Among Anderson’s big changes last year was a velocity spike that impacted all his pitches.  Because of that increase, he was able to rely more on his four-seam fastball and cutter, which subsequently resulted in him using his sinker less.  This is a plausible explanation for Anderson’s improved strikeout rate; sinkers are traditionally used to induce contact because their movement is more subtle, while cutters have sharper movement and can resemble sliders that dart away from bats.  Increased velocity on its own can help create more swings-and-misses.  When that is paired with a move towards more dynamic pitches, batters will whiff more often.  As we head into 2018, whether Anderson maintains this improved velocity will be something to watch for.

Where that velocity change came from is an interesting question, though.  We don’t have complete answers about how mechanical tweaks impact pitch effectiveness; if we did, pitchers would know exactly what they need to do to improve certain pitches.  We do know, though, that pitchers are constantly making adjustments, and occasionally they find changes that work.  Brewers’ pitching coach Derek Johnson has a reputation for helping pitchers find tweaks that work for them individually, and so it is plausible that Anderson’s velocity spike is a result of a mechanical adjustment.

Another change is that in 2017, Anderson’s release point moved from where it had been in years past.  His horizontal release point shifted over six inches from where it had been the prior year, but his vertical release point did not really change.  This likely indicates that Anderson moved sideways on the rubber, although off-center camera angles make that hard to confirm.

The exact consequences we should have expected from this shift are unclear.  Moving on the rubber can impact the level of deception a pitcher can create because it changes the hitter’s view of the ball coming out of his hand, and it can therefore help neutralize platoon splits.  Because there was no change in Anderson’s platoon splits (he continues to have a reverse split), though, I don’t know why this change would have made him better.

Additionally, moving on the rubber would not have caused a velocity increase.  Not all mechanical adjustments show up in what the PitchF/X or Statcast cameras capture; for example, a more compact motion could increase velocity because a pitcher is better balanced, but this would not necessarily cause a corresponding release point change.  Similarly, it seems as if Anderson’s mechanical tweak is not captured by release point data.

The big question for 2018 is whether Anderson’s improvements will continue.  The two trends I identified above are two keys to watch for as this season begins.  His velocity spike is likely the biggest factor in any potential continued success, as a better fastball allows off-speed pitches like a curveball to play up as well.  But whether he moves on the mound again will be interesting as well, because it would indicate he is uncomfortable and feels as if he needs to make changes.

The 2018 data in the graphs above are through his first start only, so it is an incredibly small sample size.  Pitcher velocity tends to increase after April, so any current decline is not necessarily worrying.  But it would be encouraging to see Anderson’s fastball velocity tick up towards his 2017 levels as April progresses.  If that increase does not happen, I would begin to be worried about which version of Anderson we will be getting this year.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Years before Deserved Runs Average (DRA), and the expansion of Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) into popular language, I was personally interested in investigating ways to discuss pitching performance in a language other than Earned Runs Average (ERA). The typically cited shortcomings with ERA are its dependence on the official scorer’s discretion (due to errors), and its dependence on defensive ability. Another more straight forward issue with ERA is that it simply does not equal Runs Scored / Runs Allowed (RS / RA). This is unsatisfactory because RS / RA is the primary statistic in all of baseball: teams win based on outscoring their opponents, plain and simple.

Runs Prevented is a useful stat in order to place pitching performance on the same level as the run environment, or leaguewide RS / RA. In this way, it gets a little bit closer to the language of wins and losses than ERA. Granted, by assessing a pitcher’s runs allowed, the defense is still in the mix, but there’s always going to be a shortcoming with a statistic; in this case, the issues with the official scorer’s discretion is removed.

So Runs Prevented is simply the following:

In a given workload (Innings Pitched), league (Runs Allowed per 9 IP), and park (Park Factor — I typically use Baseball Reference Three-Year Factors), how many runs would a pitcher be expected to allow? How many runs did they actually allow?

These questions can be answered in a really simple table. Here’s the 2017 Brewers, who were quite good:

This table reads as follows: the pitcher is followed by workload (Innings Pitched), actual runs allowed, expected league and park runs allowed, and the difference between the two figures (Expected RA – Actual RA = Runs Prevented). Runs Prevented is the difference between a pitcher’s actual runs allowed and the runs they would have been reasonably expected to allow given their park and league.

Unfortunately, this is quite abstract, but it’s tough to measure pitching quality. Batting quality is a bit more intuitive, I think, because Runs Scored count “upward;” but Runs Allowed should be kept low (theoretically) in order to increase the chances of winning, so “Runs Prevented” do not technically “exist.” If a pitcher works a Complete Game Shutout, that’s an easy way to understand that someone prevented runs, but it’s less useful or intuitive to say that when Chase Anderson or Zach Davies work 6 IP / 2 R, they “prevented” one run. But, in 2017 Miller Park, that’s exactly what a 6 IP / 2 R start was worth compared to the National League and park environment. A 6 IP / 2 R start equals roughly one run prevented.

If you’re interested in the basics, this is a good place to stop. The basic concept of Runs Prevented is to assess a pitcher’s performance, and a team’s performance, against the context of their league and park. The underlying goal, of course, is to assume that if a team can prevent more runs from scoring, they can increase their likliehood of winning.

One advantage of this type of focus on Runs Scored and Runs Allowed is that the stat can easily be expressed across the league in a very straightforward manner. Park-adjusted each 2017 National League team, for example, and ranking them by Runs Prevented shows that (once again) the Brewers were quite strong with their pitching staff:

A benefit of using this simple, straightforward number to express Runs Prevented is that an individual pitcher’s performance can be inserted onto any team. For example, if everything else was held steady on a .500 club, but they added Zach Davies, that club would be likely to improve by at least 9 runs (or approximately one win, holding the approximate scale of 10 Runs = 1 Win). What is especially significant about this stat is that it takes baseball out of the “Replacement Theory”; a “win” is not necessarily a marginal win in the sense that you’re assessing a player against a theoretical minor league replacement level. Instead, you’re judging a player against the park-adjusted league average, which is a much harsher standard than replacement level (in fact, something like Matt Garza’s -13 runs prevented season last year is not yet “replacement level”). So here, adding “one win” is really, really important; it’s quite different than adding one win above replacement (which raises its own questions).

