Earlier this offseason, second base was a primary concern for Brewers fans. Most assumed that GM David Stearns would bring back midseason acquisition Neil Walker. That hasn’t happened yet, and although Walker is still a free agent, it seems the team is content rolling with the pieces they’ve got at the position: Jonathan Villar, Eric Sogard, and Hernan Perez.

This Spring will determine who will be the Brewers starting second baseman on March 29th.

If a decision were to be made based on the 2017 season alone, the thirty-one-year-old Sogard would be the obvious choice. Sogard enjoyed a .393 on-base percentage (OBP) over 299 plate appearances in 2017, thanks in large part to his walk rate of 15.1 percent. He was one of just three batters with over 190 plate appearances with a walk-to-strikeout ratio above 1, joining Joey Votto and Justin Turner.

However, Sogard hasn’t always been an on-base machine. In 1,327 plate appearances over six partial seasons prior to 2017, he had an OBP of .296 and a walk rate of 6.9 percent.

Sogard’s increase in walk rate can be attributed to a simple decrease in swings. He swing rate dipped just below 35 percent in 2017, after hovering around 40 percent prior to last season. He began swinging less frequently at pitches not only outside of the zone, but inside of the zone as well.

Sogard has always been regarded as a terrific infielder. If the veteran can somehow manage to maintain his elite walk rate, he will be the an above average starting second baseman and possibly hit towards to the top of the Brewers lineup.

But history shows Sogard has been a well-below average hitter throughout his career. If pitchers adjust and begin throwing him more strikes, he will be forced to put the ball in play and rely on his weak power profile. 299 plate appearances are not enough to conclude that Sogard is a completely different hitter, which is why the next couple guys are going to get their licks.

Jonathan Villar is the primary competition for Sogard. Villar himself is a testament as to why one season can’t be the end all be all when it comes future performance. Similar to Sogard, if a decision were to be made based on the 2016 season alone, Villar would be the obvious choice.

Villar dominated in 2016, stealing 62 bases and hitting 19 home runs, producing a .826 on-base plus slugging percentage (OPS). He was the obvious fit to start at second base prior to last season.

And then he struggled. Villar made 436 plate appearances and stole 23 bases while sporting an .665 OPS in 2017. His poor offensive output forced the Brewers to search for a replacement.

Villar comes into camp this year fighting for his job back. Even if he finds himself somewhere in between his 2016 and 2017 self, it’s easy to see him being a solid starting second baseman. He is still just twenty-six-years-old, which means there’s a possibility his best days are ahead of him.

The Brewers have stacked the rest of their lineup, particularly in the outfield, which means they can afford to run with Sogard or Villar at second base and running the risk that neither of them will be a true starting caliber player. The question then is, which one is going to garner the bulk of the playing time?

If the team was forced to choose, Villar, who has a much higher ceiling than the older, less athletic Sogard, should receive the bulk of the playing time.

Villar has the ability to push the Brewers’ offense to another level. Sogard, at his best, will just move the lineup along. It’s hard to see Sogard ever reaching double digit home run numbers in the major leagues. Villar has 20+ home run power on top of being one of best base stealers in the league when he’s healthy.

In reality, both players are going to receive their fair-share of playing time unless one sticks out. If one or the other can regain their career-year form, the Brewers won’t have a single hole in their lineup.

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These projections will not be perfectly accurate come season’s end, but they provide a good starting point for analyzing the Brewers’ upcoming season.  The Brewers will have a decent shot at making the playoffs, but whether that actually happens will (obviously) be determined by which players over- or under-perform their projections and by how much.  And as some players are more risky than others, who gets significant playing time can play a big role in whether a team significantly overshoots their projection.

PECOTA tells an interesting story for the Brewers, as the six-win gap to the Cubs seems as if it should be significant.  Because of the stratification of talent across the big leagues, however, that gap is by far the smallest between the top two teams in any division (the nine-win gap between the Yankees and Red Sox is next).  The Brewers and Cardinals are the teams most likely to “steal” a division title and earn their playoff spot without having to go through the wild card round, so they should see greater incentive than other potential wild card teams to close the gap between themselves and the Cubs.

Just because a division title is plausible does not mean the Brewers should mortgage the future to reach for that goal, though.  They are still early in their competitive cycle, so trading young talent for short-term upgrades does not make sense.  What could make sense, though, is spending money on shorter-term free agent deals that will improve the team now but come off the books before any long-term extensions are required.

But another way to impact playoff odds is through deciding what types of players to give playing time to.  The goal is always to put the best players on the field, but players have different risk profiles.  There is not a ton of difference between the projections for Jonathan Villar (.244 TAv) and Eric Sogard (.238 TAv), for example, but Villar is more likely to give you a three-win season than is Sogard.  Sogard, however, is probably less likely to be a negative.

Because Villar is a higher-variance option, he gives the Brewers a better chance at exceeding their projections than would someone like Sogard or Hernan Perez.  Whether the Brewers want this, however, is an open question.  They are closer to first place than any other second-place team, so one possible path is to play for as low-variance a season as possible and hope the Cubs disappoint again.  Another option would be to take advantage of how close they are and be more aggressive.

This impacts Villar because it dictates how long his leash should be.  If he starts the season as the everyday second baseman but struggles out of the gates, the Brewers could be tempted to replace him.  If they are willing to take on higher risk, though, they should continue to give him playing time because his upside is such (at least as compared to Sogard or Hernan Perez) that he could help them close the gap on the Cubs.

If the Brewers do choose this path, and Villar does not turn it around but is instead a replacement-level player and they miss the playoffs by a game, that does not necessarily mean that the team made a mistake.  Even with perfect information, which even major league baseball teams do not have, it is impossible to predict how any individual player will fare in a particular season.  When teams are deciding how to allocate playing time, risk profile should be one of the factors taken into consideration.

Because big-league teams have better information than we do as fans, a reasonable temptation is to ask them to be perfect and accurately predict what will happen with each player in the upcoming season.  They cannot do that, though.  Their models are probably more accurate than are the public ones, at least in part because they have access to more information and so their inputs are better.  But they still cannot perfectly predict player performance, as the continuing existence of free agent bargains indicates, so instead they are playing probabilities.

Villar is a good illustration of this type of player.  The Brewers cannot know exactly what they will get from him, but his 2016 performance shows that he can be a good player.  Whether that player will show up in 2018 is an open question, but the Brewers would be justified in letting him play to see whether he can be productive and push the team towards a potential division title.  Because the Cubs are a more talented team, the Brewers have to take some risks if they want to try and catch them.  Giving Villar an extended run at second base would qualify.

