Like the July deadline, David Stearns is giving Brewers fans transactions that can be viewed from many standpoints:

• Stearns is improving both key roles and marginal roles through both deadlines.

• Stearns is arguably stockpiling as much talent as is physically possible (within the constraints of the 40-man roster).

• The GM is dealing prospects with lofty Overall Future Potential (OFP).

• The GM is dealing ultimate roles that may be blocked (Brett Phillips), uncertain (Jorge Lopez), or years away from fruition (this can apply to everyone from Jean Carmona to Orimoloye, Lara, Connell, Dominguez, and Harrison).

• Stearns is looking toward potentially longer outlooks by acquiring several players with 2019 options or roster reserve rights.

This is a lot to take in, and frankly it’s made it difficult to write about the trade deadlines in one swift motion. For on the one hand, by estimating long term value of some of the roles traded away, it appears that Stearns truly did overpay in several deals in order to succeed within a short window. Yet, it’s not entirely clear that Stearns traded away anyone that was fitting into Milwaukee’s immediate window. It pains me to say this even with strong prospects like Brett Phillips, or serviceable roles like Jorge Lopez (one of my favorite pitchers in the system for a long time). As much as I love to use depreciated surplus value to assess trades, since it is a tool that attempts Benefit-Cost Analysis on players’ production and contract, Stearns is providing a clear template for critiquing moves outside of any WARP/$ framework.

Specifically, by moving clear MLB players from a small market club that ostensibly requires cost-controlled, easily reserved talent to win, Stearns’s deadline provides an excellent opportunity to survey the uneven landscape of player development. In this regard, it is worth noting that no trade can truly meet WARP/$ standards, because in the universe of player development a pitcher can add a new pitch or rework their mechanics, a batting can revise a timing mechanism or refine a swing, a player can fall under the influence of a new coach (for better or worse), or a player can simply experience a new environment in which opportunities shift. Information asymmetry is the landscape of player development, and thus MLB transactions, and in this regard no deal can ever reach equilibrium between parties, as both teams involved in a given trade will arguably be assessing players through different environments (this argument has hidden behind my work on depreciated surplus, but surfaced in a demonstration with the Brian McCann trade).

On Tuesday, another one of the prospects dealt away from Milwaukee acquired a true MLB floor as well, as the Baltimore Orioles selected the contract of RHP Luis Ortiz (traded away as the lead prospect in the Jonathan Schoop deal). Now, the “surefire” MLB players that one could have assessed from the July deadline deals are all in The Show (Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez are in Kansas City, and Ortiz is now in Baltimore). I will not be focusing extensively on Phillips’s case here, as he is doing pretty much what could have been expected on the day of the trade: starting in center field (21 of 26 games) and right field (4 of 26 games). Lopez and Ortiz, however, offer completely asymmetrical development from the Brewers’ system, and this is worth investigating because the Brewers have what is justifiably regarded as a strong pitching program, due to their track record in 2017 and 2018 (yes, in 2018!), oft-praised coach (Derek Johnson), and their unorthodox pitching acquisitions that appear to follow very specific profiles (this applies to everyone from Oliver Drake to Chase Anderson and Zach Davies, among others). Answering questions about Lopez and Ortiz may help to address other bizarre roles in the 2018 pitching system, most notably involving Brandon Woodruff, Adrian Houser, and even (arguably) Corbin Burnes.

First, let’s establish two role discrepancies that may be the result of different organizational interpretations of information:

• Jorge Lopez has already started four games for the Kansas City Royals, boasting an 18 strike out / eight walk / two homer / 37 percent ground ball profile (4.86 Deserved Run Average). He has alternated good and bad starts thus far. However, the Brewers failed to use Lopez as a starter in 2018, instead employing Lopez as a successful member of the Triple-A shuttle team between Milwaukee and Colorado Springs; this mirrors Lopez’s 2018 minor league role (reliever) and follows his organizational shift to relief role in 2017. Despite what may be viewed as a spotty command profile and a lack of a deep pitching arsenal, the Royals promptly started Lopez and have him shifting sinker / riding fastball and slider offerings to “re-balance” his approach.

• Luis Ortiz battled some injuries and stamina concerns during his time in the Milwaukee organization, which spanned 44 games at Double-A Biloxi across parts of three seasons. Ortiz was mostly a starter in the Milwaukee organization, building his innings pitched total to career highs in three consecutive seasons; the righty is now at 99.7 innings and counting upon entering the MLB. Upon acquiring Ortiz, Baltimore assigned him directly to their Triple-A Norfolk club, and now are selecting his contract for a September showing. One might surmise this is to help boost his innings pitched total closer to 120.0 IP by season end, setting the youngster for a perfectly respectable workload floor for 2019.

Since I do not have additional, unpublished scouting information on Ortiz from his short time in the Baltimore organization (and there do not appear to be any updates from Norfolk), I am going to simply note that according to his minor league game data, there is no discernible statistic that demonstrates why the Orioles might recall the prospect. Alternately, there is equally no discernible argument as to why the Brewers did not view Ortiz as an immediate depth option to potentially bolster a contending pitching staff (and their aggressive handling of Freddy Peralta supports that question).

On Ortiz, the following table is from Baseball Reference CSV:

I would like to reject the “Orioles have nothing to lose” argument for recalling Ortiz, and I’d apply that same reasoning to the Royals, as well. For example, the Brewers apparently have everything to lose in 2018, and they entered the season with Jhoulys Chacin, Yovani Gallardo, and Wade Miley as their major pitching acquisitions for a year in which they probably suspected Jimmy Nelson would miss substantial time. The point being, “having something to lose” has not kept the Brewers from making unorthodox development moves and acquisitions, and that applies equally to starting Freddy Peralta ahead of top pitching prospect (and much clearer starting role) Corbin Burnes as it does to Chacin, Gallardo, and Miley. For goodness sake, the club just recently acquired veteran southpaw Gio Gonzalez, a starting pitcher by trade, and then mentioned that they might not use him as a starter. So, it is clear that “having something to lose” is no motivator for the Brewers to make “expected” or orthodox pitching moves; relative position in the standings should not explain these player development moves.

The flipside of this argument, I will add, is that this should not be taken as a “Derek Johnson is magic” argument, either. I do not believe that Brewers fans and analysts should fall back on that argument, because it basically substitutes a new type of devotional thinking about pitching development for previous orthodox thinking about pitching roles, and solely using a coach’s successful cases for transactional justification is a bad thing. Those of us relying on public knowledge will not understand or know any of Johnson’s potential “failures” in terms of mechanical or arsenal adjustments among Brewers pitching. Furthermore, this type of magical line of argument about Johnson’s skills could thus theoretically justify any pitching acquisition, which should be viewed as ridiculous on the face of it. For example, none of us should be rummaging the lowest DRA of 2018 simply to argue “x, y, and z should be Brewers targets because of Wade Miley and Derek Johnson,” and that’s not meant as a knock on either Johnson or Miley.

Jorge Lopez, on the other hand, has provided new data as a member of the Royals, and the righty is demonstrating a complete shift in his arsenal. Brewers fans will recall that Lopez used his big, tall frame to generate a fairly traditional rising fastball, curveball, change up arsenal. During Lopez’s time in Milwaukee in 2018, the Brooks Baseball classification system captured a “sinker,” which might also be called a riding / running fastball (although the vertical movement readings on the pitch hint that it may actually be a sinker). Lopez also introduced some variation of a slider:

Thus far in Kansas City, Lopez has reoriented this arsenal by reducing his “primary fastball” in favor of his sinker and slider. Along with these noticeable moves, Lopez is also ticking up his change and curve slightly.

Lopez has had two rough starts, but his most recent start against the Orioles was the best of his young career. In this start, perhaps Lopez cashed out the most extreme version of his arsenal adjustment, working sinker or slider for nearly 55 percent of his deliveries. Yet that curve still figures prominently at 21 percent of his overall selections, meaning that Lopez could also be called a sinker-curve guy.

This new arsenal is a fantastic look for Lopez, and it raises a difficult question that is worth asking, but must be asked in the proper critical mindset and organizational vantage point: when is a pitcher simply a new pitch, or a re-balancing of their arsenal, away from success? When is a pitcher simply in need of an opportunity? I hinted at this question following the July trade deadline, as the Brewers traded a pitcher who might be dismissed as “merely serviceable” at a time of increased need for quality depth due to injuries and ineffectiveness. Yet the Brewers did not give Lopez a start, nor did they keep him as a fixture in the bullpen, perhaps as a multi-inning guy. I don’t mean this as a criticism of the Brewers, however, because one could have reasonably asserted at the time that previously lofty goals of Lopez’s rotational Overall Future Potential were a thing of the past; here we are, though, with the tide potentially shifting within the Royals rotation.

The least satisfactory answer is that the Brewers simply missed on Ortiz and Lopez. Perhaps they were so cautious with Ortiz as to miss the potential upside (or even the current MLB floor!) in his profile. One could have said on deadline day that Luis Ortiz was maybe two or three years away from being a true impact, Number Two starter (if he were to reach his ceiling); perhaps that logic misses the value of how good a low rotation floor can be on many days in the MLB (cf. the 2018 Brewers, from Wade Miley to Freddy Peralta and, yes, even Junior Guerra most days). A more realistic answer, and perhaps the Lopez development supports this, is that maybe Milwaukee simply was not the place for these developments; even the acquisition of Jake Thompson and Jordan Lyles suggests that Stearns may have already found other development projects that better fit the organizational plan.

