So it goes tonight at Miller Park, where Ace Junior Guerra hosts Ace Jeremy Hellickson, in a battle perhaps of who can throw the most off-speed pitches, or who can inexplicably baffle batters the longest. It is a battle of unexpected success from low-cost MLB acquisitions, a battle of success from seemingly pedestrian scouting profiles, a battle of baseball lifers who just don’t quit, even after facing adversity in 2017.

Runs Prevented Workbook, July 22:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tmMK4LKWkYmDrkjnwHvJDvuur7evmWAUrwynvyRapYo/edit?usp=sharing

Primer: Exploring Runs Prevented

The Brewers Have a Good Rotation
While it’s not a monthly turn of the calendar, it is the beginning of the unofficial second half of the season, so I assembled another Runs Prevented workbook to assess the progression of MLB pitching performances. The instructions are in the workbook, but basically I used Baseball Prospectus team average and individual pitcher Park Factors, as well as Baseball Reference Three Year and Single Year Park Factors, and basic MLB Runs Allowed per Game, to construct an average of Runs Prevented across the league. Runs Prevented is an important statistic not because it is predictive or attempts to say anything about underlying performance (for that I use Deserved Run Average [DRA] to construct a Runs Prevented “counterfactual”), but because Runs Prevented can simply be plugged into the context of each team in order to assess the actual distribution of runs allowed on the field. Basically, this is everything messy and contextual about the game that ends up on the scoreboard: who receives the best fielding support? Who receives the best bullpen support? Questions like these impact Runs Prevented, but since the game is typically won according to outscoring opponents, I like Runs Prevented as an actual estimation of a pitcher’s real time performance quality.

Since most teams are approximately 100 games through the season, I added a new feature to this workbook: Rotational Averages. Thus far, MLB teams have employed 242 “regular” starters and 36 emergency (“One Game”) starters, which basically averages to more than nine starting pitchers per MLB team. If you were questioning the Brewers rotation during the off season, and continue to question their quality throughout the season, preparing for this war of attrition is indeed the strength of the club; MLB teams have around sixty games remaining and have already required throngs of starting pitching. GM David Stearns’s brilliance for the offseason came in constructing a seemingly mundane rotation that fit the quietly exceptional fielding unit, and could be seamlessly shuffled between roles (or MLB and Triple-A Colorado Springs) to provide starts whenever necessary.

So what does an MLB rotation look like? That depends on what you value. Below, I’ve constructed two tables: the first table assesses MLB rotational roles by Games Started (under the theory that a Number One starter pitches the most rotational turns, and each spot slots in behind that pitcher); the second table assesses MLB rotational roles by Runs Prevented (under the theory that a Number One starter is actually the best starter on the club, and each spot slots in behind that pitcher).

What is interesting about this table is that Runs Prevented are rather evenly distributed, between good and bad pitchers, according to Games Started category. Here a Number One starter is Justin Verlander (30 Runs Prevented) and Clayton Richard (-9 Runs Prevented), and so on. The value here is filling rotational turns, and recognizing that MLB teams need those rotational turns filled.

By Runs Prevented, on the other hand, a so-called Ace is closer to what I believe fans mean when they talk about Aces. But the bottom really falls out on the rotation:

Here, Justin Verlander is clearly a Number One starter, and Clayton Richard is something like a Number Eight or Number Nine starter, even though both pitchers have taken the most turns for their respective clubs.

Each of these rotational assessments demonstrates the shortcomings of analyzing an MLB rotation. Fans and analysts alike prefer to conceive of a rotation as “Five Turns,” following the traditional “five-man rotation” that operates in the MLB, but the trouble is that that classification only suggests a “rest” cycle. One could also use pure scouting grades to categorize each pitcher’s arsenal, command, mechanics, etc., and that might get us closer to a No. 1 / No. 2 / No. 3 / No. 4 categorization; here the trouble is that No. 1 pitchers really don’t exist, then, and most MLB teams are defined by how well they scout and prepare a group of No. 3 / No. 4 starters to “play up.”

