It was interesting to see the national media descend on the Brewers-Cubs play-in game, because outside of maybe the A’s in the American League, no one plays baseball like the Brewers, and if you’re not familiar with them, they can be confusing. Baseball Prospectus alum Joe Sheehan wanted Counsell to be even more aggressive than he already is with his bullpen, and with Hader in particular. Every pundit fixated on Hader, and every non-Hader move was greeted with a chorus of “he’s going to lose it before he gets to Hader”. If you follow the Brewers routinely, you know that, at least in the Brewers’ opinion, Hader is most effective on longer-than-normal rest for a reliever. Counsell was never saving him for an antiquated “save” situation, he was saving him to slam the door, and because the the Cubs’ lineup construction that day, Counsell was able to do so while also deriving the maximum benefit of the platoon advantage. But it’s not just that using Hader earlier would have left them vulnerable later, it’s also that the rest of the bullpen, when used properly, is nearly as effective as the big gun.

Really understanding the bullpen involves understanding platoon pitchers, and dominant pitchers. Most pitchers have platoon splits, but Hader holds opposite side pitching to a .548 OPS. Lefties may be completely helpless against him, but righties are still the equivalent of the worst hitters in baseball. Jeremy Jeffress, who was arguably as good, if not better than Hader this season, has a very small reverse platoon split. Corey Knebel, after his earlier demotion, was just as dominant. Corbin Burnes is also equally effective against both lefties and righties, and because he has starters chops, can take multiple innings when needed. These guys, plus a few select others, can be used for multiple innings against anyone, but they are not the only guns in the holster. The bullpen is amazingly deep, and Counsell excels at using platoon dominance to string together overall dominance. The best recent example of this is lefty Dan Jennings’ lone start of the year, which prompted to the St. Louis Cardinals to play their right-handed lineup, which allowed Freddy Peralta to dominate them after Jennings retired the sole Cardinal lefty, Matt Carpenter, and then promptly left the game. The Brewers do this on a small scale throughout every game they play. 

Counsell had the most difficult job in the National League in terms of bullpen management, going to his bullpen more frequently, and with greater success than any other manager. Tom Verducci wrote a brilliant article on this topic just the other day, citing the amazing fact that the Brewers’ starters stayed in to face batters a third time  in a game less frequently than any other playoff team, including the Oakland A’s. League-wide, only two teams put their starters in this vulnerable position less, and it worked brilliantly.

The Brewers also shift more than just about any other team, and players are often asked to play in uncomfortable spots to extend benches, and allow for greater flexibility in pitching and defensive changes. Earlier this season when the offense was struggling, Counsell gave it a shot in the arm by playing Eric Thames in the outfield. Thames occasionally looked comically bad doing so, but generally speaking, he did a passable job, and the offensive upgrade paid dividends. Later, after the Brewers acquired Mike Moustakas, Travis Shaw was asked to play second base, where he is about half a man larger than almost anyone else who plays there. He took to it well, and is now a crucial piece of the Brewers’ best possible lineup against right-handed pitching.

Shifts and player acquisitions come from the front office, but Counsell has the unenviable task of implementing these strategies while keeping everyone happy. Let’s not underestimate how difficult it is to not just order Shaw to play a very difficult defensive position, but to have him embrace it, and not suffer in other parts of his game. This season, Jesus Aguilar played third base, Jonathan Schoop played shortstop, Ryan Braun played first base, Travis Shaw played first base, and Hernan Perez played everywhere. Players crave comfort, and professing the breakdown of rigid positions is one of Counsell’s key achievements.

The Brewers also sent down former closer Corey Knebel and shortstop Orlando Arcia due to struggles during the season. Some players view such demotions as something to sulk over, or as punishment, but both responded brilliantly, playing some of their best ball. Ultimate credit for this obviously should go to the players themselves, but Counsell is charged with reintegrating these guys upon recall, and both came back stronger than ever.

The front office made some strange acquisitions throughout the year turning over the bottom of the lineup and bullpen frequently, and adding some star power at the deadline. Some of these, like journeyman reliever Mike Zagurski, flamed out almost immediately, but Erik Kratz stuck with the team in a big way. Kratz is an elite pitch framer, and because the Brewers employ so many command-and-control starters like Zach Davies and Wade Miley, Kratz was absolutely crucial to team success. Manny Pina is a good catcher in his own right, and has continued to contribute when he plays, but Counsell paired up Kratz with players who would benefit most from his skill set, and it has stuck.

The Brewer lineup is deadly against right-handed pitching due to a lefty heavy lineup that includes Yelich, Shaw, Moustakas, Thames, and Schoop, who enjoys reverse platoon splits. They struggle against lefties more, especially when Braun is hurt, but Counsell remains one of the best at getting the most out of his left handed hitters even when a lefty starts. Because of the depth of the Brewer bench, they frequently blow through opposing LOOGYs and wind up with their lefty mashers against a slew of righty relievers. Counsell also excels at creating a “closer” defensive alignment featuring Shaw at first base, Arcia at shortstop, and Keon Broxton in the outfield with Cain and Yelich. The Brewers are already one of the best in the bigs at turning ball in play into outs, but this defensive alignment makes stringing hits together almost impossible.

The Most Managing, The Best Managing

I think the strongest argument for Counsell as a manager is that for so long, most managers simply went through the motions, adhering to bullpen roles, sometimes double-switching, maybe playing platoons later in the game. Counsell is actively managing all the time, and getting the biggest advantages possible out of his players.The Brewers almost never sac bunt, they steal bases, efficiently, like mad, and when fully healthy, they make life hard with their pitchers, and their lineup. Counsell is a perfect mix of former player, ex-front office as Special Assistant to Doug Melvin, and manager. He can relate to his players on their level, he isn’t too proud to listen to his front offices ideas, and he commands the clubhouse well enough to keep everything working and in balance. The Brewers are 33-19 in one-run games. These are usually toss-ups, but with Milwaukee I don’t think that’s the case. If you were putting together a team to win close games, you would take all of the steps I described before.

