While there have been some attempts to measure a catcher’s control of the running game (rSB for Stolen Base Runs Saved) in Defensive Runs Saved, metrics as comprehensive as SRAA and TRAA do a much fairer job. StatCorner has had success measuring catcher’s framing abilities and turning that into RAA, but BP’s CSAA can now be folded into WARP. ESPN released an attempt to measure the ability to call a game that crowned A.J. Ellis as king. With game-calling being so difficult to quantify, Baseball Prospectus’ Catchella opted for the more reasonable ability to block pitches in EPAA. Add all four together and we are much closer to a more comprehensive understanding a catcher’s contributions to the game through wins above replacement than we’ve ever been before.

However, what brought us here wasn’t an explanation of the statistics. [Their methodology will be laid out expertly already in posts on the main site.] Instead, we’re more concerned where Jonathan Lucroy ranks compared to his peers.

Jonathan Lucroy: Behind the Dish

In this first part, you will learn how Lucroy stacks up to the competition. However, more specifically, this post will analyze how Lucroy performed in two key areas: CSAA and EPAA. Part two, which is authored by Xavier Alatorre, will be taking a more in-depth look at Lucroy’s SRAA and TRAA — more broadly, his ability to prevent greedy baserunners.

This article will solely focus on Lucroy’s job behind the plate. The job he could do hypothetically — though I wouldn’t suggest it — without his throwing arm. CSAA stands for Called Strikes Above Average. It, as you may have already intuited, measures a catcher’s ability to frame pitches. Turning balls into strikes has been the catching hot topic for the last half-decade as framing has entered somewhat of a golden age. EPAA stands for Errant Pitches Above Average. It measures a catcher’s ability to block wild pitches or prevent passed balls. Arguably the newest idea of the four to quantify.

What do the rate stats say about Lucroy?

It depends. Let’s start with the overall picture. There’s no way that Lucroy — who has six seasons in the big leagues — will place anywhere near the top, right?

By the rate version of CSAA — which we know to be reliable back until 1988 — Lucroy ranks third. The catcher we’ve watched grow up in the Milwaukee Brewers organization is the third-best framing catcher since 1988.

There are a couple quick things to take away from this, though. First, Lucroy is still young, so his rate statistics will be somewhat higher than what would otherwise be expected. By this, I mean that Lucroy hasn’t progressed far enough into his aging curve to see his defensive prowess regress with deteriorating abilities. Aging isn’t kind to any baseball player, but especially catchers. Second, this passes a very general eye-test. The players Lucroy is ranked around — Christian Vazquez, Yasmani Grandal, Jose Molina — are known in narrative as elite defensive catchers. We can better trust these numbers because they already jive with the general consensus.

What about by EPAA? As for blocking errant pitches, Lucroy ranks just barely above the mean. EPAA — which uses components that we can trust all the way back to 1950 — isn’t as kind to Lucroy. However, that’s not bad news, as his ability is right around Buster Posey’s level. Furthermore, he has still saved his team runs this way. Other names around that rank are Yan Gomes, Gary Carter, and Craig Biggio.

But how many runs has that translated into?

Where does Lucroy actually rank?

Rate stats are immensely fun, but converting them into runs saved and, eventually, wins gained is the real entertaining part.

Starting with EPAA, Lucroy has saved the Brewers 3.2 runs worth of errant pitches. While that doesn’t sound like a lot, let’s put that into context. Lucroy has had 26,641 chances in the big leagues to block errant pitches. As previously discussed, he’s done so at basically a league-average rate. However, given that many chances of being just barely better than the mean grants you nearly one-third of a win of production, just in preventing errant pitches.

For further context, remember that Gary Carter’s rate score was similar? If they stay similar going forward and Lucroy accumulates as many chances as Carter — a whopping 75,678 — the Brewers catcher could surpass the Montreal Expos great for ninth all-time. That’s right, Carter is ninth in all-time EPAA, right behind Jason Varitek and right ahead of Yogi Berra. What an amazing list!

Which brings us to the CSAA. How many actual runs has Lucroy’s framing ability generated? His CSAA already ranks among the best, but are his attempts enough? Lucroy’s framing ability has saved the Brewers 161.2 total runs. That’s good enough for fifth all-time. Behind the very elite company of Jose Molina, Brad Ausmus, Russell Martin, and Brian McCann. That’s correct: Yadier Molina.

The crescendo of this symphony

Career measures aren’t all, though. Catchella has been separated into all-time great seasons as well. And if the above hasn’t already given you a new appreciation for Lucroy, it’s time to re-calibrate once more.

In 2011, Lucroy posted the best-ever mark in CSAA yet to be measured. He saved 49.8 runs with his framing alone. Nearly five wins worth! Second place isn’t really even that close. Brian McCann’s 2008 campaign ranks second at 41.1 runs and his 2007 season is third at 37.8 runs.

Whether that’s enough to make 2011 the best season by a catcher ever or not will have to be settled in Part II.

