Surplus Grade
At Baseball Prospectus Milwaukee, I have worked on a transactional Benefit-Cost Analysis system for assessing prospect-and-MLB trades. I use the term “Surplus” to denote the value of a player through trade, which includes the player’s on-field production plus their “scarcity” (which, in terms of MLB labor, translates into their contractual dollars plus control time). In the following table, I demonstrate one way of assessing surplus for these trades, which includes both options for Soria and Moustakas picked up for the 2019 season.

Recommended Background: Refining Surplus Pricing || Organizational Logic and Playoff Trades

It should be stressed that this is not viewed as a complete analysis of a transaction, but rather an analysis that paces current MLB player production and prospect roles against the history of MLB in order to assess their value; the hypothesis is that since MLB teams can (and do) trade prospects for MLB roles, a value metric can be found that places prospects and MLB players on the same scale.

Here’s how the trades look without options:

Any way one slices it, David Stearns is “going for it,” in terms of delivering trades that provide clear cut short-term MLB roster gains while surrendering long-term roster assets. On the face of it, Stearns has paid more than he is receiving; at worst, he paid a dollar to return one quarter. In the case of the Soria trade, the time horizons are acceptable, as it is unclear how quickly lefty Kodi Medeiros will reach the MLB (even from Double-A in 2018), let alone a relief role that sees the young southpaw form his tools into high leverage function (which would arguably be his highest realistic role); the same can be said for Perez, who has never played stateside ball and thus has a truly indeterminate role horizon.

In the case of the Moustakas trade, it’s tougher to make a case about role horizons, for both Phillips and Lopez have useful (if not flashy) roles for a 2018 contending ballclub and potentially better roles for the future. Phillips could morph into a multi-tool center fielder if his bat develops at the MLB level, but his defense, speed, and power remain strong enough that Phillips could also serve as a rare “impact Fourth Outfielder;” it’s impossible not to dream on Lopez’s fastball and curveball combo playing up as a reliever, and the MLB dream for the righty would be that if the command comes along he can scale relief roles from low- to high-leverage.

Related: What does the future hold for Jorge Lopez? || Medeiros & Perez 

It must be added that if it appears perplexing that the potential transactional surplus prices involved in the Moustakas do not equal one another, they need not. One can argue that from an organizational standpoint, reaching the playoffs is a push for additional revenue, as well as an operation that concerns on-field baseball production. At some point, Wins, Runs Scored, Runs Allowed, Overall Future Potential, etc., are turned into cash for an organization. In the case of the 2018 Brewers, these recent deals, especially the Moustakas trade, bolster the club’s Wild Card lead (currently up 2.5 games) and (dare I say it) give the club a better chance at competing with the division leading Lakeview Nine (the Cubs currently lead Milwaukee by 1.5 games for the National League Central crown). Once these playoff odds are bolstered, the organization can also price out their odds of playing deeper into the playoffs, and frankly, if the Brewers believe these types of deals can help their club reach the League Championship Series, it does not necessarily matter that their deadline deals were “too expensive.”

MLB Roster Profile
Thus far, it is clear that the Moustakas move accomplishes two key objectives for the MLB roster:

• First, the move improves an offense in need of consistent production by making it deeper through the addition of a solid prime-age veteran bat.

• Second, the move will test an efficient defense and organizational shifting philosophy by moving incumbent third baseman Travis Shaw to second base.

Moving Toward Contact
To the first point, Mike Moustakas developed into a solid, consistently better than average batter after his 2015 breakout. The left-handed bat is also a clear addition to the discipline-contact department for the Brewers offense, as Moustakas consistently strikes out at a better than average clip. Ostensibly, Moustakas adds power and contact to the batting order, and as many have noted, will test these traits in a ballpark that is much friendlier to left-handed batters than Kansas City’s park.

The following table includes Moustakas’s home run, walk, and strike out percentages, as well as his True Average (TAv) and Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA), which are advanced metrics that assess underlying offensive and defensive elements to express production (.260 is average for TAv, and 0 is average for FRAA).

While Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) demonstrate some fluctuations in recent seasons for Moustakas, the third baseman performs at a consistently better than average rate with the glove as well as the bat, which should reduce some of the potential impact of the Brewers’ infield shuffle. Additionally, since Orlando Arcia is working to the left of Moustakas, theoretically some of the defensive pressure should be taken off of the third baseman.

Misusing Phillips?
One of the remaining questions for the MLB roster is whether Brett Phillips actually had a solid role for the club moving forward. Perhaps because of the left-handed batting bent of much of the Brewers positional group (Eric Thames, Christian Yelich, Shaw, and more recently Brad Miller, too), Phillips has remained out of favor for the club’s official “fourth outfield” spot, a spot that has recently belonged to the hot-and-cold Keon Broxton. Despite a .180 batting average, Broxton has walked and hit for power frequently enough to keep his glove on the roster, which is playing at around 2.4 FRAA (after a -8.2 FRAA campaign in 2017). From the right side of the plate, Broxton ostensibly offers more flexibility when manager Craig Counsell needs to spell Yelich or Thames in the outfield.

Related: Understanding Phillips

The trouble with the Broxton-Phillips wager is that Phillips arguably already surpasses this level of production even with his MLB floor, which he demonstrated in spectacular fashion toward the end of the 2017 season. In that brief performance, Phillips flashed his elite defensive tools (4.3 FRAA), while also presenting a strong batting average (.276), walk rate (nearly 10 percent), and power (seven extra base hits in 98 appearances). This type of production is what makes pricing out an MLB role for Phillips so difficult, because the left-handed batting defensive asset has enough questions about his offensive game to raise the possibility that pitchers will expose his shortcomings with more exposure. But the glove and arm are so good as to keep Phillips in a serious regular rotation if he falls out of a starting spot, and he could easily serve as an MLB outfielder with 300-to-400 valuable plate appearances, the type of ephemeral roster asset that most playoff teams dream of. The trouble with the Brewers trading Phillips is that his floor is arguably already reaching this role, which raises questions about why the club did not employ Phillips for more than 15 games in 2018.