It is interesting to work with these unsatisfactory, vague conclusions while designing a framework for assessing Brandon Woodruff’s future with the organization, or even the potential future role for someone like Wade Miley:

• Is Miley a Brewers pitcher now, worth a contract extension and a trip back to the well, a celebration of a job well done and certainly a job worth tens of millions of dollars?

• Is Woodruff, about as bread-and-butter middle rotation starter / potential impact relief profile as one could ask for, a pitcher with a steady rotation or bullpen future in Milwaukee?

• With the continued development of Adrian Houser as a starting pitcher in the minor leagues, is Houser already poised to become the MLB starting role recovery for the Brewers that Jorge Lopez was not?

The trouble with these questions is that they could be answered in different ways for different organizations, but the benefit is that the Brewers currently reserve an crucial opportunity to learn from their recent transactions and maximize their development approach with each of these pitchers.

Photo Credit: Denny Medley, USA Today Sports Images

The argument is that these players faced an impending roster crunch, so I thought it was time for another big, unwieldy, speculative post on such a crunch. What does the Brewers’ crunch look like? Is there a roster crunch?

Brief Aside on the Rule 5 Draft:
The Rule 5 draft is ostensibly meant to serve as a labor institution that keeps MLB teams from hoarding minor league players without an equal shot at MLB roles with other teams; thus, after certain required time periods (based on when / how a player was acquired), the Brewers must protect minor league players on their 40-man roster or risk their exposure to the Rule 5 draft (which typically takes place at the end of each winter meetings). The gamble is that any team selecting a Rule 5 player must typically keep that player on their MLB roster, meaning that if the Brewers do not necessarily foresee an impact or serviceable MLB role for a minor leaguer, they can leverage that risk by not protecting the player for the Rule 5 draft. Recently, teams like the San Diego Padres have called teams’ bluffs by selecting low-minors players, including the Brewers’ gamble with former Top Ten prospect RHP Miguel Diaz, eschewing the typical Triple-A / advanced minors depth player selected in the draft. The Brewers have multiple players spanning these types of gambles for 2019, ranging from low minors gambles like Carlos Herrera to advanced depth players like Bubba Derby or Quintin Torres-Costa.

Let’s start with a look at some of the best Rule 5 prospects available from the Brewers system. This list of eligible players is available thanks to the indispensable Brewerfan.net. The order is mine, based on how I might grade out the risk and potential future roles of these players:

First and foremost, if it matters, I would have slotted RHP Luis Ortiz first on this list, and he is also the most certain player of this group to appear on a 2019 Top 10 list due to one of the clearest potential impact roles of the bunch (even given his risk); LHP Kodi Medeiros would have slotted around Cody Ponce and Jake Gatewood; RHP Jon Perrin would have slotted around Herrera / Segovia / Torres-Costa. (For what it’s worth, among this group I would consider protecting Supak, Stokes, Gatewood, and Ponce).

This is a long way of saying that the Brewers arguably already traded away their best possible roles available in the Rule 5 draft for 2019, which is certainly one way to rid an organization of a potential roster crunch. As you can see looking at these prospects, there are fewer potential impact roles available, and notably fewer tough decisions for GM David Stearns. It is not clear who on this list is a player that would derail the organization if left unprotected. I’d love to sing the praises of Nathan Kirby or Devin Williams, but their respective injury histories and subsequent development raises significant questions to the point that I’m not sure how to form MLB roles; I’d place both in the Taylor Williams “it would be great if they came back and could be serviceable MLB relievers” role.

I am certain that other fans have potential Rule 5 picks that they like more than the prospects I listed, and I’m certain other folks would list these prospects in different orders. That is fine. What I want to stress is that if one actually lays out the potential roles of these players, it’s tough to see some crush of must-protect-impact-players that would cause a roster crunch worthy of trading away the (most likely) best roles from the group. Right now, it seems like Trey Supak, Quintin Torres-Costa, and Bubba Derby are players who could “play up” in Milwaukee’s current pitching system. But should all three be protected on the 40-man roster?

Thanks to recent moves, the Brewers also have a group of players with contract options for 2019, which is a good thing because the club has less than $70 million in agreements guaranteed thus far. In short: this is a team that could pick up some options and spend some cash at the MLB level, especially given the financial success of the rebuild.

Among this group, only Jordan Lyles would be a “roster crunch”-causing player. The Brewers could decline Lyles’s option in order to protect an additional player from the Rule 5 draft, or (obviously) make some other type of acquisition to bolster the club. For what it is worth, I would renew both Moustakas and Soria. Both are valuable veteran types who would help to boost a club that is now clearly within a contending window.

As I have covered throughout the year with the Daily Pythagorean record posting on @BPMilwaukee Twitter, the Brewers are averaging approximately 85-win outcomes throughout 2018 (based on their park-and-league-adjusted Runs Scored / Runs Allowed). Milwaukee is a team that is succeeding due to the uneven distribution of their bullpen and fielding success, meaning that elite relievers and extremely efficient fielding are bringing-up other aspects of the club. Additionally, there are park factor discrepancies between Baseball Prospectus and Baseball Reference such that if one follows Baseball Prospectus, the offense is much better than most fans and analysts observe (in terms of underlying elements). It’s simply the case that those underlying elements (prior to the trade deadline) still resulted in frightening frequent low-scoring games.

One benefit of the Brewers #TeamDepth attitude is that the roster is built with numerous cost-controlled players who seemingly look replaceable on paper. And thus, considering Milwaukee’s potential arbitration-eligible players and free agents is the most interesting area of the so-called roster crunch. Here I’ve attempted to rank players roughly by role:

Looking at these players, it is first and foremost clear that there is a discrepancy between Wins Above Replacement Player statistics (based on underlying stats) and the distributional strengths of the club in terms of Runs Scored and Runs Allowed. Thus, seemingly replaceable players like Junior Guerra, Wade Miley, Hernan Perez, and Dan Jennings thrive in Milwaukee’s system. This is a good thing, and perhaps some of the reason for this current roster-crunch talk is that the Brewers are loaded with a group of players that are not great but certainly cannot be discarded.

Yet, even with this caveat, nearly half of these players could be replaced in 2019. Some of these difficult decisions could follow injuries (such as Stephen Vogt), or an “end-of-the-line” in terms of MLB role in Milwaukee (see Nick Franklin, Keon Broxton, or Tyler Saladino). One could conceivably slice this group of pending transactions in numerous ways.

Coupled with yet another group of players ranging from Marcos Diplan to Matt Albers and Ariel Hernandez, Alec Asher and Aaron Wilkerson, there appears to be significant wiggle room on the 40-man roster. Thus, one ought to return to the deadline trades and reassess the acquisition cost and trade strategy used by Stearns; this is not to say that the trades were bad across the board, but rather that the allocation of resources to pick up these players is worth questioning. It is not clear that a pending Rule 5 roster crunch was so severe to necessitate steep costs where those costs involved Rule 5 players. Given this, one can turn back to the MLB acquisitions returned in the trades, and assess those roles for the contending stretch.

It is fun to be in a position to assess a club’s moves solely on a contending basis, but when the long-term picture is also invoked, it must be invoked carefully: in the case of the 2019 Brewers, the roster crunch storyline does not appear to add up. Stearns had, and continues to have, far too many 2019 options for clearing roster space to have traded Ortiz, Medeiros, and Perrin solely for those reasons. Thus, it is more interesting to suggest that Stearns was flipping potential long-term assets for controllable MLB players (in the case of Schoop, Soria, and Moustakas), or potentially clearing roster space for additional acquisitions during the 2018-2019 offseason. With (easily) more than $60 million to spend and a once in a lifetime free agency class, that latter point serves as an even more interesting roster motivation for clearing away Rule 5 protections.

Stearns just loudly answered that question this trade deadline.

What is fascinating about each of these trades is that they are fantastic in the sense of bolstering an MLB roster, in order to ensure that this stretch run features as few weaknesses as possible, while also potentially being over-pays in each case. Yet it should be stressed that these overpays are palatable for several reasons: the Brewers maintain a largely controllable roster that is also relatively inexpensive; the Brewers have a relatively large set of players that have been minor leaguers long enough to need potential 40-man roster protection entering 2019; and, perhaps most importantly, there is an incredible amount of role risk involved with each player. These trades should provide grounds for further analysis into when and how potential overpays are helpful to a team, and they should certainly provide further evidence that WARP/$ is not the sole determination of a trade’s potential value or impact.

Grading the System: 2016 || 2017

• Make no mistake about it, in terms of developing multiple quality pitches, command, and velocity, Luis Ortiz could potentially have the best pitching role for the Brewers system; there was a time, two years ago even, where it would not have been absurd for Ortiz to fight for a top tier pitching role in the prospect ranking cycle (and, really, it was not absurd). But Ortiz has been around forever in the advanced minors, it seems, without working full seasons. For example, the injury-fighting righty has 225 innings at Double-A without working 100 innings in a season, and with 68 innings at the 2018 deadline he could potentially miss 100 innings once again. If Ortiz can take his next step forward in the Orioles’ system, he is absolutely a more valuable asset, in terms of roster surplus, than Jonathan Schoop (and it is not close!!!), but that strong 60 Overall Future Potential (OFP) / 50 likely grade entering 2017 looks much more improbable. Ortiz is eligible for the Rule 5 draft for the 2019 season and almost certainly must be protected by the Orioles.