As it sits right now, the newly-acquired Jonathan Villar is perched atop the official depth chart. In his 589 career plate appearances, Villar has contributed a TAv of .239. He’s only going into his age-25 season, so some offensive improvement can reasonably be expected, especially if he is granted more full-time employment. Inconsistencies in playing time often contributes to poorer performance for young players.

The supposed problem with that reasoning, though, is that Villar never performed particularly well in the minors. In fact, over the 12 changes in levels during his career with more than 100 plate appearances, Villar’s TAv has outperformed his opponent’s TAv (that is, the True Average of those who are also competing for playing time in Milwaukee) four times. In other words, two-thirds of his career at any level has been worse than his competition. Projecting more out of him may be foolhardy, though it should be noted that Steamer projects Villar for his best season yet — a half-win season.

The Brewers player with the most Major League experience at the position is the newly-acquired Will Middlebrooks. While his experience may be tempting, he has actually been below replacement level over the past two seasons. In fact, Middlebrooks has lost his teams 1.6 games (according to WARP) over only 504 plate appearances. His walk rate in 2015 was even lower than Villar’s and his strikeout rate was basically the same.

The other two remaining options to play third base are Yadiel Rivera (a natural shortstop) and Colin Walsh (a natural second baseman). While positional changes shouldn’t be looked upon unfavorably, it doesn’t show great organizational depth. Furthermore, just because they are on the official Brewers site depth chart doesn’t really mean anything.

Rivera is going into his age-24 season and seems allergic to walks. Walsh is going into his age-26 season and has fared well at every level offensively except for a short stint at Triple-A.

This is all meant to say that there is no white-knight savior at third base for the Brewers going into the 2016 season. Except, well, perhaps there is.

Last month, the Brewers acquired Garin Cecchini from the Boston Red Sox for cash considerations. Let’s start with Cecchini’s minors stats and a blind comparison.

In 2013 Cecchini dominated High-A, posting a .349 TAv over 262 plate appearances. A different infield prospect for a different High-A club — we’ll call him Player B — posted a .340 TAv over 237 plate appearances in the same year. In 2013, Cecchini also made his Double-A debut and performed at the well-above-average clip of .312 TAv in 295 plate apperances. Player B waited until 2014 to hit the Double-A level, but in his 441 plate appearances he posted a .276 TAv. That line happens to look a lot more like Cecchini’s first season in Triple-A Pawtucket, actually, in which he posted a .256 TAv in 458 plate appearances.

In summation, Cecchini was better than Player B in High-A and much better than Player B in Double-A. Though Cecchini took a step back in Triple-A, he did stay above average according to True Average.

Player B is Toronto Blue Jays second baseman Devon Travis. Both Travis and Cecchini will be entering their age-25 seasons. The main difference, however, is that Travis has already made a fairly substantial mark on the majors. In 238 plate appearances, Travis’ .307 TAv buoyed a 1.9 WARP season. While he shouldn’t be expected to post another .194 ISO season, and his BABIP of .347 indicates some regression, there’s reason to think Cecchini could make an impression on the majors next season if he is given a shot.

Furthermore, the difference between Cecchini’s and Travis’s Steamer projections are a paltry half-a-win. If you recall, that’s the expected worth of Villar. While Travis is expected to produce 0.9 fWAR for the Blue Jays, Cecchini is projected to produce just 0.1 less than Villar. While Cecchini’s contact rate doesn’t indicate particular success, Villar’s has been even worse. Moreover, Cecchini’s walk rates were very good up until Triple-A and, with the right tutelage, his on-base percentages could definitely surpass Villar’s.

While we are less than two months away from real-life Spring Training games, there are still many decisions to make for David Stearns to finalize his roster. I think it would be a clever move for Stearns to give Cecchini a long look at camp for the Opening Day roster. If I had to pick a player to out-perform their half-a-win projection between Cecchini and Villar, I’d take Cecchini. For a rebuilding team with not a lot to lose, Cecchini could be a good low-risk, high-reward option to break camp at third base. If he doesn’t pan out away from the Boston media and their expectations, then Villar can be used as a serviceable replacement.

There’s really a bunch of things that define me as a person and disliking clichés is a pretty major one. I guess that’s kind of a sad way to self-identify, but I also suppose I’m a fairly basic person. I grind my teeth if I read “patience is a virtue” or “good things come to those who wait” to help express much larger or complex ideas. Just don’t do it.

To do this, though, is to miss the more important role of a cliché. They are meant to make lessons more relatable. These are lessons you already believe to be true, being expressed in ways that you haven’t yet explored. The Brewers then, in an idiom, do lend themselves well to a sort of Keep Calm and Carry On comparison.

For those who don’t know, the Keep Calm and Carry On posters originated in 1939 as a way to subdue worry of invasion in mainland Britain during World War II. It was rarely used back then and its rise to prominence now — especially considering that context — is kind of weird. It’s the kind of cultural appropriation Western nations always employ, I suppose, but it became more strange when companies began tweaking the saying to fit their business needs.