Along with keeping right handed pitcher Brandon Woodruff in the shuttle crew between Milwaukee and Triple-A Colorado Springs, and shifting Corbin Burnes to relief for his MLB debut (when his top role, floor, and the club’s admitted 2019 plans have him slated as a starting pitcher), the club’s usage of Phillips should serve as a serious area for strategic questioning and analysis. Did the Brewers use Phillips to the best of his current ability, even given that they’re working with his MLB floor? The flip side of this argument would hold that since the Brewers do not have outfield space to test Phillips’s top role as a starting center fielder, trading him simply means that a “blocked” prospect will get his chance elsewhere; similarly, if you believe that Phillips will settle into the impact back-up role as well, that’s not a role that you mourn trading away to bolster an MLB roster weakness elsewhere.

Does Fielding Matter?
As for moving Shaw to second base, this is the type of value-seeking move that one would love to see from a loudly-announced, so-called “analytic” front office. The Brewers have one of the most efficient defensive units in the National League, even with the recent demotion of star defensive short stop Orlando Arcia and a display of less-than-stellar middle infield play of late; the club’s bread-and-butter has been stopping hits from falling in the outfield, either on flyballs or line drives, and coupled with the somewhat bizarre distribution of batted balls between pitching units (i.e., the key relievers are typically more groundball oriented, on the whole, than the starting pitchers), the Brewers defensive unit can withstand unexpected arrangements so long as the personnel shift for key game moments.

Additionally, moving Shaw to second base answers an interesting question about the extent to which fielding matters for an MLB club. This question was prominently raised when Arcia was demoted, as even a top tier glove in all of baseball could not hold that batting performance, and now the inverse equation can be applied to Shaw. By True Average, Shaw is one of the very best bats on the Brewers, and the club essentially has a .298 TAv second baseman at the deadline (that’s good enough for sixth best in the MLB among 2B with 100 PA); neither Brian Dozier nor Jonathan Schoop, the remaining rumored second base targets for the Brewers, can be counted on to match Shaw’s impact batting production. Furthermore, keeping Shaw at second base arguably gives the club the chance to continue their long play gamble on Jonathan Villar, who can slide into a meaningful depth role once he returns from the disabled list. The equation here is quite clever, as if the Brewers are going to gamble on Dozier or Schoop putting it together, they can also gamble on Villar, who has shown flashes of brilliance in 2018 and was batting .261 / .346 / .348 over the 20 games preceding his disabled list stint.

If Counsell can start a fielding unit that includes Moustakas and Shaw, and then use a fielding substitution when a key groundball reliever enters a close game (looking at Jeremy Jeffress here), ostensibly the manager has more options to get the offense going without sacrificing key late game defense. One can dream that if the Brewers succeed in the playoffs, this unorthodox defensive gamble lead the way. At worst, Travis Shaw has simply begun a potential shift over to the right side of the infield, where he might serve as a viable first base option for 2019 should the Brewers and Moustakas exercise his mutual option for 2019.

This is #TeamDepth exhibiting team flexibility across the offense, fielding, and contractual horizons, and even if the acquisition cost seems steep, the playoffs payoff is clear and (hopefully) immediate.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USA Today Sports Images

This post was updated at 10:30 AM to include additional BPMilwaukee and Baseball Prospectus links and add Corey Ray as a top prospect.

Friday’s win almost turned into an embarrassing loss. Freddie Peralta pitched six innings and only allowed one run. Then Jacob Barnes came into the game in the top of the seventh and all hell broke loose. All five batters he faced reached base and four runs had already scored when Craig Counsell opted to use Dan Jennings to clean up the situation. With runners on second and third and no outs, Jennings struck out pinch hitter Danny Santana then induced two ground outs to get out of the inning. The outing produced his highest WPA of the season (.368).

While Jennings has generally been a part of the late inning bullpen rotation, appearing in the seventh inning or later in thirty four of his forty two appearances this season, he hasn’t been called upon in fireman situations. Jennings’ aLI (where greater than 1.0 is high pressure) for the game was 3.24, his highest figure since early April.

Jennings got the job done by keeping the ball down and out of the strike zone.

He threw three, maybe four strikes the whole inning. All of his whiffs and both groundouts came on low pitches, out of the zone.

Jennings is not your prototypical 2018 reliever who throws 95+ and looks to strike out every hitter he faces. Though his strikeout rate has ticked up to 18.8 percent this season, it’s still below the MLB average of 20.7 percent. The game plan when he’s on the mound is to induce weak contact on those low pitches and get some groundouts. He’s thrown only 40.1 percent pitches in the strike zone, a career low for him. Amongst pitchers with at least 500 pitches thrown this season, only fourteen have pitched less in the zone.

Accordingly, the sinker is his go to pitch. Jennings has thrown it on 54.9 percent of his pitches and it’s his weapon of choice in almost every situation, except those where he’s ahead in the count. He’s consistent on where he wants to place the pitch. It’s staying on his arm side and he’s keeping it low, though he can get a grounder from anywhere in the strike zone. On Friday, the two groundball outs were exactly where he wants to place the ball.

Jennings utilizes the slider more when he is ahead in the count because it’s the pitch most likely to get a swing and miss, not only this season, but throughout his career. This season, he’s thrown it a lower rate when facing right handed hitters when compared with lefties, which makes his plan of attack against right handed hitter Danny Santana on Friday so unusual. Half of his eight pitches were sliders, including the first and third pitches of the at bat. Jennings buried the sliders in the area below the plate where he can reliably get whiffs and righties don’t do much damage.

Milwaukee’s bullpen is one of the best in baseball, which means that in every situation, Counsell has multiple good options when making pitching changes. Jennings has not been the most effective pitcher out of the bullpen this season, but he was the best option to keep the ball on the ground and he represents another good option on nights where the best arms in the bullpen are not available or Counsell wants to wait to use them until later in the game.

Keon Broxton was called up to Milwaukee on June 26, and has played some of the best center field defense in MLB over the past two weeks. Playing full time last season, Broxton was worth -8.2 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA), which ranked 63^rd out of 68 players who spent time in center last season. However, thanks to some amazing plays, he currently has the 14^th best center field defense in MLB. That number is amazing because FRAA is a counting stat and every player above him on the list has played at least two and a half times as many games as Broxton. He may not be this good at defense, but his defensive numbers last season were his worst since his first full season in the minors, so he’s not as bad as he rated last season either. If Broxton can provide league average defense, then he has a career as a useful fourth outfielder ahead of him.