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In 2017, Jonathan Villar performed so badly that the club had to bring in Neil Walker to play second base while they pushed for the playoffs.  Although they fell short and missed the wild card game, Walker performed admirably.  In 38 games with Milwaukee, Walker posted a .305 True Average (TAv) and was worth 0.9 Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP).  One win from Walker in a quarter of the season is a good output, as it represented an upgrade over Villar’s season-long .242 TAv and 0.8 WARP.

As we are all aware, though, the Brewers have not yet re-signed Walker.  The only infield transactions they’ve made have been re-signing Eric Sogard and adding Mauricio Dubon to the 40-man roster.  Both Sogard and Dubon profile as more utility types than everyday second basemen, though, so their presence should not preclude an actual upgrade.  Both are capable of playing the position, but neither is good enough that the Brewers—a team with playoff aspirations—should be satisfied.

Walker is the most obvious solution.  He is not a superstar, but he is a solid player, and he may be available on a shorter, one- or two-year deal because the free agent market has collapsed.  From 2013 through 2016, Walker had been worth between 2.9 and 3.5 WARP.  That is a valuable player, and that level of consistency would be useful for a team that will be relying on some high-variability players (Lewis Brinson, Orlando Arcia) for their playoff push in 2018.  Even during last season, which was a down year by Walker’s standards, was not actually that bad, as his cumulative 1.7 WARP still made him worthy of a roster spot.

But as I mentioned above, the offseason is coming to a close, and the Brewers are running out of time.  This doesn’t matter so much if Walker is the solution, because the free agent market as a whole is moving slowly.  But if Walker signs elsewhere, the late date in the calendar makes working on a contingency plan more difficult.  Free agents are likely to sign quickly once the dominoes start falling simply because of the lack of time left in the winter, and the second base free agent market is not that deep.  There just aren’t that many exciting options; Danny Espinosa is the only one who appears slightly intriguing.

This late stature in the offseason also matters because it decreases the amount of time for a potential trade.  I don’t know what the Brewers front office is working on, and I imagine they are working on upgrades at basically every position.  But they cannot be pursuing every angle at once, so if Walker is the first choice, then pivoting to finding trade partners will still take some time.

Spring training is quite long, so one could argue that there is no need to make a move in the next month anyway.  A spring training trade, or even an April trade, would bring in a player early enough that the Brewers’ overall season would not be impacted.  The front office does not stop working once spring training starts or Opening Day arrives, so whether reinforcements arrive on January 30 or March 30 may not matter all that much.  The timing of these moves do matter, though, because the Brewers are at a bit of a crossroads in terms of how willing they are to push for the playoffs this year.  If they are waiting until March or April to address this kind of need, then they are unlikely to also be investing resources in a starting pitcher.  Thus, while the timing of when exactly a new second baseman arrives is mostly irrelevant, it would be indicative of the club’s broader strategy.

This article works on the assumption that an upgrade is needed, and I think the club believes that as well.  David Stearns has proven himself too smart to think that Eric Sogard is a long-term option; despite his 1.257 OPS in May, he finished the year with an OPS of just .770.  Even this was over one hundred points higher than his career mark of .638.  Mauricio Dubon is unproven, and questions remain about his bat.  The Brewers seem to love Hernan Perez, but he has a career .244 TAv, and he backslid from his seeming improvement in 2016.  That leaves Villar, who had a disappointing year and appears to have lost the club’s trust.  Even though he ended the season well (.888 OPS following the Walker trade), he could not regain his playing time, as he got only 63 plate appearances in the last 42 games of the season.  Villar was given a long rope, as no move was made to replace him until mid-August, but the rope did look as if it ran out.

Craig Counsell’s use of Villar in August and September suggests to me that the club does not view him as a solution at second base.  If that is the case, then an external option must be in the cards.  Because of the glacial pace of the free agent market, though, if Neil Walker is not that player, the Brewers are running out of time to find a backup.

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• GM David Stearns signed RHP Chase Anderson to a guaranteed two-year contract, which also includes escalators and club options that could extent to a four-year deal north of $30 million. This deal gambles on the distance between the gains Anderson exhibited in 2017 (where Anderson was a top 10 National League pitcher in terms of runs prevented) and his career trajectory of serviceable middle-to-back rotation depth. What Anderson’s emergence should solidify is the righty’s “true” 50 Overall Future Potential (OFP) role, as a strong middle rotation depth option with some potential upside given MLB adjustments.

• The second contract involves fan-favorite Eric Sogard, a utility depth option that provided a key hot streak in the middle of the season. Prior to a July injury, Sogard batted .331 Average / .438 On-Base Percentage / .485 Slugging Percentage in 162 plate appearances, with a 20 strikeout / 22 walk plate discipline profile giving the Brewers a solid contact-patience option for the batting order. Sogard’s deal is for one-year, $2.4 million (with incentives that could reach $3 million), which gives the Brewers a low-risk renewal for quality infield depth.

In terms of assessing both contracts for Anderson and Sogard against their 2018 roster surplus, it is important to focus on Stearns’s use of both contracts to solidify certain roles for the roster. Here, there is somewhat of a disconnect between Anderson’s WARP (0.4 career, with three replacement seasons prior to 2017) and Deserved Runs Average profile (4.05 in 2017, 5.15 career), and his established career role as steady middle rotation pitcher. This is arguably one place where WARP does not necessarily capture a pitcher’s value (140-150 innings pitched of serviceable depth), and it is clear that Stearns is using this contract to secure that role rather than reward Anderson for previous performance (as performance from 2014-2016 would certainly offset 2017 in this regard). Sogard’s contract is much easier to assess, as keeping the depth option infielder for one year at a maximum of $3 million basically “zeroes out” his surplus; it will simply be worthwhile to have a quality contact-patience profile like Sogard either filling in plate appearances around the infield, or even starting at second base for short periods of time.

Neither of these deals should be viewed as valuable in the sense of providing Milwaukee cost savings for production, or even for securing long-term better than average production for the team. Where these deals indicate success for Milwaukee’s front office is to extend the identity of the 2017 club, a team that contended precisely because of their deep collection of serviceable players. Both Anderson and Sogard were crucial elements of that identity, and Stearns gambling on both roles continuing for the club.

Digging deeper on Anderson, it should be added that expectations of the righty’s decline have been on the books since his career began, and his predicted decline by advanced metrics such as DRA and Contextual Fielding Independent Pitching (cFIP) has never truly materialized (save for 2015-2016, perhaps).

What is intriguing here is that should Anderson “decline” to his expected level of production in 2017, a 4.05 DRA evidences solidly better than average production, and his cFIP suggests the same. Fan or analytical narratives about regression for the righty must consider his ability to consistently “pitch beyond his peripherals” throughout his career, as well as his ability to improve (demonstrated modestly in 2015, and more severely in 2017). Once again, no one should expect Anderson to continue preventing runs at the top of the National League; instead, his ability to adjust his repertoire and strike zone approach should be the keys to discerning the next step in his career arc.

