In the cases of both Woodruff and Burnes, the answer is quick and easy, “no” and “no.” Neither pitcher has the combination of raw stuff, command of that stuff, and mechanical execution that renders those 70 or 80 Overall Future Potential (OFP) grades (since OFP operates on a scale of 20 to 80, the top grade is obvious ace territory, and the 70 grade usually runs a “1/2 pitcher” description that makes that grade worth including in “ace” territory). Of course, in the case of Woodruff and Burnes, both pitchers were not even listed as Top 5 arms within the Brewers system by Baseball Prospectus entering 2017. The duo fell behind Top 10 rankers…

• LHP Josh Hader (55-60 OFP, #3 SP or #4 SP / high leverage relief)
• RHP Luis Ortiz (50-60 OFP, #3/#4 SP)
• RHP Cody Ponce (45-50 OFP, average starter / late inning relief or #4/#5 SP or solid relief)

…as well as “Others of Note” RHP Devin Williams (“classic projectable righty”) and RHP Marcos Diplan (“probably future relief” but has “polish and command”). In fact, it is arguable that even with the top five arms in the system, the Brewers do not have an ace.

There is certainly an argument to be made that scouting is an imperfect science, and that perhaps the BP scouting team did not properly price Woodruff’s secondary stuff progression in Class-AA Biloxi, or that they underrated Burnes’s draft day pedigree and almost immediate professional ball impact. Yet, since the BP team bases their scouting approach upon an on-the-ground team that values actual looks, and arguably has more aggressively realistic future prospect grades than other outlets, it is difficult to see the exclusion of either Woodruff or Burnes from the 2017 Top 10 (and “Others of Note”) lists as mistakes. Similarly, accurate “useful middle to back rotation” scouting profiles might indeed “rank” lower than 15th in this Brewers system, but (more importantly) that ranking is not an insult to either player because useful MLB player should never be viewed as a slight on a prospect report.

To complicate matters, even the “accurate” ace grades do not always work out. Perhaps the best current case for this is RHP Lucas Giolito, who ranked atop the White Sox system in 2015 and landed the coveted 70 / 80 OFP (elite starting pitcher or #1/#2 starting pitcher). Giolito was a projected “ace” for many reasons:

“fastball easily works 93-97; can reach back for more; big arm-side run in lower band (93-95); explosive offering; can already throw to all four quadrants; curve shows deep two-plane break; power pitch; adept at replicating arm slot and disguise to fastball; high confidence in offering; will use at any point in the count; commands to both sides of the plate; already plus to better; elite potential; flashes feel for change; turns over with a loose wrist; displays fade with late drop; early makings of strong pitchability.”

Obviously, fans are inclined to take the good without the bad, and running with that Giolito grade also required the downsides: “Lot of body to control; can drift during landing and open early; diminishes fastball command at times; still in the early stages of building stamina; some effort in delivery wears him down; stuff can get loose and sloppy deeper into outings; velocity trails off third time through; will wrap wrist when delivering curve from time to time; change has gap to close to reach on-paper potential; loses action when throws too hard; doesn’t presently command pitch well; leaves up in zone due to early release.” Giolito was the ace in 2015, but even though he’s since dropped in rankings, the new Giolito remains a rarity in a farm system (a 60 OFP, #3 starter).

This exercise could go on and on. As far as 70 OFP aces go, recently there’s Zack Wheeler, Dylan Bundy, Taijuan Walker, Jonathan Gray, and Alex Reyes to consider. These pitchers have had their ups and for the most part remain coveted arms for nearly an organization insofar as few rotations would reject these contributors. But even with great performers like Michael Fulmer, the equation is tough; Fulmer was a 55 OFP with questions about injury and consistency that could potentially impede a #2 type starter. There is no exact science to aces, and picking one is hardly even an artform.

Even Yovani Gallardo, “an outstanding pitching prospect,” missed the ace label and was hit with “#2 and occasional All-Star” as OFP. Should 20.3 WARP signify a #2 arm, that designation would probably serve Burnes, Hader, and Woodruff quite well (and I gather Gallardo’s career earnings justify that, as well).

My standby comment to respond to Burnes / Hader / Woodruff ace talk, or the Brewers system in general, is to comment “aces do not exist.” This is not a throwaway comment, either. Aces do not exist, in the sense that from a scouting profile the grade is so rare as to basically be obsolete within the minor leagues; in the sense of performance, it is categorically true that few pitchers can be great, especially consistently so. The fun with Brew Crew Ball leader and BPMilwaukee Prospect Editor Kyle Lesniewski’s #2016BrewersAce coverage of RHP Junior Guerra is that it hit on something quite central to baseball: even in the most unorthodox historical package, Guerra emerged to dominate batters in 2016. Guerra prevented 22 runs in 2016, a feat hardly matched by a dozen arms in the NL; his splitter was one of the most effective of all time in terms of Brooks Baseball tracking, meaning that Guerra had the stuff to back up the moniker. It was both immensely fun and funny for Guerra to serve as ace, funny in the sense that the Brewers missed front rotation potential in several drafts, but landed it in the form of an age-31 rookie claimed off waivers.

