Ashby comes from a big league pedigree; he is the nephew of former MLB pitcher Andy Ashby, who also pitched at Crowder College before going on to a 14-year career that ended with a 4.12 ERA across more than 1,800 innings. Aaron himself finished with an impressive resume at Crowder, posting a 2.29 ERA across 74.2 innings in his final season while leading all Junior College pitchers in strikeouts (156) and strikeout rate (18.8 K/9). But his below-average control (5.18 BB/9) caused him to slip down to 125th overall, where he signed for a slightly above-slot $520,000 bonus.

Ashby began his career in the professional ranks in Helena, Montana, pitching for the Brewers’ Pioneer League affiliate. The bottom-line numbers say that he didn’t fare too well during his brief stint in rookie ball, as he worked to a 6.20 ERA while logging 20.3 innings. The Pioneer League is notoriously hitter-friendly, however, and the decent 19:8 K/BB ratio and 93 Deserved Run Average Minus (DRA- ) that he produced for Helena are probably more indicative of his true performance during those six outings (on a scale of 100, a DRA- below 100 is better than average). Ashby was never going to be long for rookie ball, and he was promoted to make his debut with the Class-A Wisconsin Timber Rattlers on July 29th.

Aaron would go on to make seven dazzling starts for Appleton to conclude his season, never allowing more than two earned runs in any of them. He tossed six shutout innings in his Midwest League debut against Kane County, and in back-to-back starts against Cedar Rapids on August 19th and Clinton on August 24th, he worked six innings while striking out 10 and 12 batters, respectively. All told, Ashby pitched 37.3 innings at Class-A with a 2.17 ERA, 47 strikeouts against a mere nine walks, and only one home run allowed. He limited opponents to a .233 True Average (TAv) even though he was stung by a .398 batting average on balls in play, and Ashby finished with a sterling Deserved Run Average that saw his work as 39 percent more effective than his Midwest League peers.

Free passes were Ashby’s biggest bugaboo as a collegiate hurler, but he was able to limit the walks quite well during his first 57.7 innings as a professional in 2018. His 2.7 BB/9 across two levels was nearly half his total during his last year at Crowder, though some scouts wonder how long that will continue as he begins to face more advanced hitters while climbing the minor league ladder. Ashby has a “funky,” high-effort delivery that makes it difficult for him to throw strikes at times, but it does add plenty of deception and helped him induce swings aplenty at pitches outside the strike zone against the Pioneer and Midwest League hitters.

The raw stuff is truly excellent, though. A moving fastball that routinely registers in the 91-94 MPH range; A plus curveball that has long been his go-to pitch and was graded by Baseball America as the best secondary offering of any Brewers’ pitcher drafted in 2018; A power slider that has “impressive depth and two-plane break,” that BA says Milwaukee’s development staff likes even better than the curve; and a changeup that doesn’t get used much, but projects as an average offering at maturity.

A role as a power reliever will always be there for Ashby to fall back on if the command issues creep back up in the future, but so long as he can continue refining his mechanics and adding strength to his 6’1″, 170 lb frame, Ashby could grow into a “really intriguing mid-rotation prospect” according to Baseball Prospectus’ Mark Anderson. He’ll no doubt be hoping to following the footsteps of fellow fourth-round pick Corbin Burnes, who also began as an intriguing prospect from a small college before blossoming under Milwaukee’s minor league coaching staff. Burnes fashioned himself into an integral part of Milwaukee’s big league roster within two years of being drafted; with some minor adjustments, Aaron Ashby could follow a similarly quick path to the majors.

Related Reading:
Spending Expectations
Free Agency Analysis: LHP SP

Simply in terms of statistics and historical records, though, the Brewers are also likely to fail to match their 2018 performance next year. Here’s how playoff teams in the Expanded Wild Card Era have fared with 96+ wins in their follow-up year, sorted by Follow-up Wins:

Some notes:

• In 12 of 17 cases, the “follow-up” to the 96+ win playoff season featured a better Run Differential progression than Win-Loss progression. This could be an easy fate for the 2019 Brewers, given that the 2018 Brewers outplayed their Runs Scored / Runs Allowed in resounding fashion: the Brewers in 2019 could easily become a 92 or 93 win run differential team that neverthless only cracks 88 to 90 wins on the field.

• The Brewers are comparable to the 2015 Cubs, which is interesting because those Cubs were the outcome of a “tanking” / scorched-earth rebuild that required multiple years of building, while the 2018 Brewers required no such rebuild. Those Cubs featured a young emerging core of Javier Baez, Addison Russell, Kris Bryant, Kyle Schwarber, and others, while these Brewers featured a decidedly ragtag gang of free agents, trade acquisitions, and advanced minors chumps who rode their strengths to excellent team success (overcoming a veritable book of scouting weaknesses). There is no Bryant / Russell / Baez core for the Brewers; there might not even be a prospect as good as Javier Baez from the 2018 Brewers. Yet here we are: those 2015 Cubs were not a juggernaut, instead averaging an 84-win run differential and surging after the All-Star Break, which is rather similar to the 2018 Brewers’ mediocre underlying performance and white hot September.

• Perhaps the most compelling comparison is the 2014 Orioles, who (like the Brewers) posted mediocre run differential totals early in the season but contended thanks to an extended late season surge. The 2014 Orioles were in the midst of an excellent five year contending run that included three playoff appearances (including a League Championship Series exit in 2014). These Orioles were also quite similar to the Brewers insofar as they strung together elite pitching performances out of their bullpen and an unsung rotation, while also keeping a relative hodge-podge of different player development cycles in their batting order (ranging from young Manny Machado and Jonathan Schoop to aging Nick Markakis, Steve Pearce, and Nelson Cruz.

• Trends exhibited by the Nationals, Reds, Red Sox, and Cardinals should underscore the up-and-down, uneven quality of the current era of baseball. Stated simply, being a near-100 win season in one season is nothing close to a guarantee that a roster core will even be a playoff contender the next season, especially as teams lean on young roster cores to define their success “out of nowhere” (such as 2018 Athletics, or 2017 Rockies and Twins). The median win total among these 96+ win behemoths is 86, in the following season.

How will the Brewers overcome these trends? Or, if the Brewers do take a step backwards, how will that be defined as a success for 2020 and onward? Given the state of the Brewers roster and organizational depth, the answer to both questions is the same: the Brewers’ success will largely be defined either by establishing MLB roles for Keston Hiura, Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, Freddy Peralta, Jacob Nottingham, and other prospects, or else netting elite talent in a trade return (especially involving Hiura, who should not be traded but for returning surefire MLB production). Prospect development at the MLB level should be a significant portion of the story for the 2019 Brewers, regardless of whether those newcomers help bolster a playoff club or whether the club fails to defend their NL Central crown but establishes future roles for the players.

Additionally, the Brewers can continue to define themselves as a club “on the margins” by providing the proper salary arbitration deals; for example, the club already accomplished this cutthroat mission by designating injured veteran catcher Stephen Vogt, rather than allocating a couple million of payroll dollars on a gamble that he returns to his bat-first profile behind the dish. As demonstrated below, Vogt’s contract and production history would yield nothing more than a 45 Overall Future Potential (OFP) asset via trade (i.e., basically an organizational depth player with an MLB floor), and at an estimated cost of nearly $4 million (via Cot’s Contracts), it is clear that the Brewers could readily fill that organizational depth function with that amount of money while also potentially pursuing additional upside. This is a crucial source of value because (unfortunately for players) salary arbitration offers the Brewers a chance to “freely” cut a player if they do not wish to enter salary arbitration process; depending on how tight the club’s revenue and payroll scenarios are, rampant non-tenders could be a great opportunity to expand resources for improving the club.