Ultimately the players deserve credit for their success, and every Brewer player should be extremely proud of what they have accomplished, but Counsell has put everyone in a position to not just win, but to have an advantage over whoever they are facing. Managing is improving in baseball, but there are still a shocking number of old-school guys mucking up their teams. While Counsell is not unique in terms of progressive philosophy, no one did a better job combining clubhouse management with advanced strategy. He is easily the National League’s best manager, and should win the award.

Last night (August 17th, 2018) was an absolute travesty as Craig Counsell allowed Jordan Lyles, who is bad and has a career 5.35 ERA, to pitch multiple innings in a one run game. In his second inning of work after the offense managed to claw their way back to a single run deficit, Lyles would load the bases on a single, a hit batsman, and a walk. Kolten Wong would cash in with a 2-run double, and the game was essentially over.

Leaving in Lyles to face the heart of the order was questionable to begin with, but once Jose Martinez singled it was almost certainly time to go get him. Once he plunked Dejong it was definitely time to go get him. Once he walked Jedd Gyorko alarm bells should have been going off in the Brewer dugout.

I’ve had several discussions about win probability in this game, with several people citing the fact that the Brewers were likely to lose the game anyway in defense of the idea that a good pitcher should not be wasted. I find this idea preposterous for a few reasons. First of all, if a club can get to the top of the 9th inning down by a run, they have roughly a 15 percent chance (about ⅙) to come back and tie the game, and about an 11 percent chance of winning outright. That’s a longshot, but it’s hardly hopeless, and teams routinely rally from one run deficits. Bud Norris is hardly a “lights out” closer. If you give your opponent a 3-run lead your odds plummet to between 2 percent and 3 percent, or 1/50. Wong is a left-handed hitter with substantial platoon splits, and retiring him without allowing a run would have boosted the team’s odds from hopeless to pretty good. Outcomes with a 10 percent to 15 percent chance of occurring happen all the time. But even if you didn’t want to use Hader, surely Dan Jennings, a lefty who hadn’t pitched since August 15th,  would have been a better option than Lyles who, for his career, allows an .822 OPS to lefties.

Punting on a game that the Brewers will win 1/9 of the time is inexcusable at this point in the season, and doubly so when you consider that a win by the Cardinals draws them a game closer to the wild card spot. The Brewers didn’t just flit away an 11 percent chance at a win, they also flitted away an 11 percent chance at causing the Cardinals to suffer a loss. And what did they gain by having one of their worst relievers pitch an extra inning?

Not much. Jeremy Jeffress, who is perfectly capable of pitching on back to back days, hasn’t pitched since the 15th. He joins Dan Jennings, who can seemingly pitch every day if you want him to. Hader hasn’t pitched in a week, last facing the Braves for two innings and 29 pitches on August 11th. Oh, and Corbin Burnes also hasn’t pitched since the 15th. If you are so very concerned about the game on August 18th, even if the team used Hader on the 17th, they would still have at least three quality relievers on at least three days rest. If you can’t manage a close game with such a well-rested bullpen, you frankly don’t deserve to be a manager.

Given the stakes, given the fact that everything was doubled by virtue of the opponent, and given the fact that no good relief pitchers had pitched in forever, there was no reason to let Wong put the Brewers yesterday. The race is close and if Counsell was managing reliever useage for the stretch run, it would be nice if someone would alert him that we have arrived at the stretch run. Hader and Jeffress are on pace to pitch 76 and 73 innings respectively. This is not an onerous amount, and given that much of Hader’s work actually took place in April, it’s more likely that he pitches under 70 innings for the year than over 80. By restricting him to games with leads, they’ve cost themselves wins while saving him for games that never occur. It’s likely at this point in the season, that those will cost them a playoff spot. 

Then, near the end of the first half, they slowly started to undo all of the good they’d done earlier; it is now an open question as to whether they truly are intelligently managed, or if they just happened to luck into a winning strategy without realizing it was a winning strategy.

We have all of these great stats for baseball players because baseball is mostly a series of easily quantifiable individual acts, but there are certain interlocking parts on defense and in the bullpen. If you muck with any of those, you can drastically change your fortunes. It all started innocently enough on May 9th. May 9th was the day the Corey Knebel was activated from the disabled list, and when that happened it completely changed how Craig Counsell used his stable of relievers for the worse.

The best way to demonstrate this is in Counsell’s use of Josh Hader. Hader had been used as a multi-inning fireman through all of April and most of May. Through May 25th, Hader made 18 total appearances, and in 12 of those appearances he pitched between two and three innings. He only made an appearance of one inning or less on three occasions. On May 21st, Knebel resumed a proper “closer” role, entering in the 9th inning to finish games in his next four appearances, and finishing the job three times. After Knebel became the closer, Hader’s usage plummeted.

After May 25th, Hader would only pitch more than one and two-thirds inning once, in a 3-inning appearance against the Twins on July 3rd. Hader made 13 appearances after May 25th, and lasted one inning or less in 7 of them. It’s fine to be careful with Hader as he’s a unique weapon when healthy, but this hardly seems like being careful. The ideal use of Hader probably looks like the early season version, with multi-inning appearances followed by one or two days of rest. This run of shorter appearances with one over-long appearance, seems bad.

It might not have been quite so bad had Matt Albers stayed healthy. Albers has been quietly excellent, and having him around with Jeremy Jeffress and Hader makes the bullpen mostly idiot-proof. But Albers last pitched on June 11th, and without him, things have fallen apart. Craig Counsell’s refusal to use Hader in games where the Brewers trail, even by small margins, has severely limited his use. Worse still, Counsell’s willingness to go to the weak part of the bullpen when they trail resulted in big innings for bad pitchers. Dan Jennings is ok, but he’s just OK, and his 3.76 Earned Run Average (ERA) and 1.325 Walks and Hits per Innings Pitched (WHIP) don’t warrant having been used more than the outstanding Jeffress, but that is exactly what has happened. Jacob Barnes has thrown 37 innings with a WHIP of 1.568. Mike Zagurski actually pitched innings. And, of course, Knebel’s automatic entry into save situations with a 4.53 FIP and 3.93 DRA isn’t exactly helping either.

