From MLB GameDay:

Making the rounds of Brewers Twitter this morning is a beautiful shot of Diaz’s 70-potential fastball playing out on the big stage, for the righty’s first MLB strikeout. For many of us, we rely faithfully on scouting reports and good grains of salt to understand the strengths and weaknesses of prospects without much video evidence (for those of us that do not subscribe to Minor League TV, that is). So, this morning served as a wonderful visual introduction to that sharp moving fastball.

That fastball…is better than the one I had in mind while reading 70-potential scouting reports. Of course, while reading those reports, I was also fixated on the potential 60 slider and 55 change up that accompanied the big pitch, designating Diaz as one of the Brewers’ very best right-handed prospects, at least in terms of potential three-pitch mix. The rub with Diaz was always the risk factor, which usually played much, much louder than the Overall Future Potential for the righty; it was always downgraded, that Diaz was quite a risky bet to reach the MLB as a starter. Entering 2015 as one of Milwaukee’s top prospects, Baseball Prospectus noted that a 2019 ETA might be expected for the righty:

“After tantalizing evaluators throughout the summer, Diaz stood out during fall instructs thanks in large part to a more consistent breaking ball, including a short slider/cutter variation that added another look and could provide a solid weapon for missing left-handed barrels if the changeup does not fully materialize. Because he gets such good extension on his offerings, the ball gets in on hitters quickly, allowing the pitch to play above its plus velocity grade. That has the duel benefit of helping the fastball to jump and making identification of the cutter more problematic. As with Medeiros, there’s so much distance between present profile and the ultimate skill set required to hold down a spot in a major-league rotation that the Brewers will likely take things slowly with Diaz in 2015, with a focus on continuing to build up arm strength and durability while refining the secondaries. A Helena assignment seems most likely, and would put him in line for a full-season debut in 2016 at the age of 21.”

In the middle of 2016, Grant Jones published a Baseball Prospectus eyewitness report that corroborated the risky story for Diaz while underscoring the lofty potential of the arsenal. Jones wrote, “Upside of good number three pitcher; risk factor makes power reliever very possible. Ability to throw all three for strikes, confident with all pitches, needs more reps with repeating delivery and will be a starter if he can find more consistency. High-upside arm, risk factor is very high but stuff is there. Has the makings for everything to come together soon.”

Diaz played 2016 at Class-A Wisconsin, nearly reaching 100 innings and posting a 3.14 Deserved Runs Average (DRA), a monstrous 91 strike out / 29 walk ratio, and an improved groundball ratio (from 38 percent at Class-R Arizona to 47 percent in full season ball). For all intents and purposes, this appeared to be a smashing success, although analysts must weigh Diaz’s weak competition against his extremely young age for his level. This was the type of season that could sell a risky starting pitching prospect, and unfortunately the Brewers could not take their time to decide on the merits of Diaz; having begun his professional career in 2012, he was ready for the 40-Man Roster, or risked exposure in the Rule 5 Draft. Usually, one would not blink twice at the thought of losing a low ball pitcher in the Rule 5 draft, but in fact this has happened (at least) twice over the last few seasons, including the Brewers’ own experiment with Wei-Chung Wang and the Padres’ selection of Luis Perdomo.

Rereading Diaz’s scouting reports, and viewing his stuff, it is worth asking whether reports had the risk profile backwards for Diaz. Perhaps the MLB relief floor was there, even in Class-A, what with a present-grade 60 fastball and 45 slider (how many current Brewers relievers can boast that combination of grades?). Traditionally, it is easy to simply scoff at the notion that Diaz would have been a potential relief prospect, because the traditional notion remains that you develop players as starting pitchers until they absolutely prove themselves to be relievers. Traditionally, it is easy to dismiss the notion of a Class-A player being anywhere near the MLB; that’s at least three levels and therefore three years away from the big stage, especially if a player’s profile is risky starting pitcher. The trouble is, if a player is not a risky starting pitcher but a potentially solid relief profile, that timetable stands on its head.

The problem with this line of reasoning, of course, is that fans are always ready to push players along as quickly as possible. When the Brewers signed Gilbert Lara, the question was whether Lara could be a type of breakout phenom that makes the MLB for his age-20 season, a la Miguel Cabrera. When the Brewers drafted Cody Ponce, looking at the righty’s frame and arsenal, it was interesting to question whether Ponce could become the next Michael Conforto, a relatively polished prospect that can leap from Class-A to the MLB during the same season (as Conforto did in 2015). These dreams are muted by reality, obviously. But they persist: fans still ask the same type of question about Brewers prospect Corey Ray: can’t you see Ray in Brewers blue in 2018?

Yet, MLB scouting, player development, and analytical teams must take the risk profiles and potential futures of each player quite seriously, and in this case the fact that the Brewers misjudged Diaz’s profile raises questions about how the organization should handle future low ball Rule 5 draft risks. Losing Miguel Diaz is not “nothing,” as there are few 70-potential fastballs lying around the minor leagues, even if those fastballs might be tied to a risky starting pitching profile. Indeed, on the OFP scale that historically grants Diaz $48.9 million in surplus value to the Brewers at his highest pure grade, it is so easy to imagine a future in which the Brewers develop Diaz as a starting pitcher and he never reaches the MLB ($0 surplus). Watering down Diaz’s grade with a host of 40-45-50-55-60 OFP futures gives a much more reasonable estimate of the righty’s surplus value in Milwaukee. But if one asks whether Diaz is a reliever all along, Class-A is much closer to the MLB, and Diaz certainly justifies a 40-man roster spot in that case. “Power reliever” is an essential role for a potentially contending club in 2019 or 2020, and unleashing Diaz as a reliever probably materializes his MLB career in a much easier (less risky) manner than as starting pitching.

So, here lies a logical, analytical player development problem for the Brewers: if they are risk averse with their 40-man roster spots, they must not ask, “what is this player’s ceiling?” but “what is this player’s floor?” When a floor could be as strong as that of Diaz, who was working with a 60 / 45 two pitch mix as early as midseason 2016, Milwaukee must reassess the value of that profile for their roster. Odds are the Brewers did not lose a risky starter that was very far from the MLB, but a relatively stable relief profile that was much closer to the MLB, and it is worth asking whether that profile is worth losing again in the future.

Related Reading
Creating Surplus Analysis and Depreciation Models
Normative Analysis
The Ideal 40-Man Roster

On the Difficulties of Assessing Prospects and MLB Players
First, that an “MLB player” has actually cracked the big leagues and developed some type of role can either enhance or diminish that player’s value. Either way, once that player’s value is expressed in WARP, or some other clearly defined MLB statistic, it becomes much clearer and therefore (usually) “depressed” compared to the OFP of a prospect. (Only a few can be, say, Scooter Gennetts, 50-grade prospects who actually become 4.0 career WARP MLB players! [This is a good thing, not a dig at Gennett.]). Obviously, there are MLB players with non-linear career arcs, role changes, fast or slow declines, etc., across the prospect spectrum — no 60 OFP prospect is guaranteed to become an All-Star, and a 45 OFP prospect may put together a season as a starting player at some point. Future grades and future roles are not concrete.

Second, prospects are judged in completely different ways than MLB players. An MLB player is almost always judged according to three criteria: (1) production, (2) role, and (3) contract. Sure, “production” could be nitpicked with advanced analytics — one could write programs valuing players based on physical and mechanical traits, instead of outcomes (like, say, Strikeouts / Walks / Homers for a pitcher). This is still a concrete analysis of “what has happened” that will arguably weigh what has happened much heavier than what will happen (unless one is attempting to work on a specific type of regression analysis that aims to forecast a player’s traits as future production).

