The Brewers need starting pitching help. The Brewers need an ace.

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┻┳| •.•) #Brewers didn’t need a SP
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— BP Milwaukee (@BPMilwaukee) July 31, 2018

Of course this would be the return line for the 2018-2019 offseason, because the line never went away during the season. A large faction of fans were dissatisfied with the starting pitching in April; they were satisfied with the starting pitching in May, “but can this staff beat ‘a dude’ in the playoffs?” (Yes!, it turns out); they were particularly dissatisfied with the starting pitching when the season ended in June and July, and again they were dissatisfied with the starting pitching at the trade deadline. This debate was simply never going to be won, because there is a contingent of baseball fans that refuse to either understand or accept what GM Stearns, pitching coach Derek Johnson, systemwide player development, and the front office are trying to accomplish. For arguably the first time in Brewers franchise history, certainly for the first time in a generation, the Milwaukee system strength is pitching, and not of the sort of high octane, all-risk dreamy profiles that flamed out at the turn of the 21st Century; this is a system that is built on turning a fabulous diversity of pitching profiles into potentially successful MLB profiles (witness the scouting range between Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes, for example).

When the dust settled, the system worked. The Brewers rotation was good. It was good any particular way you measured it; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on overall Games Started and workload measurements; it was a good rotation if you divide rotation spots based on true rotational scarcity (i.e., comparing each spot across the MLB); and it was a good rotation if you separate pitching classes into “true starters” and “replacements,” and measure each set of pitchers against different “spots” or “workloads.” The pitching staff was good if you believe in “Aces,” and it was good if you don’t believe Aces exist.

The Brewers rotation was good by every measurement except DRA, which should be the significant focal point of 2018-2019 offseason analysis in an effort to understand how Milwaukee assembled an elite fielding component in order to prevent runs.

If you do not wish to read the details, the table above summarizes the comparative results from each model. Each Brewers starter was assessed according to their relevant spot, and then compared by Innings Pitched (IP), Deserved Run Average (DRA), and Runs Prevented.

Rotation One: By Games Started
One way to assess a starting rotation is by ranking pitchers according to games started on a leaguewide basis. This ranking method is effective because it approximates the scarcity of both MLB resources (there’s not a whole lot of pitchers that can work full seasons) and roster construction. One benefit of focusing on games started instead of another performance metric is that analysts can reflect the success or failure of an MLB club across games started totals; for example, it matters that Gerrit Cole and Lucas Giolito both started 32 games despite widely divergent performances. The distance between Cole and Giolito is approximately 65 runs prevented, even though they worked the same number of starts, which raises an important question about how different teams assess the importance of effective starters versus soaking up innings. In fact, had Brent Suter and Zach Davies not faced injuries in 2018, they may have forced this question with the Brewers front office, and Freddy Peralta also arguably faced this (along with innings workload concerns) down the stretch run.

According to this measurement, there are approximately 10 rotation spots discernible by workload throughout the 2018 MLB, as well as emergency starters (who started one game; I will always assess emergency starters as their own category). On the surface, this is a pleasing model; the top starters by workload typically are the best starters in the game, even if there are differences between guys like Cole and Giolito, as discussed above.

On this model, it is clear that the Brewers succeeded because of their depth. A critique about the top of the rotation could be true in terms of DRA, as the contextual performances of Jhoulys Chacin and Chase Anderson were not comparable to top workload pitchers across the MLB. The importance of the depth should not be understated, from Wade Miley and Peralta to Brandon Woodruff and even Gio Gonzalez. If you’re reconsidering Gonzalez’s trade cost, not only should the veteran lefty’s surface performance be assessed, but one should not that, marginally, he was worth seven runs better than his median workload.

Another benefit of using this model is that analysts can assess “phantom” runs prevented where teams “miss” particular spots. For example, Chacin may not measure up to the median Top Spot prototype, but having his performance was better than not having a heavy workload pitcher whatsoever (in theory; Giolito’s performance would obviously have not validated a heavy workload benefit for the Brewers). If a team was missing a Top Spot, they theoretically would be punished 16-to-17 Runs Prevented. Milwaukee did not use a Five, Seven, Eight, or Ten workload, each of which approximately ranged from 2 to 4 runs below average; one could argue in this way that the Brewers also received 10 “phantom” Runs Prevented by avoiding these typical workloads.

This should help to validate the ideal that there are a couple of different ways to construct a rotation. A team could indeed bank on a Jacob deGrom type atop the rotation, and seek a 30 run advantage from their top workload. One must be careful of the cost for this type of pitcher, however, as if considerable resources are spent at the top of the rotation, they may be diminished at the bottom of the rotation. The Brewers demonstrated the “bottom-up” approach: they lost out on the Yu Darvish sweepstakes, and Alex Cobb did not bite on a one-year deal, so they proceeded with Chacin and Miley, plus their developmental pipeline. That internal pipeline was worth approximately five runs (better than their median workload) to the 2018 Brewers, while external candidates were worth more than 15 runs (better than their median workload). It was not flashy, there were no “dudes” on the marquee, but it worked.

Rotation Two: By Team

Of course, even the preceding model is relatively clean or “idealistic,” for MLB teams do not necessarily construct their rotations according to the same ideal. An additional method for assessing rotations is to judge each team’s rotation spot by turn; since two pitchers literally cannot start the same game, this method goes spot-by-spot, start-by-start for each MLB team. The benefit of this method of rotational assessment is that it reflects team preference, or injury and ineffectiveness circumstances, across the league. Some teams attempt to duct tape 13- or 14-pitcher rotations together, whether they are contending or tanking, while others attempt to yield more mileage from each spot. By giving each team one exclusive spot for each turn (until their pitchers run out), this type of rotational model can allow teams to be analyzed against attrition across the league.

Every team in the MLB required at least six rotational turns throughout the season, but this model demonstrates the divergence of team strategies one they hit six starters. Some teams preferred to give replacement starters two or three starts each, while others leaned on emergency starters.

The Brewers front office, coaching staff, and pitchers did a fantastic job weathering 162. They hit the right buttons in replacing some starters at certain points in time (such as resting Peralta down the stretch, or [arguably] “shuttling Woodruff between Triple-A and MLB), while giving starters room to breathe at others point in the season (this also applies to Peralta, who was given some time to adjust from rough starts, as well as Junior Guerra). By spitting on rotation spots 10 through 14, the Brewers also arguably saved 16 “phantom” runs, as the club would not have found effective pitchers (on average) digging that deep into league or organizational resources. (This line could be argued with further research, however, as one could note that someone like Corbin Burnes could have been effective in two starts, for example).

Rotation Three: By Type
During my time writing at Sportsbubbler (RIP) and Disciples of Uecker, I published annual starting pitching rotation rankings based on the decision point of 100 IP. If a pitcher worked 100 or more innings with 50 percent of their games as starts, they were a starting pitcher; if not, they were replacement depth. On this model, I attempted to assess pitchers according to Runs Prevented, with the ideal that (a) working a lot of innings should be worth more as a starter, and (b) rotation spots could be designated based on the resulting Runs Prevented rankings. I’m no longer certain of this method’s veracity, as I believe there are better ways to assess rotational scarcity and usage across the MLB. But, here we are, testing the Brewers 2018 rotation, so let’s assemble the pitchers.

Wouldn’t you know it, the 2018 MLB did not have many “true” rotation spots: there were only 129 pitchers across 30 teams that fit the first criterion listed above. This is not enough pitchers to fill a true five man rotation, and it’s hardly enough to fill a four man turn.

Yet, those Runs Prevented totals present some order to the universe. There are aces, even if there’s only a couple of them. There are nice middle of the rotation “dudes” that you can really sink your teeth into; 150 IP and 2 Runs Prevented feels like a solid effort for a team. Every contender would accept that workload (every MLB team would, for that matter).

Where there are not full-time starters, replacements are necessary, and MLB really dug deep in 2018: there were 227 replacement starters, including 57 Emergency Starters, across 30 MLB teams in 2018. Basically, on average, MLB teams were using more replacements than they were using regular starters. The Brewers are no different here, and in fact, that’s partially how they gained their value. Viewing the range of Runs Prevented across each of these roles should demonstrate the importance of having a solid organizational pitching strategy; replacement starters need not simply be the pitching equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall. Tampa Bay demonstrated this with their genius “Opener” strategy, and they produced one of the elite Runs Prevented units in baseball. The Brewers accomplished their success by using long-term replacements like Miley and Peralta, but they also received value elsewhere across their high-floor organizational depth.