Regardless, if I could sneak into David Stearns’ office to impart some wisdom via both poster and cliché form, I would probably pick Keep Calm and Carry On. Maybe. I mean, I wouldn’t love doing that, but if it had to be a poster with a some sort of cliché on it, then I think such a poster would be more helpful than “good fences make good neighbors” or any other alternative. I also think that’s a lesson that we should all follow to some degree. Patience can be a broad concern, and often gets misinterpreted as sloth. However, Stearns continues to make moves, so there’s no real current concern of idling.

J.P. Breen wrote an important article to discuss what methods Stearns will have to employ moving forward after the Jason Rogers trade. In it, Breen admitted following in the footsteps of the Houston Astros or Chicago Cubs, while important, can’t be Stearns’ main method. It will take some outside-of-the-box thinking for the small market Brewers to become competitive in the NL Central.

While this is definitely true, I want to highlight the one thing the Cubs and Astros did particularly well: They both waited until they actually were competitive before “going for it.” And, by going for it, I mean spending significant money on free agents, and spending high-end prospects on trades.

That’s an extremely impressive brand of patience. In my opinion, the Cubs are the true model while the Astros only serve as an additional anecdote. In retrospect, Theo Epstein probably had to make some really hard decisions last offseason. Kris ‘The Chosen One’ Bryant was definitely going to get called up at one point during the 2015 season. The temptation to push hard for the postseason last offseason must have been there for the Cubs’ front office. Despite the Cubs also signing Jon Lester, both Epstein and Jeff Luhnow spent that off-season addressing the last piece of a rebuild: the bullpen.

After his team seemed to arrive one-year ahead of schedule, Luhnow and the Astros’ front office did make some nice additions at the trade deadline for Scott Kazmir, Mike Fiers, and Carlos Gomez. While some may argue that they didn’t pay exorbitant fees to acquire that talent, it was a nice way to show the hungry Astros fanbase that they are serious about contention. It resulted in a postseason berth, after all. That’s a success in its own right.

Now that the current offseason is upon us, it’s clear that the Cubs and Astros are in a different mode, preparing to dominate Major League Baseball as best they can. Now that the Cubs are clearly contenders, they opened up their wallet to acquire Jason Heyward and traded Starlin Castro — and are probably poised to do more. The Astros dished out a massive package of prospects to get Ken Giles and should still be active in free agency. This type of “spend once you’ve already shown success” rebuilds not only seem more successful, but are also more sustainable. The Toronto Blue Jays, who have tried to rebuild on the fly while staying one of the most mediocre teams in the MLB, are in a very small window of contention for instance. Both the Cubs and Astros could conceivably go on pennant streaks, and that can be seen in the types of controllable talent they acquired.

So, while Breen is absolutely right in his assessment — that Stearns will have to find a new way to compete; find “the next market inefficiency, if you will” — that’s a very inside baseball approach. We perhaps won’t know the method ever, and we won’t know if it worked until it’s over. In the meantime, there are things we can see, diagnose, and assess as they happen. Patience is my most-earnest concern. As Breen points out again, with all the acquisitions of Rookie-ball or High-A prospects, it appears as though patience will definitely be part of the Brewers playbook under Stearns.

Among those moving parts, Darren O’Day has re-signed with the Orioles, Ken Giles has been traded, and Aroldis Chapman will likely not be traded. In short, the relief market has settled. Almost completely, in fact. Even the Chad Qualls and Steve Cisheks of the world have found homes.

As they say, hindsight is 20/20, but let’s re-visit some things now that the Giles trade has happened. For a reliever who has thrown fewer than 120 career innings — although they may be elite innings — and a shortstop prospect in rookie-ball, the Phillies acquired Mark Appel, Vincent Velasquez, Brett Oberholtzer, Thomas Eshelman, and Harold Arauz. That’s a lot. As a refresher, K-Rod got the Brewers a 20-year-old prospect in High-A.

In no world would I compare Rodriguez and Giles. Giles was a 1.9 WARP reliever last season and is under team control until 2021. K-Rod, though worth 1.7 WARP last season, is eight years Giles’ senior and probably due for some regression. But why have the costs for relief changed so abruptly? And why is the cost for premium talent so different than the cost for good-to-great talent?

Here’s one theory: General managers still believe in the ‘proven closer.’ Let’s take a look at the differences between Giles and Carson Smith. Smith got 13 saves last season and won his team 1.7 games. Giles locked down two more games but all of his saves came on or after July 28th, the date Jonathan Papelbon left for Washington. Giles had been groomed as a closer as far back as 2012, where Smith started earning saves in the minors in 2012, as well. So wait. What’s the difference between Giles and Smith?

One could point to the fact that Giles’ 2014 campaign was also very effective, though it definitely didn’t help him build a ‘proven closer’ section on his résumé. Smith and Roenis Elias netted the Seattle Mariners lefty Wade Miley and a 25-year-old relief prospect named Jonathan Aro. While Miley was actually quite good last season at 2.5 WARP, that price is decidedly less than the package Giles got the Phillies.