This should help to frame the dissonance, and brilliance, that is the Brewers rotation:

By scouting profile, there is nothing close to a No. 1, or even a No. 2, in the Brewers rotation. Currently, Junior Guerra might reach the best grades based on his splitter, which could legitimately be the best pitch in the rotation; based on 2017, one would clearly expect Chase Anderson to serve as the top rotation hurler in terms of pure stuff, but that has not materialized in 2018 (showing the true difficulty of consistent mechanical adjustments by MLB pitchers). In scouting terms, Jhoulys Chacin, Brandon Woodruff, and Zach Davies would probably fight for the purest “No. 3 starter in a good way” classification, although Davies’s injury and Woodruff’s usage pattern would certainly impact that. Otherwise, it’s not even clear what type of MLB roles these guys should be given: Freddy Peralta is a bizarre type of “all-floor” pitcher (meaning, take him as he is, from deception to fastball movement to command profile), and Brent Suter could probably be scouted the same way.

By Runs Prevented profile, however, the Brewers have done what could have been expected of them during the preseason analysis cycle. Many people misunderstood the value of how the Brewers were constructing a rotation, but basically the runs saved by keeping a truly bottom-of-the-league, replacement-style Runs Prevented pitcher out of the rotation would boost the lack of an ace; coupled with the fact that the Brewers were reasonably expected to have several middle of the rotation types, truly serviceable arms, that advantage of not “bottoming out” could be exponentially exploited with each turn in the rotation. For designing a team to withstand a baseball season, even a playoff series, is all about how one distributes risk profiles (and therefore, Runs Prevented): by flattening the risk of a truly awful start almost every single time through the rotation, the Brewers “play up” from their expected scouting roles, DRA underlying profiles (thanks to the defense), and therefore distribute quality Runs Prevented for the team. This is a systemic pitching staff.

Is Junior Guerra an Ace?
I’ve written extensively about the lack of aces in the past (here too), in order to emphasize that a pitching rotation need not be conceptualized by top-tier talent. Furthermore, given the variance at play in MLB pitching from season to season, the simple fact is that very few pitchers, so few pitchers so as to be impossible to categorize, work the consistent, year-in, year-out Runs Prevented profiles that match what fans and analysts (seemingly) mean when they talk about “Aces.”

Now, however, it is worth asking whether Junior Guerra may become a true “Ace” if his 2018 campaign continues. For Guerra prevented approximately 22 runs during his unprecedented 2016 breakout season, and now the righty is holding steady at approximately 10 runs prevented throughout the 2018 campaign. This is really, really good: if the top 10 percent of MLB starting pitchers is demarcated by approximately 16 runs prevented, Guerra is threatening to reach that threshold in two of his last three seasons. This is an excellent occurrence for the Brewers, who stuck with Guerra through a difficult 2017 campaign, and (presumably) allowed the righty to once again work throughout the winter in order to iron out his mechanics. Thus Guerra is clearly establishing himself as some type of globetrotting rotation leader, a workhorse who does not stop pitching year-round and flashes his splitter across the Americas.

If Guerra keeps this up, he’ll simply be #BrewersAce, Ace Guerra, not #2016BrewersAce or #2018BrewersAce. Which should be a great lesson for Brewers fans: aces need not hail from praiseworthy draft profiles or big International bonuses, or nine figure free agency contracts; sometimes they’re just waiting there, on the waiver wire, in need of a mechanical adjustment or a simple chance to pitch.

Correct for the Wrong Reasons
In the offseason, I wrote about Jeremy Hellickson as a potential free agency target for the Milwaukee Brewers rotation. The veteran righty was coming off of a poor surface statistics season that nevertheless featured fantastic underlying performance metrics and very clear areas for improvement in pitch selection. Summarizing Hellickson’s potential surplus value and areas of improvement, I compared the veteran righty’s arsenal and approach to Chase Anderson, using Anderson’s development from 2016 to 2017 as a potential model for Hellickson. I am writing about this now, though, because my words on Hellickson have the privilege of appearing correct, but for the wrong reason; I suggested that the concern with Hellickson was between the balance in his fastball and change up usage, as his cutter was looking for a comfortable place within his arsenal. The implication was that if Hellickson could find a balance somewhat akin to Anderson’s 2017 development, the veteran’s quality change up could return.

By contrast, Hellickson went entirely in the opposite direction, by decreasing his primary fastball, secondary fastball, and cutter usage in order to select his change up and curve more frequently than any other pitch (!!!).