What’s difficult about using Runs Prevented to assess a pitcher’s performance is that there are many contingencies in each league and team (including injuries, free agency and trades, other transactions, promotions, and demotions). This means that there is not necessarily a clear way to track future performance by using Runs Prevented. So, let’s look at shortcomings and contextual issues:

• Runs Prevented is a “one-year” statistic that captures a snapshot of the league run environment at one point in time, with the focus on the distribution of runs prevented across each individual pitcher. But, constructing runs prevented rankings over years has taught me the value in embracing the variance in the game; last season I tracked National League pitchers who worked consecutive years between 2011-2017 and found that the typical pitcher working consecutive years varies by +/- 57.0 IP and +/- 12.1 runs prevented.

• Using this context can also be helpful to understand the league’s pitching environment, especially assessing team’s by rotation spot. For example, the typical MLB team uses approximately 240 innings of -24 Runs Prevented pitchers in their starting rotation, which is quite bad; keeping this type of fact in mind will help Brewers fans understand why the 2018 depth-first rotation is actually quite solid (for they are mitigating this type of issue by seeking quality depth right out of the gate, rather than waiting for replacements to “arise” naturally).

• These are just some of the ways that Runs Prevented can be used. Additionally, I’ve been using it lately to expressed DRA figures on a different scale (i.e., to say whether one’s DRA is better or worse than average in a particular environment, and what that means in terms of improving a team’s RS / RA). Most recently, I conducted this type of analysis to emphasize the strengths of the Brewers’ 2018 rotation.

• One could also construct a FIP Runs Prevented stat as well, by scaling FIP to RA9 rather than ERA, or even a cFIP (a contextual FIP stat) Runs Prevented figure by using cFIP to index RA9. I attempted such a cFIP expression while arguing in favor of the pitching staff during a tough stretch last year.

• These are just some of the ways Runs Prevented can be used. I’m sure there’s even more ways to use it; one could design a theoretical compensation system, or even attempt to track Runs Prevented by other designations (for instance, wouldn’t it be interested to track MLB Runs Prevented based on Prospect Scouting Grades?).

Just remember with Runs Prevented to keep context in mind: there are many shortcomings with the statistic, and it should not be used as a “predictive” metric (but that’s okay; not every stat should be predictive, as descriptive statistics are also very important). By exploring the context of a run environment, and the distribution of pitching success across teams, one can come to understand a lot about roster construction, pitching rotations, and mitigating the circumstances of a 162-game season.

In 2017, Jonathan Villar performed so badly that the club had to bring in Neil Walker to play second base while they pushed for the playoffs.  Although they fell short and missed the wild card game, Walker performed admirably.  In 38 games with Milwaukee, Walker posted a .305 True Average (TAv) and was worth 0.9 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP).  One win from Walker in a quarter of the season is a good output, as it represented an upgrade over Villar’s season-long .242 TAv and 0.8 WARP.

As we are all aware, though, the Brewers have not yet re-signed Walker.  The only infield transactions they’ve made have been re-signing Eric Sogard and adding Mauricio Dubon to the 40-man roster.  Both Sogard and Dubon profile as more utility types than everyday second basemen, though, so their presence should not preclude an actual upgrade.  Both are capable of playing the position, but neither is good enough that the Brewers—a team with playoff aspirations—should be satisfied.

Walker is the most obvious solution.  He is not a superstar, but he is a solid player, and he may be available on a shorter, one- or two-year deal because the free agent market has collapsed.  From 2013 through 2016, Walker had been worth between 2.9 and 3.5 WARP.  That is a valuable player, and that level of consistency would be useful for a team that will be relying on some high-variability players (Lewis Brinson, Orlando Arcia) for their playoff push in 2018.  Even during last season, which was a down year by Walker’s standards, was not actually that bad, as his cumulative 1.7 WARP still made him worthy of a roster spot.

But as I mentioned above, the offseason is coming to a close, and the Brewers are running out of time.  This doesn’t matter so much if Walker is the solution, because the free agent market as a whole is moving slowly.  But if Walker signs elsewhere, the late date in the calendar makes working on a contingency plan more difficult.  Free agents are likely to sign quickly once the dominoes start falling simply because of the lack of time left in the winter, and the second base free agent market is not that deep.  There just aren’t that many exciting options; Danny Espinosa is the only one who appears slightly intriguing.

This late stature in the offseason also matters because it decreases the amount of time for a potential trade.  I don’t know what the Brewers front office is working on, and I imagine they are working on upgrades at basically every position.  But they cannot be pursuing every angle at once, so if Walker is the first choice, then pivoting to finding trade partners will still take some time.

Spring training is quite long, so one could argue that there is no need to make a move in the next month anyway.  A spring training trade, or even an April trade, would bring in a player early enough that the Brewers’ overall season would not be impacted.  The front office does not stop working once spring training starts or Opening Day arrives, so whether reinforcements arrive on January 30 or March 30 may not matter all that much.  The timing of these moves do matter, though, because the Brewers are at a bit of a crossroads in terms of how willing they are to push for the playoffs this year.  If they are waiting until March or April to address this kind of need, then they are unlikely to also be investing resources in a starting pitcher.  Thus, while the timing of when exactly a new second baseman arrives is mostly irrelevant, it would be indicative of the club’s broader strategy.

This article works on the assumption that an upgrade is needed, and I think the club believes that as well.  David Stearns has proven himself too smart to think that Eric Sogard is a long-term option; despite his 1.257 OPS in May, he finished the year with an OPS of just .770.  Even this was over one hundred points higher than his career mark of .638.  Mauricio Dubon is unproven, and questions remain about his bat.  The Brewers seem to love Hernan Perez, but he has a career .244 TAv, and he backslid from his seeming improvement in 2016.  That leaves Villar, who had a disappointing year and appears to have lost the club’s trust.  Even though he ended the season well (.888 OPS following the Walker trade), he could not regain his playing time, as he got only 63 plate appearances in the last 42 games of the season.  Villar was given a long rope, as no move was made to replace him until mid-August, but the rope did look as if it ran out.

Craig Counsell’s use of Villar in August and September suggests to me that the club does not view him as a solution at second base.  If that is the case, then an external option must be in the cards.  Because of the glacial pace of the free agent market, though, if Neil Walker is not that player, the Brewers are running out of time to find a backup.

