On the mound, the first thing that stands out about Andrews is his stature; he’s the size of Jose Altuve, a full foot shorter than Jimmy Nelson. Look beyond that, though, and Andrews has some some interesting tools. To start with, he’s left-handed. That puts him at an automatic advantage, personnel-wise, and lowers the ceiling Andrews would have to hit in order to have a major league career. At worst, he’ll need to develop into a competent platoon lefty, facing just one or two batters at a time.

The soon-to-be 22-year-old also has a few building blocks that could help him hit or exceed that role. Because Andrews is so short, he can’t reliably generate the steep, downward plane with his fastball that helps so many taller pitchers miss bats and coax ground balls. Andrews operates in the upper-80s with his heater, topping out around 90 mph. It’s not a very exciting pitch, but shows some signs of life and can be used high in the zone to tie hitters up. Happily, Andrews boas  ts a pair of advanced secondary pitches in a mid-70s changeup and a slower, sweeping curveball. The change looks a little better right now, with late fade and plenty of separation from the fastball. But both pitches flash plus, and could help the young hurler reduce his reliance on his fastball. Andrews’ command is solid for a pitcher his age, and should be at least big league average by the time he climbs his way to the top of the organizational ladder.

The combination of solid stuff and decent command was enough to help Andrews excel in his professional debut last summer. He tossed 33 professional innings between Helena (2.13 DRA) and Wisconsin (1.95 DRA), and managed 54 strikeouts against only 7 walks. The Brewers deployed Andrews out of the bullpen, but that may have been more about innings management than anything; Andrews started in college, and had already tossed 99.7 innings (with 118 strikeouts and a 1.99 ERA) for Long Beach State, easily a career high, by the time he came off the draft board.

Andrews’s alma mater might also provide insight into the southpaw’s profile. Long Beach State has a history of embracing players who have faced long-term questions over their futures in baseball. They recruited former Angels star Jered Weaver when most scouts thought he was better suited to basketball. And when Evan Longoria was told he was too scrawny to play Division I baseball out of high school, it was Long Beach State who swooped after the star third baseman spent a year proving otherwise at community college.

The Brewers, too, have flirted with unconventional players in the past. Milwaukee even employed a 5’6” lefty as recently as 2011, when Danny Herrera made two ill-fated Brewers appearances before being released and catching on with the Mets. As Milwaukee continues to challenge accepted pitching roles, there could well be a place for Andrews on a future big league roster. Even if he falters on the mound, he can turn back to hitting. Better still, he could carve out a fascinating career as a late-inning defensive outfield sub who trots to the mound whenever a left-handed batter steps to the plate. Keep an eye on him in the seasons to come.

In that last category stood Prince Fielder, who elicited tears of joy from a Brewers fanbase ready to watch Fielder and former teammate Ryan Braun get back to basics with that 1-2-punch celebration. Little did we know, we were watching the most valuable Brewers batter throw to another franchise great.

[/wipes back those tears]

It’s easy to enjoy Prince Fielder’s return to Milwaukee, first and foremost because the slugger was always a joy to watch and one of the club’s best prospects to translate on an MLB diamond. Make no mistake about it, Fielder was an elite slugger with exceptional plate discipline, traits that were often underplayed by fans due to his size and defensive performance. Given that Fielder retired due to an injury, and indeed survived an injury that could have taken a much larger toll on his body, there is a sense with the former slugger that it’s great to see him healthy, happy, and now having a chance to tour his home organization with a victory lap.

Yet, it was not always so rosy with Brewers fans and Prince Fielder. Because of the slugger’s defense, rated approximately 39 runs below average according to the Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) stat, and aforementioned size, there was frequent debate a decade ago among Brewers fans about when the Brewers should trade Fielder. Of course, there’s always this type of talk among fans, so some of it should be dismissed as common fan banter (we’re casually debating whether Jesus Aguilar or Domingo Santana should be traded on #BrewersTwitter this year, among other things, so, you know…); but recalling those halcyon days of the SportsBubbler (RIP!) and Journal-Sentinel Online boards, there seemed to be a different edge about Fielder trade talks. Thus, there was a sense, even during Fielder’s most elite seasons in Milwaukee, that many regular, diehard fans underappreciated the patient, disciplined hitter. It was as though, for some odd reason, Brewers fans needed to choose between Braun and Fielder, that the two couldn’t simply coexist as one of the most amazing 1-2 punches in franchise history; indeed, the most valuable 1-2 punch in franchise history.

For a time, it seemed justifiable to knock Fielder down a rung. For one, Fielder exercised his free agency rights by securing a gigantic contract with the Detroit Tigers, and thus had fewer years with the Brewers organization than some of the other franchise greats. Assessed by aggregating Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP), which assesses a player’s batting and fielding performance against the typical “next man up” from the minor leagues, Fielder is a Top 20 Brewers player, but more like Geoff Jenkins than Robin Yount. This summer, here’s what we (thought we) knew about Fielder’s career:

If we recognize that WARP penalizes Fielder (unjustifiably) for leaving Milwaukee and (justifiably) for his fielding, one can rank offensive performance on a season-by-season basis to find the best performers in franchise history.  I constructed a Milwaukee Brewers baby-database during the summer of 2018, so I have relatively recent True Average calculations during this DRC+ release week. True Average (TAv) was the old comprehensive offensive metric by Baseball Prospectus, where .260 represented an average performance and the higher the number, the better; it incorporated all sorts of elements of batting performance, but used different weights for situational hitting, parks, strike outs, and other elements than other linear weights methods. Offensively, Fielder stands out much more among the greatest Brewers of all times:

Even by TAV, Fielder’s greatness might be undermined by the general dominance of Ryan Braun and Paul Molitor in the Brewers Top 20 (four appearances each); Fielder (three appearances) is tied with Robin Yount, which is quite good; Cecil Cooper, Braun, Fielder, Molitor, and Yount comprise 16 of the Top 20 Brewers offensive seasons by TAV.

Deserved Runs Created Plus (DRC+) comes to the rescue and restores Prince Fielder to his rightful place atop Brewers offensive seasons. DRC+ is read on a scale where 100 is average, and the higher the number, the better; 80 means a batter is approximately 20 percent below average, 120 means a batter is approximately 20 percent better than average.

First, let’s take a step back: what is DRC+? DRC+ is the new Baseball Prospectus comprehensive batting metric, which is designed as a sort of “inverse” to Deserved Run Average (DRA), BP’s comprehensive pitching metric. Baseball Prospectus features numerous articles introducing the stat, including this description, and a few advanced discussions of why it should be used (this is good, too. Read everything by Jonathan Judge). The gist of DRC+ is this: once you focus on what is expected at the plate, instead of constructing a basic average of outcomes, you can model run production in a manner that is more accurate, descriptive, and predictive than other metrics. What is interesting is that the batting metrics correlate in many cases, which means that where there are outliers with DRC+, the focus on expected outcomes, different park factors, and other contextual elements could lead to valuable insights into a player’s batting performance.

So back to Fielder, DRC+ launches Fielder to the top of the Brewers franchise, and it’s a rout. By TAV, Fielder was competing with a handful of other batters; with DRC+, he’s competing with himself, clearly a step above all other comers as most valuable bat. What is especially interesting about this new offensive ranking is that the “shape” of the organization’s most elite seasons changes considerably; Fielder now has four Top 20 appearances, which is better than Braun (2), Molitor (2), Yount (2), and (now!) Gorman Thomas (2); Thomas, that Prodigal Wallbanger, did not appear in the Top 20 by TAV, whatsoever, so the DRC+ develop calibrates his career as well.