In the sense that Guerra was an ace, I suspect many Brewers fans believe Burnes or Woodruff or Hader could be an ace. This is an interesting problem to discuss because it runs deep beyond semantics. It is not merely semantics to say that a “scouting ace” and a “statistical ace” are different; the difference could land the Brewers a pennant. The trouble with this determination is that it is no easier to define the dominance of a statistical ace. For example, can an ace be one-off? Could an ace have a one-and-hopefully-not-done season, perhaps like Guerra’s 2016 campaign, or does an ace require multiple (consecutive, even!) years of success in order to be termed “an ace”? But in this sense, someone like Kyle Lohse becomes an ace, which is certainly not how many fans (especially not Brewers fans) use the term; but Lohse was a fantastic pitcher from 2011-2014, posting four consecutive better than average runs prevented campaigns.

One might call this the classic, “Is Yovani Gallardo an ace?” question. Obviously this stuff is more than semantics, because we still are inclined to talk about it in 2017. It matters to fans to say, while discussing Burnes or Hader or Woodruff, someone like Gallardo might not be an ace but was a very, very good pitcher, perhaps the next level immediately behind ace (a true #2 starter, perhaps). The table above is obviously just one captured moment in time, as it excludes 2009 and 2010 campaigns in which Gallardo was phenomenal (2.98 and 3.49 Deserved Runs Average (DRA) respectively, with 185+ IP both years) and Lohse was in transition and recovering from injuries. In either case, perhaps neither Lohse nor Gallardo are “aces” in the aspirational sense of the term, but both pitchers were among the top Senior Circuit starters for an extended period of time.

Data:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FeW8mCqDqzf6e6OGlq4SwP0tmIYlT2cpcG288mLQCDw/edit?usp=sharing

But, it’s worth chasing “aces,” and certainly a definition as such. I dove into my runs prevented data, kept annually from 2009-2011 at Sportsbubbler and Bernie’s Crew (unfortunately 2009-2010 are lost), 2012-2015 at Disciples of Uecker, and 2016 personally (officially unpublished). Analyzing a set of 845 individual pitching seasons reveals quite stunning variance that underscores the difficulty of defining acehood.

The big data are not thrilling; a 16 runs prevented season does not strike the “acehood” sense quite like Clayton Kershaw or Zack Greinke when they reach 50 runs prevented in a season. Yet, isolating those 85 pitching seasons above the 16 runs prevented threshold is quite interesting. Indeed, Junior Guerra was an ace in 2016, and by quite a bit (22 runs prevented being significantly better than 16); Gallardo and Lohse are definitely aces; so was Ian Kennedy, Jair Jurrjens, Dan Straily, Doug Fister, Kris Medlen, Wade Miley, Jhoulys Chacin, Henderson Alvarez, and of course Bronson Arroyo. What is striking about this list is the lack of regulars; only 20 pitchers in the 2011-2016 National League reached 16 runs prevented in two (or more) seasons:

This, if anything, should underscore the rarity and strangeness of acehood. Madison Bumgarner has reached 16 runs prevented exactly twice, and in this definition would be exactly as much an ace as Tanner Roark. What’s intriguing about this argument is that by constructing the counterpoint that there is more to being an ace than preventing runs, such as pitching consistently throughout multiple seasons, or consistently serving as a workhorse, acehood once again becomes something that is quite murky and ill-defined. In order to argue that Tanner Roark is not an ace but Madison Bumgarner is, one is required to shift slightly away from peak performance, and search for criteria that will ultimately dissolve the definition of an ace.

Incidentially, only 20 starters in the 2011-2016 NL worked at least 200 innings more than once, although the list diverges quite a bit from the 20 runs prevented aces above. Here, again, Yovani Gallardo answers that ace question with years of consistency:

Combining innings pitched and runs prevented, one can truly see the amount of variance that is inherent in pitching performance, which should be the last nail in the coffin of “acehood” and thus (hopefully) relieve the pressure on the Brewers to develop “aces.”

For this aspect of analysis, I constructed a times series involving every 2011-2016 NL pitcher who appeared during consecutive seasons in the rotational rankings (excluding “emergency starters,” who by definition only worked one start). If you’ve ever imagined that pitching performance varies a bunch on a seasonal basis…indeed it does! When faced with the criterion of working in at least two consecutive seasons from 2011-2016, 216 NL starting pitchers produced 724 pitching seasons, and their performances varied wildly on an annual basis. On a yearly basis, each pitcher might be expected to add or subtract 57 innings and add or subtract 12 runs prevented. To put this in perspective, given that 10 runs is typically understood to be worth “One Win” to an MLB club, each of these pitchers might be expected to either add or substract at least one win on average when they worked in consecutive years. 57 innings is a season’s work by a replacement starter, further demonstrating the importance of understanding variance inherent in starting pitching.

One might expect some outliers to exist, but once again, searching for “consistent” pitchers (pitchers who varied less than the average starter during consecutive seasons) piles doubt on a clear definition of “acehood.” Searching for pitchers with variance reasonably close to the +/- 12 Runs Prevented and +/- 57.0 IP marks reveals fourteen pitchers that started during consecutive years from 2011-2016 while doing so with consistent performance:

[Really, it’s even worth arguing whether Bumgarner, Gio Gonzalez, Mike Leake, or even Tom Koehler and Jon Niese should appear on this list, because 14-to-16 runs prevented is notably higher than 12 runs prevented.]