The table below demonstrates the Average Surplus of the Brewers’ salary arbitration deals. The ideal of Surplus is defined with value including both production (“pure” performance in the field) and scarcity (how readily available that production is, in other words how expensive that production is). Unlike previous models of Surplus Value I’ve published, this year I’m using multiple ranges of three-year performances (2014-2016, 2015-2017, and 2016-2018) to produce estimates, while also including contract estimates that are “depreciated” and “highest possible value.” A depreciated contract detracts from previous performance, expecting that a player’s performance will decline over time, while a highest possible value contract places a premium on the most recent performance (the best example here would be someone like Patrick Corbin, who would probably get his best contract based on who places the highest value on 2018 and assumes that performance can be replicated). [Last year’s rankings are here].

• Estimate: Cot’s Contracts arbitration estimate.
• Arbitration Year: Demonstrates a player’s specific point in the arbitration process (which is typically three years long, but can in some cases last four years with the most advanced service time players).
• HarmonicOne: This is a one-year contract estimate that takes the harmonic mean between a player’s harshest depreciated performance and their fullest current performance valuation.
• Maximum: This is a one-year contract estimate that uses a player’s fullest current performance valuation.
• Minimum: This is a one-year contract estimate that uses a player’s harshest past performance depreciation.
• Average Surplus: This figure weighs the average of the three contract estimates against the salary arbitration estimate, while also recognizing that a team will benefit from the player’s production both in controlling the production contractually and receiving the production on the field. [Average of HarmonicOne / Maximum / Minimum] – [Arbitration Estimate] + [Average of HarmonicOne / Maximum / Minimum], or, [Scarcity – Contract + Production].
• OFP: This is the historical equivalent Overall Future Potential grade that relates to the player’s Average Surplus  (more here). Essentially, this estimates the type of prospect the Brewers might expect in return if another team values each player in a similar manner.

This table should demonstrate several important roster decisions:

• First, it is clear that there are several Brewers players that do not have Wins Above Replacement (WARP) histories that match their value. This is especially true in the case of Hernan Perez, whose scarce defensive flexibility is probably worth significantly more than WARP estimates, and Erik Kratz, whose glove-first profile at catcher could be crucial to helping Brewers pitchers without phenomenal stuff “play up” in terms of production. Corey Knebel is obviously valued much higher than WARP based on his stuff and high leverage relief profile. So, this surplus value model is not definitive, it should only be viewed as a starting point.

• Players like Domingo Santana and Zach Davies have unclear production roles and unclear trade value. This probably explains why Santana was not traded last offseason, despite fans’ perception of a “clear” need for starting pitching and Santana’s “odd man out” status in a packed outfield; but other clubs probably do not value Santana beyond surrendering a rotation depth / organizational depth arm, and it is understandable why the Brewers would not accept that. It’s likely players like Santana and Davies “play out” their roles in Milwaukee, rather than being subjects of trade.

• Stephen Vogt is obviously not under contract any longer, but I included Vogt for two reasons. First, including Vogt’s Surplus estimate should show the type of range of contract that may be released by the Brewers. Second, Vogt’s estimate is included above to gauge what a potential contract value might be in case he is retained in some other manner (such as a minor league deal with an MLB guaranteed rate). A $1.4 million investment in Vogt, for example, would provide ample surplus value for the Brewers retaining the veteran within the organization.

• Jonathan Schoop’s past production really drives any model of his contract value; Schoop is likely a non-tender candidate if his salary expands to $11 million, but it should be noted that if there is any expectations for the slugger to reclaim anything resembling his previous performance level, the Brewers could make a contract offer.

• Travis Shaw is an absurdly valuable player to the Brewers, and in fact is probably more important than any player on the club short of Cain and Yelich (below is a sampling of the surplus value for much of the remaining roster, for comparison).

What is difficult about assessing the Brewers roster for 2019 is that the club is void of many obvious trade candidates. For example, in cases like Schoop, Chase Anderson, and Eric Thames, the club would almost certainly be selling low and thus limit themselves to seeking a “diamond in the rough” of an organizational depth trade return (such as a reliever or starting pitcher that could be rehabbed, or a utility-type profile like Hernan Perez that could “play up” in Milwaukee’s defensive system). Here the importance of making proper development decisions for the likes of Burnes, Peralta, Nottingham, and other prospects comes into focus, as it should be evident that the Brewers do not have many roster assets that could yield talent that would be obvious improvements above their depth prospects (or primary ones, at that). Milwaukee’s crossroads for the 2019 offseason will be combining those proper development decisions with payroll freed at the margins of the roster to seek at least one impact free agency contract.

Thus, it is true that GM David Stearns could non-tender much of the club to refine the roster, and non-tenders in bulk might be expected as a way to accumulate impact cash: this is one route to an attempt at beating the recent record of excellent playoff clubs, and ensuring that Milwaukee does not have a playoff hangover. Yet making proper prospect development decisions will ensure that even if the Brewers do not reach the playoffs in 2019, it won’t be anything more than a small blemish, a chance to reload, within the five-year window opened last offseason.

A quick recap on roster rules: the non-tender deadline this offseason is November 30. By that date, teams have to offer a contract to all players on the 40-man roster with fewer than six years of service time. If the team does not offer a contract to a player, then he becomes a free agent. Because Jonathan Schoop has 5.027 years of Major League service time and has not signed any extension, the Brewers have until November 30 to decide if they want to retain him for next season.

Jonathon Schoop is the greatest young power hitting second baseman of all time. There’s a lot to unpack there, but if we wanted to measure by players twenty-six and under who have played at least fifty percent of their games at second base, he’s hit the most home runs. However, impressive raw home run totals don’t necessarily mean a player is a star; even with that fun fact to his name, Schoop’s bat completely fell apart in 2018 after showing so much promise in 2017.

As a twenty-five year old second basemen in 2017, Schoop had a .280 True Average (TAv) and produced 37.6 Value Over Replacement Player (VORP), which estimates the number of runs Schoop produced beyond a freely available minor league replacement. PECOTA pegged him for a regression with .256 TAv and 15.8 VORP, yet his numbers sunk lower. Schoop’s plate discipline remained remarkably similar. His swing rate rose four percentage points to 56.8 percent, while his contact rate (71.4) and swinging strike rate (28.6) remained virtually unchanged from 2017, so his strikeout percentage only rose from twenty-one percent to twenty-three percent. The biggest difference is that his walk rate sunk from 5.2 percent to 3.8 percent, both of which are below average. Schoop’s walk rate would have placed him in the bottom five of all qualified hitters if he’d had enough at bats.

As I noted back in August, there was no smoking gun on Schoop’s poor performance at the plate, he just wasn’t hitting the ball as well. From that article’s publication date on August 13^th, Statcast numbers only slightly recovered. Even with some improvement his barrel percentage, exit velocity, launch angle, and hard hit percentage all were career lows. His expected WOBA placed in the bottom 1 percent of all hitters.

The Brewers traded for a player they probably saw as a buy low candidate. If they elect to offer Schoop arbitration, it likely means that they see something in his 2018 performance that they believe can be corrected to get him back to his 2017 numbers.