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Those narratives will undoubtedly carry into 2018 guided by the very same contradictions: Milwaukee will indeed be developing many young players at the MLB level (including Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, and Brandon Woodruff), while the team also has several opportunities to improve with established players (either through trades involving their prospects, through free agency signings, or both).

To put it another way: GM David Stearns can take the roster in several directions, and certainly has the resources available to contend while continuing to develop some players.

One way to assess player value, and therefore roster needs, is to estimate the surplus value that each player (and their contractual situation) provides the team. Value is assumed to be production and scarcity, recognizing that a player is not simply valuable to a club based on production, but also based on cost and the general availability of that skill set within the MLB. Surplus is the difference provided between a player’s production and their contract, recognizing that these aspects can be double-counted (a team simultaneously receives a player’s production on the field and their production gauged against their contract). Based on these assumptions, I tracked the surplus value of the Brewers 40-man roster (as of October 20, 2017) by using harsh depreciation to reduce each player’s maximum value (recognizing that a player’s performance typically declines over time save for rare cases).

The following chart tracks changes in surplus entering 2017 to entering 2018, while also assigning an Overall Future Potential (OFP) role for each Brewers roster member:

What these surplus numbers can suggest, in the abstract, is the difference between “the number of the wins above replacement” a player will produce during their contract and the OFP a team might receive if they traded the player at this point in time (alternately, they might suggest a contract range; for example, if the Brewers offered Neil Walker a $30 million contract, they would likely retain some surplus value during that contract).

Using the extremely interesting and difficult case of Jonathan Villar to interpret this table, his 2016 campaign and contract control years still loom large enough to suggest that the Brewers should not move the infielder for cheap; but the shortstop-turned-bench/utility option does mean that Villar’s ultimate role is trending downward, meaning that if Milwaukee believes that role decline is real and will continue to materialize, moving Villar for less than his top value could offset the issues of rostering a declining role. This should outline the difficulty of making roster decisions: in the case of Villar, there is not necessarily a right answer.

I should add that surplus value is abstract in the sense that there is a point at which additional surplus does not provide a team transaction value. Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter should be the most specific examples of this phenomenon in recent Brewers memory, as both players retained solidly positive surplus value entering 2017, but were essentially unwanted on the trade market and therefore expendable for nothing. Following this example, a rule of thumb might be to expect any type of roster move once a player’s surplus value dips below $20 million (or, less than three wins above replacement). Looking at the table of the Brewers roster above, this fact should seem intuitive with many of the names on the list (for example, it is highly unlikely that the Brewers would be able to move a player like Andrew Susac or even Eric Thames for their maximal surplus value).

By averaging each player’s 2017, 2018, and OFP surplus value, and comparing that to their change in value over time, a rather intuitive 2018 roster emerges. In this case, I excluded each player with a Negative-50 percent change in value (ex., a 50 percent decline), which produced need at Catcher, Second Base, and Right-Handed Pitcher, with additional question marks about the Utility roles. This is a rather succinct picture of the actual needs for the 2018 Brewers, and it also shows that if a few key free agents are retained, or similar free agents from outside the organizational signed, the Brewers can assemble quite a good roster:

These tables need not force an analyst to rely on numbers alone in order to validate roster decisions. Compare the following descriptions of potential role upgrades for the 2018 Brewers with those players’ statistical trends, and find nearly 20 roster spots (on the 40-Man) that can be upgraded for 2018:

The benefit of this exercise is that additional roster functions can be analyzed, either through descriptive or analytical means. For example, one could compare some of the best Rule 5 Draft Roster Protection candidates with the players above in order to find the most salient moves for the future value of the organization. Via Brewerfan.net:

Once again, this should exhibit a rather intuitive process of evaluation. If the future value of a catcher such as Jacob Nottingham is better than either Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy (or all three players), it should not hurt to lose one of those players in order to roster Nottingham. Each of these catchers are good candidates for contractual non-tenders for this reason (and, indeed, catcher is a position that the Brewers can upgrade in terms of depth behind/alongside Manny Pina). Similarly, allowing Matt Garza to walk via free agency and rostering Marcos Diplan, Freddy Peralta, or Devin Williams in that place should improve the pitching surplus of the roster. Where it gets more interesting is considering a player like Mauricio Dubon, and whether he simply takes the spot of free agent Eric Sogard, or overtakes Villar or Hernan Perez.

Using these analytical approaches should validate the fact that the Brewers are in a unique position entering 2018. They are a good team, indeed, that also features many up-and-coming players to develop at the MLB level and many declining roles that can be replaced. Where surplus value becomes useful is targeting particular trades, or simply determining when a player should be released or non-tendered.

A player like Keon Broxton, Perez, Susac, or Vogt should demonstrate this difficult decision-making process, and perhaps cause fans to realign their expectations that these types of players can receive impactful trade returns to Milwaukee. Given the packed outfield for 2018, the Brewers could conceivably release a player like Broxton should trade partners refuse to bite with a 45-to-50 OFP / quality depth trade (matching Broxton’s $11.5M-to-$19.8M surplus), for the trouble is that Broxton’s expected role is indeed declining (and any particular trade partner will also know that). This should not simply be viewed as picking on Broxton, as the point exists for Vogt and several other players on the roster.

“Slingin’ Stearns” earned his nickname for wheeling-and-dealing on the trade market during his first offseason in Milwaukee, but that reputation has calmed over time (not surprisingly, as the club completed their rebuilding process). Stearns did not show any hesitation in aggressively using waiver claims and releases to define his 2016-2017 offseason, and now the GM’s reputation may be defined by how effectively he clears roster space for what’s next: refined future development and improved MLB roles to contend in 2018.

The 2017 season proved that these goals can align and coexist within the same roster, so there are no excuses for failing to improve this strategy by learning from the 2017 progression.

Photo Credit: Jim Young, USAToday Sports Images.

That narrative started to change on March 28, when the Cincinnati Reds claimed Gennett off waivers. The loss barely registered on most fans’ radars. A blip of nostalgia, perhaps, but these were the rebuilding Milwaukee Brewers. We’re used to players coming and going. In actuality, Gennett’s sudden departure was the first in a series of unexpected events that engulfed second basemen throughout the Brewers’ system. (Perhaps the most unexpected? Scooter’s .308 Total Average (TAv) and 24 dingers in 435 plate appearances for the division-rival Reds.)

As 2017 winds down, it’s safe to say that the second base picture has grown considerably more murky. Here’s a brief overview of the state of the position up and down the organization.