As his defense has wowed, Broxton has produced nothing at the plate. Since his two home run game on June 29, Broxton has one hit and three walks in twenty four plate appearances with ten strikeouts. Broxton’s swinging strike rate has spiked to 45.9 percent, higher than his 41.3 percent in 2017. No position player who has seen as many pitches as Broxton has swung and missed more. Broxton is actually swinging less this year. His swing rate is down around 3.5 points but the contact woes have gotten worse. Unfortunately, unless he can find a way to hit the ball, he’ll never harness his talent and become a starter on a team that’s trying to win. His defense could guarantee him a bench spot for years to come, but his bat will determine his ultimate role on a team.

The Brewers have a full slate of games for the last week before the All-Star break. The good news for them is that their opponents are not daunting. Milwaukee will travel to Miami for three games then move on to Pittsburgh for five games, including a Saturday double header, to close out the “first half”. The Marlins have the worst record in the National League and ranked 27^th in last week’s BP Hit List. Miami ranks 24^th in team DRA, 26^th in team TAv and have somehow managed to slightly outperform their Pythagrorean winning percentage, which is based on their runs scored and runs allowed. Milwaukee actually has a losing record against the Pirates this season having lost three of their five games so far. After a good start, Pittsburgh has gone 11-21 since June 1.

It is time to win. It is time to win now, it is time to win next year, and the year after that, and after those years, too. This is a thrilling feeling as a Brewers fan, especially as one who came of age as an everyday fan during the initial Doug Melvin rebuild. I gather this feeling is difficult for a fanbase that is so used to losing and disappointment so as to design defensive personalities toward the idea of going for it this year. But that’s over now: There’s never next year, not for the next five, and this completely reorients the Brewers organization. With Brinson, Monte Harrison, Isan Diaz, and Jordan Yamamoto each head to Miami, clearing out three of the top ten spots (and two of the top three spots on the Baseball Prospectus 2018 Top 10). But that’s okay, take your pick: does RHP Freddy Peralta re-enter the top ten? 3B Lucas Erceg? C Mario Feliciano? RHP Marcos Diplan? OF Tristen Lutz? IF Mauricio Dubon? These are all prospects that did not reach the Baseball Prospectus Top 10 that still have Overall Future Potential (OFP) that are somewhere between “useful” and “interesting” MLB potential, and each has something to prove in 2018 (and more space within which to do so).

There will be more time to digest and analyze these moves, but now the Brewers faithful have immediately turned toward trading Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, and/or Keon Broxton. I am not simply playing the contrarian when I emphasize that the Brewers do not need to make such a move. First and foremost, each of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton remain under club reserve beyond the Ryan Braun era in Milwaukee, which means that the club can still play the long game with each of these players. It gets a little more difficult after Broxton will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2018, and Brett Phillips will likely have his last minor league option burned in 2019 (Brewerfan.net, 40-Man Roster).

But, the Brewers have a unique position of strength: first, they began a rest campaign for Ryan Braun in 2017, and there is no reason that the club cannot use a rest campaign for Lorenzo Cain as well. These players represent Milwaukee’s largest contracts, and the club has nothing to lose by remaining cautious with their health and playing time. By providing systematic rest to these veterans, the Brewers can gamble that these outfielders may be less susceptible to nagging injuries, and therefore maximize their potential production. It is worth it to Milwaukee to have the best possible versions of Cain and Braun available over the course of 162 and the playoffs. How can the club accomplish this and continue to win? By deploying some combination of Santana, Phillips, and Broxton between the bench and the minor leagues. Imagine these outfield sets:

Using a very basic assumption of four plate appearances per game for starters and one plate appearance for pinch hitters, these outfield schemes produce the following results:

This scenario obviously leans more on resting Braun than Cain, but more PA can be negotiated to maximize these scenarios. Phillips could serve as a defensive replacement for all three positions, and both Phillips and Santana could be used as late innings pinch hitters in various scenarios. Moreover, these scenarios are developed prior to considering injuries. Each of these players faces injury risks that could eat into playing time, which opens further opportunities for the next outfielder in line. If fans think about what it means to have an “analytic” front office, aggressive rest coupled with aggressive depth could be an important step in gaining an advantage over the 162 grind and the playoffs. In the World Series, after all, there will be a starting spot for three or four games for Braun, Cain, Yelich, and Santana; this is the type of long game that the Brewers can begin playing in rest strategies and roster building.

I am a proponent of the Brewers building the deepest team possible because the club needs every resource they can get in order to contend within their market. The club currently has enough cash to handle a signing of Cain and Yu Darvish or Jake Arrieta, so this is a real opportunity to build the best possible team for a half-decade span. At some point, trade returns for players like Santana, Phillips, and Broxton mean diminishing returns to the system. Neither Santana nor Broxton have enough of an MLB track record to yield impact prospect talent, and Phillips is in a strange in-between where he will neither be a likely trade destination for returning impact MLB talent or prospects. Holding steady with the outfield roster as is will work just fine; at worst, the club will run into a scenario in which players such as Hernan Perez, Stephen Vogt, Eric Sogard, or Jonathan Villar fail to make the MLB roster out of training camp. If that is the price to pay for significant outfield depth, that is a better price than to trade Santana, Phillips, or Broxton before necessary, and return a less attractive depth option at the first sight of injury or ineffectiveness during the season.

Photo Credit: Isaiah J. Downing, USAToday Sports Images

Relevantly, this includes the Brewers, who have not addressed their complicated outfield situation.  Last year, the outfield rotation was pretty well established.  Ryan Braun played left field, Domingo Santana played right field, and Keon Broxton split time with a few other players in center field.  Heading into 2018, though, the calculus was expected to be different.  One of those players that got a small portion of the center field at bats was Lewis Brinson, who is the club’s consensus top prospect and is at the point of his career where he needs major league at bats to continue his development.

