Recommended Reading:
True Outcomes (Jarrett Seidler, Baseball Prospectus)
Round Table: Short Hitter Stigma (Baseball Prospectus)
The May Promotions (Baseball Prospectus, Prospect Team)

In a way, I don’t need to write this article. So many minds are already made; I see it on Brewers Twitter everyday, that Keston Hiura is a slam dunk, guaranteed superstar prospect, and it does not matter where or how you look at it. Hiura should be untouchable in midseason trade talks; Hiura will be a guaranteed top of the order bat for the Brewers for the foreseeable future; when the Brewers’ impressive 40+ Wins Above Replacement (WAR) First Round Draft record was noted on draft day, it was easy for some to emphasize that Keston Hiura is next. Never mind that according to Baseball Reference, approximately 500 players in the entire history of baseball have reached this plateau, this next prospect is a certain thing. But my mind has waivered on Hiura, and I gather I’m not the only one who not only cringes at the unnecessary prospect hype (these will be the same people leading the torches to Miller Park should Hiura “settle” as a 5.0 WAR player or become a DH-trade asset, yet another unnecessary practice with judging MLB players), but who is genuinely perplexed about the issue posed by Hiura’s potential role. For it is easy to focus on the Top Percentile outcome, “Keston Hiura, All Star Second Baseman for the Brewers,” and end the dreaming there; if that’s your position, you probably do not need to read this article. Yet serious questions remain about how Hiura fits in the organization in his secondary, realistic risk roles of Left Field or Designated Hitter, and those questions are tied up in the thorny information asymmetry wrapped in the prospect’s throwing elbow.

It is obvious that none of us know who Hiura will be. One could look at his hitting mechanics and doubles-oriented pop and see a realistic chance that he sticks in the MLB regardless of his fielding role. His fielding roles might not be certain, or even linear; he could begin his career at second base in Milwaukee, fall off defensively, and move to designated hitter or left field. A development in his game could theoretically find him at a different position all together, especially given the flexibility-oriented mindset of many contemporary MLB teams (he could be a PH / DH / 2B / LF). He could fall off second base before even leaving the minors, but prove himself worthy of a shot in left field (this is the phenomenal Willie Calhoun role comp provided by Baseball Prospectus on their Top 10 list). All that is before considering any potential development courses derailed by the elbow injury. Yet even some members of the Baseball Prospectus prospect team have changed their public voice on Hiura, leading one to wonder whether the floor of that realistic / risk role is diminishing in likelihood.

This feature is meant as an exercise in probabilistic thinking, in which aspects of the historical record in MLB are used to define Hiura’s potential outlook using the structure of the game. The assumption is that because of MLB’s competitive organizational environment, including the quick learning of new strategies as well as the constant search for viable alternative or underappreciated strategies, there are legitimate organizational-structural constraints that define Player Development. This does not mean that history forms the future, but rather that the history of the game used in a narrow, comparative manner will provide some evidence that can inform projections about contemporary players. Here, I will focus on body type, pedigree, and defensive profile to outline just some of the extremely diverse futures that could greet Hiura.

Entering 2018, the PECOTA comparison system viewed Hiura as a bat-first prospect, and developed a projection that pegged the prospect as a replacement player second baseman for Milwaukee (a good thing). Hiura’s MLB batting line according to the March 23, 2018 PECOTA projection (CSV download, March 23, 2018) was .225 / .274 / .363, which is not bad for a prospect leaping to the MLB within a year of the MLB Amateur Draft. Much more interesting than the stats are the player comparisons generated by the underlying patterns and age curve recognized for Hiura.

PECOTA compared Hiura to three strong MLB role prospects. Matt Davidson ranked in the second tier of a stacked Arizona Diamondbacks Top 10 for 2012, with a clear bat-first role based on his power. Entering 2016, Dominic Smith ranked fifth in the New York Mets system with a 45 Overall Future Potential role as Second-Division Starter. Here the batting question awaited power at a limited defensive role. Jose Osuna was the only member of this trio unranked by Baseball Prospectus entering their age-21 season, although it’s worth emphasizing that this is not a knock against Osuna. The Pirates prospect was fighting within a system that saw Alen Hanson, Luis Heredia, and Harold Ramirez as prospects 8-through-10. Nevertheless, this trio provides interesting minor league statistical performances in their age-21 campaigns, drawing some comparison to Hiura in terms of relative discipline profile (here I am using strike outs (K) and walks (BB)), especially for both Smith and Osuna.

In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura’s First Round, Ninth pick standard is quite interesting because this area of the draft begins to shift from “going for a clear superstar territory” to “gambling on many comparable ‘best player available’ types,” leaving an unclear expectation for the pick. Yet, according to Baseball Reference, 34 of 54 players have historically made the MLB from this draft slot, and that ticks up in the modern draft era (17 of 21 Ninth overall picks from 1995-2015 reached the MLB). These players are typically not superstars in the sense one would use to discuss the most elite players in the game. Of the 21 Wild Card era Ninth picks, Geoff Jenkins, Michael Cuddyer, and Mark Kotsay are the best retired position players, and Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ are just now establishing their careers. Historically, each Ninth pick is worth approximately 5.0 WAR with 62 percent odds of reaching the MLB, while more recently (1995-2015) each Ninth pick is worth approximately 7.0 WAR (and counting) with 81 percent odds of reaching the MLB (the standard deviation is 10.1, which demonstrates the absurd volatility of the MLB draft and MLB career trajectories). In other words, the baseline for Hiura’s professional career features quite strong odds of reaching the MLB (they are not set in stone) and a very solid average performance (5.0 to 7.0 WAR is nothing to sneeze at in terms of the grand scheme of baseball). In fact, in a crude sense, a 7.0 WAR performance would extrapolate Hiura’s 50th Percentile PECOTA over the course of approximately four seasons: a solid career, indeed, and potentially one that is viewed as reasonable by projection systems.

