Like the July deadline, David Stearns is giving Brewers fans transactions that can be viewed from many standpoints:

• Stearns is improving both key roles and marginal roles through both deadlines.

• Stearns is arguably stockpiling as much talent as is physically possible (within the constraints of the 40-man roster).

• The GM is dealing prospects with lofty Overall Future Potential (OFP).

• The GM is dealing ultimate roles that may be blocked (Brett Phillips), uncertain (Jorge Lopez), or years away from fruition (this can apply to everyone from Jean Carmona to Orimoloye, Lara, Connell, Dominguez, and Harrison).

• Stearns is looking toward potentially longer outlooks by acquiring several players with 2019 options or roster reserve rights.

This is a lot to take in, and frankly it’s made it difficult to write about the trade deadlines in one swift motion. For on the one hand, by estimating long term value of some of the roles traded away, it appears that Stearns truly did overpay in several deals in order to succeed within a short window. Yet, it’s not entirely clear that Stearns traded away anyone that was fitting into Milwaukee’s immediate window. It pains me to say this even with strong prospects like Brett Phillips, or serviceable roles like Jorge Lopez (one of my favorite pitchers in the system for a long time). As much as I love to use depreciated surplus value to assess trades, since it is a tool that attempts Benefit-Cost Analysis on players’ production and contract, Stearns is providing a clear template for critiquing moves outside of any WARP/$ framework.

Specifically, by moving clear MLB players from a small market club that ostensibly requires cost-controlled, easily reserved talent to win, Stearns’s deadline provides an excellent opportunity to survey the uneven landscape of player development. In this regard, it is worth noting that no trade can truly meet WARP/$ standards, because in the universe of player development a pitcher can add a new pitch or rework their mechanics, a batting can revise a timing mechanism or refine a swing, a player can fall under the influence of a new coach (for better or worse), or a player can simply experience a new environment in which opportunities shift. Information asymmetry is the landscape of player development, and thus MLB transactions, and in this regard no deal can ever reach equilibrium between parties, as both teams involved in a given trade will arguably be assessing players through different environments (this argument has hidden behind my work on depreciated surplus, but surfaced in a demonstration with the Brian McCann trade).

On Tuesday, another one of the prospects dealt away from Milwaukee acquired a true MLB floor as well, as the Baltimore Orioles selected the contract of RHP Luis Ortiz (traded away as the lead prospect in the Jonathan Schoop deal). Now, the “surefire” MLB players that one could have assessed from the July deadline deals are all in The Show (Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez are in Kansas City, and Ortiz is now in Baltimore). I will not be focusing extensively on Phillips’s case here, as he is doing pretty much what could have been expected on the day of the trade: starting in center field (21 of 26 games) and right field (4 of 26 games). Lopez and Ortiz, however, offer completely asymmetrical development from the Brewers’ system, and this is worth investigating because the Brewers have what is justifiably regarded as a strong pitching program, due to their track record in 2017 and 2018 (yes, in 2018!), oft-praised coach (Derek Johnson), and their unorthodox pitching acquisitions that appear to follow very specific profiles (this applies to everyone from Oliver Drake to Chase Anderson and Zach Davies, among others). Answering questions about Lopez and Ortiz may help to address other bizarre roles in the 2018 pitching system, most notably involving Brandon Woodruff, Adrian Houser, and even (arguably) Corbin Burnes.

First, let’s establish two role discrepancies that may be the result of different organizational interpretations of information:

• Jorge Lopez has already started four games for the Kansas City Royals, boasting an 18 strike out / eight walk / two homer / 37 percent ground ball profile (4.86 Deserved Run Average). He has alternated good and bad starts thus far. However, the Brewers failed to use Lopez as a starter in 2018, instead employing Lopez as a successful member of the Triple-A shuttle team between Milwaukee and Colorado Springs; this mirrors Lopez’s 2018 minor league role (reliever) and follows his organizational shift to relief role in 2017. Despite what may be viewed as a spotty command profile and a lack of a deep pitching arsenal, the Royals promptly started Lopez and have him shifting sinker / riding fastball and slider offerings to “re-balance” his approach.

• Luis Ortiz battled some injuries and stamina concerns during his time in the Milwaukee organization, which spanned 44 games at Double-A Biloxi across parts of three seasons. Ortiz was mostly a starter in the Milwaukee organization, building his innings pitched total to career highs in three consecutive seasons; the righty is now at 99.7 innings and counting upon entering the MLB. Upon acquiring Ortiz, Baltimore assigned him directly to their Triple-A Norfolk club, and now are selecting his contract for a September showing. One might surmise this is to help boost his innings pitched total closer to 120.0 IP by season end, setting the youngster for a perfectly respectable workload floor for 2019.

Since I do not have additional, unpublished scouting information on Ortiz from his short time in the Baltimore organization (and there do not appear to be any updates from Norfolk), I am going to simply note that according to his minor league game data, there is no discernible statistic that demonstrates why the Orioles might recall the prospect. Alternately, there is equally no discernible argument as to why the Brewers did not view Ortiz as an immediate depth option to potentially bolster a contending pitching staff (and their aggressive handling of Freddy Peralta supports that question).

On Ortiz, the following table is from Baseball Reference CSV:

I would like to reject the “Orioles have nothing to lose” argument for recalling Ortiz, and I’d apply that same reasoning to the Royals, as well. For example, the Brewers apparently have everything to lose in 2018, and they entered the season with Jhoulys Chacin, Yovani Gallardo, and Wade Miley as their major pitching acquisitions for a year in which they probably suspected Jimmy Nelson would miss substantial time. The point being, “having something to lose” has not kept the Brewers from making unorthodox development moves and acquisitions, and that applies equally to starting Freddy Peralta ahead of top pitching prospect (and much clearer starting role) Corbin Burnes as it does to Chacin, Gallardo, and Miley. For goodness sake, the club just recently acquired veteran southpaw Gio Gonzalez, a starting pitcher by trade, and then mentioned that they might not use him as a starter. So, it is clear that “having something to lose” is no motivator for the Brewers to make “expected” or orthodox pitching moves; relative position in the standings should not explain these player development moves.

The flipside of this argument, I will add, is that this should not be taken as a “Derek Johnson is magic” argument, either. I do not believe that Brewers fans and analysts should fall back on that argument, because it basically substitutes a new type of devotional thinking about pitching development for previous orthodox thinking about pitching roles, and solely using a coach’s successful cases for transactional justification is a bad thing. Those of us relying on public knowledge will not understand or know any of Johnson’s potential “failures” in terms of mechanical or arsenal adjustments among Brewers pitching. Furthermore, this type of magical line of argument about Johnson’s skills could thus theoretically justify any pitching acquisition, which should be viewed as ridiculous on the face of it. For example, none of us should be rummaging the lowest DRA of 2018 simply to argue “x, y, and z should be Brewers targets because of Wade Miley and Derek Johnson,” and that’s not meant as a knock on either Johnson or Miley.

Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, has provided new data as a member of the Royals, and the righty is demonstrating a complete shift in his arsenal. Brewers fans will recall that Lopez used his big, tall frame to generate a fairly traditional rising fastball, curveball, change up arsenal. During Lopez’s time in Milwaukee in 2018, the Brooks Baseball classification system captured a “sinker,” which might also be called a riding / running fastball (although the vertical movement readings on the pitch hint that it may actually be a sinker). Lopez also introduced some variation of a slider:

Thus far in Kansas City, Lopez has reoriented this arsenal by reducing his “primary fastball” in favor of his sinker and slider. Along with these noticeable moves, Lopez is also ticking up his change and curve slightly.

Lopez has had two rough starts, but his most recent start against the Orioles was the best of his young career. In this start, perhaps Lopez cashed out the most extreme version of his arsenal adjustment, working sinker or slider for nearly 55 percent of his deliveries. Yet that curve still figures prominently at 21 percent of his overall selections, meaning that Lopez could also be called a sinker-curve guy.

This new arsenal is a fantastic look for Lopez, and it raises a difficult question that is worth asking, but must be asked in the proper critical mindset and organizational vantage point: when is a pitcher simply a new pitch, or a re-balancing of their arsenal, away from success? When is a pitcher simply in need of an opportunity? I hinted at this question following the July trade deadline, as the Brewers traded a pitcher who might be dismissed as “merely serviceable” at a time of increased need for quality depth due to injuries and ineffectiveness. Yet the Brewers did not give Lopez a start, nor did they keep him as a fixture in the bullpen, perhaps as a multi-inning guy. I don’t mean this as a criticism of the Brewers, however, because one could have reasonably asserted at the time that previously lofty goals of Lopez’s rotational Overall Future Potential were a thing of the past; here we are, though, with the tide potentially shifting within the Royals rotation.

The least satisfactory answer is that the Brewers simply missed on Ortiz and Lopez. Perhaps they were so cautious with Ortiz as to miss the potential upside (or even the current MLB floor!) in his profile. One could have said on deadline day that Luis Ortiz was maybe two or three years away from being a true impact, Number Two starter (if he were to reach his ceiling); perhaps that logic misses the value of how good a low rotation floor can be on many days in the MLB (cf. the 2018 Brewers, from Wade Miley to Freddy Peralta and, yes, even Junior Guerra most days). A more realistic answer, and perhaps the Lopez development supports this, is that maybe Milwaukee simply was not the place for these developments; even the acquisition of Jake Thompson and Jordan Lyles suggests that Stearns may have already found other development projects that better fit the organizational plan.