But a prospect can be judged according to best possible ceiling, actual floor, distance between ceiling and floor, proximity to the MLB, risk, individual tools (i.e., the Brewers took a chance on Adam Walker because of his power), aggregate approach / mechanics, projection, and — if you’re bold — even statistics! Even a player like Brett Phillips or Miguel Diaz is difficult to judge, not to mention someone like Phil Bickford, Demi Orimoloye, or Gilbert Lara.

• Miguel Diaz was assessed with a 60 OFP grade during an immensely successful 2016 campaign at Class-A Wisconsin, but he was somewhat old (age-21) for his level and has mechanical, size, injury, and workload questions that leave some to lean on the chance that Diaz is a relief pitching wildcard. So…striking a balance here is quite difficult, between the odds that Diaz has a chance to reach 3.0 / 2.0 / 2.0 WARP seasons as an MLB player, or that his career takes a 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 reliever path. Without even considering risk or any other aspect of Diaz’s development here, monetizing those WARP figures suggests that Diaz could be worth anywhere from $7.0 million to $49.0 million in terms of production value for an MLB team. There’s nothing satisfying about that spread.

• Phillips, a much more advanced and theoretically less risky prospect than Diaz, even exhibits the unsatisfactory aspects of grading prospects in a manner that allows them to be compared to MLB players (for the sake of grading trades and grading roster moves, for instance). There’s the 55 OFP Phillips, a tricky prospect with some bat questions but an overall full-package that allows him to project in either CF or RF, and there’s the 2016 Phillips that caused some evaluators to raise questions about platoon or bench futures. Digging deeper into Phillips’s campaign, nothing is easy — do you judge his statistics on the surface of his age, overall AVG / OBP / SLG line in the Southern League, and focus on issues of strike outs, or do you dig into the context for age-22 seasons in the Southern League and emphasize that even with all the warts, Phillips had one of the most productive seasons in the League? Again, nothing clear-cut or satisfactory here, although depending on how an analysts leans into this information, one could emerge with the positive picture of a left-handed bat that will draw the fat end of a platoon with some discipline and power promise to make the defense worth while (which is perfect counterpart to a current Brewers RF who may be short on chances to correct his own platoon issues). Again, nothing satisfactory here — the 3.0 / 2.0 / 0.0 WARP Phillips may be less likely, but even a platooning Phillips could do better than 1.0 / 1.0 / 1.0 WARP progressions.

Economics and Taking the Longview
The other issue with assessing minor leaguers is their contractual reserve status with their parent clubs. First, minor leaguers are criminally underpaid, leaving clubs that are looking to shed MLB contracts for prospects in the wondrous position of downgrading costs from (at least) $550,000 to maybe $10,000 (or less). When the Brewers swapped Carlos Gomez and Mike Fiers (and an international bonus slot) for Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, Adrian Houser, and Josh Hader, they surrendered at least $14 million in likely contracts (for 2016-2017) for what was almost certainly less than $2 million in likely contracts (for 2016-2017). That salary relief is worth nearly 2.0 WARP, on top of the surplus value and OFP the Brewers acquired in Hader, Houser, Phillips, and Santana.

Moreover, it is problematic to consider whether prospects should be evaluated for their immediate likely contribution to an organization (i.e., their trade value and maybe their first two or three years as an MLB player), or evaluated on the grounds that an MLB club potentially reserves their contractual rights for six-to-seven years. This is a difficult judgment because it will twist the values of prospects with high floors that may be able to contribute almost immediately to an MLB club, and it will also twist the values of prospects that could have huge OFP payoff that may legitimately be a half-decade away (even players like Lorenzo Cain and Jake Odorizzi are solid examples of this, as they each took at least three years to morph into their best and most-productive MLB selves, even though they were both relatively advanced prospects when traded prior to the 2011 season). Cain himself is a prospect who looked like his 2009 “Perfect World Projection” was 100 percent accurate (4.2 WARP prior to 2014), and then he turned on the burners to nearly triple that value in his next three seasons. This may be a vote in favor of using a prospect’s immediate future as a valuation tool, but once again, there are many unsatisfactory aspects of this method.

As an example, the Zack Greinke trade shows just the issue with assessing prospects.

• Even slapping a 45 OFP relief grade on Jeremy Jeffress to enter 2011 gives the righty a huge potential contract surplus for years of control. Incidentially, Jeffress’s career WARP has almost perfectly matched the $14.7M approximate value of a 45 OFP ([1.0 / 1.0 / 1.0] * 70 percent), which leads one to wonder whether simply using a monetized WARP version of OFP is the best way to assess prospects on the same transactional scale as MLB players.
• By that measure, the Brewers received exceptional trade return from their Alcides Escobar-lead package, by more than 3.0 WARP ($29.2M).
• However, if one considers the value of contractual control — which the Royals adroitly demonstrated with Cain and Escobar, and did not with Jeffress or Odorizzi, the Brewers paid more than 9.0 WARP (-$66.5M) to acquire Greinke and Yuniesky Betancourt for a potential playoff push.
• In terms of what actually happened, both teams maximized their deals — the Brewers received actual contractual value and production worth 15 percent more than the advertised sticker price at the time of the trade, and the Royals turned Cain and Escobar into a whopping $277.1M total surplus (six times their advertised sticker price!) while spinning Odorizzi as a part of what became the club’s Pennant and Championship-defining trade.

Hypothetical Modeling
As an example of the difficulties of judging prospects, consider a potential trade involving Ryan Braun, a proven elite MLB left fielder. Even with his guaranteed four-year contract, Braun’s track record (improving into his 30s, no less!) shows a total surplus of $45.8M, meaning that the opportunity cost for trading Braun is at least six wins. Following my investigation of the Astros’ trade for Brian McCann, I suspected that MLB teams do not necessarily consider a player’s depreciated performance when trading for an MLB player; in this case, Braun’s three-year production value is $58.8M, and his total surplus value (including his contract!) is worth $96.8 million.

Depending on how one reads it:

• Braun’s total surplus is hardly worth the total, full contract reserve of any average-or-better prospect (leading me to conclude that this method is problematic).

• Depreciated Braun may be worth the basic value of one 60 OFP prospect and a bench-profile throw-in.

• Non-depreciated Braun may be worth the basic value of at least two 60 OFP prospects (although this seems high).

• Braun-plus-cash is legitimately the best way to improve the prospect return for the veteran.

• Using contract surplus for a prospect, instead of total surplus, Braun is worth approximately one 60 OFP and 50 OFP prospect package.

• Of course, given the individual prospects involved, even these figures may not be helpful. A 45-50 OFP prospect that makes an adjustment to maximize a particular approach or tool could become a 55 OFP prospect. A 60 OFP prospect like Isan Diaz may appear out of thin air. Risky, low-minors plays (like Freddy Peralta, Carlos Herrera, and Daniel Missaki in the Adam Lind trade) may help to maximize the value of a potentially risky veteran trade.

Ultimately, the prospect valuation issue shows the difficulty of Cost-Benefit Analysis, where disparate elements of a transaction must be assessed on the same terms. Obviously, there is no real comparison between an MLB player and a prospect; “prospects are prospects” for a reason. Even the Brett Phillips of the world — legitimately good prospects that provide solid trade return for MLB veterans (like Carlos Gomez and Mike Fiers) — could become bench / platoon options that do not deliver on their full promise. For this reason, prospect monetization assessments based on WARP or projected WARP may always look a little funky, as there is such a harsh range of realities to consider. By slogging through the comparisons, however, one can begin to appreciate that there can indeed be value in swapping such divergent assets as MLB players for prospects.