Once again, the usual suspects are near some quite unusual arms in terms of “ace” discussions. Few would classify Jon Niese or Tom Koehler an ace; when Marco Estrada was traded to the Blue Jays, Brewers fans did not readily call him an ace when they waved goodbye (would one be happy if Burnes or Woodruff or Hader produced Estrada’s career?). However, this list should show the value of the “middle rotation” or #4/#5 scouting designation, as certainly there is room in MLB for arms like Niese, Koehler, and Estrada. Perhaps this list even casts some light on the Arizona Diamondbacks trade for Shelby Miller; maybe a pitching strapped club was not entirely shortsighted when they traded for a 15 runs prevented starter with extremely low variance between seasons (alternately, perhaps they should have looked into the other shoe dropping). Each of these points demonstrates why one should not be concerned with the ranking of the Brewers’ young prospect pitchers, and instead simply await the variance they will produce and hope for the best convergence of variance-cycles during contending seasons.

Aces do not exist. Aces do not exist in terms of scouting, where pitchers can receive ace designation as prospect and “back up” in terms of stuff, face injuries, or even hit banal developmental hurdles. Aces do not exist in terms of runs prevented, where very few arms are able to prevent runs or even work high innings pitched totals in multiple years. Finally, aces do not exist in terms of consistency, for very few National League starters demonstrated the ability to work consecutive seasons with better than average variance between 2011-2016, and many of the arms that are consistent are not “elite” performers that invoke the ideal ace. None of this should be surprising, for pitching is truly difficult, perhaps the most difficult mechanical exercise in all professional sports. This is the logical and empirical conclusion, which should drive a moral conclusion opposed to hanging “ace” tags on pitchers like Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, or Josh Hader. Each of these arms might meet one of the markers used in this article to draw ace-like comparisons at the MLB level, but the overwhelming odds are they don’t; but that alone should not be construed as a bad outcome, for there are bountiful career options without the designation of “ace.”

Data:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FeW8mCqDqzf6e6OGlq4SwP0tmIYlT2cpcG288mLQCDw/edit?usp=sharing

Photo Credit: Caylor Arnold, USAToday Sports Images

Related Reading:
Cashing Out OFP
Translating OFP

Anyway, it’s fun to continue testing the model, so let’s head back in time to assess one of Doug Melvin’s iconic moves. The Brewers’ previous President and GM famously went all-in on July 7, 2008 by trading for one of the very best arms in the game, and perhaps the best available trade asset in the MLB at that moment. To that point, franchise ace Ben Sheets had heroically paced a beleaguered pitching rotation with 96 K / 26 BB / 12 HR in 117.0 IP and 11 of 17 quality starts (including a shutout and two additional complete games). Given Sabathia’s monstrous second half for Milwaukee, where the southpaw almost seemed to will the Brewers to the playoffs, it’s easy to forget that Sheets was one of the elite pitchers that season (4.81 WARP, 3.37 DRA, and 0.3236 Post-Tunnel Break, good for twelfth best among MLB pitchers with 1000 pitchpairs); his efforts to win while pitching through a torn elbow ligament also cost him millions on the impending free agency market. On July 7, 2008, the Brewers were 3.5 games behind the division-leading Cubs, and they were outplaying a .513 Pythagorean Winning Percentage (based on Runs Scored and Runs Allowed). Something was going to give, but with Prince Fielder and Ryan Braun coming into their own, and Sheets’s free agency the first closing window for these Brewers, this was a great chance to improve the club.

For the day-of-trade analysis, I’ve priced out Michael Brantley as the PTBNL. Considering Taylor Green as PTBNL leads to different questions, although it is worth noting that neither Brantley nor Green made the Baseball Prospectus Top Prospects entering 2008. One could even argue that Green would have been priced similarly at this point and time. This model shows that in terms of Sabathia’s purest short-term value, Cleveland arguably undersold his OFP:

Once again, the tricky aspect of Benefit-Cost Analysis is considering the window through which one constructs value. If an analyst is inclined to depreciate Sabathia’s three-year-plus-2008-first-half performance, a second half with the southpaw does not look thrilling for the Brewers. Here, the ace might add a win to the club, although given their proximity to the playoff race on July 7, one win could add as much as $20 million or more in revenue to Milwaukee. On the other hand, an analyst using Sabathia’s immediate performance would conclude that the ace was just the type of asset suited to add several wins to the Brewers. Certainly, Sabathia was the type of asset worth surrendering top prospects from the Milwaukee system, especially given that the farm was already on a downward trajectory after graduating that classic young contending core.

Obviously, one can apply this analytical rigor to the prospect assessments as well. Despite a top ranking for Milwaukee, Baseball Prospectus recognized that defensive and contact shortcomings could sidetrack LaPorta’s power/discipline package. Nevertheless, even those risks gave LaPorta a strong price (and entering 2009, LaPorta was even ranked ahead of Carlos Santana in Cleveland’s system!). Even on the day of the trade, Cleveland returned a relatively risky prospect package for a proven ace like Sabathia; Brantley was the most advanced and seasoned prospect by that point, and even he did not grade into the top rankings of a middling Brewers system. Green might have even been viewed as a more interesting prospect gamble at that point; Rob Bryson was a depth arm with very little professional experience; and even for all his glamor, LaPorta had just reached his 100th professional game at the time of the trade. Zach Jackson was interesting insofar as he had a very high ceiling for a lefty depth arm, and perhaps his best case scenario would be bolstering a pitching staff losing its ace during a 37-51 first half (as a fun aside, Cleveland actually outplayed Milwaukee after the trade!).