It is interesting to work with these unsatisfactory, vague conclusions while designing a framework for assessing Brandon Woodruff’s future with the organization, or even the potential future role for someone like Wade Miley:

• Is Miley a Brewers pitcher now, worth a contract extension and a trip back to the well, a celebration of a job well done and certainly a job worth tens of millions of dollars?

• Is Woodruff, about as bread-and-butter middle rotation starter / potential impact relief profile as one could ask for, a pitcher with a steady rotation or bullpen future in Milwaukee?

• With the continued development of Adrian Houser as a starting pitcher in the minor leagues, is Houser already poised to become the MLB starting role recovery for the Brewers that Jorge Lopez was not?

The trouble with these questions is that they could be answered in different ways for different organizations, but the benefit is that the Brewers currently reserve an crucial opportunity to learn from their recent transactions and maximize their development approach with each of these pitchers.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

Stearns just loudly answered that question this trade deadline.

What is fascinating about each of these trades is that they are fantastic in the sense of bolstering an MLB roster, in order to ensure that this stretch run features as few weaknesses as possible, while also potentially being over-pays in each case. Yet it should be stressed that these overpays are palatable for several reasons: the Brewers maintain a largely controllable roster that is also relatively inexpensive; the Brewers have a relatively large set of players that have been minor leaguers long enough to need potential 40-man roster protection entering 2019; and, perhaps most importantly, there is an incredible amount of role risk involved with each player. These trades should provide grounds for further analysis into when and how potential overpays are helpful to a team, and they should certainly provide further evidence that WARP/$ is not the sole determination of a trade’s potential value or impact.

Grading the System: 2016 || 2017

• Make no mistake about it, in terms of developing multiple quality pitches, command, and velocity, Luis Ortiz could potentially have the best pitching role for the Brewers system; there was a time, two years ago even, where it would not have been absurd for Ortiz to fight for a top tier pitching role in the prospect ranking cycle (and, really, it was not absurd). But Ortiz has been around forever in the advanced minors, it seems, without working full seasons. For example, the injury-fighting righty has 225 innings at Double-A without working 100 innings in a season, and with 68 innings at the 2018 deadline he could potentially miss 100 innings once again. If Ortiz can take his next step forward in the Orioles’ system, he is absolutely a more valuable asset, in terms of roster surplus, than Jonathan Schoop (and it is not close!!!), but that strong 60 Overall Future Potential (OFP) / 50 likely grade entering 2017 looks much more improbable. Ortiz is eligible for the Rule 5 draft for the 2019 season and almost certainly must be protected by the Orioles.

• Jean Carmona just made the jump stateside for the Brewers in 2018, and thus remains a full four levels away from the MLB. Additionally, Carmona might even be another year away from a clearly defined MLB potential role. In this regard, I do not envy the job of MLB scouts and analytics personnel, as it’s not entirely clear for me how I would price Carmona’s potential future value in terms of long-term systemic development.

• At BP Milwaukee, Kyle Lesniewski describe the roles and risks associated with both Kodi Medeiros and Wilber Perez. Medeiros could become an impact reliever at the MLB level, and it’s not unlikely that some observers still believe that he could start in some capacity, as there will always be hold outs for that sort of role. Given Medeiros’s delivery and command profile, however, as well as his fastball, Lesniewski outlines the difficulties that Medeiros may have for reaching even an impact reliever profile. Medeiros is eligible for the Rule 5 draft entering the 2019 season, and almost certainly must be protected by the White Sox, while Perez had yet to play stateside in the Brewers system.

• Finally, I already detailed the roles and surplus value for Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez, so I will not go into too much detail here. However, I will add that of each of the prospects included in this midseason deals, Phillips is arguably the most likely to have MLB floor and ceiling roles that both surpass the value of the trade return (which is not a knock against Mike Moustakas, he simply might only be in Milwaukee for a couple of months). With a prospect such as Corey Ray coming on strong in Double-A Biloxi, not to mention the considerable development of Troy Stokes Jr. at the advanced level as well, Milwaukee cannot necessarily lose sleep over trading away a depth outfielder from their stacked group when they are fighting a close divisional deficit and leading the National League Wild Card race.

So, readers will witness a couple of recurring facts in these trades: the Brewers largely traded away players that must be protected for 2019 to avoid their loss via the Rule 5 draft, or players with little-to-no stateside development experience (and thus years to reach MLB), and/or players with roles that may be replicated within a year. One need not believe that a player like Stokes will surpass Phillips, in terms of overall ceiling, to see the value of the young prospect’s potential to fill an MLB depth position in 2019. Phillips himself may not have had an opportunity in 2019 to take such a role. The same logic might apply to Quintin Torres-Costa and Bubba Derby. This should not be construed to mean that these current system prospects are categorically better than Phillips / Medeiros / Lopez; in fact, I would have ranked each of that trio ahead of their potential 2019 depth replacements. But once again, since systemic development, contending windows, and player development cycles are now orbiting a club that is contending for consecutive seasons (and the foreseeable future, hopefully), if it costs system depth roles to improve MLB weaknesses, the Brewers have to eat the risk of losing those ceilings.

I like when MLB trades can simply be called good baseball moves. For all the rebuilding narratives in Baltimore, Kansas City, and Chicago, the White Sox, Royals, and Orioles front offices arguably made sensible trades with quality returns that both have long and short time horizons and development cycles. Milwaukee is working as a true contender without trading from their most elite potential prospect stash. This is good all around.

Stearns priced out these converging development cycles and adroitly moved the future role risk to address an offense that absolutely needed help for a serious contending run. Just the other day I wrote, “At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019,” without thinking that a realistic move to first base for Shaw could occur as early as this week. Now, with Jonathan Schoop in the mix for second base and Jesus Aguilar slumping, Shaw becomes a strong side platoon option at 1B to form a serious infield unit:

This infield could open 2019 should Stearns consider keeping both Moustakas and Schoop, and now the talk can turn to development cycles once more. While the Brewers continue to season second baseman Keston Hiura at the most advanced levels of the minor leagues, Schoop basically serves as an upgrade over the Jonathan Villar gamble (gambling that he’ll return to his 2016 form), thus giving the Brewers a quality starting option while Hiura completes his minor league development. While Hiura’s bat is arguably ready for the MLB, and has been mentioned as a potential MLB option by Baseball Prospectus in their latest Top 50 list, the infielder may need more work in the field after missing significant fielding development time due to an extended elbow injury. Once Hiura is ready in 2019, a Schoop / Hiura mix simply extends the #TeamDepth mantra, and the same can arguably said for the remainder of the infield.

Entering 2018, the Brewers system took a step back in terms of organizational rankings, due to a series of developmental setbacks for key prospects, MLB graduations, and trades. I began to highlight this during last year’s “Grading the System” feature, but as one can never predict baseball, the development cycles and potential OFP assessments calibrated for Corey Ray, Keston Hiura answered a crucial risk question (can he play 2B?), and a veritable gang of pop-up pitchers continued to march upward in the system, potentially boosting and extending the no-name, depth-oriented pitching staff into 2019. Make no mistake about it, the system might continue to rank in the middle of the league in terms of overall quality, and the set of clear potential impact roles (true 60 OFP+ roles) may end with Keston Hiura and Corey Ray should Corbin Burnes exhaust his rookie standing through the end of 2018.

Yet, given the instant development of 2018 First Round draft pick Brice Turang, the Brewers could demonstrate that they indeed nabbed an Elite Prep prospect that fell due to prospect fatigue. Turang could quickly help to boost the top of the system as an MLB potential role falls into place. Moreover, given the Brewers’ expanded efforts in International signings, as well as the quality use of signing bonus allocations in each of the last two MLB drafts, the lower minors could continue to host a variety of players that suddenly surge onto the prospect scene. While this does not make the Brewers system different than many other MLB systems, it provides a road map to how the club can continue to develop talent while contending. One could argue that it’s absurd to suggest that the Brewers “rely” on someone like Turang falling in the MLB draft, but this is exactly the type of prospect perception and role foresight that the Brewers must have if they are going to succeed while drafting in the bottom half of each round.

Of course, the notable graduations from the system should not be undersold as well. Now there are so many starters, depth roles, and trades from the Brewers prospect stock that I added a new category this year:

Now, with these graduates in mind, what does a somewhat thinner, but still rather interesting Brewers system look like?

Prospect Key
Top 10 Consideration
Top 30 Consideration
[Just Interesting]

Of course, it is also worth emphasizing how the system has been….decimated in key areas. Given the quick development by advanced prospects acquired from the major 2015-2016 trades, as well as the huge trades entering 2018 and during the recent deadlines, the pool of potential impact prospects acquiring via trade has waned:

This is an important category to consider simply because Milwaukee demonstrated how adroit trades could quickly rebuild a system and reform an MLB roster. It will be worth watching to see if the Stearns continues to attempt to find Jonathan Villar and Keon Broxton types via trade now that the club is solidly contending. Of course, one could argue that Stearns is always trying to find this player (be it Oliver Drake, or Jesus Aguilar, or even Alec Asher), but that it simply the fact that these players will not always come via trade.

