• There are some teams that nearly reach this ideal; in recent Brewers lore, the runs prevention and workload combination of Shaun Marcum / Yovani Gallardo / Randy Wolf / Zack Greinke / and Chris Narveson with Marco Estrada as the lone “replacement” is about as good a true pitching rotation as one can find. They prevented 14 runs, which is quite close to the 2017 Brewers rotational performance of 10 runs prevented.

• Other ideals exist with the 2014 Nationals (Roark / Zimmermann / Fister / Strasburg / Gonzalez and two short-term replacements; 95 runs prevented), or the 2016 Cubs (Lester / Hendricks / Arrieta / Lackey / Hammel plus one short-term replacement and five emergency (one GS) starters; they prevented 122 runs).

• But, let it be known that the ideal fails, too; the 2016 Cardinals rotation of Martinez / Garcia / Wainwright / Leake / Wacha and two short-term replacements was 25 runs below average (worse than the 2016 Brewers rotation, even!);

• The famous 2010 Giants won the World Series with about as true a five-man rotation as one can find, but Cain / Vogelsong / Bumgarner / Zito / Lincecum were 22 runs below average for the Champions (exactly as good as the 2016 Brewers rotation. Indeed, what does a Championship Rotation look like?).

Related Reading:
Depth Beats Attrition
83: 2018 PECOTA Projection
Fluctuation Race: Brewers and Cubs Rotations
Aces Don’t Exist: Rotation Spots
Aces Do Not Exist

As I wrote on Friday, this MLB environment is one in which teams employ over 300 starting pitching spots to complete the season. There ostensibly is only a pitching rotation for a couple of teams, with the remainder of the league simply finding ways to patch-up injuries or string together a low rotation that does not get too badly shelled on any given turn.

The Brewers have gleefully embraced the “replacement” rotation years under both Doug Melvin and David Stearns; Melvin’s 2012 rotation featuring Gallardo / Greinke / Fiers / Estrada / Marcum / Wolf plus four short-term replacements and an emergency starter was twice as good as the “established” 2011 rotation; this ragtag gang prevented 28 runs. Last year, David Stearns improved the rotation significantly, despite starting only Anderson / Nelson / Davies / Garza as regulars and using seven long- or short-term replacements and two emergency starters. This group was just about as good as the 2011 rotation; they prevented 11 runs.

In a sense, rotational queries are aesthetic queries. Do you prefer to steadily churn through a “set” group of five pitchers and take the results, come what may? This method can be dangerous as even relatively similar groups of pitchers can vary significantly from year to year. Take the 2015-to-2016 Cardinals, who made minimal rotational changes, and declined by 81 runs from their excellent 2015 core (excluding John Lackey, who left via free agency). One could complain that the Lance Lynn injury skews that, but his total loss for the season was not anything near that of Jaime Garcia or Michael Wacha’s year-to-year variation. The 2017 Cubs rotational decline has been well-documented, but it’s worth emphasizing that they made minimal personnel changes (in terms of starters) and declined by nearly 100 runs as a group compared to 2016. The Nationals, Mets, and Giants (other “consistent personnel rotations” also demonstrate wild variance between seasons).

Preventing runs is difficult even when a team employs five regular starters.

All this frames the lessons of the 2017 Brewers. Last year the club gambled on a set of mechanical and pitching approach adjustments, as well as a group of well-refined replacements, some declining veterans and in-house arms, and an interesting set of n’er-do-wells to effectively match the production of that ideal of Marcum / Gallardo / Wolf / Greinke / Narveson.

If anything, David Stearns effectively applied the lessons of the 2012 Brewers rotation in as effective a way as possible; it’s worth noting that those lessons failed in 2013 when Melvin went back to well, but it’s also worth noting the “solid rotational group” that was reassembled for 2014 also failed to improve. A Lohse / Peralta / Gallardo / Garza main group with swingmen Fiers and Estrada and MLB graduate Jimmy Nelson looks (in theory) like a much more stable group than either the 2012 or 2013 rotations; that 2014 group prevented three runs when all was said and done.