Photo Credit: Charles LeClaire, USAToday Sports Images

The tough aspect of relying on Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, and Keon Broxton to make center field work in 2018 is that the position was a weakness in 2017. Although many Brewers fans and analysts typically write off the offense and fielders as solid enough, the Brewers were indeed below average in terms of park-adjusted runs scored in 2017, and center field was one of the reasons for their inability to produce on offense. In fact, according to Baseball Reference the Brewers employed their center fielders for the fewest number of plate appearances among any position (636 PA), and the team’s .229 / .304 / .405 batting average / on-base percentage / slugging percentage performance was tied for the worst position on the team. Against league center fielders, the Brewers registered an 85 Split OPS+, meaning that the club’s center field position was approximately 15 percent below average compared to National League center field.

While it is easy for fans to dream on the eventual superstardom of Brinson or the high-floor depth offered by Phillips, it is difficult to write this duo in for a guaranteed, let alone probable, improvement if they are handed the reins for 162 center field games in 2018. On the latest Milwaukee’s Tailgate podcast, Ryan Topp made a similar argument, emphasizing that if Brewers fans are ready to run with Brinson and other young players, fans have to be ready for growing pains at the MLB level.

In short, center field is one of the clearest weaknesses remaining from the 2017 club. Lorenzo Cain immediately changes the outlook of the position, however, as the veteran offers elite fielding and average-or-better hitting for an impact package in the center of the grass. In fact, Cain is arguably the best overall free agent in the current class, and almost certainly the best position player free agent when assessing free agents by their three-year depreciated surplus value (which monetizes Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) while depreciating three-year performance by 10 percent per year in order to replicate an aging curve and nonlinear player development). I provided surplus tables in my introduction to the offseason, but it bears highlighting Cain’s strength.

First, assessed by his 2015-2017 performance, Cain is the best free agent in the 2018 field. But, even if one is concerned that Cain’s 2015 and 2017 seasons weigh too heavily in this equation, it is worth mentioning that Cain is the second best free agent in this field (second only to Jonathan Lucroy) based on his 2014-2016 performance as well.

Beyond basic rank, it is worth emphasizing that Cain also possesses another strength within this free agency class: the veteran center fielder boasts one of the biggest improvements between 2017 and 2018 surplus value within this field. The idea behind “Role Depreciation” is to not only track a player’s actual performance, or depreciated performance, over a certain period of time, but also to track the changes within those performances in order to gauge upward or downward trends. A concrete example of this concept might be found in a comparison between Orlando Arcia and Jonathan Villar; Villar posted a phenomenal 2016 WARP at shortstop, but may have been more reasonably expected to emerge as an average role player, which materialized in 2017, while Arcia’s expected first division shortstop role may lead one to reasonably expect improvement (or steady performance) following his 2017 campaign. Anyway, Cain is among the few free agents in this field to offer tangible improvement in his 2018 outlook:

One can anticipate that the major complaints about Lorenzo Cain will concern his age. Cain played his age-31 season in 2017, meaning that even a three-year free agency deal will need to cover his age-32 through age-34 seasons. Given that fans and analysts have an aversion to an aging curve that requires paying premium dollar to players on the wrong side of 30, Cain seems like an obvious pass by a small market club such as Milwaukee. However, I believe that this type of aging curve thinking is a bit too orthodox, and does not highlight the fact that certain players have different aging patterns that can be discerned from their performances. For instance, at age-31, Cain’s .280 True Average (TAv) and 19.5 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) drove a 5.6 WARP performance, which is the only 5+ WARP season by a center fielder in their 30s during the new Wild Card era (2012-2017). I have used this assumption to design detailed assessment of Ryan Braun’s aging patterns, and I hypothesize that the same approach could be used for Cain: once a player demonstrates elite production after age-30, they are on a different aging pattern than the one commonly suggested for all players.

Since center field is such a loaded position in the current MLB landscape, fans and analysts may not think of Cain as an elite center fielder, but the age-31 performance in 2017 was the best since Carlos Beltran’s 2008 and Johnny Damon’s 2005 (Baseball Prospectus CSV, retrieved January 5, 2018). A detailed search of center fielders in their 30s since the turn of the century demonstrates that this position is indeed one at which players can age and perform well; this is obviously a blanket statement that may not precisely track Cain deep into his 30s, but rather a call to understand that there may not be a typical aging curve among athletic center fielders.

Finally, Cain’s batting profile also presents a unique opportunity for the Brewers. Milwaukee’s offense is well-known as a three true outcomes (strike out, walk, home run) machine, especially heavy at the strike outs. Center field was easily the club’s worst plate discipline position, focusing on strike outs and walks:

Yet, this profile need not predetermine the club’s outlook for 2018. As Noah Nofz outlined at BPMilwaukee, the Houston Astros’ current roster incarnation began as a high-strikeout affair, before the club used internal adjustments and signings to bolster the club’s contact abilities. Should the Brewers seek this type of improvement, it is unlikely that the young Brinson and Phillips will offer this type of contact profile early in their respective careers; with adjustments over several years, both players may eventually be expected to improve in terms of discipline and contact profiles (which would also arguably track with their MLB success and accomplishing something akin to their best possible roles). Cain’s batting profile is already at that point of strong contact-discipline, which arguably adds to a case for his ability to withstand aging in center field:

All of this may seem futile as the Brewers’ rumored interest in Cain is nothing more than that, but the rumor itself provides an interesting opportunity to consider the composition of the club. With $50 million in additional MLB Advanced Media revenue due to the Brewers in spring 2018, and a slow free agency market leaving many impact players on the market, Milwaukee has a fantastic opportunity to immediately shape the best possible roster using their revenue, impact prospects, and system depth. Should this cyclone of free agency signings, development at the MLB level, and trades involve Lorenzo Cain in some way, shape, or form, the veteran outfielder’s return to Milwaukee would mean that the team has nabbed an elite free agent and immediately improved their center field outlook for fielding, production, and batting order discipline and contact.

Photo Credit: Dan Hamilton, USAToday Sports Images

That very day, the Cubs went out and got the biggest target of all. Jose Quintana made his way to the north side in an unexpected deal that pried some of the last remaining jewels from what was recently one of the top farm systems in baseball. Disinterested in losing Josh Hader to land Quintana, Brewers GM David Stearns set his sights significantly lower and zeroed in on another left-handed pitcher, whom he then acquired hours after Quintana crossed town. The terms of the deal were these: In exchange for 26-year-old minor league first baseman Garrett Cooper, the Brewers received 26-year-old Yankee reliever Tyler Webb, who had tallied all of six innings at the major league level.