According to Bill James, a junkball pitcher is one who throws a change up “first,” i.e., more than any other pitch, and I like that definition because it attributes junkball status more to pitch selection than velocity (hence my favorite sometimes-junkball pitcher, the fire throwing Edinson Volquez). But if a pitcher throws a change up more than any other pitch, what of a pitcher who throws a change and curve more than any other pitcher? I enter 2018 Jeremy Hellickson as the vaunted “Double Junkball” pitcher, a pitcher who gives you the blues thrice over because he throws a change up more frequently than any other pitch, a curveball more frequently than any pitch but the change, and he was available for nothing more than a minor league contract despite exhibiting underlying traits worthy of nearly $30 million in depreciated surplus value.

But Brewers fans can’t be picky, as this is the organization that made Junior Guerra work (twice!), signed Jhoulys Chacin as their rotational front piece over the offseason, is currently making Wade Miley work, and skipped Fastballer Freddy Peralta over the much-more hyped (and much clearer scouting role) Corbin Burnes to round out the back end of the rotation. Wanting to add Hellickson to that mix is just greedy, but oh what a rotation it could have been, what one with some of the slowest fastballs and most unsuspecting command profiles in the MLB combining to prevent runs like their lives depended on it.

Here, I’m revisiting my past work on Hellickson in order to understand why I was wrong, and to demonstrate the fickle nature of scouting profiles. A perceived fix to a glitch in a pitcher’s arsenal can run in many directions, and it is worth using probabilistic thinking to clearly demarcate and analyze each of those potential directions. Probabilistic thinking means designing a thinking process that thinks through the potential outcomes in a given scenario, including reasons for those potential outcomes and (ideally) assigning weights or probabilities to those potential outcomes. This is the type of thinking that can be applied to difficult-to-quantify areas such as pitching profiles, where data are assembled but can move in multiple directions due to strategy. In the offseason, I thought Hellickson needed to balance his fastballs and take back his change up a notch in order to reassert its success; it turns out that that could mean diminishing fastball use all together, and playing up the curveball to reassert a successful profile.

Here are the Top 10 2017 free agent arms, with the full table available here:

Related Reading: “Forecasting Chase” || “Free Agency”

Thankfully for the Brewers, no one is talking about Hellickson. Baseball Prospectus recently began a free agency ranking series, and Hellickson failed to make the Top 50. This is perfectly acceptable for Milwaukee’s purposes, however, for Hellickson is the perfect definition of a free agency class that is loaded with pitchers that have surface imperfections but are perfectly suitable to design deep and serviceable rotations. Hellickson is a more interesting case in terms of convincing Brewers fans of his merits, given his 8-11, 5.43 ERA surface performance in 2017, as well as his declining strike out rate (from 19.6 percent in 2016 to 13.8 percent in 2017). Yet, the 6’1″, 190 pound righty armed with a cutter, curve, and change up behind his primary fastball could be the perfect opportunity to apply the lessons from Jimmy Nelson and Chase Anderson’s mechanical successes.

Over the last four seasons, Hellickson has morphed his pitching arsenal to amplify his change up and move away from his primary, rising-riding fastball. In fact, it is surprising to see the righty work as a true “junkball” arm in 2017, turning to that change up so frequently as to select it more than any of his other pitches. The intrigue about this arsenal development will be in the balance between 2015, 2016, and 2017. Between 2015 and 2016, Hellickson made his first shift to the cutter while also doubling down on his change up, which drove his most successful season since 2011 (and arguably his most successful season of his career in terms of strike out rate and groundball rate alongside DRA). One could question whether these developments went a step too far in 2017, as the veteran leaned on his change up more than ever while also turning to a riding-sinking fastball and increasing that cutter.The following table tracks the basic development of Hellickson’s arsenal and pitch selection over the last four seasons (“FB” means “fastball” here):

Following these arsenal shifts and pitch selection patterns, Hellickson’s strike out rate suffered in 2017. The decline in strike outs seemingly follows a very clear pattern with the evolution in this pitching approach. Compare 2016 Brooks Baseball outcomes….

…with 2017 outcomes:

For developing an account of the vanishing strike outs, following the change up and curveball results between these charts. Those 2016 whiff rates on the change up and curveball are not necessarily outliers, which is the first important information to supplement these outcome charts. In 2015, Hellickson drew 23 percent whiffs with his change up and 16 percent with the curve; in 2014, those numbers were 22 percent with the change and 12 percent with the curve. The major factors here are (1) the complete turn from a primary, rising fastball approach to a sinking fastball approach, (2) the extreme reliance on the change up over time, and (3) the introduction and increased reliance on the cut fastball.