Why does DRC+ “love” Fielder so much? Let’s look under the hood at those absurd 2007, 2009, and 2011 campaigns. BP publishes DRC+ Run Values, which assess a player’s Runs Above Average (RAA) according to each major batting component that is an element of the DRC+ model. This is a supreme tool, and should be used alongside the basic surface DRC+ statistic!

So, the obvious, first: Prince Fielder hit some of the most majestic home runs I ever saw, and he also hit some of the hardest laser beams out of Miller Park. But I wish fans took the eye test away from the waistline a bit and watched his batting approach more carefully, for Fielder’s plate discipline was awe-inspiring. Fielder would never get cheated on his first two swings; good grief, it would be difficult to find someone who swung harder on strikes one and two. But don’t mistake those gigantic swings for a lack of discipline, for Fielder also dug in and made pitchers work, and had no trouble waiting for his pitch to drive. To my astonishment, not only does this show up in Fielder’s valuable walk totals (BB RAA), but I also hypothesize that this helps to drive his strong Ball-In-Play Outs (BIP Outs RAA) performance.

Let’s compare Fielder’s very best seasons to those of his contemporary, Braun:

Unlike Fielder, Braun derived more of his run production during his elite seasons from singles, doubles, and triples, rather than home runs and walks. This has a curious outcome on BIP Outs, but it stands to reason that by controlling the strike zone more, limiting balls in play, and maximizing slugging outcomes, Fielder would be able to produce value in that contrarian way (namely, avoiding the batted ball in play). This last line is speculation on my part, and not a reflection of the DRC+ stat, and certainly an avenue for further research (to my mind, the BIP Outs RAA stat is a fascinating aspect of this new stat).

Let’s step back from the numbers: why does any of this matter? If you’re unconvinced about the new stat, think about the eyeball test you used with Fielder during his prime years. How often did you call him a better hitter than Ryan Braun? How often did you compare him favorably to Paul Molitor? How often did you place his elite offensive production at the top of the franchise? DRC+ certainly provides the statistical background to address these questions, and in being openly situated to offensive production through a different lens than other prominent stats, we can revisit our blindspots and perhaps find value that we previously missed. It turns out that Brewers fans may have had Prince Fielder all wrong. Even if your measurement for a baseball stat is to confirm what you already know in most cases, or even if you previously believed that Prince Fielder was an elite batter, there’s room to marvel at just how great he was once more. Take the chance to dig into Fielder’s career again, and maybe revisit some other careers, as well: DRC+ gives us the chance to find some of our other blindspots.

Finding Fielder’s reappraisal is especially sweet because it places an exclamation point on one of the best competitive periods in Brewers franchise history. Fielder sure did the big things loudly, but he also did a lot of things to quietly bolster his production.

Photo Source.

Mike Fiers
Fiers was non-tendered because Oakland is not paying a mid-rotation starter, at best, a $10 million salary. According to Cot’s Contracts, the last Oakland starting pitcher earning that much money was Scott Kazmir in 2015.

The Brewers immediately come to mind as a home for Fiers because he’s a former Brewer that has survived in MLB despite having below average fastball velocity. His fourseam fastball sits around 90 MPH, which Milwaukee has some experience with. There is ample cause for concern with Fiers though. Last season his swing and miss rate dropped for the fourth straight season, and dipped below 20 percent for the first time in his career. As his whiff percentage has dropped, Fiers has allowed more home runs (ranging from 1.2 to 1.9 per 9 innings) and struck out fewer batters (losing almost two strikeouts per nine innings as there are more strikeouts now than any time in the history of MLB).

However, there may be an area ripe for exploitation which could bring renewed success for Fiers: his curveball. He threw the curve for around 16 percent of his pitches in 2018, which is around his career average. Based on results though, Fiers should be throwing it more. Batters have hit .196 and have slugged .307 against the pitch, both of which are his best numbers. In 2018, those numbers improved to .145 and .181, once again performing as his best pitch results wise.  The pitch also generates his most ground balls: over 60 percent of curveballs put in play over his career have been ground balls. His 2018 ground ball rate on curveballs in play was almost exactly his career average.

Fiers consistently buries the ball below the zone and generates a large amount of whiffs on pitches that would be balls. In 2018, almost all of the damage against the pitch was on pitches out of the strike zone, which a player can live with.

For a pitch that he’ll throw equally to lefties and righties, it’s a little baffling that Fiers hasn’t decided to ride the curveball hard as his overall results have gotten worse. His curveball usage was actually down almost 20 percent last season when compared with 2017. Even after the trade to Oakland, while he threw the pitch more, there’s opportunity to make it the focal point of his attack and Milwaukee has some experience in signing free agent pitchers and having them focus on throwing more breaking balls.

Fiers may not be worth $10M, but I think he would be an interesting signing for a team that has helped pitchers maximize their stuff to more fully reach their potential.

Blake Parker
After a season that saw regression across the board, the Angels non-tendered Blake Parker rather than pay his projected $3.1 salary. Superficially, his 3.26 ERA and career high 14 saves indicate a decent reliever. Digging a little deeper reveals some problems, though:

Most of Parker’s regression is found in performance against his fastball. In 2017, batters hit .179 and slugged .313 against his fastball, with a .204 BABIP, but those numbers rose to .315, .562 and .328 in 2018. Batters hit more home runs against his fastball in 2018 (10) than he allowed in total in 2017 (7).

After spiking in 2017, Parker’s fastball velocity fell from 94 to 92.8 last season. The pitch started the season slower and the velocity continued trending down. He also had a location issue. Parker had previously located the pitch away from both righties and lefties, generally avoiding the middle of the plate and looking to jam hitters as much as possible. That plan failed against both sides as Parker literally had a Rudolph nose in his fastball strike zone plot. While the velocity may not come back, better location can cure a lot of Parker’s ills as batters did the most damage against his poorly located pitches.

Parker also has potential with his other two pitches: the curveball and splitter. The curveball used to be his secondary pitch, but he shelved in it favor of his splitter in 2017. Parker brought the pitch back towards the end of the season. His whiffs on both pitches were down in 2018 and location may have played a role here as well. In his most effective season, Parker threw almost 62 percent of his curves and splitters below the zone, which dropped to 56 percent in 2018. In particular, he consistently missed that spot against left handed hitters. His whiff numbers on those pitches compare favorably in 2017 and 2018, but because he was missing his spot more, batters made more contact.

Aside from the velocity drop, Parker also just didn’t execute his pitches in 2018. If the Brewers think there’s an easy mechanical fix, then Parker is a potential cheap addition to Milwaukee’s monster bullpen.

Note: Projected arbitration salaries are from MLB Trade Rumors.

Our Milwaukee Brewers sent eight representatives to the Fall League to suit up for Peoria (and later, a ninth player headed down to pitch for Mesa) so let’s take a moment to recap how well those players performed in the so-called “prospect finishing school.”