• Jean Carmona just made the jump stateside for the Brewers in 2018, and thus remains a full four levels away from the MLB. Additionally, Carmona might even be another year away from a clearly defined MLB potential role. In this regard, I do not envy the job of MLB scouts and analytics personnel, as it’s not entirely clear for me how I would price Carmona’s potential future value in terms of long-term systemic development.

• At BP Milwaukee, Kyle Lesniewski describe the roles and risks associated with both Kodi Medeiros and Wilber Perez. Medeiros could become an impact reliever at the MLB level, and it’s not unlikely that some observers still believe that he could start in some capacity, as there will always be hold outs for that sort of role. Given Medeiros’s delivery and command profile, however, as well as his fastball, Lesniewski outlines the difficulties that Medeiros may have for reaching even an impact reliever profile. Medeiros is eligible for the Rule 5 draft entering the 2019 season, and almost certainly must be protected by the White Sox, while Perez had yet to play stateside in the Brewers system.

• Finally, I already detailed the roles and surplus value for Brett Phillips and Jorge Lopez, so I will not go into too much detail here. However, I will add that of each of the prospects included in this midseason deals, Phillips is arguably the most likely to have MLB floor and ceiling roles that both surpass the value of the trade return (which is not a knock against Mike Moustakas, he simply might only be in Milwaukee for a couple of months). With a prospect such as Corey Ray coming on strong in Double-A Biloxi, not to mention the considerable development of Troy Stokes Jr. at the advanced level as well, Milwaukee cannot necessarily lose sleep over trading away a depth outfielder from their stacked group when they are fighting a close divisional deficit and leading the National League Wild Card race.

So, readers will witness a couple of recurring facts in these trades: the Brewers largely traded away players that must be protected for 2019 to avoid their loss via the Rule 5 draft, or players with little-to-no stateside development experience (and thus years to reach MLB), and/or players with roles that may be replicated within a year. One need not believe that a player like Stokes will surpass Phillips, in terms of overall ceiling, to see the value of the young prospect’s potential to fill an MLB depth position in 2019. Phillips himself may not have had an opportunity in 2019 to take such a role. The same logic might apply to Quintin Torres-Costa and Bubba Derby. This should not be construed to mean that these current system prospects are categorically better than Phillips / Medeiros / Lopez; in fact, I would have ranked each of that trio ahead of their potential 2019 depth replacements. But once again, since systemic development, contending windows, and player development cycles are now orbiting a club that is contending for consecutive seasons (and the foreseeable future, hopefully), if it costs system depth roles to improve MLB weaknesses, the Brewers have to eat the risk of losing those ceilings.

I like when MLB trades can simply be called good baseball moves. For all the rebuilding narratives in Baltimore, Kansas City, and Chicago, the White Sox, Royals, and Orioles front offices arguably made sensible trades with quality returns that both have long and short time horizons and development cycles. Milwaukee is working as a true contender without trading from their most elite potential prospect stash. This is good all around.

Stearns priced out these converging development cycles and adroitly moved the future role risk to address an offense that absolutely needed help for a serious contending run. Just the other day I wrote, “At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019,” without thinking that a realistic move to first base for Shaw could occur as early as this week. Now, with Jonathan Schoop in the mix for second base and Jesus Aguilar slumping, Shaw becomes a strong side platoon option at 1B to form a serious infield unit:

This infield could open 2019 should Stearns consider keeping both Moustakas and Schoop, and now the talk can turn to development cycles once more. While the Brewers continue to season second baseman Keston Hiura at the most advanced levels of the minor leagues, Schoop basically serves as an upgrade over the Jonathan Villar gamble (gambling that he’ll return to his 2016 form), thus giving the Brewers a quality starting option while Hiura completes his minor league development. While Hiura’s bat is arguably ready for the MLB, and has been mentioned as a potential MLB option by Baseball Prospectus in their latest Top 50 list, the infielder may need more work in the field after missing significant fielding development time due to an extended elbow injury. Once Hiura is ready in 2019, a Schoop / Hiura mix simply extends the #TeamDepth mantra, and the same can arguably said for the remainder of the infield.

Entering 2018, the Brewers system took a step back in terms of organizational rankings, due to a series of developmental setbacks for key prospects, MLB graduations, and trades. I began to highlight this during last year’s “Grading the System” feature, but as one can never predict baseball, the development cycles and potential OFP assessments calibrated for Corey Ray, Keston Hiura answered a crucial risk question (can he play 2B?), and a veritable gang of pop-up pitchers continued to march upward in the system, potentially boosting and extending the no-name, depth-oriented pitching staff into 2019. Make no mistake about it, the system might continue to rank in the middle of the league in terms of overall quality, and the set of clear potential impact roles (true 60 OFP+ roles) may end with Keston Hiura and Corey Ray should Corbin Burnes exhaust his rookie standing through the end of 2018.

Yet, given the instant development of 2018 First Round draft pick Brice Turang, the Brewers could demonstrate that they indeed nabbed an Elite Prep prospect that fell due to prospect fatigue. Turang could quickly help to boost the top of the system as an MLB potential role falls into place. Moreover, given the Brewers’ expanded efforts in International signings, as well as the quality use of signing bonus allocations in each of the last two MLB drafts, the lower minors could continue to host a variety of players that suddenly surge onto the prospect scene. While this does not make the Brewers system different than many other MLB systems, it provides a road map to how the club can continue to develop talent while contending. One could argue that it’s absurd to suggest that the Brewers “rely” on someone like Turang falling in the MLB draft, but this is exactly the type of prospect perception and role foresight that the Brewers must have if they are going to succeed while drafting in the bottom half of each round.

Of course, the notable graduations from the system should not be undersold as well. Now there are so many starters, depth roles, and trades from the Brewers prospect stock that I added a new category this year:

Now, with these graduates in mind, what does a somewhat thinner, but still rather interesting Brewers system look like?

Prospect Key
Top 10 Consideration
Top 30 Consideration
[Just Interesting]

Of course, it is also worth emphasizing how the system has been….decimated in key areas. Given the quick development by advanced prospects acquired from the major 2015-2016 trades, as well as the huge trades entering 2018 and during the recent deadlines, the pool of potential impact prospects acquiring via trade has waned:

This is an important category to consider simply because Milwaukee demonstrated how adroit trades could quickly rebuild a system and reform an MLB roster. It will be worth watching to see if the Stearns continues to attempt to find Jonathan Villar and Keon Broxton types via trade now that the club is solidly contending. Of course, one could argue that Stearns is always trying to find this player (be it Oliver Drake, or Jesus Aguilar, or even Alec Asher), but that it simply the fact that these players will not always come via trade.

Thanks to the mechanical corrections, good health, and overall development of Corey Ray, as well as the surging role of Troy Stokes Jr., the development of draft prospects arguably has a better outlook entering 2019 than it did prior to 2018. Given the advancement of Corbin Burnes into a relief role, Brandon Woodruff and Taylor Williams into respective swingman and depth relief roles, and Brett Phillips into a fourth outfielder, it is clear that the Brewers front office is considering all possible role developments with each player (rather than following a cookie cutter model, or a model in which each prospect must immediately receive playing time in their clearest future role). It is arguable that this type of development strategy could maximize roles ranging from Stokes to Zack Brown, Jake Gatewood, and maybe even Lucas Erceg.

Meanwhile, Milwaukee signed a couple of additional potential impact International Amateur free agents this July, continuing an attempt to build up the low minors. Carlos Rodriguez and Larry Ernesto are already making some noise in the Dominican Summer League, while prospects like Jose Sibrian and Jesus Lujano have made the leap stateside.

Frankly, this Brewers system will not look as strong, in terms of potentially elite impacts roles, as the one that received ranking for 2018 at Baseball Prospectus. Yet, as new cycles of player development depth emerge in the low minors, and the Brewers continue their unique form of MLB roster construction (clearly using all 40 roster spots for MLB-adjacent roles and frequently shuffling those roles), Milwaukee could be an organizational well-suited to do more with less. For if 2017 fired the opening shot that the Brewers can contend simply based on giving high floor players a chance to work in the MLB, 2018 is advancing that ideal and carrying it to deeper logical, promotional, and transactional extensions.

Photo Credit: Gary A. Vasquez, USA Today Sports Images

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Depth Beats Attrition
Trust the Rotation
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Teams are eager to rely on their bullpens more frequently, and at 5.18 IP/GS for his starters, manager Craig Counsell is about as eager as anyone to turn away from the third time through the order as a starter.