Enter the 2018 Brewers rotation, who could conceivably appear as the very best rotation of the last decade in Milwaukee (I suppose that’s not terribly tough when that decade includes 2009, 2010, 2013, or even 2015 and 2016 rotations, but well, improvements have to start somewhere!). The core group, entering the season, likely includes post-adjustment, post-breakout Chase Anderson, steady-as-they-come Zach Davies, underrated rotational depth man Jhoulys Chacin, and MLB graduate Brandon Woodruff. That group gives the rotation considerable merit prior to considering any additional depth options, as these four prevented 40 runs in 556 innings in 2017.

What is especially intriguing about the 2018 rotation is the pre-established depth entering the year. I’ve written about this at length here, so I will not rehash it, but basically, the club features Wade Miley as a potential minor-league contract “walk-on” (Miley has never posted a below replacement WARP); another mechanical & strategic adjustment candidate in Yovani Gallardo; and standard depth and potential injury returns from the 2017 rotation. For scouting, strategic, and performance characteristics, see “Trust the Rotation” and “How the Brewers Beat the Cubs.”

Here’s where I think most of the cognitive dissonance lies with Brewers fans: Brewers fans are idealizing the rotational turns of a club like the 2011 Brewers, where five set starters work the full season, ebb-and-flow, but ultimately produce value by virtue of their regular turns in the rotation. Granted, in terms of Deserved Runs Average (DRA) alone, Milwaukee’s main group of pitching depth entering the 2018 season should be at least average to begin with. Fans often forget that the current MLB could require withstanding a 4.70 RA/G to 4.80 RA/G environment in Miller Park / National League. A group DRA of 4.77 is quite solid if you’re playing 4.70 RA/G to 4.80 RA/G baseball. It’s not even a bad level of production if you’re playing 4.60 RA/G baseball.

What fans are missing, however, is that compared to their roles across the league, the Brewers’ depth pitchers are better than their professional colleagues. The PECOTA replacement depth assessment especially underscores this rotational strength. This is a difficult point to convey to fans and analysts alike, because most people assume the Brewers will be bad because instead of signing Lance Lynn or Yu Darvish to pitch against folks like Kyle Hendricks or Jose Quintana, etc., the Brewers will be running Brent Suter or Miley or Junior Guerra or somebody to the mound. There are two problematic assumptions here:

• That any of the Brewers depth starters will work regularly enough as starting pitchers to be assessed as a “standard 25-to-35 GS starter.” Instead of this assumption, fans and analysts ought to think of Miley / Guerra / Suter / etc. working in “bursts” across the season; they might reasonably, as a group, average out to a few starts here or a few starts there, but they hardly should be considered “full SP” roles

• That additional MLB competitors will not be using replacement starters. This is tough to consider, because no one knows the future. So obviously it’s easier to make an argument using a pitcher one expects to be a regular, quality contributor (let’s stick with Quintana and Hendricks here) than trying to project replacements. But, rotational mismatch works both ways, and it’s worth asking how the Brewers’ depth pitchers square against other depth roles across the MLB.

Thankfully, PECOTA keeps a vast database of potential replacements; 653 starting pitchers appear in the Baseball Prospectus March 2, 2018 pitching projection worksheet. What is fascinating about this assembly of projections is that while the projection system features double the arms than those likely used by MLB squads, the proportional alignment of these arms across rotational roles roughly matches the actual distribution of pitching roles in 2017. So, in terms of assessing the quality of pitching roles within one immediate MLB environment (juiced ball, fly ball revolution, etc.), there’s an immediate correspondence or complementary aspect between PECOTA’s projections and what might reasonably be expected to occur based on immediate experience.