It is fun to see that, thus far, several of the active Ninth Pick players are playing in the National League Central, adding intrigue to the standard divisional competition. If Hiura wishes to make his mark on this Overall Pick, Javier Baez, Austin Meadows, and Ian Happ could each impact Hiura’s potential assessment of greatness.

Keston Hiura is a relatively short ballplayer, and one can use his body type to investigate MLB roles as well. This is not an insult to Hiura; it’s simply a fact, as even on his own Double-A Biloxi Shuckers squad, 33 Shuckers taller than Hiura have played in 2018. Height has real world consequences in defining MLB roles, as Hiura may become less likely to play at first base than other bat-first prospects in search of a positional home; given that the arm may also keep Hiura off right field, the nomadic defensive spectrum speculation for Hiura’s future mightily limits the prospect’s path. This is not a problem, but it should help to round out some role risk probabilities. Height also affects Hiura’s positional future in left field, as Baseball Reference Play Index shows that Kiké Hernandez is the first 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player since 1989 to play Left Field while debuting at age-22; the last 5’11”, 182-200 pound MLB player to debut at Left Field during their age-21 season was Danny Heep in 1979. During the Expansion Era, only 94 MLB position players debuted at age-21 with a listed height of 5’11”, while only 134 MLB position players debuted at age-22 with a listed height of 5’11”.

The historical path to an early (age-21 or age-22) debut for a 5’11”, 182-200 pound player is much clearer at second base. Here, a fascinating range of roles emerge.

It’s impossible to unsee Pete Rose, and that’s just such an interesting comparison for a million reasons, not the least of which that Rose’s general lack of home run power in favor of a high average, doubles-oriented approach might actually fit Hiura’s batting profile in some ways. But I do not find it helpful to focus on 80 WARP players while discussing potential prospect roles; obviously that would be an “everything goes perfectly,” elite percentile prospect outcome that would challenge Robin Yount as the greatest player in Brewers history (in terms of WARP). Kiké Hernandez, Steve Sax, and Blake DeWitt are my favorites on this list in terms of rounding out potential role determinations or profiles.

• Hernandez is a positionally flexible player that showed an early career ability to hit (2015) prior to becoming a utility player;

• Steve Sax was a batting-average and doubles hitter that used those skills to drive valuable profiles even when the glove was not there (ultimately, Sax’s 23.1 career WARP occurred with -18.8 FRAA contrasted by a .260 TAv);

• DeWitt was a player that saw an early career (first year, actually!) surge coupled with some positional trouble and a steep, almost immediate drop off.

• A “Steve Sax” career would be a phenomenal outcome for Hiura, which would also help Hiura contend with Geoff Jenkins as the best Ninth Overall position player (thus far); yet I think a “Blake DeWitt” career shows how a ballplayer can be a good prospect, produce MLB value, and also encounter some role shifts and decline at the MLB level while ultimately having a good career. To my mind, this is one way it might look if Hiura storms the MLB out of the gate at 2B, and then encounters some positional shift and offensive adjustment issues.

Figure One

One final role question concerns Hiura’s potential quality of defense at second base. Outside of the prospect’s own injury concerns, it is worth investigating the structure of the position: if Hiura’s concerns produce a below average defensive profile, will that stick as an everyday 2B? Second base is a strange position, as the progression of positional average performances during the Wild Card Era (1995-2017 for full seasons) suggests that teams are generally favoring glove-first players at second base. While True Average (TAv) is modestly improving over time for regular second basemen, Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA) is significantly improving across the league (see Figure One, above). Yet, isolating the very best bats among second basemen shows that contemporary MLB teams are very tolerant of below average FRAA seasons when the bat is excellent. Recent seasons by Scooter Gennett (2017), Ben Zobrist (2016), Jose Altuve (2016, 2014), and Joe Panik (2015) show that imperfect second base defensive profiles can continue to play so long as they hit. In fact, for each five year period (or so) during the Wild Card Era, there are roughly four bat-first, poor glove 2B in the MLB at any given time. Thus, there should certainly be a future for Keston Hiura at second base if his injury does not diminish his ability to play the field, should his bat deliver at an excellent clip.

None of these structural aspects of the game impact assessments of Hiura’s mechanical and plate approach profile, which is another endeavor that can establish the right-handed batter’s risk, floor, and potential ceiling. But, these structural aspects can be used to place Hiura’s profile within the broader context of the game. Hiura is not simply a slam dunk prospect. Based on his size, if Hiura debuts in 2018 at second base, he will be a rather rare prospect and one without much historical understanding for paths to big league success. Here, a Steve Sax career is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. In terms of draft pedigree, Hiura was not picked in a realm that generally produces game-changing superstars, instead presenting very solid regulars and All-Stars for the game. In this regard, a Geoff Jenkins profile is the goal, the legacy to beat in terms of maximal production. While assessing potential shortcomings in Hiura’s profile, especially at second base, it is worth emphasizing that a great-bat-bad-glove second baseman will work in the contemporary MLB. Here, the role ranges clearly from Scooter Gennett to Jose Altuve, rounding out a wide range of useful MLB potential futures.