Counsell, in many ways, has reverted to making the decisions of an average manager, except it’s almost worse as he’s put the typical constraints of a closer on his best fireman as well.

The Starters
 
The Brewers can’t afford to run a stupid bullpen, because their starters are a powder keg of dynamite sitting on a pile of twigs and oil-soaked rags inside of a magnifying glass factory. If you read Baseball Prospectus regularly you probably already know about DRA (Deserved Run Average) but if you don’t, DRA attempts to get to the true value of a pitcher by controlling for the factors outside of a pitcher’s control. It adjusts for things like the ballpark a pitcher pitches in, the quality of the catcher, the defense, the weather, the altitude, and a host of other issues. I consider DRA to be mostly a “front office stat” in that it’s most useful if you want to take a pitcher from some other environment, and stick him into yours. If a pitcher on your favorite team is bad and DRA says he should be good, from a fan perspective, it doesn’t really matter that his DRA is good. The results were bad, and that’s what counts.

In this case, I think it actually should matter to fans. The first thing you should know is that the DRA of every Brewer starter is terrifying. Zach Davies has a 5.71 DRA. Wade Miley has a 5.43 DRA. Junior Guerra has a 5.13 DRA.  Those are bad numbers, and with one exception, every Brewer starter’s ERA is drastically lower than their DRA.

Suter is close, but according to DRA, much of the success of pitchers like Chacin, Anderson, Guerra, and Miley is due to “other factors.” Unfortunately, the Brewers have removed many of those “other factors” from the team of late. One of the big other factors is the defense of Orlando Arcia.

Arcia has struggled with the bat all season, and there’s nothing wrong with sending him on a trip to Colorado Springs to get right. However, Arcia has now been effectively gone for about a month given his lack of regular playing time in late June before he was sent down on July first, and while Arcia’s bat has been awful, losing him comes with a real cost on defense. Arcia’s 3.7 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) is second only to Lorenzo Cain, and he accumulated that number in far fewer attempts. On a per play basis, Arcia is likely the best Brewer defensive player, and I suspect almost all defensive metrics understate his true value. The Brewers are on the high end in terms of teams who employ the shift, and Arcia’s greatness in the field allows the team wide latitude in positioning their lesser defenders. If Nate Orf is playing shortstop, it’s much more difficult to commit extra infielders to the right side, knowing that any hits to the left will be hopeless. Orf, Tyler Saladino, and Brad Miller aren’t in the same league as Arcia defensively, and while Saladino has had a nice offense surge lately, they are not good enough offensively to compensate for the lack of Arcia’s glove.

Simultaneously, the Brewers have attempted to get more offense into the lineup by playing Eric Thames in the outfield. When the Brewers have Cain, Christian Yelich, and Ryan Braun/Domingo Santana/anyone else, they have an outstanding defensive outfield, but with Cain missing some time lately, and Thames playing more frequently, the outfield defense has suffered at the same time the infield defense is suffering. The Brewers have taken everything that was working earlier, fundamentally misunderstood why it was working, and turned it on its head. The smidgen of extra offense they may have created simply isn’t worth it.

 
What Should They Do?
 
If the Brewers plan to roll with this pitching staff, the first thing they should do is call up Arcia, and commit to living with whatever issues he may have offensively. More than anything, they need to go back to leaning on their strengths. During the All-Star game it was discovered that Josh Hader wrote several racist, homophobic, and misogynistic tweets when he was in high school seven years ago. He has apologized, will undergo sensitivity training for whatever that’s worth, and will not be suspended, but from a baseball perspective, it will be interesting to see if the constant boos and heckling he is likely to encounter for the foreseeable future will render him less effective. He was already showing some signs of mortality before the incident, and if this compounds whatever physical issues he may have been experiencing, it could destroy the team’s chances.

If Hader can no longer be relied on, it’s imperative that they do the next best thing and use Jeremy Jeffress as they did early season Hader, and if Corbin Burnes can help fill the gap, so much the better.

Monkeying with internal personnel has hurt the team more than it has helped, and Milwaukee could stand to acquire at least one more bat, and if possible, a high-strikeout starter. Having an actual good pitcher who can go deep into games and limit balls in play would have a cascade effect on the bullpen by allowing them more rest, while also boosting the offense. If the pitcher is not as reliant on the defense, the team can afford to sacrifice some defense with moves like having Thames in the outfield.

The Brewers could also address the offense more directly by acquiring a bat, preferably at the catcher position. With Manny Machado off the market, improving on offense at shortstop is likely a fools’ game at this point, but the catchers are still awful, and an upgrade would do a world of good. They could also potentially upgrade at 2nd base as Jonathan Villar has been a disappointment, and it would not be surprising to see the team acquire Brian Dozier from the Twins. Whatever moves they make, they need to bolster their strengths, not replace a major strength in one area with a comparatively minor upgrade in another.

When Knebel was out, the baseball universe taught the Brewers several good lessons about how baseball could, and should be played. As soon as their closer came back they reverted to every old bad habit that they could, and while they clearly understand their own weaknesses on offense, they don’t seem to grasp the trade-offs that can accompany fixing those issues. Hopefully the return of Albers takes care of the bullpen. Hopefully Arcia’s recent success at AAA gets him back to the big leagues in short order. Hopefully the players play their way into their proper roles. I had all of the confidence in the world in Counsell to make this all happen earlier, but that confidence has mostly eroded. Here’s to hope and dumb, stupid luck.

Related:
Depth Beats Attrition
Trust the Rotation
Aces Do Not Exist
How to Turn One Hader into Two and a Half Chris Sales

Teams are eager to rely on their bullpens more frequently, and at 5.18 IP/GS for his starters, manager Craig Counsell is about as eager as anyone to turn away from the third time through the order as a starter.