Thanks to the mechanical corrections, good health, and overall development of Corey Ray, as well as the surging role of Troy Stokes Jr., the development of draft prospects arguably has a better outlook entering 2019 than it did prior to 2018. Given the advancement of Corbin Burnes into a relief role, Brandon Woodruff and Taylor Williams into respective swingman and depth relief roles, and Brett Phillips into a fourth outfielder, it is clear that the Brewers front office is considering all possible role developments with each player (rather than following a cookie cutter model, or a model in which each prospect must immediately receive playing time in their clearest future role). It is arguable that this type of development strategy could maximize roles ranging from Stokes to Zack Brown, Jake Gatewood, and maybe even Lucas Erceg.

Meanwhile, Milwaukee signed a couple of additional potential impact International Amateur free agents this July, continuing an attempt to build up the low minors. Carlos Rodriguez and Larry Ernesto are already making some noise in the Dominican Summer League, while prospects like Jose Sibrian and Jesus Lujano have made the leap stateside.

Frankly, this Brewers system will not look as strong, in terms of potentially elite impacts roles, as the one that received ranking for 2018 at Baseball Prospectus. Yet, as new cycles of player development depth emerge in the low minors, and the Brewers continue their unique form of MLB roster construction (clearly using all 40 roster spots for MLB-adjacent roles and frequently shuffling those roles), Milwaukee could be an organizational well-suited to do more with less. For if 2017 fired the opening shot that the Brewers can contend simply based on giving high floor players a chance to work in the MLB, 2018 is advancing that ideal and carrying it to deeper logical, promotional, and transactional extensions.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USA Today Sports Images

Surplus Grade
At Baseball Prospectus Milwaukee, I have worked on a transactional Benefit-Cost Analysis system for assessing prospect-and-MLB trades. I use the term “Surplus” to denote the value of a player through trade, which includes the player’s on-field production plus their “scarcity” (which, in terms of MLB labor, translates into their contractual dollars plus control time). In the following table, I demonstrate one way of assessing surplus for these trades, which includes both options for Soria and Moustakas picked up for the 2019 season.

Recommended Background: Refining Surplus Pricing || Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades

It should be stressed that this is not viewed as a complete analysis of a transaction, but rather an analysis that paces current MLB player production and prospect roles against the history of MLB in order to assess their value; the hypothesis is that since MLB teams can (and do) trade prospects for MLB roles, a value metric can be found that places prospects and MLB players on the same scale.

Here’s how the trades look without options:

Any way one slices it, David Stearns is “going for it,” in terms of delivering trades that provide clear cut short-term MLB roster gains while surrendering long-term roster assets. On the face of it, Stearns has paid more than he is receiving; at worst, he paid a dollar to return one quarter. In the case of the Soria trade, the time horizons are acceptable, as it is unclear how quickly lefty Kodi Medeiros will reach the MLB (even from Double-A in 2018), let alone a relief role that sees the young southpaw form his tools into high leverage function (which would arguably be his highest realistic role); the same can be said for Perez, who has never played stateside ball and thus has a truly indeterminate role horizon.

In the case of the Moustakas trade, it’s tougher to make a case about role horizons, for both Phillips and Lopez have useful (if not flashy) roles for a 2018 contending ballclub and potentially better roles for the future. Phillips could morph into a multi-tool center fielder if his bat develops at the MLB level, but his defense, speed, and power remain strong enough that Phillips could also serve as a rare “impact Fourth Outfielder;” it’s impossible not to dream on Lopez’s fastball and curveball combo playing up as a reliever, and the MLB dream for the righty would be that if the command comes along he can scale relief roles from low- to high-leverage.

Related: What does the future hold for Jorge Lopez? || Medeiros & Perez 

It must be added that if it appears perplexing that the potential transactional surplus prices involved in the Moustakas do not equal one another, they need not. One can argue that from an organizational standpoint, reaching the playoffs is a push for additional revenue, as well as an operation that concerns on-field baseball production. At some point, Wins, Runs Scored, Runs Allowed, Overall Future Potential, etc., are turned into cash for an organization. In the case of the 2018 Brewers, these recent deals, especially the Moustakas trade, bolster the club’s Wild Card lead (currently up 2.5 games) and (dare I say it) give the club a better chance at competing with the division leading Lakeview Nine (the Cubs currently lead Milwaukee by 1.5 games for the National League Central crown). Once these playoff odds are bolstered, the organization can also price out their odds of playing deeper into the playoffs, and frankly, if the Brewers believe these types of deals can help their club reach the League Championship Series, it does not necessarily matter that their deadline deals were “too expensive.”

MLB Roster Profile
Thus far, it is clear that the Moustakas move accomplishes two key objectives for the MLB roster:

• First, the move improves an offense in need of consistent production by making it deeper through the addition of a solid prime-age veteran bat.

• Second, the move will test an efficient defense and organizational shifting philosophy by moving incumbent third baseman Travis Shaw to second base.

Moving Toward Contact
To the first point, Mike Moustakas developed into a solid, consistently better than average batter after his 2015 breakout. The left-handed bat is also a clear addition to the discipline-contact department for the Brewers offense, as Moustakas consistently strikes out at a better than average clip. Ostensibly, Moustakas adds power and contact to the batting order, and as many have noted, will test these traits in a ballpark that is much friendlier to left-handed batters than Kansas City’s park.

The following table includes Moustakas’s home run, walk, and strike out percentages, as well as his True Average (TAv) and Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA), which are advanced metrics that assess underlying offensive and defensive elements to express production (.260 is average for TAv, and 0 is average for FRAA).

While Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) demonstrate some fluctuations in recent seasons for Moustakas, the third baseman performs at a consistently better than average rate with the glove as well as the bat, which should reduce some of the potential impact of the Brewers’ infield shuffle. Additionally, since Orlando Arcia is working to the left of Moustakas, theoretically some of the defensive pressure should be taken off of the third baseman.

Misusing Phillips?
One of the remaining questions for the MLB roster is whether Brett Phillips actually had a solid role for the club moving forward. Perhaps because of the left-handed batting bent of much of the Brewers positional group (Eric Thames, Christian Yelich, Shaw, and more recently Brad Miller, too), Phillips has remained out of favor for the club’s official “fourth outfield” spot, a spot that has recently belonged to the hot-and-cold Keon Broxton. Despite a .180 batting average, Broxton has walked and hit for power frequently enough to keep his glove on the roster, which is playing at around 2.4 FRAA (after a -8.2 FRAA campaign in 2017). From the right side of the plate, Broxton ostensibly offers more flexibility when manager Craig Counsell needs to spell Yelich or Thames in the outfield.

Related: Understanding Phillips

The trouble with the Broxton-Phillips wager is that Phillips arguably already surpasses this level of production even with his MLB floor, which he demonstrated in spectacular fashion toward the end of the 2017 season. In that brief performance, Phillips flashed his elite defensive tools (4.3 FRAA), while also presenting a strong batting average (.276), walk rate (nearly 10 percent), and power (seven extra base hits in 98 appearances). This type of production is what makes pricing out an MLB role for Phillips so difficult, because the left-handed batting defensive asset has enough questions about his offensive game to raise the possibility that pitchers will expose his shortcomings with more exposure. But the glove and arm are so good as to keep Phillips in a serious regular rotation if he falls out of a starting spot, and he could easily serve as an MLB outfielder with 300-to-400 valuable plate appearances, the type of ephemeral roster asset that most playoff teams dream of. The trouble with the Brewers trading Phillips is that his floor is arguably already reaching this role, which raises questions about why the club did not employ Phillips for more than 15 games in 2018.

Along with keeping right handed pitcher Brandon Woodruff in the shuttle crew between Milwaukee and Triple-A Colorado Springs, and shifting Corbin Burnes to relief for his MLB debut (when his top role, floor, and the club’s admitted 2019 plans have him slated as a starting pitcher), the club’s usage of Phillips should serve as a serious area for strategic questioning and analysis. Did the Brewers use Phillips to the best of his current ability, even given that they’re working with his MLB floor? The flip side of this argument would hold that since the Brewers do not have outfield space to test Phillips’s top role as a starting center fielder, trading him simply means that a “blocked” prospect will get his chance elsewhere; similarly, if you believe that Phillips will settle into the impact back-up role as well, that’s not a role that you mourn trading away to bolster an MLB roster weakness elsewhere.

Does Fielding Matter?
As for moving Shaw to second base, this is the type of value-seeking move that one would love to see from a loudly-announced, so-called “analytic” front office. The Brewers have one of the most efficient defensive units in the National League, even with the recent demotion of star defensive short stop Orlando Arcia and a display of less-than-stellar middle infield play of late; the club’s bread-and-butter has been stopping hits from falling in the outfield, either on flyballs or line drives, and coupled with the somewhat bizarre distribution of batted balls between pitching units (i.e., the key relievers are typically more groundball oriented, on the whole, than the starting pitchers), the Brewers defensive unit can withstand unexpected arrangements so long as the personnel shift for key game moments.

Additionally, moving Shaw to second base answers an interesting question about the extent to which fielding matters for an MLB club. This question was prominently raised when Arcia was demoted, as even a top tier glove in all of baseball could not hold that batting performance, and now the inverse equation can be applied to Shaw. By True Average, Shaw is one of the very best bats on the Brewers, and the club essentially has a .298 TAv second baseman at the deadline (that’s good enough for sixth best in the MLB among 2B with 100 PA); neither Brian Dozier nor Jonathan Schoop, the remaining rumored second base targets for the Brewers, can be counted on to match Shaw’s impact batting production. Furthermore, keeping Shaw at second base arguably gives the club the chance to continue their long play gamble on Jonathan Villar, who can slide into a meaningful depth role once he returns from the disabled list. The equation here is quite clever, as if the Brewers are going to gamble on Dozier or Schoop putting it together, they can also gamble on Villar, who has shown flashes of brilliance in 2018 and was batting .261 / .346 / .348 over the 20 games preceding his disabled list stint.