Major Leagues
Jonathan Villar got off to a miserable start this season, hitting only .221 before the All-Star break and battling a lower back injury in June. Even before the injury, ineffectiveness cost Villar significant playing time. The Brewers summoned utility infielder Eric Sogard from Class-AAA in mid-May, and the diminutive veteran’s hot start in Milwaukee left Villar the odd man out. It was scarcely the follow-up the club had hoped for from Villar, who led the majors with 62 stolen bases and recorded a .826 OPS last year. Villar earned his long leash, but he deserved his reduced role this summer. He’s provided fans a glimmer of hope since the break, batting .288/.306/.415 while working at second and dabbling in center field.

Sogard, meanwhile, won hearts across Brewers nation with a monstrous first half, in which he batted .331/.438/.485. He, too, was bit by the injury bug this season, landing on the 10-day disabled list with a left ankle strain in early July. He hasn’t been the same player since making his way back to the active roster, as evidenced by a paltry .171/.276/.224 triple-slash in the second half. The 31-year-old is a free agent at the end of the season, meaning his days in Milwaukee blue may be numbered.

The versatile Hernan Perez has occasionally spelled Sogard and Villar this year, and he’s done so with aplomb. Brewers brass prefers Perez in a super-utility role, though, so he shouldn’t be considered a long-term solution at the keystone. The same goes for Yadiel Rivera, who made only one brief trip to the majors in his final option year, going hitless in a pair of plate appearances.

Dissatisfied with a slumping Sogard and inconsistent Villar, the Brewers acquired Neil Walker from the New York Mets on August 12 for a player to be named. Walker has been a steady contributor this year, amassing 1.3 WARP in just 380 plate appearances. He’s turned it up a notch since coming to Milwaukee, batting .279/.395/.485 in 22 games. But the 31-year-old is likely to command more in free agency this offseason than the Brewers will want to pay. With younger options already on the big league roster, Walker is likely a pure rental, to be enjoyed while he lasts.

Minor Leagues
Eric Sogard’s May promotion to the major leagues allowed Nate Orf to lock down the second base job in Class-AAA Colorado Springs. He hasn’t disappointed. Orf hit .320/.397/.507 in the thin air of the Pacific Coast League, flashing hitherto unseen power (his 9 home runs this year surpassed his previous career total). At 27 years old, Orf is an unconventional prospect. But he’s also an intriguing one. Orf draws plenty of walks (10.7 percent), and his solid hit tool allows him to avoid strikeouts (14.8 percent). He’s managed to keep the ball off the ground this year, too, and could be a sneaky-good major leaguer if ever given the chance. His .288 TAv in Colorado Springs indicates that he’s ready for that opportunity. Orf could crack the Opening Day roster as a utility man next year if he’s protected from the Rule 5 Draft this offseason.

Mauricio Dubon split time between second base and shortstop this year, reaching Colorado Springs for the first time on June 26. Dubon possesses a solid hit tool, but he failed to replicate the power he flashed last season with the Portland Sea Dogs. If he grows into some pop, he could be a nifty starter. Otherwise, he’s destined for a role as a utility player.

Isan Diaz came to Milwaukee in the Jean Segura trade, and won the organizational Minor League Player of the Year award in 2016 by way of a first impression. He socked 20 home runs and 34 doubles in the Midwest League last season, but took a step back in Class-Advanced A Carolina this year. Diaz struck out in 26.6 percent of his plate appearances en route to a .222/.334/.376 line for the Mudcats. A fractured hamate ended his season in late August.

With the ninth selection of the Rule 4 Draft, the Brewers nabbed California-Irvine standout Keston Hiura. Hiura’s a second baseman by trade, but acted as a strict DH throughout his final collegiate season amidst concerns over an injured elbow. Any worries about whether he could field were mitigated by the fact that Hiura can really, really hit. He walloped Arizona League pitching with a .425 TAv before moving up to Class-A Wisconsin and posting a .326 TAv in just over 100 plate appearances. Hiura returned to the dirt towards the end of the season and held his own at second base. He will push Diaz for superiority in the top prospect pecking order when he gets his first taste of the Carolina League next season.

2018 Outlook
Barring any significant off-season moves, Jonathan Villar is again the odds-on favorite to start at second on Opening Day. Should he stumble out of the gate, he could cede some playing time to Nate Orf, or to a random free agent signing. Mauricio Dubon could likely benefit from another year of AAA pitching, while the high-upside duo of Diaz and Hiura are set to slug it out for a promotion to Biloxi. Keep an eye on Dubon’s ISO, Diaz’s strikeout percentage, and Hiura’s work with the glove. Villar will reach free agency after the 2020 campaign. By this time next year, we should have a pretty good idea of his heir apparent.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

Earlier this week at BPMilwaukee, Seth Victor published an argument in favor of standing pat at the trade deadline. I would like to take this argument seriously, and follow up by investigating the actual needs for the roster. Specifically, what is the likelihood of the Brewers making moves internally that can improve their roster? While fans typically are inclined to argue against placing “developing” players into a pennant race, I largely think this type of fact is immaterial simply because there are so many moving parts to an MLB roster; for instance, if someone like Brandon Woodruff or Lewis Brinson has done all they need to do to develop at Class-AAA Colorado Springs, there is little to no point in keeping them there simply because the Brewers are in a playoff race. Rather, here is where one must closely investigate the Brewers’ roster needs and some of their potential in-house players in order to (a) price out trades and (b) price out the opportunity of developing prospects at the big league level (ex., taking the next step in their development process).

Let me be as clear as possible with this: if the Brewers were working on a development plan prior to the season that included moving Lewis Brinson to center field after the trade deadline (not unlike Orlando Arcia in 2016), and Brinson has reached those developmental milestones, there is little reason to abandon that plan now. That’s not the type of decision that the Brewers should derail simply due to a contending season, for the opportunity cost of developing (or not developing) Brinson at the MLB level to close 2017 is solidifying the odds that the high floor prospect has an MLB role to open 2018 (which is crucial for instantiating the expected rebuild timeframe of contending in 2018).

Mitigating Factors
As I see it, there are two key facts that could justify a trade to boost the MLB rotation:

• Chase Anderson is injured and likely should not be counted on to return to form down the stretch (for example, even if Anderson is healthy in time for a stretch run, likely rehab starts and perhaps some starts to reestablish himself at the MLB level will eat into any type of timeframe for delivering impact starts in the regular season). Making sure Anderson is as healthy as possible, perhaps ready for a playoff run, is important, but it is not worth pushing the righty given his lucrative arbitration reserve contract for the Brewers (and, obviously, for quality control reasons in terms of ensuring the best possible performance upon return).