The cutter is a peculiar pitch for Hellickson, as the righty landed it in the strike zone less frequently in 2017, but still elicited swings on the pitch approximately half the time. This pitch was seemingly meant to induce weak contact, as the whiffs remained low both seasons (below 5 percent), while the foul ball percentages were very high both seasons. In 2017, those increased foul balls, as well as pop ups, drained the line drive rate from the pitch. This arguably ate into Hellickson’s strike out results, but the outcomes with the cutter were not problematic. Here, the change and curve come to mind as the primary sources of trouble: while Hellickson continued to combine both pitches for approximately 42 percent of his total arsenal, he continued to diminish use of the curve in favor of the change. However, this arrangement was accompanied by fewer strikes, a notable decline in swings, and subsequently plummeting whiff rates. When batters did swing, they hit the ball far, doubling the number of fly balls off of the change up; what was a fantastic pitch in 2016 (.173 AVG, 41 percent strike out rate, and .274 BABIP), the change up morphed into a nightmare in 2017 (.250 AVG, .509 SLG, 28 percent strike out rate, and .283 BABIP). Coupled with increased usage of the sinking fastball, which was not a strong suit for Hellickson to begin with, the shift to increased cutter usage, decreased curve, and extreme change up selection resulted in mound performance that drifted away from the quiet success of 2016.

Looking back at Chase Anderson’s profile, one can see how 2017 exhibited success through balance, alongside mechanical adjustments related to the secondary offerings for the righty. Comparing Anderson to Hellickson on a one-to-one basis is difficult in part because of Anderson’s climbing fastball velocity, but the adjustments involving the secondary pitches, and the balancing of those offerings between the change, curve, and even cutter became a source of success for the veteran. For example, Anderson’s whiff rate on the curve and cutter skyrocketed as both pitches increased in usages and Anderson pounded the zone more frequently than in 2016.

It’s difficult to not see the similarities between Hellickson and Anderson, as well. Both pitchers had difficult years in terms of run prevention, the latter in 2017 and the former in 2016, when their change up use climbed, their curve decline, and the balance was not yet right between the three fastballs. Without the velocity increase of Anderson, one might not expect Hellickson to improve as drastically within the Brewers system, yet it’s worth remembering that the veteran Hellickson was a 3.0+ WARP starting pitcher before Anderson was; this is not a knock on Anderson, but a recognition that he has some template for success that he can return to, or some feel for adjusting at the MLB level. In fact, given the rotational success of Zach Davies, as well as pitching staff success involving Brent Suter, it is arguable that Milwaukee is a fantastic pitching location for the exact arsenal imbalance exhibited by Hellickson in 2017. There has been a 3.4 K/BB, 43 percent groundball pitcher in Hellickson, just as there was a 3.3 K/BB, 41 percent groundball pitcher embedded in Anderson’s arsenal and world of mechanical potentialities; a particular challenge for Brewers analytics is to design a system based around specific profiles of success and spin those lessons into valuable roster acquisitions and development.

The test here is how the Brewers front office can forecast from their scouting, mechanical, and coaching successes with their 2017 staff: Hellickson is another righty with an extremely similar frame, upright delivery, and five-pitch arsenal centered around three fastballs, change up, and curve. Between age-29 and age-31, this profile is not particularly common in the MLB. An outwardly “analytical” front office should be able to process the information collected from their previous successes, from PITCHf/x data to professional insights from coaches, and balance those lessons for each particular profile that resides on their pitching staff.

From a statistical standpoint, this case is beyond a “small sample size,” for it is as arguably as biased as nearly any mechanical problem could be. Working with pitching mechanics presents an inherently biased standpoint to the pitcher, coaching staff, and front office alike. Yet, while statistical methods indeed draw fruitful observations through many applications, more narrow, biased problems reveal the depths of thought that can be applied to pitching (or mechanical problems in general); pitching in this regard is more of an ecosystem, a system of dynamic interactions, a case where even through unrepeatable singularities one may find signals worth amplifying.