Brewers fans could easily write off those prospects after Sabathia worked four consecutive quality starts to begin his tenure in Milwaukee, including a shutout and two additional complete games before the calendar even turned to August. When your team is the team that is trying to win MLB games, suddenly those risks look much steeper on those prospects, and the ceilings look less attainable. It may be an unjustifiable bias, but then again, there are many inputs, outputs, and interpretations necessary to run a Benefit-Cost Analysis. When the dust settled, Sabathia’s seven complete games (three shutouts!), 128 K / 25 BB / 6 HR, and 2.45 DRA drove a 4.5 WARP in the second half. Most importantly, Milwaukee actually made the playoffs, immediately paying out that prospect gamble with playoff revenue (which must be included in post hoc analysis).

The playoff revenue should not be underestimated: if one takes the harsh depreciation of Sabathia, and expected the trade to be a talent deficit for Milwaukee, the revenue (along with Sabathia’s WARP) covers the vast majority of any talent deficit in the trade. Adding in compensatory draft picks under the old, problematic draft-and-free-agency system made the trade look fantastic after one year:

It’s quite difficult to assess the value of a single draft pick. Historically, the Brewers had two strong picks to compensate for losing Sabathia. Yet, to say that the Brewers could potentially gain five wins from the 39th and 73rd picks does not seem quite right. Thus, in order to judge those compensatory picks, I steeply depreciated those picks against the odds that even the vast majority of 39th and 73rd picks fail to reach the MLB. Even this depreciated model makes those draft picks appear quite valuable. In addition to the production on the field and the playoff revenue, Milwaukee’s front office could reasonably gain an additional win in surplus through those compensatory picks. Given the short window and lack of prospect value leaps (or decline) for Cleveland to this point, the trade was swinging heavily in Milwaukee’s favor.

In hindsight, it’s easy to see Michael Brantley’s breakout as one of the factors that could potentially dig into the value Milwaukee received in the trade. However, it’s worth pushing back on this by noting that even after three-and-a-half years, the additional players involved in the Sabathia deal, as well as the Brewers’ compensatory picks, stalled. The Sabathia deal seemed to linger in the air of the front office, as Melvin clearly took the lesson to be a valuable one when he unloaded for Shaun Marcum and Zack Greinke to lead the 2011 and 2012 Brewers pitching staffs (both quite solid-to-great deals). Even Brantley appeared to be in a difficult position, failing to deliver defensively in centerfield, and not necessarily producing enough offense to offset that performance.

Even three-and-a-half years are not sufficient for assessing some trades.

As an aside, it’s interesting to question how a market rate deal for Sabathia could have worked out in Milwaukee, especially with an opt-out clause as signed in New York. Looking back at the three-years after Sabathia’s tenure in Milwaukee, one could argue that pumping that playoff revenue back into a huge deal with the southpaw could have been beneficial for the Brewers. This would obviously have completely changed the timeline for contending in Milwaukee, however, and probably would have netted a completely different set of supplemental deals for the franchise. Anyway, never forget that Sabathia produced 17.8 WARP during his first three years with the Yankees, serving as one of the most valuable free agent pitchers in history (those three years alone were worth nearly $125 million for New York’s Junior Circuit club).

Looking at the final tab, the Brewers received incredible short-term surplus from Sabathia. In fact, the lefty actually produced surplus that matched nearly 70 percent of his highest day-of-trade value estimate: thanks to Sabathia’s performance, the Brewers actually cashed out surplus in on-field wins, which should bar none be considered successful. Sabathia’s production (at his contract rate!) and playoff revenue shredded the depreciated surplus estimate of $13.4 million for the ace. If one wants to be particularly bold, prorating this surplus from Sabathia’s half season to a full campaign gives the Brewers quite a trade return in annual terms. Of course, Michael Brantley’s breakout for Cleveland more than makes up for Matt LaPorta’s bust (and really, the non-return of Jackson and Bryson to boot), and technically, one could argue that Milwaukee’s failure to maximize those supplemental draft picks in 2009 ate into some of Sabathia’s value.

56 percent of Brantley’s total value to Cleveland was produced in 2014. Let’s take a moment to appreciate the prescience of Cleveland’s extension offer to Brantley to avoid arbitration entering 2014. To that point, the outfielder claimed approximately 3.7 WARP on reserve contracts, providing relatively solid value to Cleveland. After moving to left field from center field, Brantley leapt from significantly below average FRAA to a serviceable 2.4 FRAA figure, bolstering that .271 TAv to drive a 2.5 WARP 2013 season. Depreciating that 2013 season against his previous performances, Brantley offered Cleveland approximately $22 million in surplus to the club entering arbitration for 2014, but the $17.5 million total value in 2013 perhaps added an exclamation point to that depreciated figure. Cleveland GM Chris Antonetti maximized every ounce of that surplus, handing it all to Brantley in a neatly wrapped four-year, $20.5 million deal with an additional signing bonus of $3.5 million and $1 million buyout on a 2018 option. Even with an injury-plagued 2016 and average 2015 campaign in the rearview, that huge .320 TAv, 20 HR / 20 SB 2014 season from Brantley pretty much completed the full extension.