Furthermore, the Red Sox have actually already felt the difference between inflated and deflated relief costs when they traded two top-100 prospects for Craig Kimbrel. Kimbrel’s sustainability as a closer has been something to behold over the past five seasons. However, last season he was worth 1.2 WARP. It is absolutely conceivable that not only Giles but also Smith have better seasons than Kimbrel.

So here’s another theory: We, as baseball fans, overvalue prospects. While I think this is generally true, I’m not sure if it applies here. There is a conceivable scenario in which the Astros didn’t need to acquire Giles and could have got similar value out of Appel or Velasquez in the bullpen. Of course, this may seem like a waste of a resource (because they could hypothetically start).

However, there’s really no plausible way that a team can simultaneously make a trade like that for Giles while also having the opinion that converting a starter into a reliever would be a ‘waste’ of an asset. That is to say, while you or I may think converting a pitcher that is capable of starting into a reliever is diminishing returns, Jeff Luhnow may not share this perspective. So, the only plausible answer is that the Astros know Giles can be excellent, and know their window of contention is opening. After all, pitching prospects are kind of expendable when your rotation looks like Houston’s

By this point last year, the Toronto Blue Jays and Oakland Athletics had completed a deal that included Josh Donaldson. This isn’t used as a reason to trade Lucroy as early as possible, though — just the opposite. Donaldson ended up bringing in a pretty nice return for the Athletics, but one has to admit that it’s nothing that quite compares to acquiring the American League’s Most Valuable Player. The Athletics acquired Brett Lawrie, Kendall Graveman, Franklin Barreto, and Sean Nolin. While that may seem underwhelming to some, Barreto is now the 18th-ranked prospect in all of baseball by MLB.com and the seventh-best shortstop. In short, this trade is a long way from actually being decided.

However, the above anecdote serves a purpose. Billy Beane is a veteran general manager. He knows what it feels like to lose a trade. He knows what it feels like to win a trade. If new Brewers GM David Stearns opts to part ways with Jonathan Lucroy — a major face of the Brewers franchise for the past half-decade — it would have to be for the right package of prospects. One that would be easy to defend to the media.

Furthermore, the free-agent market at the time of the Donaldson trade had just dried up. Having been saturated with both Pablo Sandoval and Hanley Ramirez, the Blue Jays may have felt a knee-jerk reaction to close a deal for a different option. In some ways, a saturated market may actually help a player’s trade value. Well, at least a saturated market that suddenly becomes empty.

I know, that seems counter-intuitive in some ways. How could a player’s value increase when more options exist? Basic economic principles of supply and demand fly in the opposite direction. But trends may actually bend the other way.

For instance, take what is happening in the starting pitching market. The 2015 free agent class is one of the best we’ve seen and will be much, much better than 2016. But did this surplus hurt Jordan Zimmermann’s value? He’s got a freshly-inked deal worth $110 million. Does it seem to have hurt Shelby Miller’s worth? The Atlanta Braves are reportedly asking for an A.J. Pollock or a Matt Duffy. Will it hurt Zack Greinke’s worth? He was so confident in his value that he opted out of a deal that still had $71 million on it. Did this impending market seem to hurt David Price’s worth as a rental halfway through the year? The Detroit Tigers got Daniel Norris, Matt Boyd, and Jairo Labourt. Of course, value becomes different to a team in a playoff hunt, but similar logic can be assigned to Lucroy.

I will now pose to you my theory and it’s yours to accept or deny. Devoid of the fact that Donaldson went on to win the AL MVP, the Athletics got fairly good value for their star third baseman. Furthermore, the Donaldson trade was partially a product of the Sandoval and Ramirez signings. Alex Anthopoulos — the Blue Jays GM at the time — was fully aware of what Sandoval and Ramirez were worth on the open market. So too was Beane. If you are going to make your players available, it then bodes well to have players of the same position become unavailable recently. That is to say, you don’t necessarily want a barren market to drive value, but you want a very recent loss-of-value.

This theory revolves around only observed evidence. Whether it’s believable or not is largely incumbent on if general managers are as fickle as other members of society. Some of us just had the hellish nightmare pleasure of watching full-grown adults take items away from children just so that they could get the best deal on Black Friday. Do adults really want that item that bad? Or is it — at least partially — because that item is just flying off the shelves quickly? If general managers are exploring options at catcher and suddenly see their options disappear in front of them, then the likelihood that someone overpays to acquire Lucroy drastically increases.

So, you have a new GM — but by no means necessarily a tentative one — in Stearns, waiting for the right deal on Lucroy to insure both good value and future prosperity. Despite the fact that the Brewers seem to be in rebuild, Stearns really shouldn’t feel pressured to move Lucroy this offseason. Unfortunately for Stearns, you can’t just create a surplus in the catching market. While this trade may take a while to materialize largely, Stearns’ patience seems to bode well, despite Lucroy’s expiring contract. Keeping the 29-year old Lucroy on a rebuilding team is a good idea not only because of his elite talent, but also because it can’t hurt his value after a slightly-down 2015 season.