None of these structural aspects of the game provide predictive insights for Hiura’s future. Rather, they can be used in order to help inform background expectations and probabilistic insights into the value of Hiura’s production should the youngster reach the MLB. Instead of attempting to view Hiura as an MLB slam dunk, it is worth meandering through these fields of potential roles in order to understand the wide range of success that could await Hiura. For MLB success is not simply stardom-or-bust, even for a prospect like Hiura.

References:

Baseball Prospectus. Individual Stats – Season Totals [CSV]. Parameters: 2B, MLB, All-Time.

Baseball Prospectus. Top 10 Prospects Landing Page.

Baseball Reference. MLB Draft. Ninth Overall Pick, and 2017 First Round.

Baseball Reference. Play Index. Separate Age-21 and Age-22 Searches, separate searches for 2B, DH, and LF, each where height = 71 inches; weight >= 182 lbs; weight <= 200 lbs.

Please consider Baseball Prospectus subscription and Baseball Reference ad-free browsing to support these endeavors.

That narrative started to change on March 28, when the Cincinnati Reds claimed Gennett off waivers. The loss barely registered on most fans’ radars. A blip of nostalgia, perhaps, but these were the rebuilding Milwaukee Brewers. We’re used to players coming and going. In actuality, Gennett’s sudden departure was the first in a series of unexpected events that engulfed second basemen throughout the Brewers’ system. (Perhaps the most unexpected? Scooter’s .308 Total Average (TAv) and 24 dingers in 435 plate appearances for the division-rival Reds.)

As 2017 winds down, it’s safe to say that the second base picture has grown considerably more murky. Here’s a brief overview of the state of the position up and down the organization.

Major Leagues
Jonathan Villar got off to a miserable start this season, hitting only .221 before the All-Star break and battling a lower back injury in June. Even before the injury, ineffectiveness cost Villar significant playing time. The Brewers summoned utility infielder Eric Sogard from Class-AAA in mid-May, and the diminutive veteran’s hot start in Milwaukee left Villar the odd man out. It was scarcely the follow-up the club had hoped for from Villar, who led the majors with 62 stolen bases and recorded a .826 OPS last year. Villar earned his long leash, but he deserved his reduced role this summer. He’s provided fans a glimmer of hope since the break, batting .288/.306/.415 while working at second and dabbling in center field.

Sogard, meanwhile, won hearts across Brewers nation with a monstrous first half, in which he batted .331/.438/.485. He, too, was bit by the injury bug this season, landing on the 10-day disabled list with a left ankle strain in early July. He hasn’t been the same player since making his way back to the active roster, as evidenced by a paltry .171/.276/.224 triple-slash in the second half. The 31-year-old is a free agent at the end of the season, meaning his days in Milwaukee blue may be numbered.

The versatile Hernan Perez has occasionally spelled Sogard and Villar this year, and he’s done so with aplomb. Brewers brass prefers Perez in a super-utility role, though, so he shouldn’t be considered a long-term solution at the keystone. The same goes for Yadiel Rivera, who made only one brief trip to the majors in his final option year, going hitless in a pair of plate appearances.

Dissatisfied with a slumping Sogard and inconsistent Villar, the Brewers acquired Neil Walker from the New York Mets on August 12 for a player to be named. Walker has been a steady contributor this year, amassing 1.3 WARP in just 380 plate appearances. He’s turned it up a notch since coming to Milwaukee, batting .279/.395/.485 in 22 games. But the 31-year-old is likely to command more in free agency this offseason than the Brewers will want to pay. With younger options already on the big league roster, Walker is likely a pure rental, to be enjoyed while he lasts.

Minor Leagues
Eric Sogard’s May promotion to the major leagues allowed Nate Orf to lock down the second base job in Class-AAA Colorado Springs. He hasn’t disappointed. Orf hit .320/.397/.507 in the thin air of the Pacific Coast League, flashing hitherto unseen power (his 9 home runs this year surpassed his previous career total). At 27 years old, Orf is an unconventional prospect. But he’s also an intriguing one. Orf draws plenty of walks (10.7 percent), and his solid hit tool allows him to avoid strikeouts (14.8 percent). He’s managed to keep the ball off the ground this year, too, and could be a sneaky-good major leaguer if ever given the chance. His .288 TAv in Colorado Springs indicates that he’s ready for that opportunity. Orf could crack the Opening Day roster as a utility man next year if he’s protected from the Rule 5 Draft this offseason.

Mauricio Dubon split time between second base and shortstop this year, reaching Colorado Springs for the first time on June 26. Dubon possesses a solid hit tool, but he failed to replicate the power he flashed last season with the Portland Sea Dogs. If he grows into some pop, he could be a nifty starter. Otherwise, he’s destined for a role as a utility player.

Isan Diaz came to Milwaukee in the Jean Segura trade, and won the organizational Minor League Player of the Year award in 2016 by way of a first impression. He socked 20 home runs and 34 doubles in the Midwest League last season, but took a step back in Class-Advanced A Carolina this year. Diaz struck out in 26.6 percent of his plate appearances en route to a .222/.334/.376 line for the Mudcats. A fractured hamate ended his season in late August.

With the ninth selection of the Rule 4 Draft, the Brewers nabbed California-Irvine standout Keston Hiura. Hiura’s a second baseman by trade, but acted as a strict DH throughout his final collegiate season amidst concerns over an injured elbow. Any worries about whether he could field were mitigated by the fact that Hiura can really, really hit. He walloped Arizona League pitching with a .425 TAv before moving up to Class-A Wisconsin and posting a .326 TAv in just over 100 plate appearances. Hiura returned to the dirt towards the end of the season and held his own at second base. He will push Diaz for superiority in the top prospect pecking order when he gets his first taste of the Carolina League next season.