If you previously thought the idea of “Phantom Runs Prevented” by not using a rotation spot was a suspect idea, this seems to be your chance to pounce on the Brewers for not using an “Ace” or true “Number One” starter. By this model, the Brewers were gutsy, punting nearly 63 runs prevented at the front end of the rotation. Yet, the club also did not use a true “Number Four” or full-time starter that should have been replaced, which bought the club another 43 runs prevented. All told, the Brewers rotation of regular starters lost the club approximately 19 runs here, thanks to their cavalier strategy.

Of course, the Brewers used every Replacement typology except a “true swingman,” and this is where the club torched the league. Gio Gonzalez and Wade Miley covered the lack of an “Ace” or “Number One” starter, and demonstrated the value in not having a Regular Four, either. Peralta, Dan Jennings (yes, Dan Jennings), and Woodruff gained significant Runs Prevented advantages in the replacement ranks as well. On top of these depth successes, the rotation was not bad overall; Suter and Guerra were close to true Number Three starters, and Anderson was close to a true Number Two starter. Chacin was better than a typical Number Two starter, boasting a Runs Prevented performance that almost placed him in a phantom “Number One” role for the club.

What is startling on this model is that the Brewers typologies also worked according to DRA. Once an analyst accepts that the club did not have a True Ace or True Number One starter, the threshold for assessing DRA is lowered significantly. Witness Chacin, for example, who was assessed against DRA that were significantly better than 4.00 on the first two models; his DRA performance looks much better on the final model, because once you stop comparing him to Aces, the comparison becomes more realistic. The Brewers deep organization also performs very well against median DRA requirements on this model, which raises a question about which model’s expectations one should use going forward.

The last remaining criticism for fans and analysts rests on how one interprets Deserved Run Average results for the Brewers rotation. On any model one chooses, be it based on Games Started, Team Rotational Turns and Scarcity, or Actual Runs Prevented performance, the Brewers’ rotation was good in 2018. Now it is worth digging through these models during the offseason, in order to gain important lessons for Corbin Burnes, Woodruff, and Peralta during their potential first full workloads in 2019, and even for reworking Jimmy Nelson. Milwaukee has proven the success that can come with aggressive rotational swings and an organizational pitching strategy, coupled with elite, efficient fielding.

An underrated 2018-2019 offseason would find David Stearns making moves to further improve the fielding (such as improving Right Field, and then working Christian Yelich primarily as a Left Fielder), which should in turn help boost the pitching depth strategy going forward. As it stands, the Brewers do not even need an external pitching move; this makes potential offseason moves even more interesting for speculation.

Woodruff debuted in the big leagues last season and didn’t exactly light the world on fire, posting a 4.81 ERA and an ugly 123 DRA- across eight starts and 43.0 innings. He was ranked as Milwaukee’s #7 prospect to begin the year by Baseball Prospectus, and the knock against him was that “the stuff doesn’t jump off the page—or scouting sheet—and he may lack a consistent swing-and-miss offering in the majors…and the command profile is only average. Woodruff might be better served airing it out in short bursts.” Perhaps those evaluators were on to something.

Woodruff did begin the year in the starting rotation, but ended up as one of the club’s many rotating, optionable arms on the shuttle between Colorado Springs and Milwaukee. He finally started to come into his own during the final month of the season, when he was brought back to the big leagues and plugged into a multi-inning role within Milwaukee’s vaunted “run prevention system.” He ended the regular season with an improved 3.61 ERA while tossing 42.3 innings, though this time his work came across 19 appearances (four starts). He struck out 47 batters for the highest strike outs per nine innings (10.0 K/9) he has ever posted in the majors or minors. A sparkling Deserved Run Average valued his overall production as 30 percent better than that of a league-average pitcher. Woodruff has now made three postseason appearances, logging 10. and 1/3 innings with a 2.61 ERA and 15 strikeouts against two walks.

Perhaps predictably, it seems that a move to the bullpen has allowed Woodruff’s stuff to play up a few ticks. He saw a significant improvement on his fastball velocity, per Brooks Baseball, jumping from an already-hard 94.81 MPH in 2017 all the way to 95.96 MPH during the 2018 regular season and playoffs. He’s added about 40 RPM of spin to his four-seamer and another inch of armside movement, as well, and has joined the growing group of hurlers that focus predominantly on working the pitch up in the strike zone, generally keeping it inside on right-handers.

Woodruff’s fastball improved from -1.2 runs in 2017 (according to linear weights from Pitch Info) to +4.5 runs in 2018. Batters have hit only .207 against it this season, a vast improvement over the .302 average the posted in 2017. The righty boosted his whiff rate with the offering by a couple of points and uses the four-seamer as his go-to pitch with two strikes, especially to left-handers; 37 of Woodruff’s 60 punchouts between the regular season and playoffs have come on his fastball.

But it isn’t just Woodruff’s heater that has improved. He’s added a mile-per-hour to his slider and changed the shape of it, turning into more of a 3-t0-9 pitch (reading numbers on a clock) rather than the 2-to-8 movement he was getting on it in 2017. Batters are now whiffing at the pitch more than 14 percent of the time, where it was below 10 percent in 2017. The movement and velocity on Woodruff’s chanegup are similar to 2017, but the results are not; opposing hitters whiff on the pitch nearly 16 percent of the time and have batted .273 with a .000 SLG against it, whereas those numbers were 9.89 percent and .316 (.632 SLG) in 2017. After punching out a measly 6.7 batters per nine with an 8.4 percent swinging strike rate in his previous campaign, Woodruff is striking out batters like never before while generating swinging strikes at a robust 10.4 percent clip.

In addition to his pitches having a little bit more zest, Woodruff has also worked to address his other perceived shortcoming: he’s throwing more strikes. The righty’s walk rates have been similar across the last two seasons (2.93 BB/9 vs. 2.98 BB/9), but his zone rate has improved from 48.6 percent up to 51.1 percent. Called Strike Probability is a metric that attempts to quantify how skilled a player is at working in and around the strike zone; it is meant as a measure of control, and Woodruff’s Called Strike Probability jumped from 0.46 in 2017 all the way up to 0.50 in 2018. In terms of control, Woodruff ranked among the top 20 percent of MLB pitchers (minimum 42 innings, for a total of 382 pitchers).

The Milwaukee Brewers will undoubtedly continue to blur the lines between “starter” and “reliever” with their 27-outs approach going forward, and that could benefit Brandon Woodruff over the long term. Without the pressure of having to work deep into a ballgame, Woodruff has been able to “let it eat” over shorter, multi-inning stints, which has led to improved stuff and results across the board. It seemed at times like Woodruff’s future with Milwaukee was up in the air while he was yo-yo’d around during the regular season, but it now appears that he will be an integral part in the pitching plans for David Stearns and Craig Counsell in the years to come.

The story of the Brewers’ remarkable winning streak that has carried them into the playoffs and now a League Championship Series matchup with the Dodgers has been the dominance and run-prevention of the bullpen. With a matchup looming against a much stronger team offensively than the Rockies (the Dodgers finished the season fifth in MLB in runs scored per game and first in True Average), not to mention a longer series and therefore more outs to “get,” it’s fair to ask how sustainable the heavy bullpen usage looks to be for the rest of the postseason.

Usage
Inning limits seem to be an inexact science at best, given what we know publicly.  There may be a slight effect in terms of injury prevention when drastic inning increases are managed by teams. But beyond injuries, suffice it to say that given the toll pitching takes on the human body (with the caveat that every pitcher is different), generally pitchers approaching substantial workload increases are more likely to fatigue. This makes sense on an intuitive level.

Among likely Brewers to make the NLCS roster as non-starting “out getters,” most of the pitchers seem to be in relatively good shape with regard to their innings in the previous season and well within their career highs, with a maximum of 14 games left in the season. Knebel, Burnes, and Woodruff in particular are encouraging in terms of how many innings they may have left over last year’s totals. Freddy Peralta has already pitched over 20 innings more than his 2017 season and might be managed more carefully, especially if the Brewers see him as a starter moving forward.