LHP Daniel Brown

Brown, a fastball-slider lefty who works in the low-to-mid-90s, enjoyed an excellent AFL. In nine appearances he covered 12.0 innings, allowing only eight hits, four walks, and a 3.00 Earned Run Average (ERA). Deserved Run Average thought his performance was nearly perfect; his DRA came in at 0.12 for a DRA- of 2.5! (DRA- measures DRA in league context, with 100 as average and the lower the number, the better).

RHP Bowdien Derby

The Javelinas used Derby as a starter in the AFL, and he toed the slab to begin seven games while logging 26.3 innings pitched. He did so with a modest 4.78 ERA, though DRA- (86) still assessed Derby as 14 percent better than the average pitcher on the circuit. Derby’s 18:9 strikeout:walk ratio wasn’t exactly inspiring, and we’ll see if the AFL performance that followed up a decent season as a swingman for Colorado Springs is enough to convince some team to pick him in this year’s Rule 5 Draft. Derby was left unprotected by the Brewers.

RHP Jon Olczak

Olczak turned in one of the most stellar campaigns of any reliever on the AFL circuit this year. He logged a 1.50 ERA across 12.0 innings, striking out 13 while allowing only eight hits and five walks. DRA- (45) valued his work as 55 percent better than his league-average cohorts. This comes after a terrific 73 DRA- in 56.3 innings for Double-A Biloxi during the regular season, and it wouldn’t come as a surprise to find out that the fastball/slider slinging Olczak (who sits 92-94 MPH) winds up generating plenty of Rule 5 interest in advance of next month’s draft.

RHP Miguel Sanchez

The 24 year old Sanchez put together a surprising pop-up season in 2018, advancing from Class A-Advanced all the way up to Triple-A before earning a shot at the Fall League. He continued to be effective in Arizona, posting a 3.60 ERA in 10.0 innings. He struck out eight while walking three, generating ground balls at a 65 percent rate. DRA- (74) saw his performance as well above average for the league.

RHP Aaron Wilkerson

After a truncated regular season split between Triple-A and the big leagues, the Brewers sent Wilkerson as a late addition to the AFL so that he could stretch back out in advance of pitching in winter ball in the Dominican Republic. Wilkerson joined the Mesa Solar Sox and appeared in three games, tossing four scoreless innings with three strikeouts and three walks.

C Mario Feliciano

Injuries limited Feliciano to just 46 games between the Arizona Rookie League and Class-A Advanced in 2018, so the Brewers assigned him to the Fall League to try and catch him up with some addition reps. It didn’t work out, though, as injuries unfortunately halted Feliciano’s progress once again. After only two games and six plate appearances (that included a hit and two walks), he was sidelined with discomfort in his throwing shoulder that led to arthroscopic surgery at the beginning of November. He should be ready to go again come next spring.

UTIL Weston Wilson

A jack-of-all-trades utility man, Wilson was highly impressive during the AFL campaign, batting .364 average /.462 on-base /.636 slugging percentage in 39 plate appearances for a True Average of .387. He clubbed a double, a triple, and two home runs, and even stole a pair of bases, too. A former 17th-round draft pick, more and more are coming around to the idea that the 24 year old Wilson has the ability to be a big leaguer after his terrific season between Class A-Advanced, Double-A, and the Arizona Fall League in 2018.

OF Trent Grisham

This former first-round pick, on the other hand, has plenty of people doubting that he’ll ever make it to The Show based on what he’s been showing lately (and really since being picked in 2015). Grisham’s passive approach has led to walks aplenty as a professional, but not much in the way of batting average of hard contact. Grisham hit .133/.304/.133 with 17 strikeouts in 57 AFL plate appearances, leading Mark Anderson of the BP Prospect Team to comment recently that “his comfort in the box and overall feel for hitting are seemingly non-existent at this point.”

2B Keston Hiura

Hiura is Milwaukee’s top prospect for good reason. Often described as a “hitting savant,” Hiura led the AFL in hits (31), RBI (33), and total bases (54). His five home runs were one off the league lead and his .934 OPS ranked sixth overall. Hiura’s overall slash was good enough for a .352 True Average, and he was so good so often that the BP Prospect Team seemed almost annoyed that they needed to keep writing about him. Hiura’s tremendous performance helped net not only the AFL Championship trophy, but earned him some well-deserved personal hardware, too.

#Brewers‘ hitting machine Keston Hiura is the 2018 @MLBazFallLeague MVP after hitting .323 with 5 homers and a league-leading 33 RBIs in 23 games. More from @wboor: https://t.co/Qbc6keDe54 pic.twitter.com/f47t6zO7fR

— MLB Pipeline (@MLBPipeline) November 17, 2018

What’s Runs Prevented? Flexible Elite Roles ||  Exploring Runs Prevented || Aces Do Not Exist || Rotation Spots || Third-Time Charmers

Here’s how the Brewers pitching staff looks when ranked by Average Runs Prevented. For additional context, each pitcher’s Games, Games Started, and Innings Pitched statistics are included.

Stats: 

Average Runs Prevented is the average of park-adjusted, league-adjusted estimates of a pitcher’s actual runs allowed compared to their expected runs allowed.

DRA Runs Prevented is the difference between a pitcher’s expected runs allowed and their DRA performance. 

Direction is the “Direction of Change” between a pitcher’s 2018 Average Runs Prevented and 2018 DRA Runs Prevented.

G is “Games” (total appearances); GS is “Games Started” (total starts); IP is “Innings Pitched.”

Why is this important? DRA is a pitching statistic that estimates each pitcher’s performance based on numerous contextual factors. DRA is a statistic that can describe a player’s performance on the field by correlating Runs Allowed per 9 IP (RA9) to DRA; it is modeled to consistently assess a player’s performance year-to-year; and it is modeled to predict next year’s RA9. Runs Prevented, on the other hand, is a purely descriptive statistic, simply aiming to measure the extent to which a pitcher compares to their park and league environments.

Before we get into the extended analysis, if you’d like to know why this topic is important, consider the following questions; for fun, the exercise could also end here, as there’s a lot to think about with this staff.

….which of these pitchers would you expect to improve in 2019?

….which of these pitchers would you expect to improve in 2019?

….which of these pitchers would you expect to improve in 2019?

By describing Runs Prevented and DRA Runs Prevented statistics year-over-year, it is possible to understand the absolute volatility of pitching performance. DRA is also potentially a tool that can be used to set someone in the right direction for analyzing statistical profiles in order to project improvement or decline.

Let’s take a look at MLB pitchers that worked in 2017 and 2018:

The value of using a statistic such as DRA is that the year-to-year Runs Prevented performance by MLB pitchers is absurdly volatile. The table above demonstrates the absolute value of change in several key statistics for pitchers that worked in both 2017 and 2018. 639 MLB pitchers worked in both 2017 and 2018 seasons. On the whole, this group was quite volatile, with the average change in runs prevented moving by nine runs prevented (positive or negative); a pitcher that worked in both 2017 and 2018 also saw their innings pitched total fluctuate between 33 and 34 innings, and their average games started fluctuate by four. Focusing specifically on starters (i.e., pitchers who started a game in 2017 and pitchers who started a game in 2018), the fluctuations are even wider.