In general, a lot of things go into a trade. All potential trade partners have to be explored, the loss of that particular player has to be justified by the return for both parties, one owner may have to agree to take on extra salary, and scouts and analytics departments have to agree on the cost-benefit analysis of taking on a new player and all they bring to the table. That means having previously scouted the players yourselves and having near-exhaustive knowledge of their tools.

What’s really interesting though is the timing of the deal. It’s not as if an absolute smorgasbord of closers are reportedly on the market. There’s Aroldis Chapman. Maybe Ken Giles, if you’d like to already grant him the closer’s title. That’s it. Craig Kimbrel has already been dealt. It should be noted that perhaps the fact that Kimbrel has already been traded tells us that although it seems so publicly, the closer market isn’t so thin. Or the overwhelming return for Kimbrel made it too good to pass up. We don’t know. Stearns—or any front office person—would know this much better than us outsiders.

I don’t have any insider information here, nor do I mean to pretend to. However, let’s move forward assuming the closer market is actually more saturated than previously thought. It’s not even that much of a stretch, considering the fact that Andrew Miller is also rumored to be on the market. Say that, hypothetically, a lot of teams expect Darren O’Day to close as well. Frankly, those are very believable scenarios. It wouldn’t be too difficult to imagine a couple more of your own hypothetical situations. Kudos, then, goes to Stearns for being able to get a non-zero return for K-Rod.

But still, why now?

If O’Day is expected to close, that saga will end soon enough—the reliever market is stagnating until he signs as a free agent. If Miller gets dealt, the Yankees would reportedly be looking for a massive return. Despite playing the same position, the difference in quality between Miller and Rodriguez means we’re probably looking at a different market of teams. Add to the mix that the Cincinnati Reds are actively shopping Chapman and reportedly want him dealt this offseason. It seems that we have a curious case for trading away a second-tier closer before other, bigger chips fall into place and teams get desperate.

After all, what did the Brewers have to lose by keeping Rodriguez while other aspects of the team are addressed first? In fact, there’s a case to be made that trading away Rodriguez right now is selling as low as you can on a player. Nick Lampe wrote a great article over at Beyond the Box Score where he broke down the differences between offseason and trade deadline deals. His conclusion, while tentative, was that “there does appear to be some evidence that teams pay a significantly higher price … to acquire marginal wins at the trade deadline.”

If that’s true, though, why would Kimbrel have garnered such a huge return during the offseason? As Ben Carsley over at BP Boston wrote, the Red Sox “gave up two–two!–top-100 prospect types and two more lottery tickets for a relief pitcher.” That’s a huge return, no matter if you buy the ‘proven closer’ narrative or not. Perhaps a shift is beginning in how contending teams acquire elite relief pitchers. When Jonathan Papelbon got traded mid-season, it was for a Double-A prospect who lacks upside. Of course, it’s worth noting that Papelbon is considered to be overpaid and has a slew of clubhouse issues attached to him.

Moving even further, perhaps Stearns believes that selling a closer mid-season will become harder now that the outcome of the Papelbon deal has happened. That is to say, Papelbon’s post-trade antics have given a bad name to closers with tempers everywhere. Rodriguez doesn’t have Papelbon’s track record, but at the same time, he’s been known to get into some altercations of his own. K-Rod is hypothetically one outburst away from being much more difficult to trade. Furthermore, Stearns could just want the right-hander not involved in anything come spring training. Perhaps K-Rod had even privately expressed concern for closing for a losing team. Who knows what is happening on the inside? Nonetheless, J.P. Breen did a great job of breaking down why Stearns would want to be rid of Rodriguez sooner rather than later.

With all of that being said, the offseason still seems like an odd time to trade a non-elite closer. Rodriguez is a ‘proven closer’ (someone still believes in that, right?) on a contract that is pretty team-friendly. With his current deal technically expiring at the end of the 2016 season (though it does have a $8 million team option for 2017), Rodriguez would be one of the optimal ‘rental relievers for a pennant race team at the trade deadline’ candidates. Furthermore, the return of the trade is fairly comparable to the Papelbon trade who gets paid quite a bit more than K-Rod.

New Brewers prospect Javier Betancourt could have upside, but although he is still quite young, his bat has already had trouble adjusting at the High-A level. Stearns and his front office could be really high on Betancourt, however, there’s a large chance that at the 2016 trade deadline—at the very least—a similar deal would still be available. It’s perfectly conceivable that a better deal could have even come up, too. According to one report from The Detroit News, Betancourt’s future value is only 45 (not an everyday player). That’s a far-cry from the Andrew Miller trade that took place during the 2014 season in which the Red Sox acquired a prospect with a future value of 60 in Eduardo Rodriguez. Certainly K-Rod and Miller aren’t fully comparable pieces, however, Miller did end up being a rental pitcher for the Orioles.