(1) Grading Thames
Several sources of projection have outlined expectations for Eric Thames in Milwaukee, so I’m not going to attempt to project Thames’s statistical performance in Milwaukee. Instead, I want to look at the opportunity cost of Thames, as well as the potential value from his scouting profile. Really, my analysis of both Thames and Thornburg will depend on your feelings of WARP; whether or not you believe that WARP adequately captured Chris Carter’s value to the Brewers is going to be a factor that impacts how you view the slugger’s surplus value, for instance (a similar issue will arise with Thornburg below).

In my last analysis, I estimated that in terms of contractual value and production, Carter was worth between $18 million and $25 million to the Brewers (the main focal point here is not to consider the fact that he may have cost between $8 million and $10 million in salary arbitration, but that the Brewers could release Carter without spending a dime [and they did just that], which frames his contractual value). The most interesting note on Thames is that the slugger has changed his approach and mechanics while working in the KBO, which places a different lens on his outburst in that league, and also changes his scouting outlook in the USA. Beyond the Box Score features a detailed look at Thames’s swing in the KBO, which shows some development from his MLB swing.

If one attempts to balance Thames’s winding career path with his recent KBO superstardom, a “punt” scouting grade of 45-50 may be in order for the age 30-33 first baseman’s contract. Yet, visions of Jose Bautista come to mind whenever someone says “late 20s mechanical adjustment,” as the Blue Jays’ iconic slugger was little more than a .239 / .324 / .398 slasher through 2008 when Toronto acquired him. The idea that a player can unleash his power after his prime development years is not implausible, and indeed some of those players become superstars (Edwin Encarnacion, Bautista’s teammate, is another example).

In 1,000 scenarios, imagine that Thames reaches 40 OFP 900 times ($1,800M), 50 OFP 80 times ($2,976M), 60 OFP 19 times ($1,452M), and Jose Bautista once ($218M): the Brewers still come out ahead, even if in 90 percent of scenarios Thames effectively busts (0.93 WARP over four seasons). Their total surplus, in this scenario, would be approximately $2.8M. So, the Thames contract is a wash at worst, and at best a fantastic opportunity to sign a foreign league superstar that was simply a late bloomer. Now the only question is if Thames ends up closer to the 0.1 percent odds of breaking out as an MLB superstar on the strength of his KBO adjustments.
Surplus Value: Approximately $2.8M if assumed 40 OFP in 90 percent of outcomes.

(2) Trading Thornburg
How does one grade the Thornburg trade? In my previous grading of current assets, Thornburg’s three-year performance weighed down his significant gains as a reliever. Boston obviously traded for Thornburg with the idea of building on his season as an excellent high leverage relief option, and whether or not Thornburg is a closer, there is a chance that he will provide excellent value to their roster if given the chance to prove himself in the late innings over another season. The best aspect for the big market Red Sox is that they now reserve arbitration rights for Thornburg for three seasons, meaning that there is plenty of time for Thornburg to move within different high leverage roles, struggle, iron out any issues, even weather an injury. In this case, a study of the McCann trade, which caused me to reconsider using depreciation-models to assess trade value, one would do well to assess Thornburg in the most robust manner, certainly weighing his 2016 improvements much more heavily than his previous struggles.

If anything, this comparison should show that it’s extremely difficult to simply assess a trade based on one single model, or one assumption. The Brewers could assume that Thornburg’s troubles would weigh heavier, and they wouldn’t necessarily be wrong; the Red Sox could buy high and have a robust model for Thornburg, and be equally correct. I dare say there will be no equilibrium found for this deal, between either club. The deal is an immediate victory for the contending Red Sox, who bolster their bullpen with a hard throwing up-and-coming reliever that offers three years of arbitration reserve; the deal is an immediate victory for the Brewers, who turned a struggling swingman-at-best into a lights-out reliever and then sold at the best possible moment (it can be argued that even waiting to see if Thornburg could close for the first half of 2017 is too risky for the Brewers, since any issues in that regard would tank the value built during 2016).

Considering both conservative and aggressive estimates for the trade as currently constructed, it should not be outlandish to say that the Red Sox properly gambled that they can retain value with Thornburg’s contract (which can be non-tendered without cost prior to 2018 and 2019). If the PTBNL turns out to be a player with a pedigree other than organizational depth, that might push Thornburg into 2.0 WARP/year territory to regain value. Yet, given that the Red Sox are gambling for playoff spots, overpaying in a trade for a high leverage player is not necessarily a bad deal if the payoff is somewhere between $10 million and $30 million of playoff revenue. Adding together playoff revenue, playoff prestige, and potential flags flying is well worth a PTBNL. There is plenty of evidence to argue the trade a success for either team, which is a good sign that Milwaukee maximized their short-term closer’s value.

(3) Miguel Diaz’s Value
I previously called GM David Stearns’s refusal to protect top RHP prospect Miguel Diaz from the Rule 5 draft a “dreadful, terrible” move, but I think I emphasized the wrong reasons. As the Brewers potentially lost Diaz to the Padres (via the Twins), depending on how he fares early in the season and whether he sticks with San Diego, it is worth recasting the move as a failure even if Diaz does not reach the MLB or his gaudiest 60 OFP from summer 2016.

Imagine that Diaz follows the odds of reaching the MLB at approximately 20 percent; among those potential MLB futures, consider a 40 OFP / roster filler status as the vast majority (95 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 1.0 WARP over three seasons), a 50 OFP (4.5 percent of potential MLB futures, maybe reaching 4.0 WARP over three seasons), and 60 OFP in 0.5 percent of MLB futures (maybe reaching 7.0 WARP over three seasons). Spread over 1,000 potential futures, Miguel Diaz averages out to approximately 0.23 WARP, or someone worth between $0.500 million league minimum contract (replacement contract) and $1.61 million using the standard $7 million / WARP “market estimation.” This is the biggest problem with failing to protect Diaz: in the first place, he’s one of only a few true 50+ / 60 OFP prospects in the Brewers system. There are many 50 prospects in the system, and several 50+ prospects, even, but not many reached a 60 OFP grade in 2016. Diaz reached that level, and is therefore one of the best prospects even adding in all the risk one can find.
Value Lost: $1.6 million.

(4) Roster Summary
Here is a summary of notables trades, Rule 5 transactions (MLB and AAA), and free agency signings. Moves with 40-man roster impact are highlighted.

Thus far, the Brewers have added approximately $23.7 million in total surplus through 40-man roster transactions (this figure does not factor in full reserve control for minor leaguers, but instead focuses on OFP value). That is basically worth 1.7 WARP from a league minimum contract, or 2.75 WARP from Eric Thames (2.75 WARP is worth approximately $19.3 million, minus $15 million guaranteed). In total surplus value, Stearns has acquired approximately $63 million for the organization, which can be translated as approximately 4.5 total WARP from a league minimum salary, or acquiring approximately three 50 OFP prospects via trade.

A quick refresher on Rule 5 draft eligibility:

A player who signed when 18 years old or younger is eligible for the draft after five years. A player who signed at age 19 or older is eligible after four years. According to the rules, it’s how old a player was on the June 5th immediately preceding his signing. The cost of each pick is $50,000 paid to the organization losing the player. If a player is selected, that player must remain on the active MLB roster or disabled list for all of the 2017 season, lest he be run through waivers and offered back to his original team for $25,000.

