Now the 2018 Brewers are on pace to challenge the 1988 Brewers for the best pitching staff in franchise history. As it stands, the Brewers could basically pitch average baseball for the remainder of the season and finish with the third best staff in franchise history; as the table above shows, Milwaukee has already surpassed their 2017 Runs Prevented total this season.

The purpose of this post is not to present a normative argument about whether or not the Brewers should be expected to produce the best pitching season in franchise history. Evidence abounds in all directions. First and foremost, at the time of this writing, the trade deadline has yet to pass, which means that the Brewers could further improve their pitching; second, the latest average Runs Prevented table demonstrates that the Milwaukee hurlers are already approximately 12 runs from their May 31 pace, meaning that the club has slowed slightly in their elite Runs Prevention; additionally, key injuries and subsequent ineffectiveness (ranging from Brent Suter and Zach Davies to Matt Albers and, of course, Jimmy Nelson) also impact projections of runs prevention. Alternately, Chase Anderson has prevented approximately seven runs since the beginning of June, and is beginning to look like a rotation leader at the same time the club traded for Joakim Soria and recalled Corbin Burnes to bolster the bullpen. If anything, this swirling set of evidence might allow one to believe that the pitching staff will at least remain steady.

Rather, I am going to investigate the pitching staff structure for a few of the best franchise pitching staffs listed in the table above. The purpose here will be fun, first and foremost, as almost everyone can name the key Brewers batters and supporting casts of the club’s great offensive performances (ten of the top 13 runs production seasons come from the 1978-1983 and 2009-2012 roster cores), but the great pitching staffs beyond Teddy Higuera, Ben Sheets, and CC Sabathia remain underappreciated or perhaps even unknown. Furthermore, by comparing the structures of these great staffs, one can get an idea of how pitching roster construction has evolved over time. For example, the 2018 Brewers may very well end up producing the greatest bullpen in franchise history, but how does their rotation compare? On the other hand, one might expect the classic 1980s clubs to be rotation-first, in terms of value.

Defensive Efficiency
Prior to investigating Baseball Prospectus pitching profiles of these classic Brewers pitching clubs, it is worth emphasizing that most of the top Brewers pitching teams were also typically very good fielding teams relative to their respective leagues.

Indeed, the table above demonstrates that the 2018 Brewers shares the top of these fielding profiles with the 1992 club, which were the most efficient fielding unit on the Junior Circuit. Here, I am using defensive efficiency to assess fielding because it is a basic number that calculates the extent to which a fielding unit converts outs. The outliers here are the 2005, 2011, and 2017 Brewers clubs, which prevented runs despite mediocre fielding performances (they prevented approximately 26, 47, and 47 runs, respectively, despite their middle of the road fielding).

Roster Construction
Teddy Higuera had quite a career for the Milwaukee Brewers, posting single season WARP totals above 4.0 in three of nine seasons. Higuera’s best year in Milwaukee occurred during the 1988 season, in which the southpaw worked nearly 230 innings while striking out 192 batters to only 59 walks. Using Deserved Run Average (DRA), a statistic that scales pitching performance to numerous contextual components, Higuera was better in 1988 than in any other season in Milwaukee, and those results total nearly 7.0 WARP.

Yet the 1988 club was also a crossing of two eras in Milwaukee, where the fading glory of Harvey’s Wallbangers (who never got the consistent ace they deserved in Higuera) would congeal into a roster core that could never quite get Robin Yount and Paul Molitor into the playoffs with a second generation of talent. Behind Higuera, the 1988 squad featured four prominent contributors age-25 or younger in Juan Nieves (23), Don August (24), Chris Bosio (25), and Bill Wegman (25), ostensibly giving the Brewers a stable pitching rotation around which their next contending seasons could follow. Yet injuries, ineffectiveness, and inconsistencies derailed this group, leaving 1988 their best performance. Of these youngsters, Bosio was en route to beginning a stretch of several quality pitching seasons, and in fact the righty was more valuable each of 1989, 1991, and 1992 (compared to 1988).

Chuck Crim deserves mention, of course, because the 26-year old rubber arm worked more than 100 innings over 70 appearances. Not only did the righty work 42 multiple inning appearances according to Baseball Reference, but he also inherited 68 runners. In terms of percentage points, Crim’s strand rate was eight points better than the league average, meaning that aside from his own exceptional runs allowed total, Crim added several Runs Prevented simply by stranding runners that occupied bases when he entered ballgames; this performance foreshadowed Brian Shouse’s efforts for the excellent 2008 pitching staff (60 IR / 20 scored), as well as Jeremy Jeffress and Dan Jennings (62 IR / 14 scored (!!!) entering Sunday) in 2018. This excellent performance is reflected in Crim’s leads converted statistics, as the righty successfully produced nine saves and 13 holds, against only two blown save or hold opportunities.

The Crim mention is a perfect transition to the 2017 pitching staff, which featured a few excellent starting pitching performances boosted by an even better bullpen. Thus appears Jacob Barnes in the club’s top performers for 2017, as the hard near-cutter / slider reliever is not only a throwback to the bread-and-butter 1980s reliever (enter Crim, a favorite media comp for Barnes, too), but also one of the only 2017 Brewers pitchers to accumulate more than 1.0 WARP. What is interesting about the 2017 pitching staff also foreshadowing the strengths of the 2018 staff, and that is the sheer depth of the pitching operations. Eventually, the pitching-by-depth gamble unraveled as the club faced injuries and a rotating cast of fifth starter ineffectiveness down the stretch. But along with the more popular impact relievers of Corey Knebel and Josh Hader, Barnes was one of the key reasons for the club’s success in 2017 and, like Crim and Hader, another deep round MLB draft success story.

By the way, let it be said that for any other critiques of the Brewers current GM, David Stearns sure can build a runs prevention unit. Despite being in his third season as GM, and ostensibly leading the club through a rebuilding phase, Stearns already boasts two of the 17 average or better pitching staffs in franchise history. Interestingly enough, for all the grief President Doug Melvin gets about his apparent inability to assemble a pitching staff, the highly regarded Harry Dalton also had the same issue. While Sal Bando is not highly regarded by most Brewers fans, the GM sure could build a pitching staff, and Bando (more than Melvin or Dalton) is Stearns’s target for building quality pitching; Dalton and Melvin are obviously the targets for beating postseason appearances.

Comparing Jimmy Nelson, Chase Anderson, and Zach Davies, who was an excellent Runs Prevented starter in 2017 even if his WARP did not look great, to the 1988 squad should underscore the difficulty of building a consistent rotation. Producing a great starting rotation certainly does not come close to guaranteeing pitching success in the following season, when injuries, mechanical adjustments, and inconsistencies that were absent in the “great year” can creep up in the following campaign. Once again, though, the Brewers have a group of truly controllable, quality starting pitching arms (as they did in the late-1980s), but it is worth raising questions about the scouting profiles and future prospects of these arms following the mechanical adjustments and injuries that have plagued 2018. The book is not closed, however, as Chase Anderson has shown over his last ten starts (59.7 IP, 3.02 ERA, four quality starts); if all goes well, Anderson’s contract extension would be well-justified if he comes anywhere near Chris Bosio’s best four years in Milwaukee.

2008 needs no introduction, as the Brewers media and Twitter recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of the CC Sabathia trade. Of course, as Sabathia rightfully carries the reputation as the arm that saved that season, it is always worth emphasizing that Ben Sheets was phenomenal in 2008 as well. Sheets managed a 3.13 DRA and 5.3 WARP across 31 starts, including an electrifying 1-0 complete game effort over the Padres while pitching through a torn elbow ligament. In terms of pitchers putting their careers on the line for Milwaukee, it’s tough to top Sabathia and Sheets, as both pitchers risked millions of dollars on the 2008-2009 free agency market to will the Brewers to their first playoff appearance in a generation; Sheets lost the bet for future millions, while Sabathia cashed on an uncanny performance.