The fact is that the move is by no means a bad one for Stearns. A closer on a team that isn’t expected to win a lot of games is a strange asset to keep. It’s just a weird time to pull the trigger on such a mediocre return. Kimbrel just got traded for two top-100 prospects. Chapman is going to fetch a similar return for the Reds perhaps shortly. O’Day could sign a deal that only the Dodgers will afford. Giles has been linked in rumors to two or three high-level prospects. That makes K-Rod a really unique asset. He’s second-tier compared to these guys which could have made him appealing to a much broader array of teams. Everyone can afford a K-Rod, not everyone can afford a Kimbrel or an O’Day. All the first-tier players could have settled into their own teams and it wouldn’t have affected Rodriguez’s trade value one iota.

In the end, this trade will likely be a footnote in Stearns’ tenure as Brewers GM. It won’t matter if Betancourt pans out or not, getting rid of Rodriguez was a good move. However, for one of his first moves, the timing didn’t exactly show patient baseball acumen.

Despite starting at home for six-straight games, their first four competitors are the San Francisco Giants, the Houston Astros, the St. Louis Cardinals, and the Pittsburgh Pirates. At the point of writing this, three of those teams represent likely postseason teams and the one team that isn’t currently in a playoff spot (the Giants) seems to have a penchant for playing specifically well in even-numbered years. In fact, moving forward, it’s hard to imagine a scenario where people place any of those four teams low in the pre-season projections next season.

But a keen reader shouldn’t actually think that matters too much, right? Even when next-season projections come up in a September conversation, it’s easy to forget that April is a month of hope and promise. Offseason moves and storylines change the complexion of preseason predictions. Breaking down how good certain teams might be seven months from now is a fools errand, as plenty of trades and signings still have to happen. A team, even one as fortunate as the Giants, can’t just win the World Series every other year because of narrative. Additionally, Dallas Keuchel probably deserves a pay-raise, which could affect the remainder of the Astros’ winter plans. One figures the Cardinals can’t continue to out-perform their Pythagorean record so handily on a yearly basis. A.J. Burnett and his 3.14 ERA are probably going to retire, and even if not, his 4.45 DRA suggests a major regression is in store.

See? We didn’t even have to try that hard, and we came up with separate narratives that could help Brewers fans dream on 2016 a bit longer — or, at least, not immediately throw in the towel early in the season.

Preseason projections are not gospel — or even close to that. Take the aforementioned Houston Astros for instance. Some self-proclaimed “experts” ranked them to finish fourth in the AL West. No one could see their meteoric rise to the top of the AL West standings. In the same projected rankings, one can quickly see that the Texas Rangers were the team that was supposed to finish in the basement as well. Those teams hold first and second respectively.

None of this is to say that the Milwaukee Brewers will outperform their 2016 projections just because other teams did so. Instead, all of this is mentioned to caution against raising the white flag on 2016, just because the opening four series appear to be brutal on paper. Looking forward to next season through the regular-season schedule is an exercise in excitement and hope, not dread. Though, to be fair, a winter without baseball will do more to raise the hopes of any Brewers fan than anything else. In March, as the season draws near, the opening four series won’t seem close to as daunting as it currently does.

Let’s start first with some fair analysis. During Melvin’s tenure, the Brewers had a win-loss record of 1004-1052. Considering the team he inherited had just come off a 106-loss season, that record isn’t terrible. Even out of context, a record of 48 games under .500 over the course of 13+ seasons is fairly admirable for a small-market club.

Now we move to the unfair analysis, as some may say. According to the Pythagorean record during the Melvin era, the Brewers should have had a 990-1066 record. That’s only one extra loss per season when you space it out, but still, it’s worth mentioning. Furthermore, if the 2015 season ended Tuesday, the Brewers would finish a combined 182.5 games back of first place. That includes the 2011 season when they finished six-games ahead of the second-place St. Louis Cardinals.

It’s clear that winning a pennant was extremely difficult. One could attribute this to many things — the small market of Milwaukee, the difficulty of the NL Central, etc. — but doing so feels like giving management a free pass. During a 13-year span, every team should be able to hope for two first-place finishes. That’s not a lofty goal. Granted, the vast majority of Melvin’s teams played in a six-team division, but that does little to dismiss blame. Melvin’s Brewers finished first one time. They made the postseason twice. In 13 years. And that’s not good.

Every team’s goal on Opening Day is postseason baseball. Once a team reaches that elusive plateau, anything can happen. Just reach it. Unfortunately, the long season is grueling, and baseball excels at weeding out the teams that don’t belong. It’s somewhat intuitive, then, that the only teams that “belonged” in the postseason for the Brewers were the 2011 and 2008 iterations. Their greatest win total with those seasons omitted was only 83, which they matched twice (2007 and 2012). Only two-games above .500 rarely makes the postseason. That is, of course, unless you were a team in the NL West during the 2005 season.