If you’re new to baseball analytics, one of the best possible strategies to learn is the starting pitcher’s “times facing a batting order.” The table above demonstrates On-Base-Percentage plus Slugging-Percentage each time through the order for National League starting pitchers. This may seem like a trivial aspect of the game, but if you read the new midseason scouting reports emerging on your favorite arms, or even look into 2018 MLB Draft scouting reports, chances are you’ll see a line like “without a third pitch, a role in the bullpen could be most likely.” What you’re reading, in nearly any variation of this line, is the strategic idea that in order to beat MLB batters a third time through the order, a starting pitcher is going to need additional pitches to cross-up batters and make adjustments as the game deepens. Milwaukee left-hander Warren Spahn is classically attributed with the quote, “pitchers need two pitches, one they’re looking for and one to cross them up,” but even here Spahn was not quite right; a pitcher needs as many pitches as are necessary to adjust to their designated role. I imagine that if you’re Warren Spahn (perhaps much like Ben Sheets or Clayton Kershaw), life is rather easy with mostly two pitches; if you’re Dave Bush or Victor Santos or Zach Davies or pretty much anyone of the other 300+ starters that work in the MLB, life with only two pitches would probably be miserable.

But perhaps the stats speak on their own: last year, the average NL batter the first time through the order was Cory Spangenberg. By the third time through the order, the average NL batter was Christian Yelich. In order to keep batters closer to the Cory Spangenberg level of production, having command of that third pitch (with a quality “stuff” grade, too) will get the scouts ready to slap that “#3 SP” Overall Future Potential grade.

Manager Craig Counsell was handed a group of supposedly below average-to-horrendous starting pitchers according to most Brewers fans, but as most fans could have surmised from the 2017 squad, pitching was the strength of the organization. And indeed, pitching has continued to serve as the strength of the 2018 club, although statistics like Deserved Run Average suggest that the club may be due for some regression to the mean (in terms of preventing runs). But what was most important about the 2017-2018 offseason was that GM David Stearns built a pitching system, and Counsell’s eagerness to pull starters at just the right time has indeed reflected a machine-oriented approach to pitching. Setting aside the injured Zach Davies and the mechanics-ironing Chase Anderson, the 2018 Brewers starting rotation is lead by Chacin (4 Runs Prevented in 69.0 IP), Brent Suter (2 Runs Prevented in 63.3 IP), and Junior Guerra (approximately 9 Runs Prevented in 60.3 IP after Tuesday night). Counsell has pulled these pitchers early almost uniformly; the Table below compares each pitcher’s last major workload as a starting pitcher to their 2018 workload, in terms of facing a batting order multiple times:

This is what managing with an elite bullpen can do for someone: pretty much every night of the week, Counsell can give each starting pitcher the same workload. In contrast to the narrative of burned out bullpens, which Kyle Lesniewski has also studied at Brew Crew Ball, it is worth arguing that Counsell is providing starting pitchers with a clearer definition of a workload. In fact, the old saying for starting pitchers to “go as deep as you can into the game” is rather problematic; if your stuff isn’t there, you’re probably done after 100 pitches and five (or fewer innings), which will be offset by the great 7.0-to-8.0 IP evenings, or complete games. Counsell and the Brewers are almost giving their starting pitchers better role certainty than any “traditional” starting pitcher has ever had (at least in the last 30 years): “give me your best 16 outs.” This is how you turn Guerra, Chacin, and Suter in a 15 Runs Prevented machine, which is one hell of a low rotation, by the way, and exactly the type of performance that turns a low rotation into an entity that offsets the lack of a so-called “Ace” at the top.

Has it worked? The Table below demonstrates that while there are some hiccups along the way, this Big Three low rotation has indeed improved in at least one area of the game, and in some cases the third time through the batting order is receiving grand benefits. These stats are even before Guerra’s course correction at Cleveland:

What is notable about minimizing a pitcher’s times through the batting order is that they can theoretically readjust their plan of attack. Someone like Guerra or Chacin no longer has to think about establishing his best stuff and figuring out what he’s going to do 100 pitches later; Suter might not ever have been expected to go that deep into ballgames, but even the Raptor-esque southpaw can arguably find some benefit in his ballgame by understanding that he needs to go 16 outs. Looking through Brooks Baseball pitching logs, it is arguably the case that what Counsell (and presumably Stearns, coaching staff, and the Front Office in this case) is doing is indeed turning each of these guys into….let’s call them “really, really long relievers who start the game”:

• According to Brooks Baseball, compared to his full season in 2016, Junior Guerra cut his splitter and slider usage (both below 15 percent!) while increasing his secondary running fastball (which Guerra selected approximately 23 percent of the time entering Tuesday night). As a result, Guerra is getting more whiffs on both of his fastballs as a group, and improving his slider whiffs without yielding too much value from his splitter. He’s also improving his pop-ups, suggesting batters are getting weak contact even though they are facing his fastball more frequently (presumably making Guerra more “predictable”).

• As covered by Andrew Salzman in the latest Weekend Recap at BPMilwaukee, Brent Suter is becoming a fastballl-first pitcher. The southpaw is firing what appears to be a near-cutting, rising fastball (think Jacob Barnes) two-thirds of his offerings, with good results in terms of improving swings-and-misses.

• By contrast, Chacin is much more of his previous self, with the caveat that he’s working his slider slightly more frequently than in 2017 while moving away from his primary fastball a bit. His outcomes with these pitches are rather similar as well, which suggests that even if the Brewers are deploying Chacin in a manner that is more systematic and potentially more radical, he is not deviating from what got him through a very successful 2017 campaign, earning him his excellent contract.

Milwaukee is receiving much deserved praise for their bullpen, which was expertly curated by David Stearns during his first two seasons with the club. Now the rewards are visible during what could become one of the most important seasons in franchise history, returning the club to their first extending contending window in quite some time. But it is worth emphasizing that Stearns was correct in assembling a starting pitching staff that could complement the relief staff, and together with the efficient fielders, the arms are a Runs Prevented machine. None of these moves were terribly difficult to make, either, which means that the most thrilling part of this series of moves is that they can be repeated in future seasons: Junior Guerra was Stearns’s very first acquisition, Brent Suter was a deep draft pick during the Doug Melvin era that was freed into a stunning big league role, and Jhoulys Chacin was a proven veteran signed off the margins of an underwhelming free agency class that nevertheless yielded some surprising contracts elsewhere. This is what systematic baseball can look like in Milwaukee, and it involves neither being “cheap” (Chacin signed a decent guaranteed deal) nor “dogmatic” about acquisition style (waivers, free agency, and draft are represented here). Most importantly for the prospect arms, both hyped (Corbin Burnes and Luis Ortiz) and unassuming (Freddy Peralta and others), the Brewers front office is gleefully demonstrated that nobody needs aces any longer. Bring your two best pitches for 16 outs, and let’s get on with it!

Photo Credit: David Richard, USA Today Sports Images

Resources:
Baseball Reference. Player Pitching Splits, NL Pitching Splits, 2016-2018 [CSV].

There’s one more impact prospect on the cusp of this wave, buried behind more steady performers but well ahead of the next tier of arms: Luis Ortiz, the last man standing from the blockbuster 2016 return for Jonathan Lucroy and Jeremy Jeffress. If things go right for Ortiz, he has a chance to outshine all the rest.

Thus far in Ortiz’s brief tenure as a Brewers farmhand, though, things have not gone right. He posted impressive baseball-card-stats upon joining the organization late in 2016, but the 1.93 ERA he ran across six starts in Biloxi belied a plummeting K-rate and a 6.51 DRA. Still, it was only six starts, and Ortiz entered the 2017 season solidly in the middle of most top-100 prospect lists. You won’t find him on any of those lists now. Ortiz battled injury and stretches of ineffectiveness throughout last season. A balky hamstring forced him out of the rotation twice and contributed to some shaky mechanics and 3.5 walks per nine innings. At season’s end, Ortiz was sitting on a 4.01 ERA, 4.84 DRA, and 94.3 innings across 20 starts. He’s fallen short of 100 innings pitched in each of his professional seasons.

It’s tempting to see a body like Ortiz’s and forecast continued struggles with health and conditioning. Listed at 6’3” and 230 pounds, Ortiz will always be a big guy, and it’s fair to wonder whether last year’s hamstring injury could have been avoided with better conditioning. Ortiz may have wondered that himself, actually. He showed up to spring camp this year in better shape than he left last fall, and worked over the offseason to improve his flexibility and stamina. If he’s able to stay on the mound, the organization sees big things in Ortiz’s future.

When Ortiz is on, he’ll show three average-or-better offerings, plus a slow curve that he’ll sprinkle in his second and third time through a lineup. Used in that way, the curveball plays up a bit; it’s good for puzzled caught-lookings and flummoxed half-swings. He’s predominantly a fastball-slider pitcher, though, and both of those pitches easily grade out as plus. They’re ready to retire major league hitters right now, and Ortiz is still just 22 years old. The fastball runs in the 93–96 mph range, and Ortiz manipulates it well, adding sink and swerve as needed to keep hitters off balance. He knows how to locate his mid-80s, biting slider, giving him an effective out pitch. His changeup is an average pitch with glimmers of more, and he commands it well. Put all the pieces together and cross your fingers for health, and that’s the profile of a #2 or #3 starter. It’s just that the results haven’t quite backed that up yet.

Ortiz is determined to change that in 2018, where he’ll likely settle in for a third tour at Biloxi (it bears repeating: he’s still just 22), this time with a clean bill of health atop his priority list. He’ll need to be added to the 40-man roster next offseason to avoid being exposed in the Rule 5 draft, a fact that he’s aware of and using for motivation. With age on his side and something to prove, Ortiz is poised to shoot back up prospect lists and into the Brewers’ near-term rotation plans. His is a volatile profile: one should never assume health for a starting pitcher, and Ortiz’s frame makes it even harder. But all the tools are there. And the Brewers need only a few of their prized arms to pan out to have the makings of an excellent 2019 or 2020 starting rotation. Ortiz has as good a chance as any of them to slot in towards the top of that staff.