I created two PECOTA rotational models. The first “rotates” through PECOTA projections in 30 player sequences, in order to estimate the number of rotational spots that exist in PECOTA. Since the system is used to project system depth as well as established MLB players, there are 10 rotational spots as well as a Replacement and an Emergency group in 2018 PECOTA:

Since this table is quite abstract, I then designed another model in which 2018 PECOTA data are distributed in a manner similar to the 2017 MLB rotation:

Here is a model that assesses the Brewers’ primary system depth against the potential MLB roles and replacements. The last two columns judge each pitcher’s runs prevented against both the 2018 PECOTA rotational spot and the comparable 2017 rotation spot (based on Games Started, as a “true” rotational measurement).

Finally, to assess another range of rotational roles, here is how the Brewers fare against the PECOTA full depth system (1-to-10 spots, plus Replacements and Emergency starters). These sets of columns provide the “Best” and “Lowest” rotational roles assigned by the PECOTA rotation, and then the runs prevented versus each role:

These figures tracking runs prevented by role are highly abstract, so I suggest reading them in the following way:

• While the Brewers’ overall rotation may have an “average” outlook, once replacement rotations begin to appear in the 2018 MLB, the Milwaukee replacements will have a runs prevented advantage of at least 30 runs (assessed against other teams’ replacements).

• All things being equal, the top four Brewers rotational pitchers are average compared to the major primary rotation roles, meaning that the additional low rotation role mismatches could help the team outperform their Runs Scored / Runs Allowed by approximately three-to-five wins.

• An alternate implication is that when the Brewers’ top four pitchers face other teams’ replacements, the Brewers will have a larger positive “role mismatch” than their opponents’ primary starters will have against Milwaukee replacements.

Assessed against other depth roles in the MLB, the Brewers 2018 rotation holds up quite nicely. The top of the rotation, even with considerable projected “decline” compared to 2017, remain average across the first four turns of the rotation. That Anderson, Woodruff, Davies, and Chacin indeed might reasonably be expected to work at least 102 starts is quite a solid proportion, and clearly leaves open space to assume injuries during the 162-game slog will occur.

Moving to the replacement and emergency starter candidates, however, the Brewers rotation begins to shine: frankly, over the course of their projected innings pitched, the Brewers depth are notably better than other replacement arms projected throughout the MLB. This should not necessarily be surprising, for where other clubs may have fewer tested options waiting in the wings, the Brewers have two 1,000+ IP veterans (Gallardo, Miley), and previously solid run preventers (2016 Guerra, 2016-2017 Suter). That’s before reaching the more inexperienced prospect depth, as well as potential injury returns (it’s not necessarily worth considering Nelson’s return, if for no other reason than to not establish false hopes or pressure), or even answering any questions about Josh Hader’s eventual MLB role (even he could “start” a game given the right match-up).

This type of speculative analysis should begin to show how the rotations of attrition may play out in 2018. It should accompany concrete scouting and strategic analysis of pitching profiles and performance pedigree. Thus far, it appears that the Brewers have indeed assembled rotational depth that is ready to be deployed in flexible roles (Suter as swingman; Guerra as a potential reliever / swingman; Miley as minor league option, “next-man-up”). Moreover, in terms of DRA alone, these pitchers ultimately have production levels that match #3 / #4 starters based on the actual distribution of pitching talent in the MLB. One should not get into exercises of “wishful thinking” about this rotation because this Brewers rotation does not need wishful thinking to work; however, role-by-role, these arms are better than replacement arms to a degree that one wonders which of these arms might be able to step into a more extended role should serious injuries or ineffectiveness take a toll during the season.

At worst, this 2018 Brewers rotation should be a group of arms that can hold games steady in waiting for the strong back-end bullpen to take over. At best, this 2018 Brewers rotation is simply hiding in plain sight, an unassuming depth club that is ready by design to replace starters. Once the wheels of attrition begin churning across the MLB, this is the type of rotation that can shine in fits and starts, around the margins of the team, in assuming ways.