But oh, ode to Manny Parra, Dave Bush, and Carlos Villanueva, the sometimes frustrating but often dependable low rotation and swingman crew for the mid-00s Milwaukee teams. Bush was worth approximately 10 WARP to the Brewers over his 2006-2008 seasons, with 2006 being the high mark; Villanueva and Parra each had their best Milwaukee years in 2008, which is not a bad thing to occur during a playoff race. This trio of pitchers seems quite comparable to many of the 2018 Brewers group, for this trio either had unassuming stuff, or serious profile questions or command concerns when the stuff was there. While one will be quick to point out that the 2018 Brewers do not (yet) have their Sabathia, nor do they have their Sheets, one can find semblances of the Bush, Parra, and Villanueva trio in profiles such as Junior Guerra, Jhoulys Chacin, Wade Miley, and/or Freddy Peralta. This is not an insult: the 2008 trio have never truly received enough credit for their respective roles in carrying the rotation early in the season, nor for their overall value.

Finally, if 1988 was the best franchise pitching season, 1992 exemplified the turn of generations once more, as Jamie Navarro and Cal Eldred were set to join Bosio and Wegman atop the pitching staff. This time, Wegman bested Bosio in terms of value, but both pitchers were quite strong, producing nearly 10 WARP for those 1992 Brewers. Eldred and Navarro also acquitted themselves well, although they would reprise the injuries, inconsistencies, and ineffectiveness that has served as a theme throughout these pitching profiles.

In 1992, one can suddenly see the eras shift, as baseball’s strategic tides moved toward relief pitching prominence, and these Brewers had a deep and fantastic bullpen. Fetters, Holmes, and Orosco were not even the most prominent relievers on the staff (see Plesac, Dan; Henry, Doug; and Austin, Jim). What is stunning about this group is that despite their excellent and deep composition, the Brewers were near the bottom in the American League in both Saves and Holds, and their relievers mostly faced low leverage innings according to Baseball Reference. In 1992, 42 percent of Brewers relief appearances qualified as low leverage; to get a sense of what that might look like, consider than the 2018 Brewers are nearly the exact opposite, with 36 percent of relief appearances qualified as high leverage. It is interesting to think about this strategic snafu of 1992 during a current season in which managers are reaching for their bullpens early and often in order to gain every advantage possible.

Yet is a bullpen ever a vehicle for anything other than strategic failure? Is there a proper way to manage the pen over an extended period of time? If the 2018 Brewers are going to catch the 1988 squad to produce the best pitching season in franchise history, hopefully manager Craig Counsell effectively dispatches those Runs Prevented in the most strategic manner possible.

Baseball Prospectus. Milwaukee Brewers Individual Statistics by Team [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Baseball Reference. Milwaukee Brewers Franchise [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Baseball Reference. Park Factors and League Encyclopedia [CSV]. Retrieved July 29, 2018.

Runs Prevented were calculated using the average of park factors between Baseball Prospectus and Baseball Reference sources, with the addition of a basic league environment runs prevented stat as well. Each Brewers team was assessed by average runs prevented and standard deviation.

Among Anderson’s big changes last year was a velocity spike that impacted all his pitches.  Because of that increase, he was able to rely more on his four-seam fastball and cutter, which subsequently resulted in him using his sinker less.  This is a plausible explanation for Anderson’s improved strikeout rate; sinkers are traditionally used to induce contact because their movement is more subtle, while cutters have sharper movement and can resemble sliders that dart away from bats.  Increased velocity on its own can help create more swings-and-misses.  When that is paired with a move towards more dynamic pitches, batters will whiff more often.  As we head into 2018, whether Anderson maintains this improved velocity will be something to watch for.

Where that velocity change came from is an interesting question, though.  We don’t have complete answers about how mechanical tweaks impact pitch effectiveness; if we did, pitchers would know exactly what they need to do to improve certain pitches.  We do know, though, that pitchers are constantly making adjustments, and occasionally they find changes that work.  Brewers’ pitching coach Derek Johnson has a reputation for helping pitchers find tweaks that work for them individually, and so it is plausible that Anderson’s velocity spike is a result of a mechanical adjustment.

Another change is that in 2017, Anderson’s release point moved from where it had been in years past.  His horizontal release point shifted over six inches from where it had been the prior year, but his vertical release point did not really change.  This likely indicates that Anderson moved sideways on the rubber, although off-center camera angles make that hard to confirm.

The exact consequences we should have expected from this shift are unclear.  Moving on the rubber can impact the level of deception a pitcher can create because it changes the hitter’s view of the ball coming out of his hand, and it can therefore help neutralize platoon splits.  Because there was no change in Anderson’s platoon splits (he continues to have a reverse split), though, I don’t know why this change would have made him better.

Additionally, moving on the rubber would not have caused a velocity increase.  Not all mechanical adjustments show up in what the PitchF/X or Statcast cameras capture; for example, a more compact motion could increase velocity because a pitcher is better balanced, but this would not necessarily cause a corresponding release point change.  Similarly, it seems as if Anderson’s mechanical tweak is not captured by release point data.

The big question for 2018 is whether Anderson’s improvements will continue.  The two trends I identified above are two keys to watch for as this season begins.  His velocity spike is likely the biggest factor in any potential continued success, as a better fastball allows off-speed pitches like a curveball to play up as well.  But whether he moves on the mound again will be interesting as well, because it would indicate he is uncomfortable and feels as if he needs to make changes.

The 2018 data in the graphs above are through his first start only, so it is an incredibly small sample size.  Pitcher velocity tends to increase after April, so any current decline is not necessarily worrying.  But it would be encouraging to see Anderson’s fastball velocity tick up towards his 2017 levels as April progresses.  If that increase does not happen, I would begin to be worried about which version of Anderson we will be getting this year.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

• First, there is some debate as to whether the Brewers were “for real” in 2017, or whether they overplayed their “true” talent level on their roster. A corollary to this point is to argue “the Brewers exceeded expectations,” which is an easy argument to dismiss once it is pointed out that one can revise expectations, rather than expecting reality to converge with them (in other words, is it the Brewers’ 2017 performance that was “wrong”, or were low expectations of the club “wrong”? Of course, the truth probably rests somewhere in the middle, and analysts ought to work hard to avoid placing their own expectations ahead of the actual 2017 results).

• Second, there is industry discussion about whether baseball teams should be expected to “tank,” or “rebuild” in such a manner so as to be bad for an extended period of time, and only focus on the extremes as “rebuilding” or “contending.” The idea in the industry is that a baseball team should no longer “aim for the middle,” that being in the middle is now some kind of forbidden gray area, for a club will neither be expected to be a “true contender” or a “true rebuilder.” Obviously, the truths are quite gray in this debate as well, for a club can plummet to the bottom of the league for completely unexpected reasons, and previously “bad” clubs can skyrocket in just the same way.

• Finally, there is a question about whether front offices face the expectation to win from ownership groups, in the sense that there will be consequences if the club does not win. The trends toward “rebuilding” in this sense can be viewed as an additional layer of job security, as was pointed out in a fantastic industry reflection at FanGraphs; an ownership group cannot necessarily hold a front office accountable for their baseball decisions if any given roster and farm system is simply “part of a long term process.”

It is questionable as to whether teams are expected to simply “create the best team possible” in any given season. Here, one might even point to the slow 2017-2018 offseason to question whether ownership groups have placed enough pressure on GMs to mobilize available resources in order to improve their respective clubs (as each day passes in this slow market, it is an inefficient position for a GM with cash-at-hand to ignore signing a player that improves their club).

The #Brewers are currently on pace to be a true 90 win team, with a Run Differential that is +23 R on offense and +73 R on pitching/fielding

— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) April 15, 2017

While it is difficult to address the latter points without detailed discussions with members of the industry, and a direct line to club executives and owners, it is possible to measure the first claim. In this regard, one such method is to track a club’s daily Pythagorean W-L, which is basically the club’s expected record based on the balance between their runs scored and runs allowed (versus the standards set by league and park). I tracked this manually via BPMilwaukee Twitter throughout the summer, as the exercise gained a surprising amount of interest from Brewers fans (and it was a lot of fun). Following up the exercise by using Baseball Reference CSV to reconstruct the 2017 season, one can validate the general lesson learned from BPMilwaukee Twitter: the Brewers were exactly the club their final record alluded to very early in the season, and in fact they were an extremely steady club.