If you’re new to baseball analytics, one of the best possible strategies to learn is the starting pitcher’s “times facing a batting order.” The table above demonstrates On-Base-Percentage plus Slugging-Percentage each time through the order for National League starting pitchers. This may seem like a trivial aspect of the game, but if you read the new midseason scouting reports emerging on your favorite arms, or even look into 2018 MLB Draft scouting reports, chances are you’ll see a line like “without a third pitch, a role in the bullpen could be most likely.” What you’re reading, in nearly any variation of this line, is the strategic idea that in order to beat MLB batters a third time through the order, a starting pitcher is going to need additional pitches to cross-up batters and make adjustments as the game deepens. Milwaukee left-hander Warren Spahn is classically attributed with the quote, “pitchers need two pitches, one they’re looking for and one to cross them up,” but even here Spahn was not quite right; a pitcher needs as many pitches as are necessary to adjust to their designated role. I imagine that if you’re Warren Spahn (perhaps much like Ben Sheets or Clayton Kershaw), life is rather easy with mostly two pitches; if you’re Dave Bush or Victor Santos or Zach Davies or pretty much anyone of the other 300+ starters that work in the MLB, life with only two pitches would probably be miserable.

But perhaps the stats speak on their own: last year, the average NL batter the first time through the order was Cory Spangenberg. By the third time through the order, the average NL batter was Christian Yelich. In order to keep batters closer to the Cory Spangenberg level of production, having command of that third pitch (with a quality “stuff” grade, too) will get the scouts ready to slap that “#3 SP” Overall Future Potential grade.

Manager Craig Counsell was handed a group of supposedly below average-to-horrendous starting pitchers according to most Brewers fans, but as most fans could have surmised from the 2017 squad, pitching was the strength of the organization. And indeed, pitching has continued to serve as the strength of the 2018 club, although statistics like Deserved Run Average suggest that the club may be due for some regression to the mean (in terms of preventing runs). But what was most important about the 2017-2018 offseason was that GM David Stearns built a pitching system, and Counsell’s eagerness to pull starters at just the right time has indeed reflected a machine-oriented approach to pitching. Setting aside the injured Zach Davies and the mechanics-ironing Chase Anderson, the 2018 Brewers starting rotation is lead by Chacin (4 Runs Prevented in 69.0 IP), Brent Suter (2 Runs Prevented in 63.3 IP), and Junior Guerra (approximately 9 Runs Prevented in 60.3 IP after Tuesday night). Counsell has pulled these pitchers early almost uniformly; the Table below compares each pitcher’s last major workload as a starting pitcher to their 2018 workload, in terms of facing a batting order multiple times:

This is what managing with an elite bullpen can do for someone: pretty much every night of the week, Counsell can give each starting pitcher the same workload. In contrast to the narrative of burned out bullpens, which Kyle Lesniewski has also studied at Brew Crew Ball, it is worth arguing that Counsell is providing starting pitchers with a clearer definition of a workload. In fact, the old saying for starting pitchers to “go as deep as you can into the game” is rather problematic; if your stuff isn’t there, you’re probably done after 100 pitches and five (or fewer innings), which will be offset by the great 7.0-to-8.0 IP evenings, or complete games. Counsell and the Brewers are almost giving their starting pitchers better role certainty than any “traditional” starting pitcher has ever had (at least in the last 30 years): “give me your best 16 outs.” This is how you turn Guerra, Chacin, and Suter in a 15 Runs Prevented machine, which is one hell of a low rotation, by the way, and exactly the type of performance that turns a low rotation into an entity that offsets the lack of a so-called “Ace” at the top.

Has it worked? The Table below demonstrates that while there are some hiccups along the way, this Big Three low rotation has indeed improved in at least one area of the game, and in some cases the third time through the batting order is receiving grand benefits. These stats are even before Guerra’s course correction at Cleveland:

What is notable about minimizing a pitcher’s times through the batting order is that they can theoretically readjust their plan of attack. Someone like Guerra or Chacin no longer has to think about establishing his best stuff and figuring out what he’s going to do 100 pitches later; Suter might not ever have been expected to go that deep into ballgames, but even the Raptor-esque southpaw can arguably find some benefit in his ballgame by understanding that he needs to go 16 outs. Looking through Brooks Baseball pitching logs, it is arguably the case that what Counsell (and presumably Stearns, coaching staff, and the Front Office in this case) is doing is indeed turning each of these guys into….let’s call them “really, really long relievers who start the game”:

• According to Brooks Baseball, compared to his full season in 2016, Junior Guerra cut his splitter and slider usage (both below 15 percent!) while increasing his secondary running fastball (which Guerra selected approximately 23 percent of the time entering Tuesday night). As a result, Guerra is getting more whiffs on both of his fastballs as a group, and improving his slider whiffs without yielding too much value from his splitter. He’s also improving his pop-ups, suggesting batters are getting weak contact even though they are facing his fastball more frequently (presumably making Guerra more “predictable”).

• As covered by Andrew Salzman in the latest Weekend Recap at BPMilwaukee, Brent Suter is becoming a fastballl-first pitcher. The southpaw is firing what appears to be a near-cutting, rising fastball (think Jacob Barnes) two-thirds of his offerings, with good results in terms of improving swings-and-misses.

• By contrast, Chacin is much more of his previous self, with the caveat that he’s working his slider slightly more frequently than in 2017 while moving away from his primary fastball a bit. His outcomes with these pitches are rather similar as well, which suggests that even if the Brewers are deploying Chacin in a manner that is more systematic and potentially more radical, he is not deviating from what got him through a very successful 2017 campaign, earning him his excellent contract.

Milwaukee is receiving much deserved praise for their bullpen, which was expertly curated by David Stearns during his first two seasons with the club. Now the rewards are visible during what could become one of the most important seasons in franchise history, returning the club to their first extending contending window in quite some time. But it is worth emphasizing that Stearns was correct in assembling a starting pitching staff that could complement the relief staff, and together with the efficient fielders, the arms are a Runs Prevented machine. None of these moves were terribly difficult to make, either, which means that the most thrilling part of this series of moves is that they can be repeated in future seasons: Junior Guerra was Stearns’s very first acquisition, Brent Suter was a deep draft pick during the Doug Melvin era that was freed into a stunning big league role, and Jhoulys Chacin was a proven veteran signed off the margins of an underwhelming free agency class that nevertheless yielded some surprising contracts elsewhere. This is what systematic baseball can look like in Milwaukee, and it involves neither being “cheap” (Chacin signed a decent guaranteed deal) nor “dogmatic” about acquisition style (waivers, free agency, and draft are represented here). Most importantly for the prospect arms, both hyped (Corbin Burnes and Luis Ortiz) and unassuming (Freddy Peralta and others), the Brewers front office is gleefully demonstrated that nobody needs aces any longer. Bring your two best pitches for 16 outs, and let’s get on with it!