Photo Credit: Joe Camporeale, USAToday Sports Images

The trouble seems to be that this roster does not align with some theory about MLB roster building, in which a club simply signs the nine best position players and five best starting pitchers they can find and then gets to work. Even if fans or analysts concede that there will be injuries during a season, they do not seem to align that concession with the actual brutality of 162-game conditions. For example, those four roster spots for Braun, Cain, Santana, and Yelich sure look rough, until one views the number of teams that typically work with multiple outfielders for 100+ Games. In 2017, here’s a list of teams with three outfielders that started 100 games:

That’s it: six MLB teams, six MLB teams managed to field an outfield with three outfielders that started 100 (or more) games. In fact, if you read that table carefully, you will see that any definition of a “full time outfield” that expects three outfielders to work 130 (or more) games is extremely unrealistic; only two MLB teams managed to start three outfielders in at least 130 games. Looking at the last five years, one could argue that this is an anomaly, or the beginning of a trend; here are the number of teams that have started three outfielders in 100 or more games in recent seasons: 2017 (6), 2016 (4), 2015 (6), 2014 (8), and 2013 (10).

The same analysis works with each infield position and catcher in 2017. Ten teams started one catcher for at least 100 games. If you’re worried about the second base logjam, half of the 2017 MLB teams found a starter for 100 or more games. That number increases slightly to 17 for third basemen, and increases again to 19 shortstops with at least 100 games started. Even the “easy” position of first base saw 23 teams start one player for 100 or more games.

There are two ways to view these data: first, one can argue that since regular, dependable starting players are so rare, finding a suitable starter for each position as a roster strategy is of the utmost importance. On the contrarian side, one can run with the market failure: if the evidence of a 162-game season suggests that injuries will deplete a roster and alternative strategies exist (such as heavy platooning or rotational systems), a team can focus on designing a roster that can withstand those issues. This is perhaps one reason the Brewers succeeded in 2017: they started 11 outfielders, four catchers, three first basemen, five second basemen, four third basemen, and two shortstops. Given that several of these starts belong to Hernan Perez, Nick Franklin, Jonathan Villar, and Eric Sogard, that should underscore the significance of positional flexibility for the Brewers roster: many players can be deployed across the roster at will.

This is why I have said, and will continue to say, keep all the outfielders. With options remaining for Keon Broxton and Brett Phillips, and Braun, Cain, Santana, and Yelich at the MLB level, the Brewers have a chance to field an extremely deep and talented team in 2018. Consider, for instance, that the full second outfield is Hernan Perez, Keon Broxton, and Brett Phillips left-to-right; perhaps one would not want to start that outfield for the full season, but if the Brewers are in an extreme injury bind, this is absolutely a playable group.

Moving to the pitching rotation, the same roster building trouble exists: 80 percent of the league cannot find three pitchers to start 30 or more games.

Notice that this list is not exhaustive of playoff teams, either; seven of the 2017 playoff teams reached that level without three pitchers starting at least 30 games. So, yes, this Brewers rotation is what a playoff rotation can look like.

Lest you think I’m cherry-picking, if one expands the selection to teams that were able to start four pitchers for at least 25 games, well, nine MLB teams were able to do that in 2017. Interestingly enough, this second group of teams does not include each team listed in the table above, meaning that even some of these teams with three 30+ GS pitchers were searching for starts in the fourth slot.

Worse yet, it appears that fans and analysts suffer from an idealized notion of the quality of a pitching rotation. In reality, once one falls below 25 games started, the quality of these pitchers plummets, even in a league where 4.70 runs averaged per nine innings (RA/9) is acceptable or average.

In case you’re also concerned about Zach Davies, Chase Anderson, Jhoulys Chacin, and Brandon Woodruff leading the rotation, here are the mythical “top rotation starters”:

These numbers work out to approximately eight runs prevented for the pitchers starting 30 (or more) games, while the 25-to-29 games started group works out to an average of five runs prevented. In this regard, even this threshold of runs prevention is quite reasonable for Davies and Anderson, and even Chacin. Woodruff remains untested, but the basic idea is that this group of “regular starting pitchers” is not terribly far ahead of the Brewers’ fourth starter (and by this point, most teams are not receiving 25-to-29 games started, anyway.