Thanks to all the trades that Doug Melvin and David Stearns have made over the last two years, Milwaukee’s farm system is stuffed with more talent than we’ve ever seen before. The club added Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, Ryan Cordell, and Taylor Williams to the 40 man roster last month to protect them from the Rule 5 Draft, but the Brewers still were unable to safeguard all of the prospects who could draw interest from other teams around the league. Jim Goulart over at Brewerfan.net has a comprehensive list of all the Rule 5 eligible players within the Brewers’ minor leagues, and here are the players who are the most likely to attract attention during this year’s draft:

LHP Wei-Chung Wang
Doug Melvin and company memorably selected Wang in the 2013 Rule 5 Draft from Pittsburgh, at which point he had never pitched above rookie ball. It wasn’t pretty, but Wang stuck with the team all through 2014 and the Brewers were able to retain his rights. After a poor start to the 2015 season in high-A, the Brewers were able to pass Wang through outright waivers and remove him from the 40 man roster. Over the last year and a half since then, he’s re-established himself as a legitimate left-handed pitching prospect. Wang spent last season split between AA Biloxi and AAA Colorado Springs, posting a combined 3.78 ERA in 133.1 innings pitched. He struck out 21 percent of the batters he faced (7.7 K/9) while walking just 6.4 percent (2.4 BB/9), and both FIP (3.38) and DRA (3.96) largely supported his results on the mound.

Despite his success in the minors this year, the new front office regime apparently didn’t feel the need to protect Wang. That didn’t stop JJ Cooper of Baseball America from identifying Wang as one of the top Rule 5 Draft eligible players, noting that while he doesn’t throw as hard as he did a couple of seasons ago – “his fastball is average at best and gets some fringe average grades” – he features an “excellent” changeup to go along with an average slider along with good command and control. Fangraphs’ KATOH projections similarly identified Wang as one of the top left-handers available. The 24 year old (25 next April) does have only five years of club control left after having already spent a season in the big leagues, but he’s an MLB-ready arm who could soak up innings next year at the back-end of a pitching needy team’s starting rotation.

RHP Miguel Diaz
Diaz was an international signee by the Brewers back in 2011 at the tender age of 16 and only just turned 22 a few days ago on 28 November. He spent all of 2016 in Appleton with the Class-A Timber Rattlers, tossing 94.2 innings with a 3.71 ERA and marks of 8.7 K/9 and 2.8 BB/9. Both FIP (3.59) and DRA (3.30) feel he was even better than his solid earned run average showed, as well.

We don’t typically see younger, less experienced prospects like Diaz taken in the Rule 5 Draft, which may be why Slingin’ Stearns didn’t feel compelled to protect the youthful right-hander. As we saw with the Padres selection and retention of Luis Perdomo last year, however, it’s not totally out of the realm of possibility. Diaz has quite the promising profile, too; an eye-witness report by BP’s Grant Jones earlier this year graded Diaz as having a 60 OFP, saying he has the “[u]pside of good number three pitcher; risk factor makes power reliever very possible.” Diaz received future grades from Jones of 70 for his fastball, which sat 95-96 MPH and touched 98, along with 60 for his slider and 55 for his changeup. A selecting team could theoretically utilize Diaz’s fastball/slider combination out of the bullpen this year with the idea of continuing his development as a starter in the minor leagues once his contractual rights are retained.

OF Kyle Wren
The Brewers picked up Wren in a minor trade with the Braves during the 2014-15 offseason, shortly after his father Frank was fired as Atlanta’s general manager. The diminutive left-handed hitter played all three outfield positions for both AA Biloxi and AAA Colorado Springs in 2016, slashing an impressive .322/.412/.412 across a combined 471 plate appearances at the two levels. With Milwaukee’s crowded outfield situation, however, Wren wasn’t able to find his way on to the 40 man roster after his strong campaign.

Wren’s game offers very little power, as he owns just an .079 ISO and five home runs in 448 career minor league games. He’s a speedster who has stolen at least 29 bases in all four of his professional seasons, has a line drive approach to all fields and is considered an above-average defender. Wren has only struck out in 13.5 percent of his career plate appearances and showed an increased ability to draw free passes in 2016. Wren walked 13.4 percent of the time this past season after posting just a 7.8 percent walk rate during his first three seasons in the minors. KATOH pegged the 25 year old (26 next April) as the top outfielder available in the Rule 5 Draft, with author Chris Mitchell adding “[f]rankly, I’m surprised a player of Wren’s caliber went unprotected.”

Others Who Could Draw Interest:
UTIL Nate Orf
1B/OF Garrett Cooper
RHP Josh Uhen
RHP Angel Ventura

It is difficult to find the relevant points for constructing marginal analysis of baseball transactions because MLB teams are arguably not in economic competition for resources (they are more effectively viewed as colluding firms seeking to keep other operators — competing baseball leagues — from succeeding). Also, MLB-level talent is so incredibly scarce that it is difficult to say that there is a diminishing return from adding too much talent; this is not the same as hiring too much labor or investing too much into capital infrastructure in a competitive market. To demonstrate the latter point, consider the number of 3.0 WARP players in 2016 MLB (77) compared to 1348 batters; given that teams are willing to employ 148 more batters than the total number of 40-man roster spots (1200) in a season to squeeze out every win, at the very least one would argue that (1) there is no diminishing return on adding impact players, and (2) the best place to look at marginal value would be the cost and production of those additional 148 players cutting their teeth at the edges of the MLB roster. But no one would say that MLB teams should only acquire, say, two 3.0 WARP players, and with their third 3.0 WARP player they lose value.

What does this have to do with anything? The Brewers are doing practically nothing thus far in the 2016-2017 offseason, and some of the moves from GM David Stearns are downright perplexing. Others still are non-events, and some of those moves might still produce another surprise player (like Junior Guerra or Jacob Barnes or Keon Broxton or something). So, while I am not going to be able to offer you a full theory of marginal roster value here, consider that in these early season transactions, we are judging the cost of adding one additional player to the 40-man roster, either at the expense of additional future value to the organization, additional surplus value (in terms of production value, trade value, at a certain contract rate), or additional WARP right now. Since most people still assume the Brewers are rebuilding, let’s forget the third motive for rosterbuilding, and prioritize the first two (I’d even add an asterisk to the first goal, adding future value).

(1) Dreadful, dreadful, terrible move: Not Adding Miguel Diaz to 40-man roster.
Set aside the fact that one of these days, analytical front offices will eventually start plucking intriguing A-ball prospects in the Rule 5 draft with regularity. The Brewers made such an audacious (and brilliant) move when they nabbed LHP Wei-Chung Wang from the Pittsburgh Pirates for the 2014 season, effectively stashed him, and even effectively kept him within the organization after designation for assignment. That was a phenomenal future play for a low-cost asset that addressed a (then) organizational weakness (left-handed starting pitching). Of course, the Brewers neglected to protect Wang from the 2016 Rule 5 draft, which is rather problematic in itself. But Wang himself shows the potential value in toughing it out with an extremely inexperienced professional ballplayer as a Rule 5 pick: Wang improved the system’s starting pitching and replacement pitching depth at low cost. The Padres also demonstrated this strategy by selecting RHP Luis Perdomo in 2016, suggesting that perhaps this is finally the beginning of analytical front offices doing audacious things to find value.