Stepping into speculative histories of MLB players, I’ve been thinking about what I’d expect from players like Burnes or Peralta if they reached the MLB in 2018. Both pitchers provide extreme challenges to the observer, and for different reasons.

• Burnes provides a challenge because the righty’s quick ascent to the advanced minors has out-paced the non-proprietary information available about the pitcher, which manifested itself during the 2017 season in the form of widely varying fastball, slider, and delivery reports. From early in the season, when on-the-ground reports placed Burnes as a potentially high reliever-risk profile who could make it work as a middle rotation starter, to late in the season when delivery adjustments and improved fastball reports began leaking out, fans and analysts were essentially given several different pitchers’ worth of information. Entering 2018, then, it’s worth asking whether Burnes is the fastball / slider reliever with middle rotation question marks, the middle rotation arm who could decrease reliever risk by continuing to refine his delivery, or the surging pitching prospect who simply continues to redefine roles by refining mechanics and therefore allowing his stuff to take the next step. All of this can happen with Burnes, or none of it; thus the righty prospect is an acute example of information asymmetry.

• Peralta faces different questions about his stuff and profile, especially due to his diminished stature (compared to Burnes) and his pitching approach (he’s not quite a command-and-deception guy, but he twists and turns his fastballs in order to help his stuff “play up”). In one sense, Peralta is much more conventional than Burnes, insofar as Peralta will be lauded as “the small framed righty who proved everyone wrong” should his frame stick in a functional mid-rotation role. On the other hand, given the frame and lack of a strong fastball, it is worth questioning how Peralta’s arsenal and command will play as he advances in the system. The significance of the righty’s pitch sequencing and location will not be understated. It’s tough to say whether Peralta faces “reliever risk” in the same sense Burnes does, as Peralta’s top role is even murkier than his Advanced Minors teammate.

So, if Burnes and Peralta reach the MLB in 2018, what will their potential roles be? What performance levels might fans expect? With Counsell looking at both pitchers as potential midseason reinforcements for the staff, it is worth digging into potential production expectations.

Role risk will be nothing new to the 2018 Brewers; role risk is all over the roster, even beyond the rookie class. But, in attempting to form expectations about Burnes and Peralta, I turned to other rookie pitchers that are on the MLB roster or in Spring Training camp as non-roster invitees. By my count, these rookies comprise (in order of height) Peralta, Taylor Williams, Marcos Diplan, Jorge Lopez, Aaron Wilkerson, Erik Davis, Burnes, Luis Ortiz, Adrian Houser, Brandon Woodruff, Tyler Webb, and Jon Perrin.

• Several of these arms are already established as MLB relievers or very likely to have relief roles in 2018 (see Williams, Lopez, Davis, Houser, and Webb).

• A few of these arms are organizational depth with questionable futures in terms of organizational plans (see Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Davis, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Finally, there’s a deep group of potential rotation depth, in terms of starters who could work as rotational replacements or MLB emergency starters in 2018 (Peralta, Diplan, Lopez, Wilkerson, Burnes, Ortiz, and Perrin).

• Woodruff is likely the only pitcher here who is a rotational lock in 2018 (and even writing that leads me to raise some questions, as “There is no such thing as a pitching prospect,” there is no such thing as a surefire pitching role).

Available PECOTA projections (March 2, 2018) for 2018 Brewers rookies (Erik Davis and Jon Perrin projections unavailable). This table features IP projections, as well as Runs Allowed and Runs Prevented figures drawn from projected Deserved Runs Average. Runs Prevented figures are drawn from an average of the 2016-2017 Miller Park / National League. PECOTA strike outs, walks, and WARP are also featured.

With these dozen pitchers, I’ve already laid out extensive role risk simply by categorizing these arms. So, in order to form potential expectations for 2018, I turned to speculative history: namely, how many pitchers in the MLB expansion era matched these arms’ precise height, weight range, handedness, and age as rookies? That is to ask, if these pitchers reach the MLB as rookies in 2018 (e.g., their precise 2018 age), how does their physical profile fare (e.g., their handedness, height, and weight?).

To answer this question, and engage in this speculative exercise, I used the indispensable (and highly recommended) Baseball Reference Play Index to search comparable expansion era players. I searched the expansion era because it is a largely integrated era that also includes a relatively similar form of baseball over the decades in terms of pitching arsenals or prototypes (it tracks the diminishing knuckleball, rise of the splitter / forkball, rise of the fastball / slider profile, etc.). Additionally, as I attempted to search other time frames, I found the reasoning to be rather arbitrary (e.g., if I search the Wild Card Era, should I simply search the Contemporary PED era? If I only search the expanded Wild Card Era (2012-present) will I have a large enough group of players to analyze? And so on).

Using the expansion era, here are the search results from Baseball Reference Play Index. For each player, I searched exact height, handedness, age, and rookie status, while also searching a five percent range in weight (there are some issues with using listed weight). The “Comps” column shows the number of historical rookie comparisons for each potential 2018 Brewers rookie.

This table shows the basic summary of the searches that I conducted using the Play Index tool. What immediately surprised me was the lack of comparisons for some players (like Peralta, Diplan, and Webb), and the large number of comparisons available for “prototypical” starting pitching frames (particularly Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff). Alternately, for a supposedly “old” prospect, the number of comparisons available for Perrin also surprised me, which suggests to me that there has been a path in MLB history for righties of his size and draft pedigree to reach the MLB, even if it takes a while.

Meandering through the comparisons, there are simply some fun and interesting names that appear.

• 2018 rookie Jon Perrin would reach the MLB at the same time as 2012 rookie Yu Darvish, who shares Perrin’s handedness, age, height, and basic weight range; among older comps, Doug Brocail and Todd Worrell are my favorites for Perrin.

• A few names jump off of 2018 rookie Brandon Woodruff’s spreadsheet, like Corey Kluber (!), Ryan Vogelsong, and (of course), Tim Worrell.

• Corbin Burnes has Michael Fulmer and Steve Bedrosian, Houser has Kevin Quackenbush, while Neftali Feliz and Shelby Miller belong to Luis Ortiz. Fulmer is a fascinating comp for Burnes not because of his excellent MLB performance, but because he shared Burnes’s information asymmetry in terms of advanced minors scouting roles and MLB adjustments to exceed expectations. Feliz and Miller are interesting comps for Ortiz, for as the righty faces questions about innings workload and relief risk, it’s good to remember that successful arms have also shared the righty’s frame, height, and age as rookies.

• The lone comps for Diplan and Peralta? Peralta matches 2000 rookie Byung-Hyun Kim (!), while Diplan matches 1965 rookie Dick Selma.

• Obviously, there is a world of gray area here, as these comparisons say nothing about a player’s draft or international development status, stuff, place in the minor league system, etc. Moreover, for my search, I did not use these comparisons to create trends or aging curves, so what I am attempting should not be read alongside the (much more methodologically sound) PECOTA system.

From these searches, a batch of 257 rookie comparison seasons resulted. In order to analyze potential performance markers in environments comparable to the 2016-2017 MLB, I indexed each season according to Runs Allowed per Game (RA/G), and sampled post-Strike rookies that played during a season with a run environment within 5 percent of the 2017 RA/G. This analysis produced a sample of 85 rookie comparison seasons. The following table shows the basic production range for this 85 rookie population:

For this analysis, I focused on Innings Pitched and basic league-level Runs Prevented (I did not investigate historical park factors for this analysis). To compensate for the lack of park factors, I produced a range of runs prevented estimates. Overall, this group of pitchers did not average high innings pitched totals (presumably due to their rookie status, in many cases), with the average pitcher in this sample working nearly 39.0 innings.

This sample can be further categorized to focus on each specific Brewers rookie’s physical profile. In the next table, a range of runs prevented (RnPrv, LowRnPrv, and HighRnPrv) accompany Innings Pitched and Runs averages and standard deviation (IP, IP_StDev; Rn, Rn_StDev).

This table undoubtedly demonstrates a wide range of potentialities for these Brewers rookie pitchers. The innings pitched variance alone suggests that these players could range anywhere from “Did Not Play” to 70-to-80 IP seasons. It’s easy to get excited about some of these results; for example, 75 innings pitched and five runs prevented from Corbin Burnes, or 56.3 IP and six runs prevented from Taylor Williams would represent excellent rotational and bullpen support for Milwaukee.

Yet, the basic averages might provide some hint as to why the Brewers front office has remained quiet on the pitching free agency market thus far: even averaging around 35 innings and providing moderate runs prevented totals, this group of pitchers has a physical pedigree that suggests competent replacement depth can come from rookie ranks. Of course, it is impossible to fully extrapolate from these historical rookie comparisons to the Brewers 2018 pitching staff; this is not a correlative relationship. Yet, through this speculative historical analysis, one can find that Milwaukee has some solid physical characteristics with plenty of historical counterparts (especially Lopez, Burnes, and Woodruff); there are also some nearly one-of-a-kind profiles (see Diplan, Peralta, and Webb). Ultimately, these dozen rookies present Milwaukee’s front office and field management with an array of options to collect outs and prevent runs, even if they’re a group of wide-ranging replacements.