Where a previous imbalance existed in Chase Anderson’s approach, a current imbalance exists in Jeremy Hellickon’s arsenal, and the Brewers are precisely the club that can capitalize on the latter’s free agency status, redevelop that arsenal within their system, and deploy a deep rotation to maintain the pitching successes of 2017. This is the type of move that can define the club moving forward, and the type of move that can answer now-popular questions like, “Who is the next Charlie Morton?,” now applied to Milwaukee’s particular coaching standpoint.

Photo Credit: Derik Hamilton, USAToday Sports Images

Throughout the summer, I found myself repeating an argument about the Brewers front office: if the Brewers front office implements scouting, mechanical, and coaching adjustments with a given player, they have some form of prediction or forecast that forms an expectation for the impact of that adjustment. Consider the two major pitching developments for the Brewers, namely Jimmy Nelson’s delivery shift, pitch addition, and subsequent breakout, and Chase Anderson’s arsenal adjustment: given that the organization has kept biomechanical data for quite some time, it is reasonable to suspect that player development decisions about adding pitches or redesigning mechanics at the MLB level are data-driven to some extent.

Namely, if the Brewers front office understands that Nelson will change his delivery timing and throw a curveball, or Chase Anderson will shift his cutter and curve, they have some idea of the range of success expected by such a move. Even this is quite a conservative statement; given the amount of time invested in developing these players (for example, Nelson threw at least 640 innings before using a curve in 2015), a development such as adding a pitch or mechanical overhaul will not be taken lightly. It was my contention that the Brewers understood the benefits of these moves, and expected significant improvement because of these moves.

The flipside of the argument, which becomes more speculative and therefore much more interesting, is that the Brewers front office should be able to form a solid idea about the relative success or failure of a pitching mechanics or arsenal shift for a player. I gather that they should be expected to do the same for a batting mechanics adjustment, as well. This statement is not quite as radical as it sounds; it is not an inversion of “can” into “should” (where, “the Brewers can design data-driven formula to track the success of pitching mechanics and arsenal adjustments” becomes “the Brewers should be able to forecast the impact of mechanical and arsenal adjustments”). Forecasting involves the use of data collection, statistical methodology, and some form of modeling (this can come from relatively simple and straightforward measurements of change to more complicated methods such as linear regression, or ever more complicated methods still) in order to look at a series of projections and craft a statement about its most likely path; think about this in the way that Nate Silver encourages “probabilistic thinking” (providing a range of predictions instead of one), or the way PECOTA offers “percentile” projections and thousands of tests of any given season.

Granted, there are potential data issues that the ballclub could encounter (data could be incomplete and face additional questions of quality or collection errors, or the club’s analysts could make suspect decisions about the underlying concepts for their forecasts, etc.). Yet, that there are potential concerns with MLB data collection and forecasting should not be viewed as a reason to dismiss discussions of clubs’ forecasting expectations for particular mechanical adjustments; in fact, I’d argue that this is the whole point of an “analytical” movement in MLB front offices.

Stated simply, the Brewers front office probably had a very good idea of what their key pitchers’ adjustments would be worth on the field. At the very least, they should have forecast (and probably did forecast) the likely impact of those adjustments. At worst, if the Brewers forecast those mechanical adjustments and completely missed the breakout seasons, they now have additional data to expand their models. Now, they can return to their layers of data, and any previous forecasts, and investigate where their models succeeded and where they failed.

What the Brewers now have in Chase Anderson is a prototype: fans and analysts can break this prototype into any number of characteristics worth testing.

• Chase Anderson is listed as 73 inches tall and 200 pounds according to Baseball Reference; he throws with his right hand;
• he worked 418 MLB innings before his breakout;
• his breakout occurred in his age 29 season;
• he does not throw a slider according to Brooks Baseball; and so on and so forth.
• Each of these characteristics can be used to build comparisons with other MLB pitchers, in order to test lessons about Anderson’s arsenal and mechanical adjustments.

The trouble here, in terms of statistical theory, is that within the MLB there will be no randomized sample of a population of pitchers who could perform like Chase Anderson. Constructing such a sample would require meeting extremely narrow characteristics that already limit the underlying population. For example, according to Baseball Reference Play Index, 163 MLB expansion era pitchers were 73 inches tall, less than or equal to 210 pounds, and right-handed while working 100 or more innings during age-29, age-30, or age-31 seasons (limit that to age-29 seasons, and the list drops to 60; or focus instead on right-handed or left-handed pitchers, and that list expands to 231 pitchers; and so on). Luckily, there are statistical tools available for controlling for variables in a model that does not involve a randomized sample of a population.