One projection for Schoop’s potential arbitration award places him at a $10.1M salary in 2019, which would be 3^rd on the team in salary, just above Christian Yelich, in case you needed another reminder about how great that contract is for the Brewers. The only other potential second basemen on the 40-man roster, presuming that Shaw is back at third base on Opening Day, are Tyler Saladino, Hernan Perez and Mauricio Dubon. None of these players are projected as a starting caliber player on a contending team.] in 2019.

The most intriguing internal option to replace Schoop would be Keston Hiura. Our mother site’s midseason top 50 prospects list had Hiura at number five and claimed that Hiura was “basically major-league ready” back when it was posted in mid-July. If the team agrees with the assessment, then he could be the starting at second by May 1, with service time manipulation likely preventing him from starting the season with the big-league club. While he’s considered a bat-first prospect, if the Brewers could shift and game plan their way into making Travis Shaw league average at second, fans shouldn’t be too worried about Hiura.

The Brewers could also look at potential free agents who could sign a one-year deal and provide flexibility in case the team wants to wait on Hiura (or if he proves not to be ready). Ian Kinsler had a terrible post-trade run with the Red Sox capped with baserunning and fielding blunders in Game 3 of the World Series. However, he provided above average defense according to Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) (even if it wasn’t quite Gold Glove worthy). If you squint, his offense wasn’t terrible in 2018! From his nadir on May 28 through his trade to Boston on July 30, he slashed .286/.349/.518, which is above his career line of .271/.339/.443. One wouldn’t expect a two-month hot streak to be his baseline production going forward, but it does show he has some life left in his bat, and could serve a useful role as a bridge to Hiura.

The Brewers are lucky to be in the position where they don’t need to double down on the Schoop trade. It would hurt the front office’s external perception to write off the acquisition as a total loss after three months of poor production, but I don’t believe that’s going to factor into their calculation. Milwaukee is always going to operate on a limited budget, but if the team decides its best choices are Schoop and Hiura, two different budget issues arise. Is the team willing to keep Schoop at more than $10 M when there’s a non-zero chance he’s not worth a roster spot? If Hiura shines in spring training and proves he’s the best player for the team, are they willing to ignore service time considerations and have him start the season with the team? If not, who would cover the gap of at least two weeks? Milwaukee’s front office has a few weeks to make these decisions, but whichever direction they turn will shed light on their internal evaluations of the players in question.

His first go-round in the Southern League came in 2015, the inaugural season for the Biloxi Shuckers. He spent the majority of the year manning center field, but after posting solid True Averages (TAv) of .266 for Wisconsin in 2013 and .267 for Brevard County in 2014, Taylor could only manage to put forth a .260/.312/.337 slash for a TAv of .243. Power has never been a major part of Tyrone’s profile but what little pop he could boast all but evaporated, as he clubbed a mere three home runs while posting an .077 Isolated Power (ISO) mark.

It’s not uncommon for a player to struggle during their first exposure to Double-A, especially when they make it to the level by the tender age of 21. So it wasn’t much of a surprise when Taylor returned to the Southern League for a second time in 2016; his continued struggles were flummoxing. This time, he yielded a .232/.303/.327 batting line across 519 plate appearances, with his TAv of .244 almost mirroring his total from the year prior. Tyrone did run into a few more homers (9), but still posted an ISO below .100 and stole fewer than 10 bases (9) for the first time since debuting in full-season ball. Taylor was Rule 5 eligible for the first time that offseason, and he was left unprotected by the Brewers and unpicked by any other team around the league.

His prospect stock was already plummeting when hamstring issues began to plague Taylor during the following season in 2017. He wasn’t able to get on the field until late June, taking at-bats in the Arizona League for a couple of weeks before heading back to Biloxi for a third time. He wound up finding action in only 25 games for the Shuckers and again, failed to inspire any sort of confidence with his bat. Taylor ended 2017 with a .247/.316/.376 slash in 95 plate appearances, tallying a single home runs and two stolen bases. Another sub-.250 TAv, and Taylor was nowhere near the club’s top-30 prospect rankings and was once again passed over in the Rule 5 Draft.

Despite his struggles, there was at least one man within the front office who was still in Taylor’s corner. “Tyrone Taylor is a guy who really battled injuries last year. He’s fully healthy. He’s had a chance to get over into some big league games. The power stroke seems to be coming back. It’s just great to see him healthy. He’s been a sleeper in the past,” Farm Director Tom Flanagan told MLB Pipeline’s prospect team during Spring Training 2018. The Brewers remained steadfast in their belief that there was still untapped offensive potential within Taylor because of his bat speed and contact ability, and hoped that ability to pepper the gaps with line drives could translate into more home run power. So after three years if struggles in Biloxi, the org decided it was time for a new challenge and assigned Taylor to Triple-A Colorado Springs for the 2018 season.

It was Taylor’s first subjection to the highest level of the minor leagues, and at age-24 he was nearly two and a half years younger than the median age for the Pacific Coast League. The outfielder was anything but overmatched, however. It was quite the contrary, in fact, as Taylor put together an offensive season like he’d never produced before. The Sky Sox outfield featured several MLB veterans throughout the course of the season (including Domingo Santana, Keon Broxton, Rymer Liriano, Quintin Berry, Brett Phillips, and Nate Orf, among others) and yet Taylor still saw his name etched on the lineup card nearly everyday, appearing in 119 games. In 481 trips to the plate, he hit .278/.321/.504, translating to a .265 TAv that was his highest in four years. And, as Flanagan and the Pipeline scouts intimated, the power finally showed up: Tyrone launched 20 balls over the fence after never hitting even double-digit dingers in a single season previously.

The key for Taylor appears to have been a successful indoctrination into the ranks of the “fly ball revolution.” Early on in his career, his batted ball profile resembled that of most speedsters; plenty of ground balls, relying on his fleet feet to beat out base hits. But things began to shift during his injury-shortened season in 2017, as Taylor (who posted fly ball percentages around 38, 30, and 39 percent, respectively, from 2014-16 in AA) hit 65 percent of his batted balls in the air during his rehab stint in Arizona.Taylor then produced nearly 45 percent flyball rate during his 25 games for Biloxi. In Colorado Springs, his fly ball rate jumped up again, this time close to 50 percent. Taylor hit the ball in the air nearly half the time last season, and his 11 percent HR/FB ratio was double his previous career rate.

Perhaps most impressive is that Taylor was able to add more loft to his swing and dramatically improve his power without sacrificing any of his bat-to-ball ability. He posted a .226 ISO and mashed those 20 taters while striking out in only 15.4 percent of his plate appearances, and he’s never whiffed at higher than a 19 percent clip at any level of the minors.

Taylor may have added a newfound power stroke to his tool box in 2018, but the speed and defense part of his profile is still indeed present. He once again swiped double-digit bases, nabbing 13 bags on 17 attempts. He’s also a capable defender at all three outfield spots and spent a majority of his time (56 appearances) in the premium position of center field this season. Taylor piled up 8.9 Fielding Runs Above Average in a shade over 950 innings in the field this season and was credited with a whopping 18 outfield assists, including four double plays.

Tyrone Taylor would have been eligible to become a minor league free agent this fall, but as a reward for his breakout campaign in Colorado Springs, the Milwaukee Brewers purchased his contract and made him a member of the 40 man roster earlier this week. A fallen prospect whose career appeared to be on life support just one year ago, Taylor now seems destined to make his MLB debut at some point in 2019. Milwaukee’s backup outfielder mix could be in a bit of flux this winter, as both Keon Broxton and Domingo Santana will be out of minor league options heading into camp next spring. With his right-handed bat, ability to go out and get it at all three outfield spots, and full slate of minor league options, Tyrone Taylor could wind up playing a meaningful role for the Menomonee Valley Nine next season.