Baseball Prospectus. 2018 PECOTA (March 2, 2018) [CSV]. Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Prospectus. “More PECOTA” (Player Cards). Retrieved March 4, 2018 from baseballprospectus.com.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Sports Reference, LLC., Sports Reference LLC, 2000-2018. Searches conducted March 3, 2018 from baseball-reference.com.

The Graduate

2. LHP Josh Hader

Hader was ranked as the Brewers’ #2 prospect entering the 2017 season, and he did not disappoint during his first taste of big league action. The lefty spent the first few months of the season struggling in the hitter-friendly Pacific Coast League, but once the projected Super Two cutoff had comfortably passed the Brewers brought Hader up to join a struggling bullpen. He was a revelation in a true fireman role, tossing 47.7 innings of 2.08 ERA baseball covering 35 appearances. He struck out batters in bunches, registering 12.8 K/9, while holding opponents to a .204 TAv. If ERA isn’t enough to illustrate his dominance, he also recorded an 86 cFIP and 80 DRA-. Inconsistent command and secondaries call into question whether or not Hader can eventually become a starter, but he looks to at least have fulfilled his floor of impact reliever.

Bull Market

1. OF Lewis Brinson

The 23 year old outfielder was Milwaukee’s #1 prospect last year, and there’s little doubt that the title will be bestowed upon him once again heading into 2018. In his first extended run at the minors highest level, Brinson pounded opposing pitchers to the tune of a .331/.400/.562 slash with 13 home runs and 11 steals in 76 games. He struggled in his brief MLB debut and suffered (yet another) injury in August that ended his season early, but those issues should do little to dim his long-term outlook.

6. OF Brett Phillips

Like Brinson, Maverick Phillips got his first extended taste of the AAA level in 2017 and thrived. A year after grappling with Southern League pitching, Phillips torched the PCL for a .305/.377/.567 batting line with 19 long balls and 10 steals. Unlike Brinson, Phillips opened up some eyes within the organization during an outstanding September in the big leagues, and ended 2017 with an MLB slash of four big league dingers, five steals, a .293 TAv, and some stellar defensive play in center field (+4.4 FRAA). He’s still got a lot of swing-and-miss in his game, but that’s becoming more and more prevalent throughout the league. Phillips appears to be on the inside track for the center field job in Milwaukee next spring.

Holding Steady

8. 3B Lucas Erceg

Erceg got off to a slow start in a tough league for hitters down in Carolina, but came on strong once summer officially hit. His .256/.307/.417 slash doesn’t jump off the page, but he did post an .807 OPS after June 1st and only four batters in the Carolina League slugged more than his 15 home runs. Erceg doesn’t look like he’ll be more than an average hitter who doesn’t walk much, but the power could be above-average to plus and Baseball America ranked his as both the top defensive third baseman and the top infield arm in the Carolina League this season.

9. SS/2B Mauricio Dubon

Dubon split the year between AA and AAA and displayed quality bat-to-ball skills and nifty defensive ability at both second base and shortstop. He didn’t brandish the power that he showed during his AA stint in Boston’s organization in 2016, though, but not many people really expected him to. Dubon’s game is built around high contact and speed, and he could contribute at the big league level as soon as this coming season.

10. RHP Cody Ponce

Ponce stayed healthy in 2017, which was one of the more worrisome issues regarding his development previously. He fills the zone and doesn’t walk many hitters, but his velocity hasn’t been quite what it was during his college days. His stuff is inconsistent at times and he didn’t miss a ton of bats this year, registering only 6.7 K/9. But he did throw nearly 140 innings in 2017 between high-A and AA while logging a 3.14 ERA, helping make his projection as a inning-eating back end starter that much more realistic.

Bear Market

3. OF Corey Ray

Ray’s been a pretty big disappointment in the early stages of his career since Milwaukee popped him fifth overall in 2016. He’s struggled adjusting to even average fastball velocity, and was overmatched to the tune of a league-leading 156 strikeouts in 112 games (31 percent K-rate) with Carolina this past season. He’s become a well-regarded defender in center field and has speed to burn, but after batting .238/.311/.367 with 7 homers this season, he’s started getting some grades as a future fourth outfielder.

4. 2B/SS Isan Diaz

Diaz has been lauded as one of the top-hitting middle infield prospects in the game, but that didn’t really come to fruition in 2017. His power was way down as he clubbed 13 home runs in Carolina (from 20 the year before in low-A) and saw a 50+ point drop in his ISO. He also had issues with expanding his strike zone and whiffed in nearly 27 percent of his plate appearances. Given that he’s unlikely to stick at shortstop with his limited range, there’s a lot of pressure on his bat to develop. A .222/.334/.376 slash in A-ball isn’t going to cut it.

5. RHP Luis Ortiz

Ortiz spent the entire year in AA at the age of 21 in 2017 and finished with a respectable 4.01 ERA in 94.3 innings, which was a career-high. But he missed time once again with injury, which is concerning given his reputation for poor conditioning and a “bad body.” For as much talk as there’s been about his advanced stuff, he didn’t get a lot of whiffs against his Southern League competition, registering 7.5 K/9, while also issuing a career-worst 3.5 BB/9. While there’s still hope for an above-average starter, he’s behind the eight-ball when it comes to building an innings base and needs to show that he’s capable of handling a full-season’s workload.

7. OF Trent Clark

Another Ray Montgomery 1st-rounder that has so far failed to live up to expectations. Clark was considered the most advanced high school bat in the 2015 class, but so far in the professional ranks he’s been dinged for being far too passive in the strike zone. His reserved approach helps him get on base at a high clip and draw plenty of walks against low-level pitching, but that won’t be sustainable as he climbs the minor league ladder. He has yet to find any semblance of consistent power, either, as his OBP (.360) was higher than his SLG (.348) in 2017. This purportedly “advanced hitter” could manage only a .223 average in 2017 while striking out at a 24 percent clip. His limited arm strength means that left field is probably the best fit long-term, putting even ore pressure on the bat to start developing.

This is a fascinating development for a franchise that has not been known for pitching, and fans and analysts may have to get used to this scenario: the arms are ahead of the bats across the system. In 2017, while consecutive first round draft picks Corey Ray and Trent Clark backpedaled, pop-up pitcher Corbin Burnes posted a phenomenal year and saw his stuff tick ahead after noted mechanical adjustments in his delivery. But the pitching development hardly ends with Burnes, who exemplifies the current stock of middle-to-back end rotation starting pitching prospects that grade out as thoroughly solid quality within that role; reports cooled on Cody Ponce, but he had a ho hum innings building season, as did Luis Ortiz at Class-AA; Freddy Peralta was chasing Burnes for most impactful pitching season within the minors; his trademate Carlos Herrera took a big step forward in full season ball; and behind these quality depth options, Trey Supak, Josh Pennington, and others still had quite fine seasons.

Related Reading:
2017 Brewers Minors: Bats

There is a type of depth with these pitchers that simply cannot be matched by the current bats in the Brewers system. Currently, the bats feature multiple risk factors, especially in terms of developing hit tools. This profile not only suits graduates Lewis Brinson and Brett Phillips, but also the aforementioned Clark and Ray, among others. Perhaps the selection of Keston Hiura in the 2017 draft is most important to counteract this risky trend, although Hiura simply reapplies that risk in a different area of the game. If the Brewers bats currently fit the profile of “could be big tools impact” / “might not make it out of a bench role,” the arms are quite the opposite, with no true top-end pitching prospect in the system. It’s a beautiful thing: not one ace. But among those non-aces, perhaps a number of starters that could prove as “boring” as Zach Davies, or have question marks answered like Chase Anderson or even Jimmy Nelson.

One gets the sense that these Brewers arms could be plugged in the rotation any which way, which should be considered an exciting affair given the recent hype of pitching coach Derek Johnson’s blank-slate, situational-personal coaching approach. It should also be mentioned that in an era of velocity, the top Milwaukee arms are hardly flamethrowers, which adds an interesting question about whether the Brewers are exploiting undervalued aspects of the game (I know that’s a played out question by now, but still…), or simply whether the Brewers have found a profile of arm that fits their system or organizational approach.

To accompany the statistical index of 2017 Brewers minor league bats, I have prepared an index of statistics for the 2017 arms in the affiliated ranks. To provide basic consistency with the survey range for the bats, I translated the initial scale of 50 batting PA to 16.7 pitching IP for assessing seasons. This largely produced a similar number of players across leagues, which also means that league median statistic figures should have a solid range to reflect statistical context.

I choose the method of indexing statistics because it is relatively straightforward in terms of user interface: every metric can be measured against a “constant” or comparison variable, such as “Player Total Average (TAv)” versus “League TAv.” In an index, 1.00 can basically be read as “average,” for it means that a player’s metric perfectly matches the comparison metric. For example, righty Eric Hanhold played his age-23 season at Class-Advanced A Carolina, where the median age was also 23; his index is therefore 1.00 for that statistic.

It should be noted that I calculated the index in a different way for pitching prospects in order to remain consistent with the batting index. This means that an overall index greater than 1.00 suggests that a pitcher’s OPS-allowed was better than the average contextual indicators in the league, and that an index below 1.00 means that pitcher was below average given the context of the league. In order to provide additional context to an index that only weighs age, park factor, and opposing OPS alongside OPS-allowed, I added a Deserved Run Average (DRA) index so that readers can compare outcomes and reflect on the validity of the OPS-allowed index.