Photo Credit: David Richard, USA Today Sports Images

Resources:
Baseball Reference. Player Pitching Splits, NL Pitching Splits, 2016-2018 [CSV].

These rules are important, because they added a component of strategy. This means that data needs to be gathered to analyze the proper strategy. A few baseball sites have been gathering this type of information. The one that I will use today is the Retrosheet information.

Before anything further gets pointed out, it’s important to acknowledge that umpires are very good at their jobs. In 2015 only 48.86% percent of challenges were overturned, and in 2016 47.5% of calls have been overturned (the 2016 data only goes until June 30th).

With this new strategy, managers now have another added component to their jobs. They wield  more responsibility towards the game. Therefore, let’s look at how Craig Counsell and other managers have decided to utilize those challenges.

Counsell wasn’t the manager for the entire season in 2015, but he definitely used the most challenges out of the two Brewers managers. As mentioned before, in 2015 managers were successful in only 48.86% of their challenges. Counsell was right around that mark at 48% himself in 2015, but he only challenged 25 plays all year, which ranked 27th out of 74 managers who used a challenge. But, most of those are managers that barely used any challenges and are clustered at the bottom, where they’ve challenged less than ten plays, meaning that Counsell didn’t challenge many plays in 2015.

2016, however, is a different story.

Counsell has already challenged 22 plays and ranks 16^th. The reason I bring this up is because it seems as though teams should be challenging more plays.

As Jesse Wolfersberger wrote for The Hardball Times:

“So, should a manager challenge a one-on, one-out play in the first inning? According to my analysis, the likely answer is ‘yes.’ I found that the expected number of any over-turnable plays in a given game is less than one. Further, the expected number of over-turnable plays that go against your team in a medium-to-high leverage situation is far less than one.

Bottom line for managers: If there is a call that you have even a 50/50 chance of reversing, you should probably challenge, no matter the inning or the game situation. The odds are, there won’t be a better time to use that challenge later in the game.”

In total, managers only used their challenges in 28.1% of games in 2015, and the Brewers only challenged plays in 20.4% of their games.

This seems incredibly inefficient. In theory, teams should probably use their challenge at least once a game. It doesn’t even matter whether they get it right most of the time. Of course, if there is a close, and critical play in the fifth or sixth inning, the manager should use his challenge, but there are a number of times when managers don’t use their challenges. Basically, managers often go through an entire game without a single challenge being used, even though it wouldn’t hurt to try to challenge a play in the eighth inning (even if it didn’t really have a good chance of being overturned).

Who knows, maybe the people reviewing the game will make a mistake.

There are obviously aesthetic reasons as to why this wouldn’t be an enjoyable way of watching baseball. More replays means more delays, which means more downtime, and therefore, longer games. But, this shouldn’t be the concern of the manager and the team; their goal is to win games.

This is a flawed system, and it’s odd that managers aren’t abusing the ability of these challenges.

It’s in many ways like the forfeit rule. As Henry Druschel pointed out, teams can use the forfeit rule when a game is basically out of reach, “Teams are almost certainly harming their long-term win rates in a meaningful way by playing until every out of every game has been recorded. For example, the Red Sox encountered a grueling quirk of the schedule on Wednesday night, when they were scheduled to play the Orioles at 7:05 p.m. before traveling to Detroit and playing the Tigers at 1:10 p.m. the next day. When it began to pour in Baltimore at roughly 9:00 p.m., the Red Sox were leading 8-1 after six innings, but imagine if the situation was reversed, and Boston was instead trailing 8-1 with three innings to go. Their odds of coming back to win such a game would be something like 0.5 percent. In such a scenario, they could either wait in the clubhouse until the game was either resumed or officially cancelled, or they could forfeit as soon as the rain began, and head for the airport and Detroit right away.”

Teams jump through loops on end to try and get an advantage, and yet, there are still aspects of the game that are done inefficiently.

Expanded replay is here to stay. Once that door was opened, there’s no shutting it ever again. But, the way replay is done can always be changed and altered. Right now, we have a challenge system. It adds a layer of strategy, but for some reason, teams seem to be more concerned with getting the play right, than to use the replay challenges to it’s potential.

Bonus:
Here’s a look at which plays get challenged the most.

WHOOPSIES!: The biggest play of the game came within the first four batters of the game, as the resurgent Matthew Joyce smacked a three-run homer to hand the Pirates a strong lead. The Pirates’ odds of winning jumped from 58 percent to 80 percent on that play (+0.22 WPA).

Best and Worst Plays: In terms of WPA and game sequencing by the ol’ eyeball test alike, the Brewers’ best and worst plays occurred during consecutive plate appearances in the top of the eighth inning. These plays were made possible thanks to an all-guts display in the seventh inning by Ryan Braun (single, wild pitch, run), Hernan Perez (RBI double, pick-off error, run), and Scooter Gennett (grittiest groundball productive out! #Scoots!). Something was rumbling amidst the Brewers bats as they entered the eighth down by two runs.

Best Play: Hit machine Martin Maldonado opened the inning with a nice little base knock, which knocked the Pirates’ odds of victory from 87 percent back to 80 percent. Then, Craig Counsell called off Jonathan Lucroy’s planned day of rest, so the elite catcher could pinch hit for Jhan Marinez. In a game of “anything you can do…” among the Brewers’ catching corps, Lucroy grounded a surefire double play ball that was hilariously mishandled.

By reaching on the error, Lucroy produced the Brewers’ best play of the game, bringing the Pirates odds to 70 percent (0.11 WPA for Milwaukee). According to BaseballProspectus, with runners on first and second and no one out, the Brewers were odds on favorites to score approximately 1.467 runs in the eighth. With superstar shortstop Jonathan Villar coming to the plate, those odds seemed ever more interesting…

Worst Play: …until Villar executed a sacrifice bunt (W..T…) straight to the pitcher (!!!). With Maldonado running to third, Tony Watson had a chance to write a thank you note to Villar before throwing to third to nab the lead runner. This was Milwaukee’s worst play of the game, bringing the Pirates’ odds of winning back to 79 percent. It decreased the expected runs to 0.9145.