If Counsell can start a fielding unit that includes Moustakas and Shaw, and then use a fielding substitution when a key groundball reliever enters a close game (looking at Jeremy Jeffress here), ostensibly the manager has more options to get the offense going without sacrificing key late game defense. One can dream that if the Brewers succeed in the playoffs, this unorthodox defensive gamble lead the way. At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019.

This is #TeamDepth exhibiting team flexibility across the offense, fielding, and contractual horizons, and even if the acquisition cost seems steep, the playoffs payoff is clear and (hopefully) immediate.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

This post was updated at 10:30 AM to include additional BPMilwaukee and Baseball Prospectus links and add Corey Ray as a top prospect.

Baseball Prospectus 2015 Astros Top 10 prospect rankings largely support the reaction of the time, in which Phillips was the “get” of the trade, Santana was a quality, workable advanced prospect, and Hader and Houser both served as equal parts risk-and-reward (albeit due to completely different profiles). It’s worth remembering what type of prospect Hader was when the Brewers acquired the potential fireballing lefty, so I’m quoting in full:

“The long and lanky lefty enjoyed a season to build upon with High-A Lancaster, working with an upper-80s to low-90s fastball with lots of dance out of a tough low three-quarters slot. He can reach as his as 95 mph and could sit closer to that mark in shorter bursts should he wind up in the pen as some evaluators suggest. His slider is a second potential above-average offering that can make lefty bats highly uncomfortable due to the angle of approach. His change is a third usable weapon, though both it and the slider regularly play fringe average or below, as Hader is still working to find a consistent release that allows him to work the totality of the zone with each. He’ll need more precision in execution to continue his run of success against stiffer Texas League competition, and could find a home as a useful lefty relief arm should he prove incapable of turning over upper-level lineups with his fastball-heavy approach.”

Of course, time is equal parts blessing and curse for player development, and in this case the Brewers used varying approaches with each player. Santana had already reached the MLB with the Astros, and the Brewers front office almost immediately caused the trade to pay dividends by recalling the right-handed batting outfielder on August 21, 2015. Santana showed it all within his first two weeks, belting four homers and two doubles while batting .216 and striking out 12 times in 43 PA. The Brewers gave the outfielder time in center field as well as his more common corner spot, potentially testing the waters for a high-power fourth outfield role if the regular right field spot did not work. Santana finished his 2015 Milwaukee campaign with modest success in 38 games, boasting a .299 True Average (TAv) and -4.8 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA). Adrian Houser joined Santana at the MLB level as a September call-up, immediately compounding the *reality* of this trade, or the sense that this trade could be of real impact for the Brewers.

Using depreciated surplus analysis, here’s how the trade looked on the “day-of.” (The TL;DR is that this analysis essentially monetizes Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) and Overall Future Potential (OFP), while also considering contract cost and reserve time, to compare prospects and MLB players of varying service time. It is a Benefit-Cost Analysis. More here if you’re interested):

In hind sight, over the course of three prospect cycles (pre-2016, 2017, 2018) and two full seasons, it is easy to view the Gomez-Fiers trade as a complete, smashing success for the Brewers. And the trade was indeed successful; on the day of the trade, the Brewers essentially “extracted” one additional potential MLB average player ($19.5 million) from the Astros, meaning that the trade could certainly be viewed as fair for both the Astros and the Brewers, with the Astros potentially surrendering a bit more than one would normally like for a super star CF and playoff race rotation help. The trade almost certainly was a huge success for the Astros in terms of revenue, as Carlos Gomez smashed the game-winning home run in the American League Wild Card in 2015, ensuring that Houston entered a longer series and had a chance at more playoff coin. I left this out of my analysis, but it is worth separately considering organizational trade incentive.

The last two trade check-ins published midseason 2016 and 2017 are worth publishing once again, just to show the ridiculous swing in surplus value:

So, why the retrospective? Well, frankly, it appears that the trade has already been promptly rewritten as highway robbery after the collapse of Carlos Gomez in Houston, and now the MLB ascent and success of Josh Hader, as well as many of the criticisms of the Brewers’ deep offseason outfield acquisitions, appears to color the value of the trade once more. Now, the Brewers apparently have a potential top rotation starter in Josh Hader, and a superstar right fielder in Domingo Santana…which is great to dream about, but misses the fun and importance of the Gomez-Fiers trade.

The Gomez-Fiers trade was a strong deal for Milwaukee on day one, but it was also a weird deal, and it’s worth exploring that a bit more. Entering 2018, the Brewers had a lot of value extracted from the Gomez-Fiers trade. Josh Hader lost his breaking ball and experiencing some mechanical / approach hiccups in Triple-A Colorado Springs, so his development continued at the MLB level. The twirling fastballer hardly hiccuped from his first June appearance onward, working seven scoreless outings before allowing his first run. Of course, the command was not yet there, as Hader also allowed eight walks to six strike outs over 9.3 IP; compare that to Hader’s current 22 strike out / three walk line over 9.7 IP to start 2018. Anyway, Hader established himself as a curious role player, almost instantly proving to serve as an MLB relief chameleon a la Andrew Miller, but without any of the 96 G / 66 GS / 359.3 IP of trial and error, 5.79 ERA baseball over three teams that actually defined Andrew Miller’s ascent to one of the greatest and most interesting relief aces in the game. For the honest developmental reason that Hader could not start, and that the lefty was re-establishing his stuff, delivery, and command, the Brewers’ young southpaw got to fast forward past the ugly stuff and reach his 2017 Baseball Prospectus realistic role: high leverage relief. This is different than his 2015 prospect role, but it’s not bad; it’s simply more in focus.

As an aside, why should Hader be more than this? Of course the funky lefty everyone loves to cite for Hader’s fantastical upside is Chris Sale, an ace that surprised scouting profiles in some cases. But this is a moment worth instructing on player comparisons: Hader is not Chris Sale. Chris Sale was a 13th overall college pick by the White Sox (2010), a pick who was already working in the MLB during the same year that he was drafted; Hader was a 19th round pick who required two trades and nearly five-and-a-half seasons of development to reach the MLB. Sale was age-23 by the time the White Sox transitioned the one-time oddball reliever to the starting rotation; Josh Hader is in his age-24 season right now. Sale is listed at 6’6″ and threw between 96 and 98 MPH with a primary sinking-running fastball as a reliever; Hader is listed at 6’4″ and throws between 92 and 95 MPH with a primary rising fastball as a reliever. Josh Hader is not Chris Sale and should not be compared to Chris Sale; we have data available to make better comparisons, so make better comparisons. Anyway, Hader is already proving to have potential as a strangely role-flexible, elite quality MLB reliever. Don’t get greedy!

If Hader’s success was at the MLB level as a budding relief ace with extremely flexible roles, Brett Phillips opened 2018 as (presumably) the last Gomez-Fiers player on a Top 10 list. Baseball Prospectus ranked Phillips fifth in the Brewers system, and a couple years of struggle, redemption, and a smashing 2017 MLB debut placed the left-handed batting outfielder’s role in focus. Read this beautiful prose, as not many prospect list roles are so clear:

“OFP 60—First division center fielder carried by his glove and pop
Likely 50—Average outfielder whose secondary skills prop up low averages”

It does not get much better than that. So, Phillips is where he is, another so-called casualty of the Brewers’ #TeamDepth, but in a sense the age-24 outfielder is exactly where his scouting role should place him on a competitive MLB team: Phillips is going to be an indispensable depth player for the Brewers, offering a fantastic glove and arm that keep him in the MLB while the potential promise of power at the plate sorts itself out. This is different than his 2015 prospect role, but it’s not bad; it’s simply more in focus.

Domingo Santana is having a bit of a “ho hum” start to the 2018 campaign, which is not a bad thing. In fact, it’s nearly worth a sigh of relief to see the right fielder opening the year with a .283 batting average and 10 percent walk rate (entering play Sunday), driving a powerless TAv of .273 (not bad!). I know there are a ton of Brewers fans who just want Santana to be a superstar, to break out from the 2017 campaign that saw 3.3 WARP on the strength of a full season of improved plate discipline, .306 TAv, and -7.6 FRAA. It’s tough to say this in the right voice, that’s not a knock on Santana, but Santana need not be a superstar…Santana is a good MLB player. It’s okay to stop there; the OFP 50 / realistic 40 grade RF has already produced nearly 5.0 WARP for the Brewers over portions of four seasons. In fact, I dare say that this is his 2015 prospect role, with the swing and approach concerns ironed out. The Brewers may have picked up Domingo Santana they had hoped to acquire.