Miguel Diaz is probably a Top Five pitching prospect in the Milwaukee farm system to most evaluators, and if you weigh fastball, secondary stuff, potential command and development, and even risk, the righty could probably also land a Top Three pitching prospect designation on the right day (I’d slot Diaz behind RHP Luis Ortiz and LHP Josh Hader; on my own Brewers list, I have Diaz (easily) ranked within the Top Five Percent of the entire Milwaukee organization (with Ortiz, CF Lewis Brinson, and IF Isan Diaz standing as the One Percenters). In a June 2016 eyewitness report, Diaz landed heady 70 fastball OFP, 60 slider OFP, 55 change OFP, and “ability to throw all three for strikes;” risk comes from level / distance from the MLB, full command development, and delivery repetition. All told, a 60 OFP on Diaz makes him easily one of the best prospects in Milwaukee’s system; one could probably rank him in the Top Five and not think twice.

The Brewers neglected to protect Diaz from the Rule 5 draft. Consider this: if a 60 OFP player might be expected to produce at an above-average level at least once, and maybe produce at an average level at least once, it is quite easy to assign a 4.0 WARP / 2.0 WARP / 1.0 WARP three-year spread for a 60 OFP prospect. Yet, recognizing the risk of reaching that level, and the likelihood of depreciating performance, a harsh depreciation level of 70 percent still lands Diaz a three-year OFP grade of 4.9 WARP; an even harsher depreciation level of 40 percent (10 percent for each level away from the MLB, on top of 70 percent depreciation) still lands Diaz a three-year OFP grade of 2.8 WARP.

What I’m trying to say is this: at the basic cost of less than $0.6 million and maybe a burned option year, the Brewers neglected to find roster space for at least $19.6 million in OFP production value. What’s worse is that that future production does not account for the contract eating into that value (it costs nothing to release Diaz, meaning his $19.6 million minimum future value is completely untouched by his contract), nor does it account for the trade value inherent in (1) his strongest projections and (2) his potential production + potential contract. Miguel Diaz is worth at least $39.2 million to the Milwaukee Brewers in surplus value; but that’s an incomplete picture, as it does not include the full contractual reserve rights for the Brewers (but it’s also less effective to say that Diaz is worth $80 million in surplus value).

That the front office neglected to spend a 40-man roster spot on Diaz is an unforgivable offense. I know that’s harsh, but this is the first true mistake of GM David Stearns’s administration, and here’s why: the whole point of an analytical front office, if one views their aims as different than “winning ballgames,” is (a) to cut costs by steering revenue from players to ownership, (b) maximize WARP / $ ratios, and (c) value process over everything, or rather, create processes that consistently and effectively identify value.That the Brewers could not identify the clear value play in Miguel Diaz for an unforgivable risk in even 1-in-100 scenarios (that is, losing Diaz in the Rule 5 draft, for nothing), by spending nothing more than a 40-man roster spot on the righty, is plainly baffling. Moreover, if another MLB team does not select Diaz, they are also making a mistake and poorly evaluating the cost of stashing $39.2 million in surplus value on their roster.

2017 Opportunity Cost: 5.6 WARP ($39.2 million / $7 million per WARP). Ex., you could probably trade Diaz for a very good MLB player.

(2) Other Rule 5 Guys?
For fun, using slightly different calculations than the process I outlined above for Diaz, from my previous post on “Grading Trades“:

I think there are other claims to be made about protecting someone like Wei-Chung Wang, or even someone like Tyrone Taylor. But, since I just went off about Miguel Diaz for far too many words, let’s just say losing Taylor or Wang would be slightly more forgivable. Notably, Adam Walker has a similar prospect grade to both Taylor and Wang, meaning that the Brewers grabbing Walker at the expense of Wang and Taylor is probably close to a value non-event.

(3) The Waiver Shuffle

David Goforth has a career WARP of 0.3, driven by 24.7 innings worked in 2015 to the tune of 0.4 WARP, on the strength of a 3.44 DRA. On the 2016 Brewers, for context, that performance would have made him the fifth best reliever. Unfortunately, it’s a year removed for Goforth and memories are short and there are no second chances in baseball — scratch that, we’re rebuilding, there are plenty of opportunities for a pitcher such as David Goforth to get another chance in Milwaukee. Unfortunately, in the last 10 days, the Brewers have added Adam Walker, added Blake Parker, subtracted Walker, and now added Steven Geltz. The club designated Goforth for assignment to make room for Parker, which was a positive value play on the margins by approximately 0.3 WARP over six seasons (#ThisIsHowYouWinChampionships).

Much more interesting is the fact that both Geltz and Parker throw splitters according to BrooksBaseball, and even more interesting are both righties potential ties to current Brewers pitching coach Derek Johnson (Parker, potentially in the Cubs system) and Vice President and Assistant General Manager Matt Arnold (Geltz, potentially in the Rays system). It’s hard to dislike the mental picture of Stearns and Arnold emerging from the tank in Miller Park with two hard fought waiver claims based on the organization’s splitter-algorithm that caught Junior Guerra; or I don’t know, maybe like Guerra these signings are scouting-gut “I like this guy getting another chance” deals.

If you’re inclined to wonder why the Brewers are designating Walker for assignment, and inclined to be upset about it, consider the chance that he clears waivers and remains in Milwaukee, accepting a minor league assignment: the club just added a potential play worth $11.6 million in surplus value, to stash away for a rainy day (or by mid-June, we’ll see). Liken this move to the Garin Cecchini move, which was great even though it didn’t work out (or, more properly, has yet to work out). It’s tough to judge Walker’s value against Geltz’s rough WARP performance, but somewhere there’s a spin in that splitter that made someone’s afternoon in the plush offices of Miller Park.

2017 Opportunity Cost: Probably no more than 0.25 WARP assuming Walker clears waivers and accepts assignment ($1.8 million maximum roster space / $7 million per WARP). 1.71 WARP maximum cost ($12 million / $7 million per WARP).

(4)The Carter Misstep?
One of the biggest mistakes baseball fans make is viewing value as “production,” rather than “production + scarcity.” Production may be what it may be, but depending on other teams’ needs or wants, a player’s service time, and a player’s contract (among other factors), “scarcity” can be traded. This is what cannot be missed in the case of Chris Carter, after anyone smugly multiplies 0.8 WARP * $7 million, writes “Chris Carter is not worth salary arbitration,” and wrings their hands. So, while rumors suggest that the Brewers may non-tender Carter should they fail to receive a trade offer for the first baseman, a non-tender option should not necessarily be viewed as a positive event for the 40-man roster. For even at $10 million, Carter has value to the Brewers: he has three-year depreciation value at 2.66 WARP ($18.6 million), and two years of arbitration control (at zero cost to non-tender, worth approximately $12.4 million). Carter, at the very least, is worth $18.6 million to the Brewers, and even with harsh depreciation he could be worth as much as $24.8 million to Milwaukee. If you’re unimpressed by this, Carter’s contract surplus and production for one season is worth approximately $11.2 million.