Brinson is not the only youngster fighting for playing time, though.  Brett Phillips also performed well last year in minimal playing time (.293 TAv, 4.3 FRAA in 37 games), and he appears to be a capable like-for-like replacement for Broxton.  And given that Phillips’ prospect pedigree (Baseball America ranked him 80th in all of baseball this offseason), he likely has a higher ceiling than Broxton, thus incentivizing the club to prioritize Phillips ahead of Broxton.  Additionally, Hernan Perez and Jonathan Villar both got some playing time in the outfield last season, and the fact that they can play both infield and outfield increases their value because they are more versatile than is Broxton.

For these reasons, a common thought at the beginning of the offseason was that the Brewers would look to trade one of their outfielders.  Santana was a possible trade chip, as he now has a track record of being a productive big league hitter, and he is probably be the most attractive non-Brinson asset that the Brewers could dangle to bring back a front-line pitcher.  If Santana were to be dealt, Broxton could serve as a fourth outfielder and platoon with Phillips in left field.  He would also provide Brinson insurance in case something went wrong with the club’s top prospect.

If the Brewers decided to keep Santana, though, Broxton himself could have been a trade chip.  He was not so productive last year that the club could not replace him, and Phillips appears ready to step in and be the fourth outfielder.  A Broxton trade is trickier than a Santana trade because Broxton’s trade value as a cost-controlled role player is harder to determine, but it was nonetheless a possibility if the Brewers needed a way to address their roster logjam.

Three months into the offseason, though, nothing has been done to address this issue.  The slowness of the free agent market appears to have impacted the trade market as well; Gerrit Cole is the only pitcher of note to have changed teams this offseason, so Santana could still be included in a trade (for Chris Archer, for example).  The Brewers have therefore been hesitant to commit to a particular path, as trading Santana might encourage them to keep Broxton.

One might think that if Broxton is replaceable, then they should simply deal him and get a replacement if they also trade Santana.  As mentioned above, however, it’s unclear whether Broxton has much trade value.  He is still in his pre-arb years, but he is already 27 and so he isn’t a highly touted prospect who teams will be clamoring to get for the next four seasons.  He has accumulated 2.3 WARP in 700 plate appearances, which makes him a roughly league average player but not a standout.  He is therefore a valuable player to have on a big league roster, but he is not likely to be the type of player who returns a lot in a trade.  He may therefore be more valuable to the Brewers on the field (if they need him) than he would be to another team.

The Brewers’ front office is smart and capable of dealing with this problem, and they have shown they are not afraid to lose players for nothing even if there might still be some residual value.  It is here where the slowness of the market comes into play, however.  If a Santana trade happened or were ruled out in December, the Brewers would have had a couple months to figure out how to best use Broxton’s roster spot (whether it be on Broxton or on someone else).  Now, however, they are in a time crunch.

If they have decided that they will be keeping Santana, then Broxton is basically expendable.  And if they decided that in December because they had passed on all the potential deals, they would have had two months of watching the waiver wire to find players who were a better fit for their roster than Broxton.  I do not believe they have made that determination yet, though, so their roster is still in flux.

As I wrote two weeks ago about the second base situation, this is not an insurmountable problem.  It is, however, a way that the slowness of the market impacts the clubs beyond just delaying any roster decisions.  The Brewers will have less time to assess their options, and any potential waiver wire acquisitions may be more contested as teams are looking to finalize their rosters heading into spring training.

Photo Credit: Kim Klement, USAToday Sports Images

The tough aspect of relying on Lewis Brinson, Brett Phillips, and Keon Broxton to make center field work in 2018 is that the position was a weakness in 2017. Although many Brewers fans and analysts typically write off the offense and fielders as solid enough, the Brewers were indeed below average in terms of park-adjusted runs scored in 2017, and center field was one of the reasons for their inability to produce on offense. In fact, according to Baseball Reference the Brewers employed their center fielders for the fewest number of plate appearances among any position (636 PA), and the team’s .229 / .304 / .405 batting average / on-base percentage / slugging percentage performance was tied for the worst position on the team. Against league center fielders, the Brewers registered an 85 Split OPS+, meaning that the club’s center field position was approximately 15 percent below average compared to National League center field.

While it is easy for fans to dream on the eventual superstardom of Brinson or the high-floor depth offered by Phillips, it is difficult to write this duo in for a guaranteed, let alone probable, improvement if they are handed the reins for 162 center field games in 2018. On the latest Milwaukee’s Tailgate podcast, Ryan Topp made a similar argument, emphasizing that if Brewers fans are ready to run with Brinson and other young players, fans have to be ready for growing pains at the MLB level.

In short, center field is one of the clearest weaknesses remaining from the 2017 club. Lorenzo Cain immediately changes the outlook of the position, however, as the veteran offers elite fielding and average-or-better hitting for an impact package in the center of the grass. In fact, Cain is arguably the best overall free agent in the current class, and almost certainly the best position player free agent when assessing free agents by their three-year depreciated surplus value (which monetizes Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) while depreciating three-year performance by 10 percent per year in order to replicate an aging curve and nonlinear player development). I provided surplus tables in my introduction to the offseason, but it bears highlighting Cain’s strength.

First, assessed by his 2015-2017 performance, Cain is the best free agent in the 2018 field. But, even if one is concerned that Cain’s 2015 and 2017 seasons weigh too heavily in this equation, it is worth mentioning that Cain is the second best free agent in this field (second only to Jonathan Lucroy) based on his 2014-2016 performance as well.