Following the criteria listed above, here’s an example of pitchers most comparable to Anderson’s class, focusing specifically on the last two seasons. This will be helpful to begin the next installment of this series, which be an analysis of particular player acquisition targets for the Brewers:

Beyond the technical issues, an intriguing theoretical issue exists. Since one is ostensibly testing Anderson’s prototype in order to find another pitcher with similar mechanics, arsenal, or characteristics that could conform to the successful lessons passed to Anderson, we already know what we’re looking for (our pitching survey is biased). This is acceptable for one very specific reason: baseball players are extremely scarce, and pitchers especially approach the game with a relatively narrow set of strategies (the vast majority throw a fastball) and mechanical approaches (ex., the vast majority throw overhand), and rulebound constraints (delivery timing requirements, approach to the batter, etc.). Moreover, a front office is not simply “looking for baseball players,” they are “looking for baseball players that could be good,” or “looking for baseball players that could improve,” etc. What the Brewers can use their mechanical, arsenal, and coaching lessons to construct is a system, a system into which particular player prototypes can be included in order to apply lessons and logic of that system to coax future success. This is very obviously a difficult thing to do, and one should not expect an MLB front office to be successful in every case. Yet, one should expect an MLB front office to reasonably apply their successes to as many future players as possible in order to maximize those successful lessons (or even to improve upon, to build from player development failures).

In this way, assessing a pitcher’s mechanical approach is much like underwriting a real estate development deal: an MLB front office will have to make decisions based on extremely limited, or flawed, samples. Player acquisition and development is more akin to working within conditions of market failure than a perfectly competitive marketplace. Continuing the analogy, an underwriter for a multifamily project will not compare that project to single family homes, nor will an underwriter of an affordable housing multifamily building compare that project to a market rate multifamily set-up, and so on: there is a particular ideological approach and set of market constraints for each type of deal listed above, just as there are specific constraints for each class of MLB pitcher that can be evaluated. There certainly may be some scenarios in which assessing those real estate deals blindly and with an overreaching view is valuable (such as a regional land value survey), just as there may be some scenarios in which blindly assessing all baseball players would be valuable (ex., “What percentage of draft signees from the 2000s reached the MLB?”). But these conditions will not necessarily adhere to each particular transaction (and each particular player development decision is likely made with much more focused, narrow forms of knowledge, and much more problematic forms of data at that).

The Chase Anderson system can be applied to the 2017-2018 free agency, trade, and waiver classes, in order to answer one of the Brewers’ most difficult questions of the offseason: how will the club repeat rotational successes of 2017? How will the front office fill the void of the injured Jimmy Nelson? How will the club build on the success of Chase Anderson? Looking at these questions produces one of the most fun aspects of this coming offseason, for these questions can be addressed in a very particular manner by an openly analytical front office. What is especially fun is that when the Brewers eschew big name free agents (perhaps by necessity of market size, perhaps by choice) in favor of someone less well known, or perhaps more puzzling, fans and analysts should immediately look to the club’s prototypes in order to consider which lessons (from successes or failures) are being applied to the roster.

Photo Credit: Jeff Curry, USAToday Sports

Recently, my surplus analysis of the Brewers roster affirmed the relatively well-known fact that Catcher, Right-Handed Pitcher, and Second Base are the greatest positions of need for Milwaukee in 2018.

Extrapolating those needs:

• While Manny Pina performed quite well, the Brewers could use stronger back-up support. It is not clear whether Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy have profiles that are suitable for high-end back-up to help the Brewers contend. This is prior to considering any concerns in approach or mechanics that suggest Pina will not be able to continue performing at his 2017 level.

• Waiver trade deadline acquisition Neil Walker delivered solid production down the stretch for the Brewers, and arguably should be a clear target in free agency given the lack of any immediate prospect that flashes a strong starting second baseman role in the advanced minors. Walker will not block any prospects, and his ability to play at multiple infield positions will help the Brewers execute their “Team Depth” strategy.

• Finally, right-handed pitching will take hits due to injury (Jimmy Nelson), free agency (Matt Garza and Anthony Swarzak), uncertain prospect production / development projects at MLB level (Brandon Woodruff, followed by Corbin Burnes and company), and arguably role depreciation as well (everyone from Junior Guerra to Jorge Lopez to Aaron Wilkerson could fit this description). It should not be outlandish to suggest that the Brewers could easily use two-to-three additional starting pitching options in order to withstand April-through-July and the battle of attrition that is the 162 grind.