These fluctuations would be the equivalent of Jhoulys Chacin becoming a slightly below average, slightly smaller workload pitcher in 2018, or improving steadily into “ace” territory; Freddy Peralta expanding into a more regular rotation role, or stepping back into a smaller replacement role; Corey Knebel fluctuating to a below average reliever or recovering his excellent high leverage form; or Josh Hader becoming “just” an average reliever or taking the next step in his high leverage ace development. These are just a few examples of the real impact that typical run prevention fluctuations can cause to a team. Each of these pitchers are likely to remain under Brewers contractual control in 2019, so it matters how their performances change.

Let’s dig deeper into that group of 639 pitchers that worked in both 2017 and 2018 to assess the descriptive value of DRA and Runs Prevented. A couple of caveats are in order. First, this is a biased analysis, insofar as I am expressly limiting my search to players that worked in both 2017 and 2018, which excludes a “true talent assessment” of players that missed either of those seasons for a multitude of reasons (from player development, such as Freddy Peralta, to injury, such as Jimmy Nelson). Second, since I will be describing the general direction of DRA, I am not using statistical methods to assess the significance of DRA’s predictions. With these caveats in mind, I think it remains useful to see how DRA assesses players within a single season, and across two seasons.

Now that we’ve discussed the average absolute value of Runs Prevented change between 2017 and 2018, let’s take an overview of this group of pitchers in terms of improvement or decline. Excluding pitchers with Runs Prevented totals between -2 and 2 in 2017 and 2018, which represents a relatively minimal range of fluctuation that could simply be explained by park factors or league environment, more pitchers declined than improved between 2017 and 2018. In many cases, these changes were quite major, as 132 pitchers declined by 10 or more Runs Prevented, while 53 pitchers improved by 10 or more Runs Prevented. The overall magnitude of major declining performances ensured that this group of 639 pitchers was -439 Runs Prevented (!!!) between 2017 or 2018; this means that if each 2017 team retained these pitchers, on average they would have been expected to lose approximately 44 more games (as a group) in 2018, all else held equal.

Based on 2017 performance, could anyone have predicted these directions of change among these pitchers? Once I assembled an Average Runs Prevented analysis of the 2017 MLB season, and isolated pitchers that worked in both 2017 and 2018, I analyzed several aspects of each player’s performance:

• I analyzed the 2017 Direction of Change, which is the change between 2017 Runs Prevented and 2017 DRA Runs Prevented, in order to assess whether a player overperformed or underperformed their DRA.

• I analyzed the 2017 Direction of Change and the difference between 2018 Runs Prevented and 2017 Runs Prevented, in order to assess whether a player’s between-seasons change (2017 to 2018) matched their 2017 underperformance or overperformance. Focusing on 2017 Direction of Change and between-seasons change is one way to describe the types of projections made by DRA.

• I assessed 2017 DRA Runs Prevented and 2018 DRA Runs Prevented in order to determine whether the statistic consistently estimated a pitcher’s contextual performance.

First and foremost, in terms of 2017 and 2018 consistency, DRA consistently assessed 389 pitchers as either Above Average or Below Average in both 2017 and 2018. Since the “Other Pitchers” group is quite a set of outliers, I provided a couple of key statistics about their DRA Runs Prevented.

In this case, the “Other” group is comprised of outliers, including pitchers like Wade Miley and Chase Anderson, as well as Lucas Giolito, Kyle Freeland, and Derek Holland, among others. This is an area where the biased selection of this group of pitchers could impact analysis, as developments such as a new pitch (by Miley) or backed-up stuff and command (by Giolito) create role discrepancies that would be difficult to predict without granular scouting information. Of course, these are precisely the types of uneven player development facts that teams attempt to exploit. Wade Miley was not a particularly good pitcher in 2018, indeed he could have reasonably been replaced (which is partially why he was available for a minor league contract entering 2018); his development to an average pitcher was worth 44 DRA Runs Prevented between 2017 and 2018, a massive improvement that is going to skew nearly any sample of players.

On the whole, it is worth noting that DRA Runs Prevented tracked better than Average Runs Prevented, in terms of absolute value of change, between 2017 and 2018. Among pitchers that worked in both seasons, DRA Runs Prevented fluctuated by approximately 8 runs, compared to approximately 9 runs by Average Runs Prevented. Not bad!

How does DRA work with this group of pitchers in terms of predicting the general direction of change between 2017 and 2018? Based on a pitcher’s internal 2017 difference between DRA and Runs Prevented, that pitcher’s typical improvement or decline between 2017 or 2018 matched the overperformance or underperformance (in terms of 2017 DRA versus 2017 Runs Prevented). DRA correctly assessed a pitcher’s expected performance change in 79 percent of cases:

Within this group of pitchers, DRA performs quite well in terms of assessing the actual size of the Runs Prevented change, as well as the direction. Once I categorized pitchers into groups of players that had Predicted Improvement, Predicted Decline, or some Other Prediction, I compared the change between 2017 and 2018 DRA Runs Prevented to 2017 and 2018 Actual Runs Prevented:

It should be underscored that this is a descriptive account of DRA’s predictions, rather that a statistical test of the significance of DRA’s predictions. Still, what is incredibly impressive about DRA is just how strong the statistic is in anticipating the shape of the run environment, and understanding the wide variance that can occur year over year.

What is interesting is that, according to DRA, the Brewers pitching staff was indeed better than average in 2018. However, there are 22 pitchers from that staff that might reasonably be expected to post a notable improvement or decline in 2019, if one assesses the extent to which they outperformed or underperformed their 2018 DRA. Thus, it is worth repeating the questions about who might be expected to improve in 2019, for even if the overall direction of the club’s pitchers may be expected to stay the course, their shape and distribution of Runs Prevented can all but expected to look quite different.

The first thing that stands out about the 22-year-old Supak is his sheer physical presence. At 6’5” and 235 pounds, he cuts a classic, old-school silhouette on the mound. The guy looks like a throwback workhorse, capable of soaking up 200 decent innings with a rubbery arm and a smooth, repeatable delivery. It’s a great starting point for a pitching prospect.

What may hold Supak back from becoming a rotation mainstay is the quality of his raw stuff, which is largely average. Even at the time of his trade three years ago, Supak’s frame was more or less maxed out. Accordingly, the big Texan’s fastball velocity hasn’t really budged as he’s grown older; Supak still operates right around 90 or 91 mph, with the ability to reach back on occasion and crank it up to 94. It’s a decent pitch, as fastballs go, but hardly an elite offering. Supak has, however, taken some steps forward with his secondaries. What was once a fringe-y curveball has turned into a legitimate weapon; it now profiles as no worse than average, with good downward break and great velocity separation off of his heater (the curve spins in at 75-78 mph). His changeup, too, has been much improved over the last several years, traveling from non-existent all the way up to fringe-average. It should, at worst, become a “show-me” pitch in the majors, which may be just enough to allow Supak to stick in a starting rotation. At best, it could become average; it’s a little firm at the moment, but it comes in right around 85 mph and is at least capable of disrupting a hitter’s timing.

Supak has always shown good command of his pitches, leading to some suspicion that the solid results he produced in the low minors had more to do with the inexperience of his opponents than his own prowess on the mound. (Through A-ball, pitchers with good command and middling stuff routinely fudge their way through to impressive stat lines; once they reach the upper minors, more advanced hitters start to hit back.) That Supak was able to maintain his effectiveness as a 22-year-old getting his first taste of Double-A last season lends some optimism to his outlook.