The real danger zone may be with Jeremy Jeffress, who, despite sitting out a few games to manage minor injuries toward the end of the season, is 11 innings above what he pitched last year. That may not or may not be a factor moving forward, but it is [checks math] a higher workload. As such, there could be fewer opportunities for Jeffress to cover multiple innings. Combined with his recent minor injuries that made him unavailable in Game 163, and his performance so far in October, it’s worth keeping an eye on the next area of the pitching staff to consider for the aggressive bullpenning Brewers.

Fatigue
This is where there is a small area of concern for Jeffress’ availability moving forward to the degree he has been used so far this season.

Source: BrooksBaseball.net

The one-mile per hour difference on Jeffress’ four-seam fastball might not be anything, and in fact comes with a major caveat of a sample size of just 15 times that he’s thrown it in October. But coupled with the recent minor injuries and increased workload, it certainly stands out among the other Brewer relievers, who are mostly throwing harder in October than they have in the season overall.

As a unit it seems like the Brewer bullpen isn’t suffering from any fatigue just yet in October. Somewhat unbelievably, Josh Hader is actually up two ticks on his fastball, and the young and promising duo of Burnes and “secret weapon” Woodruff are also up pretty significantly. Basically, if Craig Counsell is looking just at in-game performance or the metrics that might imply fatigue among his relievers, there’s seemingly little to raise a red flag.

Schedule
This is where the bullpen strategy gets a little tricky. During a 7-game series, how will the Brewers manage their run-prevention strength with also needing to cover more innings overall?

Playing a strictly “bullpen game” as the Brewers did in Game 1 of the Division Series is still workable but may be a bit more difficult to pull off when there are just simply more outs to cover. For example, if after Jhoulys Chacin and Wade Miley pitch Games One and Two, and Counsell decides to bullpen Game Three, he could find himself without Woodruff and Burnes for games Four and Five, leaving a shorthanded staff presumably with Gio Gonzalez and/or Zach Davies toeing the rubber to start Game Four. Perhaps a Game One bullpen game is in the cards again, as it would allow the Brewers to put their best pitcher, Johnny Wholestaff, up against Clayton Kershaw, and then have Chacin go for Game Two. That would allow the bullpen to get some extra rest for the travel off-day to Los Angeles before Game Three.

My head hurts.

At any rate, there are more decisions to consider in a longer series that has 3 games in a row, and it will also likely limit the number of relievers the Brewers are willing to burn for multiple innings at a time.

The bullpen overall looks to be in good shape given their usage so far in the season and at least by velocity, there doesn’t seem to be much drop off in production, either. The Brewers will, however, need some kind of help from their bats or a third starter especially in the middle 3 games of the series in Los Angeles if they want to maximize meaningful innings for their best run-preventing weapon.

Josh Hader’s historic success and Jeremy Jeffress’ Comeback-Player-of-the-Year-worthy, All-Star season are certainly worthy of a lot of attention. Corey Knebel’s dominance after his “re-set” in Arizona have made the bullpen even more formidable in September. And David Stearns’ raid of the White Sox reliever pantry has added much needed depth and versatility to what was already a leading bullpen in all of baseball.

But overlooked in this dominance has been Brandon Woodruff. The young righty might just be ready for an October prime-time role in the bullpen, however the Brewers need to deploy him.

Woodruff has pitched just over 40 innings at the big-league level this year, and through September 25 sits in fourth place in Deserved Run Average for all Brewer pitchers who have thrown that many innings.  While good, that statistic actually underrates a bit how good Woodruff has been in the bullpen.

Woodruff made 4 starts this season, mostly in a swingman-type role that shuttled him between the bullpen and starting early in the year before going back down to Triple-A. In those four starts, Woodruff gave up 11 runs in 15.1 innings pitched for a 6.46 ERA. It’s not any surprise that he has done better in relief appearances, as you would expect most starters to be able to do, but the difference has been pretty striking. In his 24.7 relief innings, Woodruff has allowed just 6 runs, good for a 2.19 ERA.

That ERA would trail only Jeremy Jeffress on the team. That ERA is better than Hader, Knebel, or anyone.

It’s backed up by strong peripherals, too. In Woodruff’s relief appearances, he’s striking out better than a batter per inning, but his real strength lies in his ability to get ground balls. On the season, he has approximately 53 percent ground ball rate, which would place him in the top 10 percent of all pitchers in baseball. Those two outcomes might make him the Brewers’ best option with a runner on base in a high-leverage situation late in the game with the team’s better defensive unit behind him.

Much has also been made about the workload of Brewer pitchers, especially as it relates to Josh Hader’s ability to go multiple days in a row and monitoring his total inning count. Brandon Woodrfuff presents a nice relief option to fill in on those days, as he still hasn’t matched last season’s innings total of 120 innings. And he’s been particularly good in multiple-inning outings against Washington (4 IP, 5 K, 0 ER) and the Reds (3 IP, 2 K, 0 ER) since his September call-up.

Woodruff seems fresh, too. His average four-seam fastball velocity is at a season-high 96.8 mph this month, and he’s getting more whiffs on that pitch than at any other time this season in the bigs.

Perhaps more valuable to Craig Counsell is Woodruff’s splits between left and right-handers evening out. Our secret relief ace thus far in his career has had pretty terrible luck against left-handers, including a .377 batting average in balls in play against (.221 BABIP against righties), and a lower career fielding independent pitching against left-handed batters (3.77) than right-handers (4.31). This season however, tells a different story.

Woodruff has performed a little better overall against right-handed batters, which is to be expected, but the numbers are actually pretty close across the board and he’s struck out more left-handers in fewer plate appearances. Even chalking some of this up to a limited sample size this season, these splits are much closer to his career Fielding Independent Pitching stats than his Batting Average on Balls In Play-fueled results against left-handers.

In sum, the Brewers have a fresh reliever who shouldn’t have much of an innings cap, if any, throwing as hard and more effectively than he has at any time this year without an extreme platoon split. Considering Woodruff as a reliever only, he’s been one of the most productive members of a deep and effective bullpen.

Those traits could provide a lot of versatility, should the Brewers choose to employ it.

Woodruff could fill a 2-inning relief role when Hader isn’t available, since he’s not even at his 2017 innings count, and on account of his platoon-busting. For those reasons he might also make either an excellent “opener,” or a bridge from a third or fourth starter to go one time through the order and then to a rested bullpen. His worm-burning tendencies combined with a decent strikeout rate would also be a good option for mid-inning high-leverage situations with runners on base.

But based on how well Woodruff has pitched so far out of the bullpen right alongside the other relief aces for the Brewers this season it would be hard to argue against using him in almost any situation.

Like the July deadline, David Stearns is giving Brewers fans transactions that can be viewed from many standpoints:

• Stearns is improving both key roles and marginal roles through both deadlines.

• Stearns is arguably stockpiling as much talent as is physically possible (within the constraints of the 40-man roster).

• The GM is dealing prospects with lofty Overall Future Potential (OFP).

• The GM is dealing ultimate roles that may be blocked (Brett Phillips), uncertain (Jorge Lopez), or years away from fruition (this can apply to everyone from Jean Carmona to Orimoloye, Lara, Connell, Dominguez, and Harrison).

• Stearns is looking toward potentially longer outlooks by acquiring several players with 2019 options or roster reserve rights.

This is a lot to take in, and frankly it’s made it difficult to write about the trade deadlines in one swift motion. For on the one hand, by estimating long term value of some of the roles traded away, it appears that Stearns truly did overpay in several deals in order to succeed within a short window. Yet, it’s not entirely clear that Stearns traded away anyone that was fitting into Milwaukee’s immediate window. It pains me to say this even with strong prospects like Brett Phillips, or serviceable roles like Jorge Lopez (one of my favorite pitchers in the system for a long time). As much as I love to use depreciated surplus value to assess trades, since it is a tool that attempts Benefit-Cost Analysis on players’ production and contract, Stearns is providing a clear template for critiquing moves outside of any WARP/$ framework.