Related Reading:
Counterbuilding: Trading and Drafting
The Successful Rebuild

Better yet, depending on how one views revenue expectations from the 2018 season, the Brewers likely increased their share of labor spending to approximately 40 percent, based on publicly available information and various trend forecasts (from conservative to aggressive). All of this precludes the MLB Advanced Media money, which undoubtedly gives the Brewers ownership group more cash to leverage for both capital and labor projects.

[quick rant]Brewers, increase minor league pay! Pay your minor leaguers a living wage across all systems![/quick rant]

Of course, one of the difficult aspects of navigating the 2018-2019 offseason is that in order to increase the labor share of the club, Milwaukee actually had to go out and sign some players. So some previously rosy payroll estimates may be pushed back a few years (click that link if you’d like payroll analysis with Lewis Brinson arbitration horizon estimates): but this is a good thing, because the Brewers are in better shape with Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich patrolling the outfield, and they’re also in better shape with clearer salary arbitration pictures for Corey Knebel, Travis Shaw, and even Jonathan Schoop.

The trouble is, without assuming that the Brewers will allocate full playoff revenue, and an increasing share of overall revenue, to the MLB payroll, the 2018-2019 offseason might look a little boring if the club simply renews each and every one of their arbitration eligible players. Here’s how this group looks, with Cot’s Baseball Contracts estimates:

Without major revenue growth, and considering a similar distribution of revenue to labor, this is how the Brewers payroll freedom might project:

It is evident that on the most conservative estimates, the Brewers cannot keep each arbitration eligible player and sign additional impact free agents. This raises questions about how the Brewers will employ trade and non-tender (basically releasing an arbitration-eligible player for free) strategies to maximize space, while also raising questions about how lucrative the playoffs were, where that MLBAM money will kick in, and how the club will (or did) allocate profits from 2016-2017.

For if the most rosy scenario plays out, the Brewers could keep a substantially larger portion of arbitration eligible players, and continue to add impact talent on the open market. Thus, there is room across the roster for GM David Stearns to wheel and deal. This is a great time for counterbuilding, which basically means making trades that run contrary to the assumed roster building strategy of the team. If a rebuilding team is expected to trade MLB salary for prospects, and a win-now trade reverses that by bundling prospects for MLB salary, those positions can be mixed in contrarian fashion to help maximize roster resources. Given that the Brewers have the opportunity to develop numerous players at the MLB level in 2019, some (seemingly) head-scratching trades would be a great way to free up additional salary in order to bolster the prospects with gambles on more proven producers.

Stearns developed a contending club so quickly by trading for MLB assets in his first offseason; now the GM can ironically continue to maintain the health of his MLB roster forecast by shedding some salaries for prospects or depth moves. Given the strengths of the 2018 club, this could be just the strategy necessary to improve around the margins, develop top prospects, and land one big ticket free agent.

Yes, Grandal or Realmuto would represent significant upgrades. But in the meantime, David Stearns, Craig Counsell, and the rest of the Brewers staff have been able to squeeze great value out of the current crop of time-shares and journeymen. Looking beyond the major league roster, catcher is a position full of surprising contributors up and down the organizational ladder. What follows is an overview of some of those contributors, as well as some brief notes on their outlook for the 2019 season and beyond. Upgrading would be nice; staying the course is probably fine, as well.

Major League Options

Player Name: Plate Appearances, Batting Average / On Base Percentage / Slugging Percentage, Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP)

Manny Piña; 337 PA, .252/.307/.395, 1.7 WARP
For the second year in a row, Piña handled the lion’s share of catching duties for Milwaukee. He continued to be a steady performer, offering tolerable offense and sturdy defense. His offensive production fell off some, relative to his breakout 2017 campaign, thanks to a slow start and a dip in Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP). Piña turned it on in the second half, hitting .295/.328/.429 after the break even as he lost playing time to immortal folk hero Erik Kratz.

With just over three years of service time on his major league clock, Piña is controllable for three more seasons through the arbitration process. He’ll be 34 by then, so it’s likely that someone else will have wrested away the bulk of available playing time behind the dish. Still, he handles a pitching staff well, and figures to get plenty of turns through the order in 2019 barring a major roster shakeup.

Erik Kratz; 219 PA, .236/.280/.355, 1.4 WARP
Erik Kratz came to the Brewers via a surprise trade with the Yankees, and wasted little time in endearing himself to fans and teammates alike. Though he didn’t bring much of a big league résumé into Milwaukee, he performed quite well in limited time, making up for his anemic offensive output with superlative glove work (11.1 Adjusted Fielding Runs Above Average in fewer than 500 defensive innings!).

Kratz elected free agency when he was removed from the Yankees’ 40-man roster prior to the 2018 season. He re-signed with New York before his trade to Milwaukee, but finished the year with fewer than six years of big league service time to his name. He can be controlled via arbitration for the 2019 season, though at age 39, he may have retirement (or a late career surge as a knuckle-balling reliever) on his mind. I’m not betting on a return, much as my heart hopes otherwise.

Stephen Vogt; Did Not Play in Majors (Shoulder Surgery)
All-around good guy Stephen Vogt was limited to 9 plate appearances for the Biloxi Shuckers in May before undergoing season-ending shoulder surgery. It was the second major shoulder operation of Vogt’s career; his big league future is in jeopardy. I’m not aware of any public information on his rehab, but Vogt could be controlled via arbitration in 2019 if he’s able to work his way back to the ball field.

For his career, Vogt is a .251/.310/.416 hitter, good for a strong .267 True Average (TAv). He’s below-average with the glove, though, and struggled to throw out base runners even before re-injuring his throwing arm. He’s well-loved among his teammates, but Vogt’s path back to the majors may be as a reserve first baseman or a DH.

Jacob Nottingham; 196 PA, .281/.347/.528 in Triple-A
Public opinion of Nottingham was fairly sour heading in to the year, and it’s not too difficult to see why: A .209/.326/.369 slash line in your second year of AA isn’t going to win over many casual fans. Biloxi is a run-suppressing environment, though, in a tough league for hitters. So that same ugly triple-slash translated to a barely-above-average.264 TAv. This year, with much better baseball-card stats courtesy of Colorado Springs, Nottingham’s TAv in the minors was all the way up to .282.

Expecting that kind of production in the big leagues, at least at first, is probably foolish. In his (very) limited time in Milwaukee, Nottingham compiled just 24 plate appearances and looked a tad over-matched at times, striking out on eight occasions. He also drew four walks, to his credit, and the sample size is far too small to be seriously examined. Most excitingly, Nottingham can seriously hurt a baseball when he finds one in his sweet spot, to the tune of 450+ feet. He’s made tremendous strides with the glove over the last few years, transforming himself into something approaching an average defensive catcher. Couple that with league-average-or-better offense at the position, and he still has the ability to produce sneaky value for the Brewers over the next six seasons. (Catchers in 2018 batted .232/.304/.372, so Nottingham doesn’t have to turn into Pudge Rodriguez to give the Brewers a boost.) I’m hoping he piles up a couple hundred big league plate appearances next season.

Jett Bandy; 216 PA, .292/.353/.510 in Triple-A
Bandy broke camp with the Brewers, but failed to impress. He hit .188/.268/.266 with shaky defense in 24 games before being removed from the roster and passed over on waivers. The 28-year-old came alive in Triple-A, but he’s reaching do-or-die status as a major league contributor. He’ll have to contend with at least two of the above names on the depth chart, and will likely struggle to find big league playing time should he remain in the Brewers organization. Still, he’s youngish enough and talented enough that he has a chance to shed his current quad-A label and become a solid backup with some pop.