His performance in the Southern League becomes even more impressive when it’s examined in halves. Supak made 16 starts for the Shuckers last year after his late-May promotion, with a nice cumulative ERA of 2.91. But in the first eight of those starts, he allowed 23 earned runs in 39.7 innings for a 5.22 ERA. Opposing batters lit him up for a .720 OPS. Wins don’t matter, but Supak was also winless in six decisions during that span.

The next eight starts were a little different. From July 16 through the end of the season, Supak pitched 47.0 innings and allowed a measly five earned runs. Opposing batters struggled to an anemic .527 OPS. His ERA during that time was 0.96, and he won each of the six decisions into which his performance factored.

If that line in the sand seems a little too convenient to be taken seriously, well, sure. We’re talking about a pretty small sample here, for one. I wasn’t present at any of Supak’s starts, so I’m unable to comment on how his stuff, or his demeanor, or the defense behind him, looked during that rough first taste of Double-A. For better or worse, I’m relying on the numbers and some scant video, neither of which always paints the full picture. (Exhibit A: Supak’s swinging strike percent actually edged downwards during his dominant late-season stretch.) Even so, those sorts of stats tend to jump off the page.

Add them all up, and we’re left with this: 25 games started and a career-high 137.7 innings pitched across two levels in 2018. 123 strikeouts, 44 walks, and only six home runs allowed. A cumulative ERA of 2.48, including his time in Carolina. DRA, it must be noted, is a little more measured in assessing Supak’s 2018 performance, pegging him as a league-average pitcher for the Mudcats, where his 4.69 Deserved Run Average stands in contrast to a glittering 1.76 ERA and his 99.7 DRA- is hardly exciting (a 100 DRA- is league and park average, and the lower the number, the better). But DRA also acknowledges that Supak turned it on after his promotion, finishing with a 3.73 DRA and a tidy 79.2 DRA- in Biloxi. That kind of performance is worth protecting.

Supak will start the 2019 in the minors, perhaps even back in Biloxi. But his above-average command and fastball-curveball combo make him a solid candidate to join the bullpen shuttle to the big leagues as early as mid-season. If 2018 taught us anything, it’s that the Brewers know how to make good use of their players with option years, rotating them between Triple-A and Milwaukee as needed.

The bullpen may well be Supak’s longterm home, too. If he performs well next year, he’ll have a chance to claim a spot as a middle-reliever or swingman for the foreseeable future. His stuff may also tick up a notch or two; instead of cresting at 94 mph, like he does as a starter, that number may become more of a baseline in relief.

There’s also a chance that Supak develops into an effective back-end starter, of the kind that the Brewers have had so much success with lately. He’s got that classic innings-eater frame, but limiting him to two trips through the batting order could do wonders for his ability to prevent runs. What’s more valuable: 200 innings with a 4.50 ERA, or 150 innings with a 3.80 ERA?

Supak has flown under the radar a bit in recent years. He’s pitched well, but not spectacularly; his ascent has been slower and less noticeable than those of 2016 Brandon Woodruff, 2017 Corbin Burnes, and even 2018 Zack Brown. But it has been steady. Now, he’s knocking at the door. Add his name alongside those of Woodruff, Burnes, Brown, Peralta, and others, and it’s clearer than ever that it’s time to retire the years-old narrative that the Brewers can’t develop good arms. Supak and his peers say otherwise.

Here at BPMilwaukee, Andrew Salzman surveyed Schoop’s season and the roster factors related to the arbitration-eligible veteran, and also analyzed Schoop’s batting elements in early August. Salzman noted the declining aspects of Schoop’s plate approach, which resulted in a general profile of weak contact involving groundballs and pop-ups (both headed in the wrong direction). Paul Noonan offered a thorough critique of the logic of the trade during the deadline press cycle. Noonan illustrated the confusing logic of using Schoop in potentially interchangeable roster strategies at second base (including a potential platoon scenario), and highlights the difficulty of the second baseman fitting into the batting order.

Evaluating Schoop according to his Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) progression complicates the matter. While Schoop undoubtedly declined in 2018, his stature as an arbitration-eligible player and his exceptional 2017 season impacts almost any pricing mechanism of his performance. If the Brewers take Schoop through the arbitration process, they cannot decrease his salary according to his performance (as salaries are protected through the arbitration process, which values service time more than performance). In terms of overall career progression, Schoop’s production remains close to a $11 million per season value, which is his estimated arbitration salary according to Cot’s Contracts; other estimates are similar, assessing approximately $10 million in 2019 salary for Schoop.

The following table estimates Schoop’s three-year surplus value, which roughly means evaluating Schoop’s production and scarcity (or, production and cost), and derives one-year contracts from those models. A “harmonic mean” contract is used to balance overall 2014-2018 surplus values with the highest possible value from that time period; this is an attempt to even out the roughest edges of these value estimates.

It’s not hard to see a scenario in which Schoop is worth $10 to $11 million; in fact, balancing high- and low-value figures for Schoop places his ideal contract in that neighborhood. Even if Schoop is not “truly” worth $10 million or $11 million, it should not be difficult to see a League Championship Series caliber team overpay a player if they believe they can yield the best possible performance from that player. The difficulty is determining whether Schoop fits that logic.

An additional difficulty is that because Schoop is so young, the “Aging Curve Logic” suggests that he should be working in a prime season, and therefore produce quality performances. Yet, relying on an aging curve to promote a bounce back season from Schoop is somewhat dubious, as there are numerous disagreements about peak age, evidence that season-over-season statistics become less volatile once a player reaches age-26, and a recognition that different types of players age in different ways, anyway (Silver 2015, 81-86). There is a very real sense that Schoop already “is who he is.”

As of March 30, 2018, PECOTA picked Bret Boone, Howie Kendrick, and Jeff Kent as the age-26 comparable players for Schoop. Kendrick is an interesting pick, as his 2010 season fell backwards from a 2009 breakout, but Kendrick eventually recovered to produce better offensive value. Kent is an interesting pick because at age-26 he was not yet “Jeff Kent,” and there were some real doubts about what he might become. Boone is more interesting still, as the young phenom fell back during 1995-1997 campaigns, and produced fringe average seasons prior to breaking out again during his early 30s. These last two comparisons should be kept in mind, as it could be possible that Schoop takes several years to continue developing aspects of his plate approach, and that his 2018 and 2019 season have little to no bearing on what Schoop eventually becomes. This may not appear to be a likely scenario, but it’s a possibility worth keeping in mind given the long and often unpredictable twists of player development.

The simple point is that projecting and pricing 2019 Schoop is not simply a binary exercise; his future is not one basic either/or scenario.

With these caveats in mind, I investigated MLB seasons with at least 300 plate appearances in their age-24, 25, and 26 seasons during the Wild Card Era (1995-present) with the intention of finding players similar to Schoop’s extreme plate discipline and power approach. This is a biased sample in several ways, most importantly in the sense of seeking out “starting roles,” which I roughly designated as players with 300 or more plate appearances (which reasonably excludes players with catastrophic injuries, fringe players, and many bench players). Additionally, the sample is confined to the institutional, player development, and game constraints of the last generation, which means that this survey is in no way representative of some “true population” of age-24, 25, or 26 players throughout baseball history. Additionally, by excluding minor league players of the same age groups, I am not fully assessing Schoop’s development and plate discipline against potential replacements or other developmental trends in the game, which is another limitation for assessing players by age. Given these biases, I am reasonably asking, “Who are relatively recent MLB starting players who approach the game like Schoop?,” and “How did these players age?”; since this is not any sort of sample representative of a population, I am using this to describe development trends rather than predict Schoop’s path in 2019.