What about the positives, though? There are many. For instance, what about the Brewers’ draft record? From Rickie Weeks in 2003 to Taylor Jungmann in 2011, Melvin’s staff has done pretty well in the first round. Despite what has happened to tarnish his career, a case could be made for Braun being the second-best player drafted in 2005 (behind Andrew McCutchen who was picked 11th). Mix that with Jake Odorizzi, Brett Lawrie, and Jeremy Jeffress and that’s a decently successful tenure. Even Matt LaPorta — even though he didn’t pan out — served the club’s needs as the key piece in obtaining CC Sabathia for the successful 2008 postseason push. That Melvin could garner some value out of even his missed draft picks bodes well for his legacy.

Looking forward, Melvin has seemed to leave the farm system somewhere around the middle of the pack. Derek Harvey recently broke down the landscape, doing a great job of showing the ETAs of prospects in a suddenly healthy system. Despite having a larger amount of legitimate prospects, it remains unclear whether many of them will reach their ceilings. That being said, it could be worse. Melvin could have banked on this team a lot harder and depleted the system pre-season. The club could have refused to trade Yovani Gallardo. This upcoming offseason, Brewers fans should be excited with the potential prospect returns of their remaining tradable assets. I thought the haul for Carlos Gomez and Mike Fiers was a tad underwhelming; however, there’s no reason to think future prospect packages will continue to be so.

Melvin was not great. But he wasn’t terrible, either. Perhaps that fact stings the most. A non-terrible general manager achieves two things. First, he doesn’t get dismissed as quickly due to the existence of more “we were pretty close” years than there were “LIGHT THIS TEAM ON FIRE” seasons. Second, he runs a mediocre team that is often too gun-shy to make flashy deadline moves, ultimately finishing somewhere in the middle and breaking fans hearts. Credit to Melvin for acknowledging the two seasons in which his team was good enough to make those additions, but, sadly, they were too few. A more comprehensive push in 2011 might have been better, but a winning season is a winning season. Revisionist history doesn’t help anyone.

Brewers fans should be slightly excited that Melvin is stepping down. Not because they are now rid of a bad general manager — nothing at all that harsh — but mostly because it’s the beginning of a new era. There are a few blue-chip executives on the unemployment line that may decide to accept Milwaukee as their new employer. Or perhaps they will opt for a fresh face, like with Craig Counsell. Whatever team of executives and managers is assembled for the 2016 campaign, they should provide hope for a team that will build on Melvin’s legacy, but also for a team that might look at the way other teams — such as Houston — have rebuilt. The future seasons only reside in the mind right now. Keep it realistic, and one will be rewarded.

Having already thrown 19 pitches in the top of the 3rd inning on Saturday, Matt Garza served up a fastball at the top of the zone to Anthony Rizzo, who promptly deposited it in the right field seats (+.298 WPA).

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The inning started pretty easily for Garza, who seemed to be settling into a groove after needing 39 pitches to get through the first two innings. Garza got Addison Russell to fly-out on four pitches, and then bested that by getting Dexter Fowler to pop a bunt up for a shallow fly-out on the very next pitch. Kyle Schwarber followed up those two quick outs by working an 11-pitch battle, ripping a liner to shallow center for a single. Chris Coghlan then was gifted a four-pitch walk from the likely-fatigued Garza, paving the way for Rizzo to swing at the first fastball he liked.

Despite having two-out and none on-base, the top of the Cubbies lineup showed their ability to stay in the game as Matt Garza let this game slip away.

BOTTOM PLAY (WPA)

In the bottom of the second inning, after drawing a very rare walk from Kyle Hendricks, Khris Davis got caught leaning toward second base (-.061 WPA).

Davis, who is not known for his theft abilities, was granted a free-pass to first base but was promptly picked off by the not-very-deceptive pickoff move of Hendricks. Khris Davis is now 8-for-10 stealing bases in his career and 50% (1-for-2) this season.

While this by no means ended the game for the Brewers, the last thing they wanted to do with a leadoff baserunner was have them picked off stealing to begin the next at-bat. Khris Davis did look a bit confused on the basepath when it happened, leading me to believe the stolen base call might have come from the dugout. Regardless, with Jean Segura at the plate, one would want to see the batter work with a runner on base as opposed to the alternative. That being said, Segura has grounded into quite a few double plays this season. Not that that entirely rests on Segura’s shoulders, but it could have helped force Counsell’s hand.

KEY MOMENT

When Michael Blazek gave up his first home run of the season was pretty ‘key.’ It was also really deflating as a viewer. Matt Garza pitches one of the most-labored quality starts a pitcher can possibly work but, hey, a quality start is a quality start, right? His final line was 6IP, 4 H, 4 BB, 3 ER on 107 pitches. The point is, not a lot of people are buying stock in Garza after this one.

Regardless, the Brewers were actually in Saturday’s game when he left the mound in a 3-1 ball game. Then Michael Blazek comes into the game in the seventh, tasked with facing the top of the Cubs lineup, gets two quick outs and then Kyle Schwarber comes up. One could be noticing a pattern by this point, right?

Schwarber took Blazek’s two-seamer (which wasn’t even poorly located) to dead centerfield.

Michael Blazek has thrown his two-seam fastball 114 times this season and opponents are batting .172 against it. It’s been one of his most valuable pitches in what has been an extremely valuable season for him.