• Zach Davies and Junior Guerra simply are not pitching well. I just don’t know what else to say; they’re not preventing runs, their Deserved Runs Average (DRA) and contextual Fielding Independent Pitching (cFIP) markers are down from 2016, and there are command and mechanical questions one could ask about both starters. Coupled with the insertion of Brent Suter into the rotation, who is a formidable swingman but may not be desirable as a full stretch run rotation option, the Milwaukee rotation is set for a steep second half regression.

By scaling expected innings pitched (based on full rotational turns over 70 games), and scaling runs prevented based on standard Runs, DRA Runs, and cFIP Runs, what appears to be a solid rotation on the surface may significantly step back:

Should the bullpen continue their excellent performance, they would yield roughly 14 runs prevented over the course of the second half…which would be wiped out completely by the starting rotation if one considers cFIP and DRA to be indicative of their future (emergence of their underlying) performance. This would place pressure on an offense that is already quite volatile, but should the bats keep up their pace Milwaukee could still win approximately 85 to 86 games in this scenario. However, since the club is currently on pace to win 89 games with their balance of good pitching and offense through the first half, an 85-86 win performance would be quite a significant fall during a playoff chase. It should be noted that the Brewers’ Daily Pythagorean (RS / RA) Win-Loss for the season averages to 85 wins, so perhaps there is some sense that this just is an 85 win club (which is quite good for this stage in development, we could really just stop the debate here. Nice job, David Stearns and front office!)

On the offensive side of the equation, the picture is much more certain should Ryan Braun remain healthy. Braun anchors a batting order that is already full of above average position players (Santana, Arcia, Shaw, Eric Thames, and Manny Pina) and great depth (Hernan Perez, Jesus Aguilar, and Eric Sogard). Center field is the only position at which the Brewers feature a median everyday bat (in terms of Total Average) and below average defense (Fielding Runs Above Average). Even the bemoaned Jonathan Villar is pairing an elite glove with his below average bat in 2017, which is drawing some value from the second baseman. In this case, the Brewers’ troubles could perhaps be ironed out by redistributing plate appearances rather than making trades; by taking the harmonic mean between Runs and Runs Batted In, a quick estimate of the Brewers’ batting order and positional performances versus the National League/Miller Park show some inefficiencies in terms of runs production:

Given that the Brewers have solid run production and depth in terms of positional production, they can bolster their second half odds of competing by shifting the batting order. Taking seniority out of the picture (for example, Ryan Braun will likely bat third or fourth or nowhere else in the batting order), Milwaukee could optimize production with the following order:

Taking into account seniority and other specific traits (such as Sogard’s On Base skills, when he returns), a more interesting batting order might be the following:

Moves
So you want to make a trade! The good news is, if you take DRA and cFIP seriously, a trade for a better than average starting pitcher, especially a controllable one, could make the largest impact for the 2017 Brewers. Taking fan favorite Sonny Gray as an example, the steep prospect package required for the righty (probably start with OF Corey Ray or 2B Isan Diaz and RHP Luis Ortiz at the very least) would be worthwhile even if one adjusts for the fact that Gray would move from a 4.49 RA/G environment to a 4.70 RA/G environment (Cot’s Contracts notes that Gray is under arbitration reserve for 2018 and 2019).

Gray has in fact been perfectly average in Oakland, so projecting future runs prevented is a bit difficult in that regard (average is as average does), but DRA and cFIP both love the righty (and Miller Park would love that 56 percent groundball rate). Even scaling DRA and cFIP to a more difficult run environment suggests that Gray over Guerra is a TWO WIN (20 run) move.

How might Brandon Woodruff perform in the MLB? Fans love the righty’s stats, although they rarely cite his relatively easy opponents in Class-AAA Colorado Springs. Nevermind that, DRA and cFIP still like the righty in the minors, but one might not be surprised to see a brief set of struggles as the righty adjusts to his first few turns through the National League. A slightly below average run over 53 innings (once he returns from injury rehab) would be worth at least three runs compared to Davies, and potentially as much as eight or nine runs (nearing the value of another win).

This is an example of how Milwaukee can play for the future in two regards: first, by trading for a solidly above average righty with club control (taking the extreme example of Gray in this case); and second, by advancing one of their strongest organizational arms to regular starts down the stretch. Given that Brewerfan.net reports both Davies and Guerra have minor league options, moving either of those players from the rotation would not necessarily be difficult in terms of transaction cost (it would be personally difficult in terms of player development, I imagine, and there is some opportunity cost in either or both pitchers failing to get a chance to right their stuff for evaluation in the 2018 rotation).

Finally, as for the “start Josh Hader” line, the southpaw is doing quite well in the bullpen. Since I last evaluated the underlying logic in keeping the bullpen relatively stable and allowing their underlying performances to (potentially) emerge, the bullpen has performed quite well. Hader is a part of a great thing in the bullpen, and fans should understand that the prospect is going nowhere in terms of long-term starting pitching plans. In terms of development, the team simply thinks it best to pitch him in the bullpen for now, a move that has played out for several other notable prospects of the last decade.

The lone problem with a trade involving an impact pitcher like Gray is that the Brewers theoretically would not “add wins;” it’s not as though the club would suddenly move the needle from 89 wins to, say, 91 wins. However, if one takes the underlying performance of the starting rotation seriously, adding an impact starting pitcher would help to keep the bottom from falling out of the rotation (which may occur according to both DRA and cFIP). At this very moment, projections such as Baseball Prospectus Team Audit standings suggest the very same for Milwaukee, who may lose the division 84 wins to the Cubs’ 86 wins. So, should the Brewers jump into a trade to improve the rotation, don’t be disappointed if somewhere around 89 wins remains the destination; staving off internal decomposition is just as important as fending off opponents during playoff races.

Photo Credit: Kelley L. Cox, USAToday SportsImages

When Sogard was called up in May, #NerdPower ensued, and was analyzed on BPMilwaukee by Colin Anderle. Sogard finished the month at a .400 batting average clip, a 26.5 percent walk rate, and a .387 BABIP. Sogard was bound to regress and regress hard.

In June, Sogard’s walk rate (seemingly his main claim to legitimacy), has diminished, while his strikeout rate has bloomed. It seemed as if his plate discipline was keeping him alive. However, with a June walk percentage of 7.8 and a strikeout percentage of 16.5, Sogard is still hitting .315 on the month, and his season batting average (.339) would tie for second in baseball, if he qualified.

To continue the metaphor, Sogard simply won’t go away. Like the Brewers, some regression is still to come, but signs of legitimacy continue to arrive. How is Eric Sogard sustaining his success?

The answer can be pointed at on an advanced stat sheet, for surface level analysis. His BABIP is still inflated, down just nine points from .387 in May to .378 in June. But in diving deeper into his batted ball statistics, Sogard is making much better contact when he hits the ball.