Perhaps this rumor by the Brewers is a public relations plot, or perhaps it is an effort to negotiate a different contract with Carter (imagine a two year, $18 million contract, for example, which would pay Carter 100% of his production value, and 50% of his surplus value). This scenario would be valuable to the Brewers for several reasons: (1) No one better is available at 1B within the system; (2) Carter is relatively dependable; (3) the club still maintains trade value with that contract; and (4) Who cares, the team is sitting on $60 million already and there’s another $60 million due in 2017, and Carter can hit home runs like this:

Do you think Carter was aiming for his picture on the scoreboard? Anyway, the point is, it’s not enough to look at Carter’s production alone and judge a potential non-tender. In the context of the Brewers organization, and even the 2016-2017 first base free agency market, there is little opportunity cost in keeping Carter and paying him grand slam bucks. One of the few MLB free agents that would improve on Carter’s value is Steve Pearce, whose 5.39 WARP three-year depreciation score doubles Carter’s.

2017 Opportunity Cost: 3.5 WARP ($24.8 million / $7 million per WARP). Just pay the slugger!

(5) Total 2017 Opportunity Cost: 9.35 WARP ($65.5M). What this means is that Stearns is willing to pay $65.5M for these roster moves, or rather, that these roster moves have given him the space to find 9.35 WARP. In more straightforward language, the forthcoming roster moves will need to generate 9.35 WARP to balance the roster from these moves.

Related Reading:
Timber Rattler Bats

BPMilwaukee has been lucky to have the watchful eye of BP Scout James Fisher covering the Midwest League. On a recent trip, Fisher extensively scouted some of the Timber Rattlers’ biggest names and sleepers alike. This feature will include a statistical overview of the competitive levels and performance of these prospects, as well as some notes on their respective tools and ceilings.

Midwest League Environment
Judging minor league players by their statistics is a tricky endeavor. First and foremost, since players are developing their tools at the minor league level, their actual performances on the field are not always indicative of their MLB ceiling or potential future value. Furthermore, if a player is honing in on one specific area of their respective toolbox, other areas of their performance may suffer in their statistics. In this case, it is somewhat possible to have a player move forward without necessarily showcasing each of their tools in their statistical record. Age and development levels can also impact a player’s performance; this is especially true in the Midwest League, for instance, where a 19-year-old performing in their first full season of professional play after being drafted out of high school would be expected to perform at a different level than a polished college player working in their age-21 or age-22 season.

With that in mind, one way to consider minor league statistics is by judging each player within their specific context of age, opposition strength, and league strength. For example, the Midwest League is a much more depressed environment than the Class-A counterpart South Atlantic League, which impacts how one can read statistics:

With this in mind, I developed two charts to judge batting and pitching context for the Midwest League. 218 Midwest League batters have had regular play after the June draft or throughout the season, with a base threshold of 130 PA:

The 90% percentile is most elite, meaning that a player facing .661 opposingOPS pitchers is facing tougher competition than 90% of the league, or a .300 TAv is better than 90% of Midwest League regulars (i.e., the other way around, that player would be in the Top 10% of production). In terms of age, the 20th percentile is old for the level, the 90th percentile age is extremely young.

For pitchers, 228 arms have worked 30 innings or more:

In this case, a 2.55 FIP is better than 90% of regular hurlers, and a pitcher that faces a .682 opposingOPS is facing tougher competition than 90% of the Midwest League regular arms. One can note that comparing the full Midwest League with “regular players,” regular batters (130+ PA) have posted a much better median TAv than the league median (.252 TAv for regulars, .243 TAv for the full league). So, one might expect a regular batter to have a better performance in this sense (depending on their age and strength of opposition, of course).

Wisconsin Pitchers Scouted
The following entries are built from James Fisher’s scouting notes, the vast majority of which were compiled during an early August series in Appleton. Notes on Zack Brown and Corbin Burnes were added during a recent Beloit series.

Zack Brown – RHP (50th percentile FIP, 70th percentile age, 30th percentile competition): Brown has a tall, lean frame with room for more. Starts from a semi-windup and 3/4 slot, and arm action shows some warts with high back elbow, effort, and head whack out front. Fastball sat 90-94 and touched 95 with sink and finish down in the zone. Showed feel to both sides of the plate with swing and miss. Showed average feel for the curveball with 10/4 shape at 79-82, which is a swing-and-miss pitch, a power breaking ball with bite. Changeup is too firm at 82-85 and lacks true action. Brown can be effective with fastball/curveball combo, but will need third pitch to succeed.
MLB Role: Back end of the bullpen type in big leagues.
Wisconsin Note: Notably young, posting a median FIP against relatively weak competition.

Corbin Burnes – RHP (20th percentile FIP, 70th percentile age, 40th percentile competition): Medium frame with small shoulders. Burnes starts from a semi-windup and 3/4 slot. The arm action in the back is a little floppy and there is some effort throughout. Fastball sat 90-94 and touched 96. Burnes also throws a little cutter at 88-90 with late break. Fastball command limited in this outing, with front shoulder fly open. Most misses were arm side. Curveball sat 74-78, which started off slurvy but firmed up to 11/4 shape with bite and depth as the outing progressed. Showed feel for the pitch. Slider at 80 with short lateral break. It lacked depth in this outing. Changeup was 83-85 with below average fade. Threw enough strikes in this outing to be effective, but needs to reign in command to stay a starter.
MLB Role: 3 or 4 starter at the big league level.
Wisconsin Note: Poor FIP from a notably young pitcher facing slightly below-median competition.

Jordan Desguin – RHP (20th percentile FIP, 50th percentile age, 60th percentile competition) – Stocky, medium framed righty. Desguin starts from a high ¾ slot and a semi-windup. Pitches with a slightly below average fastball at 87-91, with some 2-seam action to it. His curveball sits 75-78 with 11/4 shape but lacks quality rotation and bite to the pitch. Changeup has marginal fade at 81-84, but Desguin keeps arm speed. High A ceiling. In Wisconsin, Desguin is median age, facing slightly stronger than median competition.

Jake Drossner – LHP (below 20th percentile FIP, 50th percentile age, 50th percentile competition): Drossner has a big, pro-style frame with little room remaining. Starts from a semi-windup and has a high ¾ slot. The elbow gets a touch high in the back and he pitches uphill through a high front shoulder. The southpaw pitches with a 6 fastball at present, sitting 90-94 with some late wiggle down in the zone. The Curveball lacks quality spin, but is thrown at 73-76 with 1/7 shape. Drossner can steal a strike call with it early in the count. The changeup sits 81-84 with slight fade when he keeps his arm speed. AA/AAA Roster filler ceiling. In Wisconsin, Drossner is median age, posting a poor FIP against median competition.

Nathan Griep – RHP (80th percentile FIP, 50th percentile age, 60th percentile competition): Large frame with High ¾ slot and funky delivery. Grief has a high, floppy elbow in back with effort throughout. Fastball sits 92-94 with armside run and some sink. Breaking ball is downer with bite, 11/4 shape. Changeup sits at 79 but lacks proper arm speed and authority. Lacks the ability to command the baseball. Thrower, not a pitcher. AA ceiling at best. In Wisconsin, median-aged Griep is posting a notably above average FIP against relatively tough competition.

David Lucroy – RHP (below 20th percentile FIP, 20th percentile age, 30th percentile competition): Pro-style frame with ¾ slot. The righty is short in the back, with a high elbow and stiffness throughout the delivery. Fastball sits 85-90 and is fairly straight. Lucroy’s curve sits 72-78, and he lacks feel for spin with 11/5 shape. High-A at best. In Wisconsin, Lucroy is relatively old, and is posting a poor FIP against relatively weak competition.