With these positive figures, it must be emphasized that Brantley has the benefit of eight-and-a-half years from the day of the trade to reach this level of surplus for Cleveland; in this regard, the high monetary value produced must be prorated in much the same way Sabathia’s must be prorated, which leaves a lack of a satisfactory answer to the long-term-versus-short-term question in Benefit-Cost Analysis for MLB trades. It’s difficult to determine when and how teams succeed or fail in trades, especially given that short-term and long-term outlooks, not to mention specific teambuilding goals, can produce wildly fluctuating assessments. Nevertheless, it’s hard to imagine living in the universe where Sabathia was not a Brewers ace for those magical three months.

After one year, this trade raises many question marks. Granted, there’s still quite a lot of value present in the trade, both in terms of future rotation potential (or trade value) for Houston (with Fiers), and trade, controllable contracts, and hopefully potential performance for the Brewers quartet. Still, even raising these types of vacant hopeful pleasantries does not substitute the fact that one year out, what looked like a blockbuster for both sides is creeping toward a somewhat value-neutral non-event. If there’s any lesson to be drawn from this trade, however, it is that the perception of a trade can change over time, and that a trade’s legacy is certainly not finished on its consummation day, nor one year later. In 2017, this trade might still have those value questions for Milwaukee, and even in 2018 or 2019; yet, it is somewhat absurd to suggest that analysts must wait five years to assess the total value of the trade. What is more interesting is to dig deeper into those years and understand how a trade’s legacy and change year-in and year-out.

I know no better trade with which to demonstrate this point than the Zack Greinke trade orchestrated between the Brewers and the Royals. It was commonplace during the 2014-2015 World Series appearances (and Championship) by the Royals to hear Brewers fans groaning about how former President Doug Melvin traded away Championship-caliber players, but it’s easy to forget that by opening day 2013, the quartet of youngsters traded to Kansas City had dwindled to two roster spots (Alcides Escobar and Lorenzo Cain) and a total of 3.1 WARP between the 2011-2012 seasons. Interestingly enough, Zack Greinke suffered his own surface stat nightmares in 2011, waddling through a productive WARP season while ranking fourth best in terms of runs prevention on a solid, consistent Division Championship rotation. Still, the trades for Shaun Marcum and Greinke were indeed vindicated by the Division Championship and League Championship Series run, which undoubtedly netted the Brewers significant playoff revenue shares, not to mention local merchandise.

Greinke netted a strong 8.67 WARP for the Brewers before the front office traded the righty away midseason 2012, understanding that the club would not be able to defend their NL Central crown. By the end of 2012, the trade looked like a rout — the Brewers netted 8.67 WARP, playoff revenue, and Jean Segura, while the Royals controlled the contracts for 3.1 WARP worth of production; about the only benefit Kansas City could claim were those reserve rights.

Using harsh 3-Year, 10-percent depreciation analysis, as with the other sections of the Grading Trades series, one can see that the prospective value of the Brewers prospects matched up quite well with the production value of Zack Greinke; various WARP or contract surplus estimates place the trade package within 80 percent of Greinke’s expected value, which seems quite good for estimating trade value.

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP in 2010; 0.14 3-Year Depreciation ($0.5M). Contract surplus: -$5.8M. 

***

Of course, Wade Davis and James Shields may have been more crucial to the Royals’ postseason success than Cain or Escobar (not to say they were unimportant), and both of those righties were traded in a package involving the Royals’ Jake Odorizzi. It is interesting that fans almost never mention that Doug Melvin traded away a depth prospect that allowed the Royals to land crucial Championship-drivers, instead focusing on the controllable Cain and Escobar. Trades are as important to building contenders as controlling players, and the Royals instantly turned around their fortunes even while making a trade that caused much head-scratching at the time (myself included). By 2013, the Zack Greinke traded proliferated to two other deals, as the Royals matched Brewers newcomer Segura with their own acquisition of key production assets.

The Jean Segura story has been told multiple times, and it may be worth revisiting it again a few years in the future. But here it is most interesting to point out that even if Segura had an up-and-down-and-out performance in Milwaukee, the shortstop may have helped to net one of the franchise’s new cornerstones. Isan Diaz, Aaron Hill, and Chase Anderson are the latest branches from the Greinke deal, with Wendell Rijo and Aaron Wilkerson added to the family by extension of the Aaron Hill deal. And so this trade moves on and on: with Diaz, the Brewers have another potentially elite trading chip, or a potential middle infield cornerstone if everything goes right.