On the surface, this was a swap of AAA over-performers who were buried on their respective depth charts. Webb had set the pitcher-friendly International League ablaze with a 1.38 DRA in 33.3 innings for the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre RailRiders; Cooper was riding a .329 TAv in the hitter-friendly PCL for Colorado Springs. The Yankees had a glaring need at first base and a vaunted bullpen. Half of the Brewers’ opening day relief corps (Neftali Feliz, Tommy Milone, Jhan Marinez, and Taylor Jungmann) had already pitched their way out of town and the Thames/Aguilar timeshare at first was in full, powerful swing. Both teams likely hoped to catch lightning in a bottle and wring some productivity out of a pair of players from the fringe.

From Cooper, the Yankees received 45 plate appearances of .326/.333/.488 ball that translated to a .276 TAv and all of 0.1 WARP. Cooper was later traded (along with five-minute-Brewer Caleb Smith of the 2016 Rule 5 Draft) to the Miami Marlins in exchange for international slot money and a low-level pitching prospect.

The Brewers, whose position in the standings started to slide as soon as the second half opened, let Webb into just two big league games. He gave up three hits and a run in each of these.

Early returns suggest that this could be the sort of deal with such imperceptible effects on the franchises involved that nobody will ever remember it happening. Webb offers the Brewers a chance for something more, though. Gaze beyond his shaky eight-inning sample of big league work, and he looks the part of a serviceable bullpen piece.

Webb relies on a four seam fastball to set the table, opting to let it rip for two pitches out of every three. It’s a competent offering, featuring decent rise and middling run. Webb’s command of his fastball is average. Lots of things about Webb are average. The heater zips in around 90-92 mph, with a Statcast-measured average perceived velocity of 91.82 mph. That puts Webb squarely in the middle of the pack among lefties.

There are two secondary pitches in Webb’s arsenal. The first is a 82 mph slider that the six-foot-five lefty threw once for every five of his big league pitches. It, too, is an average pitch. But Webb starts to separate himself with his changeup, which didn’t show well during his 2017 cup of coffee but has been known to dominate hitters in the upper minors. The change dives to the plate at around 81 mph, and in theory gives Webb a tool that could allow him to retire right-handed batters and move beyond a specialist role.

It’s nice to watch Webb throw. He has fluid arm action and repeats his delivery well, unleashing all three of his pitches from the same slot and release point. In the major leagues, Webb induced grounders on 43.5 percent of his balls allowed in play. But his minor league work was stronger, including a 57.1% mark in the thin air of Colorado Springs. He also knows how to miss bats, fanning eight in eight innings in the bigs and 11.2 per every nine innings of minor league work. He may not replicate his 4.45 K:BB ratio in the minors, but it’s not hard to imagine that number settling into the mid-3s with more major league experience.

Here’s Webb with the Yankees, jamming Domingo Santana with an inside fastball the week before his trade:

And here he is in the 2015 Grapefruit League, changing speeds for an emphatic K:

The profile is intriguing enough that Webb was selected by the Pittsburgh Pirates in the 2016 Rule 5 Draft. Though he was eventually returned to New York, he still has two minor league options and a good chance to produce some surplus value towards the back of the major league bullpen. He’ll battle fellow former Rule 5 pick Wei-Chung Wang for a lefty specialist spot in spring training, and will likely accumulate frequent flyer miles between Milwaukee and Colorado next season. By the end of 2018, he could carve out a steady role retiring lefties or pitching in low-to-mid-leverage innings. Not a bad return for 45 plate appearances of Garrett Cooper.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

But if you don’t have Yuni on your team, and instead have good players, things get trickier. Good players are AWFUL for improvement, and while going from a Yuni to a Lind may cost you a few million dollars, going from Keon Broxton (.9 WARP. Let’s call it 1 WARP) to someone who is three wins better than Keon Broxton (Andrew McCutchen or Byron Buxton) is much more expensive. Going from, say, Domingo Santana to Giancarlo Stanton is even more expensive. Adding wins isn’t really linear, and the Brewers are about to run smackdab into a big curve.

The Astros won 106 games and had an awesome offense led by homegrown stars Jose Altuve (6.4 WARP), Carlos Correa (4.59), George Springer (4.19), and Alex Bregman (4.08). That’s an incredibly solid group of young great players. Altuve and Springer are a bit older, but certainly not old, and should remain stars for the foreseeable future.

The Milwaukee Brewers won 86 games, which is good! The Brewers’ best position player, and the only one to post a WARP over four, was Travis Shaw. The rest of the offense was bolstered by lucky streaks, old guys with big platoon splits (which even Shaw can be accused of) and the defensively inept (Domingo Santana). It was a balanced offense. While it was good last season, improving it in the short term will be very difficult. It will be even more difficult because the Brewers were pretty lucky last season.

Not everything went right for the Brewers, of course. The bullpen struggled early while Neftali Feliz was installed as closer, Jimmy Nelson suffered a terrible injury and may never return to form, and Chase Anderson missed a good chunk of time, but generally speaking the Brewers, GM David Stearns, and Manager Craig Counsell were both masterful and extremely lucky in managing injuries, streaks and slumps. Thames got them off to a gangbusters start, but when he stopped being able to hit same-side pitching, Jesus Aguilar was there to at least keep the position average. Jonathan Villar was fixed by a ridiculous steak from Eric Sogard, who was later fixed by the acquisition of Neil Walker. Jett Bandy started strong, Stephen Vogt finished strong, Manny Pina was at least fine and often quite good most of the rest of the time. Even Hernan Perez, overused down the stretch, was strategically good earlier in small doses. Timing is everything, and on offense, the Brewers enjoyed some excellent timing.

All of this luck resulted in a very good, but not quite playoff record, and that’s great, but it leaves the team with a tricky mix of high expectations and likely regression. To see any real improvement, they need to add not just good players, but star players. Star players are expensive, and while the Brewer system is well-regarded, it’s most often praised for its depth of talent, not its ceiling. It’s possible that Brett Phillips, who was great down the stretch, turns into a bona fide star, and it’s possible that Lewis Brinson does the same, but it’s unlikely, especially for 2018.