This post will outline a set of topics for free agency analysis, but first it is worth looking at the three-year depreciated surplus figures for the Top 25 free agents among pitchers and batters. The following tables include:

• Raw 2017 Three-Year Depreciated Surplus (treated without contract, as though the player was a 2016-2017 free agent).

• Raw 2018 Three-Year Depreciated Surplus (once again, treated without contract, with every player on a three-year scale for ease of comparison).

• The difference between 2018 and 2017 depreciated surplus, which should read like “role depreciation,” or “role trend,” to suggest whether the player is largely trending upward or downward.

• These figures are drawn from Baseball Prospectus WARP, knocked down to 70 percent to imitate production regression of aging and injury (etc.), and placed on the “market rate” WARP schedule of approximately $7 million per one WARP.

• Additionally, players that have options or opt-outs were not included in this search in order to present a uniform class of players and avoid complicated contractual assumptions.

First, the best bats:

Now, following the same table structure, a look at the 2018 pitching free agents:

Future Topics:
From this basis, much analysis should follow, as the surplus figures are highly abstract and obviously not tethered to the reality of negotiating contracts that could span anywhere from one-year (perhaps for someone like Cameron Maybin) to seven-years (for someone like Yu Darvish). Obviously, specific statistical, mechanical, age, injury, and other considerations will come into play in the actual market, as well. More detailed analysis on these areas will follow. However, for now, it is worth drawing some big picture conclusions about the class:

• Should someone wish to gamble on injury recovery risk, pitchers from Alex Cobb to Michael Pineda, or even Yu Darvish, could provide significant surplus (yes, Darvish could provide surplus value to a club even with a huge contract). Obviously, these cases will require particular attention to detail in terms of mechanics, injury type or severity, and other medical or recovery-related factors.

• The supposed lack of star power among position players could provide a feast for the right front office mentalities: players from Eric Hosmer to Neil Walker to reclamation projects like Carlos Gomez, Jonathan Lucroy, or Carlos Gonzalez could deliver plentiful returns to front offices with a sharp eye to mechanics, strike zone approach, and other related factors.

• An amazing bench (or set of depth role players) could emerge from this class, lead by someone like Jarrod Dyson (a fantastic glove-first centerfielder). Even the Brewers, with their noted glut of outfielders, could arguably find room to upgrade depth roles with a player like Dyson (who offers more certain defense and a rather disciplined-if-unspectacular plate approach compared to someone like Keon Broxton off the bench).

• Moreover, who will be the next Chase Anderson? Or rather, how will the Brewers front office learn from their coaching and arsenal approach successes with the veteran? My vote in this regard is for the unheralded Jeremy Hellickson, who you last heard about in the ridiculed 2017 deadline trade involving the Phillies and Orioles. Yet although Hellickson followed up his strong 2016 campaign with some troubles in 2017, his arsenal and mechanics maintain the basic form of their 2016 foundation. Additionally, the righty works with the much-familar sinker-cutter-curve-change approach that the Brewers have worked with (see Davies, Zach, as well as Anderson).

While all the hype will justifiably go to guys like Jake Arrieta and Yu Darvish, the 2017 Brewers pitching success proved that arms can indeed succeed by being placed within a particular system that uses the proper individualized approach to each pitcher’s needs (Derek Johnson’s chameleon coaching style is oft-praised for this characteristic). For this reason, a raw mechanical project like Arrieta could succeed in Milwaukee, but given the cost comparisons and serviceable depth options available, this is a perfect offseason for Stearns and the front office to gamble on pitching acquisitions that fit a particular mold suitable to the organization. Since Milwaukee will face market constraints throughout their contending years, learning how to repeatedly find the next Chase Anderson will arguably be as important as learning when to jump at an elite contract.

The Brewers can indeed contend in 2018 while continuing to develop players at the MLB level, but they will be required to do so with the most….interesting roster in the division (as opposed to the one with the most starpower). In this regard, perhaps a consistent head-scratcher like the 2012-2016 Orioles is a better model for replication and discussion than the popular Cubs, Pirates, or Astros building models.

Photo Credit: Jeff Hanisch, USA Today Sports Images