(1) Schoop and Grichuk. In the last 24 seasons, there is one player who matches Schoop’s general trend of striking out more than 20 percent of the time, walking less than 6 percent of the time, and homering more than 3.5 percent of the time during each of his age-24, 25, and 26 seasons. Interestingly enough, that player is also a contemporary of Schoop, Randal Grichuk. Even within these general parameters, Grichuk is quite different than Schoop, as his walk totals are sometimes closer to that 6 percent threshold, and the strike outs are also much higher; Grichuk is more of a “Three True Outcomes Hitter” (relying on strike outs, walks, and homers) than Schoop, who is more of a bizarre type of contact hitter.

It is startling that even given the general acceptance of strike outs over the last generation, and the proliferation of home-run based batting approaches, baseball simply does not produce batting profiles like Schoop. This could be a good thing for the Brewers, as the club certainly seems comfortable working with unorthodox plate approaches; for example, another recent Stearns era player with an unprecedented approach is Keon Broxton; additionally, another unprecedented role on the Brewers’ roster is Hernan Perez. It certainly cannot be said that Stearns is squeamish about working with relatively oddball player profiles, and that trait probably helps to explain his ability to quickly turn around the Brewers franchise by assembling a bunch of high-floor players with extremely prominent scouting flaws. The only question now is whether Stearns will pay $10 million for that privilege.

(2) Examining “low walk” players (Schoop and Salvador Perez). Working with the parameters defined above (1995-present survey), Baseball Prospectus CSV provided 29,397 players overall, which whittled down to 6,495 players with 300 (or more) plate appearances; when searching for players with at least 300 plate appearances in each of their age-24, 25, and 26 seasons, I constructed a batch of 246 players for analysis (thus the above caveats for sample bias). This is quite an interesting group of players, and as one might expect from the present biases, it’s a very productive group of players:

Within this group of players, the most striking and promising trait for comparison with Schoop was walk rate, which was a good indicator to separate comparisons and descriptions of development from big walk, big strike out, big home run players. For Schoop’s intriguing trait is generally huge power (and indeed, he consistently produced better-than-median power for this group) without corresponding high walk totals. Thus, it wouldn’t do much good to compare Schoop to Mike Trout, Adam Dunn, Prince Fielder, Edgardo Alfonzo, and other age-26 walk monsters; those players are doing something different at the plate to reach their prodigious power. So, I isolated a group of 37 low-walk total players that posted an additional 300 (or more) plate appearances during their age-27 campaign, in order to describe an age-26 to age-27 aging pattern for these players. This is quite a fun group!

Here, the top table shows the change in category performance from age-26 to age-27 season, while the bottom table shows the basic age-26 production for Wins Above Replacement Player, Plate Appearances, True Average, and Strike Outs / Walks / Home Runs.

By plate discipline (K / BB / HR), the most comparable player to Jonathan Schoop on this table was Salvador Perez. Perez was able to cut down the strike outs and tap into more power during his age-27 campaign, which provided a boost back to league average batting production for the catcher. Jedd Gyorko was the best of these players at age-27, but did so by completely retooling both walks and home run power; this is a demonstration that large scale plate discipline changes can occur on a season-over-season basis. What is striking is that even among players who are comparable to Schoop in terms of low walk rates, there are very few that strike out as much as Schoop, or hit for big power. Hence the lack of comparable players, save for Randal Grichuk.

Schoop has his work cut out for his age-27 season, as the middle infielder can retain value through his power if his strike outs and groundball / pop-up fluctuations do not impede that power. He’s a strange $10 million gamble for a front office, as the general ideal of age-27 seasons from players with 4.0+ WARP seasons on their resumes suggests bright futures rather than large question marks. Yet, there could be reason to suspect that Schoop may age differently than other prime age middle infielders, both due to his consistently better than average power and due to his extreme plate discipline. Nobody hits like Schoop, and in some sense this ought to result in a vote of confidence from GM Stearns when the opt-in is a one-year gamble. But the lean months of 2018 speak loudly, where the power was rendered empty by low batting averages and the lack of another offensive carrying tool when that one vanished. So here we are, fixated on a relatively marginal roster deal, looking for excellent production in the middle of the diamond.

Citation

Silver, Nate. 2015. The Signal and The Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail – but Some Don’t.. Penguin.

This post was updated at 5:24 PM on November 23, 2018 to correct the figures in the Grichuk / Schoop table.

In 2017, the 84th best pitcher averaged approximately 10 runs prevented, establishing the 90th percentile performance point; in 2018, the 89th best pitcher averaged approximately 10 runs prevented, suggesting that the 90th percentile performance did not change. If you like false certainty, even here the decimal points look similar, as the 2018 cut-off was 10.221 average runs prevented versus 10.229 average runs prevented in 2017. Let’s call it 10 Average Runs Prevented for fun…

 Exploring Runs Prevented || Aces Do Not Exist || Rotation Spots || Third-Time Charmers

What is Runs Prevented? Runs Prevented is a relatively basic statistic that attempts to measure the quality of a pitcher’s performance within their run environment (which is roughly the combination of their ballpark, which can impact scoring, and their league, which can impact the mix of talent faced). Measuring pitching is difficult because unlike batting stats, you cannot simply “count up” with pitchers; a team that scores 750 runs is  likely better than a team that scores 700 runs, but a team that allows 650 runs is likely better than a team that allows 700 runs. So, assessing pitching in a “run environment” requires accounting for that “negative space” (in this example, between 650 RA and 700 RA). Throughout the 2018 season, I developed an Average Runs Prevented statistic that attempted to track variance in park factors (between Baseball Prospectus Pitching Park Factor and Baseball Reference Park Factors) as well as variance in league environments. Usually these differences did not amount to much, but tracking them is an important step to understanding variance and reflecting uncertainty in the Runs Prevented metric: I can say “Jeremy Jeffress prevented 24.63337 runs in 2018,” or I can say “on average Jeremy Jeffress prevented between 23 and 26 runs in 2018,” or I can say, “Jeffress prevented 25 runs.”

…The short lesson: if you’re an MLB pitcher that prevented 10 runs, you’re really, really good. This holds regardless of role. In 2018, the top ten percent of all MLB pitchers featured 53 starting pitchers and 36 relief pitchers, which is quite a swing in favor of starting pitching quality; in 2017, these 90th percentile pitchers featured 41 relievers and 43 starters. What’s important here is to takeaway that great relievers prevent enough runs to break into the top threshold of league performance; Runs Prevention need not categorically be dominated by starting pitching, which is one reason the Brewers did not need a starting pitcher at the trade deadline (thanks to their strong bullpen).