2018 Outlook
Barring any significant off-season moves, Jonathan Villar is again the odds-on favorite to start at second on Opening Day. Should he stumble out of the gate, he could cede some playing time to Nate Orf, or to a random free agent signing. Mauricio Dubon could likely benefit from another year of AAA pitching, while the high-upside duo of Diaz and Hiura are set to slug it out for a promotion to Biloxi. Keep an eye on Dubon’s ISO, Diaz’s strikeout percentage, and Hiura’s work with the glove. Villar will reach free agency after the 2020 campaign. By this time next year, we should have a pretty good idea of his heir apparent.

Photo Credit: Benny Sieu, USAToday Sports Images

Most assumed the Brewers were done making moves. However, Wednesday morning the team claimed utility player Nick Franklin off waivers from the Tampa Bay Rays, presumably to take the role Gennett formerly filled.

Franklin, who just recently turned 26, is out of minor league options. In other words he will be on the major league roster. It remains to be seen who he will be replacing.

Many were puzzled by the move from Gennett to Franklin. Why would the Brewers make the effort to essentially swap to similar players while getting rid of a fan-favorite?

First of all, Nick Franklin has more potential to be an impact contributor. Although it doesn’t seem like much, Franklin is ten months younger than Gennett. The biggest difference between the two is the amount of opportunity each has been given.

Franklin, former Mariners top prospect, has only played over 100 games in a season once, way back in 2013 when he played in 103 games. Gennett has played over 100 games in three different seasons. The elder Scooter has been given real opportunities while Franklin has barely been given a chance for a full-time job, instead having to deal with sparing play-time and pinch-hit opportunities.

They both had very similar breakout seasons in 2013. Gennett was worth 1.8 WARP over 230 plate appearances. Franklin debuted with 2.5 WARP over 412 plate appearances. Continuing with the two’s similarities, both have left much to be desired since their 2013 seasons. Scooter has had the more recent overall success with his 2016 season, posting 2.0 WARP over 542 plate appearances, but the ex-Ray was actually the better hitter, posting a .275 TAv compared to Gennett’s .262.

Both Franklin and Gennett were at or below replacement-level over the 2014-2015 seasons. The Mariners questionably held Franklin down in AAA in 2014 for 75 games while he tore it up in Tacoma, posting a .310 TAv, before being traded to the Rays mid-season. One can only wonder how Franklin’s season would have turned out if he wasn’t jerked around. In contrast, Gennett stayed with the major league club through his tough 2014 and 2015 seasons. He had the opportunity to play through his difficulties. Neither of them came out smelling like roses.

Franklin is much more versatile than Gennett. He has played every position on the diamond besides catcher (Yes, he even pitched an inning for the Rays in 2015). Third base is the only spot where he hasn’t seen extended time. The Brewers now have two super-utility players in him and Hernan Perez. Gennett has only spent time at second base, besides emergency fill-ins in the 2014 season in the outfield. The Brewers are hoping to get 150+ games out of Jonathan Villar at second base. A light-hitting, average fielding second base-only player off the bench has much less value than a player that can competently fill six positions on the field.

The Brewers may be holding out hope for that former top prospect glow that Franklin has. He was once heralded as the next Ben Zobrist. Gennett, a solid contributor in his own right, has never been considered a top prospect.

It really is just apples and oranges. Gennett comes with more stability and recent success. Franklin might be looked as the sexier pick, more risk/reward. The Brewers are at the stage in their rebuild where betting on Franklin is the practical choice. Gennett likely wouldn’t have been an impact player on the next Brewers playoff team. His replacement has the potential to contribute all over the field if he can gain back some of that former top prospect helium.

Related Reading:
Gennett’s Unforeseen Future (2015)
Gennett’s Defense Past and Future
Gennett Takes Walks (2016)
Gennett Hits Lefties (2016)
Gennett’s 2016 Season

When arguments are made about the state of the Brewers farm system that impeded contending runs between 2011 and 2015, fans might be tempted to look at the 2009 draft as a failure, as Gennett, Mike Fiers, and Khris Davis were the best talent returned to Milwaukee. But that’s backwards; Gennett, Fiers, and Davis were not the reason for a lack of contending clubs, the missed opportunities at the top of the draft (and relatively shallow drafts by Jack Zduriencik’s scouting department in 2007 and 2008) hurt the Brewers much more. In some universe, Milwaukee hit on the top talent and Gennett, Fiers, and Davis served as fantastic supporting cast starters in contending runs from 2013 through 2015.

Scooter Gennett appeared on three top prospect lists for Baseball Propsectus, bouncing between sixth (2012), seventh (2011), and tenth (2013). For the earlier years, Gennett scaled low among the Brewers’ three-star prospects, behind Kentrail Davis, Cody Scarpetta, Mark Rogers, Kyle Heckathorn, Amaury Rivas, Wily Peralta, Jed Bradley, Taylor Jungmann, Tyler Thornburg, and Taylor Green. Yet Gennett has had a better MLB career than each player thus far, with the potential asterisk that Wily Peralta and Tyler Thornburg are wild cards that could extend MLB roles to produce more future value than Gennett. Again, that’s a relatively rough memory lane to experience for Brewers fans, but Gennett is not a part of the problem of player development for those Brewers; he’s a resounding success story.