The Brewers would obviously like to compete next season, as all teams would, however doing so will essentially require:

1. A replacement for Nelson (3.89 WARP) in the rotation (expensive)

2. A multi-win upgrade among already good positional players (expensive)

3. Good luck (unlikely)

I think they’ll sign or trade for a few guys, but until the pipeline (or Mark Attanasio’s wallet) produces a few 4+ WARP players, they are relying on luck just to tread water. The Brewers are close to being something special, but as much as some want them to make a big splash, take on more payroll, or give up prospects in trade, 2018 is likely to see them take a step back no matter what they do, and spending the amount necessary to mitigate that likelihood would narrow their window of contention down the line. Think about how much a player like Giancarlo Stanton costs on the open market. The Brewers need a few of those, but they probably need to come from inside the system.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Against the mighty Cubs, then, the Brewers went +6 RS / +12 RA compared to an average distribution of the Cubs seasonal Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. Compared to the Brewers’ own performance, Milwaukee went +2 RS / -3 RA against the Cubs based on an average distribution of their seasonal Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. On balance, this means that the Milwaukee Nine held their own against the vastly superior Cubs, which was evident throughout the tense September series in which the Brewers forced a divisional conversation and nearly made the playoffs.

Brewers fans are largely complaining about the state of the club’s Winter Meetings, as the club is expected to improve pitching but came away from the meetings without any new starting pitchers or relievers. Obviously, the offseason is very young, and Stearns himself has shown a penchant for working deep into the offseason: see the Khris Davis trade in February 2016, as one example, or even the bullpen-depth-defining Jared Hughes signing entering 2017. But even as fans fret about a rotation featuring Chase Anderson, Zach Davies, Junior Guerra, Brent Suter, and Brandon Woodruff to enter 2017, it is worth remembering the performance against the Cubs to frame the potential of this group of arms. Specifically, it was the unassuming Davies (and, arguably, equally unassuming Anderson and Suter) that strung together some of the best outings against the Cubs.

In fact, selecting a biased sample of these four pitchers’ best starts against the Cubs, a 58.7 IP, 15 runs (2.30 runs average!), 47 strikeout / 11 walk / 4 home run performance appears. Despite a 47 RS / 28 RA (!!!) team performance in these ten, Milwaukee’s bats and bullpen unfortunately failed to support the starters in some of these games, resulting in a 6-4 record despite the successful starting pitching (Milwaukee went 3-6 in the other nine games versus the Cubs with a much worse 41 RS / 56 RA performance).

Selecting the successful games obviously presents a biased image of performance, but it is worth diving into these starts in order to see how the Brewers succeeded. In what follows, it will be clear that the Brewers succeeded by adjusting throughout the year against the Cubs, and (for the most part) sticking with extremely balanced pitch selection approaches against the monstrous Cubs offense. What is meant to result from this study is increased fan confidence in the approach of the pitchers along with the catching staff, coaches, and (probably) team baseball research department. The Brewers undoubtedly had a lot go right in 2017, and if no baseball season can be successful without luck, the Brewers were particularly lucky in their convergence of events. But, luck does not explain the full story, as across the board a group of relatively unknown or unheralded players quietly gave hell to the most hyped team on the Senior Circuit.

This is not to suggest that the Brewers will have continued success against Cubs bats simply by working in similar zones, but rather that these Brewers processes of dancing throughout the zone from start to start could continue to orient these arms for seemingly surprising success. Indeed, the Brewers arms already improved by 26 runs between the first and second half of 2017, thanks to a 4.11 runs average in August, capped off with 3.64 runs average in September/October. Milwaukee is a pitching-first club, and the nails approach against the Cubs demonstrates one of the keys to that success.

The image of Zach Davies conjures a sinker-change up starter who constantly works low in the zone. What’s intriguing about Davies’s success against the Cubs throughout 2017 is that the righty consistently worked up into the zone to offset his low, sinking change up and blooping curve. Moreover, the righty’s additional pitch, what Brooks Baseball calls a “Cutter” but could be somewhere between a traditional cut fastball and slider, became one of the balancing aspects of his approach with the Cubs. The “cutter” itself for Davies is an interesting pitch, one that the young righty first expanded in 2016, and then shifted slightly in 2017; the PITCHf/x readings are slight, but essentially in 2017 Davies was using the pitch to “run” slightly more armside and rise slightly more than the 2016 version. Unlike 2016, Davies basically evened out his exceptional change up and big curveball, an arsenal change that churned out more groundballs and whiffs from the cutter in 2017.

Here are Davies’s four best starts against the Cubs. The shifts are subtle, but it’s clear that the righty was changing his approach with each meeting against the Cubs simply based on pitch selection. But these aren’t wholesale changes, instead (like the pitcher) they went on-a-bit, off-a-bit, adding and subtracting subtly to find a successful approach with each start. By the end of the year, the approach was working wonders for the righty.

Davies did not simply rely on pitch selection to baffle the Cubs, however. The righty consistently changed his approach within the zone for each start, including challenging the Cubs up in the zone with both fastballs and breaking balls. According to Brooks Baseball, here are the four best Davies starts versus the Cubs in terms of total zone migration:

By separating Davies’s sinker and fastball, as well as his cutter, change, and curveball, one can isolate the specific areas of the zone in which the righty was attempting to work “hard” and “soft.” Here are Davies’s sinker and the occasional fastball:

I grouped Davies’s “cutter” with the change and curve, because I’m simply not certain that it works like an additional “hard” pitch for Davies. The righty’s arsenal is beginning to look like that of Shaun Marcum at his best (a very good thing, remember Marcum was a 12.1 WARP starter from 2007-2011), meaning that the righty can provide armside- and gloveside-breaking pitches, while also essentially changing speeds on his “sinker” (with the change up) and “fastball” (with the cutter), making the curveball the “great” equalizer. Against previous scouting reports, size questions remain for Davies, although he has remained particularly durable in each of his advanced seasons thus far, and he is succeeding beyond the expected back-end starter “Overall Future Potential (OFP)” role because of his ability to adjust at the MLB level and due to his new cutter.

The cutter is typically the breaking pitch that Davies throws “uo” in the zone, with the curve and change dropping low. This gives Davies the distinct advantage of working three different velocity levels through different areas the zone:

What is striking about both migrations throughout the zone is that Davies does not simply “climb the ladder” with the hard stuff as time progresses, but he also locates his “breaking” and “off speed” offerings higher in the zone from time-to-time, too. As a result, Davies is essentially going straight after Cubs batters, and despite their acumen for power, they were largely unable to hit the righty as the season wore on. This could be an effective mindgame from Davies, insofar as he has established himself as someone who not only prefers to work low in the zone but also is perceived to be someone who cannot come into the zone to challenge batters. One might question whether batters’ lack of expectation for pitches within the zone allowed Davies to have an advantage for pounding those areas with strikes. Indeed, he was rather successful throughout these four starts in terms of limiting hits:

Notice that by the last start against the Cubs, despite locating heavily throughout the zone and especially gloveside (to your right on the GIF), the Cubs simply did not end AB in those zones, and did not collect hits in those areas.