Watching Adrian Houser throw 95-to-96 MPH rising and running fastballs during his 2.0 IP relief outing against the Cubs was a wondrous occasion. The big righty (listed 6’4″, 235 lb) threw that heat with ease, and also sprinkled in both of his off speed offerings (a change and curve). There were rumblings in spring that the Brewers hope to stretch Houser into a starter, which was somewhat surprising given the righty’s return from Tommy John surgery and the club’s handling of Taylor Williams (another TJ-returnee). But, every injury case is different, and every rehab case is different, so the Houser that the Brewers picked up in the 2015 trade may now turn in to something that Brewers fans never could have expected: a central player in a pitching staff that is built around depth and aggressive use of a bullpen (Brewers fans literally could not have imagined a quality depth-based rotation rounded out with Wade Miley, Corbin Burnes, Freddy Peralta, and Houser in July 2015, but here we are). In this context, gambling on a potential back-end starter that has already reached the MLB and demonstrated some stuff that could play looks like quite an interesting bet (at least) for the Brewers runs prevention chances. Houser will not be flashy, but he’s here. His injury may change the risk profile, meaning that he’s not the prospect he was in 2015, which isn’t bad; it’s simply more in focus.

Several aspects of player development and strategic assessment make the Gomez-Fiers trade great.

• First and foremost, as I’ve written before and is always worth emphasizing, Doug Melvin did well to acquire mostly advanced prospects who had fairly well-defined scouting roles on the day of the trade. This trade was not as huge a gamble as it could have been.

• Second, the Brewers quickly advanced players when they needed to be advanced, and allowed players with shortcomings to develop at the MLB level.
  • Santana had nothing left to prove in Triple-A, even with strike zone contact questions that were very well known prior to the trade. It was up to the Brewers to help Santana develop that hit tool and iron out that approach at the MLB level.
  • Hader falls into this camp as well; imagine if the Brewers had demoted Hader to Double-A Biloxi last year, as an answer to altitude and as a chance to get the lefty back on track to becoming a starting pitching prospect. Imagine Hader working in Biloxi as a starter throughout the season, getting that command and delivery back while he re-established his breaking ball. That could have happened; see Jorge Lopez and Taylor Jungmann, for example. Instead, David Stearns correctly assessed a need on the MLB club, and correctly assessed Hader’s strength (delivery deception and advanced fastball) and wagered that the southpaw could answer his development questions at the MLB level. These are huge player development successes for Melvin and Stearns, and if you don’t believe it, again, imagine Hader opening the 2018 season as a starting pitching prospect in Triple-A once more, perhaps this time to add innings after he found his secondary stuff in Biloxi.

• Third, the Brewers adroitly took it slow when they needed to, working Adrian Houser all the way back from a Tommy John surgery and returning Brett Phillips to Double-A Biloxi for 2016 despite his shredding the league in 98 age-21 plate appearances. In case Phillips feels like an “old” prospect, remember that he’s still just in his age-24 season in a league with an average age nearly three years older (AAA), while serving as MLB depth. Houser is in his age-25 season serving as MLB depth. Time remains with this trade.

• Finally, with nearly three full years of assessment due on this trade, it is worth emphasizing that this trade is a smashing success despite only one of the prospects truly reaching their day-of ceiling (Santana), while others forged interesting new role questions (Hader), or at the very least solidified the value of usable MLB floors (Houser, Phillips). This is exactly the type of trade that Brewers fans and analysts can study in order to think through the varying degrees of prospect risk, and the types of roles that a prospect can demonstrate (or, the spectrum that even one single role could include). A trade does not need to include top of the rotation starters, superstar right fielders, and flashy everyday defense-first center fielders in order to become a smashing success. Sometimes reaching the MLB is enough, for good player development at that level ensures that some prospect questions can be answered with exclamation points, even without bona fide stardom.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

Baseball Prospectus:
Why PECOTA Hates Your Favorite Team
13 Noteworthy Projections

Since PECOTA is a probabilistic model, which means that it is designed to reflect the most probable outcome in a distribution of projected outcomes, Brewers fans should keep in mind that “84” is not some special or magic number. As demonstrated last season, a club that was expected (at best) to flirt with .500 surged ahead and competed for the playoffs, but that surge was not even greater than one standard deviation away from the projected win total. These Brewers could indeed use their strengths to once again push the club ahead of schedule by contending for a playoff spot or winning the division in 2018, or they could indeed sputter in development patterns or role depreciation and return closer to .500. What PECOTA reflects is that the Brewers’ big offseason moves (trading for Christian Yelich, signing Lorenzo Cain) did not guarantee them a playoff spot or even playoff contention, but instead, “more probable” competition or “more probable” playoff contention.

So, what’s going to make the Brewers “tick” in 2018? Here are my favorite picks from 2018 Brewers PECOTA:

PECOTA “punts” the Yelich Trade
Standing behind the curtain during some of the PECOTA work throughout the offseason, it was very interesting to see that the trade involving Lewis Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto for Christian Yelich….did not really “move the needle” on the Brewers’ 2018 expected win total. This is surprising given the court of public opinion, but there are two specific reasons that the trade does not immediately yield an absurd advantage for the 2018 Brewers: (1) Lewis Brinson’s high floor is real, and (2) Christian Yelich could experience some role depreciation. It’s always so easy to look at the best possible outcomes or potentialities in each trade; Brinson the future superstar, Yelich the 5.0 WARP player, but it’s also worth emphasizing Brinson’s risk in reaching his peak role and Yelich’s fluctuation between varying degrees of serviceable-to-great production.

Don’t get me wrong: Christian Yelich is a very good baseball player, and his contract makes him worth every potential prospect future that the Brewers surrendered. PECOTA thinks so, too, projecting Yelich primarily as a Brewers left fielder working a .279 TAv and serviceable fielding at a corner position. That’s good for 2.7 WARP, second only to Lorenzo Cain (3.5 WARP). But, remember that floor for Brinson? Even if the center fielder fails to reach his fullest and best hit tool (and therefore, fullest and best power) in the MLB, he’s still a speedy, strong defense, strong arm player in the center of the diamond. PECOTA projects Brinson at .262 TAv and an overall plus on defense for the Marlins, which is good for a club leading 2.5 WARP. This is great for both teams: the Brewers land a quality outfielder under control for five years who has already shown his developed peak abilities at the MLB level (while rounding out the club with a left-handed bat and better plate discipline), while Marlins fans immediately landed the face of their rebuild, the best player on their team, and (at best) someone who neutralizes the toxic offseason orchestrations of Project Wolverine.

Zach Davies and Orlando Arcia Remain Quietly Competitive
As mentioned, the Brewers contended in 2017 due to the “high floor” strengths of their youngsters: players like Orlando Arcia and Zach Davies were not set up to be immediate superstars, but still maintained quality, consistent MLB seasons that propelled the team along “behind the scenes.” PECOTA projects the same for 2018, although this time Zach Davies is leading the pitching staff with a solid 4.43 DRA over 170+ innings, good for a 1.6 WARP. Arcia sits behind Cain and Yelich in terms of overall WARP, but the young shortstop is projected to continue onward with excellent defense and a serviceable bat at shortstop. One could look at these players’ projections and emphasize that PECOTA sees them declining from their absolute 2017 WARP, but I don’t think the WARP is the point here. Instead, what matters is that this duo is still viewed as a quality backbone of the club, even with some attrition, which will undoubtedly serve crucial roles for grinding through 162.

The Outfield Depth is a Problem
Projecting the Brewers’ outfield depth was a nightmare. I previously wrote about how a rotational system can make five outfield spots work for Yelich, Cain, Santana, Ryan Braun, and Brett Phillips, but it’s much more difficult to put those ideals into the mixer and dissect the potential probabilities. Probability #1, which PECOTA currently projects sans Santana trade, is that Ryan Braun plays right field, but only some first base and left field, and therefore loses all of his defensive value. Both Braun and Santana suffer in this universe, creating a total of 1.9 WARP (but 75 extra base hits!) and TAv below .280. Comparable players for Domingo Santana are Oswaldo Arcia, Jonny Gomes, and Joc Pederson, and his plate discipline regresses (98 strike outs and 36 walks in 315 plate appearances). Granted, I do think there is still a path of optimism about the current roster depth (perhaps Braun works 1B more frequently, and Santana receives more regular playing time across the outfield, interleague designated hitter, and pinch hitting roles), but I do not think that means PECOTA is categorically mistaken for the pessimistic trends for Braun or Santana. After all, the current roster mash up is designed in a way to particularly showcase flaws for both Braun and Santana, which does not mean they’re bad baseball players (in fact, their TAv are projected to contend for best overall offensive production on the club), they simply may be imperfect ballplayers for this current roster.

Chase Anderson is Chase Anderson
There are many good stories about the 2017 Brewers, but it’s tough to find one that’s better than Anderson’s arrival as an impact starting pitcher. Anderson resonated with Brewers fans not simply because he was a previous low-to-mid rotation depth option who arrived as one of the very best pitchers in the National League, but because he also vindicated the mechanical, analytical, and strategic approach of pitching coach Derek Johnson. In 2018, PECOTA projects some of 2016 Anderson to return, particularly in the shape of walks, hits, and home runs, without phenomenal gains in strike outs or ground balls. Underlying modeling views Anderson as one of the most likely pitchers on the Brewers to “collapse” in 2018, and less likely to “improve,” and it’s not hard to squint and see a scenario in which a comparable of Dustin McGowan is suitable for the righty’s age-30 campaign. Even with all of this noted, Anderson’s DRA is projected at 4.59 for the year, which should be a better than average performance if the offensive environment holds steady. There is value in that performance over 168.0 innings pitched, and this type of season still validates the contract extension that Anderson signed.