Let’s meet Gennett in 2011. Baseball Prospectus introduced the “16th round pick who signed for fourth round money,” who was thought to be “a remarkably adept hitter with excellent bat speed and hand-eye coordination who consistently barrels balls with gap power. He has solid average speed and plays the game with an infectious energy.” The “bad” was already well-projected, even at this relatively early stage in the game: “It’s hard to imagine a player who looks more like a Scooter, as Gennett is short, skinny to the point of frail, and wears his socks high to accentuate his rail-thin build. He has no physical projection and needs to keep hitting, as second base is his only defensive option, and he’s no more than an average fielder.”

Fast forward to 2013, and under a new prospect ranking system, Gennett ranked as a 5 OFP, a low risk “second division starter” with the same knocks as before: “Lacks plus tools; hit tool is carrying weapon; glove is only average; arm plays below average; shows some pop, but game power will play well below-average; will need to play above ceiling to make it work.” Yet, even here the upside was worth gambling on: “Good baseball instincts; plays with intensity and purpose; can make consistent contact; can square quality stuff; shows good bat control; some pop in the stick; glove will play as average tool; improving through repetition; gamer type (of course, guys named “Scooter” have to be gamers).” As the name indeed suggests, Scooter was made to be the player that he is, and his 4.0 WARP career speaks to these scouting reports, as the second baseman carries a -10.9 FRAA with a .263 Total Average.

Even if one considers that Gennett is more akin to a fourth rounder that fell due to signability concerns than a true late rounder, the second baseman is one of the success stories of the 2009 draft. Using Baseball Reference draft data, Gennett ranks 30th among players that signed out of that draft.

This chart also supports the notion that Gennett was part of an extremely successful late round campaign by Bruce Seid, underscoring the fact that it was the top round failures that defined this draft’s issues rather than Gennett, Davis, and Fiers. Comparing Gennett to pick 496 in the history of the draft further emphasizes the success of the second baseman:

Gennett nearly tripled the expected performance level of his draft pick, providing extensive value to the Brewers for their player development in this case.

Along with the draft success, Gennett’s 2016 featured intriguing shifts, showcasing a veteran that could potentially adjust to increase his value or staying power in the MLB. The articles linked above document the intriguing adjustments Gennett made in 2016. Yet, for all the improvements against southpaw pitchers, or in the field, BPMilwaukee’s own Seth Victor proved prescient: “His career .263 TAv (in 1,637 plate appearances) speaks to his true talent level with his bat, and his defensive history speaks to his true talent level with his glove. He has absolutely earned the right to start at second base going into next season (barring an unforeseen upgrade at third base that pushes Villar across the diamond), but expecting that the Brewers have a league-average second baseman they can slot into their lineup every day is a mistake.” So it goes: an infield of Eric Thames, Jonathan Villar, Travis Shaw, and Orlando Arcia elbowed out Gennett. However, it would be a mistake to use this waiver move as evidence that Gennett is nearing the close of his career; if there is any lesson to be learned from Gennett’s career adjustments thus far, he is always ready to prove us wrong once again.

But Gennett faded into the background as the season went on. Villar outshot any reasonable expectations, Ryan Braun bounced back to some semblance of his former self, and Chris Carter ended up tied for the National League lead in home runs. Gennett instead became a consistent presence in the everyday lineup, but he didn’t stand out in the same way that some of the team’s other players did.

However, he finished the season with 2.0 WARP, which means he was a league-average player this year. For a 26-year-old who had declined to the point of being below-replacement-level last season, that is quite a rebound. It is also an encouraging sign for the Brewers, as they will be hoping that Gennett can justify a place on the big league roster in years to come even if they have likely given up on him being a star at any point.

The most interesting part of Gennett’s season, though, was how his performance broke down. While he was making his way up the prospect ladder, BP’s prospect staff constantly noted (in 2011, 2012, and 2013) that his bat was his carrying tool and his glove was average at best. That scouting report tended to be accurate through his first few seasons, as he never posted a positive FRAA and the value of his season overall was dependent on whether he hit.

But this season, he was a league-average player despite being just a league-average hitter, which means his defense was good enough to keep him above water overall. That isn’t an outcome I would have foreseen before the season started; instead, I would have assumed that for Gennett to be worth two wins, he would have had to hit much better than he actually did. In reality, his 2.02 WARP ranked 20th in MLB among all second baseman, but his .262 TAv was just 23rd in that same category.

This does create some level of worry, though. Defensive metrics are more volatile on a year-to-year basis, so outliers should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism—especially when they don’t line up with previous scouting reports. This is especially true given that defense peaks much earlier in a player’s career, so this sort of unexpected bump in defensive performance is surprising. The fact that Gennett would be a top-ten defensive second baseman in the league flies directly in the face of what we thought we knew coming into the season.

It is, of course, possible that Gennett has just improved his defense and become a competent big-league player. The idea that someone could settle into a major league role and perhaps improve his understanding of positioning and therefore become a better defender is entirely within the realm of possibility. However, the idea that Scooter Gennett—who had never before posted a positive FRAA—could be a league-average player on the strength of his glove rather than his bat would have seemed ridiculous before the season, and we should remember that through the offseason.

There is a temptation to try and explain away this discrepancy by saying that there was always a possibility Gennett would be a viable major leaguer, and that this is sustainable because his offense should bump up next year even if his defense drops down. That type of logic, however, is easily exploitable; psychological links aside, a player’s offense and defense occur in two separate planes and do not rise and fall in concert. If we think Gennett is a below-average defender—which he always has been—and if we think Gennett has not proven able to hit enough to make up for his glove—which is the case so far in his career—then we should evaluate him accordingly.