Sogard’s low hard contact rate in May has jolted up to a semi-respectable number in June.  The same can be said about spreading the ball to all fields. Sogard has always sprayed the ball well across the diamond, but his batting results have come much closer to each other than in May. This type of variation limits predictability and enhances his chances of getting on base.

Sogard, in short, has been making more efficient contact with the ball. Not necessarily better, because he is making less contact with the ball, but he’s hitting it much harder. This could be due to his recent freer-swinging tendencies in comparison to May. As mentioned before, his walk rate has dropped from 26.5 percent in May to 7.8 percent in June, while his strikeout rate has quadrupled in that timeframe.

In June, Sogard has been whiffing much more on low pitches outside of the strike zone. This trend is obviously concerning, and explains his diminishing plate discipline numbers.

Sogard’s whiff rate heat map makes his continued production that much more incredible, and puzzling. His plate discipline looked to be the sole fingernail clinging to a cliff above regression. However, in abandoning a solid BB/K ratio, Sogard has continued to tread water. The 5’10 lefty is finding new ways to fight off regression, and, like the Brewers, it has lasted much longer than we all thought.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images

Related Reading:
130 Games of New Wave
An Ode to Chumps

What is underrated about this gang of audacious upstarts is their potential for playoff personality and supreme star power transition on the national stage. These Brewers have a set of undeniable villains on their roster, as well as some stylish counterpoints, workingman depth, and future stars. I’ve previously called these Milwaukee Nine the 2002 Angels for the Ivy League Analytics era based on their penchant for turning an unsuspecting roster into a contender with (almost) everything falling the right way. That team saw a blend of aging stars (Kevin Appier and Tim Salmon, for example), unsuspecting breakouts (Scott Spiezio and maybe even Ramon Ortiz), and newcomers (Troy Glaus and John “Mr. Clean” Lackey) ride a combination of their best possible seasons (in most cases) to World Series glory. Should the Brewers continue their success, fans and analysts will probably be tempted to look back on this team and see a group of players where almost everything went right.

But these contenders have star power in another way, which solely exists through their respective personalities. Who are these 2017 contenders? Milwaukee features a roster of unexpected stars, unexpected depth contributors, and veterans who are holding court while a gang of younger prospects are forging their own identities as stars. [Stats compiled Wednesday evening, June 21, 2017].

THE SLUGGING VILLAINS: Eric Thames (.334 Total Average [TAv]) and Ryan Braun (currently on DL, .292 TAv)
Eric Thames is amazing: there was so much anticipation wound within the fanbase after his signing, and any ideals about the slugger’s shifted plate mechanics may have been mitigated by fan dissatisfaction with the shrewd business of cutting Chris Carter, the home run king of the 2016 National League. Yet herein rests the first contradiction of the 2017 Brewers, namely that a cost-saving move was not a tank move designed to orchestrate a team bad enough to land the top pick of the 2018 draft. Thames cut cost, yes, but aligned the 2017 roster to immediately compete and contend. There must be a supercomputer somewhere in Miller Park that GM David Stearns and company leaned on to analyze their $15 million deal to Thames with this as their forecast.

Yet Thames must be the villain. The positively sculpted first baseman looks like he stepped out of an Austrian body building contest, so much so that one wonders why the MLB does not allow ripped baseball players to don fitness speedos at the plate. Surely Thames is ripped enough to handle such an outfit, and one wonders if he’s the Aroldis Chapman of the Brewers insofar as his workouts are so intense as to force his teammates from the gym at said time. With Thames, greater baseball surely feels that Milwaukee is reinstalling PED use within the Post-Steroids Era landscape, which is terrible for the moralizers until their favorite team has their own alleged user. Could you imagine Cubs fans reacting to a Kris Bryant positive test, or a Jake Arrieta doping clinic scandal? The loudmouthed John “This Late 30s Resurgence Is Totally Natural” Lackey would certainly have nothing to say of his own teammates’ almost certain doping (and when Balco drug dealers insist that half the game is using, one must simply wonder who among each team is indeed using. And who cares?)

Mood: pic.twitter.com/GrxEO1ImjS

— Steve (@BrewersKeepTUTH) June 17, 2017

So Thames became the perfect villain, not simply for his bodybuilding finesse and outlandish WWE-style personna, but also for his legitimate appeal to playing the heel. I happened to be in Milwaukee for one of Matt Pauley’s WTMJ pregame shows around the time of Weathergate at Wrigley Field, and Thames had just appeared with a supposed heel at WWE’s NXT event in the Chicagoland area. Pauley set up the scenario for Thames as heel. Here the villain persona is perfect: Thames, just recently accused of using PEDs by the #1 wife-leaving chicken-eating punk Lackey (who files “knows a villain when he sees one” under “takes one to know one”), is appearing in Chicagoland alongside an entertainment industry heel ready to pump his own sculpted body alongside the wrestler:

Just catching up with NXT and I can only imagine the fantastic chats Kev had with Milwaukee Brewers superstar Eric “The River” Thames. pic.twitter.com/EKjKfh1CeL

— Tom aka The Big Dog™ (@TomBlargh) May 21, 2017

Even more perfect than Thames’s christening as a bona fide villain is his place in the batting order next to baseball’s evil cause celebre, that man who has improved since his involvement and suspensions from the Biogensis scandal, Ryan Braun. Braun is a perfect heel to play alongside Thames, a sort of veteran who understands “evil is just business,” the kind of man who I must imagine asks his partner to play a soundtrack of boos to set the mood when the time is right. Braun gets off on the challenge of perfectly shoving his own perfection in the faces of lustily booing opposing fans, a legacy that is easily three years in the making:

every time road fans boo Ryan Braun it takes me back to the Philly fan yelling “Booooooo! Cheater!” as he homers https://t.co/KqUILBZtK0

— Jack Moore (@jh_moore) April 28, 2016

This is the face of a villain with a .312 career TAv driving 44.4 WARP (photo source). Go ahead and boo away!

So the Brewers are off to quite a great start with playoff persona for 2017. I can imagine the amazement when Milwaukee, a team of absurdly audacious upstarts, makes the playoffs and National TV Broadcasters are welcomed with explaining the phenomenon of lustily booing fans during the Division Series. “This team just came out of nowhere, and yet there seems to be so much disdain for their core stars.” Witness Braun and Thames, the Brewers stars who will play the perfect heels to drive media coverage and fan hatred of these bizarro Brewers.

THEE OBP MAD SCIENTIST: Eric Sogard (15 percent walk rate)
Every heel needs a counterpart. Imagine this counterpart to be the understudy of an Evil Bureaucrat, but the type of counterpart who is so perfectly good at their job as to surpass any moral judgment whatsoever. This is the counterpart that has perfected the insertion of precise scientific knowledge into the organizational structure, so as to return Pareto efficient practices not because it’s the right thing to do but because it’s his certain destiny to allocate resources in the best manner possible. THIS is Eric Sogard, the age-31 middle infielder who paraded into Milwaukee in early May to a chorus of fan resentment only to prove himself the perfect assistant to the EVIL slugging villains; yes, Eric Sogard is the Mad Scientist, specifically the Mad Scientist of On Base Percentage (OBP).

Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports Images, captured our counterpart in his natural environment:

And Noah K. Murray, USAToday Sports Images, managed to find the Mad Scientist in action with one of the Slugging Villains:

The best part about Eric Sogard is that he’s the type of mad scientist who perhaps hides within plain sight. If the thin second baseman was not serving as a wicked double play pairing with Orlando Arcia or setting the table for Eric Thames, it’s difficult to tell whether he’d be more apt to grace the pages of GQ to model workplace ready knowledge chic, or sell you a copy of the newest Algiers or Grizzly Bear record (a good thing!). This is the sign of the mad scientist of the highest order, for his appearances do not betray any type of knowledge above another, and thus he’s perfectly suited to sustain his amazing lead-off skills for the playoff bound Brewers.

SMOOTH OPERATOR: Orlando Arcia (7.3 Fielding Runs Above Average)
I was going to write something here, but I believe recent video simply supports the ideal of Arcia as the Smooth Operator:

Arcia is the Smooth Operator for these Brewers, the joyful, mechanically perfect, gutsy, and perfectly timely shortstop who will perform unbelievable feats with such clarity that you will forget he’s one of the youngest shortstops currently playing in the MLB. The beauty is that the Brewers already have one of the best defensive shortstops in baseball on their roster, and no one knows about it. A recent poll presented by a major media outlet quizzed fans on the best young shortstop in the game, and Arcia was nowhere on the list despite his place atop the MLB in terms of his glove (at a glove-first position no less). So a Brewers playoff run would almost certainly serve as a national awakening for the smooth operator, who would probably welcome the chance to face the brightest lights and return a superstar from a larger market after popping off one of his patented spin-throws.

THE EMERGING SUPERSTAR: Domingo Santana, Travis Shaw, Corey Knebel, Jimmy Nelson, Chase Anderson
There are a number of Brewers on the roster that are materializing some of their scouting reports that made analysts and fans dream some years ago. These range from the thrilling power of Domingo Santana, who is slowly but surely answering questions about his strike zone contact, to the ace-via-middle-rotation Chase Anderson, who is giving a glimpse of why it is important to stockpile middle rotation depth that might have a certain what if? about it. Jimmy Nelson also falls in this category for the Brewers, as does third baseman Travis Shaw, who is answering questions about his abilities as a platoon third baseman for the Red Sox. Travis Shaw looks like a strong cost-controlled starter for the Brewers, at worst a second-division starter who will serve as contending depth and at best a stunning depth guy who will emerge as a star to lead the club.

Mind you, none of this needs to be sustainable for it to work in 2017, which is a great lesson about rebuilding, win-now, and roster building in general: life is what happens when you’re busy making plans. Which is to say that one can put into place the best baseball process known to humankind and still end up demoting Hall of Famer Kyle Schwarber midseason. Stars are never stars for long for the vast majority of baseball history: enjoy this while it lasts!

Corey Knebel is a bit more interesting in this group, as he perhaps had the most certain scouting profile of the bunch (unless one simply focuses on the middle rotation aspects of Nelson and Anderson). The Texas closer gained a job by happenstance for the Brewers, which is perhaps the birth of the vast majority of MLB closers. Knebel, however, had a high leverage relief pedigree since the scouting reports, and he just happens to be cashing in that ceiling to lead a bullpen for a stunning team of National League upstarts.

Anyway, there are multiple players on this Brewers club who could become team leaders for the next contender, and this group of five should not be viewed as exhaustive. This group will be, however, the most likely to gain notoriety should the Brewers push their contending effort deep into the season, and any playoff effort in 2017 seems impossible without this quintet.

THE WORKING CLASS STAR: Hernan Perez, Keon Broxton, Manny Pina, Jacob Barnes, Jesus Aguilar, Junior Guerra, Zach Davies, Jared Hughes.
I’ve already written about the wonders of “the Chump” recently, so I’ll spare the verbiage on this group of players. But, the overall point is still crucial: these Brewers are succeeding precisely because a gang of second-chancers or organizational depth guys are seizing MLB roles. Zach Davies was scouted as a back rotation guy, and his 2017 campaign is bearing that out moreso than his excellent 2016 effort, but as the righty progresses it appears he has a chance to seriously answer questions about his stamina and ability to become an innings eater. This is the difference between a career at the back of the rotation (complete with Mike Leake or Ian Kennedy money) and a trip to the bullpen. Manny Pina is the Player To Be Named Later who is becoming a team regular, both in terms of his solid catching defense and his bat at a premium position. Serviceable supreme is not bad for a PTBNL. Hernan Perez is probably the best “chump” (a good thing) on the club, a superutility player that has helped the club bridge injuries to Braun (2017) and Santana (2016), cover for Arcia when he’s slumping at the plate, or even start in place of Jonathan Villar, or give rest to a CF or 3B. Don’t forget Jacob Barnes, the mid-draft relief anchor, or Junior Guerra, the most incredible upstart you could ever know.

These players round out a roster that could provide national TV networks a complicated feeling during playoff coverage, should the club continue to contend. The Brewers feature a robust group of players, some already detested by opposing fans and therefore ready to provide amazing primetime spectacle (imagine Braun hitting a crucial playoff homer in the face of opposing fan boos), and some ready to remind the national media that they should never have been forgotten in the first place. Yet, on the other end of the spectrum, these Brewers are the anti-Cubs, proving that it’s perfectly fine if no one knows who you are, that you can win with Manny Pina and Hernan Perez and Junior Guerra and Zach Davies when the league is passing them up. And so the Brewers are primed to make their revenge, with a club that’s almost absurdly well-situated to seize headlines and become a loved-and-hated storyline should they continue to contend. Certainly should they fail to contend deep into September or October, it will not be for lack of character.

I’m talking about Eric Sogard. Here, I’ll  link the actual leaderboard, because I’m not even offended; you’re right to be skeptical. By no reasonable projection was this thirty-one-year-old Quad-A utility infielder supposed to be the best in baseball at anything, except for possibly Best Impersonation of a College Professor.

There is certainly ample evidence supporting the notion that Sogard is a flash in the pan, waiting for the painful regression back to the mean. But, while expecting him keep up an MVP pace might be overly ambitious, there’s also reason to believe that Sogard has made a couple of late-career adjustments that can pay off with on-field value, especially hitting at the top of Milwaukee’s lineup.