The #Brewers are on pace to play true 85 win baseball (+33 RS / +19 RA). 85 wins is their 2017 Daily Pythagorean W-L mean record.

— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) June 16, 2017

Here’s a visual demonstration of the 2017 Brewers’ steadiness, which Indexes their daily performance to the club’s average park-adjusted RS / RA record for 162 games.

By game 11, the Brewers were on the way to their first extended period of play above their average 2017 talent level (as demonstrated by 162 games of RS / RA performance). By game 27, the club was clearly established as an average 85 win club (or so), and this trend clearly settles by the middle of the season. Those “expectations” that the club would win fewer than 80 games? The last point at which that was a concern was game number nine. These 2017 Brewers were indeed quite consistent, and they played according to their true talent level throughout the season: they were an 85 win club based on their park-adjusted RS / RA.

The 2017 Brewers were an 85 win club. Establishing this reality runs straight into one of the industry dilemmas described above: these Beloved Milwaukee Nine were smack dab in the middle of the league, that middle road that is strongly advised against by the tank advisors. If you’re not going to be a clear contender, you’d better be rebuilding, and the Brewers were doing neither in 2017 by most estimations; almost no one was ready to call them a “true” contender, and any thoughts about the club rebuilding were dashed by a lack of trades away from MLB contracts in favor of prospects. In fact, even if they were depth prospects like Ryan Cordell, prospects were starting to head out the door in midseason trades, and the front office was even heavily rumored to be involved with top trade targets. The Brewers were metaphorically in the middle of the league in terms of narrative, and an audacious roster of unassuming players proved that the middle ground was worth it every day of the season; manager Craig Counsell’s club was playing right on target.

In contrast to the industry trend, and sometimes clamoring fans, in favor of the rebuild, these Brewers raise an interesting question about residing in the middle of the road. In fact, searching for a legacy of the tenure of GM David Stearns thus far, this very question about the fruits of residing in the middle of the league may be the most radical accomplishment of the front office: what is a playoff team? What is the identity of a playoff team? How many wins does a contender have in the middle of the season?

While constructing Daily Pythagorean models for the Brewers, throughout the fall of 2017 I used Baseball Reference CSV to reconstruct the daily performances of each playoff team during the New Wild Card era (2012-present), as well as any clubs that were relatively close to .500 or the Wild Card spot in the middle of each respective season (this allowed me to include teams like the 2017 Brewers in studies of contending clubs during this recent playoff era). This sample yielded 60 playoff teams and 31 non-playoff teams from 2012-2017. My purpose in constructing this study was to look at each playoff team’s average W-L over 162 games, average Pythagorean W-L over 162 games, their midseason and end of season actual Pythagorean W-L, and the standard deviation of each measure.

• Mid_RS/RA measures the club’s average Daily Pythagorean W-L at 81 games. (Mid_StDev is the standard deviation of that statistic).
• Avg_W-L measures the club’s 162 game average of their actual daily W-L pace.
• W-L is the club’s actual 162 game win total.
• End_RS/RA is the club’s actual Pythagorean W-L after 162 games.
• RS/RA-Avg measures the club’s 162 game average of their daily Pythagorean W-L. (End_StDev is the standard deviation of that statistic).
• WinDiff is the difference between each club’s average daily W-L and their average daily Pythagorean W-L. (E.g., how much did each team overplay or underplay their run differential on a daily basis?).

The following table is a summary of the playoff teams and contenders that missed the playoffs in the new Wild Card Era:

The logic of focusing on these statistics was to (a) capture the extent to which playoff teams outperform or underperform their RS / RA over the entire course of a season, and (b) to capture whether playoff teams posted average W-L that were better or worse than their actual overall records. Each of these metrics were used to construct a well-rounded view of the volatility of a baseball season over 162 games; in the aggregate, they also show how different each season is in terms of playoffs composition (for example, the average W-L pace of playoff clubs and contenders in 2012, 2014, and 2015 were not as good as those in 2013, 2016, and 2017; even still, the average contenders and playoff clubs in 2016-2017 were not as good as those in 2013).

An auxiliary goal of this research was to place the Brewers within a larger constellation of recent playoff teams and contenders that fell short, in order to determine whether this club was an outlier: how frequently is a club like the Brewers a playoff team during the new Wild Card years?

Focusing on the playoffs teams alone, at first glance there seems to be little benefit to residing in the middle of the league: 45 percent of playoffs teams from 2012-2017 posted final wins totals at 94 or above. One quarter of the teams posted records of 89 wins or fewer.

(For fun, an aggregated distribution of 2012-2017 MLB playoff team win totals nearly approximates a normal curve):

Yet, when shifting to midseason runs scored / runs allowed, the range of Pythagorean W-L records is much larger, and skewed toward lower wins totals. Using midseason Pythagorean W-L, only 46 percent of playoffs teams from 2012-2017 posted expected wins totals above 89 wins; here, one quarter of the teams posted expected records of 84 wins or fewer.

[Visually, these two charts are quite an appealing demonstration of “regression to the mean,” I’d argue: a projected W-L range that spans 60 wins at midseason shrinks to a 20 win range. Playoffs teams establish themselves by “surging” from a slow start, or “declining” from a great start. Baseball equalizes almost everyone!]

Simply contrasting these two line charts, one can readily see that although playoffs teams boast a relatively compact set of relatively high wins totals, these clubs look entirely different only 81 games into each season. Searching for meaning in these statistics, one might raise questions about what a “true” contender looks like in terms of outlining trade deadline strategies. Additionally, one could seek “micro-narratives” within each season, recognizing that a playoff team may not “look” like a true contender in game 25, game 40, game 81, or even game 120 (that’s the last point at which the 2017 Cubs were underplaying their average Pythagorean W-L). As the Cubs demonstrated last season, all it takes is a 42 game sprint to win a division (and they are hardly the only example of this phenomenon; for example, the 2012 Baltimore Orioles looked like a sub-.500 team between games 74 and 150 if one was solely using RS / RA).

Comparing these distributions with the full playoff and contending team summary table above, one can find that typical fan “targets” for contending goals hold true: in the New Wild Card Era, aiming for roughly 89 to 90 wins on average will get a team into the playoffs or thoroughly within the hunt. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that in half of the seasons, a midseason average Pythagorean W-L pace of 86 wins defined playoffs contention. While a club may need to reach 89 to 90 wins in order to become a highly probable playoff club, they need not be a 90-win team from the get go.

I focused specifically on average midseason Pythagorean W-L in order to make a point about the development of an MLB season, and the potential importance of sitting in the middle of the pack. If a ballclub is hovering around .500 in terms of their RS / RA, 81 games provides plenty of time to turn the season around through trades, hot streaks, mechanical adjustments, development advancements, minor league promotions, and other transactions.

Interestingly enough, nine of these 91 teams surveyed boasted midseason Pythagorean W-L above 89 wins and failed to reach the playoffs, which should raise the question about what a “true” playoff team looks like (which gets back to the original point about challenging “expectations,” as well). Not surprisingly, nine of these 91 surveyed teams boasted midseason Pythagorean W-L at or below 81 wins and made the playoffs, which should seem stunning in light of the previous statistic: two teams that are on pace to be 10 wins apart at midseason may swap positions by the time that the playoffs come around (see the 2013 Dodgers versus 2013 Rockies and Diamondbacks, for example, or the 2012 Giants and the 2012 Dodgers).

Those 2012 Orioles were a true playoff club despite their lowly midseason RS / RA, for instance, but in 2013 the Baltimore Nine had a midseason Pythagorean W-L of 90 games and sputtered to 85 wins. Brewers fans know this pain all to well, as in complete contradiction to the True Blue 2017 squad, the 2014 Brewers were expected to win 91 games in the middle of the season, only to painfully collapse and close the window on one particular era in the ugliest fashion possible. Incidentally, I wish I kept Daily Pythagorean W-L in 2014, because if I had, we all could have expected the downturn much earlier: according to Daily Pythagorean W-L, our Milwaukee Nine were expected to be an 83-to-85 win club between July 10 and August 7, foreshadowing the club’s 82 actual win total.