I do not know any other conclusion to this analysis than to state that there is no such thing as a pitching rotation outside of the “standard routine that a team will use for their current group of pitchers who start games.” Here is an area where Brewers manager Craig Counsell could be ahead of the game in admonishing Milwaukee beat writers about calling pitchers “starters” or “relievers”; Counsell is quite astute to observe that he needs to get 27 outs, and he needs a pitching staff that can get 27 outs and prevent runs while so doing. That could mean that the first turn of the season is Zach Davies, Chase Anderson, Jhoulys Chacin, Brandon Woodruff, and Wade Miley, but the second turn could substitute in Brent Suter or Junior Guerra if the match-up is right. I’d bet that even Josh Hader sees a “start” when the match-up is right (say, “neutralizing Cubs left-handed bats”).

Stop asking “Is Junior Guerra or Brent Suter good enough to beat the Cubs?” or “Is Davies / Woodruff / Anderson / Chacin / Miley / Suter / Gallardo / etc. good enough to beat the Cubs?” Stop saying, “But Brent Suter cannot make it more than a couple times through the batting order.” Start saying, “Brent Suter, as a starter, needs to be better than 5.37 to 5.45 runs allowed per nine innings,” or “Wade Miley can work April and needs to be better than 5.70 to 5.93 runs allowed per nine innings.” If the Brewers reach these thresholds, they will be as good as the teams who employed 254 low rotation or replacement starting pitchers in 2017. What is more likely, it seems, is that the Brewers front office, coaching staff, and field management have found a group of pitchers that they believe can quietly shave runs off the back end of the rotation, the replacement games, and throwaways during the grind.

Much like “pitching wins championships except for when hitting wins championships,” the Brewers have correctly gauged that one does not need to reach the playoffs by being a better team than their best possible competitor. Instead, the team needs to be better than the league’s trends, and the league averages. Injuries and roster building strategies suggest that there will not be 130 or more starts from three outfielders, or 30 or more starts from three pitchers, and so the Brewers stand in seas of depth.

The 2018 Milwaukee Brewers need to win a war of attrition, they need to win the grind of 162, they need to win the mundane days of June as well as the thrilling days of September. One way to accomplish this objective is by designing a team that is camouflaged to attrition, injuries, and the grind. In this regard, these Brewers will be hiding in plain sight.

Photo Credit: Orlando Ramirez, USAToday Sports Images

In laymen’s terms, that 2017 line means Perez has played at least 10 games in left field, third base, right field, and center field. He’s also played second base and shortstop.

President Doug Melvin was already on the right track with Perez when his Brewers employed the ex-Tigers depth option as an infield utility player. Already evident in 2015 was Perez’s ability to play around the diamond. That role expanded in a large way under David Stearns’s roster construction, as Perez had a chance to sub for an injured Domingo Santana in right field while also playing more traditional positions of third base and second base (traditional for his experience and profile). As I profiled prior to the season, Perez’s /8367 trip around the diamond made him extremely special, one of eleven expansion era players to work two games each at 1B, 2B, 3B, SS, LF, CF, and RF while also playing regularly enough to hit 300+ plate appearances and well enough to reach a 90+ OPS+. Stated simply, almost no one does what Perez does. An updated Baseball Reference Play Index search for Perez’s 2017 positions shows that the trend continues…only the Dodgers’ age-25 Enrique Hernandez matches Perez’s collection of 10+ games at LF, 3B, RF, and CF. This suggests that even in an era of respect for defensive flexibility within the game, it’s still relatively difficult to find players to serve this role.