His career .263 TAv (in 1,637 plate appearances) speaks to his true talent level with his bat, and his defensive history speaks to his true talent level with his glove. He has absolutely earned the right to start at second base going into next season (barring an unforeseen upgrade at third base that pushes Villar across the diamond), but expecting that the Brewers have a league-average second baseman they can slot into their lineup every day is a mistake.

Top Play (WPA): In the top of the seventh inning, Paul Goldschmidt hit a RBI single which tied the game at 4 and also advanced Jean Segura to second base (.181). The play itself was fluky. Goldschmidt attempted to check his swing on a low and outside pitch, but he got a piece of the ball and hit a sharp liner right at Chris Carter, who was playing in with runners on the corners. Carter dove for the ball, but it glanced off his glove. He recovered quickly, but at that point, everyone was safe, and the Diamondbacks had tied the game.

Bottom Play (WPA): Chris Carter came to the plate with the score tied at 3, runners on first and second, and no outs in the bottom of the sixth inning. Arizona pulled starter Patrick Corbin in favor of Enrique Burgos for the at bat. After starting off Carter with a fastball away, Burgos threw three straight sliders inside on Carter. Carter swung at the first slider and looked at the second for a called strike. He swung again at the third, but unfortunately grounded into a double play for a negative .139 WPA on the play. Though Scooter Gennett drove in Ryan Braun in the next at bat, a potential big inning was lost. Per the Baseball Prospectus expected runs matrix, the Brewers expected runs in the inning fell from 1.46 before the double play to .36 runs afterwards.

Anatomy of a Big Inning: As mentioned at the top, the Brewers scored five runs in the bottom of the eighth inning to take control of the game. The barrage of runs came solely through walks and singles, as the Brewers exhibited patience and let Arizona pitchers Daniel Hudson and Zac Curtis beat themselves. Looking at Brooks Baseball’s Game Logs, Hudson threw twelve pitches out of the zone and the Brewers only swing at two. Curtis threw ten pitches out of the zone with the Brewers swinging at one. By waiting and forcing the bullpen corps to find the zone, the Brewers let Arizona beat themselves.

Trend to Watch: Since this is deadline week, it’s worth taking a look at Matt Garza’s start. In total, his line of six innings pitched with three runs allowed is respectable. If a team wants Matt Garza, the Brewers aren’t getting a Drew Pomeranz return. He’s a back end guy whose job would be to soak up some innings and not lose the game for his team. And while he had a strong start to the season, his three runs allowed last night were his fewest since his second start of the season back in June.

Last night, Garza’s problem innings were the first and fourth, while he cruised in his other four innings, allowing only one baserunner. I’ve split out his start into the problem innings and the clean innings below:

While each chart certainly features Garza trying to attack the bottom (and below) of the strike zone, the marked difference is the amount of strikes Garza threw in his good innings. Rather than trying to paint the corners and make the perfect pitch, it looks like in the clean innings Garza challenged the Diamondbacks to hit his pitches. They generally couldn’t. That’s how Garza needs to make his living, and how the Brewers need to sell him this week, and into August. There’s a serviceable pitcher in there and he can turn himself into a viable option for a team that’s getting nothing from the back end of its rotation like, say, the Red Sox.

Up Next: The Brewers look to continue their successful series tonight against Arizona. Jimmy Nelson will start for Milwaukee. Nelson lost his last start against the Cubs, pitching five innings while allowing four runs. Archie Bradley takes the hill for the Diamondbacks. He also lost his last start. Last week he pitched against Cincinnati and only lasted five innings and allowed three runs off five hits and five walks. First pitch is 7:10.

TOP PLAY (WPA)
Milwaukee hit back immediately after Anderson surrendered the Brewers’ early lead. Trailing 3-2, Ryan Braun led off the third with a single and Jonathan Lucroy followed with a walk. Both advanced into scoring position on a double steal, and after Chris Carter did one of the three things that he does (strike out), Scooter Gennett painted the first base line to score both runners (+.161). Gennett was awarded a ground-rule double on the play when the ball was fielded quite expertly by a gray-shirted man in the first row, though both runners likely would have scored regardless. The hit flipped the lead back to Milwaukee and put the Brewers ahead for good.

BOTTOM PLAY
Two of Pittsburgh’s strongest offensive threats this season were at it again in the fifth inning. Starling Marte led off the inning with a single, then tied Jonathan Villar atop the stolen base leaderboard with his 33rd swipe of the year (Villar retook sole possession of the crown a half-inning later). Known Brewers killer David Freese cashed in, drilling a double to center (-.140) to bring Pittsburgh within a run.

THE MOMENT
A.J. Schugel’s first inning out of the bullpen was a successful 1-2-3 affair, but the Brewers got to him early and often in the sixth. Villar led off with a walk, Hernan Perez moved him to second with a single to left, and Ryan Braun made their double steal meaningless when he walked to load the bases. A half-inning after the Pirates had drawn within a run at 5-4, Lucroy banked some Badger Mutuals with a liner to left that scored a pair. Chris Carter followed with a sacrifice fly to make the score 8-4 and put the game out of reach.

TREND TO WATCH
The Brewers have been piling up the STATs (Stuff That Angers Travis) in 2016, leading all of baseball in one-out strikeouts with a runner on third. Milwaukee picked up another pair of those on Wednesday, giving them 38 on the year in 159 PA (a 23.9 percent rate). Seems bad, right? No! Immediately following both of those frustrating at bats, Milwaukee got big bail-outs from the ensuing hitter. The first came from no less a rare source than Anderson, who singled in the second inning following a Ramon Flores strikeout to plate Chris Carter and open the scoring (Villar followed with another two-out hit to score another run). Two innings later, the Brewers seemed poised to waste a bases loaded opportunity with no one out that knocked Jeff Locke out of the game. Against the new pitcher, Braun flied out and Lucroy struck out. Instead, Carter drew a walk to score Anderson and give the Brewers a little breathing room.