It is nearly impossible to write these twists and turns into the Greinke trade saga. Kansas City drew 14+ WARP from James Shields and Wade Davis, although one gets the sense that WARP sells short the situational mastery of Davis. Milwaukee received more than 10 WARP of production from Jean Segura before netting a 50-60 grade surging prospect in Isan Diaz. These figures can be added to total production received by both clubs in the original Greinke deal. Of course, even Cain and Escobar famously overcame their 2011-2012 hiccups to bolster the Royals with valuable play during their contending seasons. Prorated to normalize six years of performance against Greinke’s year-and-four-months for Milwaukee, the production value of the original Greinke deal again appears quite evenly matched:

EDIT: Updated November 2 to add Yuniesky Betancourt. 1.5 WARP (2011); $5.5M contract surplus ($16.0M total annual value). NOTE: 6.6 FRAA in 2011 (!!!).

***

So, one can only imagine the twists and turns that the Gomez-Fiers trade will take in Milwaukee. One can extend this lesson to nearly every trade, in terms of understanding that the lineage of a trade can take winding manifestations that are never imagined at the time of that trade. It remains to be seen if Hader, Houser, Phillips, and Santana impact the next Brewers contender more via trade or their own performances, or a mix of both. If the first year is any lesson, it is worth expecting another strange twist in 2017.

As we head towards the end of January and little of major import is happening anywhere near the field, I thought it would be fun to take a look at the Brewers’ pitchers success (or lack thereof) at the plate over the past fifteen years. That is an arbitrary cutoff, selected because 2001 kind of marks the turn of the century, and fifteen is a nice, round number. When I begin discussing individual performances, I will be referring only to pitchers who have accumulated at least 90 plate appearances so as to get a decent enough sample size to eliminate such offensive luminaries as Francisco Rodriguez (career 1.000 OPS in two plate appearances) but also a small enough one to include Zack Greinke (97 plate appearances with Milwaukee) who is now famous for his hitting with the Dodgers.

This is not something that purports to explain the club’s lack of success in that time, nor will I attempt to figure out why they have not had quality hitting pitchers. The range of hitting outcomes for pitchers is so narrow that being good or bad is mostly irrelevant; the best team OPS in this fifteen-year sample belongs to the Cubs, and their .398 mark is just 53 points better than Milwaukee’s — or roughly the same as the difference between Josh Donaldson and Mike Trout in 2015. Instead, this should serve to both entertain as well as explain that pitcher hitting does not appear to be a skill that is predictive or all that meaningful.

We should perhaps begin with the massive outlier here: Brooks Kieschnick, whose 115 OPS+ is the only one on this list that even approaches average. However, he was also a position player who only pitched in the big leagues with Milwaukee, so his being labeled as pitcher — while technically correct — perhaps understates his skillset. Regardless, his 144 plate appearances is a relatively large number that does bump up the overall production of this group.

There are no other outstanding performances; Glendon Rusch was the second-best Brewers’ hitting pitcher of the millennium, and his 54 OPS+ is both nothing to write home about and only marginally better than Yovani Gallardo (46) and Chris Narveson (44). Differentials that small and at that low a level are not particularly significant. In fact, one might take Gallardo’s sample size (about four times larger) than either Rusch’s or Narveson’s and conclude that he was a better hitter than Rusch, simply because we have more confidence in the validity of Gallardo’s numbers. Ultimately, though, such a distinction is unnecessary.

Of the four starting pitchers who are likely to be in the Opening Day rotation for the 2016 Brewers, only Wily Peralta and Matt Garza have accumulated enough plate appearances to be on this list, and both are absolutely brutal hitters (-39 and -53 OPS+, respectively). Of course, if the two of them return to the form they’d shown through 2014 on the mound, their hitting performances will be irrelevant.

Aside from Kieschnick, who holds a unique spot in modern baseball history, the most interesting member of this list is Zack Greinke. Since 2013, when he began his stint with the Dodgers, Greinke has earned a reputation for being an excellent hitting pitcher, and, indeed, his 85 OPS+ in those three years did in fact lead all of baseball. One might assume that he simply needed the consistent at bats to truly show off what he could do after spending much of his career prior to joining Los Angeles with the Angels and Royals. However, he did spend 2011 and 2012 in Milwaukee, and he was not a good hitter. He put up a 27 OPS+ and a .171/.198/.280 line in a hitter-friendly ballpark, which is decidedly not impressive. However, essentially as soon as he joined the Dodgers, he became one of the best hitting pitchers in the game.

We should not draw any conclusions from that statement; it is not as if the Brewers hitting coaches, who have developed some of the game’s best hitters in the last decade, have a blind spot when it comes to pitchers and Greinke just needed to escape their tutelage. Instead, we should probably just remember that pitchers are not particularly good at hitting; after all, even with his 125 OPS+ in 2013, Greinke’s career 65 OPS+ is far closer to that 27 mark he posted with Milwaukee than one would have expected given his last three years.

Whenever I watch pitchers hit, I am reminded of a 2009 article by ESPN’s Jerry Crasnick in which he discusses Aaron Harang’s lack of hitting talent.

Harang has lots of different bats and gloves in his collection, and he genuinely strives to be good.

The only thing holding him back is a lack of talent.

As professional competitors, pitchers undoubtedly want to help their own cause at the plate. However, whether it be because of a lack of talent or a lack of an opportunity to practice, they simply are not able to do so. The Brewers, despite having rostered one of this generation’s best hitting pitchers, have had very little success when their pitchers step into the box. That is not a cause for worry, though, because no other team has had much success, either.