Honestly, while watching this play, I literally felt speechless. Did the Brewers bench actually call a bunt with a piano on second and a celeste on first? If the bench did not call such a play, what compelled Villar, who already had slammed a third inning solo home run, a .300 hitter and one of the Brewers’ most productive players with a .291 TAv, to put the ball on the ground? Even if one is inclined to argue that the Brewers were avoiding the double play chance by bunting, it is worth noting that Villar has 23 infield hits thus far in 2016, according to Baseball Reference. 16 percent of his plate appearances also feature line drives, and 12 percent of his plate appearances end in walks.

Moreover, and I don’t mean to be rude, but after Villar, the Brewers had honorable replacement player Jake Elmore batting second. Don’t get me wrong, there is a valuable place for Elmore in the MLB, especially on a team like Milwaukee that cannot carry a deep bench because two of their starting pitchers cannot work into the fifth or sixth inning (at best). So, the flexible Elmore is a valuable member of the Brewers insofar as he can play every single position on the diamond. But the fact of the matter is, and here’s where even batting average is a great stat, the odds are better that Villar makes something happen in the game right then and there. I really hate writing like this, by the way, because I hate knocking any professional ballplayer. But, either Villar or the Brewers bench made a poor decision, which cost the Brewers runs (and a real chance to win the game).

Here’s a place where the “rebuilding” schtick really becomes irksome, by the way. I understand that the Brewers will take their knocks this year, blah blah blah, and every loss is worth anywhere from $2,000 to $11,000 in draft bonus pool money to the Tankheads, blah blah blah (#RaceToTheBottom!). But what I despise about this idea is that the Brewers should be instructing their players, especially extreme future value players like Villar, a player who stands a good chance of being a part of a competitive core in Milwaukee, in the ways of winning. I don’t care if you give Villar a 100% green light and he learns how to run aggressively and force the game on the basepaths; but I absolutely do care if the Brewers do nothing to try and win with Villar, one of their best players, in a situation where the game is literally on the line. Is there any better place for Villar to learn how to handle a critical game situation than in a critical game situation?

The bunt is a terrible play. Even if it works it reduces the Brewers’ expected runs for the inning! The Brewers coaching staff is implicated either by calling the bunt or not putting an “Absolutely Do Not Bunt” sign on. Hopefully this becomes a learning situation, because what will be much more important than that $11,000 maximal gain that loss provided in 2017 draft bonus money is fighting for those millions of dollars of playoff revenue in 2019. Will Craig Counsell bunt in this situation in 2019?

Up Next: The Brewers host their friendly neighbors from Milwaukee’s Largest Suburb this weekend, as the Collapsing Cubs come to Miller Park. The All Star Break seems to be just what the Cubs needed, though, as they are now 4-2 after a 14-20 tailspin entering the break. First up is Notable Veteran Jason Hammel (4.36 DRA) and Guts Nelson (5.18 DRA). Nelson is perhaps the Brewers’ most interesting pitcher, with a chasm between his actual runs prevention (very good!) and underlying pitching aspects (not as good). Then, by DRA, it’s Bucket Brigade Lackey (3.61) against Thee Imposing Zach Davies (3.62) on Saturday, and Yips Lester (3.65) versus Ace Guerra (3.46) to close the series. The Tankheads want the losses, but in all seriousness this is a great opportunity for Milwaukee’s best pitchers to face a strong challenge in the Lakeview offense.

One example of this came a couple weeks ago. Counsell, who oversees a number of compelling hitters, has had the option of slotting one in at leadoff and sticking him there. But as Tom Haudricourt wrote at the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, that kind of approach doesn’t suit Counsell, who wants to keep things fresh:

“We get to have a new lineup every day, so it doesn’t have to stay the same,” he said.

…

“We’ve talked about a lot of different lineup considerations. I think we’re going to be flexible throughout the year on lineups.”

While lineup choices don’t matter quite as much as we might think, putting a subpar hitter at leadoff can sink you. Royals manager Ned Yost, for instance has continually relied on Alcides Escobar atop his lineup, and Reds skipper Bryan Price has penciled in Jason Bourgeois to lead off. Neither of these makes sense — USA Today’s Ted Berg called the former “a lousy strategy,” and ESPN’s Dan Szymborski likened the latter to “a surgeon leaving instrument inside a person 16 times.” (The fact that Kansas City doesn’t seem to have suffered from Yost’s faulty thinking shouldn’t impact our opinion of it.)

Counsell, by contrast, has demonstrated an ability to tweak his lineup. Sometimes, he’ll use Jonathan Villar to lead off, as he told Haudricourt. Other times, Domingo Santana gets the nod; yesterday, the spot went to Eric Young Jr. When the season starts, the lineup may crystallize more formally, but as Counsell explained, he doesn’t expect to set anything in stone: He explained that the team is “set on No. 3″ (Ryan Braun), beyond whom things might change. On a team with so many moving parts — which, admittedly, Yost’s Royals and Price’s Reds may lack — that sort of flexibility makes a sizable difference.

In the bullpen, we got another development yesterday. While this one appears to differ a bit from the leadoff question, it still testifies to Counsell’s willingness to change. When MLB.com’s Adam McCalvy asked the manager about his plans for closer, Counsell told him that one man alone won’t occupy the role:

Beyond that, Counsell expects to use both [Will] Smith, a left-hander, and [Jeremy] Jeffress, a right-hander, in early-season save opportunities.

“I’m not putting any limits on it,” Counsell said. “It certainly could end up being one guy, but I don’t think there’s any reason to put restrictions on it right now. Those guys are both really good. One throws left-handed, one throws right-handed, and I think we should take advantage of that.”