Prospects and Depth

Christian Bethancourt; 418 PA, .297/.328/.506 in Triple-A
Brought in on a minor league pact, Bethancourt played very well in his return from the pitcher’s mound. He has soft hands behind the dish, and a good arm. He also hit a bit in Colorado Springs, with 20 home runs and a nifty .271 TAv. One knock on his offense: He gave away plenty of walks as a pitcher, but largely refuses them as a hitter.

Bethancourt was brought into the organization on a minor league pact. There will be plenty of plate appearances available for catchers in AAA next year, but it’s no guarantee that Bethancourt will be making the move to San Antonio along with the rest of the organization’s most advanced minor leaguers. Plenty of rebuilding clubs may take a roll of the dice on the former top prospect.

Dustin Houle and Max McDowell, Advanced A & Double-A
These two are the same age, and at about the same stage developmentally. Houle was drafted out of high school way back in 2011; McDowell followed from college in 2015.

Houle is a big-bodied catcher without a true carrying tool. He’s got a decent arm and is fairly strong, but the lack of a hit tool cramps his game power. He’s a nice organizational depth piece, but something very strange will have happened if he sees major league time in 2019.

McDowell has a bit more upside, with a strong throwing arm, decent athleticism, solid glove, and some untapped raw power. He flashed a nice bat in Wisconsin in 2016, but his hit tool hasn’t progressed much as he’s moved up the ladder. He’s got a chance to turn into a light-hitting backup at the highest level.

Mario Feliciano; 165 PA, .205/.282/.329 in Advanced A
2018 was basically a lost season for the 19-year-old, who battled back from an arm injury to play in 42 games for the Carolina Mudcats. He started slow in June, showed signs of life in July, then cratered in August. It was a disappointing year for a player who impressed in 2017 as one of the youngest prospects in the Midwest League. Ultimately, though, I see little reason to dampen long-term expectations. Catching at Class-Advanced A is an almost laughable challenge for a 19-year-old. He should return for another round in 2019, and I expect him to play pretty well. Keep in mind that the Carolina League is hard on hitters, so his stat line may not be all that impressive. The fact that he’ll be there at all, though, at 20 years old? Impressive. The defense could use some work, and he has plenty of time for that. Meanwhile, he could develop into a .270 hitter with a line-drive approach and average power.

Feliciano is currently playing in the Arizona Fall League to make up for some of his lost time this year. It’s not working, though: He’s only worked his way into two games, with one single in four at bats.

Payton Henry; 389 PA, .234/.327/.380 in Advanced A
Henry had a rough April and a tremendous May, followed by an acceptable June and July and a ghastly August and September. He’s a bat-first prospect with plus raw power, but he struck out in about 32 percent of his plate appearances. He needs to work on his receiving and his arm if he wants to stay behind the plate; he becomes a much less exciting prospect if he moves to first base or an outfield corner.

Worth Noting
Finally, backstops David Fry and Robie Rojas are due a mention here. Fry hit .315/.406/.563 while playing catcher, first base, and third base for the rookie league Helena Brewers. He drew 29 walks and struck out just 42 times in 261 plate appearances. Rojas, a 38th-round pick in 2017, spent plenty of time on the 7-day Disabled List and was relegated to the minor league taxi squad. He managed just 66 plate appearances on the year, including 13 at Triple-A, and hit surprisingly well in a (very small) 13-game sample in Carolina. All together, he had a line of .304/.409/.393.

Fry’s rookie league stats, while nice, are by and large worthless, and I have no idea what to make of Rojas at this point. But I’ll be curious to see what the organization does with both of these prospects in 2019.

It’s an ending that seemed inconceivable on Opening Day.  Fans were optimistic, sure, but the pitching staff was young and unproven, and the offense was full of question marks.  It seems like years ago that Ryan Braun started the first game of the season at first base.  In the six-plus months since, Yelich became the likely MVP, Josh Hader became a dominant relief ace, and Braun rediscovered his old form.

Sports are weird.  The connections they inspire are somewhat arbitrary, as fans attach themselves to athletes who play for a team that happens to be in the same city they live in.  One of the main storylines on the national broadcast was the Brewers’ connection to Southern California and how Yelich and Braun grew up as Dodgers fans.  The fact that they were trying to beat their childhood team, and disappoint the thousands of fans in the stadium with whom they had a lot in common, is slightly odd.  It is, of course, a coincidence of fandom and how people interact with their local institutions.

Keeping these connections in context is important.  Friendly rivalries are fun and good, and Brewers fans will always have a healthy dislike for the Cubs and Cardinals, and the members of those fanbases as well.  But fans of the Brewers have more in common with fans of the Cubs than they do with the actual players on the Brewers, who, generally, will not maintain a connection with the city of Milwaukee once their time with the club ends.  Fans, though, will continue to root for the next generations of Brewers.  Cubs fans will act the same way.

Sports teams are valuable civic institutions that provide a unifying point for otherwise-disparate communities.  As Nicholas Zettel wrote earlier this season, “Milwaukee is a deeply segregated city.”  People in different parts of the city do not have the same lives, but shared sports memories bind people together.  The Brewers are a communal experience that anyone in the city can be a part of, and that is important.  Civic pride is a valuable resource that sports teams can help build.

What we should not lose sight of, however, are the limits of what sports can provide.  Sports are an escape for some people—an opportunity to immerse oneself in an important but ultimately consequence-free athletic competition.  For other people, though, sports are anything but an escape; instead, they are a manifestation or reminder of how they are viewed.  A city suffering from significant income inequality may spend hundreds of millions of unplanned dollars on a baseball stadium rather than allocating it to organizations designed to help people improve their lives.  One of baseball’s oldest and most revered stadiums may be built on top of houses that were vacated only when city authorities forcibly dragged people from their homes.

This site has not shied away from addressing these concerns.  On its very first day, Jack Moore explained how Miller Park continues to cost taxpayers millions of dollars.  Earlier this season, Nicholas Zettel wrote the aforementioned analysis of Milwaukee’s housing segregation.  Last offseason, I discussed the impact of professional athletes’ public statements.  There are also many other examples of us covering off-field issues, and I point this out not to be self-congratulatory but instead to reinforce the importance of proper context.

Sports are supposed to be entertainment.  We invest ourselves in people who wear our city’s name on their shirt, and in some circumstances, our happiness depends on how they perform on the field.  That is good and normal, as we should build connections with those things that matter to us.  For example, Brewers fans should care about how the Brewers do, and hating the Cubs is perfectly normal given the animus between the two teams and cities; these connections help us enjoy the game even more.  Rivalries help bring additional meaning to certain games throughout the year, which certainly enhances the season’s entertainment value and piques fan interest at otherwise dull parts of the year.

This season was fun.  It should not be less fun just because the Brewers did not win the World Series, nor if this is ultimately the closest this iteration of the franchise comes to a championship.  There are a lot of great memories from this year, and there is likely to be another one when Yelich wins the MVP award.  After July 12, the Brewers did not have sole possession of first place in the NL Central until after Game 163.  They were 2.5 games behind the Cubs with a week to go, and they overcame that deficit to win the division.  They won a winner-take-all game against the Cubs that determined home-field advantage throughout the National League playoffs.  Those games all happened, as did all the other moments throughout the summer that you enjoyed watching, whether it was Jesus Aguilar’s unlikely All Star Game selection, Freddy Peralta’s wonderful debut on Mother’s Day, the wild fifteenth inning walk-off against the Pirates that featured Jordan Lyles drawing a walk, or any other game that you may have positive memories with.  Those games are all a part of the experience of being a fan.