The Diamondbacks may have been one of the few teams less likely than the Brewers to rise up and spend the money necessary to acquire Greinke’s services. The move has thrown the balance of power in the NL West entirely out of whack. Neither the Dodgers nor the Giants could have been considered a great team in 2015, while Arizona surprised many by hanging around .500 through the entire season. Greinke’s move to Arizona could make the Diamondbacks a contender, particularly if they aren’t done adding talent to this squad.

But to me, the most intriguing story to emerge from Greinke’s new deal comes from this Jayson Stark tweet:

Hearing lots of consternation from other clubs about the Greinke deal. Sources say the Dbacks got almost $80M in revenue sharing last 3 yrs

— Jayson Stark (@jaysonst) December 5, 2015

Consternation? What could the other owners be mad about, other than the fact that they just got outspent on one of the finest pitchers in the world? As Stark elaborated, the crux of the issue is that the Diamondbacks beat out richer teams using money from the revenue sharing pool — that is, they effectively stole Zack Greinke from the Dodgers with the Dodgers’ own money. While that may indeed be consternating, this is also exactly the purpose of a revenue sharing program. How do you bring a star player to a stagnant franchise in an unattractive city? You pay him.

The suggestion that the Diamondbacks somehow stepped out of line by paying for Greinke is absurd for a few reasons. It’s absurd because Major League Baseball already tries to artificially lower free-agent market value through anti-competitive measures like draft pick compensation (just ask Kyle Lohse) for years. Major League owners even went so far as to collude against the players, which eventually resulted in a $280 million settlement with the players in 1990. Collusion allegations have popped up occasionally since then, most notably regarding Barry Bonds’s forced retirement in 2008. Less well known is that MLB owners also paid out $12 million from the luxury tax funds in the CBA in response to allegations of collusion in 2002 and 2003, although the agreement was made with no admission of guilt.

It’s also ridiculous because this deal almost certainly had less to do with revenue sharing than it had to do with the Diamondbacks’ gigantic new television deal with Fox Sports Arizona, worth $1.5 billion over the next 20 years. After the Greinke move, we already know Diamondbacks CEO Derrick Hall was lying when he told reporters, “No, we really can’t” become big spenders behind the new television contract, which included a signing bonus. Television money has been a huge determinant in who can spend and who can’t in the Major Leagues, and as I wrote for Sports On Earth  back in 2014, the richest of the rich teams are taking action to ensure the millions they rake in through television stay in their own coffers. Multiple large-market teams have taken huge equity stakes in their regional sports networks, most notably the Red Sox (80 percent), Dodgers (50 percent), Phillies (25 percent) and Yankees (20 percent) because that money, conveniently enough, isn’t subject to revenue sharing.

This is the kind of rule that should infuriate Brewers fans, because the Milwaukee market will always be at a huge disadvantage with respect to the power of TV money purely based on population counts. Milwaukee remains the smallest television market in the league. Television has swiftly become the primary source of revenue for baseball teams, and for these teams to hide that money from revenue sharing through ownership stakes in a television channel that primarily exists to broadcast and profit from baseball games blatantly flies in the face of the spirit of any revenue sharing program.

In the eyes of baseball’s owners and executives the problem here is the Diamondbacks, who dared to spend some of the television windfall that is falling into owners’ laps across the league, who dared to improve the product on the field rather than pocket the extra profit. And that tells you everything you need to know about how little they care about the fans, the players, or any of the people who actually give life to baseball in America.

In a sense, Lucroy said two important truths: (1) the Milwaukee Brewers must rely on a consistently excellent minor-league system to overcome the barriers presented by a small-market revenue stream; and (2) he’s unlikely to re-sign with the Brewers and will explore his options in free agency. Hell, it wasn’t difficult to read between the lines and understand that he’d welcome a trade to a contending club. Lucroy emphasized that he and his family love the Brewers, the city of Milwaukee, and the fans; however, winning is paramount for the Brewers’ catcher. Nothing wrong with that, either.

This article doesn’t seek to explore Lucroy’s motivations for prioritizing winning over remaining with a single organization. That hardly seems necessary. Instead, this article is more interested in unraveling his comments about the big trades in 2008 and 2011 that hollowed out the system and has resulted in a paucity of talent in Milwaukee. It seems to me that this assessment is mistaken in several aspects.

First and foremost, it’s a fallacy to assume that a player’s developmental path would have happened in an identical fashion in Milwaukee, as it did in another organization. Coaches change. Circumstances change. Environments change. Teammates change. Roster priorities change. Assuming that a player’s development is somehow foreordained and would’ve happened whether that player came up in the Brewers organization or another organization is making a dangerous mistake. And it’s not about the Brewers’ coaching staff or developmental staff being lesser. It’s about recognizing that context matters and different people react to the same person in divergent ways. For example, if Jake Odorizzi didn’t join the Tampa Bay Rays, he wouldn’t have learned his split-changeup from Alex Cobb, which transformed his career. Sure, there’s a small, random chance that someone in the Brewers’ organization could’ve taught Odorizzi the same split-change, but one has to desperately reach for that argument.