Beyond basic rank, it is worth emphasizing that Cain also possesses another strength within this free agency class: the veteran center fielder boasts one of the biggest improvements between 2017 and 2018 surplus value within this field. The idea behind “Role Depreciation” is to not only track a player’s actual performance, or depreciated performance, over a certain period of time, but also to track the changes within those performances in order to gauge upward or downward trends. A concrete example of this concept might be found in a comparison between Orlando Arcia and Jonathan Villar; Villar posted a phenomenal 2016 WARP at shortstop, but may have been more reasonably expected to emerge as an average role player, which materialized in 2017, while Arcia’s expected first division shortstop role may lead one to reasonably expect improvement (or steady performance) following his 2017 campaign. Anyway, Cain is among the few free agents in this field to offer tangible improvement in his 2018 outlook:

One can anticipate that the major complaints about Lorenzo Cain will concern his age. Cain played his age-31 season in 2017, meaning that even a three-year free agency deal will need to cover his age-32 through age-34 seasons. Given that fans and analysts have an aversion to an aging curve that requires paying premium dollar to players on the wrong side of 30, Cain seems like an obvious pass by a small market club such as Milwaukee. However, I believe that this type of aging curve thinking is a bit too orthodox, and does not highlight the fact that certain players have different aging patterns that can be discerned from their performances. For instance, at age-31, Cain’s .280 True Average (TAv) and 19.5 Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) drove a 5.6 WARP performance, which is the only 5+ WARP season by a center fielder in their 30s during the new Wild Card era (2012-2017). I have used this assumption to design detailed assessment of Ryan Braun’s aging patterns, and I hypothesize that the same approach could be used for Cain: once a player demonstrates elite production after age-30, they are on a different aging pattern than the one commonly suggested for all players.

Since center field is such a loaded position in the current MLB landscape, fans and analysts may not think of Cain as an elite center fielder, but the age-31 performance in 2017 was the best since Carlos Beltran’s 2008 and Johnny Damon’s 2005 (Baseball Prospectus CSV, retrieved January 5, 2018). A detailed search of center fielders in their 30s since the turn of the century demonstrates that this position is indeed one at which players can age and perform well; this is obviously a blanket statement that may not precisely track Cain deep into his 30s, but rather a call to understand that there may not be a typical aging curve among athletic center fielders.

Finally, Cain’s batting profile also presents a unique opportunity for the Brewers. Milwaukee’s offense is well-known as a three true outcomes (strike out, walk, home run) machine, especially heavy at the strike outs. Center field was easily the club’s worst plate discipline position, focusing on strike outs and walks:

Yet, this profile need not predetermine the club’s outlook for 2018. As Noah Nofz outlined at BPMilwaukee, the Houston Astros’ current roster incarnation began as a high-strikeout affair, before the club used internal adjustments and signings to bolster the club’s contact abilities. Should the Brewers seek this type of improvement, it is unlikely that the young Brinson and Phillips will offer this type of contact profile early in their respective careers; with adjustments over several years, both players may eventually be expected to improve in terms of discipline and contact profiles (which would also arguably track with their MLB success and accomplishing something akin to their best possible roles). Cain’s batting profile is already at that point of strong contact-discipline, which arguably adds to a case for his ability to withstand aging in center field:

All of this may seem futile as the Brewers’ rumored interest in Cain is nothing more than that, but the rumor itself provides an interesting opportunity to consider the composition of the club. With $50 million in additional MLB Advanced Media revenue due to the Brewers in spring 2018, and a slow free agency market leaving many impact players on the market, Milwaukee has a fantastic opportunity to immediately shape the best possible roster using their revenue, impact prospects, and system depth. Should this cyclone of free agency signings, development at the MLB level, and trades involve Lorenzo Cain in some way, shape, or form, the veteran outfielder’s return to Milwaukee would mean that the team has nabbed an elite free agent and immediately improved their center field outlook for fielding, production, and batting order discipline and contact.

Photo Credit: Dan Hamilton, USAToday Sports Images

Phillips, who was more valuable than Broxton in a quarter of the plate appearances this season, is younger, a stronger outfielder, a better hitter than his counterpart. Brett Phillips deserves to be the everyday centerfielder for the Milwaukee Brewers starting Opening Day 2018.

Phillips was drafted in the sixth round of the 2012 Major League Baseball draft by the Houston Astros. He was a part of the package that sent Carlos Gomez to the Astros at the 2015 trade deadline.

The prospect started out the 2017 season with the Brewers Class-AAA affiliate in Colorado Springs and had what was likely the best professional season of his career. He finished seventh in slugging percentage in the Pacific Coast League (PCL) at .567, while his 10.4 percent walk rate placed him twentieth in the league. Phillips’s excellent slugging percentage and solid walk rate made him the fifth-best hitter in the league according to OPS at .944.

Phillips supplements his offensive game with excellent baserunning. He has stolen 73 bases over six full minor league seasons since his debut in 2012. According to Baseball Prospectus, he has been worth 12.6 baserunning runs (BRR) since 2014 as a minor leaguer. In his short debut in the majors this year, Phillips stole five bases. Over that same small sample size in the majors, he was worth 0.3 BRR. Statcast’s Sprint Speed is on board as well, rating Phillips as the second fastest player on the Brewers roster last year at 28.2 ft./sec.

What sets Phillips apart is his defense. Despite playing in just 39 games, Phillips ranked 15^th in fielding runs above average (FRAA) at 4.4 runs and also had four outfield assists. MLB Pipeline’s Bernie Pleskoff says “He plays outstanding defense, with quick and correct reads of the ball off the bat, good range and speed to chase down balls hit to all directions.”

Phillips’s age leaves plenty of room for him to grow. Although he has been in professional baseball since 2012, he is still just 23 years old. He doesn’t turn 24 until the end of May. In contrast, Broxton will be 28 in May. Top prospect Lewis Brinson, who has consistently been seen as a higher-ceiling prospect than Phillips, will also turn 24 (in June 2017).

Phillips’s high strikeout rate is the only gaping hole in his game. His strikeout rate jumped from 29.9 percent in AAA this year to 34.7 percent in his short stint in the majors. If he can manage to get his strikeout rate back below 30 percent, his power numbers will more than make up for his lack of contact.

Compared to Brinson and Broxton, a lot less hype surrounds Brett Phillips. It isn’t clear why, given the all-round game he has displayed throughout his minor-league career and now in his major-league debut. As Anderle pointed out, Phillips was worth 1.1 wins above replacement player (WARP) in 98 plate appearances. Broxton was worth just 1.0 WARP in 463 PAs. Brinson was worth -0.2 WARP in 55 plate appearances.

The Brewers have decisions to make. Left and right field seem to be penciled in with Ryan Braun (seemingly) not going anywhere and Domingo Santana’s breakout 2017 season. The team has two centerfield prospects knocking at the door in Phillips and Brinson to go along with Broxton, everyone’s favorite breakout pick before the 2017 season. If no moves are made, the team would be wise to hand the job over to Brett Phillips, who has more than proven he can perform at a high level in the three most important aspects of the game.