Like Davies, Chase Anderson’s success in 2017 swirled around a cutter and a curveball, although those tow pitches mean two different things for both arms. Anderson has become slightly more of a “velocity” pitcher, ramping his fastball from roughly 92 MPH in 2014 to nearly 94 MPH in 2017, and he famously revamped his curveball and cutter under the watch of pitching coach Derek Johnson. With a new grip, and increased usage of both the curve and cutter (at the expense of the change and other fastballs), Anderson upped the whiffs and groundballs on the curveball within the system of his new arsenal.

What is interesting about Anderson is that while one might expect Davies to be the wily pitch shifter, against the Cubs Anderson’s five-pitch arsenal moved in a more extreme manner than that of Davies. With the added velocity, Anderson effectively looks like a cross between a pitch-bending trickster and a classic over-the-top power pitcher:

From start to start against the Cubs, Anderson also migrated his pitching approach throughout the zone. Here are the righty’s three best starts against the Cubs. Notice the total overall migration from armside-to-gloveside zone approaches, especially the sharp overall pitch location contrast between the two September starts:

Within these overall migration patterns, Anderson’s distinct alignment of the cutter / fastballs approach and off-speed stuff is a beautiful thing. Unlike Davies, I lumped Anderson’s cutter in with his fastballs, simply because Anderson has a less distinct fastball queue than Davies (who throws a true “sinker”), as Anderson’s “moving” fastball is more like a hard running, riding pitch than a sinker. That his cutter is also nearly 90 MPH makes that pitch much closer to Anderson’s original fastball velocity, and easier to classify as a true cut fastball. Watch as Anderson stacks up the Cubs gloveside with hard stuff in his first September start, then dilutes the hard pitches throughout the zone:

What’s stunning with Anderson’s fastball / off-speed pitching approach is how he completely splits the two classifications of pitches throughout the zone. Granted, this would happen somewhat with Davies as well if the cutter is treated like a fastball instead of a breaking ball, so it is worth bearing this methodological decision in mind. Still, Anderson’s split is quite extreme, as shown in his first September start: with fastballs and cutters blaring in gloveside, Anderson whips those off-speed pitches to the armside of the zone. Once again, this is a beautiful type of dispersion, as once the Cubs have this start in mind, during their second look at Anderson later in the month, he completely moves his off-speed pitches gloveside.

Like Davies, Anderson effectively used these moving selections to limit hits from Cubs bats:

With Brent Suter and Junior Guerra, there are fewer starts available, and therefore less room to compare their respective arsenals.

So let’s just appreciate that Suter throws his 86 MPH fastball as his majority pitch (he is NOT a junkballer), and that he also consistently used his fastball to challenge Cubs bats high in the zone:

With the lefty’s insistence against squaring up when he releases the ball, Suter’s high fastball must be an uncomfortable sight. Imagine the Raptor’s arms rotating at you, and then instead of a top-down delivery, the southpaw slings the ball around his body while also pushing it high in the zone. This is a beautiful pitch, and it’s also worth questioning whether Suter is really just throwing a cutter; from time to time, the Raptor throws that pitch in a way to break “in” on righties, which is precisely what he did in both starts against the Cubs.

Not to be outdone, Guerra’s post-injury work against the Cubs revealed a bizarre variation of his splitter, where the off-speed pitch actually flattened out and seemed to flutter as a “straight change up” to the plate. Guerra often seemed to have no idea where the bizarre splitter would run, as the pitch sometimes dropped, sometimes rose, and sometimes simply landed on a straight line like Rich Harden’s ghost pitch:

It should not be viewed as a cliche that the Brewers beat the Cubs because their best pitchers consistently adjusted against Chicago bats. It’s not a truism that MLB players succeed by adjusting; they succeed by adjusting, and at times when the adjustments don’t work, the struggles can be difficult to turn into effective performances. The Brewers succeeded with a gang of unheralded pitchers, in the form of swingman Suter, old rookie Guerra, “back-end” Davies, and replacement level Anderson. But none of this quartet was what they were supposed to be during the 2017 season, in part because of their ability to use flexible approaches to maximize their tools. Davies maximized his approach by coming after presumably unsuspecting batters high in the zone, while Anderson maximized his approach by running vast migrations throughout the strike zone. The difficulty of this approach is that while it is true that Milwaukee will once against need these pitchers to adjust to succeed in 2018, their adjustments may not necessarily mimic their 2017 success; new or changed pitches may emerge, new pitch sequencing, or velocity questions (or surpluses) may also impact zone approaches.

At the very least, the ability to adjust in 2017 should cause Brewers fans and analysts not to count out this unsuspecting rotation prior to 2018.

Photo Credit: Dennis Wierzbicki, USAToday Sports Images.

Stearns has already spoken this offseason about how the way the core group of players gelled and succeeded together allows the org to “accelerate the timeline” of competing. The GM has indicated that the focus this offseason will be improving the Major League club, whereas building the farm system was the main focus of Stearns’s first two winters at the helm. This is an exciting time to be a Brewers’ fan, as the team has resources aplenty in terms of both payroll space and prospect capital to work with while searching for upgrades.

Starting pitching depth is said to be the main point of emphasis for the Brewers this winter, and it’s easy to see why. With Jimmy Nelson set to miss significant time in 2018 after shoulder surgery (and his return to 2017 form in question), Chase Anderson and Zach Davies represent the only proven starters on hand. The team needs innings, and Brewers have already been linked to names like Jake Arrieta and Lance Lynn in the early going this winter. Stearns has been quick to downplay those rumors, as he is with just about any transaction his team is rumored to be considering, but he has acknowledged that he and his team have had exploratory free agent and trade discussions. He has also discussed how as a small market team, it is difficult for the Brewers to build their team through free agency and make significant commitments to players over the age of 30. The goal, once again, is to “acquire, develop, and retain young talent.”

With that in mind, it may not be surprising then to see the Brewers turn to the trade market in search of addition arms to fortify their pitching staff for 2018. While Dan Straily and Jake Odorizzi are two players who figure to be available that could be of interest, there have also been rumblings about more premium arms like 29 year old Chris Archer and 26 year old Marcus Stroman potentially being available in the right deal. Acquiring one of those frontline caliber starters will require giving up quite a nifty package of players, but the Brewers have the prospects to entice other organizations and the depth in their farm system such that brokering a deal for a multiyear asset like Archer or Stroman won’t “mortgage the future.”