A strictly defined closer can mean the difference between victory and defeat. Most notably, Cardinals manager Mike Matheny didn’t put in Trevor Rosenthal during Game 5 of the 2014 NLCS, with St. Louis and San Francisco tied in the ninth inning. Michael Wacha allowed a walk-off home run to Travis Ishikawa, ending the series and eliminating the Cardinals. Matt Williams — whom, uncoincidentally, the Nationals fired this offseason — displayed a similarly perplexing mindset. He unwaveringly deployed Rafael Soriano and Jonathan Papelbon to close games, despite the former’s struggles and the latter’s behavior.

This assertion from Counsell seems to indicate that he won’t fall into that trap. Smith can set down lineups with a lot of lefties, whereas Jeffress will seal out victories against righty-heavy teams. If the starter departs early, either Jeffress or Smith can enter in the eighth inning, to earn a four- to six-out save. Other managers have helped to blaze the closer-by-committee trail — at the beginning of last season, the Yankees, Mets, and Rockies all experimented with the idea — and now, hopefully, Counsell will adopt it as well.

Because they play in a small market, the Brewers operate with a setback relative to their peers. They need to seize every advantage they can get, which means they can’t lag behind with old-school thinking. Counsell recognizes this as well as anyone — he told Haudricourt that they “have to redefine ‘conventional'” and they should focus on “making good decisions,” regardless of customs. If Counsell holds to his promises about the lineup and the closer (and his apparent strategy with stolen bases), his sagacity will likely manifest in the win column.

Ron Roenicke came to Milwaukee after the 2010 season with a distinct philosophy in mind. As Christina Kahrl wrote in 2011:

Roenicke came into the job saying he was going to import the Angels way of taking extra bases and pushing opposing defenses, not to change the Brewers’ winning-slugly ways but to augment them. What had been a station-to-station offense under his predecessor, Ken Macha, would have to do more than that to win on his watch. “I want us to be aggressive running the bases, and we will emphasize this with the Brewers,” Roenicke said. “I think being aggressive gives the players more confidence, and it also wears on the opposition.”

This sort of mindset began to manifest itself in the team’s stolen base numbers. After a 2011 season that saw the Brewers rank 21st in baseball with 94 stolen bases, they would lead the majors with 158 in 2012 and place third with 142 in 2013. But that approach came with a cost: more outs made. Across those respective three years, Milwaukee went from 26th to 15th to second in caught stealings, accruing a respective 31, 39, and 50. Thus, while the Brew Crew’s 9.4 stolen base runs topped the world during the middle season, they accumulated a more modest 1.4 and 4.3 runs in the years sandwiching it.

As if those campaigns didn’t demonstrate the volatility to this model, the 2014 campaign showed how it could severely backfire. In that year, the Brewers paired the eleventh-most stolen bases in the majors (102) with the sixth-most failed attempts (43); that combination caused them to drop to 17th in stolen-base runs, with -0.9. Some of that came from the personnel — an injured Braun and an awful Gerardo Parra, to name a few contributors — but it ultimately fell on the team’s strategy. Even as the club plummeted from contention, Roenicke stuck by his guns.

In the offseason, it appeared that things could change. Roenicke told Tom Haudricourt that, although the team would still play aggressively, they were “running into too many outs” and would have to exercise more discretion going forward. The Brewers’ skipper, of course, only received 25 more games to put that plan into action, and those contests didn’t show much improvement: Milwaukee swiped eight bags in 14 tries, losing 1.1 runs in the process. Those deficiencies helped drag the team to a 7-18 record, which cost Roenicke his job.

But enough about the old guy. Counsell manages this team now, and his squad had some base-stealing success in his debut. Across the final 137 games of the season, the Brewers stole 76 bases while coming up short just 23 times; that earned them 3.9 runs. Extrapolating that over the full 162 games of a season, you get 4.6 runs, a mark that would have tied the Royals for fourth-most in baseball.

Of course, one season of prosperity doesn’t mean a whole lot — after all, Roenicke’s team fared well in 2012, and that didn’t last. The difference lies in their policy. As you may have guessed, Counsell doesn’t share the brash tendencies of his predecessor:

[Stolen base chances defined as H + uBB + HBP, in accordance with wSB.] 

Not only did the Brewers take off less often under Counsell, they did so given more opportunities. Whereas Roenicke would give them one green light per game, Counsell held up more often, and it seemed to work in his favor.

It is worth noting that, as he had promised, Roenicke became more passive in his final month-plus. The team’s 14 tries over 25 games and 172 chances represented a significant decrease from the levels of prior years. Nevertheless, Roenicke viewed the art of base stealing very differently than Counsell does, which — for the latter — is likely a good thing. As more players with fleet feet join the Brewers in 2016 and the years beyond it, perhaps a more cautious approach will allow them to excel in this regard. And as a small-market club with long-term aspirations that are rather lofty, every little advantage will be crucial.

The 2016 season, then, will bring an entirely new bullpen layout. Without a truly experienced closer currently on the roster, it’s unlikely that Counsell will go into the season with a single defined choice. Instead, we will probably see some form of closer-by-committee where the choice depends on the situation. Fortunately, for the Brewers this will probably result in the team’s best relievers being used in the highest-leverage situations. 

Once we remove Matt Garza’s one relief appearance, Rodriguez had the team’s highest leverage index. This is no surprise; ninth innings often — though not always — are the highest leverage because the stakes are greatest and there are (mostly) only two results: win or lose. K-Rod came into a game in the eighth inning only three times. Each time, the Brewers were losing by a significant amount and the game ended after eight. This is not to say that Rodriguez only pitched in high-leverage situations, but rather that he often pitched in the most. 

Rodriguez, though, is no longer on the team, which leaves a hole for someone to step into. This “someone” is probably already in the organization, as investing in high-priced bullpen arms makes little sense for a team that is not expecting to compete.

In 2015, only two other Brewer pitchers had a leverage index above 1.0 (which is average): Jeremy Jeffress and Will Smith. Smith was by far the better pitcher, as his 2.50 FIP was the lowest of any Brewer who threw more than seven innings. Jeffress, though, was no slouch either. A 3.25 FIP and 2.65 ERA in a relatively high-leverage role is nothing to sneeze at.