Specifically, by moving clear MLB players from a small market club that ostensibly requires cost-controlled, easily reserved talent to win, Stearns’s deadline provides an excellent opportunity to survey the uneven landscape of player development. In this regard, it is worth noting that no trade can truly meet WARP/$ standards, because in the universe of player development a pitcher can add a new pitch or rework their mechanics, a batting can revise a timing mechanism or refine a swing, a player can fall under the influence of a new coach (for better or worse), or a player can simply experience a new environment in which opportunities shift. Information asymmetry is the landscape of player development, and thus MLB transactions, and in this regard no deal can ever reach equilibrium between parties, as both teams involved in a given trade will arguably be assessing players through different environments (this argument has hidden behind my work on depreciated surplus, but surfaced in a demonstration with the Brian McCann trade).

On Tuesday, another one of the prospects dealt away from Milwaukee acquired a true MLB floor as well, as the Baltimore Orioles selected the contract of RHP Luis Ortiz (traded away as the lead prospect in the Jonathan Schoop deal). Now, the “surefire” MLB players that one could have assessed from the July deadline deals are all in The Show (Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez are in Kansas City, and Ortiz is now in Baltimore). I will not be focusing extensively on Phillips’s case here, as he is doing pretty much what could have been expected on the day of the trade: starting in center field (21 of 26 games) and right field (4 of 26 games). Lopez and Ortiz, however, offer completely asymmetrical development from the Brewers’ system, and this is worth investigating because the Brewers have what is justifiably regarded as a strong pitching program, due to their track record in 2017 and 2018 (yes, in 2018!), oft-praised coach (Derek Johnson), and their unorthodox pitching acquisitions that appear to follow very specific profiles (this applies to everyone from Oliver Drake to Chase Anderson and Zach Davies, among others). Answering questions about Lopez and Ortiz may help to address other bizarre roles in the 2018 pitching system, most notably involving Brandon Woodruff, Adrian Houser, and even (arguably) Corbin Burnes.

First, let’s establish two role discrepancies that may be the result of different organizational interpretations of information:

• Jorge Lopez has already started four games for the Kansas City Royals, boasting an 18 strike out / eight walk / two homer / 37 percent ground ball profile (4.86 Deserved Run Average). He has alternated good and bad starts thus far. However, the Brewers failed to use Lopez as a starter in 2018, instead employing Lopez as a successful member of the Triple-A shuttle team between Milwaukee and Colorado Springs; this mirrors Lopez’s 2018 minor league role (reliever) and follows his organizational shift to relief role in 2017. Despite what may be viewed as a spotty command profile and a lack of a deep pitching arsenal, the Royals promptly started Lopez and have him shifting sinker / riding fastball and slider offerings to “re-balance” his approach.

• Luis Ortiz battled some injuries and stamina concerns during his time in the Milwaukee organization, which spanned 44 games at Double-A Biloxi across parts of three seasons. Ortiz was mostly a starter in the Milwaukee organization, building his innings pitched total to career highs in three consecutive seasons; the righty is now at 99.7 innings and counting upon entering the MLB. Upon acquiring Ortiz, Baltimore assigned him directly to their Triple-A Norfolk club, and now are selecting his contract for a September showing. One might surmise this is to help boost his innings pitched total closer to 120.0 IP by season end, setting the youngster for a perfectly respectable workload floor for 2019.

Since I do not have additional, unpublished scouting information on Ortiz from his short time in the Baltimore organization (and there do not appear to be any updates from Norfolk), I am going to simply note that according to his minor league game data, there is no discernible statistic that demonstrates why the Orioles might recall the prospect. Alternately, there is equally no discernible argument as to why the Brewers did not view Ortiz as an immediate depth option to potentially bolster a contending pitching staff (and their aggressive handling of Freddy Peralta supports that question).

On Ortiz, the following table is from Baseball Reference CSV:

I would like to reject the “Orioles have nothing to lose” argument for recalling Ortiz, and I’d apply that same reasoning to the Royals, as well. For example, the Brewers apparently have everything to lose in 2018, and they entered the season with Jhoulys Chacin, Yovani Gallardo, and Wade Miley as their major pitching acquisitions for a year in which they probably suspected Jimmy Nelson would miss substantial time. The point being, “having something to lose” has not kept the Brewers from making unorthodox development moves and acquisitions, and that applies equally to starting Freddy Peralta ahead of top pitching prospect (and much clearer starting role) Corbin Burnes as it does to Chacin, Gallardo, and Miley. For goodness sake, the club just recently acquired veteran southpaw Gio Gonzalez, a starting pitcher by trade, and then mentioned that they might not use him as a starter. So, it is clear that “having something to lose” is no motivator for the Brewers to make “expected” or orthodox pitching moves; relative position in the standings should not explain these player development moves.

The flipside of this argument, I will add, is that this should not be taken as a “Derek Johnson is magic” argument, either. I do not believe that Brewers fans and analysts should fall back on that argument, because it basically substitutes a new type of devotional thinking about pitching development for previous orthodox thinking about pitching roles, and solely using a coach’s successful cases for transactional justification is a bad thing. Those of us relying on public knowledge will not understand or know any of Johnson’s potential “failures” in terms of mechanical or arsenal adjustments among Brewers pitching. Furthermore, this type of magical line of argument about Johnson’s skills could thus theoretically justify any pitching acquisition, which should be viewed as ridiculous on the face of it. For example, none of us should be rummaging the lowest DRA of 2018 simply to argue “x, y, and z should be Brewers targets because of Wade Miley and Derek Johnson,” and that’s not meant as a knock on either Johnson or Miley.

Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, has provided new data as a member of the Royals, and the righty is demonstrating a complete shift in his arsenal. Brewers fans will recall that Lopez used his big, tall frame to generate a fairly traditional rising fastball, curveball, change up arsenal. During Lopez’s time in Milwaukee in 2018, the Brooks Baseball classification system captured a “sinker,” which might also be called a riding / running fastball (although the vertical movement readings on the pitch hint that it may actually be a sinker). Lopez also introduced some variation of a slider:

Thus far in Kansas City, Lopez has reoriented this arsenal by reducing his “primary fastball” in favor of his sinker and slider. Along with these noticeable moves, Lopez is also ticking up his change and curve slightly.

Lopez has had two rough starts, but his most recent start against the Orioles was the best of his young career. In this start, perhaps Lopez cashed out the most extreme version of his arsenal adjustment, working sinker or slider for nearly 55 percent of his deliveries. Yet that curve still figures prominently at 21 percent of his overall selections, meaning that Lopez could also be called a sinker-curve guy.

This new arsenal is a fantastic look for Lopez, and it raises a difficult question that is worth asking, but must be asked in the proper critical mindset and organizational vantage point: when is a pitcher simply a new pitch, or a re-balancing of their arsenal, away from success? When is a pitcher simply in need of an opportunity? I hinted at this question following the July trade deadline, as the Brewers traded a pitcher who might be dismissed as “merely serviceable” at a time of increased need for quality depth due to injuries and ineffectiveness. Yet the Brewers did not give Lopez a start, nor did they keep him as a fixture in the bullpen, perhaps as a multi-inning guy. I don’t mean this as a criticism of the Brewers, however, because one could have reasonably asserted at the time that previously lofty goals of Lopez’s rotational Overall Future Potential were a thing of the past; here we are, though, with the tide potentially shifting within the Royals rotation.

The least satisfactory answer is that the Brewers simply missed on Ortiz and Lopez. Perhaps they were so cautious with Ortiz as to miss the potential upside (or even the current MLB floor!) in his profile. One could have said on deadline day that Luis Ortiz was maybe two or three years away from being a true impact, Number Two starter (if he were to reach his ceiling); perhaps that logic misses the value of how good a low rotation floor can be on many days in the MLB (cf. the 2018 Brewers, from Wade Miley to Freddy Peralta and, yes, even Junior Guerra most days). A more realistic answer, and perhaps the Lopez development supports this, is that maybe Milwaukee simply was not the place for these developments; even the acquisition of Jake Thompson and Jordan Lyles suggests that Stearns may have already found other development projects that better fit the organizational plan.

It is interesting to work with these unsatisfactory, vague conclusions while designing a framework for assessing Brandon Woodruff’s future with the organization, or even the potential future role for someone like Wade Miley:

• Is Miley a Brewers pitcher now, worth a contract extension and a trip back to the well, a celebration of a job well done and certainly a job worth tens of millions of dollars?

• Is Woodruff, about as bread-and-butter middle rotation starter / potential impact relief profile as one could ask for, a pitcher with a steady rotation or bullpen future in Milwaukee?

