could impact the perception of a player’s performance. To this end, I will publish a two part series detailing the contextual factors impacting Brewers regular (or semiregular) batting and pitching minor leaguers, which should hopefully add information to the use of scouting lines throughout the offseason.

I choose the method of indexing statistics because it is relatively straightforward in terms of user interface: every metric can be measured against a “constant” or comparison variable, such as “Player Total Average (TAv)” versus “League TAv.” In an index, 1.00 can basically be read as “average,” for it means that a player’s metric perfectly matches the comparison metric. For example, Outfield Michael Reed played during his age-24 season at Class-AA Biloxi, and the Southern League had a median age of 24; therefore, Reed’s age index is 1.00 (after all these years, Reed is still not “old” for advanced minor league ball).

For system wide reference, here is a key:

For this exercise, I indexed Age, TAv, Opposing OPS (oppOPS), and Park Factor statistics drawn from Baseball Prospectus CSV (retrieved September 13, 2017). These categories do not exhaust the information available, but they are arguably foundations for measuring the typical quality of the regular players in the league, the quality of opposing pitchers, and any extreme (or not) park environments. Note that I did not focus on Rookie classes (Pioneer League, Arizona League, or Dominican Summer League), as those leagues are not only (arguably) more instructional in nature but also representative of professionals at their earliest stages of development (therefore, I am not quite certain what Rookie class stats “say”).

I used two methods:

• Once I created an Index for each of these statistics, I weighted each player’s OPS by assessing it against the Opposing OPS quality and contextual factors. Again, 1.00 can be read as average; below 1.00 can be read as below average, while above 1.00 can be read as better than average.
• To provide a quality control for this rudimentary method, I used a basic TAv Index. Since Total Average is already scaled to many contextual factors, it more accurately reflects a player’s performance within a specific run, park, and league environment (certainly moreso than OPS).
• By using a 50 Plate Appearance cut off, I captured 72 batting seasons performed by 63 Brewers minor leaguers.

A few observations:

• The very best statistical performances within the minor league system have varying degrees of scouting support. Keston Hiura, for example, was advertised as one of the best bats in the 2017 Draft (perhaps the most advanced college bat, even), and Hiura indeed scorched the Midwest League to the tune of a .326 TAv; he did so while being young for his league (during his first pro go-around), facing solid to slightly-tough opponents, and a moderate park environment. Jake Gatewood may have been the surprise breakout of the season, combining new contact lenses and mechanical advancements to pummel both Class-Advanced A and Class-AA leagues. Monte Harrison was another strong tools prospect – really, a fantastic athlete – that finally played a healthy season. Harrison and Gatewood diverge in terms of the type of Overall Future Potential roles they have, but here they converge in making great strides in showcasing their tools in 2017. On the other hand, Troy Stokes does not necessarily have the full scouting pedigree behind his statistical performance, which makes his 2017 season eye opening in terms of assessing an organizational depth role. Garrett Cooper was advanced minor league depth who went on to post a .275 TAv in 45 injury-shortened PA with the Yankees.

• Much has been made of the disappointing season by the much-hyped gang of Carolina bats (Corey Ray, Lucas Erceg, Isan Diaz, and Trent Clark). However, it should be underscored that they did not actually have bad seasons. At worst, they had arguably average seasons when considering their age and developmental status (each facing a new league the first time through). However, what is interesting is that each player has new scouting reports on potential flaws that could indeed impact Overall Future Potential; for example, a midseason 2017 eyewitness report downgraded Ray’s role, and several other members of the prospect team confirmed hit tool concerns throughout the season. This type of scouting concern cycle was repeated for several of these prospects, but it is worth nothing this was also scouts’ first full look at Corey Ray and Lucas Erceg. In this case, one ought to hold the conclusions on statistical and scouting assessments for another season, as more information will be necessary to understand these potential shortcomings. Anyway, hold the hype (and really, be healthy about hype in the first place!).

• There are a ton of interesting sleepers around here. Some interesting reports are floating around regarding infielder Wendell Rijo, for example, but the second baseman has never really flashed the stats. This year, Rijo graded solidly both in terms of contextual OPS and TAv. Clint Coulter remained young for his level (Class-AA Biloxi in 2017), and posted some intriguing peripheral statistics to go along with his overall solid line. Granted, there are few emerging reports on either of these players yet, which leaves room for a healthy dose of skepticism about future role. But, it’s worth remembering that many of these guys are so young when drafted that they remain young even through several repeated stages of Advanced ball development; hanging around at that upper level, one wonders what might come of a guy like Coulter after Garrett Cooper received trade interest.