Aces are more difficult to define than “Average Runs Prevented.” I can at least give you a math equation for Average Runs Prevented at the end of the day. But an “ace” can be many things;

• Some fans want an ace to be a breathy “dude” or “guy”, a “stud” atop the rotation. File this one under the debate about playoff dudes,  “Do you want Jhoulys Chacin and Wade Miley to pitch in the playoffs?” (Yes, actually);

• Some people ascribe to a theory than an “ace” is simply the best pitcher on each MLB team (e.g., 30 teams means 30 aces, and no team can have more than one ace);

• Scouts like to define “aces” in very rigorous ways, focusing on the quality of a pitcher’s stuff (typically better than average fastball and off-speed or breaking ball is the minimum stuff requirement for acehood), as well as their command (must be great), and probably their frame, too (it’s good to project innings from an ace). But I take it that this is not how most fans mean “ace,” and it’s also no fun because aces rarely exist under this mold (#EveryoneIsAMidRotationStarter);

• Finally, there’s the simple stipulation that an “ace” is an elite starting pitcher, at the top of the league in terms of performance (presumably, hopefully, for multiple consecutive years. For example, this is why people say Clayton Kershaw is an ace, but Junior Guerra is not. I used to be sure of the importance of consistency, but….well, aces hardly exist under this requirement, either).

In this analysis, I am going to demonstrate two of the shortcomings with the idea of using performance to define the concept of an ace.

(1) Threshold of Greatness. Seeking the 90th percentile of MLB pitchers seems like a very high standard; it’s quite literally the top of the league, but includes a large enough group of pitchers to make meaningful comparisons. What I mean by this is, if we used a more strict threshold, there really would not be any aces; take the Top 10 pitchers by Runs Prevented in 2017 and 2018, for instance:

I rather like this, in the sense that it demonstrates that aces do not exist, but it doesn’t pass the eye test. If you’ve designed a threshold where only Corey Kluber, Chris Sale, and Max Scherzer are aces in 2017 and 2018, but not Kyle Freeland, Justin Verlander, Clayton Kershaw, Blake Snell, or Jacob deGrom, you’ve probably missed the threshold and poorly defined the concept.

An interesting problem arises with using the 90th percentile threshold, however: starting pitchers no longer dominate the proceedings, and 10 Average Runs Prevented is the measure for an ace. This surely won’t do for Brewers fans, for example, as 2016 Junior Guerra is absolutely, positively an ace under this regard; interestingly enough, so are 2018 Jeremy Jeffress, Josh Hader, and Wade Miley. Of course, this is conceptually interesting because Brewers fans absolutely did not want Miley to work in the rotation, and he was an “ace,” it turns out. Really, a truly fantastic pitcher, better than 90 percent of the MLB. Jeffress and Hader are difficult in terms of “acehood” because they do not start ballgames; but it’s not clear to me than an ace must start ballgames.

Consider the false controversy to open 2018, regarding whether or not Josh Hader should start or work in his relief role; as a starter, the concern is clearly that Hader does not have the command or pitching profile to work through a batting order multiple times, and based on news throughout the season, his delivery is probably too high effort to withstand a starting workload. But that was never the debate; the debate among angry fans was, “Josh Hader should start because the Brewers must see whether he can be an ace.” Ironically, based on the 90th percentile threshold of Runs Prevented, Hader is an ace, undoubtedly so (in fact, he’s better than 95 percent of the league in 2018; Jeffress was even better, beating 98 percent of the MLB). In this debate, it seems that the ideal of “finding an ace by making sure they can start games” misses the concept of what an ace ought to do (“consistently prevent runs at an elite level”), and so the Hader starting pitching controversy falls by the wayside.

Both Hader and Jeffress are aces, on this model. As they should be.

(2) Consistency. Josh Hader showed flashes of brilliance during the 2017 season, in which he established a clearly valuable MLB “floor” performance level, and raised debates about how high the “ceiling” performance could be. I gather this is in part why fans wanted so badly to see Hader start; when he began his career in the bullpen, it was certainly due to his tough season at Triple-A Colorado Springs, where he lost his breaking ball and had his stuff and command profile back-up a little bit. Yet Hader excelled in his MLB debut role, working through some command issues by offsetting bad outings with a dozen scoreless multi-inning appearances. Hader prevented between 13 and 14 runs in 47 and 2/3 innings.

Any team will receive considerable value from a pitcher that prevents more than 10 runs in a season; no team would balk at a chance at 90th percentile runs prevention production. Yet, there is more value to be had from pitchers that can repeat the feat in consecutive seasons. For example, 639 pitchers worked in both 2017 and 2018 seasons, with considerable variance in their production. The typical back-to-back pitcher in 2017 and 2018 found their runs prevented total shift by at least nine runs, with their innings pitched total fluctuating by 33. If you ascribe to the rule of thumb that approximately ten runs are equivalent to “one win” when balancing Runs Scored and Runs Allowed, the MLB pitchers that worked in 2017 and 2018 fluctuated enough to produce as many as 575 total wins (or losses), depending on how teams balanced their resources (as a side note, this is one reason organizations should not ever tank, and should always try to compete: there are always tons of runs that can be “captured” every year through trades, free agency, and player development fluctuations).

This is where I believe fans and analysts turn against “one year aces” like Junior Guerra. The idea is not that Guerra was not valuable to the Brewers in 2016, but that it is more valuable to have a pitcher that a team can “depend” on to produce 90th percentile performance year-in, and year-out. The trouble is, these pitchers do not readily exist. Looking at 2017 and 2018, here are the pitchers that were able to produce 10 Average Runs Prevented (or better) in both seasons:

This seems like a good list, for two reasons: (1) it’s intuitive enough to pass the “eye test” in terms of including pitchers like deGrom and Kershaw, but it also includes some “newcomer” aces like Aaron Nola; (2) it includes enough counterintuitive pitchers that we can look into new cases and further define quality pitching roles. Here, I’m thinking of Josh Hader (who is an ace in relief), JA Happ (who has morphed into an extremely consistent late career pitcher), and Dellin Betances (who is typically criticized as a middle reliever when it comes to contract negotiation matters, but should be thought of in the highest terms of consistency). Moreover, this table shows the benefit of being more inclusive in terms of defining aces, rather than less exclusive. Here’s what happens if you only consider pitchers with consecutive 20+ Runs Prevented seasons to be aces:

This list is visually appealing insofar as we all know that these pitchers are great, the top of the game in fact. This group would be the true 99th percentile of the game of baseball at the moment. But, it does not capture easily acquired pitchers (except for the Cleveland arms, perhaps, in Carlos Carrasco and Corey Kluber, this is an expensive group in terms of draft status, contract, or prospect resources required for acquisition). So, the cases of aces exclude most MLB teams from acquiring aces. Furthermore, there is no diversity of roles in this table, and to my eye that seems like the biggest shortcoming in this definition of the ace: for if we continue to define aces according to the highest possible standard, we will continue to replay and repeat the “Josh Hader should start” debate, and miss the reasons why Wade Miley or Jeremy Jeffress could be aces, too.

Building a pitching staff based around flexible roles, or based on elite relief roles and interchangeable starting rotation roles, does not preclude acehood. In fact, the 2018 Brewers demonstrate that effectively, both with multi-year consistent aces (Hader) and (potentially) one-off successes (Jeffress, Miley).

Related Reading:
Brewers Organization Catchers

The Baseball Prospectus top 2019 Free Agents list had four catchers in the top 50: Yasmani Grandal, Wilson Ramos, Kurt Suzuki and Jonathan Lucroy. Eliminating Lucroy, who was the second worst catcher who received regular playing time in 2018, the Brewers have three options if they wanted to dip into the free agent pool to try and upgrade the position.