The Bullpen is Fantastic
As a group, the primary Brewers bullpen as currently constructed looks fantastic. Josh Hader and Corey Knebel are projected as the most likely relievers to improve in 2018, but Jeremy Jeffress, Boone Logan, and Matt Albers also receive relatively strong scores in the category. The current main group is projected to produce a DRA below 4.30, which should demonstrate the potential for average or better production in most offensive environments that the arms face in 2018. Some red flags float beneath the surface, however, as the walk rates are slightly worse than average for the relief group, and outside of Adrian Houser, Jeffress, Albers, and Jacob Barnes the group is projected to have relatively low ground ball rates. Yet, even outside of Knebel and Hader the relievers are projected as a strong strike out group, suggesting that some of the slider-heavy moves of the offseason should pay dividends in high leverage situations.

Prospects Begin Appearing on the Scene
One of my favorite aspects of digging into PECOTA projections is the appearance of new faces to the MLB. Caden Lemons, Keston Hiura, KJ Harrison, and Tristen Lutz are all listed as highly improbable MLB players by PECOTA, but their appearance on the radar after the 2017 draft means that the system is now generating comparable players for this group. Jacob Nottingham was added to the 40-Man Roster at the beginning of the 2017-2018 offseason, and one of the comparable names that popped up in his player line is Jonathan Lucroy, which is fascinating for many reasons (not the least of which is Lucroy’s general reputation as a defense-first catcher for the beginning of his career, and Nottinghma’s floor as a back-up catcher with pop). Mauricio Dubon appears as one of the more probable MLB prospects for the club, and his line is a very serviceable utility infielder (.250 batting average, .380 slugging percentage).

Brewers fans might be most excited to see Corbin Burnes at the bottom of the club’s starting pitcher list with three starts, as the pop-up righty prospect is given relatively favorable odds to reach the MLB and a set of comparable players that effectively grade out his reliever risk, reliever potential, and (most excitingly) his starting pitching potential. Additionally, Adrian Houser is given lower odds of reaching the MLB in 2018, but seeing the power sinker reliever in the mix leads to an exciting scenario where the entire Carlos Gomez / Mike Fiers trade return is potentially playing with the Brewers during the same season.

It’s a good reminder that even though common perception is that the Brewers system took a big hit with the Christian Yelich trade, there is still an intriguing group of prospects potentially knocking at the door for 2018. Add an asterisk to this potential 83-win season, as one that exhibits contending-ready talent and depth roles that are still developing for more future success.

Photo Credit: Ken Blaze, USAToday Sports Images

Edit: Updated at 7:15 AM to reflect updated win total, from 84 to 83.

It is time to win. It is time to win now, it is time to win next year, and the year after that, and after those years, too. This is a thrilling feeling as a Brewers fan, especially as one who came of age as an everyday fan during the initial Doug Melvin rebuild. I gather this feeling is difficult for a fanbase that is so used to losing and disappointment so as to design defensive personalities toward the idea of going for it this year. But that’s over now: There’s never next year, not for the next five, and this completely reorients the Brewers organization. With Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto each head to Miami, clearing out three of the top ten spots (and two of the top three spots on the Baseball Prospectus 2018 Top 10). But that’s okay, take your pick: does RHP Freddy Peralta re-enter the top ten? 3B Lucas Erceg? C Mario Feliciano? RHP Marcos Diplan? OF Tristen Lutz? IF Mauricio Dubon? These are all prospects that did not reach the Baseball Prospectus Top 10 that still have Overall Future Potential (OFP) that are somewhere between “useful” and “interesting” MLB potential, and each has something to prove in 2018 (and more space within which to do so).

There will be more time to digest and analyze these moves, but now the Brewers faithful have immediately turned toward trading Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, and/or Keon Broxton. I am not simply playing the contrarian when I emphasize that the Brewers do not need to make such a move. First and foremost, each of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton remain under club reserve beyond the Ryan Braun era in Milwaukee, which means that the club can still play the long game with each of these players. It gets a little more difficult after Broxton will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2018, and Brett Phillips will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2019 (Brewerfan.net, 40-Man Roster).

But, the Brewers have a unique position of strength: first, they began a rest campaign for Ryan Braun in 2017, and there is no reason that the club cannot use a rest campaign for Lorenzo Cain as well. These players represent Milwaukee’s largest contracts, and the club has nothing to lose by remaining cautious with their health and playing time. By providing systematic rest to these veterans, the Brewers can gamble that these outfielders may be less susceptible to nagging injuries, and therefore maximize their potential production. It is worth it to Milwaukee to have the best possible versions of Cain and Braun available over the course of 162 and the playoffs. How can the club accomplish this and continue to win? By deploying some combination of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton between the bench and the minor leagues. Imagine these outfield sets:

Using a very basic assumption of four plate appearances per game for starters and one plate appearance for pinch hitters, these outfield schemes produce the following results:

This scenario obviously leans more on resting Braun than Cain, but more PA can be negotiated to maximize these scenarios. Phillips could serve as a defensive replacement for all three positions, and both Phillips and Santana could be used as late innings pinch hitters in various scenarios. Moreover, these scenarios are developed prior to considering injuries. Each of these players faces injury risks that could eat into playing time, which opens further opportunities for the next outfielder in line. If fans think about what it means to have an “analytic” front office, aggressive rest coupled with aggressive depth could be an important step in gaining an advantage over the 162 grind and the playoffs. In the World Series, after all, there will be a starting spot for three or four games for Braun, Cain, Yelich, and Santana; this is the type of long game that the Brewers can begin playing in rest strategies and roster building.

I am a proponent of the Brewers building the deepest team possible because the club needs every resource they can get in order to contend within their market. The club currently has enough cash to handle a signing of Cain and Yu Darvish or Jake Arrieta, so this is a real opportunity to build the best possible team for a half-decade span. At some point, trade returns for players like Santana, Phillips, and Broxton mean diminishing returns to the system. Neither Santana nor Broxton have enough of an MLB track record to yield impact prospect talent, and Phillips is in a strange in-between where he will neither be a likely trade destination for returning impact MLB talent or prospects. Holding steady with the outfield roster as is will work just fine; at worst, the club will run into a scenario in which players such as Hernan Perez, Stephen Vogt, Eric Sogard, or Jonathan Villar fail to make the MLB roster out of training camp. If that is the price to pay for significant outfield depth, that is a better price than to trade Santana, Phillips, or Broxton before necessary, and return a less attractive depth option at the first sight of injury or ineffectiveness during the season.

Photo Credit: Isaiah J. Downing, USAToday Sports Images

Relevantly, this includes the Brewers, who have not addressed their complicated outfield situation.  Last year, the outfield rotation was pretty well established.  Ryan Braun played left field, Domingo Santana played right field, and Keon Broxton split time with a few other players in center field.  Heading into 2018, though, the calculus was expected to be different.  One of those players that got a small portion of the center field at bats was Lewis Brinson, who is the club’s consensus top prospect and is at the point of his career where he needs major league at bats to continue his development.

Brinson is not the only youngster fighting for playing time, though.  Brett Phillips also performed well last year in minimal playing time (.293 TAv, 4.3 FRAA in 37 games), and he appears to be a capable like-for-like replacement for Broxton.  And given that Phillips’ prospect pedigree (Baseball America ranked him 80th in all of baseball this offseason), he likely has a higher ceiling than Broxton, thus incentivizing the club to prioritize Phillips ahead of Broxton.  Additionally, Hernan Perez and Jonathan Villar both got some playing time in the outfield last season, and the fact that they can play both infield and outfield increases their value because they are more versatile than is Broxton.

For these reasons, a common thought at the beginning of the offseason was that the Brewers would look to trade one of their outfielders.  Santana was a possible trade chip, as he now has a track record of being a productive big league hitter, and he is probably be the most attractive non-Brinson asset that the Brewers could dangle to bring back a front-line pitcher.  If Santana were to be dealt, Broxton could serve as a fourth outfielder and platoon with Phillips in left field.  He would also provide Brinson insurance in case something went wrong with the club’s top prospect.

If the Brewers decided to keep Santana, though, Broxton himself could have been a trade chip.  He was not so productive last year that the club could not replace him, and Phillips appears ready to step in and be the fourth outfielder.  A Broxton trade is trickier than a Santana trade because Broxton’s trade value as a cost-controlled role player is harder to determine, but it was nonetheless a possibility if the Brewers needed a way to address their roster logjam.

Three months into the offseason, though, nothing has been done to address this issue.  The slowness of the free agent market appears to have impacted the trade market as well; Gerrit Cole is the only pitcher of note to have changed teams this offseason, so Santana could still be included in a trade (for Chris Archer, for example).  The Brewers have therefore been hesitant to commit to a particular path, as trading Santana might encourage them to keep Broxton.

One might think that if Broxton is replaceable, then they should simply deal him and get a replacement if they also trade Santana.  As mentioned above, however, it’s unclear whether Broxton has much trade value.  He is still in his pre-arb years, but he is already 27 and so he isn’t a highly touted prospect who teams will be clamoring to get for the next four seasons.  He has accumulated 2.3 WARP in 700 plate appearances, which makes him a roughly league average player but not a standout.  He is therefore a valuable player to have on a big league roster, but he is not likely to be the type of player who returns a lot in a trade.  He may therefore be more valuable to the Brewers on the field (if they need him) than he would be to another team.