COMING UP NEXT
The Brewers will wrap up their three-game series with the Pirates tonight at 6:05, as Milwaukee and Pittsburgh each send starting pitchers with 5+ ERAs to the hill for the second consecutive day. For the Brewers it’ll be Matt Garza, while opposing him from the Pittsburgh dugout is Francisco Liriano.

Related Coverage:
Five Stats to Watch
Scooter Gennett Can Hit Lefties
Scooter Gennett Takes Walks

Yet, even if Gennett may eventually become a platoon second baseman, or even was previously a platoon second baseman, it is important to understand the value of each and every contrarian season. Gennett now has 390 career games, including 324 starts, and counting, over parts of four seasons. This is not the profile of a platoon second baseman who will fight for a big league role. Gennett has also served as a member of an extremely successful platoon for the 2014 Brewers (on the offensive side, anyway), weathered injuries and a minor league demotion in 2015, and survived a front office regime change. It is important to look at Gennett’s approach in 2016, because an entirely new question bubbles beneath the surface: can Gennett’s improvements in 2016 lead to a continued starting role for the Brewers? 2016 is now another year in Gennett’s strange journey of delaying MLB inevitability.

Some may scoff at this question as unnecessary or trivial, especially if one believes that the Brewers will take several years to rebuild. One may emphasize that the role of starting second baseman for a rebuilding club is not necessarily a crucial organizational decision. I disagree vehemently with both of these arguments. Rebuilding is about aligning current roster assets for maximal future value; if Gennett can continue his role as a starting second baseman, he either (1) hastens the contending years by clarifying the potential performance of a club controlled contract, (2) improves the industry perception of his trade value to another contender, and/or (3) extends his career outlook to potentially add veteran presence to a future Brewers contender (among other potential outcomes). I don’t believe any of these outcomes are insignificant, either for Gennett’s own career potential (especially in terms of salary) or for the Brewers as an organization.

While looking for hints at Gennett’s improvement in his statistics and approach, one thing is certain: selectivity is the true name of the game. This has been covered by BPMilwaukee, and is emerging as one of the clear and intriguing storylines of the year; indeed, one of the leaders of the patient and selective Brewers is in fact Gennett. According to Brooks Baseball data, Gennett’s performance against secondary pitches has shifted, with the curveball now serving as his favored off-speed offering (as opposed to the slider, which Gennett smoked for a .340 AVG and .491 SLG in 2015). This is an interesting aspect of Gennett’s approach, but the clear victory for the second baseman is in his approach to fastballs, sinkers, and cutters.

What is especially fascinating about Gennett’s approach against hard pitches is that he has not necessarily improved in every single area. Some of his approach and outcomes remain similar, in terms of groundballs, line drives, and flyballs, for instance. The biggest shift, as many have noted, is that Gennett is swinging less, and this has especially improved his fastball approach. Using Brooks Baseball data, here is the hard pitch profile for Gennett in 2016:

The combination of selectivity and power is difficult to ignore. This is where discusssing plate discipline leaps from evidence to voodoo, but it simply appears that by swinging less, Gennett is actually reaching his pitch more frequently. By his pitch, I mean a pitch that Gennett can drive for power. It is difficult to judge this profile for sustainability in the sense that Gennett still hits sinkers for groundballs, has not significantly changed his outlook on batted balls in play (in terms of percentage), and has not necessarily mitigated any swing and miss tendencies. However, what jumps off the page is the fact that Gennett is swinging less frequently, coaxing more balls from pitchers (and therefore more walks), and subsequently driving the ball for significantly more power.

This transition in approach carries over to left handed pitchers, which is Gennett’s notorious area of weakness. In fact, Gennett’s new ability to select, and therefore dominate, the fastball is driving the majority of his success against lefties. Yet, once again, even where Gennett is failing to improve batted ball outcomes versus lefties, his selectivity is allowing him to reach base:

What is encouraging about this development is that it is not some across the board, astronomical improvement. There are areas where Gennett still needs to develop his approach, which is less damning now that one can clearly see that he is developing his approach against big league competition. If Gennett can sustain this adjustment, one might reasonably ask, what is the next adjustment? Since these adjustments are twofold, Gennett also has several ways to redefine his approach going forward. If the slugging dries up somewhat, Gennett can use his selectivity to fight his way on base; if that dries up, perhaps his selectivity will help him hit his way aboard. It would not be surprising to see a 2017 batting line that looks much different from this 2016 line, as Gennett can use this base to morph once again.

Of course, manager Craig Counsell has also praised Gennett’s defensive adjustments as well, and it is worth investigating whether or how the Brewers’ current shifting attitudes and practices are also impacting his glove. Not only has the 26 year old second baseman made strides to correct some of his weaknesses at the plate, but he has also improved his defensive performance (his 2016 FRAA of 0.2 is easily the best of his career). This shores up the other aspect of Gennett’s role: now, when the bat slumps, there may be another tool to carry Gennett in the field. As a result, one might argue that at the moment, Gennett has completely shifted his future value from that popular “platoon second baseman” judgment to a “starting second baseman” option.