Craig Counsell is a bit of a wild card in this situation. He used Francisco Rodriguez in a very traditional way, but he also inherited an environment in which he had a single veteran reliever who expected to pitch the ninth. He may very well prefer to continue using the classic bullpen roles. But the Brewers’ new front office is young and analytically-oriented, so they may lean on Counsell to eschew those traditions. 

The Brewers don’t really have an option that was not on the 25-man roster last year. Although 28-year-old Jaye Chapman led Triple-A Colorado Spring in saves, he is too old to be taken seriously as a true candidate to make an impact at the big-league level. Damien Magnifico led Double-A Biloxi in saves and is just 24, but his 1.17 ERA in 2015 was the first time he posted a mark below 3.50 in his minor-league career. He could be a viable big-league reliever at some point, but that point is not 2016.

This essentially means that Jeffress and Smith are the team’s only two options. Michael Blazek was the only reliever who was better than Jeffress (besides the aforementioned Smith and Rodriguez), but his underwhelming strikeout rate (just 7.6 strikeouts per nine innings) means that he is not really a huge standout candidate. Additionally, the fact that none of the other relievers had a leverage index even at 1.0 indicates that Counsell did not trust anyone else. He relied heavily on Jeffress and Smith in important situations, which means that they are the most likely to pitch these same situations in 2016.

Counsell is an unknown quantity as a manager, so we do not know his specific philosophy. Teams now use left-handed pitchers as closers when the players’ talents warrant, as is the case with Aroldis Chapman in Cincinnati. However, due to the rarity of quality left-handed relievers, teams often try to save their lefties for specific instances when they will be able to get out an opponent’s key left-handed bat — which makes reserving one for the ninth inning all but impossible.

I expect Counsell to follow this pattern. He will probably not fully commit to Jeffress as his full-time closer at the beginning of the season, as the young righty lacks the experience to simply be handed that role. We will probably see a bit of Will Smith. Smith, though, will probably be utilized in a more flexible manner because of the hand with which he throws. He will be trotted out to face the middle of a team’s lineup in the seventh or eighth innings, especially when a series of dangerous left-handed batters are coming up. While this decision may not be made with the best thought process, it will benefit the Brewers in terms of attempting to win games.

Brew Crew Ball || Hiring of David Stearns cements new direction for Brewers

BP Milwaukee’s own Derek Harvey walks through the announcement of the hiring of new Brewers’ general manager David Stearns, formerly the top assistant for Jeff Luhnow in Houston. Harvey says the hiring of the 30-year-old Stearns signals the beginning of a new era for Milwaukee; although he lacks experience as a department head, he’ll be backed by “special advisor” Doug Melvin and highly-regarded veteran scouting director Ray Montgomery.

ESPN || Under-the-radar breakout propects and improved farm systems

Warning: This piece is behind the ESPN Insider paywall.

The Brewers feature heavily in this article in which Tony Blengino talks about some under-the-radar prospects on whom he’s higher than most, as well as some of baseball’s most improved farm systems. Brewers’ 2014 first-round pick Kodi Medieros is mentioned among the former. Blengino notes that while the left-hander’s surface numbers are pedestrian, his peripherals point to better days ahead. Among the league’s most improved systems, Milwaukee is listed first, though no ranking is explicit or necessarily implied.

SB Nation || The Brewers and their new GM are in a better spot than you think

Grant Brisbee for SB Nation says Stearns and the Brewers are in a good position to win in the near-long term. Drawing comparisons between the current Brewers, the 1997 Athletics after Billy Beane took over, and Stearns’ former team, Houston, after Luhnow took over, Brisbee notes that all three teams had ragged major-league rosters without a competitive pitching staff, promising and rising minor-league systems, and were looking at a top-five draft pick. Brisbee says the stronger comparison is to the Astros of recent history — with which I would quibble given Oakland’s more similar salary restrictions. He also fails to make mention of the fact that Milwaukee will be rebuilding while sharing a division with three of the five best teams in baseball, a situation perhaps most like the Baltimore Orioles of the early part of this decade. Brisbee rightly concludes that, rather than being charged with turning the franchise around, all Stearns really needs to do is stay the course and not screw anything up.

FanGraphs || Craig Counsell on Decision and Collaboration

David Laurila, king of the Q&A at FanGraphs, shares a conversation with Brewers’ manager Craig Counsell in the wake this week’s hiring of Stearns. Of the relationship between himself and the GM, Counsell says, “The general manager is selecting players in a way that he thinks they’re going to succeed if they’re used in (a certain) manner. It’s important to put them in a position to succeed, and that’s my biggest job.” He’s right, of course. As we’ve seen with the train wreck that is the 2015 Washington Nationals, a strong roster can struggle if the manager fails to properly utilize the talent at his disposal. Counsell and Stearns have just met, but early reports point to a positive first impression between the two.

MLB Daily Dish || That we’ve never really heard of David Stearns is the best possible news for the Brewers

For MLB Daily Dish, Mike Bates offers his own take on the Brewers’ hiring of Stearns, who he says signals the possibility of change from Milwaukee’s decades of (mostly) mediocrity. While Bates makes a number of astute and encouraging points, of their future he says, “Aside from their payroll, Stearns and his vision will be the only thing determining whether the Brewers can be a successful franchise from this point forward,” implying Stearns will enjoy the utmost autonomy as Milwaukee’s GM. More realistic fans know that Stearns’ ability to shape the franchise as he sees fit will be curbed by the wishes of owner Mark Attanasio, who has publicly committed to a rebuild but is not at all likely to submit to a complete teardown like the one the Astros recently suffered.

Grantland || Yogi Berra: 1925-2015

For Grantland, the incomparable Jonah Keri reflects on the life of Yankee great Yogi Berra, who passed away this week at the age of 90. Berra, of course, is much more well known for his silly ‘words of wisdom,’ which is a shame, because he was an incredible ballplayer as well. One of the all-time great catchers who was among the best hitters in the game during an era during which catchers were abused to an extent unheard of in today’s game (he caught both games of a doubleheader 117 times in his 19-year career), Berra won three MVPs and never finished lower than fourth in the voting during his peak years from 1950-56.