Trey Supak – RHP (20th percentile FIP, 80th percentile age, 50th percentile competition): Supak has a large, pro-style frame with strong lower half. Starts from a semi-windup and high ¾ slot. The delivery isn’t smooth, but there aren’t major concerns in the delivery; Supak is a little herky jerky. The fastball is a 6 to a tick above and sits 91-95. It’s a heavy ball with some arm side run. The righty locates the pitch to both sides of the plate, and isn’t afraid to elevate when needed. The curveball sits 87-80 with large 11/5 shape. It has average spin with consistent depth. The changeup sits 80-81 with fade and Supak keeps his armspeed.
MLB Role: Back end of the rotation potential.
Wisconsin Note: Supak is posting a poor FIP, although he is notably younger than the median pitcher, while also facing median competition.

Quintin Torres-Costa – LHP (70th percentile FIP, 70th percentile age, 30th percentile competition) – L3/4 slinger with average fastball and long sweepy breaking ball. Starts from an extremely closed off stance and strides closed creating deception from his arm slot. Left handed hitters don’t see it well out of the hand. Fastball sits 88-92 with run/sink that gets under hitters hands. Commands it armside but often loses the pitch gloveside. Sweepy, slurvy breaking ball that sits 74-76 with 2/8 shape. It has a long break that A-ball hitters struggle with but more advanced hitters will lay off of. At best, with a tighter breaking ball, a LOOGY at the big league level.
MLB Role: Situational relief.
Wisconsin Note: Torres-Costa is relatively young, and he is producing a strong FIP against relatively weak competition.

Devin Williams – RHP (40th percentile FIP, 70th percentile age, 60th percentile competition): Fisher noted, when asked to highlight a specific player, “I think the recently promoted Devin Williams needs some attention, his Changeup is truly fun to watch.” Fisher’s notes bear this fact:

Williams has a lean frame with broad shoulders, and room for more strength. Starts from a step back semi-windup and a high ¾ slot. He has a high leg lift and no major issues on the back side. Strides towards home plate with a flexed landing leg. The fastball is a 6 with 90-94, touching 96 when he needs it. The fastball is fairly straight, but Williams is working on a wrinkle 2-seamer around 87-88 to keep hitters honest. Controls the pitch to both sides of the plate and will elevate at 95 when he wants a K.

Williams’s changeup is a true 6, with quality arm speed and fade. When it’s right, hitters have no chance. Isn’t afraid to double up on the pitch to either side of the plate. Curveball sits 78-81 with inconsistent shape and spin. The curve is at its best when the shape is 11/5 with downer spin. Slider is being thrown more lately at 83-85 with shorter shape that he can get around on. Has some feel for spin, so one of the two breaking balls will get to average. Williams has really taken a step forward this year, and it’s fun to watch.
MLB Role: Back end of the rotation potential.
Wisconsin Note: Williams is posting a slightly below-median FIP, although the righty is relatively young and facing slightly stronger-than-median competition.

Jordan Yamamoto – RHP (80th percentile FIP, 80th percentile age, 40th percentile competition)– 6’0’’ righty with plus fastball and feel for spin. Starts from a ¾ slot and semi-windup. The delivery gets a little soft in the back. Lands flexed and online. FB sits 91-93 T94 with slight armside run. Curveball sits 74-76 with 10/4 shape. Loopier soft breaking ball that lacks bite and depth. Slider sits 82-84 with tighter rotation but still lacks average rotation and bite. Sweepy. Changeup lacks consistent arm speed but when thrown properly flashes fade. Command profile weak at present with side-to-side fastball but softness in back of delivery will keep from becoming average. AA/AAA roster filler ceiling. Wisconsin Note: Yamamoto is extremely young, and posting an excellent FIP against slightly-below median competition.

Did Not See:
Miguel Diaz – RHP (30th percentile FIP, 70th percentile age, below 20th percentile competition); Alex Farina – RHP (40th percentile FIP, 20th percentile age, 30th percentile competition); Scott Grist – RHP (40th percentile FIP, below 20th percentile age, 20th percentile competition); Thomas Jankins – RHP (90th percentile FIP, 80th percentile age, 90th percentile competition [!!!]).

DL:
David Burkhalter (60th FIP, 80th age, 20th competition), Conor Harber (80th FIP, 40th age, 30th competition), Drake Owenby (below 20th FIP, 40th age, 70th competition), Chase Williams (80th FIP, 20th age, 90th competition).

James Fisher is a BaseballProspectus scout and author.

The trade deadline and whether the Brewers will sell in a meaningful way will be an omnipresent and, likely, irritating discussion over the next two-and-a-half weeks. Twitter will be aflutter with tweets about players increasing or decreasing their trade value based on 25 plate appearances, a trio of relief appearances, or a pair of starts. Player values are established by this point. The only things that will change a player’s value over the next two weeks are his health and price tag.

Still, the upcoming 16 days will hint at the long-term direction of the franchise, whether the club is willing to engage in a full rebuild or simply try to remain fringe-relevant in hopes of making a low-probability run at the postseason. It will only hint at the team’s blueprints for the future, though, as holding many of their most valuable trade chips does not necessarily indicate an unwillingness to sell. The winter’s trade market may prove more larger and more profitable for the Brewers, if they ultimately wait to shop guys like Carlos Gomez, Jean Segura, and Jonathan Lucroy.

At the same time, I do think the upcoming trade season can serve as a barometer, on some level, of the team’s direction. Some rumblings about owner Mark Attanasio’s unwillingness to engage in a full tear-down of the club have bubbled to the surface over the last three months, and perhaps there is some truth in those rumors. I also believe that, as a businessman, Attanasio has legitimate qualms about an intensive rebuilding project in Milwaukee. Unfortunately, though, a quiet trade deadline doesn’t guarantee that the Brewers are unwilling to thoroughly rebuild the roster. The upcoming offseason will be the true litmus test.

Just don’t expect that latter fact to stop most people from panicking, if the team fails to make many moves before July 31.

(2) Will Taylor Jungmann continue to show a level of command that’s unprecedented in his career?

Through seven starts, Taylor Jungmann has won four decisions and posted a 2.15 ERA. His 2.45 DRA (Deserved Run Average) further indicates that his success is reflective of true talent, rather than a stretch of good luck. Watching a few of his starts — particularly his recent complete-game gem — it’s obvious that he’s on top of his game. He’s spinning the breaking ball better than he had in the minors and is relying on his sinker to generate a 55.5 percent ground-ball rate. Moreover, he’s pounding the strike zone better than ever before.

That has been central to my hesitation on Jungmann’s future role with the club and why I’m not ready to consider him as anything more than a potential fifth starter or swingman. It’s not a BABIP-based argument that cites his .252 BABIP and naively calls for that to regress to the mean, though that seems likely since he’s only had a BABIP under .300 once in his four minor-league seasons. Instead, I’m skeptical that Jungmann can continue to throw strikes at this high of rate.

In general, players do not suddenly perform at career-best levels after making the most difficult jump in professional baseball, from Triple-A to Major League Baseball. Jungmann has somehow altered his profile, from a ground-ball specialist who struggled to pound the zone to a ground-ball specialist who has a stellar walk rate.

It’s certainly something that could have happened. I mean, Dallas Keuchel had a career ERA over 5.00 before magically becoming a legitimate ace. But, again, it’s about probability. When projecting future performance, should we bank on Taylor Jungmann being an anomaly who suddenly (and unexpectedly) figured it out in the majors? There’s a small chance that’s the case. I’m just not ready to put my money on that.

(3) Can Jeremy Jeffress step up and claim the “closer of the future” title?