So the Brewers are in the middle of the league. Judging by the club’s current roster construction, should no further moves be made, the 2018 Brewers should look a lot like the 2017 version that stormed the league: unassuming starting pitching rotation that could produce serviceable-to-above-average results; power / speed / aggression at the plate and on the bases; absurd position player depth in order to withstand injuries, ineffectiveness, and provide flexible match-ups; serviceable fielding with an emphasis on great groundball fielding up the middle (may Jhoulys Chacin feed Orlando Arcia and Jonathan Villar or Eric Sogard); and, an elite bullpen (in fact, this version looks even better and is battle-tested entering 2018). Yet, it is not clear that projection systems are going to fawn over these Brewers, for many areas of the club will not look intimidating in terms of statistics or scouting profiles.

But, with the bottom falling out of the National League thanks to a convergence of ongoing and newly minted rebuilding / firesale efforts coupled with a graduation of rebuilding efforts or injury-riddled / underwhelming / stuck 2017 clubs, the middle could once again prove to be a feasting area within the National League. Hardly 20 percent of the league can be defined as clearly contending, meaning that there is ample ground to be seized from the remainder of the league.

GM David Stearns and President Doug Melvin spearheaded a brief rebuilding effort, and for all the hype about the new GM’s “analytic” bent, the 2017 and 2018 clubs are looking a lot like Melvin’s old strategy that often caught hell with fans: the club is simply in the middle. We return to the familiar ground of simply sticking in the middle of the pack and seeing what happens. Perhaps this time around, the rebuild will shine a bit brighter in terms of player development or big time trade returns; maybe the Brewers will end all this talk by signing Jake Arrieta. Regardless, Stearns deserves credit for bucking industry roster building signposts (either “obviously rebuild” or “clearly contend”), and if the Pythagorean trends of the New Wild Card Era hold, our Milwaukee Nine could quite easily be in the thick of things with a 78-to-85 win midseason RS / RA pace.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

The Brewers selected Jungmann with the 12th overall pick back in 2011, the year they had two first-rounders after Dylan Covey had failed to sign the year before. A Texas native with a big fastball and curveball, Jungmann had just concluded a distinguished collegiate career as the Longhorns’ ace and had posted an 0.95 ERA in his final season in Austin. Baseball America called him “a potential #2 starter” that could rise quickly through the minor leagues and praised his ability to thrive in high-pressure situations and to win without his best stuff. Baseball Prospectus said that “his huge frame and collegiate track record suggest he’ll soon be a workhorse” and noted Jungmann’s polish and mid-rotation upside in their 2012 edition of the Annual. Though BP’s final 2011 mock draft said that Jungmann was a player with few anticipated signing issues, he put pen to paper just moments before the deadline to sign draftees, inking for a $2,525,000 mil bonus. As a result of waiting so long to sign, he didn’t make his professional debut until the following season in 2012 with Class-A Advanced Brevard County.

Once Jungmann got back on the mound, his development didn’t move quite as swiftly as hoped. He put up decent enough results while climbing during his first full season as a pro, logging a 3.53 ERA in 153.0 innings with the Manatees. He induced grounders at a 56 percent clip, but concerns arose about a demonstrated inability to miss bats in a pitcher-friendly league. Jungmann made the jump to AA next season and joined the Huntsville Stars’ rotation, and though his ERA of 4.33 looks palatable at first glance, the season was not a good one for Taylor. His walk rate nearly doubled and he issued 4.7 free passes per nine innings, walking 73 batters on the whole while striking out only 82. His DRA was an unsightly 7.22, and in the BP Annual the following spring it was written “he lacks the control to thread fine needles. The Brewers made a clear choice for polish over ceiling with Jungmann, and it backfired.”

Taylor bounced back in a big way in 2014, beginning with nine strong starts in AA that added up to a 2.77 ERA and 2.25 DRA in 52.0 innings. In summer he received his first bump up to AAA and joined the rotation for the Nashville Sounds, where he continued to build upon his success with the Stars. Jungmann logged another 101.7 innings for Nashville with a 3.98 ERA and a nifty 2.95 DRA. He continued to issue a few too many walks, but that season Jungmann saw a major uptick in his ability to generate swings-and-misses. He fanned 147 batters in 153.7 innings between the two levels, but even those gains didn’t impress the scouts at BP. His Annual comment the following spring stated that Jungmann was “struggling to adjust to his declined stuff” and that his best days were behind him, back in college at Texas.

Milwaukee’s realigned their AAA affiliation the following winter and paired up with Colorado Springs, and in 2015 Jungmann began the year as a member of the Sky Sox rotation. Pitching at altitude had a dastardly effect on his ERA, but he continued to miss a good amount of bats and issue a few too many walks en route to a 2.93 DRA in 59.3 innings. Then, on June 9th, Jungmann finally got the call he and Brewer fans had been for more than four years: he would join the Brewers and make his MLB debut against the Pirates. The club had staggered out of the gates, had fired their manager, and was mired in last place and on the verge of beginning to rebuild. None of that seemed to matter on that day, however, as Jungmann methodically dispatched the Pirates to earn a winning decision in his first big league start. He logged 7.0 innings, firing 61 strikes out of 92 pitches while allowing only one run on three hits, one walk, and five punchouts.

For much of the summer, Jungmann became a feel-good story and provided a shot in the arm to the starting rotation. He threw a complete game three-hitter against the Dodgers in Los Angeles on July 11th, and after his 16th MLB start on September 3rd, he had earned nine victories and was carrying a 2.42 ERA. Jungmann had done an excellent job of limiting the free passes during his first several starts with Milwaukee, but those newfound gains eroded as the summer went on. The righty came crashing back down to Earth during his final five starts of his rookie campaign, as he could muster only a 9.53 ERA over his final 22.7 innings with 21 strikeouts, 13 walks, and eight dingers served up on a silver platter. Ultimately, he concluded the 2015 season with a 3.77 ERA and 4.12 DRA over the course of 119.3 innings. He registered a DRA- of 96 and accrued 1.4 WARP along the way, giving hope that he could still be a controllable, back-end starter type to eat up innings while Milwaukee rebuilt their organization.

A new front office regime took over during the 2015-16 offseason, and even after his struggles down the stretch Jungmann reported to Maryvale the following spring penciled in as the #3 starter in Milwaukee’s rotation. However, it became quite clear very early that Taylor wouldn’t last long in that position. He struggled mightily out of the gates once the regular season began, as he fought with his mechanics and dealt with a fastball that was struggling to scrape 90 MPH after regularly working in the 92-94 MPH range the year prior. After posting an ERA over 9.00 through five starts, new GM David Stearns exiled the lanky right-hander back to Colorado Springs. Trying to get your mechanics on track while going to work at the country’s highest-altitude stadium is no easy task, and it proved to be too much for Jungmann to handle. He lasted only 31.0 innings with the Sky Sox, walking 35 batters while striking out just 24. After putting up a DRA of 19.38 (that’s not a typo), he was sent to extended spring training for a “mental health break” with his confidence more or less destroyed. After the season, he even refused to talk about his time in Colorado Springs with the media and wouldn’t even say the city’s name.

Jungmann was able to right the ship after getting assigned to AA Biloxi upon his return, though pitching to a 91 DRA- as a 26 year old in the Southern League isn’t exactly a notable accomplishment. It was enough for a September call-up back to Milwaukee, at least, and he ended the three nondescript appearances and a cumulative DRA- of 127 in his 26.7 big league innings in 2016. The front office asked him to prepare to enter 2017 as a reliever and he ultimately broke camp with the team, but was demoted after one appearance in which he recorded two outs and gave up a home run.