Sports are a focal point for communities, and they link generations.  They are a place for kids to learn, grow, and develop into adults, and those same people then pass that experience on to their children or friends.  People may watch games with their family, friends, neighbors, or by themselves.  Everyone’s relationship with their team is different, but each individual story contributes to the team’s importance to its community.  Those communities, though, go beyond sports.  The choices people make about their teams’ relationship with the community impacts more than just on-field performance; and while we remember this most vividly when issues such as public funding are making headlines, it is always true.

Sports inform our relationships with our cities and neighbors, and they create bonds between people who may not otherwise have any or reinforce them between people who are already close.  They provide people with an emotional outlet that comes with no lasting consequences.  But they are also just a portion of the way we experience the world.  As long as we remember their role in our lives, they are a great escape and place to invest ourselves.  They are fun, and we should remember that.

The Brewers need starting pitching help. The Brewers need an ace.

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┻┳| •.•) #Brewers didn’t need a SP
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— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) July 31, 2018

Of course this would be the return line for the 2018-2019 offseason, because the line never went away during the season. A large faction of fans were dissatisfied with the starting pitching in April; they were satisfied with the starting pitching in May, “but can this staff beat ‘a dude’ in the playoffs?” (Yes!, it turns out); they were particularly dissatisfied with the starting pitching when the season ended in June and July, and again they were dissatisfied with the starting pitching at the trade deadline. This debate was simply never going to be won, because there is a contingent of baseball fans that refuse to either understand or accept what GM Stearns, pitching coach Derek Johnson, systemwide player development, and the front office are trying to accomplish. For arguably the first time in Brewers franchise history, certainly for the first time in a generation, the Milwaukee system strength is pitching, and not of the sort of high octane, all-risk dreamy profiles that flamed out at the turn of the 21st Century; this is a system that is built on turning a fabulous diversity of pitching profiles into potentially successful MLB profiles (witness the scouting range between Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes, for example).

When the dust settled, the system worked. The Brewers rotation was good. It was good any particular way you measured it; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on overall Games Started and workload measurements; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on true rotational scarcity (i.e., comparing each spot across the MLB); and it was a good rotation if you separate pitching classes into “true starters” and “replacements,” and measure each set of pitchers against different “spots” or “workloads.” The pitching staff was good if you believe in “Aces,” and it was good if you don’t believe Aces exist.

The Brewers rotation was good by every measurement except DRA, which should be the significant focal point of 2018-2019 offseason analysis in an effort to understand how Milwaukee assembled an elite fielding component in order to prevent runs.

If you do not wish to read the details, the table above summarizes the comparative results from each model. Each Brewers starter was assessed according to their relevant spot, and then compared by Innings Pitched (IP), Deserved Run Average (DRA), and Runs Prevented.

Rotation One: By Games Started
One way to assess a starting rotation is by ranking pitchers according to games started on a leaguewide basis. This ranking method is effective because it approximates the scarcity of both MLB resources (there’s not a whole lot of pitchers that can work full seasons) and roster construction. One benefit of focusing on games started instead of another performance metric is that analysts can reflect the success or failure of an MLB club across games started totals; for example, it matters that Gerrit Cole and Lucas Giolito both started 32 games despite widely divergent performances. The distance between Cole and Giolito is approximately 65 runs prevented, even though they worked the same number of starts, which raises an important question about how different teams assess the importance of effective starters versus soaking up innings. In fact, had Brent Suter and Zach Davies not faced injuries in 2018, they may have forced this question with the Brewers front office, and Freddy Peralta also arguably faced this (along with innings workload concerns) down the stretch run.

According to this measurement, there are approximately 10 rotation spots discernible by workload throughout the 2018 MLB, as well as emergency starters (who started one game; I will always assess emergency starters as their own category). On the surface, this is a pleasing model; the top starters by workload typically are the best starters in the game, even if there are differences between guys like Cole and Giolito, as discussed above.

On this model, it is clear that the Brewers succeeded because of their depth. A critique about the top of the rotation could be true in terms of DRA, as the contextual performances of Jhoulys Chacin and Chase Anderson were not comparable to top workload pitchers across the MLB. The importance of the depth should not be understated, from Wade Miley and Peralta to Brandon Woodruff and even Gio Gonzalez. If you’re reconsidering Gonzalez’s trade cost, not only should the veteran lefty’s surface performance be assessed, but one should not that, marginally, he was worth seven runs better than his median workload.

Another benefit of using this model is that analysts can assess “phantom” runs prevented where teams “miss” particular spots. For example, Chacin may not measure up to the median Top Spot prototype, but having his performance was better than not having a heavy workload pitcher whatsoever (in theory; Giolito’s performance would obviously have not validated a heavy workload benefit for the Brewers). If a team was missing a Top Spot, they theoretically would be punished 16-to-17 Runs Prevented. Milwaukee did not use a Five, Seven, Eight, or Ten workload, each of which approximately ranged from 2 to 4 runs below average; one could argue in this way that the Brewers also received 10 “phantom” Runs Prevented by avoiding these typical workloads.

This should help to validate the ideal that there are a couple of different ways to construct a rotation. A team could indeed bank on a Jacob deGrom type atop the rotation, and seek a 30 run advantage from their top workload. One must be careful of the cost for this type of pitcher, however, as if considerable resources are spent at the top of the rotation, they may be diminished at the bottom of the rotation. The Brewers demonstrated the “bottom-up” approach: they lost out on the Yu Darvish sweepstakes, and Alex Cobb did not bite on a one-year deal, so they proceeded with Chacin and Miley, plus their developmental pipeline. That internal pipeline was worth approximately five runs (better than their median workload) to the 2018 Brewers, while external candidates were worth more than 15 runs (better than their median workload). It was not flashy, there were no “dudes” on the marquee, but it worked.

Rotation Two: By Team

Of course, even the preceding model is relatively clean or “idealistic,” for MLB teams do not necessarily construct their rotations according to the same ideal. An additional method for assessing rotations is to judge each team’s rotation spot by turn; since two pitchers literally cannot start the same game, this method goes spot-by-spot, start-by-start for each MLB team. The benefit of this method of rotational assessment is that it reflects team preference, or injury and ineffectiveness circumstances, across the league. Some teams attempt to duct tape 13- or 14-pitcher rotations together, whether they are contending or tanking, while others attempt to yield more mileage from each spot. By giving each team one exclusive spot for each turn (until their pitchers run out), this type of rotational model can allow teams to be analyzed against attrition across the league.

Every team in the MLB required at least six rotational turns throughout the season, but this model demonstrates the divergence of team strategies one they hit six starters. Some teams preferred to give replacement starters two or three starts each, while others leaned on emergency starters.

The Brewers front office, coaching staff, and pitchers did a fantastic job weathering 162. They hit the right buttons in replacing some starters at certain points in time (such as resting Peralta down the stretch, or [arguably] “shuttling Woodruff between Triple-A and MLB), while giving starters room to breathe at others point in the season (this also applies to Peralta, who was given some time to adjust from rough starts, as well as Junior Guerra). By spitting on rotation spots 10 through 14, the Brewers also arguably saved 16 “phantom” runs, as the club would not have found effective pitchers (on average) digging that deep into league or organizational resources. (This line could be argued with further research, however, as one could note that someone like Corbin Burnes could have been effective in two starts, for example).