• In terms of melding scouting pedigree and performance, Brett Phillips might have the best season of any Brewers prospect. While many viewed his 2016 campaign as a disappointment, there were several aspects of Phillips’s game that exhibited strengths even through the perceived weaknesses of his stat line. Of course, Phillips was also quite young for his level. The intriguing “elite”-4th Outfielder-to-potential CF or RF starter put it all together in 2017, including a couple of stunning cups of coffee in the MLB (including a 2-for-4, three RBI night with an Outfield Assist against the Pirates on Wednesday). Hiura has the flashiest immediate hype and performance, but Phillips’s full season production and realization of one aspect of his MLB future could arguably win him “Best Bat” of the system for 2017. I gather that someone like Monte Harrison most deserves a “Player of the Year” Award, but Phillips should not be discounted when considering the Brewers system’s best players.

Continuing age-based analysis of minor league statistics, the 2016 Midwest League could be the most interesting case yet. Unlike the Southern League or Pacific Coast League, the Midwest League featured a group of three different age levels with similar production, and two adjacent age groups that did not fall far. From age-21 to age-22 to age-23 players, Midwest League bats slashed .245 / .316 / .356, .249 / .318 / .352, and .247 / .317 / .353, respectively. On the outskirts, age-20 batted .249 / .307 / .367 while age-24 batted .252 / .315 / .333, giving the league an expansive middle ground of 345 players that can be judged by very similar production standards.

One might ask whether this reflects the nascent stages of minor league competition, perhaps where players may be closer to the same development curve, thereby exhibiting less stratification among minor league players. Perhaps Class-A is the first level at which “organizational lifers” emerge, or players hit their first professional ceiling and stick around for a year or two before heading to their next career. It would be worthwhile digging into a scouting explanation for this phenomenon, in order to see how the physical tools relate to the statistics; perhaps everyone (or almost everyone) at Class-A is still learning the strike zone, or pitch recognition, or some foundational trait that places the vast majority of players on the same level.

There are a number of notable bats that defined the Timber Rattlers in 2016. Isan Diaz produced one of the best seasons at the Class-A level, and although he did not win MVP, he certainly has the performance level worthy of consideration. Lucas Erceg also stormed the league out of the 2016 draft, demonstrating a completely different developmental stage (relatively polished college draftee) than Diaz. Along with Diaz and Erceg, several depth players produced interesting or good seasons, giving fans and writers more players to think about and watch during the 2017 campaign. Perhaps no one will be more interesting to follow than Monte Harrison, whose statistical line was damaged by a rough April and early-May, and whose hot streak was cut short by injury. Harrison has shown flashes of “putting it together,” so it will be crucial to see how he returns from injury.

Down in Florida, the Brevard County club had a rough season, mostly due to the bats. This level lagged behind in the system during 2016, and unfortunately, even age-based statistics do not allow one to reconsider many gems.

It is worth noting that Corey Ray produced a fine campaign, based on his age level and the fact that he was making his professional debut in an aggressive assignment. While Ray’s surface stats of .247 / .307 / .385 does not look very good, age-21 players in the Florida State League were notably worse than that production level, allowing one to see that Ray showed solid hitting, discipline, and (especially) strong isolated slugging. Even if one follows scouting reports to raise some questions about the hit tool, there is a sense that Ray’s tools are already showing up in his stat line, even if that line is depressed by his environment.

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It has been worth retelling this story over the last year, since the franchise is clearly changing their vision from the short term to the long term. But in this story, there is a clear difference between the talent landed by Melvin, and the talent that incoming GM David Stearns acquired from fall 2015 onward. The GMs worked the rebuild on several different fronts, which arguably has strengthened Milwaukee’s current position.

• Doug Melvin acquired prospects that could immediately begin playing in the MLB with a strong “floor” (or base skillset. See Barrios, Domingo Santana, and Zach Davies, for instance).
• Melvin bolstered his trades with advanced minors prospects that basically could and should arrive in the MLB around the 2017 trade deadline (Brett Phillips and Josh Hader).
• Outfielder Malik Collymore, previously a potential Top 30 member for the St. Louis Cardinals, is Melvin’s largest future play (along with January trade return, righty Marcos Diplan, which makes the Yovani Gallardo trade look more like a rebuilding effort).
• Stearns countered with low minor acquisitions that began filling out the system behind Melvin’s advanced acquisitions (this list includes roughly six players).
• The new GM also spurred several counterbuilding efforts, including trades involving Brewers’ prospect depth Cy Sneed, Trevor Seidenberger, and 40-man reserve asset Jason Rogers. This added significant “high floor” talent to the system, in the form of the “second-chance prospect.” It is crucial to keep mentioning this because this talent now largely escapes prospect lists (see Garin Cecchini or Keon Broxton, for instance).