Besides that one game, Jungmann spent the entirety of the 2017 season in the minor leagues between Biloxi and Colorado Springs. He spent most of the year in the place that was a personal hell for him in 2016, and appeared to have conquered his demons; in 90.3 innings with the Sky Sox, Jungmann contributed a 2.59 ERA and a DRA that was 23 percent better than league average. Still, it became clear throughout the season that he had fallen out of favor with the new front office regime. Several times during the course of the summer he was passed over for spot starting opportunities at the big league level. When the Crew’s starting pitching situation became especially dire in September, the org chose elected to hand the ball in must-win games to reliever Jeremy Jeffress, a pair of rookies in Aaron Wilkerson and Brandon Woodruff, and starters who had previously pitched their way out of rotation roles in Matt Garza and Junior Guerra. Even with expanded rosters, Jungmann wasn’t considered deserving enough for a September call-up. The writing was on the wall for the 28 year old.

In the end, Jungmann wound up contributing 146.7 innings of 4.54 ERA baseball to the Brewers during his six-year tenure with the organization. He’ll ultimately be considered a disappointment by fans, though he does compare favorably with the 60 players drafted in the “first round” of the 2011 draft. Only 38 of those players have stepped foot on a big league field at this point, and according to Baseball-Reference’s calculations only 21 of the 60 players have generated more value in terms of Wins Above Replacement than Jungmann. That draft was a particularly rough one for the Brewers, as neither of their first rounders (Jed Bradley being the other) remain in MLB-affiliated ball. 14th-round pick Jacob Barnes looks like he’s become an important member of the bullpen, and Jorge Lopez remains on the 40 man roster (though his prospect stock has fallen off a cliff by this point). Meanwhile, stalwarts like the late Jose Fernandez, Sonny Gray, and Michael Fulmer were selected after in the first round. Just goes to show how much of a crap-shoot the draft can be.

This isn’t the end of the road for Taylor Jungmann, though, it’s only a new beginning. He’s reportedly close to joining the Yomiuri Giants of Japan’s NPB and there’s reason to believe that he could become quite successful in Japan:

Taylor Jungmann projects as the 12th-best starting pitcher in NPB. Rare to see a pitcher this good make the move from MLB to Japan.

— NEIFI Analytics (@NEIFIco) January 10, 2018

Here’s hoping Taylor Jungmann can follow the trail that Miles Mikolas blazed this winter; after washing out with the Padres and Rangers, Mikolas went over and dominated in Japan for three seasons and turned that into a $15.5 mil guarantee from St. Louis as a free agent. Perhaps when the 2020-21 offseason rolls around, we’ll be talking about Taylor Jungmann in a similar manner. Regardless of what happens, here’s wishing the big Texan with the cross-fire delivery and knee-buckling bender the best of luck in his future endeavors.

Related Reading:
Do the Brewers Need to Trade?
Roster Surplus and Depth Questions

In fact, one potential demonstration of a 40-man roster entering 2019 offseason shows how prospects can be accommodated and protected from the Rule 5 draft. In this scenario, I left someone like RHP Carlos Herrera unprotected under the assumption that the young prospect will still be in A-ball (likely Carolina) for 2019, making his scenario a potential repeat of the Miguel Diaz non-protect by Stearns. Players like RHP Corbin Burnes and 2B Keston Hiura do not make an appearance on this roster because they do not need to be protected after the 2018 season, and I am not making any assumptions about MLB ascension; this is an exercise in organizational necessity as connected to prospect protection.

On the face of it, this is not a bad roster. However, once one views this strategy of protecting prospects, and valuing their protection over potential trades, another set of questions arise. Most importantly, is this type of roster actually moving the club forward? Should this club enter 2019, there would be many question marks about the development of players from Orlando Arcia and Josh Hader to Lewis Brinson and Brandon Woodruff. This type of roster would absolutely heighten the “role risk” faced by each developing player. Additionally, one could challenge whether or not this type of roster strategy adequately capitalizes on the great steps forward in 2017, as the added focus on rostering Monte Harrison, Josh Pennington, and Luis Ortiz, among others, behind the likes of Brinson, Hader, and Woodruff undoubtedly pushes the Brewers’ likely competitive window into the 2020s. If players like Brinson or Brett Phillips will need a couple of years to develop at the MLB level, the same may be said for the next line of prospects as well. This puts a premium on developing players at the MLB level, which raises questions about whether the Brewers can consistently sustain a develop-and-compete strategy. One could argue that the club adequately demonstrated this ability in 2017, although it bears repeating that the front office failed to maximize resources to reach the playoffs in that case (even though the development aspect of the roster was largely a success).

Moreover, after 2018, rostering another set of prospects heightens the role risk of that group of players. Below, here is an example of some of the risks one can expect from this group of players:

The trouble with the current Brewers farm system is that even if there are potential impact roles under club control (such as Monte Harrison’s star centerfielder potential, or Luis Ortiz’s mid-rotation+ potential), there is considerable risk for reaching these roles at the MLB level (Harrison remains a raw prospect who has the same type of hit tool questions of Lewis Brinson; Ortiz has significant workload risk that impacts the quality rotation ceiling). Remaining arms in the system also exhibit rotation risk, from Nathan Kirby’s injury history to repertoire concerns from Cody Ponce and Freddy Peralta to Josh Pennington and Trey Supak.

In many cases, the roles that Brewers fans are dreaming on will indeed be impeded by risk. So the question becomes not whether the Brewers must trade these players (they don’t have to), either to win-now or to avoid a roster crunch, but whether the 40-man roster can bear the level of risk presented by these prospects. The risks associated with developing these players from advanced minors roles to MLB roles must be heavily weighed against the risks associated with trading these prospects. I do not believe that this conversation occurs in earnest among Brewers fans and analysts. The assumption is always that if the Brewers trade Brinson or Harrison, they are trading a star centerfielder; but, should the Brewers trade these types of players, they are also trading the risks associated with developing those roles at the MLB level (including adjustments necessary to address those risks).

Drawn from this particular 40-man roster, and the acceleration of potential roles and risks associated with those roles from the minor league to MLB scale, one must understand that relying on internal prospects to develop the next Brewers contender is as “all-in” a strategy as trading away prospects to acquire MLB contracts. A middle ground includes some of these prospects on the big league club, say one of Brinson or Harrison, and a trade involving the other; the same can be said of Corbin Burnes and Freddy Peralta, Josh Pennington and Trey Supak, and so on down the minor league ladder. The ability of the Brewers front office to develop the next contending club will rest with their diversification of risk throughout the MLB club and 40-man roster: there is no silver bullet for winning, not even one that involves hanging on to each and every high ceiling prospect in the system. Will David Stearns learn from midseason 2017, and become shrewd enough to find the proper balance of risk types and roster roles?

Working with the current roster, the Brewers will once again compete in 2018 with stunning depth, complete with a rotation that looks better suited to planting dreams of dingers in batters’ heads, rather than striking fear. This very systematic approach worked in 2017 by using a series of pitching adjustments and strategies, and now the club has doubled down on potential low rotation depth in a manner that should push some fringe arms into more effective bullpen roles. If the Gallardo signing was poised to potentially improve the fifth rotation spot by approximately 10 runs (in a best case scenario), adding veteran Jhoulys Chacin features some runs prevented upside (Chacin prevented six runs in 2017, and was a fantastic starter in earlier days with the Colorado Rockies) that makes him even more attractive as innings-eating depth for the club. Here’s one potential pitching staff alignment (based on 2017 roles):

The club’s batting moves thus far are nearly head-scratching in their assemblage of talent that essentially blocks Lewis Brinson and Brett Phillips from starting CF or impact OF depth roles at the MLB level. As constructed, the current roster sends Brinson and Phillips to Triple-A as “next man up” depth. For this reason, it would not be surprising to see some combination Stephen Vogt, Hernan Perez, Jonathan Villar, or Keon Broxton fail to make the club from Spring Training.