Rotation Three: By Type
During my time writing at Sportsbubbler (RIP) and Disciples of Uecker, I published annual starting pitching rotation rankings based on the decision point of 100 IP. If a pitcher worked 100 or more innings with 50 percent of their games as starts, they were a starting pitcher; if not, they were replacement depth. On this model, I attempted to assess pitchers according to Runs Prevented, with the ideal that (a) working a lot of innings should be worth more as a starter, and (b) rotation spots could be designated based on the resulting Runs Prevented rankings. I’m no longer certain of this method’s veracity, as I believe there are better ways to assess rotational scarcity and usage across the MLB. But, here we are, testing the Brewers 2018 rotation, so let’s assemble the pitchers.

Wouldn’t you know it, the 2018 MLB did not have many “true” rotation spots: there were only 129 pitchers across 30 teams that fit the first criterion listed above. This is not enough pitchers to fill a true five man rotation, and it’s hardly enough to fill a four man turn.

Yet, those Runs Prevented totals present some order to the universe. There are aces, even if there’s only a couple of them. There are nice middle of the rotation “dudes” that you can really sink your teeth into; 150 IP and 2 Runs Prevented feels like a solid effort for a team. Every contender would accept that workload (every MLB team would, for that matter).

Where there are not full-time starters, replacements are necessary, and MLB really dug deep in 2018: there were 227 replacement starters, including 57 Emergency Starters, across 30 MLB teams in 2018. Basically, on average, MLB teams were using more replacements than they were using regular starters. The Brewers are no different here, and in fact, that’s partially how they gained their value. Viewing the range of Runs Prevented across each of these roles should demonstrate the importance of having a solid organizational pitching strategy; replacement starters need not simply be the pitching equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall. Tampa Bay demonstrated this with their genius “Opener” strategy, and they produced one of the elite Runs Prevented units in baseball. The Brewers accomplished their success by using long-term replacements like Miley and Peralta, but they also received value elsewhere across their high-floor organizational depth.

If you previously thought the idea of “Phantom Runs Prevented” by not using a rotation spot was a suspect idea, this seems to be your chance to pounce on the Brewers for not using an “Ace” or true “Number One” starter. By this model, the Brewers were gutsy, punting nearly 63 runs prevented at the front end of the rotation. Yet, the club also did not use a true “Number Four” or full-time starter that should have been replaced, which bought the club another 43 runs prevented. All told, the Brewers rotation of regular starters lost the club approximately 19 runs here, thanks to their cavalier strategy.

Of course, the Brewers used every Replacement typology except a “true swingman,” and this is where the club torched the league. Gio Gonzalez and Wade Miley covered the lack of an “Ace” or “Number One” starter, and demonstrated the value in not having a Regular Four, either. Peralta, Dan Jennings (yes, Dan Jennings), and Woodruff gained significant Runs Prevented advantages in the replacement ranks as well. On top of these depth successes, the rotation was not bad overall; Suter and Guerra were close to true Number Three starters, and Anderson was close to a true Number Two starter. Chacin was better than a typical Number Two starter, boasting a Runs Prevented performance that almost placed him in a phantom “Number One” role for the club.

What is startling on this model is that the Brewers typologies also worked according to DRA. Once an analyst accepts that the club did not have a True Ace or True Number One starter, the threshold for assessing DRA is lowered significantly. Witness Chacin, for example, who was assessed against DRA that were significantly better than 4.00 on the first two models; his DRA performance looks much better on the final model, because once you stop comparing him to Aces, the comparison becomes more realistic. The Brewers deep organization also performs very well against median DRA requirements on this model, which raises a question about which model’s expectations one should use going forward.

The last remaining criticism for fans and analysts rests on how one interprets Deserved Run Average results for the Brewers rotation. On any model one chooses, be it based on Games Started, Team Rotational Turns and Scarcity, or Actual Runs Prevented performance, the Brewers’ rotation was good in 2018. Now it is worth digging through these models during the offseason, in order to gain important lessons for Corbin Burnes, Woodruff, and Peralta during their potential first full workloads in 2019, and even for reworking Jimmy Nelson. Milwaukee has proven the success that can come with aggressive rotational swings and an organizational pitching strategy, coupled with elite, efficient fielding.

An underrated 2018-2019 offseason would find David Stearns making moves to further improve the fielding (such as improving Right Field, and then working Christian Yelich primarily as a Left Fielder), which should in turn help boost the pitching depth strategy going forward. As it stands, the Brewers do not even need an external pitching move; this makes potential offseason moves even more interesting for speculation.

While the series is over and done with and the team should be looking forward and planning for next season, there was one decision I wanted to revisit from Game Seven. Before the game, the pitcher usage had been fully mapped out, with contingencies built in based on what actually occurred once the game started. Thus, lifting Jhoulys Chacin for a pinch hitter in the bottom of the 2^nd inning with two outs and runners on second and third was not a surprise, nor is it a decision I feel qualified questioning. However, I think using Jonathan Schoop as the pinch hitter in that specific spot was a legitimate tactical error which contributed to the Game Seven loss.

Leverage Index is a stat which quantifies the importance of a situation in a game, where the average is 1.0 and the higher the number, the higher leverage the situation. That plate appearance had a leverage score of 1.86, making it the highest leverage plate appearance in the game for Milwaukee, yet Jonathan Schoop was the batter at the plate.

Up to that point, Schoop was 0-for-7 in the playoffs, including two pinch hitting appearances. Schoop’s performance since coming to Milwaukee had no hidden indicators that he was good selection for this spot. Other than running into a few balls, Schoop hadn’t hit in three months and spent October swinging at everything. Using Schoop didn’t even get Milwaukee the platoon advantage, so there was no old-school baseball rationale either.

Walker Buehler attacked Schoop with sinkers. He threw only nine sinkers in the game, and four were in this at-bat. Schoop only swung at two of the pitches, both of which were arguably balls, but he still grounded out the end the threat.

Domingo Santana would have been a better choice for the situation. Since his recall on September 1, Santana slashed .409 batting average /.458 on-base percentage /.909 slugging percentage in pinch hitting appearances during the regular season, and added another two hits and two walks in ten playoff pinch hit opportunities. Pinch hitting is an acquired skill and Santana had at least shown some knack for it in the past six weeks. He did get a pinch-hitting appearance with one out in the fifth inning, but the leverage index on that at bat was .97, almost exactly half of Schoop’s plate appearance.

With the aggressive use of the pitching staff, it’s slightly baffling as to why they held back their best pinch hitter and Curtis Granderson in favor of Schoop. None of them played in the field, so no defensive considerations seemed to play into the decisions, so it should have purely been the best hitter in that spot. You cannot save a better hitter for a higher leverage situation which may never come, and it didn’t in Game 7.

Jeremy Jeffress had a poor postseason, as I’ve unfortunately noted in the past two weeks. He allowed runs in three of his eight appearances and only had one game where he didn’t allow at least two baserunners. On Saturday entered the game in the 6^th inning with a runner on first and wound up giving up a backbreaking home run to Yasiel Puig which shot the Dodgers’ win expectancy up to ninety-one percent. In Jeffress’ 1 and 1/3 innings, he threw twenty pitches, none of which were splitters. It was only his third game this season where he threw at least twenty pitches and no splitters. All of those outings have occurred since September 10^th.

Starting in September, Jeffress drastically reduced his splitter usage. For the season, batters hit .209 against the pitch with only a .045 isolated slugging percentage, making it one of his most effective pitches. The splitter also had a seventeen percent whiff rate, on par with Jeffress’s curveball. However, those whiffs almost completely disappeared in September and October, with only one swing and miss on eighteen total splitters.