The Brewers’ front office is smart and capable of dealing with this problem, and they have shown they are not afraid to lose players for nothing even if there might still be some residual value.  It is here where the slowness of the market comes into play, however.  If a Santana trade happened or were ruled out in December, the Brewers would have had a couple months to figure out how to best use Broxton’s roster spot (whether it be on Broxton or on someone else).  Now, however, they are in a time crunch.

If they have decided that they will be keeping Santana, then Broxton is basically expendable.  And if they decided that in December because they had passed on all the potential deals, they would have had two months of watching the waiver wire to find players who were a better fit for their roster than Broxton.  I do not believe they have made that determination yet, though, so their roster is still in flux.

As I wrote two weeks ago about the second base situation, this is not an insurmountable problem.  It is, however, a way that the slowness of the market impacts the clubs beyond just delaying any roster decisions.  The Brewers will have less time to assess their options, and any potential waiver wire acquisitions may be more contested as teams are looking to finalize their rosters heading into spring training.

Photo Credit: Kim Klement, USAToday Sports Images

The tough aspect of relying on Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, and Keon Broxton to make center field work in 2018 is that the position was a weakness in 2017. Although many Brewers fans and analysts typically write off the offense and fielders as solid enough, the Brewers were indeed below average in terms of park-adjusted runs scored in 2017, and center field was one of the reasons for their inability to produce on offense. In fact, according to Baseball Reference the Brewers employed their center fielders for the fewest number of plate appearances among any position (636 PA), and the team’s .229 / .304 / .405 batting average / on-base percentage / slugging percentage performance was tied for the worst position on the team. Against league center fielders, the Brewers registered an 85 Split OPS+, meaning that the club’s center field position was approximately 15 percent below average compared to National League center field.

While it is easy for fans to dream on the eventual superstardom of Brinson or the high-floor depth offered by Phillips, it is difficult to write this duo in for a guaranteed, let alone probable, improvement if they are handed the reins for 162 center field games in 2018. On the latest Milwaukee’s Tailgate podcast, Ryan Topp made a similar argument, emphasizing that if Brewers fans are ready to run with Brinson and other young players, fans have to be ready for growing pains at the MLB level.

In short, center field is one of the clearest weaknesses remaining from the 2017 club. Lorenzo Cain immediately changes the outlook of the position, however, as the veteran offers elite fielding and average-or-better hitting for an impact package in the center of the grass. In fact, Cain is arguably the best overall free agent in the current class, and almost certainly the best position player free agent when assessing free agents by their three-year depreciated surplus value (which monetizes Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) while depreciating three-year performance by 10 percent per year in order to replicate an aging curve and nonlinear player development). I provided surplus tables in my introduction to the offseason, but it bears highlighting Cain’s strength.

First, assessed by his 2015-2017 performance, Cain is the best free agent in the 2018 field. But, even if one is concerned that Cain’s 2015 and 2017 seasons weigh too heavily in this equation, it is worth mentioning that Cain is the second best free agent in this field (second only to Jonathan Lucroy) based on his 2014-2016 performance as well.

Beyond basic rank, it is worth emphasizing that Cain also possesses another strength within this free agency class: the veteran center fielder boasts one of the biggest improvements between 2017 and 2018 surplus value within this field. The idea behind “Role Depreciation” is to not only track a player’s actual performance, or depreciated performance, over a certain period of time, but also to track the changes within those performances in order to gauge upward or downward trends. A concrete example of this concept might be found in a comparison between Orlando Arcia and Jonathan Villar; Villar posted a phenomenal 2016 WARP at shortstop, but may have been more reasonably expected to emerge as an average role player, which materialized in 2017, while Arcia’s expected first division shortstop role may lead one to reasonably expect improvement (or steady performance) following his 2017 campaign. Anyway, Cain is among the few free agents in this field to offer tangible improvement in his 2018 outlook:

One can anticipate that the major complaints about Lorenzo Cain will concern his age. Cain played his age-31 season in 2017, meaning that even a three-year free agency deal will need to cover his age-32 through age-34 seasons. Given that fans and analysts have an aversion to an aging curve that requires paying premium dollar to players on the wrong side of 30, Cain seems like an obvious pass by a small market club such as Milwaukee. However, I believe that this type of aging curve thinking is a bit too orthodox, and does not highlight the fact that certain players have different aging patterns that can be discerned from their performances. For instance, at age-31, Cain’s .280 True Average (TAv) and 19.5 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) drove a 5.6 WARP performance, which is the only 5+ WARP season by a center fielder in their 30s during the new Wild Card era (2012-2017). I have used this assumption to design detailed assessment of Ryan Braun’s aging patterns, and I hypothesize that the same approach could be used for Cain: once a player demonstrates elite production after age-30, they are on a different aging pattern than the one commonly suggested for all players.

Since center field is such a loaded position in the current MLB landscape, fans and analysts may not think of Cain as an elite center fielder, but the age-31 performance in 2017 was the best since Carlos Beltran’s 2008 and Johnny Damon’s 2005 (Baseball Prospectus CSV, retrieved January 5, 2018). A detailed search of center fielders in their 30s since the turn of the century demonstrates that this position is indeed one at which players can age and perform well; this is obviously a blanket statement that may not precisely track Cain deep into his 30s, but rather a call to understand that there may not be a typical aging curve among athletic center fielders.

Finally, Cain’s batting profile also presents a unique opportunity for the Brewers. Milwaukee’s offense is well-known as a three true outcomes (strike out, walk, home run) machine, especially heavy at the strike outs. Center field was easily the club’s worst plate discipline position, focusing on strike outs and walks:

Yet, this profile need not predetermine the club’s outlook for 2018. As Noah Nofz outlined at BPMilwaukee, the Houston Astros’ current roster incarnation began as a high-strikeout affair, before the club used internal adjustments and signings to bolster the club’s contact abilities. Should the Brewers seek this type of improvement, it is unlikely that the young Brinson and Phillips will offer this type of contact profile early in their respective careers; with adjustments over several years, both players may eventually be expected to improve in terms of discipline and contact profiles (which would also arguably track with their MLB success and accomplishing something akin to their best possible roles). Cain’s batting profile is already at that point of strong contact-discipline, which arguably adds to a case for his ability to withstand aging in center field:

All of this may seem futile as the Brewers’ rumored interest in Cain is nothing more than that, but the rumor itself provides an interesting opportunity to consider the composition of the club. With $50 million in additional MLB Advanced Media revenue due to the Brewers in spring 2018, and a slow free agency market leaving many impact players on the market, Milwaukee has a fantastic opportunity to immediately shape the best possible roster using their revenue, impact prospects, and system depth. Should this cyclone of free agency signings, development at the MLB level, and trades involve Lorenzo Cain in some way, shape, or form, the veteran outfielder’s return to Milwaukee would mean that the team has nabbed an elite free agent and immediately improved their center field outlook for fielding, production, and batting order discipline and contact.

Photo Credit: Dan Hamilton, USAToday Sports Images

Santana was the most advanced prospect at the time of the Houston mega-deal, and he’s flourished at the plate to the tune of a .308 TAv and 3.3 WARP in 2017, never mind that he bumbles around the outfield like a baseball-loving Inspector Clouseau.

Josh Hader debuted last year and exceeded expectations in Milwaukee after struggling in the thin air of Colorado Springs. Hader pitched to a 3.79 DRA and accumulated 0.7 WARP while punching out 12.8 batters per nine innings. He’ll play a prominent role on the 2018 pitching staff, be it as a starter, swingman, or high-leverage reliever.

Houser required Tommy John surgery last July after logging two big league innings as a September call up in 2015. He’s on his way back to Miller Park, earning rave reviews along the way, and should compete for a bullpen spot in 2018.

That’s already a more-than-solid return.

And then there’s Brett Phillips, deemed the “clear prize” of the deal per MLB Trade Rumors when news of the blockbuster broke. Phillips actually beat Hader to the majors last year, joining the big league squad on June 5 when Travis Shaw was placed on paternity leave. (Hader was recalled four days later.) But while the lanky lefty stuck in the Brewers’ bullpen for the rest of the season, Phillips bounced up and down from Colorado Springs to cover for injuries and ineffectiveness in Milwaukee as needed.

Considering his youth and see-saw journey between Triple-A and the bigs, the energetic outfielder’s play was electric. Phillips managed a strong .293 TAv and 1.1 WARP over 37 games and just 98 plate appearances. Any team would have been happy to plug his .276/.351/.448 batting line into their outfield mix, and that’s before you factor in his 4.3 Fielding Runs Above Average. In case you hadn’t heard, Phillips packs heavy artillery in the outfield.

All of this has understandably generated a lot of excitement among Milwaukee’s fans. It’s also left a few of those fans ready to anoint Phillips an everyday or near-everyday outfielder as soon as 2018. There’s been a steady drone of buzz suggesting that the Brewers should trade one of Lewis Brinson, Keon Broxton, or Santana in a package for a controllable young starter like Chris Archer or Danny Duffy this winter.

With Jimmy Nelson out for an unknown “chunk” of next season and the Brewers looking the part of plucky, upstart contenders, it’s an interesting thought. But advocates of handing Phillips the outfield reins should be cautioned that a repeat stat-line is unlikely. A closer look at his 2017 performance suggests that next season could be a year of growing pains.