• With the continued development of Adrian Houser as a starting pitcher in the minor leagues, is Houser already poised to become the MLB starting role recovery for the Brewers that Jorge Lopez was not?

The trouble with these questions is that they could be answered in different ways for different organizations, but the benefit is that the Brewers currently reserve an crucial opportunity to learn from their recent transactions and maximize their development approach with each of these pitchers.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

New Runs Prevented Workbook || Runs Prevented Primer

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This is not even some “to-be-expected” regression, as even if one wishes to look at Deserved Runs Average (DRA) throughout the season as a “true” measure of the Brewers talent (which should be cautioned), the Brewers would have been expected to allow anywhere between 23 and 30 fewer second half runs than they actually have allowed.

This is unforeseen and catastrophic.

The blame can be spread around to everyone, from the post-forearm injury Junior Guerra (10 IP, 9 runs on July 24 & 29), injured reliever Matt Albers (1.7 IP, 10 R), former? closer Corey Knebel (9.3 IP, 8 R entering Sunday), and even rookie rotation depth Freddy Peralta (19 IP, 17 R since the break). Worse yet, there is a sense of adding insult to injury, as newly acquired Joakim Soria hit the disabled list promptly after surrendering a grand slam home run in a devastating loss to San Diego, and quietly effective Taylor Williams hit the disabled list with an elbow injury. While fans will feel less sympathy for Matt Albers, who had a couple of different bouts of ineffectiveness surrounded by separate disabled list stints, the veteran righty was crucial to early season success (25 IP, 4 R through the end of May) and each day his injury status and effectiveness is not answered is a day that manager Craig Counsell must carefully ration Jeremy Jeffress and Josh Hader with little back-up. The same goes for Williams, and now Soria; while Jacob Barnes was previously an impact reliever and boasts solid peripherals and a 2.99 Deserved Run Average (DRA), his runs prevention performance in 2018 has not been to the level of that injured trio, and now it’s Barnes, Corbin Burnes, and Jordan Lyles trying to nail down the quietly effective support roles.

It’s as simple as this: the Brewers’ bullpen has two truly fantastic options in Jeffress and Hader, and those options will be great regardless of their surrounding cast. For the purposes of contending, however, this duo is amplified when Stearns’s excellent depth picks (Albers, Williams, even Corbin Burnes), closer (Knebel), and additional acquisitions (Soria) are performing well. Jeffress and Hader cannot do it themselves.

Injuries have also trimmed the rotation, as Brent Suter’s torn elbow ligament and Zach Davies’s back ailments have limited the Brewers’ effective rotational depth. Using Baseball Reference Three Year Park factors, both Suter and Davies combined for 18 Runs Prevented over 273 innings in 2017, offering excellent middle and replacement rotation depth. That level of impact depth performance will not be matched by the duo in 2018. Additionally, even if one could have argued that the club might not have expected Jimmy Nelson to return from his shoulder injury in 2018, having that materialize as a likely injury-scenario reality in 2018 is quite another ballgame. Consider this as Freddy Peralta meets a likely innings limit, Chase Anderson continues an uneven season, and Brandon Woodruff finds himself without a rotational role: #TeamDepth is now basically #TeamNecessity in terms of rotation building.

There’s no need to state it any other way: as much as one would like to criticize the Brewers pitching staff, and GM David Stearns for his failure to build a staff, the club is now to the point where injuries are diminishing even his strongest moves. The Soria trade looms loudest here, as the Brewers grabbed a legitimate high leverage, veteran reliever at the trade deadline and did not get six innings from his right arm before he hit the DL with a groin injury; Albers and Williams could be fan whipping posts when they were ineffective, but the Albers free agency deal looked like a brilliant low-cost gamble early in the season while Williams seemed poised to catapult himself into the high leverage workload discussion (Williams worked a 17.3 IP, 5 R stretch, Holding three leads, from June until the All Star Break).

Citing injuries to the pitching staff is not an “excuse” for the poor performance.

It would have been enough to deal with this group of recent injuries and setbacks, but the Brewers also simultaneously were gifted with a set of role reversions on the pitching staff. Corey Knebel’s descent from excellent closer in 2017 cost the Brewers a chance at a truly elite relief corps; according to Baseball Reference Three Year Park Factors, Knebel prevented nearly 25 runs in 2017. Even a 50 percent regression from that performance level would fit nicely with Jeffress and Hader, who have both been consistent Top 25 pitchers in the 2018 MLB. Add in the aforementioned struggles of Peralta, Barnes, and a bit of stalled usage from the shuttled Houser (he’s only worked two MLB appearances from July onward), and Counsell’s strategic options are looking much more thin while they are also being exasperated by some ineffective starts.

Beyond these role question marks, it is worth questioning the timing of the inclusion of Jorge Lopez in the Mike Moustakas trade. Since Lopez has served the season as an up-and-down member of the Triple-A / MLB “shuttle team” relief squad, discussions of the quality of Lopez’s performance were largely nonexistent at the trade deadline (I’m also guilty of this charge). But, it is worth emphasizing that as a back-roster depth strategy, the “shuttle team” prevented runs at a solid clip, especially when one considers the nature of this replacement role and the likely quality of other replacement pitchers to be acquired in their place.

In fact, these shuttle relievers combined to produce near-average aggregate performance for the Brewers, which leads one to question why Stearns traded Lopez and simultaneously decided to keep Brandon Woodruff at the Triple-A level to serve as replacement starting pitching depth. With Lopez in the Royals system and Woodruff now serving as starting pitching depth, the revolving door relief strategy is effectively dead at what could be the worst time of the season. Given that Woodruff boats a 3.55 DRA at the MLB level to accompany a 52 percent ground ball rate, while also demonstrating an average DRA at Colorado Springs with a consistent ground ball rate there, it is worth questioning why Stearns has not simply replaced Peralta with Woodruff (on the one hand) or simply promoted Woodruff to a steady MLB relief role (on the other hand). According to Brooks Baseball, the relief role is agreeing with Woodruff, who is throwing a sizzling 95-to-96 MPH fastball with more armside run than his 2017 variation, complete with steady change up and slider usage (both with more whiffs than in 2017, too).

This is not a bottomless pit (yet). That the Brewers remain the 12th best pitching staff in the MLB, within one standard deviation of the 10th spot, and sixth best pitching staff in the National League, should demonstrate just how good the club has been for most of the year. Indeed, this pitching staff has fallen off, and it’s important to underscore that it’s not simply “regression,” but a bad combination of regression, injuries, and strategic missteps at the worst possible time. But there could be a quick way out of this issue for the club:

• Get Zach Davies healthy, without any further setbacks, and use him to replace Freddy Peralta in the rotation.

• Develop an MLB role for Brandon Woodruff; preferably this would be a rotational role to spell another ineffective starter down the stretch (or add a sixth man for September), but even a well-defined one-inning bullpen role could be extremely helpful at the moment.

• Re-evaluate depth roles for Ariel Hernandez, Jordan Lyles, Alec Asher, and Aaron Wilkerson, and make any necessary waiver trades to boost the pitching staff. E.g., is Jordan Lyles the right arm to work in the shadow of the successful Triple-A shuttle crew? Is now the best time to make a potential long-term development play for Ariel Hernandez?

• Reconsider Adrian Houser’s shuttle role in favor of a regular one-inning role.

With the assumption that some combination of Soria, Albers, and Williams can get healthy for the stretch run, and that some of the “role regression” pitchers can make adjustments at the MLB level once again, this is a pitching staff that can improve quickly and regain its flexible frontier of roles and runs prevention that were celebrated in April and May. With Zach Davies healthy, a waiver trade acquisition (or two), and potentially prominent roles for two righties that can rush it up there (Woodruff and Houser), this pitching staff can rebound. Now we wait and watch.

Prior to Woodruff’s most recent demotion yesterday, the righty’s minor league ERA is better but his peripherals are worse.  His 3.02 ERA in 50.7 innings in Colorado Springs looks good (and considering the altitude the Sky Sox play at, it is).  His strikeout rate in Triple-A is 7.5 per nine innings, though, which is much lower than the 9.5 per nine that he has posted in the big leagues.  His major league walk rate of 3.3 per nine innings is also better than his Triple-A rate of 3.7 per nine.