More examples could be cited—such as how Brett Lawrie didn’t get along with the Brewers’ minor-league staff and once refused to go to the Arizona Fall League—but the overarching point should be clear. Player development is not independent of environment. Lamenting over a former prospect’s success and how it could’ve been in Milwaukee is only natural, but mostly an exercise in wishful thinking.

Secondly, the Brewers’ weak farm system is primarily a function of poor drafts between 2006-2011 (save 2008) and a lack of international activity until the past couple years. Here are the organization’s first-round picks since 2006:

• 2006 – RHP Jeremy Jeffress
• 2007 — 1B Matt LaPorta
• 2008 — 3B Brett Lawrie
• 2008 — RHP Jake Odorizzi
• 2008 — LHP Evan Frederickson
• 2009 — RHP Eric Arnett
• 2009 — OF Kentrail Davis
• 2009 — RHP Kyle Heckathorn
• 2010 — RHP Dylan Covey
• 2011 — RHP Taylor Jungmann
• 2011 — LHP Jed Bradley

A small-market team cannot afford to miss that many times in the first round. Jeffress and Jungmann are in the big leagues, but it’s not really a “win” when one’s first-round picks become middle relievers and fifth starters. Zero impact came from these drafts. One could perhaps argue that 2007 was a success because LaPorta helped net CC Sabathia, but if we’re talking about trades gutting the farm system, it seems somewhat hypocritical to cherry-pick which players to approve of being traded because they ultimately flamed out.

The Brewers must be able to trade prospects for elite players from time to time, as waiting for a magical run where all a team’s prospects develop in unison for a long-term window of contention is fool’s gold. That doesn’t happen. Even when the Brewers hit on many draft picks in the early-2000s, they still needed to go out and acquire CC Sabathia. The key, though, is that the team’s draft-and-develop processes must be quality enough to fill in the gaps left by the trades. As one can easily see by the above list, the Brewers did not hit the mark between 2006-2011. Things have improved in recent years; however, that doesn’t cover the missteps from previous scouting regimes.

One of the least discussed factors in the Brewers’ weak farm system is the team’s lack of commitment to the international market in the same time frame. The Brewers didn’t even re-open a Dominican training complex until late-November. Even then, their Dominican Summer League team didn’t have enough players and needed to be split with the Orioles organization. While other teams heavily invested in the Latin American market and capitalized on acquiring talent outside the MLB Draft, the Brewers rarely spent money, and when they did, they were forced to send them to their AZL club, which then added a myriad of “culture-shock” challenges to the normal player-development ones. Again, the Brewers have rectified their previous missteps in the international market in recent years, but it doesn’t make up for the gaps created by previous regimes.

Finally, and what I think is the most important argument when addressing the trades made in 2008 and 2011, if the Brewers wouldn’t have made those key moves, the organization would likely still be waiting to make their first postseason appearance since 1982. The 2008 Brewers wouldn’t have made the postseason without CC Sabathia, and I don’t think that’s a controversial statement. Similarly, the 2011 Brewers would’ve been extremely hard-pressed to grab a 2011 postseason berth without Zack Greinke and Shaun Marcum headlining their rotation, especially given the injury to Yovani Gallardo early in the year. I even wrote a piece for the Baseball Prospectus 2015 Annual that explained how Doug Melvin has done a great job replacing the production that left in those trades.

And, no, the current crop of former prospects wouldn’t have made a difference. Brett Lawrie hadn’t played above Double-A at that point. Michael Brantley was a one-win player for the Cleveland Indians that year, even if we erroneously assume that his developmental path would’ve been the same. Jake Odorizzi was still in High-A. Lorenzo Cain had barely tasted Triple-A. I think one could make a convincing argument that Alcides Escobar would have positively affected the Brewers’ postseason hopes in 2011, but the massive holes in the rotation would have still existed and he’s not a good enough player to overcome those problems.

If we pretend, for a moment, that the above five players would have developed in the same way for the Brewers, they’d perhaps be hitting their stride right now or maybe 2014, if one wants to be kind to Odorizzi. That would have meant two things: (1) essentially wasting the production of Prince Fielder, Rickie Weeks, Ryan Braun, Corey Hart, J.J. Hardy, Yovani Gallardo, etc. to wait for the magical 2015 season in which they all started to hit their potential at the same time; and (2) willingly passing on chances to make the postseason for the first time 26-plus years for a potentially cheap winning club in 2014/2015. I’m one for patience, but that’s a hard sell for any supporter.

In essence, this isn’t an effort to suggest Doug Melvin and his regime were perfect from 2008-2011, as they certainly were not. They failed in multiple places even prior to that postseason stretch, the Carlos Lee trade comes immediately to mind. The point, however, is that the current state of the farm system is primarily due to the terrible early-round drafts from 2006 through 2011, as well as general neglect for the international market at a time when elite talent could be purchased for the highest dollar with no restrictions. The organization has learned from their mistakes—which is why the lower levels of the minor-league system are promising—but that can’t hide the missteps in acquiring amateur talent in the first half-dozen(ish) years after Mark Attanasio purchased the club in September 2004. That’s the missing piece of the puzzle that has come to haunt the Brewers in 2015, not the trades to acquire Sabathia, Marcum, and Greinke.

Lead photo courtesy of Matt Kartozian-USA TODAY Sports