There’s something underwhelming about this roster outside of cheering for the upside plays. Getting Jonathan Villar another chance to hit on the tools and disciplined approach that created his breakout 2016 campaign could be extremely worthwhile to the Brewers longterm contending chances, as could getting Junior Guerra to continue his winter ball success at the MLB level to rebound in 2018 (Guerra has allowed 19 runs on 40 hits and 17 walks, with 30 strike outs, in 48.3 winter innings). Watching Brinson, Phillips, Josh Hader, and Brandon Woodruff further develop MLB roles will also be worthwhile. Yet, what’s interesting is the number of singular players on the roster; according to Baseball Reference Play Index, there is no position player in the MLB Expansion Era that has combined Keon Broxton’s extreme plate approach through 700 career plate appearances; the only other Expansion Era catcher to play his rookie season at age-30 while amassing 300 PA is Kenji Johjima; Hernan Perez is the youngest effective superutility player in Expansion Era history. GM David Stearns may be validated by giving these players another chance to prove themselves in 2018, despite all common sense and MLB history saying “these are not typical MLB contributors.” In fact, drawing on these unorthodox talents may be one way to help bolster the roster around the top prospects.

One of the raging debates is when, or how, the Brewers should trade prospects in order to acquire MLB-ready producers to enhance their roster. An interesting take on this debate is that even if the Brewers do not trade their very best prospect (Lewis Brinson), they could use their future 2018 Rule 5 draft depth to form trades and beat a roster crunch. BrewersFarm assembled one such list of this Rule 5 roster crunch on Twitter, and at first glance it looks quite daunting.

Sure. But all of these guys will need to be on 40-man by next winter or risk being taken in Rule 5. Dealing from prospect depth is gonna be darn near a necessary at some point. There’s probably 15 or so guys that will probably need to be added. pic.twitter.com/RqJ4iGnxBb

— Brewers Farm (@BrewersFarm) December 20, 2017

Alongside top prospects such as Monte Harrison and Isan Diaz, obvious Rule 5 protections, stand a group of potential pop-up pitchers for 2018 (Josh Pennington, Carlos Herrera, and Trey Supak), alongside additional useful depth that can use 2018 to take their next steps to the MLB (here Troy Stokes, Luis Ortiz, and Cody Ponce might come to mind). How many of these players should be protected? Here’s one potential short list of “interesting” 2018 Rule 5 guys:

The argument goes something like this: since the Brewers will have a roster crunch pending after 2018 with these players, they can use some of these players to headline trades to compete in 2018. This is obviously most attractive in the case of players like Monte Harrison and Luis Ortiz, who have solid potential roles that outweigh much of their risk.  Harrison and Ortiz would be the types of prospects that could probably help to construct an impact MLB trade. But otherwise, the trouble with this group of players is that they have largely failed to come into focus yet; it’s difficult to look at Carlos Herrera, Josh Pennington, or even Trey Supak as anything more than throw-ins right now. 2018 will be as crucial for them in terms of developing in the minor leagues as the year will be for establishing MLB roles for Brinson, Phillips, and Woodruff.

For all the strengths of the roster’s depth, a waltz through the current Brewers 40-man roster (and the rumored signing of Boone Logan) shows a sizable group of players that either have contracts expiring, easy contracts to drop, non-tender options, etc. If the Brewers need to find room for even eight or ten Rule 5 protections (in the most extreme case, perhaps), the front office should easily be able to find room for them on the roster:

One potential issue with shifting such depth from MLB-tested players to such a large number of prospects is that the 2019 club will simply encounter the same types of issues that the 2018 club faces: namely, finding playing time for prospects while they develop at the MLB level, and facing the uncertainty of developing MLB players in the midst of designing an otherwise competitive club. Yet, this type of strategy solidifies the sense that this Brewers team may actually win through depth, or because of their depth, rather than relying on one star to emerge from this pack of prospects. The only questions that remain concern the types of MLB deals that can be had with this next group of prospects, and how the players at the fringes of the 2018 MLB roster perform during the season. Unlike the relative strategic ease of rebuilding, there are no right answers in 2018 and 2019. How many paths to winning may the club follow?

Photo Credit: Dale Zanine, USAToday Sports Images

Malcolm Farley’s exquisite 2002 FanFest artwork is truly breathtaking, as is the fact that the pro shop spells Richie’s name wrong, making it impossible to find for anyone who might consider buying.

After you hang Ritchie here on your wall, you’ll need something to help you appreciate your new art while your stroke your chin and comment on the quality of the brush work. A nice glass of red is the perfect complement, and you can’t go wrong with the 2015 Brewers Club Series Cabernet.

With hints of blackberries, cherries, and spices, nothing will class up the joint more, or pair better with Secret Stadium Sauce.

Hank!

Hanks is everywhere, probably because there are secretly two of him. Kidding, kidding, but given his presence in the pro shop doing all manner of things, you’d be tempted to think so, even though the Brewers have absolutely confirmed it isn’t so.

He’s sitting on a barrel with the Bratwurst for $68.00,

There are several half human, half Hank, “WereHank” monstrosities,

And a delightful book on our favorite little guy.  

I wonder which Hank it’s about.

KILL IT WITH FIRE

Ghosts are supposed to be scary, but not like this.

This creepy white pile of goo who constantly stares up at whoever is carrying it is the perfect Halloween bucket for your small child. Lacking either the kitsch of a jack-o-lantern or the capacity of a pillow case, the Brewers Ghost Halloween Bucket will have his or her friends asking “What is that?” and “Can you get it away from me?”

Bad This Shirt Is

Star Wars is all the rage right now so it’s no surprise to see t-shirts like this truly unfortunate Yoda number…

And this is even worse than putting your actual last name on a jersey. Do not put your actual name on a jersey, it’s always a bad decision, and a key indicator of a fan that will be pointed out to an usher at some point during the game. 

Do not do this, it is bad. That said, not everything in the Star Wars’ line is bad. This is both awesome, and flies in the face of retconned George Lucas canon:

I’d buy that shirt, well done.

Finally

I don’t know what Tokidoki is or what’s going on here, but I do like donuts. In any case, if you’re interested in a fake-anime girl wearing a donut dress and carrying a wheat stalk, the Milwaukee Brewers have you covered.

Happy Holidays everyone.

But if you don’t have Yuni on your team, and instead have good players, things get trickier. Good players are AWFUL for improvement, and while going from a Yuni to a Lind may cost you a few million dollars, going from Keon Broxton (.9 WARP. Let’s call it 1 WARP) to someone who is three wins better than Keon Broxton (Andrew McCutchen or Byron Buxton) is much more expensive. Going from, say, Domingo Santana to Giancarlo Stanton is even more expensive. Adding wins isn’t really linear, and the Brewers are about to run smackdab into a big curve.

The Astros won 106 games and had an awesome offense led by homegrown stars Jose Altuve (6.4 WARP), Carlos Correa (4.59), George Springer (4.19), and Alex Bregman (4.08). That’s an incredibly solid group of young great players. Altuve and Springer are a bit older, but certainly not old, and should remain stars for the foreseeable future.

The Milwaukee Brewers won 86 games, which is good! The Brewers’ best position player, and the only one to post a WARP over four, was Travis Shaw. The rest of the offense was bolstered by lucky streaks, old guys with big platoon splits (which even Shaw can be accused of) and the defensively inept (Domingo Santana). It was a balanced offense. While it was good last season, improving it in the short term will be very difficult. It will be even more difficult because the Brewers were pretty lucky last season.

Not everything went right for the Brewers, of course. The bullpen struggled early while Neftali Feliz was installed as closer, Jimmy Nelson suffered a terrible injury and may never return to form, and Chase Anderson missed a good chunk of time, but generally speaking the Brewers, GM David Stearns, and Manager Craig Counsell were both masterful and extremely lucky in managing injuries, streaks and slumps. Thames got them off to a gangbusters start, but when he stopped being able to hit same-side pitching, Jesus Aguilar was there to at least keep the position average. Jonathan Villar was fixed by a ridiculous steak from Eric Sogard, who was later fixed by the acquisition of Neil Walker. Jett Bandy started strong, Stephen Vogt finished strong, Manny Pina was at least fine and often quite good most of the rest of the time. Even Hernan Perez, overused down the stretch, was strategically good earlier in small doses. Timing is everything, and on offense, the Brewers enjoyed some excellent timing.