This index is slightly different than the batting index, since there are different OPS values for pitchers and their opponents (for example, a batter is facing tougher opposition if the opposing OPS is lower; for pitchers, tougher opposition means higher OPS from opponents). For this reason:

+1.00 Age Index means “younger” than league average age.

+1.00 oppOPS Index means better than average opponents (compared to the league).

+1.00 Park Index means hitter’s park.

This index should not be read as a significant, be-all / end-all assessment of pitching performance. Instead, it should be read alongside other statistics and scouting reports as an indicator of the context in which the pitcher performed, as well as how their advanced performance (via DRA) compared to the league.

A few observations:

• Like the batting index, the “non-prospects” immediately dominate this pitching index. Trey Supak has been a deep cut since the Brewers acquired the projection-upside play in the Jason Rogers trade, and the righty worked what finally would be his first full season….at age 21. Taylor Jungmann is hardly even old for Class-AAA Colorado Springs as an organizational depth option. Quiet relief prospect Bubba Derby, a member of the Khris Davis trade, worked a season that matches the “contextual” aspects of Corbin Burnes or Supak (his trademate Jacob Nottingham also had a fine season on the batting index). Freddy Peralta looks like loads of fun, bringing numerous fastball and off-speed / breaking ball offerings and a funky delivery to keep hitters off balance. In this case, the command aspects (and delivery repetition due to a crossfire set-up) of the scouting report should be read alongside the index to round out future role and expectations, but it is undeniable that Peralta placed himself on the radar of quality organizational depth (at worst) in 2017.

• Cody Ponce had quite an interesting year in terms of DRA deviating from his other contextual factors. In terms of OPS, age, and park factors, Ponce scored well in both Carolina and Biloxi. Yet, the righty’s DRA did not stack up against either league, with DRA index of 0.86 and 0.97 in both assignments, respectively. The big righty is making his way up the organizational ladder, however, and it’s tough not to dream on that cutter or fastball at least helping Ponce secure a solid bullpen role of some sort.

• BP scouting team member James Fisher provided a detailed description of Jordan Yamamoto for last season’s midseason prospect feature, noting that delivery refinements and stuff progression drove the righty’s stock. Yamamoto continued to build on that 2016 notice with an excellent 2017 campaign, arguably putting together the most interesting pitching season in the organization (Burnes received the hype, but Yamamoto could have defined a role).The righty was extremely young for the Carolina League, and if the progression continues, the youngster could be primed to expand on a 140+ IP floor during his age-22 season at Class-AA Biloxi. It is worth noting that Yamamoto did not face tough competition in Carolina, although the funky park factors and his age did mightily correct for that indicator. If you’re skeptical about the index, DRA likes Yamamoto even more.

• Additional potential 2018 pop-ups / projection guys who posted better than average contextual index and DRA scores: Zack Brown, Josh Pennington, Braden Webb, and Thomas Jankins. Keep an eye on: Parker Berberet (!!!), Luis Ortiz, Jorge Lopez, Matt Ramsey, and Jon Perrin.

In the cases of both Woodruff and Burnes, the answer is quick and easy, “no” and “no.” Neither pitcher has the combination of raw stuff, command of that stuff, and mechanical execution that renders those 70 or 80 Overall Future Potential (OFP) grades (since OFP operates on a scale of 20 to 80, the top grade is obvious ace territory, and the 70 grade usually runs a “1/2 pitcher” description that makes that grade worth including in “ace” territory). Of course, in the case of Woodruff and Burnes, both pitchers were not even listed as Top 5 arms within the Brewers system by Baseball Prospectus entering 2017. The duo fell behind Top 10 rankers…

• LHP Josh Hader (55-60 OFP, #3 SP or #4 SP / high leverage relief)
• RHP Luis Ortiz (50-60 OFP, #3/#4 SP)
• RHP Cody Ponce (45-50 OFP, average starter / late inning relief or #4/#5 SP or solid relief)

…as well as “Others of Note” RHP Devin Williams (“classic projectable righty”) and RHP Marcos Diplan (“probably future relief” but has “polish and command”). In fact, it is arguable that even with the top five arms in the system, the Brewers do not have an ace.

There is certainly an argument to be made that scouting is an imperfect science, and that perhaps the BP scouting team did not properly price Woodruff’s secondary stuff progression in Class-AA Biloxi, or that they underrated Burnes’s draft day pedigree and almost immediate professional ball impact. Yet, since the BP team bases their scouting approach upon an on-the-ground team that values actual looks, and arguably has more aggressively realistic future prospect grades than other outlets, it is difficult to see the exclusion of either Woodruff or Burnes from the 2017 Top 10 (and “Others of Note”) lists as mistakes. Similarly, accurate “useful middle to back rotation” scouting profiles might indeed “rank” lower than 15th in this Brewers system, but (more importantly) that ranking is not an insult to either player because useful MLB player should never be viewed as a slight on a prospect report.

To complicate matters, even the “accurate” ace grades do not always work out. Perhaps the best current case for this is RHP Lucas Giolito, who ranked atop the White Sox system in 2015 and landed the coveted 70 / 80 OFP (elite starting pitcher or #1/#2 starting pitcher). Giolito was a projected “ace” for many reasons:

“fastball easily works 93-97; can reach back for more; big arm-side run in lower band (93-95); explosive offering; can already throw to all four quadrants; curve shows deep two-plane break; power pitch; adept at replicating arm slot and disguise to fastball; high confidence in offering; will use at any point in the count; commands to both sides of the plate; already plus to better; elite potential; flashes feel for change; turns over with a loose wrist; displays fade with late drop; early makings of strong pitchability.”

Obviously, fans are inclined to take the good without the bad, and running with that Giolito grade also required the downsides: “Lot of body to control; can drift during landing and open early; diminishes fastball command at times; still in the early stages of building stamina; some effort in delivery wears him down; stuff can get loose and sloppy deeper into outings; velocity trails off third time through; will wrap wrist when delivering curve from time to time; change has gap to close to reach on-paper potential; loses action when throws too hard; doesn’t presently command pitch well; leaves up in zone due to early release.” Giolito was the ace in 2015, but even though he’s since dropped in rankings, the new Giolito remains a rarity in a farm system (a 60 OFP, #3 starter).

This exercise could go on and on. As far as 70 OFP aces go, recently there’s Zack Wheeler, Dylan Bundy, Taijuan Walker, Jonathan Gray, and Alex Reyes to consider. These pitchers have had their ups and for the most part remain coveted arms for nearly an organization insofar as few rotations would reject these contributors. But even with great performers like Michael Fulmer, the equation is tough; Fulmer was a 55 OFP with questions about injury and consistency that could potentially impede a #2 type starter. There is no exact science to aces, and picking one is hardly even an artform.

Even Yovani Gallardo, “an outstanding pitching prospect,” missed the ace label and was hit with “#2 and occasional All-Star” as OFP. Should 20.3 WARP signify a #2 arm, that designation would probably serve Burnes, Hader, and Woodruff quite well (and I gather Gallardo’s career earnings justify that, as well).

My standby comment to respond to Burnes / Hader / Woodruff ace talk, or the Brewers system in general, is to comment “aces do not exist.” This is not a throwaway comment, either. Aces do not exist, in the sense that from a scouting profile the grade is so rare as to basically be obsolete within the minor leagues; in the sense of performance, it is categorically true that few pitchers can be great, especially consistently so. The fun with Brew Crew Ball leader and BPMilwaukee Prospect Editor Kyle Lesniewski’s #2016BrewersAce coverage of RHP Junior Guerra is that it hit on something quite central to baseball: even in the most unorthodox historical package, Guerra emerged to dominate batters in 2016. Guerra prevented 22 runs in 2016, a feat hardly matched by a dozen arms in the NL; his splitter was one of the most effective of all time in terms of Brooks Baseball tracking, meaning that Guerra had the stuff to back up the moniker. It was both immensely fun and funny for Guerra to serve as ace, funny in the sense that the Brewers missed front rotation potential in several drafts, but landed it in the form of an age-31 rookie claimed off waivers.

In the sense that Guerra was an ace, I suspect many Brewers fans believe Burnes or Woodruff or Hader could be an ace. This is an interesting problem to discuss because it runs deep beyond semantics. It is not merely semantics to say that a “scouting ace” and a “statistical ace” are different; the difference could land the Brewers a pennant. The trouble with this determination is that it is no easier to define the dominance of a statistical ace. For example, can an ace be one-off? Could an ace have a one-and-hopefully-not-done season, perhaps like Guerra’s 2016 campaign, or does an ace require multiple (consecutive, even!) years of success in order to be termed “an ace”? But in this sense, someone like Kyle Lohse becomes an ace, which is certainly not how many fans (especially not Brewers fans) use the term; but Lohse was a fantastic pitcher from 2011-2014, posting four consecutive better than average runs prevented campaigns.