With this development as a backdrop, Stearns’s 2016 deadline moves appear shrewd. The GM received a sizable amount of social media backlash for failing to demand the “hype” prospects, but what these prospects lack in name recognition they counter with tools. Previous top five Rangers prospects Lewis Brinson and Luis Ortiz could arguably top the system immediately, as Baseball Prospectus graded both players with strong 60 future roles. Giants prospect Phil Bickford received less stunning grades from the BP team, but even if Bickford ends up in the bullpen his role could grade out into the high leverage camp. Catcher Andrew Susac may be the best deadline acquisition, adding to the clear “second chance” prospect theme of 2016. Susac previously received future grades as a starting backstop, and, freed from Buster Posey, he will now receive the plate appearances to prove it.

So, the rebuild comprises approximately three clear fronts at the moment:

• Continue acquiring low minors talent to create solid pipelines of talent at each position (approx. 8 prospects).
• Grab as much advanced minors potential impact talent as possible (approx. 9 prospects).
• Acquire “second chance” or blocked prospects that have either “outlived” their welcome or do not have an impact role in their previous organization.

In terms of timeline, the rebuild has now added another notch. If you don’t believe that the system is quite far along, consider a three year window beginning with last year’s opening shot for rebuilding:

• 2015 (July, Offseason)
• 2016 (July, Offseason)
• 2017 (July, Offseason)
• 2018 (July, Offseason)

Milwaukee is now through approximately half of their midseason trading windows, and a quarter of their offseason trading windows. Of course, it is worth mentioning that if the club continues to land second chance prospects (like Jonathan Villar) and successfully develop them into regular MLB players (like “future third baseman”), that shortens the rebuilding window in terms of answering MLB question marks (“who will be the third baseman of the future?” Jonathan Villar).

In terms of result, one cannot necessarily call the rebuild a success until one defines the desired outcome (Championship? LCS? Consecutive division titles? Sustained 1525 Elo Rating? 900 wins between 2019 and 2028?). In terms of process, however, it is difficult not to praise the systems building efforts of both Doug Melvin and David Stearns. Melvin effectively ensured that the rebuilding years could sustain a high floor by adding near-ready prospects; Stearns could then continually look for talent across various levels without as much concern for immediate MLB graduations. Adding in various player development successes (from Michael Reed, Jorge Lopez, and Orlando Arcia in 2015, to Jake Gatewood, Jon Perrin, or Brandon Woodruff (among others) in 2016), Stearns can soon turn his future efforts to both acquiring depth and dealing from depth. The rebuilding process now becomes one of consistent velocity, where each player development success becomes an answer to a particular question. It is now up to Stearns to know the questions.

Perhaps the arguments are not what Brewers fans need any longer. So, to grade the progress of the rebuild, let’s visualize the system through three routes (the draft, the trades, and international signings).

Related Reading:
Three Up Three Down: Gatewood, Nottingham, Phillips
Three Up Three Down: Mallen, Orf, Perrin
Three Up Three Down: Diaz, Ponce, Yamamoto

If the 2015 season belonged largely to the 2011 draft (Reed, Lopez, and Jacob Barnes), the 2016 season belongs to the 2014 draft. Jake Gatewood is using mechanical adjustments to spur his most successful professional campaign, and a step into multiple positions to accommodate other prospects will only hasten Gatewood’s MLB opportunities (consider Gatewood the “true corner depth player” or “the 1B” or “the 3B;” that’s at least three potential MLB roles now). Brandon Woodruff is surging at AA Biloxi, thanks to his hard upper-90s fastball and strike zone dominance (78 K / 22 BB / 3 HR / 49 percent GB against 282 AA batters).

But, this is only two examples. If one seeks to construct a potential “Top 30″ list based on roles, floors, ceilings, and MLB proximity, the drafts are looking quite strong.

• KEY:
• Top Ten considerations in bold and italics, top 30 considerations in bold, [just interesting depth or MLB grads in brackets].

The drafts have provided a steady set of strong tools for the Brewers system, especially from 2014-2016. By contrast, the Brewers front office has revolutionized the system through trade. This is not to knock the draft, but to note that it features an entirely different purpose than the trades; via trade, Milwaukee has largely acquired players with better defined future roles / ceilings and tools than via the draft (which seems logical):

Finally, a revitalized International Complex has allowed the Brewers to more aggressively sign some top talent (like Gilbert Lara), and graduate more talent into the low minors. The international prospects are quite intriguing, if far from defining their MLB potential roles and tools.

SS Orlando Arcia will be recalled from Triple-A @skysox tomorrow. He will be making his Major League debut.

— Milwaukee Brewers (@Brewers) August 2, 2016

It is easier to dream, however, as Orlando Arcia makes the leap to the MLB:

If you’ve lost count, that’s approximately 23 MLB graduates, 16 prospects worthy of Top Ten consideration, more than 40 prospects worthy of Top 30 consideration, and at least another dozen “just interesting” prospects. This visualization should underscore the extent to which the Brewers system will soon bear MLB impact development and sustain “win now” trades (when necessary).