TREND TO WATCH

To start off the game something really annoying happened. Scooter Gennett hit a line drive single to centerfield on the second pitch Hendricks threw. That’s not the annoying part. That means the number-two hitter — presumably one of the best in the lineup — gets to come up with one-on and nobody out; this is the exact spot you’ve designed your batting order to deal with most effectively to generate runs early in the game by swinging the bat. And Shane Peterson promptly drops the bunt down. In the first inning. With no one out.

There are two ways to explain how this could happen. First, Peterson took it upon himself to bunt. In doing so, Peterson’s actions should speak loudly to Counsell; he is not a number-two hitter, and the manager should stop placing him there in the lineup. It could mean that Peterson doesn’t understand the ideas of run creation and needs to be placed elsewhere in the lineup.

Alternatively, the bunt call could have come from the dugout. This one is far more damning. Counsell is telling the Brewers fans that he is the one that doesn’t understand the tenants of run creation. He doesn’t understand what a number-two hitter is employed to do. Most importantly, though, in calling for the bunt, Counsell is telling his number-two hitter “I shouldn’t have put you here.”

Regardless, I’m hoping the trend to emerge from this is that no more bunts happen from the number-two spot in the lineup. I also don’t expect Shane Peterson to bat in that location in the lineup. But maybe those expectations are too high.

COMING UP NEXT

In the finale of this four-game set, Kyle Lohse (5-12, 6.24 ERA) hits the bump trying to get at least one win from the stingy Cubs. Lohse has allowed at least one run since May 15, 14 starts ago. In fact, in that same time frame, the right-hander hasn’t allowed fewer than 2 runs at all and has given up 52 runs total, all of which have been earned. Clayton Richard (1-0, 5.40 ERA) will start for the visitors making just his third start this season. Likely only a spot start while Dan Haren gets re-acquainted with his new-old team, the left-hander will have to face tough righties Segura, Lucroy, and Braun to start off the game. Let’s just hope none of them bunt each other over.

It was a tough luck pitch for Patrick Corbin. It did probably catch a bit too much of the heart of the plate, but Corbin, who hadn’t made many mistakes to this point, still tried to work down and away from Braun’s bat. The Diamondbacks left-hander had six strikeouts through the five previous innings, only having thrown 60 pitches. He looked primed to go the distance if his offense could cache some runs in for him, but was outdueled by Jimmy Nelson.

There has been a little chatter about Ryan Braun being a possible trade chip for the Brewers, and one can imagine a very long line of general managers for his talents. Fortunately—or I guess unfortunately if you’re looking for a firesale—Braun has been a joy to watch and, personally, I think there’s little sense in dealing him. After all, the Brewers have actually been the best team in the league in July by fWAR (5.1). I don’t know about you, but I don’t necessarily think this team is as far from contention as the standings suggest, and I want to see a bit of 2016 before I make up my mind. I wouldn’t begrudge Melvin that.

BOTTOM PLAY (WPA): In the bottom of the eighth, with none out and Inciarte on first, A.J. Pollock grounded into a double play (-.207 WPA). This was actually the third double play the Brewers would turn in the game as the Diamondbacks offense turned anemic.

KEY MOMENT

This turns out to follow the previously-discussed bottom play. Jeremy Jeffress had just come in the game in relief of Nelson’s scoreless seven innings, being asked to deal with the top of the opposing order. After allowing Goldschmidt to reach following the double play, Counsell elected to switch go lefty-against-lefty and bring Will Smith out of the pen to face David Peralta. The Diamondbacks refused to oblige this match-up and pinch hit their offseason international free agent Yasmany Tomas. Tomas, who homered the previous game, made this a pretty tense at-bat, getting ahead in the count a couple times and running the count full. So tense, Smith—who really doesn’t have a great pickoff move for a left-hander—tried to get the easy pickoff of Goldschmidt at first twice.

Smith ended up getting the better of his opposite number though. That is, with the help of home plate umpire Paul Schrieber, who wrung up Tomas on a called third strike that was on the lower end of the zone, but ultimately a strike.

TREND TO WATCH

Francisco Rodriguez got his 22nd save of the season last night, continuing his streak. However, he did allow his first run in 26 innings, a streak dating back to June 28th. I think K-Rod is still the trend to watch for the consecutive saves streak. This could be the beginning of another 26-inning streak for the Brewers closer. Or could that streak get going with another team?

COMING UP NEXT

The third game of this four-game set sees Taylor Jungmann (5-1, 2.04 ERA) take on Rubby De La Rosa (7-5, 4.83 ERA). Jungmann hasn’t lost since June 14th and, in fact, hasn’t even been part of a losing effort since June 25th. Over his last four starts, he has struck out 20 over 30 innings pitched, allowed only five earned runs and a 0.87 WHIP. Ryan Braun will try to keep his hot streak going and move out of his eighth-place tie in home runs with division-rival Joey Votto.

Lead photo courtesy of Rick Scuteri-USA TODAY Sports