If Stearns and company do decide to turn their attention towards the trade market, there are a couple of prospects within the system that it may be wise to try and build a deal around. The first is Monte Harrison. Harrison was finally able to stay healthy for a full season for the first time in his career and posted a breakout year across the Class A and Class-A Advanced levels – a .306 TAv, 21 home runs, and 27 steals in 513 plate appearances between the two stops. Evaluators have been drooling over the tools he was finally able to display, and he garnered praise as a true “five-tool talent” with a 70 OFP – future All-Star caliber center fielder in BP’s recent top prospects update for the Brewers.

Though Harrison may very well have a bright future ahead of him, he’s has yet to reach the AA level and is a few years away from making an impact at the Major League level. There are also questions that could limit his ceiling, namely the rawness of his baseball skills and the utility of his hit tool. Reports indicate that his swing-and-miss tendencies were trending in the right direction by season’s end, but he whiffed 139 times in 122 games in 2017, a rate of more than 27 percent of his plate appearances. Without further adjustments, that rate figures to only increase as Harrison continues to climb the ladder to face (and potentially be exploited by) more advanced pitching. There’s also the obvious questions about his durability, as well, after he missed significant chunks of time in 2015 and 2016.

The other player is right-hander Corbin Burnes. The former 4th-rounder won Milwaukee’s minor league pitcher of the year after tossing 145.2 innings with an astonishing 1.67 ERA in 2017, compiling 140 strikeouts against just 36 walks between Class-A Advanced and Double-A this past season. His DRA- at the lower level was 40 and it was 56 after his promotion, further exhibiting the dominance that he displayed over his minor league competition in 2017.

Burnes came in at #4 on Milwaukee’s updated top prospect list and certainly has an enticing profile. Namely, the righty has the ideal build (6’3″, 205 lbs) and advanced command of four solid pitches. The stuff doesn’t quite match up with the dominating results he posted in 2017, though. Corbin Burnes doesn’t appear to be the “future ace” that fans are always pining for. His changeup needs some work to reach an average grade and his curveball is inconsistent will likely settle in as a below-average offering. At present he lacks a true plus offering, which will make it difficult for him to consistently miss bats at the big league level. Craig Goldstein noted that without some further growth, the ultimate package is probably “an inconsistent back-end starter, or a candidate to shift to the bullpen and focus on his heater and best secondary.”

The Brewers have a plethora of young, advanced outfield depth (Domingo Santana, Keon Broxton, Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, Troy Stokes) as well as right-handed pitchers (Brandon Woodruff, Freddy Peralta, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Cody Ponce, Jon Perrin, Aaron Wilkerson), which helps make the idea of a trade more palatable. Monte Harrison and Corbin Burnes both enjoyed excellent performances in 2017 and scouts believe that they may eventually be destined for big things in the MLB. But there are reasons to be wary of each player’s continued development, and with Milwaukee shifting the focus towards winning at the big league level, now may be the ideal time to sell high on Harrison and Burnes if the right deal comes along and let another franchise worry about developing them. Certainly, if the Brewers are planning on playing that segment of the market it’s worth at least exploring if a package for an Archer or Stroman could be built around those two players rather than two would-be MLB contributors in 2018 like, say, Lewis Brinson and Brandon Woodruff.

As a result, it is becoming harder and harder to argue with tanking as the means for long-suffering franchises to rebuild and return to or, in the case of the Astros, finally arrive at the top. For owners and fanbases frustrated with the cycle of mediocrity that has plagued many small or mid-market teams who have spent and spent in futile attempts at perennial contention, the success of the Astros and dazzling potential of the 76ers will have an undeniable appeal. 

The Milwaukee Brewers, undoubtedly, were subscribers to this ideology upon Doug Melvin’s exit in 2015. It should be no surprise considering the new head of their front office, David Stearns, was indeed one of the architects of the champion Astros. The Brewers emptied the cupboards and dealt almost every player of note. The trades of Carlos Gomez and Jonathan Lucroy in particular have refreshed Milwaukee’s farm system, turning it from one of the worst in the league to one of the best in just a few years’ time.

These moves undoubtedly maximized Milwaukee’s return on these assets. This club was going nowhere in 2015 nor 2016, and trading these players on expiring contracts for controllable assets was a no-brainer. But this is not what makes the ideology governing Milwaukee’s plan over Stearns’s first few years one of austerity. These moves were accompanied, however, by a drastic reduction in payroll at the major league level. The Brewers fielded payrolls ranging from $80 million to $105 million from 2008 through 2015, but dipped to just $63 million in 2016 and 2017, both times lowest in the league. And perhaps more notably, the club entered the 2017 offseason carrying just one multi-year contract: Ryan Braun’s.  Even this contract is one that likely would have been dealt if not for the stigma surrounding Braun, his history with steroids, and his injury-prone nature since returning from the Biogenesis suspension.

I have no doubt that many aspects of the ideology that brought the Astros to success and have 76ers on the brink of a breakthrough are indeed the keys to breaking the cycle of mediocrity, which has portions of fanbases across the country clamoring for their teams to join the tanking fad. Collecting young talent and purging assets that have value solely in the present moment are both behaviors that put floundering teams in a better position for future success. 

But here is where I quibble with The Process and its copycats: Why must payroll be pushed to its lower limits, even when it wouldn’t interfere with the acquisition of young talent or other future-focused assets like draft picks or bonus pool cash?; or, even when it would help to meet those goals?

I think the 2017 Brewers provide a perfect example of this question. No, there was no legitimate way to predict that this Brewers squad would be a winning team, would challenge the mighty Cubs deep into September, and would fall heartbreakingly short of just Milwaukee’s fifth playoff appearance since the Brewers returned baseball to the city in 1970. But I can’t help but wonder, had the Brewers made a few acquisition in the free agent market to bring their payroll back up near the $80 million mark the club hovered around for most of the 2010s, would they have been able to win the National League Central, or at least a spot in the Wild Card Game?

This is especially relevant when considering the way the club’s season went. The Brewers used an early season hot streak to force themselves into the conversation as contenders. Although many of the players who fueled that hot start regressed — Eric Thames, Jett Bandy and Eric Sogard, for instance, never could replicate the brilliance of their first 100 or so plate appearances — the acquisitions of players like Stephen Vogt, Neil Walker, and Anthony Swarzak allowed the club to remain competitive and continue to play well throughout the second half when many expected them to fade, albeit not quite well enough.