All of this is to say that Woodruff’s season has been a mixed bag.  He hasn’t had enough innings in the major leagues for us to understand how or even whether he will be successful.  30 innings this year (and 73 in his big league career) just isn’t a large enough sample size.

These innings do provide some data for a first step of analysis, though.  And because one of Woodruff’s problems is his walk rate, his release point is a clear place to start.  The chart below shows his release point for each of his months in the big leagues, and the lack of consistency is jarring.  Of course, some of the months represented are just a few innings (March 2018 is just two innings), but we would expect release point to be consistent from outing to outing because pitchers’ mechanics should not change this often.  Instead, what we see is that Woodruff has difficulty locating his preferred arm slot.

What exactly his preferred arm slot should be, though, is an open question.  How you measure a pitcher’s success is not as easy a question as it seems it should be, but Woodruff’s best months by strikeout-to-walk ratio are July 2018 (7.0) and March/April 2018 (5.0).  His worst months are August 2017 (1.5) and June 2018 (1.5).  Unfortunately, there is no pattern in his release points that indicates what leads to success.  His release points in August 2017 and July 2018 are pretty similar, but he was an entirely different pitcher.  Likewise, his high release point in June is similar to what he did in September of last season, but his results were different (a 3.33 strikeout-to-walk ratio).

If we measure pitcher success by ERA, we don’t get any more clarity.  Woodruff’s best months, August 2017 (1.62) and June 2018 (0.00), look nothing alike.  His worst months were May 2018 (8.10) and September 2017 (6.84); they too look nothing alike.

Derek Johnson has an excellent reputation.  He received praise for helping simplify Jimmy Nelson’s mechanics last year, and both Chase Anderson and Zach Davies had surprisingly good seasons in 2017.  If Woodruff becomes successful, it will surely be the result of more consistent mechanics, and those improvements are Johnson’s job.

I cannot say whether Woodruff will be successful, or which mechanical adjustments should be made.  However, it is hard to pitch well when the release point is all over the place the way Woodruff’s is.  Mechanics are supposed to be consistent.  They don’t have to be perfect; they just need to be repeatable so that a pitcher can place his pitches where he wants them to be.  Woodruff clearly struggles to repeat his delivery, and that is undoubtedly causing him problems.

The fact that there is no correlation between his release point and success (or lack thereof) is confusing to me.  Because of this, there is no clear path to follow, as he does not have a release point he can point to as the model for success.  However, this type of information is still useful; it tells us that the fix is not particularly simple.  Instead, Woodruff’s mechanical issues will likely be an ongoing problem that he will have to work on throughout his career.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Yet, there are many shortcomings with the 2018 Brewers, for all their strengths. The difficulty with quantifying the shortcomings for this team, however, is that they are not strategic shortcomings. In 2018, the shortcomings of the roster are shortcomings borne of development cycles and the long paths necessary to build extended MLB success from young players, or players seeking to establish their respective careers. The former category suits both Domingo Santana and Orlando Arcia, and to a lesser extent Jorge Lopez, Brandon Woodruff, and Zach Davies; the latter category suits players like Manny Pina, and to a lesser extent Brent Suter. These players challenge the long-term development goals of the Brewer given the extremely successful start to the 2018 season, but it is not an overstatement to write that each of these reserve-controlled contracts are significant assets to the Brewers organization and crucial for future success to the degree that they can build consistent MLB roles. This difficult development scenario is compounded when one realizes that pitching prospects Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes could also factor into second half plans for the Brewers, as well as depth position players like Jacob Nottingham and Brett Phillips.

Looking back on 2017, it’s easy to see that the Brewers could have solved their midseason shortcomings in a transactional manner. The club did not even need to make an impact starting pitching move, but could have used waiver claims or depth trades to bolster a rotation that was hit with midseason injuries and wearing thin (much more thin than the 2018 rotation, by the way). With the success of youngsters in 2017, their roster concerns were not development-oriented. Looking forward to the finish line in 2018, it is much more difficult to simply fix a transactional ideology to the Milwaukee roster issues. Simply stated, the Brewers need to prove their ability to help young players through adjustments at the MLB level, which is applicable to both Santana and Arcia. Both Arcia and Santana are crucial members of our beloved Milwaukee Nine despite their diverse scouting roles and tools. But this development decree also extends to the refinement of roles for Lopez and Woodruff in the pitching staff, as well as questions about clearing space for Peralta and Nottingham, let alone Burnes and Phillips. The Brewers can bolster their midseason 2018 club by doubling down on their player development approach at the MLB level, and giving players the space to make adjustments at the MLB level.

Related to this question about the Brewers’ ability to develop young players at the MLB level, it is worth asking whether a “rebuilding effort” was necessary to create this Brewers team. Or rather, are the Brewers succeeding “but for” their rebuilding efforts by previous President Doug Melvin and GM Stearns? Here’s a look at top Milwaukee players by WARP and acquisition:

What is fascinating about the 2018 Brewers is that despite the “branding” of the so-called rebuilding effort, a “rebuild” is hardly stamped on this team. 5.6 WARP of the team leaders could have been acquired by nearly any MLB team, through a purchase (i.e., a trade for cash) or MLB free agency. 0.7 WARP belongs to the MLB amateur draft, meaning that there is no high draft pick from a rebuilding season boosting this club (a la the “classic” scorched earth Cubs and Astros efforts); it’s even debatable whether one could call Corey Ray (picked Fifth overall) and Keston Hiura (picked Ninth overall) true “rebuilding” draft picks (in other words, a team does not “tank” to draft fifth overall). At best, one might argue that the Brewers’ 2016 record helped them gain favorable position to land Jesus Aguilar, allowing Milwaukee’s front office to build their #TeamDepth strengths.

The trades on this list are most interesting, though; the trades by both Melvin and Stearns form a spectrum ranging from “rebuilding” to “organizational depth” to “extended win-now,” and everything in-between.

• The move to acquire Josh Hader was most certainly a “rebuilding” move, by which I mean that Melvin traded away MLB contracts for minor league prospects.

• The move to acquire Christian Yelich was most certainly the opposite of a rebuilding move, as Stearns traded away four minor league prospects for an MLB contract, but it’s not quite a “win now” move as Yelich’s age and contract keep that window open for years. Yet in another sense this trade could certainly not have happened without rebuilding efforts, as acquisitions involving Lewis Brinson and Isan Diaz were necessary to eventually land Yelich.

• Meanwhile, the Tyler Thornburg – Travis Shaw transaction is arguably a textbook “counterbuilding” move in which Milwaukee and Boston swapped positions of MLB surplus (or, lack of need); it was not a classic rebuilding move, as Shaw was acquired to become the starting MLB 3B. That Boston somehow also included prospects in the deal is icing on the cake.

• Finally, the latest Jeremy Jeffress acquisition was a classic organizational depth trade.

Were these 10 players the ones you expected to lead the Brewers to contend for the 2018 NL Central crown? (I gather it’s an interesting mix of “Yes” and “No,” but I personally find this list endlessly fascinating. #YouCantPredictBaseball).

But are these WARP leaders truly the fruits of a rebuilding effort? One could argue that rebuilding should not have a transactional form, as I’m using the term, but instead should denote a phase in a club’s development cycle (a “spatial” form). In this regard, acquisitions like Eric Thames or Travis Shaw may not have technically been rebuilding moves, but they would have been less likely to occur by a true win-now club on a contending cycle since they required a certain “space to play” and “room to fail,” or room to find an MLB role. (This is the spatial role of rebuilding that many have argued is a valuable aspect of the MLB development cycle.) The same could be said about the MLB development of Jacob Barnes, or even, inexplicably, the development of Jesus Aguilar. Yet, in this regard, these spaces of rebuilding were rather shallow, as key development players like Pina, Santana, and even Chase Anderson and Jonathan Villar have struggled since their major breakthroughs. This is not a criticism of the players, for development cycles are long and each of these players could find success in their next turn. For example, Villar is already coming around for the 2018 Brewers, for instance, completely silencing the need for a 2B trade, while Chase Anderson is ironing out mechanical issues and potentially rebounding.

Following the spatial definition of rebuilding, then, one can completely reverse course and argue that the Brewers have mess less incentive to make large trades in 2018 than they did in 2017.