Yasmani Grandal was ranked 9^th best free agent this offseason and projections put him at least a  three year commitment between $15-16M a year. At that salary, Grandal would rank second on the team in annual salary, only behind Ryan Braun. While Grandal is entering his age-30 season, he only trailed J.T. Realmuto in catcher Wins Above Replacement Player (BWARP) in 2018 and was close enough that one could consider him the best in baseball. Grandal may have been the most complete catcher as he ranked second in both Value Over Replacement Player (VORP) and FRAA amongst catchers, which respectively measure offensive and defensive value, showing that he’s strong at both ends of the game.

If there’s one area of concern, it’s that most of Grandal’s defensive value came from framing. He led MLB in framing runs in 2018 but provided only slightly positive value for blocking and throwing runs. If the Brewers were to commit the resources necessary to sign Grandal, then they would need to believe his bat will age gracefully as well as that  he can continue to provide defensive value through framing, which is not a given.

Wilson Ramos is a year older than Grandal and with his injury history projects for a three year contract at $36 million. He doesn’t provide much defensive value. In his last season before tearing his ACL, Ramos had a 10 FRAA. Since the tear, he’s -3.9. Amongst catchers who caught at least 2,000 pitches, Ramos ranked 35^th of 61 catchers in FRAA, which make sense given his numbers: he’s not bad in any one area, but he also doesn’t stand out defensively.

Ramos will provide offensive value. In 2018, his True Average (TAv) was right behind Grandal and ranked fourth amongst all catchers. If you were concerned that a rate stat props up his value, then don’t worry because he was tied for seventh in VORP.

A big worry with Ramos would be playing time management. Prior to his knee injury, he maxed out at 131 games and 523 plate appearances. Last year he appeared in 111 games and went to the plate 416 times between Tampa and Philadelphia. While the Brewers don’t have any problems with rotating players, Ramos has no positional flexibility and would need to be paired with a competent backup who can cover somewhere between twenty-five to thirty-three percent of the playing time. Unless the market on Ramos falls short of projections, it’s difficult to see the Brewers making a strong play for his services because they’d also need to commit to a strong backup, perhaps straining the payroll too much for one position.

The last catcher in the top fifty is one who may make the most sense as a Brewer if he’s willing to leave his current club. Kurt Suzuki has had a late career renaissance at the plate in Atlanta, posting his two best TAvs in 2017 and 2018. In those two seasons, Suzuki started swinging more. Whereas prior to 2017, he was swinging at less than forty-five percent of the pitches he saw, he’s above a fifty two percent swing rate now, while also maintaining a contact rate above eighty percent. Suzuki finished sixth in both TAv and VORP amongst catchers in 2018, providing near equal offensive value to Ramos.

Suzuki does not provide much value behind the plate. He had a -5.5 FRAA in 2018, which was fueled by his poor framing numbers. He finished 52^nd out of 61 catchers in framing runs and his modest blocking and throwing numbers couldn’t offset the framing numbers.

Suzuki’s numbers have increased as he’s played fewer games. He’s split time with Tyler Flowers in Atlanta, playing in 186 games over two seasons with less than 700 plate appearances. The good news is that his advanced age and limited playing time make him a potential cheap upgrade for Milwaukee. Projections have him at two years and $10 million, which is reasonable enough to make him a realistic alternative to Pina or Kratz.

If the team does decide to look to the free agent marker to upgrade the catcher position, it feels like Suzuki would be the target. He’s a low cost option who could provide outsized production when compared with his salary. For an organization that always looks for surplus value in their acquisitions, a player like Suzuki makes sense for the team. Grandal and Ramos are buzzier additions but the cost of those two veterans may not fit in the budget. The good news is that the team has options at different levels outside the organization, so they can negotiate from a position of strength.

Ashby comes from a big league pedigree; he is the nephew of former MLB pitcher Andy Ashby, who also pitched at Crowder College before going on to a 14-year career that ended with a 4.12 ERA across more than 1,800 innings. Aaron himself finished with an impressive resume at Crowder, posting a 2.29 ERA across 74.2 innings in his final season while leading all Junior College pitchers in strikeouts (156) and strikeout rate (18.8 K/9). But his below-average control (5.18 BB/9) caused him to slip down to 125th overall, where he signed for a slightly above-slot $520,000 bonus.

Ashby began his career in the professional ranks in Helena, Montana, pitching for the Brewers’ Pioneer League affiliate. The bottom-line numbers say that he didn’t fare too well during his brief stint in rookie ball, as he worked to a 6.20 ERA while logging 20.3 innings. The Pioneer League is notoriously hitter-friendly, however, and the decent 19:8 K/BB ratio and 93 Deserved Run Average Minus (DRA- ) that he produced for Helena are probably more indicative of his true performance during those six outings (on a scale of 100, a DRA- below 100 is better than average). Ashby was never going to be long for rookie ball, and he was promoted to make his debut with the Class-A Wisconsin Timber Rattlers on July 29th.

Aaron would go on to make seven dazzling starts for Appleton to conclude his season, never allowing more than two earned runs in any of them. He tossed six shutout innings in his Midwest League debut against Kane County, and in back-to-back starts against Cedar Rapids on August 19th and Clinton on August 24th, he worked six innings while striking out 10 and 12 batters, respectively. All told, Ashby pitched 37.3 innings at Class-A with a 2.17 ERA, 47 strikeouts against a mere nine walks, and only one home run allowed. He limited opponents to a .233 True Average (TAv) even though he was stung by a .398 batting average on balls in play, and Ashby finished with a sterling Deserved Run Average that saw his work as 39 percent more effective than his Midwest League peers.

Free passes were Ashby’s biggest bugaboo as a collegiate hurler, but he was able to limit the walks quite well during his first 57.7 innings as a professional in 2018. His 2.7 BB/9 across two levels was nearly half his total during his last year at Crowder, though some scouts wonder how long that will continue as he begins to face more advanced hitters while climbing the minor league ladder. Ashby has a “funky,” high-effort delivery that makes it difficult for him to throw strikes at times, but it does add plenty of deception and helped him induce swings aplenty at pitches outside the strike zone against the Pioneer and Midwest League hitters.

The raw stuff is truly excellent, though. A moving fastball that routinely registers in the 91-94 MPH range; A plus curveball that has long been his go-to pitch and was graded by Baseball America as the best secondary offering of any Brewers’ pitcher drafted in 2018; A power slider that has “impressive depth and two-plane break,” that BA says Milwaukee’s development staff likes even better than the curve; and a changeup that doesn’t get used much, but projects as an average offering at maturity.

A role as a power reliever will always be there for Ashby to fall back on if the command issues creep back up in the future, but so long as he can continue refining his mechanics and adding strength to his 6’1″, 170 lb frame, Ashby could grow into a “really intriguing mid-rotation prospect” according to Baseball Prospectus’ Mark Anderson. He’ll no doubt be hoping to following the footsteps of fellow fourth-round pick Corbin Burnes, who also began as an intriguing prospect from a small college before blossoming under Milwaukee’s minor league coaching staff. Burnes fashioned himself into an integral part of Milwaukee’s big league roster within two years of being drafted; with some minor adjustments, Aaron Ashby could follow a similarly quick path to the majors.