Photo Credit: Charles LeClaire, USA Today Sports Images.

Recently, my surplus analysis of the Brewers roster affirmed the relatively well-known fact that Catcher, Right-Handed Pitcher, and Second Base are the greatest positions of need for Milwaukee in 2018.

Extrapolating those needs:

• While Manny Pina performed quite well, the Brewers could use stronger back-up support. It is not clear whether Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy have profiles that are suitable for high-end back-up to help the Brewers contend. This is prior to considering any concerns in approach or mechanics that suggest Pina will not be able to continue performing at his 2017 level.

• Waiver trade deadline acquisition Neil Walker delivered solid production down the stretch for the Brewers, and arguably should be a clear target in free agency given the lack of any immediate prospect that flashes a strong starting second baseman role in the advanced minors. Walker will not block any prospects, and his ability to play at multiple infield positions will help the Brewers execute their “Team Depth” strategy.

• Finally, right-handed pitching will take hits due to injury (Jimmy Nelson), free agency (Matt Garza and Anthony Swarzak), uncertain prospect production / development projects at MLB level (Brandon Woodruff, followed by Corbin Burnes and company), and arguably role depreciation as well (everyone from Junior Guerra to Jorge Lopez to Aaron Wilkerson could fit this description). It should not be outlandish to suggest that the Brewers could easily use two-to-three additional starting pitching options in order to withstand April-through-July and the battle of attrition that is the 162 grind.

This post will outline a set of topics for free agency analysis, but first it is worth looking at the three-year depreciated surplus figures for the Top 25 free agents among pitchers and batters. The following tables include:

• Raw 2017 Three-Year Depreciated Surplus (treated without contract, as though the player was a 2016-2017 free agent).

• Raw 2018 Three-Year Depreciated Surplus (once again, treated without contract, with every player on a three-year scale for ease of comparison).

• The difference between 2018 and 2017 depreciated surplus, which should read like “role depreciation,” or “role trend,” to suggest whether the player is largely trending upward or downward.

• These figures are drawn from Baseball Prospectus WARP, knocked down to 70 percent to imitate production regression of aging and injury (etc.), and placed on the “market rate” WARP schedule of approximately $7 million per one WARP.

• Additionally, players that have options or opt-outs were not included in this search in order to present a uniform class of players and avoid complicated contractual assumptions.

First, the best bats:

Now, following the same table structure, a look at the 2018 pitching free agents:

Future Topics:
From this basis, much analysis should follow, as the surplus figures are highly abstract and obviously not tethered to the reality of negotiating contracts that could span anywhere from one-year (perhaps for someone like Cameron Maybin) to seven-years (for someone like Yu Darvish). Obviously, specific statistical, mechanical, age, injury, and other considerations will come into play in the actual market, as well. More detailed analysis on these areas will follow. However, for now, it is worth drawing some big picture conclusions about the class:

• Should someone wish to gamble on injury recovery risk, pitchers from Alex Cobb to Michael Pineda, or even Yu Darvish, could provide significant surplus (yes, Darvish could provide surplus value to a club even with a huge contract). Obviously, these cases will require particular attention to detail in terms of mechanics, injury type or severity, and other medical or recovery-related factors.

• The supposed lack of star power among position players could provide a feast for the right front office mentalities: players from Eric Hosmer to Neil Walker to reclamation projects like Carlos Gomez, Jonathan Lucroy, or Carlos Gonzalez could deliver plentiful returns to front offices with a sharp eye to mechanics, strike zone approach, and other related factors.

• An amazing bench (or set of depth role players) could emerge from this class, lead by someone like Jarrod Dyson (a fantastic glove-first centerfielder). Even the Brewers, with their noted glut of outfielders, could arguably find room to upgrade depth roles with a player like Dyson (who offers more certain defense and a rather disciplined-if-unspectacular plate approach compared to someone like Keon Broxton off the bench).

• Moreover, who will be the next Chase Anderson? Or rather, how will the Brewers front office learn from their coaching and arsenal approach successes with the veteran? My vote in this regard is for the unheralded Jeremy Hellickson, who you last heard about in the ridiculed 2017 deadline trade involving the Phillies and Orioles. Yet although Hellickson followed up his strong 2016 campaign with some troubles in 2017, his arsenal and mechanics maintain the basic form of their 2016 foundation. Additionally, the righty works with the much-familar sinker-cutter-curve-change approach that the Brewers have worked with (see Davies, Zach, as well as Anderson).

While all the hype will justifiably go to guys like Jake Arrieta and Yu Darvish, the 2017 Brewers pitching success proved that arms can indeed succeed by being placed within a particular system that uses the proper individualized approach to each pitcher’s needs (Derek Johnson’s chameleon coaching style is oft-praised for this characteristic). For this reason, a raw mechanical project like Arrieta could succeed in Milwaukee, but given the cost comparisons and serviceable depth options available, this is a perfect offseason for Stearns and the front office to gamble on pitching acquisitions that fit a particular mold suitable to the organization. Since Milwaukee will face market constraints throughout their contending years, learning how to repeatedly find the next Chase Anderson will arguably be as important as learning when to jump at an elite contract.

The Brewers can indeed contend in 2018 while continuing to develop players at the MLB level, but they will be required to do so with the most….interesting roster in the division (as opposed to the one with the most starpower). In this regard, perhaps a consistent head-scratcher like the 2012-2016 Orioles is a better model for replication and discussion than the popular Cubs, Pirates, or Astros building models.

Photo Credit: Jeff Hanisch, USA Today Sports Images

Because of this, the centerfield job should be somewhat open to competition when the players report next spring. It should not be, by default, an opportunity to develop Lewis Brinson at the MLB level. If one player improves his game significantly during the next few months, then comes to Arizona as a brand-new ballplayer, that absolutely will change things. If that player is Brinson, great! But if that doesn’t happen, there’s another answer that the team should consider: a traditional right/left platoon between Broxton and Phillips. (While this scenario will consider Broxton and Phillips, it should not be construed as a dismissal of Lewis Brinson’s place on the roster. Rather, it is a recognition of the fact that a team contending for the playoffs should prioritize building a championship MLB roster over everything else, and that now applies to the Brewers.)