There should be clear reason for this fact: just as the expansion of short relief has not entirely erased the starting pitching role or morphed it into a motley set of piggyback assignments, there remains significant value for landing a regular at a set fielding position. Witness Ryan Braun, obviously, but also Travis Shaw or Domingo Santana for the Brewers. What’s even more expressive of this value is the fact that Keon Broxton received continuous playing time in center field despite a performance that was not demonstrably better than that of Perez, which should suggest that the value of finding an everyday position player who sticks is significant enough to wage 326 plate appearances on a player oscillating between fiery power-speedster and fringe replacement option.

Perez’s value, then, comes from another aspect of the game. Indeed, if one views Perez as an ultimate bench profile, which is what a scouting report would probably unemotionally hand down to the superutility option, his skills begin to shine. Here, .257 TAv is quite good, and 3.1 FRAA is almost astonishing. In terms of strategy, Perez has played 22 games with appearances at two or more defensive positions, and another four games as a pinch hitter who stays in the game at a fielding position (PH-LF, PH-3B, and PH-2B, which again seems unheard of in terms of bench flexibility). Stated simply, Perez may not be valuable as an everyday option, where perhaps his 15.9 percent strikeout and 4.7 walk rate profile may diminish his ability to stick at any single position. His value is that of tactical advantage to Manager Craig Counsell, who knows in nearly every mid-to-late game decision event that he has an option better than a “standard” bench player that can play anywhere on the diamond.

Consider a brief table investigating the number of players across baseball with fewer than 50 games played thus far at Hernan Perez’s 2017 positions:

That’s 143 players employed by MLB teams that work at the margins of the roster, perhaps as pinch hitters, bench defensive depth, injury call-ups, cups of coffee, you name it. Judging median offensive production, these players sport TAv generally between .210 and .220 as an aggregate median. MLB teams average approximately five of these players per team, which should reflect just how short MLB benches truly are in terms of talent (and evidence what “replacement theory” actually looks like in practice). Brewers fans complaining about Nick Franklin’s playing time could use this table to understand why the Brewers may have been attempting to unlock some production in the short term, and also play him at four positions (LF, RF, 2B, and SS); had the Brewers unlocked another Perez, Counsell would have exponentially expanded his tactical value options. This should also underscore why Jonathan Villar and his .229 TAv continues to receive playing time; he’s worlds better than a replacement second baseman.

In a weird way, Perez is a replacement player. Perhaps the replacement player, insofar as he contorts everyday value and bench value into something that can no longer be recognized. Consider the production above from players with fewer than 50 games thus far, and how Perez would compare to such players coming off the Brewers bench. Basically, each time Counsell needs to add another positional substitution into the game, Perez’s flexibility ensures that Counsell can rearrange the field how he pleases; for double switches or pinch hitting moves, Counsell also has a much better option than the typical MLB bench player. These benefits cascade with each additional position that Perez can play, ensuring that the Brewers have better depth options than most of their opponents at each step in the game. Perez delays the passage of the game from starters to replacements.

So Hernan Perez poses perhaps the best possible trap for baseball analysts: He is not valuable in the traditional sense of the term. It is not clear that the Brewers could play Perez at one set position on a daily basis and extract strong production from his profile; it’s not clear that he has stunning tools that drive a clearly better than average future ceiling. At the same time, this should not be viewed as a knock against the superutility option, who is finding notable MLB value in a role that is nearly impossible to replicate by the league (which is evidenced by the lack of similar profiles around the MLB). This should lead to a challenge for Brewers fans and analysts, a challenge not to draw any essential conclusions about Perez based on his sustained MLB role between 2016 and 2017. These successful years are not some audition for a larger role, since the role is already set. This is not some value play to create a trade opportunity where the Brewers “sell high” with a trade involving Perez. One could even suggest that this type of role may not be sustainable, although the frequency of injuries and the slog of playing 162 games should leave plenty of superutility opportunities over the next few years. Here Perez serves as some odd trend bucking maverick, a player that does not have any role in a traditional sense, but whose role itself is opportunity presented by baseball’s marathon.

Photo credit: Bill Streicher, USAToday Sports Images