After getting shipped from Milwaukee to Kansas City to Toronto, former first-round pick Jeremy Jeffress has returned to the Brewers and has transformed himself into a quality reliever. That’s hardly the end-goal when drafting a prep right-hander with the 16th-overall pick, but a useful relief arm seems to be a desirable consolation prize for the organization.

Jeffress has compiled ERAs of 1.88 and 2.95 over the past two years with the Brewers, respectively, continuously gaining the trust of Ron Roenicke (then) and Craig Counsell (now). He has seen the most high-leverage appearances of any Brewers reliever, aside from K-Rod, and has the second-most shutdowns (13) on the club. Although Will Smith and Jonathan Broxton are the team’s co-called “set-up men,” the Brewers have actually employed Jeffress in key situations more often.

The 27-year-old’s emergence has wholly been tied to his improved control. Prior to his second stint with the Brewers, Jeffress had not posted a big-league walk rate below 4.35 BB/9 and was only two years removed from walking 8.78 batters per nine innings. With the Brewers, though, those walk rates have been nearly cut in half to 2.20 BB/9 and 3.18 BB/9, respectively. He features a heavy mid-90s fastball nearly 80 percent of time, so realistically, he mostly needs to fill up the zone with his two-seamer and get the opposing hitters to pound the ball on the ground — which can be seen by his 61.5 and 58.9 percent ground-ball rates over the last two years.

Another issue that plagued Jeffress early in his big-league career was an inability to throw his curveball for strikes, which allowed hitters to sit on the fastball. Even a mid- to high-90s fastball can be crushed if opposing batters know it’s coming. As a reference point, Jeffress had never thrown more than 31 percent of his curveballs for strikes. The past two years, that mark has increased to approximately 40 percent. That additional threat is one of the reasons why his swinging-strike rate on his curve has jumped to 18.1 percent. Hitters now must honor it as a legitimate offering, instead of not swinging whenever they recognized the “hump” and spin of the curve.

With relievers, though, it’s difficult to determine whether such improvements are sustainable or whether they’re just a small-sample illusion. The second half of the 2015 will go a long way towards solidifying the answer to that question.

(4) Is Ryan Braun back?

For all the post-PED handwringing that continues to surround Ryan Braun’s public perception, it’s possible that Braun has rebounded from suspension and injury to once again be one of the top offensive outfielders in Major League Baseball. His .835 OPS ranks 13th among all qualified outfielders, and that includes a dreadful start to the season in which he tried to break bad mechanical habits that he developed last year. If one looks at his last 66 games, Braun has compiled a .900 OPS with 11 stolen bases — an OPS that would rank sixth-best among all outfielders.

Ample statistical evidence illustrates Braun’s re-emergence at the plate. Firstly, the 31-year-old is squaring up the baseball with regularity and the power has returned. His average batted-ball velocity is 93.69 mph, which ranks third-best in all of baseball — behind only Giancarlo Stanton and Yoenis Cespedes, and just ahead of Miguel Cabrera and Mike Trout. His .220 ISO is far above the .143 league-average for all hitters and the .151 league-average for outfielders. In other words, the post-PED power-outage argument has a significant evidence problem.

Secondly, Braun has re-discovered his power stroke to left field.In June of last season, ESPN’s Buster Olney explained how opposite-field oriented Braun had become at the plate, even taking a non-subtle PED jab for good measure. His nerve injury in his hand made it difficult to keep his top hand on the bat, much less pull the baseball, so the six-time All-Star adjusted and began shooting the baseball to right field. That muscle memory carried over into spring training and April of 2015, as Braun continuously shot baseballs to the right-center and right fields.

That has changed in recent months. Since the beginning of May, Braun has begun to hit for power to all fields.

This hit chart won’t show a paucity of balls being hit to right field — Braun will always be willing to use right field regularly — but it does show a half-dozen homers to the pull side of center. It shows a half-dozen doubles to the pull side of center. At the risk of being too reductionist, it shows the Ryan Braun of old.

Finally, the Brewers’ right fielder has improved his contact rate and has improved his plate discipline. One of the biggest side effects of Braun’s nerve injury was the need to start his swing earlier to “cheat” against pitches in on his hands. That resulted in less time to identify spin, location and velocity, and as one would expect, that led to more swings at pitches outside the zone, fewer walks, and a higher swinging-strike rate.

Correcting bad habits takes time, but it appears that after a rough few weeks in April, Ryan Braun has returned to his career norms. His contact rate has normalized. His walk rate has jumped significantly since last year. And while he continues to swing at more pitches outside the zone than before, it’s lower than 2014 and is truthfully a function of today’s game. In 2009, for example, the average major-league hitter swung at 25.1 percent of pitches outside the zone. This year, the average is 31.0 percent. In that context, we should perhaps expect that Braun’s number should be higher than his career norm. What’s important, though, is that Braun is pairing it with an above-average contact rate.

As far as the rest of the season is concerned, Brewers fans could treat this argument in two ways. One could argue that the remainder of 2015 will (A) serve as Braun’s litmus test as to whether he’s truly “back,” in all the different ways that can be interpreted, or (B) be an opportunity to enjoy Braun’s return to form. After all, watching Ryan Braun at his offensive peak was aesthetically pleasing and should be going forward.

For me, I lean toward the latter, but while acknowledging that the former remains valid until Braun is able to extend his body of work into a more convincing sample size. A half-season doesn’t define a player, no matter how much it feels like it at the moment. Remember when Cesar Izturis made the All-Star Game in 2005 on the basis of two strong months?

(5) How will the starting pitching develop down on the farm?

Guys like Marcos Diplan, Jorge Lopez, and Tyler Wagner have all taken steps forward in 2015 and have garnered ample attention; however, the organization needs to develop more depth within the system. Relying on mid-rotation free agents has proven undesirable and, largely, not cost effective. Cultivating homegrown talent for the rotation should be one of the primary goals for the Milwaukee Brewers over the next few years.

Right-hander Devin Williams returned from injury a couple months ago and owns a 3.36 ERA for Class-A Wisconsin, but reports on his command have been rather poor — which is also reflected in his walk rate of 4.15 BB/9. He’s a guy who has begun to fly under-the-radar because the Brewers’ have handled him cautiously. Two years in rookie ball and this season in Class-A, the 20-year-old has only thrown 157.1 professional innings in three years. Still, he remains one of the most electric arms in the system.

Taylor Williams and Miguel Diaz finished the 2014 instructional season as two of the most-exciting pitching prospects in the Brewers organization. They have yet to take the mound in 2015. Williams has dealt with forearm tightness all year and suffered a setback earlier this summer, while Diaz has been on the 7-day DL for the past two months. Injuries happen — especially with pitchers — but their absence is obviously hindering their professional development, and if Taylor Williams ultimately needs Tommy John surgery, he’s looking at roughly two years of non-production and potentially not returning to game action until he’s 25 years old. In other words, he’d be a year younger than Tyler Thornburg at this point and would have never pitched above High-A. That’s a tough profile about which to get excited.

Finally, the Brewers need their 2015 draft class to sprint out of the starting gates. Right-hander Cody Ponce has dazzled with impressive performances in Helena and Class-A Wisconsin, but Nathan Kirby has yet to pitch a professional inning and Nash Walters has walked eight batters in 10.2 innings. While the best prospect in the draft class may be outfielder Trent Clark, the Milwaukee Brewers need their early pitching selections to establish themselves as legitimate prospects, which is a process that starts in earnest this summer.