• The 2017 club ironically may have featured players have simultaneous peak years, or at least peak role surges: Jimmy Nelson (now injured), Chase Anderson (now mechanically repaired?), Orlando Arcia (needs to adjust), and Domingo Santana (needs to adjust) were worth 15.1 WARP in 2017, a production level that will almost certainly not return in 2018 (they are currently valued at -0.7 WARP [!!!]). The Brewers are never guaranteed to have that combination of elite defense, strong offensive production, and top rotation pitching again from this quartet, not in the same year. Even if each of these players settles into regular MLB roles, they may have reached peak production last year.

• (A counterargument could be made that given the Brewers’ production of Lorenzo Cain, Christian Yelich, Travis Shaw, Josh Hader, and Jeremy Jeffress, the 2018 window features at least five performances that may not occur again. I believe these roles are different than those of Nelson and Anderson, or even Arcia and Santana. Yelich, Cain, and even Jeffress have more established MLB success, and their time horizons with the club arguable improve the chances that this type of success could occur again. In fact, someone like Yelich could even improve. One could also argue that the Brewers should not waste this opportunity to win with an elite bullpen; I am much more sympathetic to that position.)

• So, it’s worth questioning whether more urgency for a roster-improving transaction was necessary in 2017 than 2018, when the club is already succeeding and can take a chance at continuing the development cycle with each of these players, or other organizational depth roles.

• Following the spatial definition of rebuilding, in which a rebuilding club is one that allows players the room to develop at the MLB level regardless of consequence, 2018 could serve as a strange competitive window season in which the club is justified in turning their gaze to the long-term: how important is it for the 2019, 2020, 2021 Brewers, etc., for Arcia and Santana to get right at the MLB level? Can they both be “rehabbed” at Triple-A Colorado Springs? Is it worth Milwaukee disrupting potential MLB rotational introductions to their trio of Woodruff, Peralta, and Burnes? If those pitchers have true MLB rotation roles, they are going to have to be introduced to the staff at some point during this current five-year contending window.

What is exciting about these Brewers, more than the winning, is that they remain an unexpected work in progress where suddenly every strength gained from 2015-2017, every lesson learned from 2015-2017, can be repurposed for the future. Contending teams need not stick to rigid transactional regimes; they can make trades to gamble on Travis Shaw, or free agency signings to gamble on Eric Thames, and still compete for the playoffs. Rebuilding teams need not bottom out, for there can be as much value in simply using roster space to gamble on Jonathan Villar, Junior Guerra, or Manny Pina, even compared to a top draft pick (for it is questionable whether an MLB team can truly forge useful developmental spaces while attempting to field a roster worthy of the first two or three draft picks).

Boiling this lesson down, it may seem like a radical departure from my previous criticisms, but the logic of the 2018 roster remains the same: open those developmental spaces for the organizational players struggling to correct their careers and build roles for 2019 and onward while this well-designed #TeamDepth contends onward. If they execute it correctly, these Brewers have an opportunity to exist entirely outside of win-now and rebuilding cycles.

Photo Credit: Bill Streicher, USA Today Sports Images

Ryan Braun went 6-12 over the weekend which includes a double, a triple and two home runs, and two hits in each game. It’s Braun first streak of three multi-hit games in a row since April 24-26.

It’s been a difficult season for Braun. He once again landed on the disabled list, but when he’s been active, he hasn’t been productive. Braun is on pace to post the lowest TAv (.258) of his career. Pitchers are now throwing him strikes on 50.8 percent of their pitches, the highest rate Braun has seen in MLB. He’s swinging less on pitches both in and out of the zone, but unfortunately the recipe of facing more strikes and swinging less is not helping Braun’s numbers. Braun’s contact rates are down from last year and his whiffing on almost a quarter of his swings.

When looking at Braun’s numbers this season compared with his career, there are a few noticeable differences. There’s been a slight shift in how pitchers approach Braun. While they’ve always preferred to keep the ball low, the numbers are more extreme this season. Pitchers are really trying to pound him on those low pitches away from him. That’s not an area where many batters are going to find success.

Braun has also expanded his zone in a productive manner. He’s always been disciplined on away pitches. There’s a lot of blue on the right side of that zone, as he’s always laid off those pitches. In 2018, Braun is chasing those pitches located outside. He’s not generating any productivity off those pitches though. Not only is there no power produced in those swings, he’s also not even slapping those pitches for singles. You can’t pin all of his problems only on these pitches, but these unproductive swings are dragging down his numbers.

Traditionally, Ryan Braun gets most of his power in the upper half of the zone located middle and inside, but he’s not turning on those pitches now. There are some singles in those zones, but more of his power is on pitches away in the zone, which may be evidence of a slower bat which can’t turn on the pitches he used to feast on.

In Philadelphia, there were some encouraging signs. On Friday and Saturday, all of Braun’s hits came on pitches in the middle of the zone, where he’s struggled more than usual this season. During Sunday’s game, his double came on a pitch in his traditional power zone and his single came on a 99 MPH fastball which was up and away. That’s an absurdly tough pitch to hit. While Braun didn’t tattoo it, he went up the middle against a shifted infield and got on base. There are no guarantees going forward, but if Braun can start to approach even his numbers from last year, the Brewers can start to sustain a more consistent offense that won’t go quiet for a week at a time.

Craig Counsell made an aggressive move during Sunday’s game when he lifted Brandon Woodruff for a pinch hitter in the fifth inning. At the time of the move, the Phillies were ahead 1-0 but the Brewers had the bases loaded with only one out. In 2018, a team can expect to score 1.5 runs in that situation. Woodruff had a .124 TAv for the season coming into the game and he’s only singled three times in his nineteen career plate appearances. The pinch hitter, Hernan Perez, struck out, but it’s not unreasonable to believe that he had a better chance of getting a hit than Woodruff.

Results aside, was pulling Woodruff the best tactical decision to maximize the Brewers’ chances of winning the game? Woodruff had already reached sixty seven pitches, but after a rough first inning in which he needed twenty-five pitches to complete the frame, he’d been cruising and it’s not unreasonable to think that he had enough pitches to get to the sixth inning. In the fourth inning, his fastball was still touching 96 mph, which was around his maximum reading for the day, so he didn’t show any overt signs of tiring. The bottom of the Phillies’ order was due up in the next inning as well, so Woodruff wasn’t about to face the third time through the order penalty.

Even if Counsell could have counted on at least one more inning from Woodruff, it’s important to consider the thought process at the time. While there’s no guarantee that Perez gets a hit as a pinch hitter, he’s also more likely to produce a hit that will score multiple runs. Considering that the top bullpen arms were fairly well rested after two easy games on Friday and Saturday, one of the best bullpens by DRA should have been up for the challenge and may have been, if Shaw didn’t commit a throwing error. While there’s no excuse for walking a batter when the bases are already loaded, Dan Jennings didn’t make mistakes with his location in the fifth inning; the Phillies just got enough of the pitches to scratch across some runs.

Milwaukee returns home this week for a series against the Cubs, then the return series with Philadelphia. The Cubs are currently a half game behind the Brewers for first place in the division, having gone 4-2 against the Phillies and Pirates last week. Chicago currently has the best run differential in the National League, bolstered by their 7-1 record and plus twenty run differential this season against the Brewers.

Photo Credit: Eric Hartline, USA Today Sports Images

Stepping into speculative histories of MLB players, I’ve been thinking about what I’d expect from players like Burnes or Peralta if they reached the MLB in 2018. Both pitchers provide extreme challenges to the observer, and for different reasons.

• Burnes provides a challenge because the righty’s quick ascent to the advanced minors has out-paced the non-proprietary information available about the pitcher, which manifested itself during the 2017 season in the form of widely varying fastball, slider, and delivery reports. From early in the season, when on-the-ground reports placed Burnes as a potentially high reliever-risk profile who could make it work as a middle rotation starter, to late in the season when delivery adjustments and improved fastball reports began leaking out, fans and analysts were essentially given several different pitchers’ worth of information. Entering 2018, then, it’s worth asking whether Burnes is the fastball / slider reliever with middle rotation question marks, the middle rotation arm who could decrease reliever risk by continuing to refine his delivery, or the surging pitching prospect who simply continues to redefine roles by refining mechanics and therefore allowing his stuff to take the next step. All of this can happen with Burnes, or none of it; thus the righty prospect is an acute example of information asymmetry.