While it probably doesn’t fully explain Jeffress’s struggles, his pitch mix lost its balance when he stopped throwing the splitter and he started struggling. If it was a matter of feel, he has the whole offseason to regain confidence in the pitch or develop another weapon to induce swings and misses, because his results took a step back in October.

Christian Yelich had a tough postseason, but his struggles shouldn’t be a cause for concern for Brewers fans. First, the approach pitchers took against Yelich is not sustainable for a full season, unless they’re prepared to walk him at a rate comparable to Barry Bonds. Here’s the zone profile for Yelich for all of 2018:

Here’s Yelich’s zone profile during the playoffs:

While there was some effort to stick with the general plan to pitch him low and away, there’s a lot of blue in the strike zone and a lot of red bordering it. Pitchers spent three weeks staying away from Yelich, which makes sense after his second half of the season. However, pitchers will have to throw him more strikes in 2019. Yelich also maintained his plate discipline during the barrage of balls. He cut down on his swings on non-fastballs and also swung and missed less on breaking and offspeed pitches, while staying around his seasonal fastball whiff rate. By focusing on pitches in the zone, Yelich will lure pitchers back into throwing more strikes and he should pick up at the start of next season where he left off on October 1^st.

Unfortunately, there’s no new series to preview this week for the Brewers. While the result fell short of what fans were hoping for, it’s important to remember the ride to Game Seven and not focus on the NLCS loss itself. This was a fun team to follow all season and is poised to repeat its performance next season while also changing expectations on what a pitching staff should be in terms of usage and the best fits of skills in each role. The organization works as one unit and made an experiment like Travis Shaw: Major League Baseball Second Basement evolve from a sarcastic joke to a legitimate option by the end of the season. Remember the fun in getting to this point and start getting excited about what team will be put together this offseason.

P.S. They’re still not trading for/signing an ace.

Of course, the rotation was not that unstable, as there were “sub-rotational cores” beneath those aforementioned four- , five- , and six-man turns, which basically means that manager Craig Counsell would frequently stick with three starters and then rotate out two other arms. Yet even here the manager would change the order of the three main starters as necessary. The 2018 Brewers rotation could afford such flexibility because the club aggressively used minor league assignments for pitchers with contractual option years; they signed guaranteed MLB contracts (like Chacin) and minor league deals (like Miley), spatially staggering their production across organization levels; they made additional acquisitions (Gio Gonzalez); and, perhaps most importantly, there really was no pitcher “set” in the rotation as a true, standalone ace (in the sense that most fans and analysts use the term “ace”; in fact, Wade Miley and Jhoulys Chacin each produced excellent seasons).

This is a pitching staff designed for attrition, and the club was forced to deal with contingencies throughout the entire season. One suspects that Jimmy Nelson was out longer than expected for the front office, even if they publicly noted that the righty would miss a “chunk” of 2018; Nelson missed the entire season. This opened up spots, at varying points, for Zach Davies and Brent Suter, who both suffered injuries throughout 2018. Wade Miley was also on-and-off the disabled list early on, which offered additional room for the Brewers to “prove” their organizational depth. And so they did: the pitching rotation was fantastic, all things considered, precisely because the organization did not keep ineffective pitchers on the mound for long, and they were able to shuffle competent depth up-and-down between Triple-A Colorado Springs and the big club.

Keep this in mind for the offseason: this is a pitching rotation that could look much more “traditional” in 2019 if Jimmy Nelson returns, Corbin Burnes and Brandon Woodruff are returned to formal roles, and Jhoulys Chacin, Chase Anderson, Zach Davies, and the gang are afforded roles in some capacity. Yet this is also a team, should Jordan Lyles and Jake Thompson stick around, that could produce the same revolving door results. It all depends on how the season goes, and the Brewers proved in 2018 (even where it may not have been their preferred plan) that a club can succeed simply by building a roster prepared to withstand the full extent of the season.

In March, responding to the (exhausting) constant calls for the Brewers to trade excess outfield depth for starting pitching, I presented the Brewers roster as a true-depth marvel ready for wear-and-tear. I found it important to demonstrate that, across the MLB, teams were not finding regular starters in the field, be it in the outfield or at specific infield positions. It may not be the case that MLB teams prefer to operate this way, but due to player development cycles, injuries, and other transactions, teams operate with revolving door player rosters much more than fan imaginations allow.

In 2018, attrition was the name of MLB once more.

Like 2017, only six outfields in the MLB featured three 100 game starters, including two repeat teams (but only five repeat players) from 2017. This demonstrates that even where teams had consistent, regular starting outfields last season, those outfields were not sustained into 2018. Regular starting groups come and go quickly in the MLB.

The 2018 Brewers are a fantastic example of why this type of roster shuffle occurs. At the beginning of the season, fans may have been most upset about the outfield depth because they would either have liked to pencil in Ryan Braun / Lorenzo Cain / Christian Yelich or Yelich / Cain / Domingo Santana, but not both. I suspect give Santana’s exceptional 2017 campaign and quick ascent into fan-favorite territory, fans would have preferred to see the Yelich / Cain / Santana outfield penned into the list above. Yet it simply was not meant to be; Santana could not cut it throughout the first two months of the season, and needed another stint at Triple-A to redevelop his bat; Ryan Braun was not a regular outfielder due to injuries and (thanks to Santana) early season stints at first base. But it all worked out: Keon Broxton provided phenomenal defense during call-up stints, Hernan Perez did what Hernan does, and even Eric Thames started 31 games in the outfield (!!!). Counsell did whatever was necessary to put the best team on the field, and once again, even if this was not the ideal team in the minds of the front office or field management staff, this squad was the ideal of weathering the storm.

The same story goes for the infield in 2018, where the Brewers were perhaps the most radical team in MLB, both with their Hernan Perez usage and their Travis Shaw / Jonathan Schoop experiment. But even here, the less-than-ideal scenario played out, as Orlando Arcia required additional minor league seasoning, and a group of second basemen could never really get it figured out for a sizable chunk of the season.

Keep these lessons in mind when you’re designing your ideal 2019 Brewers squad. Simply stated, the expectations that MLB teams would not find regular starters across the diamond held throughout the season, and the Brewers showed exactly how clubs can take advantage of that. Furthermore, it’s already possible to imagine how the club will elude 100-game starters at many positions, even without injury; for instance, second base could easily be a turnstile between Perez, (hopefully) Shaw, arbitration-eligible Jonathan Schoop, Mauricio Dubon, and Keston Hiura; if Mike Moustakas sticks around, Shaw will take time away from second base and first base “regulars”; and one might expect the Brewers to design more quality depth after some of their left-handed pitching match up weaknesses were regularly exposed.

A roster without regularity could present another fantastic endeavor for both David Stearns and Craig Counsell in 2019, because the next step in their puzzle requires them to develop their top prospects at the MLB level (if they are not traded) while defending a National League Central Championship bid. The club cannot punt the latter effort in order to accomplish the former, so the Brewers will need to be creative in shuffling their roster around to create time for prospects and contending players alike. In this regard, the lucky outcome of 2018 was that it was simply a practice run that went sideways and turned into a League Championship Series run. May 2019 be another practice run.

Alternately, things are not going to work out as you expect in 2019. But that’s not categorically a bad thing. Let’s use this offseason to think through roster building and understand how the Brewers can place their best foot forward using all 40-man roster spots.