For one thing, let’s start with what Eric Sogard is not doing, and that is hitting the ball hard enough to sustain the comparisons to Barry Bonds. Entering Monday:

Sogard’s average launch angle and average batted ball height both rank well below average, and both his average exit velocity and average velocity generated are dwarfed by the league average as well. In terms of batted ball stats, Sogard ranks in the bottom half of the league, not at the very top.

Furthermore, there’s evidence that he’s been very lucky so far. Since he’s not hitting the ball hard, we can expect that Sogard’s .389 BABIP is going to fall to something closer to his career mark of .274. And a 20 percent HR/FB rate compared to a 2.6 percent career rate is another sure bet for regression. Eric Sogard is not a .390 hitter, not really, and his .244 isolated power mark is hugely inflated. Expecting him to continue either of those torrid paces is utter lunacy.

But there’s one big area of Sogard’s game which he has improved remarkably since his last big-league action in 2015, and that’s his approach at the plate. Sogard’s calling card is his glasses, which inspired his “Nerd Power” nickname, but prior to 2017 the numbers he put up at the plate lead one to wonder if maybe he needed a stronger prescription. His career walk rate in the big leagues is 7.6 percent and his K-rate is 12.4 percent. This year, however, he has walked 14 times in 56 plate appearances, and he has thrice struck out.

That is a level of plate discipline and strike-zone ownership nearly unparalleled in the modern game of baseball. The only player since the turn of the century to walk four times for every strikeout is Barry Bonds, who did it in both 2002 and 2004. Even at AAA Colorado Springs, prior to his call-up, Sogard was walking at a 14 percent clip and striking out 11.2 percent of the time.

A look at the raw swing data tells us that this is no fluke, either. I controlled for players who have seen at least 100 pitches (as pitchers tend to skew the data), and sorted all qualifying hitters by their rate of swinging at pitches out of the zone:

Sogard has been the 17th-best hitter in baseball at laying off of pitches out of the strike zone, placing him in the third percentile of MLB hitters in the valuable but often hidden skill of “not giving the pitcher extra strikes to work with.” Even when the pitcher gets the ball over, though, Sogard will gladly take a called strike if it’s not a pitch he wants; he’s got the seventh-lowest swing rate in the game. The wrong hitter could get into a lot of trouble with this kind of approach, but Sogard has thrived. When he does pull the trigger, his contact rate paces all of baseball:

Thanks to the zone profiles at BrooksBaseball, we can break down Sogard’s pickiness and contact skills. He’s a left-handed hitter, and this chart is shown from the catcher’s perspective, so keep that in mind:

Sogard dislikes the high and tight strike, and he lets it pass at a 75 percent rate. But the rest of the inner two thirds of the plate are where he wants the ball, and he will swing far more than half of the time the ball is put there. Pitches on the outside corner will induce Sogard to swing about half the time, largely if he’s down to his final strike:

It’s interesting to note that this “outside third” of the plate does extend down below the zone, which would seem to be the only flaw in Sogard’s pitch recognition wizardry. Still, pitchers have attacked that zone with enthusiasm during those two-strike counts and he has yet to strike out on one. Sogard prefers the pitches over the meat of the plate, but his skill for fouling off undesirable strikes is truly impressive and highly useful.

Teach me your disciplined ways, Eric Sogard. pic.twitter.com/ZTk29ZvwUl

— Curt Hogg (@CyrtHogg) June 1, 2017

Sogard’s emergence as baseball’s premier contact-and-plate-discipline guy gives the Brewers’ front office and fan base quite a bit to discuss, in no small part because Sogard’s newfound strengths are the exact areas of the game that Jonathan Villar is currently struggling with. Villar’s strikeout rate has soared north of 30 percent this season while his on-base percentage has cratered to .284. Furthermore, he’s hitting the ball on the ground 63 percent of the time. Those are poor numbers for any starter, and downright unacceptable from a leadoff hitter. Villar’s not just getting unlucky, as Andrew Salzman showed in the piece linked above. Pitchers have adjusted to his love of low pitches and are working him up in the zone, and out of the zone, at a far greater rate this year.

Villar’s 2016 season saw him put up more WARP than Sogard has been worth over the course of his entire career, May breakout included. But a majority of fans seem to want Sogard in the lineup permanently, and Villar banished to the bench. Prior to the season, such a thing was positively unthinkable. Then again, so was the concept of the Milwaukee Brewers sitting a full game ahead of the Cubs at this point in the season. With the team in the thick of contention, and a player so perfectly compatible with his position in the field and batting order having a late-career awakening, Villar might not get a chance to reclaim his job.

Still, I think Craig Counsell would be wise to stop short of giving the job to Sogard on too full-time of a basis. Instead, he should utilize the stylistic difference between the two to deploy Villar for the games in which his base-stealing can make the most difference, such as when the opposing catcher has a weak arm, or the opposing pitcher is Jon Lester.

Otherwise, with the two Erics hitting 1-2, Milwaukee has stumbled into a devastating double-barrel weapon atop their lineup. As you’ll notice from the data above referring to swings outside the zone, Sogard and Thames were 17th and 19th in all of baseball, respectively. When the Brewers face off with starting pitchers who struggle to find the strike zone, those pitchers have no margin for error, psychologically. Sogard and Thames are among the best in the game at laying off when the pitcher can’t find the strike zone, and Sogard is the very best at staving off strike three and extending at-bats.

The Brewers’ lineup construction with the Erics atop the order takes pitchers who struggle with command and dumps them unceremoniously into the deep end from the first pitch. There’s almost no chance of a pitcher missing his spots, but getting bailed out by bad swings, and settling down as he starts to feel confident and pitch with purpose. And if he can’t hit the ground running, throwing strikes consistently from the get-go, he’s going to have a first-inning jam on his hands in a hurry.

And even for pitchers who don’t really struggle with command, Sogard and Thames are a pain. Most pitchers today are strikeout pitchers, and they’re trained to nibble around the edges and pound the corners. When Sogard and Thames are working the count, though, that just means that the pitcher throws foul ball after foul ball, essentially wasting all the gas in his tank on trying to get out of a muddy spot.

Counsell talked about how much Sogard and Thames made deGrom work and he wasn’t kidding. He threw 38 of his 105 pitches to those two.

— Tom (@Haudricourt) June 1, 2017

It’s no wonder that the Brewers are 7-0 when Sogard and Thames go 1-2 in the order. And while Eric Sogard is unlikely to continue putting up such a historically outlying performance, especially with regards to hitting for power, he’s made it abundantly clear that he’s a different player than he ever was before, and his new look is a great fit in the leadoff spot. The Brewers should still play the matchups to get Jonathan Villar into the lineup when he’s a strategic fit, but the Sogard-Thames tag team has proven to be simply too effective to break up for now.