What if the club had been willing to spend on these positions of weakness before the season began? What if Milwaukee had acquired a more expensive and reliable reliever than Neftali Feliz, whose incompetence cost the Brewers multiple games early on? What if they had spent on a starting pitcher to support a woefully inexperienced rotation?

The answer from those who support the austerity ideology would be that any such acquisitions would have been a heavy investment in the present at the expense of the future. The fact that Houston resisted such impulses and avoided the free agent market as they incurred historically horrific seasons in 2012 and 2013 only served to set the stage for their 2017 squad, as the draft picks they received as a result of those losses turned into players like Carlos Correa and Alex Bregman.

But I think it’s important we remember that the Astros’ success can’t entirely be credited to the tank. There was the disastrous selection of Mark Appel and the selection of Brady Aiken, who went unsigned. And there were also the players in place before the tanking even began; Jose Altuve, lest we forget, had been in the Astros system well before Jeff Luhnow’s arrival, and key players like Dallas Keuchel and Marwin Gonzalez were major league holdovers from the pre-Luhnow era as well. George Springer was an 11th pick overall, the fruit of a 76-win season, the last year before the big tank. 

I believe it is erroneous to credit the success of these tanking teams to the fact that they were austere with their payrolls. Spending on payroll is one of very few ways teams have to acquire talent, and more and more, baseball’s rules are making it harder and harder to go above and beyond to get better. To this point, look at the limits on bonus pools and international free agents. Even if that major league talent isn’t going to carry a team to the postseason immediately, teams always need help at the deadline, and with the right bet, a slick free agent acquisition even in a non-contending season could lead to a big prospect haul in July to aid the rebuilding effort.

I would be more open to the idea that the Brewers would need to save money if not for the fanbase’s consistent support of this club through good times and bad. Wisconsin baseball fans have consistently delivered with attendance figures over two million for a full decade now. The cash was there to make a splash with the reliever or back-end starter the Brewers needed to get over the hump. Even if the Brewers hadn’t turned into surprise contenders, such moves would have given them assets to play with either at the trade deadline or over this offseason.

Hopefully I’ll be proven wrong, but it looks to me like the Brewers may have cost themselves a year of their competitive window because they weren’t ready to open up the checkbook. I believe the same thing happened to the Astros, who won 86 and 84 games in 2015 and 2016 with the 29th and 21st largest payrolls in the game respectively as their front office was slow to spend and surround their first wave of prospects with the supporting cast it needed to take the next step. Obviously, 2017’s pennant and title soothes all for the Astros, but teams looking to follow their model should be aware that you can’t guarantee the window will last long enough to afford missing at the first crack.

What I fear will happen in baseball and across the American sporting landscape is that owners will look at the Astros success and only see the austerity without seeing the rest of the philosophy that backed it up: the aggressive acquisition of undervalued talent, the maximizing of future value by spending in the draft and amateur markets, and the understanding of when to cash in and turn future assets into present assets. But for the owners, tanking is a win-win scenario: If the team gets better, great, but if not, ownership cashes the revenue sharing checks and laughs all the way to the bank.

Last year’s Brewers showed the tanking process is not always going to follow a neat and perfect timeline. A team that looked a couple years away showed it was nearly ready for the big time. The front office has done a tremendous job of turning around what was a decrepit roster and farm system after the 2015 season, and the work that David Stearns and company have done to put this team in this position after just a few years is phenomenal. But after missing out on this shot last year, it now must be time to spend. Austerity isn’t what won the World Series for the Astros, and it won’t win one for the Brewers either.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USAToday Sports Images

So accepting the caveat that I’m not sure about the utility of the information I am about to present, Domingo Santana’s 2017 batted ball profile looked surprisingly different from his 2016 profile.  Before Statcast, we would have looked at his power numbers and seen a jump, and that would have been the end of the analysis.  In 2016, Santana hit eleven home runs in 281 plate appearances, or one every 25.5 plate appearances.  This year, he hit thirty home runs in 607 plate appearances, or one every 20.2 plate appearances.  His Isolated Slugging Percentage (ISO) jumped from .191 to .227, and his home run-per-fly ball rate jumped from 27.5 percent to 30.9 percent.  All this tells the unsurprising story of someone who improved in his first full big league season.

By itself, this trend is not surprising.  Santana was a relatively highly regarded prospect, and 2017 was his first full big league season.  He took a step forward and produced well, so we would expect to be able to look at his peripherals and see improvements.  Now, though, we can look even further at any differences in how the ball came off his bat.

As I’m sure you could guess, that is the point of this research at which I found something interesting.  As I laid out above, Santana’s power numbers improved this year; he hit more home runs, and he produced more extra base hits.  Not surprisingly, then, the average distance of his contact increased as well, from 171 feet in 2016 to 175 feet in 2017.

One of the hot topics in baseball analysis this year was the “launch angle revolution,” as players began to try and hit the ball in the air to increase their power.  Santana was one of the adherents, as he raised his launch angle  from 9.4 degrees to 10.5 in 2017.  This is still a low number; league leader Joey Gallo’s average launch angle was 22.7 degrees, and Santana’s 10.5 ranks 226th of the 387 players with at least 100 at bats.

Santana’s rising launch angle was not accompanied by an increased exit velocity; in fact, his exit velocity fell significantly from 92.8 mph in 2016 to 89.3 mph in 2017.  The fact that he improved his results so much while his exit velocity decreased suggests that exit velocity does not portend success, but I do not want to draw overarching conclusions about a statistic from studying just one example.  It suffices for this conversation to say that Santana hit the ball with less authority but higher in the air, and he saw improvements.

It is hard to decouple the launch angle revolution from the change in the ball.  More fly balls are becoming home runs because the ball itself has changed, so hitters are incentivized to hit the ball in the air.  Santana is among those hitters who took advantage of the change and hit more fly balls, and he benefited.

One thing we don’t know is whether this type of trade-off would have occurred in an environment with a different ball; for example, have hitters been losing exit velocity as they improve their power for years, and we just couldn’t measure it?  This could be a natural outgrowth of hitter development.  Because of his generally low launch angle, Santana is a good example of this.  He did not drastically change his approach and end up near the top of the league in launch angle, but rather he generated a little bit more loft and was able to leverage some of his natural power into hitting more home runs.  On the other hand, of course, he hit thirty home runs without hitting the ball in the air as much as the league’s home run leaders.  Regardless, because of the change in his approach, Santana was a more successful hitter in 2017, and that is to his credit.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USA Today Sports Images