All of this luck resulted in a very good, but not quite playoff record, and that’s great, but it leaves the team with a tricky mix of high expectations and likely regression. To see any real improvement, they need to add not just good players, but star players. Star players are expensive, and while the Brewer system is well-regarded, it’s most often praised for its depth of talent, not its ceiling. It’s possible that Brett Phillips, who was great down the stretch, turns into a bona fide star, and it’s possible that Lewis Brinson does the same, but it’s unlikely, especially for 2018.

The Brewers would obviously like to compete next season, as all teams would, however doing so will essentially require:

1. A replacement for Nelson (3.89 WARP) in the rotation (expensive)

2. A multi-win upgrade among already good positional players (expensive)

3. Good luck (unlikely)

I think they’ll sign or trade for a few guys, but until the pipeline (or Mark Attanasio’s wallet) produces a few 4+ WARP players, they are relying on luck just to tread water. The Brewers are close to being something special, but as much as some want them to make a big splash, take on more payroll, or give up prospects in trade, 2018 is likely to see them take a step back no matter what they do, and spending the amount necessary to mitigate that likelihood would narrow their window of contention down the line. Think about how much a player like Giancarlo Stanton costs on the open market. The Brewers need a few of those, but they probably need to come from inside the system.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Against the mighty Cubs, then, the Brewers went +6 RS / +12 RA compared to an average distribution of the Cubs seasonal Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. Compared to the Brewers’ own performance, Milwaukee went +2 RS / -3 RA against the Cubs based on an average distribution of their seasonal Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. On balance, this means that the Milwaukee Nine held their own against the vastly superior Cubs, which was evident throughout the tense September series in which the Brewers forced a divisional conversation and nearly made the playoffs.

Brewers fans are largely complaining about the state of the club’s Winter Meetings, as the club is expected to improve pitching but came away from the meetings without any new starting pitchers or relievers. Obviously, the offseason is very young, and Stearns himself has shown a penchant for working deep into the offseason: see the Khris Davis trade in February 2016, as one example, or even the bullpen-depth-defining Jared Hughes signing entering 2017. But even as fans fret about a rotation featuring Chase Anderson, Zach Davies, Junior Guerra, Brent Suter, and Brandon Woodruff to enter 2017, it is worth remembering the performance against the Cubs to frame the potential of this group of arms. Specifically, it was the unassuming Davies (and, arguably, equally unassuming Anderson and Suter) that strung together some of the best outings against the Cubs.

In fact, selecting a biased sample of these four pitchers’ best starts against the Cubs, a 58.7 IP, 15 runs (2.30 runs average!), 47 strikeout / 11 walk / 4 home run performance appears. Despite a 47 RS / 28 RA (!!!) team performance in these ten, Milwaukee’s bats and bullpen unfortunately failed to support the starters in some of these games, resulting in a 6-4 record despite the successful starting pitching (Milwaukee went 3-6 in the other nine games versus the Cubs with a much worse 41 RS / 56 RA performance).

Selecting the successful games obviously presents a biased image of performance, but it is worth diving into these starts in order to see how the Brewers succeeded. In what follows, it will be clear that the Brewers succeeded by adjusting throughout the year against the Cubs, and (for the most part) sticking with extremely balanced pitch selection approaches against the monstrous Cubs offense. What is meant to result from this study is increased fan confidence in the approach of the pitchers along with the catching staff, coaches, and (probably) team baseball research department. The Brewers undoubtedly had a lot go right in 2017, and if no baseball season can be successful without luck, the Brewers were particularly lucky in their convergence of events. But, luck does not explain the full story, as across the board a group of relatively unknown or unheralded players quietly gave hell to the most hyped team on the Senior Circuit.

This is not to suggest that the Brewers will have continued success against Cubs bats simply by working in similar zones, but rather that these Brewers processes of dancing throughout the zone from start to start could continue to orient these arms for seemingly surprising success. Indeed, the Brewers arms already improved by 26 runs between the first and second half of 2017, thanks to a 4.11 runs average in August, capped off with 3.64 runs average in September/October. Milwaukee is a pitching-first club, and the nails approach against the Cubs demonstrates one of the keys to that success.

The image of Zach Davies conjures a sinker-change up starter who constantly works low in the zone. What’s intriguing about Davies’s success against the Cubs throughout 2017 is that the righty consistently worked up into the zone to offset his low, sinking change up and blooping curve. Moreover, the righty’s additional pitch, what Brooks Baseball calls a “Cutter” but could be somewhere between a traditional cut fastball and slider, became one of the balancing aspects of his approach with the Cubs. The “cutter” itself for Davies is an interesting pitch, one that the young righty first expanded in 2016, and then shifted slightly in 2017; the PITCHf/x readings are slight, but essentially in 2017 Davies was using the pitch to “run” slightly more armside and rise slightly more than the 2016 version. Unlike 2016, Davies basically evened out his exceptional change up and big curveball, an arsenal change that churned out more groundballs and whiffs from the cutter in 2017.

Here are Davies’s four best starts against the Cubs. The shifts are subtle, but it’s clear that the righty was changing his approach with each meeting against the Cubs simply based on pitch selection. But these aren’t wholesale changes, instead (like the pitcher) they went on-a-bit, off-a-bit, adding and subtracting subtly to find a successful approach with each start. By the end of the year, the approach was working wonders for the righty.

Davies did not simply rely on pitch selection to baffle the Cubs, however. The righty consistently changed his approach within the zone for each start, including challenging the Cubs up in the zone with both fastballs and breaking balls. According to Brooks Baseball, here are the four best Davies starts versus the Cubs in terms of total zone migration:

By separating Davies’s sinker and fastball, as well as his cutter, change, and curveball, one can isolate the specific areas of the zone in which the righty was attempting to work “hard” and “soft.” Here are Davies’s sinker and the occasional fastball:

I grouped Davies’s “cutter” with the change and curve, because I’m simply not certain that it works like an additional “hard” pitch for Davies. The righty’s arsenal is beginning to look like that of Shaun Marcum at his best (a very good thing, remember Marcum was a 12.1 WARP starter from 2007-2011), meaning that the righty can provide armside- and gloveside-breaking pitches, while also essentially changing speeds on his “sinker” (with the change up) and “fastball” (with the cutter), making the curveball the “great” equalizer. Against previous scouting reports, size questions remain for Davies, although he has remained particularly durable in each of his advanced seasons thus far, and he is succeeding beyond the expected back-end starter “Overall Future Potential (OFP)” role because of his ability to adjust at the MLB level and due to his new cutter.

The cutter is typically the breaking pitch that Davies throws “uo” in the zone, with the curve and change dropping low. This gives Davies the distinct advantage of working three different velocity levels through different areas the zone:

What is striking about both migrations throughout the zone is that Davies does not simply “climb the ladder” with the hard stuff as time progresses, but he also locates his “breaking” and “off speed” offerings higher in the zone from time-to-time, too. As a result, Davies is essentially going straight after Cubs batters, and despite their acumen for power, they were largely unable to hit the righty as the season wore on. This could be an effective mindgame from Davies, insofar as he has established himself as someone who not only prefers to work low in the zone but also is perceived to be someone who cannot come into the zone to challenge batters. One might question whether batters’ lack of expectation for pitches within the zone allowed Davies to have an advantage for pounding those areas with strikes. Indeed, he was rather successful throughout these four starts in terms of limiting hits:

Notice that by the last start against the Cubs, despite locating heavily throughout the zone and especially gloveside (to your right on the GIF), the Cubs simply did not end AB in those zones, and did not collect hits in those areas.

Like Davies, Chase Anderson’s success in 2017 swirled around a cutter and a curveball, although those tow pitches mean two different things for both arms. Anderson has become slightly more of a “velocity” pitcher, ramping his fastball from roughly 92 MPH in 2014 to nearly 94 MPH in 2017, and he famously revamped his curveball and cutter under the watch of pitching coach Derek Johnson. With a new grip, and increased usage of both the curve and cutter (at the expense of the change and other fastballs), Anderson upped the whiffs and groundballs on the curveball within the system of his new arsenal.