One of the more glaring red flags in Phillips’ statistical profile is his .408 BABIP, a near-perfect reflection of the .412 mark he ran in the hitter’s haven of Colorado Springs. Phillips is no stranger to inflated BABIPs, having hovered near the .360s for much of his minor league career. He has some of the physical tools to sustain a higher number, such as plus speed and his line-drive launch angle, which sat at an above-average 13.27 degrees in the majors. But the league average BABIP hovers right around .300, and Phillips is likely headed for some regression in this department.

Various projection models and xStats agree. Phillips posted a strong wOBA of .338 last year, but his xwOBA was just .286. That’s the difference between Travis Shaw and José Peraza, who just ran a wRC+ of 62 en route to 0.3 WARP. Projections aren’t gospel, but the 2017 PECOTA long-term forecast pegged Phillips for a .252 TAv and 1.1 WARP over 378 plate appearances in 2018. That’s certainly decent, but it isn’t star-level production. Steamer is more skeptical, projecting Phillips for a .228 batting average and 0.1 fWAR in just 159 PAs.

The single biggest flaw in Phillips’ offensive game is his inconsistent ability to make solid contact. It’s telling that the 23-year-old struck out in 35 percent of his major league plate appearances. He employs a violent and at times wild swing, with an awkward weight transfer and  that can prevent him from reaching his above-average raw power.

Fortunately, Phillips is capable of making adjustments, as he’s had to do so numerous times to even reach the major leagues. At his peak, he could be an above-average regular in the outfield who sneaks his way onto a few All-Star teams when the batted balls bounce his way. Or he could settle in as a .240 batter who will sock 15-20 home runs, swipe a few bags, and whiff enough to keep the fans in the bleachers nice and cool on a summer day at Miller Park. At the very least, he should be able to match the career of Kirk Nieuwenhuis, who is invoked as Phillips’s most comparable player on the rookie’s Baseball Prospectus player card.

No matter his trajectory, Phillips is looking at a productive, multi-year career in the major leagues. His defensive prowess alone should see to that, and he has plenty of upside to offer, too. It’s good to be excited about Phillips’ future in Milwaukee. But he may not be the immediate answer for a team hoping to contend in 2018. Trading some outfield depth for starting pitching would be nice. But keeping that depth around would probably work out to be pretty nice, too.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

2018 Milwaukee Brewers Top Ten Prospects (and more)

The Brewers are in a bizarre state of flux as an organization, with the most hyped prospects of the 2015 and 2016 drafts largely stalled, injured, or drifting backwards save for an exception or two, and several of the rebuilding trades hanging in a suspended state of anticipation. This whole line could easily turn around if Lewis Brinson makes adjustments at the MLB level and hits, or Brett Phillips continues to override his weaknesses with a well-rounded set of secondary skills. As has been previously mentioned, the 2017 surprise success largely vindicated President Doug Melvin’s 2015 deadline trades (Zach Davies, Domingo Santana, and Josh Hader combined for 7.5 WARP), and the greatest steps forward in the minor league system (perhaps for the second consecutive year, if one counts last year’s Brandon Woodruff campaign) belonged to the late Bruce Seid’s 2014 draft (Monte Harrison for certain, as well as improving depth roles from Jake Gatewood, Troy Stokes, and Jordan Yamamoto).

Again, none of this is news to the Brewers minor league fan, but it’s worth repeating in order to process the difficulties and absurdities that define player development: there is no linear path to baseball success. Now, one of the ostensible reasons for the necessity of the Brewers rebuild (a weak homegrown farm system) will define key roles for the 2018 big league club (Orlando Arica, Jacob Barnes, Brent Suter, and the aforementioned Woodruff) and perhaps the next impact outfielder for the club (Harrison). A system in which Harrison potentially leapfrogs Brinson is fascinating insofar as it seemed highly improbable even a year ago, but then again, unexpected outcomes are the new normal in Milwaukee. This is the club whose rebuilding GM, David Stearns, has made his best moves at the MLB level (Travis Shaw, Chase Anderson, Jonathan Villar, and Junior Guerra) rather than with the minor leagues (Brinson is his major hope here).

Stearns awaits his first impact prospect graduation to the MLB level. Will 2018 be that year?

Update (9:15 AM): to visualize the system in another light, here is a look at the last five drafts, including the top five picks from each and their 2018 organizational outlook. Ten of these players dot the Top 20, including three top tier prospects, another two are already on the MLB roster, and two other prospects have defined the MLB roster via trade:

All of this is a prelude to a difficult question about the state of the Brewers minor league system once more. For a system with advanced quality prospects (Brinson, Woodruff, and Phillips still make the cut as rookies), there remains much risk in developing full MLB roles. Phillips may be the closest of the group to his impact role, as the fantastic defensive centerfielder and Three True Outcome bat showed just how an “inbetween” role at the MLB level can look at its best. My favorite comp for Phillips is Jarrod Dyson (who also happens to be one of my favorite free agent targets for the Brewers), as Dyson exemplifies the “true fourth outfielder” role, someone who has evident shortcomings in terms of pure scouting but uses his strengths to define an extended career. Dyson is a 9.7 career WARP player despite never cracking 350 plate appearances in a season; he has become one of the most valuable players of his draft class and a true anomaly as a player that can define a career through a string of sub-2.0 WARP seasons.

As for Brinson, the BP Prospect Team listed one risk: “He may not hit major-league pitching. Wheeee!” In extended form: “Brinson has shown the ability to make adjustments at each level, but he’s also needed adjustment time. I find those prospects to be a bit riskier at the highest level.” Woodruff, on the other hand, does not exhibit the same type of risk as someone like Brinson, as the righty has never been held to All-Star ultimate roles. But, even if the “will he be a reliever?” debate is not as loud with Woodruff as it was (and is) with Josh Hader, it remains, hiding within the necessary adjustments in Woodruff’s secondary pitch approach. This is not an incurable problem, as it is worth noting that Zach Davies had the same back-end rotation versus bullpen question marks, and has since adjusted his arsenal and approach into an MLB rotational bulldog stance.

Any warnings about Brinson are worth extending to Monte Harrison, perhaps the most stunning solid Top Five appearing in the 2018 list. One can learn from Brinson’s MLB transition in order to temper hype expectations for Harrison, as indeed the pure athlete has already demonstrated the extent to which a professional baseball career will take its twists. 2017 top draftee Keston Hiura joins Harrison at the very heights of the list, arguably the best prospect in the system on the basis of that hit tool, but knocked down a rung depending on how one views the defensive scenario for Hiura. The second baseman-to-be will inevitably receive every chance he needs to stick in the infield, and then he’ll get every chance to stick in the outfield, too. One wonders if he might, at worst, follow a path blazed by Jason Kipnis, who certainly showed that an impact second baseman need not bring the leather year after year.

Corbin Burnes rounds out the new faces in the Top Five. The righty might exemplify the risk-hype wager for the Brewers system, as Burnes will almost certainly not meet the expectations of Brewers fans who are solely scouting his stat line thus far. Burnes became quite an interesting case study throughout the 2017 season, as scouting reports based on early season viewings had yet to capture his delivery adjustments that occurred later in the season, and almost everyone on Brewers Twitter had conflicting information about his stuff. It was interesting to watch the developments unfold, certainly a lesson to fans that (1) statistics do not mean a thing at the minor league level because (2) there is often significant disjoint between those stats and the scouting of mechanical adjustments and organizational approaches with minor leaguers. There are numerous player development hurdles to define role risk for prospects before one considers questions about information asymmetries.

What is intriguing is that Burnes may be one of the clearest prospects on this list to quickly reach his peak role, middle rotation starter.

Let us bask in the mid-rotation arm that could be Burnes, and destroy the narrative that “the Brewers do not have any aces.” This concern occurs again and again with Brewers fans, and it’s as unnecessary an application of unrealistic expectations that could exist within baseball fandom. Here, leaning on the successes of 2017 can provide worthwhile lessons going forward: Jimmy Nelson was never scouted as an ace, Chase Anderson was never an ace, Zach Davies was never an ace, even Josh Hader was never an ace. Brent Suter? Junior Guerra? ….well… Anyway, you’ve clearly seen the point by now: MLB pitching is quite a volatile endeavor, with very few pitchers piecing together consistent MLB campaigns (or even consecutive, successful MLB campaigns as regular starters). Should Davies follow up on his 2017 season with another good year, for instance, even he would be catapulted into some fantastic category, “MLB pitcher with three consecutive better-than-average seasons.” If Davies does that, and Burnes is even Zach Davies, the Brewers rotation will be solid beyond belief.

If you do not learn anything else from the Milwaukee Brewers 2018 Top Prospect list, hopefully you will walk away with the view of the benefits of having multiple advanced-minors, mid-rotation pedigree arms lined up. For that matter, even the value of having multiple players stacked at any position should be evident; now, the 2020 Milwaukee Brewers do not necessarily rely on Lewis Brinson in the outfield. Through the layers of 5,000 universes, it’s probably Brinson, but we also know that it could be Phillips, or it could be Harrison (or of course, someone else entirely). Each of these statements, each of these players, obviously means different things for the Brewers, who could be a 76-win team in 2020 after peaking with this current roster. So it goes: once you walk away with the lesson about aces, or #TeamDepth, or role risk, you gain the comfortable certainty of player development and team-building volatility. The best part is that many of these players are close to the MLB, meaning that Brewers fans will soon get to agonize over a new, tumultuous journey.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images