One might call this the classic, “Is Yovani Gallardo an ace?” question. Obviously this stuff is more than semantics, because we still are inclined to talk about it in 2017. It matters to fans to say, while discussing Burnes or Hader or Woodruff, someone like Gallardo might not be an ace but was a very, very good pitcher, perhaps the next level immediately behind ace (a true #2 starter, perhaps). The table above is obviously just one captured moment in time, as it excludes 2009 and 2010 campaigns in which Gallardo was phenomenal (2.98 and 3.49 Deserved Runs Average (DRA) respectively, with 185+ IP both years) and Lohse was in transition and recovering from injuries. In either case, perhaps neither Lohse nor Gallardo are “aces” in the aspirational sense of the term, but both pitchers were among the top Senior Circuit starters for an extended period of time.

Data:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FeW8mCqDqzf6e6OGlq4SwP0tmIYlT2cpcG288mLQCDw/edit?usp=sharing

But, it’s worth chasing “aces,” and certainly a definition as such. I dove into my runs prevented data, kept annually from 2009-2011 at Sportsbubbler and Bernie’s Crew (unfortunately 2009-2010 are lost), 2012-2015 at Disciples of Uecker, and 2016 personally (officially unpublished). Analyzing a set of 845 individual pitching seasons reveals quite stunning variance that underscores the difficulty of defining acehood.

The big data are not thrilling; a 16 runs prevented season does not strike the “acehood” sense quite like Clayton Kershaw or Zack Greinke when they reach 50 runs prevented in a season. Yet, isolating those 85 pitching seasons above the 16 runs prevented threshold is quite interesting. Indeed, Junior Guerra was an ace in 2016, and by quite a bit (22 runs prevented being significantly better than 16); Gallardo and Lohse are definitely aces; so was Ian Kennedy, Jair Jurrjens, Dan Straily, Doug Fister, Kris Medlen, Wade Miley, Jhoulys Chacin, Henderson Alvarez, and of course Bronson Arroyo. What is striking about this list is the lack of regulars; only 20 pitchers in the 2011-2016 National League reached 16 runs prevented in two (or more) seasons:

This, if anything, should underscore the rarity and strangeness of acehood. Madison Bumgarner has reached 16 runs prevented exactly twice, and in this definition would be exactly as much an ace as Tanner Roark. What’s intriguing about this argument is that by constructing the counterpoint that there is more to being an ace than preventing runs, such as pitching consistently throughout multiple seasons, or consistently serving as a workhorse, acehood once again becomes something that is quite murky and ill-defined. In order to argue that Tanner Roark is not an ace but Madison Bumgarner is, one is required to shift slightly away from peak performance, and search for criteria that will ultimately dissolve the definition of an ace.

Incidentially, only 20 starters in the 2011-2016 NL worked at least 200 innings more than once, although the list diverges quite a bit from the 20 runs prevented aces above. Here, again, Yovani Gallardo answers that ace question with years of consistency:

Combining innings pitched and runs prevented, one can truly see the amount of variance that is inherent in pitching performance, which should be the last nail in the coffin of “acehood” and thus (hopefully) relieve the pressure on the Brewers to develop “aces.”

For this aspect of analysis, I constructed a times series involving every 2011-2016 NL pitcher who appeared during consecutive seasons in the rotational rankings (excluding “emergency starters,” who by definition only worked one start). If you’ve ever imagined that pitching performance varies a bunch on a seasonal basis…indeed it does! When faced with the criterion of working in at least two consecutive seasons from 2011-2016, 216 NL starting pitchers produced 724 pitching seasons, and their performances varied wildly on an annual basis. On a yearly basis, each pitcher might be expected to add or subtract 57 innings and add or subtract 12 runs prevented. To put this in perspective, given that 10 runs is typically understood to be worth “One Win” to an MLB club, each of these pitchers might be expected to either add or substract at least one win on average when they worked in consecutive years. 57 innings is a season’s work by a replacement starter, further demonstrating the importance of understanding variance inherent in starting pitching.

One might expect some outliers to exist, but once again, searching for “consistent” pitchers (pitchers who varied less than the average starter during consecutive seasons) piles doubt on a clear definition of “acehood.” Searching for pitchers with variance reasonably close to the +/- 12 Runs Prevented and +/- 57.0 IP marks reveals fourteen pitchers that started during consecutive years from 2011-2016 while doing so with consistent performance:

[Really, it’s even worth arguing whether Bumgarner, Gio Gonzalez, Mike Leake, or even Tom Koehler and Jon Niese should appear on this list, because 14-to-16 runs prevented is notably higher than 12 runs prevented.]

Once again, the usual suspects are near some quite unusual arms in terms of “ace” discussions. Few would classify Jon Niese or Tom Koehler an ace; when Marco Estrada was traded to the Blue Jays, Brewers fans did not readily call him an ace when they waved goodbye (would one be happy if Burnes or Woodruff or Hader produced Estrada’s career?). However, this list should show the value of the “middle rotation” or #4/#5 scouting designation, as certainly there is room in MLB for arms like Niese, Koehler, and Estrada. Perhaps this list even casts some light on the Arizona Diamondbacks trade for Shelby Miller; maybe a pitching strapped club was not entirely shortsighted when they traded for a 15 runs prevented starter with extremely low variance between seasons (alternately, perhaps they should have looked into the other shoe dropping). Each of these points demonstrates why one should not be concerned with the ranking of the Brewers’ young prospect pitchers, and instead simply await the variance they will produce and hope for the best convergence of variance-cycles during contending seasons.

Aces do not exist. Aces do not exist in terms of scouting, where pitchers can receive ace designation as prospect and “back up” in terms of stuff, face injuries, or even hit banal developmental hurdles. Aces do not exist in terms of runs prevented, where very few arms are able to prevent runs or even work high innings pitched totals in multiple years. Finally, aces do not exist in terms of consistency, for very few National League starters demonstrated the ability to work consecutive seasons with better than average variance between 2011-2016, and many of the arms that are consistent are not “elite” performers that invoke the ideal ace. None of this should be surprising, for pitching is truly difficult, perhaps the most difficult mechanical exercise in all professional sports. This is the logical and empirical conclusion, which should drive a moral conclusion opposed to hanging “ace” tags on pitchers like Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, or Josh Hader. Each of these arms might meet one of the markers used in this article to draw ace-like comparisons at the MLB level, but the overwhelming odds are they don’t; but that alone should not be construed as a bad outcome, for there are bountiful career options without the designation of “ace.”

Data:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FeW8mCqDqzf6e6OGlq4SwP0tmIYlT2cpcG288mLQCDw/edit?usp=sharing

Photo Credit: Caylor Arnold, USAToday Sports Images

Let’s have a look at where the system stood for the previous update:

Now, here’s the competition through May 12:

There are a few things worth noting here:

• Brandon Woodruff is whipping the Pacific Coast League, but he’s faced one of the easiest opposing OPS among regular pitchers. It is still worth digging into Woodruff’s solidly above average strikeout and walk rates, and also emphasizing that Woodruff has maintained his 48 percent groundball: 52 percent flyball ratios established at Class-AA Biloxi last season. Everyone is excited to see Woodruff take the next step to Milwaukee, but as with Lewis Brinson, take that shiny surface statistical performance with a grain of salt and expect a slightly more average MLB role.

• On the contrary, what role can one present for age-30 phenom Paolo Espino? In terms of scouting stuff, no one would place Espino ahead of Woodruff. Espino seems like a pitchability-supreme guy. And so he is, outpitching Brewers fans’ current favorite pitching prospect while facing significantly tougher opponents (.756 oppOPS to Woodruff’s .724 mark). With Junior Guerra returning from the disabled list, and a series of rotating improvements among Brewers starters, Espino may find it easiest to sneak into an MLB bullpen role. But, handling a tough PCL does lead one to wonder whether Espino could start; we’ll split the difference and call him a pitchability swingman for 2017.

• We await scouting updates on Trey Supak, but as recently featured on BPMilwaukee, the young righty is maximizing his time in the Midwest League. Supak is posting the best strikeout-to-walk ratio among Wisconsin starters. For the future, watch his flyball rate (currently 66 percent) and look for scouting updates on Supak’s third pitch.

• Might we praise the 19-16 Biloxi Shuckers, those Shuckers outplaying a sub-.500 run differential in an extremely tough environment? The Shuckers, the gem of the Brewers system breakout in 2015, are the forgotten affiliate in 2017, as the in-between prospects from last year’s forgettable Brevard County club and the remainder of 40-man roster depth and advanced minors veterans forge a supreme sub-hype crew. Shuckers bullpen leaders Matt Ramsey, Nick Ramirez, Taylor Scott, Forrest Snow, and Bubba Derby have a lot to say about that, with a cumulative 102.3 IP, 104 K / 46 BB / 7 HR (0.20 Fielding Independent Pitching ratio), and 32 runs allowed (2.82 runs average against an approximate 3.71 park-adjusted run environment, good for 10 runs prevented).

• And yet they win, lead by Jorge Lopez and Luis Ortiz. Lopez and Ortiz have both faced notably tougher-than-median opponents, and within this duo Ortiz has faced even significantly tougher opponents still. But no sweat, as the median-age Lopez and very-young Ortiz are posting strong K:BB ratios. From here out, keep an eye on the flyballs, as both righties have flyball rates above 60 percent; this figure may fly in the suppressed environment of Biloxi, but could be very problematic at Miller Park (currently playing a 102 pitching park factor over thee years, according to Baseball Reference).