What is interesting about Anderson is that while one might expect Davies to be the wily pitch shifter, against the Cubs Anderson’s five-pitch arsenal moved in a more extreme manner than that of Davies. With the added velocity, Anderson effectively looks like a cross between a pitch-bending trickster and a classic over-the-top power pitcher:

From start to start against the Cubs, Anderson also migrated his pitching approach throughout the zone. Here are the righty’s three best starts against the Cubs. Notice the total overall migration from armside-to-gloveside zone approaches, especially the sharp overall pitch location contrast between the two September starts:

Within these overall migration patterns, Anderson’s distinct alignment of the cutter / fastballs approach and off-speed stuff is a beautiful thing. Unlike Davies, I lumped Anderson’s cutter in with his fastballs, simply because Anderson has a less distinct fastball queue than Davies (who throws a true “sinker”), as Anderson’s “moving” fastball is more like a hard running, riding pitch than a sinker. That his cutter is also nearly 90 MPH makes that pitch much closer to Anderson’s original fastball velocity, and easier to classify as a true cut fastball. Watch as Anderson stacks up the Cubs gloveside with hard stuff in his first September start, then dilutes the hard pitches throughout the zone:

What’s stunning with Anderson’s fastball / off-speed pitching approach is how he completely splits the two classifications of pitches throughout the zone. Granted, this would happen somewhat with Davies as well if the cutter is treated like a fastball instead of a breaking ball, so it is worth bearing this methodological decision in mind. Still, Anderson’s split is quite extreme, as shown in his first September start: with fastballs and cutters blaring in gloveside, Anderson whips those off-speed pitches to the armside of the zone. Once again, this is a beautiful type of dispersion, as once the Cubs have this start in mind, during their second look at Anderson later in the month, he completely moves his off-speed pitches gloveside.

Like Davies, Anderson effectively used these moving selections to limit hits from Cubs bats:

With Brent Suter and Junior Guerra, there are fewer starts available, and therefore less room to compare their respective arsenals.

So let’s just appreciate that Suter throws his 86 MPH fastball as his majority pitch (he is NOT a junkballer), and that he also consistently used his fastball to challenge Cubs bats high in the zone:

With the lefty’s insistence against squaring up when he releases the ball, Suter’s high fastball must be an uncomfortable sight. Imagine the Raptor’s arms rotating at you, and then instead of a top-down delivery, the southpaw slings the ball around his body while also pushing it high in the zone. This is a beautiful pitch, and it’s also worth questioning whether Suter is really just throwing a cutter; from time to time, the Raptor throws that pitch in a way to break “in” on righties, which is precisely what he did in both starts against the Cubs.

Not to be outdone, Guerra’s post-injury work against the Cubs revealed a bizarre variation of his splitter, where the off-speed pitch actually flattened out and seemed to flutter as a “straight change up” to the plate. Guerra often seemed to have no idea where the bizarre splitter would run, as the pitch sometimes dropped, sometimes rose, and sometimes simply landed on a straight line like Rich Harden’s ghost pitch:

It should not be viewed as a cliche that the Brewers beat the Cubs because their best pitchers consistently adjusted against Chicago bats. It’s not a truism that MLB players succeed by adjusting; they succeed by adjusting, and at times when the adjustments don’t work, the struggles can be difficult to turn into effective performances. The Brewers succeeded with a gang of unheralded pitchers, in the form of swingman Suter, old rookie Guerra, “back-end” Davies, and replacement level Anderson. But none of this quartet was what they were supposed to be during the 2017 season, in part because of their ability to use flexible approaches to maximize their tools. Davies maximized his approach by coming after presumably unsuspecting batters high in the zone, while Anderson maximized his approach by running vast migrations throughout the strike zone. The difficulty of this approach is that while it is true that Milwaukee will once against need these pitchers to adjust to succeed in 2018, their adjustments may not necessarily mimic their 2017 success; new or changed pitches may emerge, new pitch sequencing, or velocity questions (or surpluses) may also impact zone approaches.

At the very least, the ability to adjust in 2017 should cause Brewers fans and analysts not to count out this unsuspecting rotation prior to 2018.

Photo Credit: Dennis Wierzbicki, USAToday Sports Images.

In a vacuum, it makes sense for the Brewers to seek to trade Santana. The twenty-five-year-old is coming off a breakthrough season in which he posted an .876 on-base-plus-slugging percentage with 30 home runs and 15 stolen bases, good for a .306 TAv. The right fielder still has four seasons left of team control, and he won’t enter arbitration until next offseason.

In addition to Santana’s promising performance and contract situation is the Brewers current logjam in the outfield. As of right now, from left-to-right the team’s starting outfield looks like Ryan Braun, Keon Broxton, and Santana; prospects like Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, and Corey Ray are waiting in the wings. The Brewers also have Hernan Perez, who is adequate in the outfield.

It doesn’t seem like Braun is going anywhere due to his no-trade clause, and Broxton will not garner anywhere near as much value in a trade as Santana due to his performance and age. Something has to give to make room for the teams young prospects. Santana seems to be the front offices’ choice as the odd man out.

Despite Santana’s success and the Brewers willingness to seek out a deal, a market that would appease David Stearns and company’s demand has not materialized, according to a report by Jerry Crasnick of ESPN. The disinterest in paying the presumable high asking price for the cost-controlled young outfielder has to do with his defensive troubles in the outfield and his questionably high luck-related statistics, namely batting average on balls in play (BABIP) and home run per fly ball rate (HR/FB).

It’s no secret that Santana is a bad outfielder. By fielding runs above average (FRAA), he was fifth-worst in the league among 65 right-fielders at -7.6 FRAA. In 2015 and 2016 combined, he was worth -10 FRAA despite playing in just 115 games. Statcast ranked him 294th out of 309 outfielders according to their Outs Above Average metric. Santana didn’t make a single 4 or 5 star play in 38 attempts according to Statcast. Outfield defense only gets worse with age. Because Santana is atrocious in the outfield at age 24, he’ll likely be unplayable as he gets closer to 30. Teams don’t want to pay a premium for a future DH.

Compounding on Santana’s issues defensively was his alarmingly high BABIP and HR/FB in 2017. Santana had the six-highest BABIP in the league among those with over 500 plate appearances, at .363. He hovers around the likes of Avisail Garcia and Tim Beckham, who enjoyed fluky breakout seasons, Charlie Blackmon, who plays his home games in Coors Field, and Jose Altuve, who just won the American League MVP. BABIP is one of the first indicators that a player is playing over his head. Statcast’s Exit Velocity metric suggests Santana was a bit lucky with his balls in play this year. His average exit velocity was 89.3 MPH, putting him at 62nd in the league. He barreled the ball in just 5.6 percent of his plate appearances. Statcast’s findings are nothing to scoff at, but hardly indicative of a player who is going to have future success on balls in play. Inquiring teams are aware of this.

Not only did Santana have providential success on balls in play, but many more of his fly balls went from home runs than one would otherwise expect. His 30.9 HR/FB rate ranked behind just Aaron Judge and Giancarlo Stanton among qualified hitters. Smart money is on that HR/FB rate to come down.

But Santana’s batted ball profile cannot afford for that HR/FB rate to come down. He is a ground ball despite what his power profile suggests. His ground ball percentage was up around 50 percent in 2017. If his HR/FB plummets, his power numbers will dwindle more than the average player due to his reliance on the ground ball unless he makes an adjustment in the meantime.

Front offices around the league are aware of these weaknesses and fortunate outcomes in Santana’s game. They aren’t going to pay top price for a product they expect to diminish in performance and value. This is why the Brewers need to hold onto Santana. The right fielder needs to prove that he can fix his defensive woes or that his batted ball profile is not a fluke with the Brewers before they can entertain the notion of trading him. Until then, they need to ride the Santana wave and see what kind of performance they can get out of him.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images