INF Aaron Hill and cash have been traded to Boston in exchange for RHP Aaron Wilkerson and 2B Wendell Rijo.

— #VoteBraun (@Brewers) July 7, 2016

Aaron Hill wasn’t technically a sign-and-flip player, but he essentially served that function for Slingin’ David Stearns and the Brewers after being brought in as a part of the Jean Segura/Tyler Wagner deal with Arizona. Coming off of sub par campaigns of .234 TAv and .241 TAv in 2014-15, the Diamondbacks were looking to shed as much of the $12 million final season of Hill’s contract as they could. Once Isan Diaz and Chase Anderson were added in to sweeten the pot, the Brewers agreed to take on Hill and pay $5.5 million of the money owed to him. He was installed as their regular third baseman to start the season, and the hope was that he’d play well enough to be able to flipped at the deadline.

Aaron didn’t disappoint. After a brutal first month that caused me to incorrectly call for his benching, Hill’s bat caught fire. Since May 1, Hill logged a torrid .323/.408/.481 slash line to bring his season total up to .283/.359/.421 along with eight home runs and four stolen bases. His .286 TAv is the highest he’s managed since 2013 and he’s been worth nearly two WARP already this year after combining for less than one WARP during the previous two seasons. Hill spent most of his time with the Brewers at the hot corner along with a fair amount of time at second base, which has been his primary position throughout his career. He’s received solid defense marks at both spots and will provide the Red Sox with some bench depth and versatility for a potential playoff run at a rather minuscule cost, depending on how much cash Milwaukee sends their way.

In exchange for Hill, the Brewers received a couple of interesting prospects. Aaron Wilkerson is the kind of story that you root for: the 27 year old right hander went undrafted out of NAIA Cumberland University after undergoing Tommy John following his senior season. He pitched for three different indy league teams during 2013-14 before hooking on with the Red Sox as a 25 year old and has done nothing but dominate his minor league competition since then. In 54 MiLB appearances covering 279.0 innings, Wilkerson has worked to a 2.52 ERA along with a 293:75 K/BB ratio. That includes a 2.44 ERA and 3.16 FIP in 48.0 innings in AAA this season, where he has struck out 54 batters against 11 walks.

The tools aren’t quite as dominant as the statistical profile suggests, however. According to Sox Prospects, the 6’3″ and 205 lb righty throws about a 50 grade fastball in the 88-92 MPH range, a 50 grade curve with 12-6 movement that sits 73-75 MPH, a 45ish changeup with good arm speed that sits 83-85, and an 82-84 MPH slider that is inconsistent and well behind his other pitches in terms of effectiveness. He doesn’t walk many guys and has excellent pitchability. An easy comparison would be to former Brewer Mike Fiers: another low velocity, high strikeout pitcher that’s on the older side. Wilkerson is most likely a back-end of the rotation type hurler at best, but given the fact that he was rumored to be on his way to Boston in the weeks before the trade came down, we can almost assuredly expect to see him pitching big league innings for the Brewers this season.

Wendell Rijo, the other piece of the deal, is the Brewers’ upside play here. A native of the Dominican Republic, Rijo signed with Boston as an international free agent back in 2012 and received a rather sizable $575,000 bonus. The 20 year old has displayed a good eye at the plate in the minor leagues, having walked in roughly 10 percent of his plate appearances while working to an overall .250/.329/.373 slash with 16 home runs and 50 steals across 333 contests. Once a plus runner, a torn ACL cost Rijo some of his speed and it’s closer to average now, though he’s still shown the ability to use his good instincts to swipe a bag. Rijo should develop an average hit tool with quick bat speed according to MLB Pipeline, though his limited arm strength pigeonholes him to second base defensively and he projects to have below average power.

The 20 year old right-handed hitter began the year in high-A but was quickly promoted to the AA Portland Sea Dogs, where he has looked over matched as one of the youngest players in the Eastern League. Rijo has struggled to a meager .186/.245/.266 slash (.195 TAv) through 51 games at the level. There’s certainly no rush with Wendell for the Brewers, so they’ll give him plenty of time and opportunity to allow him to hopefully develop into the “offensive-minded regular” that Pipeline suggests Rijo could become at the keystone, though a utility/fringe starter type of player is probably the more likely outcome here.

All in all, it’s tough not to like this trade for the Brewers. Aaron Hill looked like a corpse for two years in Arizona before his surprising age-34 renaissance with Milwaukee, so we really should be happy that the club was able to extract any sort of value from him. At the end of the day, receiving an MLB-ready back end starter and a possible fringe-regular middle infielder in exchange for an expiring contract is excellent work by Slingin’ Stearns, who has certainly wasted no time in putting his stamp on the franchise.

Turns out having one of the best all-around front offices in baseball is pretty fun.

— J.P. Breen (@JP_Breen) July 7, 2016