Phillips, who bats left-handed, has already shown the beginnings of a strong platoon tendency. Forecasting this off of 98 plate appearances is far from exact, and should thus be taken with a grain of salt, but Phillips’ OPS against right-handers in 2017 was .855; against lefties it was .311.

That might not be enough to establish a pattern but it’s certainly a trend that bears watching. Still, an .855 OPS in 87 plate appearances at the top level is impressive. When it comes attached to a base-stealer who plays elite defense, that’s even better.

Phillips’s struggles against lefthanders might be a small-sample-size mirage, or his swing-and-miss issues could be further exploited as pitchers learn how to attack him. If either of those comes up they can be addressed then, and not now when they’re nothing but hypotheticals. Plans can always change. But the Brewers have a perfect candidate in-house to fill out the other side of the platoon, so why not take advantage of the setup?

Keon Broxton’s role with the team has been a point of discussion for a while, but limiting his exposure to right-handed pitching might just be the answer to maximizing his value while minimizing his problems. Phillips doesn’t have enough MLB experience to generate a platoon splits graph on his BP player page, but Broxton does:

For his career, Broxton has a slash line of .286/.406/.500, with a .315 True Average, against southpaws. Turn the pitcher around and those numbers all fall off a cliff, to .210/.315/.379 and .250. BP’s defensive metrics graded Broxton as costing the Brewers just shy of seven runs in 2017, but he’s graded positively by those same numbers dating back to 2014 in the minor leagues. Plus, Broxton’s defense passes the eye test with flying colors:

Broxton’s baserunning aptitude is what truly sets him apart, though. He was the 27th-most valuable player in all of baseball by that metric in 2017. His exit velocity numbers, too, paint a picture of a ballplayer who could be elite in the right circumstances. By platooning him with Phillips and limiting his exposure to right-handers, who keep him off the basepaths at a critical rate, the Brewers are optimizing his ability to make a positive contribution and minimizing his chances of getting dragged into a vortex of failure.

As if the strategy wasn’t appealing enough already, Phillips and Broxton both have skill sets that make them valuable off the bench, too. Whichever one doesn’t start can be used as a pinch runner, defensive replacement, or pinch hitter against an opposite-handed reliever.

The National League Champion Los Angeles Dodgers have employed platoon splits heavily since Andrew Friedman was hired as general manager, and it is a huge reason they have been so consistently excellent. Putting your players in the best position to succeed is what every team’s management personnel and front office strive towards. The Brewers have an opportunity to do just that from the get-go with their two center fielders in 2018.

Photo Credit: Jeff Hanisch, USAToday Sports Images

Those narratives will undoubtedly carry into 2018 guided by the very same contradictions: Milwaukee will indeed be developing many young players at the MLB level (including Lewis Brinson, Josh Hader, Brett Phillips, and Brandon Woodruff), while the team also has several opportunities to improve with established players (either through trades involving their prospects, through free agency signings, or both).

To put it another way: GM David Stearns can take the roster in several directions, and certainly has the resources available to contend while continuing to develop some players.

One way to assess player value, and therefore roster needs, is to estimate the surplus value that each player (and their contractual situation) provides the team. Value is assumed to be production and scarcity, recognizing that a player is not simply valuable to a club based on production, but also based on cost and the general availability of that skill set within the MLB. Surplus is the difference provided between a player’s production and their contract, recognizing that these aspects can be double-counted (a team simultaneously receives a player’s production on the field and their production gauged against their contract). Based on these assumptions, I tracked the surplus value of the Brewers 40-man roster (as of October 20, 2017) by using harsh depreciation to reduce each player’s maximum value (recognizing that a player’s performance typically declines over time save for rare cases).

The following chart tracks changes in surplus entering 2017 to entering 2018, while also assigning an Overall Future Potential (OFP) role for each Brewers roster member:

What these surplus numbers can suggest, in the abstract, is the difference between “the number of the wins above replacement” a player will produce during their contract and the OFP a team might receive if they traded the player at this point in time (alternately, they might suggest a contract range; for example, if the Brewers offered Neil Walker a $30 million contract, they would likely retain some surplus value during that contract).

Using the extremely interesting and difficult case of Jonathan Villar to interpret this table, his 2016 campaign and contract control years still loom large enough to suggest that the Brewers should not move the infielder for cheap; but the shortstop-turned-bench/utility option does mean that Villar’s ultimate role is trending downward, meaning that if Milwaukee believes that role decline is real and will continue to materialize, moving Villar for less than his top value could offset the issues of rostering a declining role. This should outline the difficulty of making roster decisions: in the case of Villar, there is not necessarily a right answer.

I should add that surplus value is abstract in the sense that there is a point at which additional surplus does not provide a team transaction value. Scooter Gennett and Chris Carter should be the most specific examples of this phenomenon in recent Brewers memory, as both players retained solidly positive surplus value entering 2017, but were essentially unwanted on the trade market and therefore expendable for nothing. Following this example, a rule of thumb might be to expect any type of roster move once a player’s surplus value dips below $20 million (or, less than three wins above replacement). Looking at the table of the Brewers roster above, this fact should seem intuitive with many of the names on the list (for example, it is highly unlikely that the Brewers would be able to move a player like Andrew Susac or even Eric Thames for their maximal surplus value).