• Peralta faces different questions about his stuff and profile, especially due to his diminished stature (compared to Burnes) and his pitching approach (he’s not quite a command-and-deception guy, but he twists and turns his fastballs in order to help his stuff “play up”). In one sense, Peralta is much more conventional than Burnes, insofar as Peralta will be lauded as “the small framed righty who proved everyone wrong” should his frame stick in a functional mid-rotation role. On the other hand, given the frame and lack of a strong fastball, it is worth questioning how Peralta’s arsenal and command will play as he advances in the system. The significance of the righty’s pitch sequencing and location will not be understated. It’s tough to say whether Peralta faces “reliever risk” in the same sense Burnes does, as Peralta’s top role is even murkier than his Advanced Minors teammate.

So, if Burnes and Peralta reach the MLB in 2018, what will their potential roles be? What performance levels might fans expect? With Counsell looking at both pitchers as potential midseason reinforcements for the staff, it is worth digging into potential production expectations.

Role risk will be nothing new to the 2018 Brewers; role risk is all over the roster, even beyond the rookie class. But, in attempting to form expectations about Burnes and Peralta, I turned to other rookie pitchers that are on the MLB roster or in Spring Training camp as non-roster invitees. By my count, these rookies comprise (in order of height) Peralta, Taylor Williams, Marcos Diplan, Jorge Lopez, Aaron Wilkerson, Erik Davis, Burnes, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Brandon Woodruff, Tyler Webb, and Jon Perrin.

• Several of these arms are already established as MLB relievers or very likely to have relief roles in 2018 (see Williams, Lopez, Davis, Houser, and Webb).

• A few of these arms are organizational depth with questionable futures in terms of organizational plans (see Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Davis, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Finally, there’s a deep group of potential rotation depth, in terms of starters who could work as rotational replacements or MLB emergency starters in 2018 (Peralta, Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Burnes, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Woodruff is likely the only pitcher here who is a rotational lock in 2018 (and even writing that leads me to raise some questions, as “There is no such thing as a pitching prospect,” there is no such thing as a surefire pitching role).

Available PECOTA projections (March 2, 2018) for 2018 Brewers rookies (Erik Davis and Jon Perrin projections unavailable). This table features IP projections, as well as Runs Allowed and Runs Prevented figures drawn from projected Deserved Runs Average. Runs Prevented figures are drawn from an average of the 2016-2017 Miller Park / National League. PECOTA strike outs, walks, and WARP are also featured.

With these dozen pitchers, I’ve already laid out extensive role risk simply by categorizing these arms. So, in order to form potential expectations for 2018, I turned to speculative history: namely, how many pitchers in the MLB expansion era matched these arms’ precise height, weight range, handedness, and age as rookies? That is to ask, if these pitchers reach the MLB as rookies in 2018 (e.g., their precise 2018 age), how does their physical profile fare (e.g., their handedness, height, and weight?).

To answer this question, and engage in this speculative exercise, I used the indispensable (and highly recommended) Baseball Reference Play Index to search comparable expansion era players. I searched the expansion era because it is a largely integrated era that also includes a relatively similar form of baseball over the decades in terms of pitching arsenals or prototypes (it tracks the diminishing knuckleball, rise of the splitter / forkball, rise of the fastball / slider profile, etc.). Additionally, as I attempted to search other time frames, I found the reasoning to be rather arbitrary (e.g., if I search the Wild Card Era, should I simply search the Contemporary PED era? If I only search the expanded Wild Card Era (2012-present) will I have a large enough group of players to analyze? And so on).

Using the expansion era, here are the search results from Baseball Reference Play Index. For each player, I searched exact height, handedness, age, and rookie status, while also searching a five percent range in weight (there are some issues with using listed weight). The “Comps” column shows the number of historical rookie comparisons for each potential 2018 Brewers rookie.

This table shows the basic summary of the searches that I conducted using the Play Index tool. What immediately surprised me was the lack of comparisons for some players (like Peralta, Diplan, and Webb), and the large number of comparisons available for “prototypical” starting pitching frames (particularly Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff). Alternately, for a supposedly “old” prospect, the number of comparisons available for Perrin also surprised me, which suggests to me that there has been a path in MLB history for righties of his size and draft pedigree to reach the MLB, even if it takes a while.

Meandering through the comparisons, there are simply some fun and interesting names that appear.

• 2018 rookie Jon Perrin would reach the MLB at the same time as 2012 rookie Yu Darvish, who shares Perrin’s handedness, age, height, and basic weight range; among older comps, Doug Brocail and Todd Worrell are my favorites for Perrin.

• A few names jump off of 2018 rookie Brandon Woodruff’s spreadsheet, like Corey Kluber (!), Ryan Vogelsong, and (of course), Tim Worrell.

• Corbin Burnes has Michael Fulmer and Steve Bedrosian, Houser has Kevin Quackenbush, while Neftali Feliz and Shelby Miller belong to Luis Ortiz. Fulmer is a fascinating comp for Burnes not because of his excellent MLB performance, but because he shared Burnes’s information asymmetry in terms of advanced minors scouting roles and MLB adjustments to exceed expectations. Feliz and Miller are interesting comps for Ortiz, for as the righty faces questions about innings workload and relief risk, it’s good to remember that successful arms have also shared the righty’s frame, height, and age as rookies.

• The lone comps for Diplan and Peralta? Peralta matches 2000 rookie Byung-Hyun Kim (!), while Diplan matches 1965 rookie Dick Selma.

• Obviously, there is a world of gray area here, as these comparisons say nothing about a player’s draft or international development status, stuff, place in the minor league system, etc. Moreover, for my search, I did not use these comparisons to create trends or aging curves, so what I am attempting should not be read alongside the (much more methodologically sound) PECOTA system.

From these searches, a batch of 257 rookie comparison seasons resulted. In order to analyze potential performance markers in environments comparable to the 2016-2017 MLB, I indexed each season according to Runs Allowed per Game (RA/G), and sampled post-Strike rookies that played during a season with a run environment within 5 percent of the 2017 RA/G. This analysis produced a sample of 85 rookie comparison seasons. The following table shows the basic production range for this 85 rookie population:

For this analysis, I focused on Innings Pitched and basic league-level Runs Prevented (I did not investigate historical park factors for this analysis). To compensate for the lack of park factors, I produced a range of runs prevented estimates. Overall, this group of pitchers did not average high innings pitched totals (presumably due to their rookie status, in many cases), with the average pitcher in this sample working nearly 39.0 innings.

This sample can be further categorized to focus on each specific Brewers rookie’s physical profile. In the next table, a range of runs prevented (RnPrv, LowRnPrv, and HighRnPrv) accompany Innings Pitched and Runs averages and standard deviation (IP, IP_StDev; Rn, Rn_StDev).

This table undoubtedly demonstrates a wide range of potentialities for these Brewers rookie pitchers. The innings pitched variance alone suggests that these players could range anywhere from “Did Not Play” to 70-to-80 IP seasons. It’s easy to get excited about some of these results; for example, 75 innings pitched and five runs prevented from Corbin Burnes, or 56.3 IP and six runs prevented from Taylor Williams would represent excellent rotational and bullpen support for Milwaukee.

Yet, the basic averages might provide some hint as to why the Brewers front office has remained quiet on the pitching free agency market thus far: even averaging around 35 innings and providing moderate runs prevented totals, this group of pitchers has a physical pedigree that suggests competent replacement depth can come from rookie ranks. Of course, it is impossible to fully extrapolate from these historical rookie comparisons to the Brewers 2018 pitching staff; this is not a correlative relationship. Yet, through this speculative historical analysis, one can find that Milwaukee has some solid physical characteristics with plenty of historical counterparts (especially Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff); there are also some nearly one-of-a-kind profiles (see Diplan, Peralta, and Webb). Ultimately, these dozen rookies present Milwaukee’s front office and field management with an array of options to collect outs and prevent runs, even if they’re a group of wide-ranging replacements.

Baseball Prospectus. 2018 PECOTA (March 2, 2018) [CSV]. Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Prospectus. “More PECOTA” (Player Cards). Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Sports Reference, LLC., Sports Reference LLC, 2000-2018. Searches conducted March 3, 2018 from baseball-reference.com.