By averaging each player’s 2017, 2018, and OFP surplus value, and comparing that to their change in value over time, a rather intuitive 2018 roster emerges. In this case, I excluded each player with a Negative-50 percent change in value (ex., a 50 percent decline), which produced need at Catcher, Second Base, and Right-Handed Pitcher, with additional question marks about the Utility roles. This is a rather succinct picture of the actual needs for the 2018 Brewers, and it also shows that if a few key free agents are retained, or similar free agents from outside the organizational signed, the Brewers can assemble quite a good roster:

These tables need not force an analyst to rely on numbers alone in order to validate roster decisions. Compare the following descriptions of potential role upgrades for the 2018 Brewers with those players’ statistical trends, and find nearly 20 roster spots (on the 40-Man) that can be upgraded for 2018:

The benefit of this exercise is that additional roster functions can be analyzed, either through descriptive or analytical means. For example, one could compare some of the best Rule 5 Draft Roster Protection candidates with the players above in order to find the most salient moves for the future value of the organization. Via Brewerfan.net:

Once again, this should exhibit a rather intuitive process of evaluation. If the future value of a catcher such as Jacob Nottingham is better than either Stephen Vogt, Andrew Susac, or Jett Bandy (or all three players), it should not hurt to lose one of those players in order to roster Nottingham. Each of these catchers are good candidates for contractual non-tenders for this reason (and, indeed, catcher is a position that the Brewers can upgrade in terms of depth behind/alongside Manny Pina). Similarly, allowing Matt Garza to walk via free agency and rostering Marcos Diplan, Freddy Peralta, or Devin Williams in that place should improve the pitching surplus of the roster. Where it gets more interesting is considering a player like Mauricio Dubon, and whether he simply takes the spot of free agent Eric Sogard, or overtakes Villar or Hernan Perez.

Using these analytical approaches should validate the fact that the Brewers are in a unique position entering 2018. They are a good team, indeed, that also features many up-and-coming players to develop at the MLB level and many declining roles that can be replaced. Where surplus value becomes useful is targeting particular trades, or simply determining when a player should be released or non-tendered.

A player like Keon Broxton, Perez, Susac, or Vogt should demonstrate this difficult decision-making process, and perhaps cause fans to realign their expectations that these types of players can receive impactful trade returns to Milwaukee. Given the packed outfield for 2018, the Brewers could conceivably release a player like Broxton should trade partners refuse to bite with a 45-to-50 OFP / quality depth trade (matching Broxton’s $11.5M-to-$19.8M surplus), for the trouble is that Broxton’s expected role is indeed declining (and any particular trade partner will also know that). This should not simply be viewed as picking on Broxton, as the point exists for Vogt and several other players on the roster.

“Slingin’ Stearns” earned his nickname for wheeling-and-dealing on the trade market during his first offseason in Milwaukee, but that reputation has calmed over time (not surprisingly, as the club completed their rebuilding process). Stearns did not show any hesitation in aggressively using waiver claims and releases to define his 2016-2017 offseason, and now the GM’s reputation may be defined by how effectively he clears roster space for what’s next: refined future development and improved MLB roles to contend in 2018.

The 2017 season proved that these goals can align and coexist within the same roster, so there are no excuses for failing to improve this strategy by learning from the 2017 progression.

Photo Credit: Jim Young, USAToday Sports Images.

Milwaukee’s top contributor among position players through this pivotal month hasn’t been Eric Thames or Ryan Braun or Travis Shaw, the usual suspects who powered the Brewers through much of the first half. No, it has instead been the mercurial outfielder Keon Broxton, who owned a ridiculous .265/.342/.559 batting line with six home runs, 11 runs scored and 12 RBI through 23 August games entering Sunday’s contest with Los Angeles. And he has done this all while providing this kind of defense in center field:

It seems like a question Brewers fans have been asking ever since Broxton was acquired by the Brewers two years ago, but Broxton’s performance this August is once again forcing us to confront the question of what Milwaukee’s long-term plans for Broxton will be. Despite Broxton’s hot August, he still owns just a .227/.303/.454 overall line with 1.3 BWARP. Quibble with the fact that the evaluative systems haven’t loved Broxton’s defense this year if you want, as UZR and FRAA both have him at either neutral or slightly negative this year, but Broxton hasn’t established himself as even an average player here in 2017.

Broxton will still be a pre-arbitration player next year, so that part of the decision is fairly easy. But it gets complicated because Broxton will be out of options in 2018. The plan that the Brewers have used with him this year, which includes sending him down for a reset at hitter-friendly Colorado Springs, won’t be an option without exposing him to waivers. And so next year, the Brewers will have little choice but to endure the terrible stretches Broxton’s strikeout-happy ways are bound to produce, such as his 3-for-45 this July, or the infamous 0-for-16 that began his career in Milwaukee in 2016.

Because of his strikeout rate, all the way up to 37.5 percent, highest in the majors and the worst of the last half-century, there is a very real ceiling on Broxton’s potential production. As such, it’s going to be difficult to justify giving him plate appearances over the Brewers’ slew of young outfielders. Domingo Santana, Brett Phillips, and Lewis Brinson already have to contend with Ryan Braun for one slot. Broxton’s place in the Brewers future is dwarfed by those three talents.

The easy answer here is to trade Broxton, but there just isn’t enough surplus value here for teams to trade a significant prospect haul for Broxton. At the very least, this is not likely over an offseason; things might be different should he heat up right before the trade deadline next year. The better option, in my estimation, is to keep Broxton as the ultimate utility outfielder in 2018. While I’m not a subscriber to the idea that defense doesn’t streak or slump — watch Nyjer Morgan or Carlos Gomez patrol center field for a full season and you’ll quickly be dissuaded from that belief — Broxton has the ability to contribute as a defensive replacement or pinch runner even when he’s going cold, making him a valuable roster asset.

While I certainly believe players like Brinson and Phillips need every day at-bats when they come up to the majors, there are over 2,000 at-bats available in a major league outfield, not to mention the extra at-bats that come for National League pinch hitters and designated hitters for interleague play. We certainly can’t expect Ryan Braun to take 650 plate appearances, and injuries are just a fact of major league life even for the livelier and healthier youngsters who will make up the rest of Milwaukee’s outfield in 2018. Even if Broxton doesn’t break camp as a starter, there will be a need for his services at some point.

It’s easy, if you want, to focus on the negatives in Broxton’s game, or to be more accurate, the one giant glaring negative that is his strikeout rate. Because he has such a hard ceiling, it can be easy to dismiss Broxton as an important piece of this Brewers team, present and future. His big August is a huge reason why this team is still afloat, and this year and next year are likely to be the peak years of his career. The best way for the Brewers to get the most out of Broxton seems clear to me: Keep him on this roster, deal with the inevitable slumps as they come, and let him do what he’s great at s long as he can.

Photo Credit: Ron Chenoy, USAToday Sports Images