The value in this role change is extreme, even if Gennett is not a star. First and foremost, if Gennett sticks as a starter, the Brewers can slowly and carefully develop their now robust second base pipeline of prospects without the big league club wanting for production. Secondly, when Orlando Arcia arrives, should Jonathan Villar move to third base, the club’s infield improves even further if they can rely on Gennett to produce in a regular role. This helps the club to solidify a certain level of production while also advancing prospects that have the tools to improve the club (such as Arcia’s elite shortstop defense). By presenting fewer questions for the 2017 Brewers, Gennett shows that a quiet aspect of rebuilding an MLB club can also manifest in organizational depth veterans redefining or solidifying their MLB roles. If the 2017 Brewers are a better club because they can rely on Gennett to perform, that is a clear victory for the organization and Gennett.

Junior Guerra: 3.15 DRA
Even though Guerra’s first half ended on a somewhat sour note Sunday, as he allowed three runs on two homers over 5.7 innings against the Cardinals, Guerra has turned in a campaign to be very proud of thus far. He still owns a sharp 3.06 ERA and a decent 3.87 FIP to go with that nifty DRA. Guerra’s solid DRA suggests his ERA isn’t simply the product of luck or a quality Brewers defense (the club ranks below average according to BP’s Park Adjusted Defensive Efficiency), but rather that he is consistently generating the kind of outcomes that make for a successful pitcher.

If there’s one reason to believe, it’s Guerra’s splitfinger, which continues to be a consistently devastating pitch. It’s his most effective swing-and-miss pitch (22.2 percent whiff rate), has been thrown for a strike a respectable 60 percent of the time, and has been responsible for just one of the eight homers Guerra has allowed this year. Hitters are slugging just .238 on the rare occasion they do make contact against it. His fastball has been hittable (.264 AVG, .423 SLG), but when Guerra manages to get ahead in the count, there hasn’t been much hitters can do when he gets to bust out that splitter.

Scooter Gennett: .273/.373/.477 vs. LHP
Gennett has hardly set the world on fire this year, as he’ll head into the All-Star Break with a .262/.325/.410 batting line. Still, that’s a major improvement over last season’s disappointing .264/.294/.381 marks. A bulk of the improvement comes from Gennett’s solid performance against left-handed pitching.

Perhaps the most encouraging part of it is the power production — Gennett has hit two of his seven home runs, as well as three doubles, against lefties in just 51 plate appearances. Of course, that low number of plate appearances means this could just be noise, but if Gennett can stay on the field against left-handed pitching, his future as a starter on a competitive team looks far, far more viable.

Jimmy Nelson: 4.0 BB/9
We’ve seen a lot of good stretches from Jimmy Nelson this year, who will enter the break with two straight quality starts and a 2.45 ERA in his past four outings. But even in these past four starts, Nelson has walked four or more batters twice. He has just five starts this season with fewer than three walks, and his control issues have made him prone to blowups — eight runs (six earned) in 3.2 innings June 15th against San Francisco (three walks) and six runs in four innings June 3rd against Philadelphia (three walks) being the best examples.

Of Nelson’s 48 walks, 30 have come against left-handed pitching, as he just hasn’t managed to find a secondary pitch (curveball or changeup) to get lefties out. That would go a long way towards fixing his issues — 20 of the 32 extra-base hits he has allowed this year have come against lefties as well, even though he has faced more righties (232) than lefties (229).

Team: 106 SBA
Jonathan Villar: 31 SB, 10 CS in 148 SB opportunities
The Brewers ran about as much as the average team last year, as their 113 attempts ranked 16th in baseball in 2015. This year, nobody is running more than Milwaukee. The difference between their 106 attempts and number two Cincinnati’s 95 attempts is bigger than the difference between Cincinnati and number five Pittsburgh’s 88 attempts. There has been some sacrifice in efficiency — the Brewers ranked sixth in the league with a 74.3 percent success rate last year and now rank 11th in the league at 72.6 percent, in large part because of Jonathan Villar’s MLB-worst ten caught stealings.

But still, the Brewers are succeeding at an above-average rate and taking more bases than anybody else in the league as a result. Villar’s 31 steals leads the National League, as he has attempted a steal 41 times in just 148 opportunities (per Baseball Reference). If he keeps running with abandon like that, it won’t matter how inefficient he is, he’s bound to finish atop the National League’s stolen base leaderboard.

Chris Carter: 22 home runs, .284 ISO
If Carter could play all 162 of his games at Miller Park, he’d be a Hall of Famer — he has needed just 45 games in Milwaukee to blast 16 dingers. Even with his poor performance on the road (six homers, .200/.306/.370 line in 39 games), Carter’s power production in 2016 is going to be among the best in Brewers history. His 22 home runs in 87 team games puts him on a pace for 41 this season, which would tie him with Ryan Braun (2012) and Ben Oglivie (1980) for the sixth-most by a Brewer in a single season. Only Richie Sexson (twice), Gorman Thomas and Prince Fielder (twice) have gone over 41, with Fielder’s 50 in 2007 leading the club all-time.

Carter has 16 doubles and one triple to go with his 22 home runs, giving him 39 extra-bases against just 29 singles this year. Carter is the ultimate grip-it-and-rip-it slugger, working on yet another season with a strikeout rate over 30 percent. Still, his raw power is the best Milwaukee has seen since Fielder. Carter’s .284 ISO would be fifth in Brewers history for a single season, behind Fielder’s 2007 (.330) and 2009 (.303), Gorman Thomas’s 1979 (.294) and Jeromy Burnitz’s 1999 (.291).

BOTTOM PLAY (WPA):
Matt Garza’s fifth start of the year did not start out as the 32-year-old hoped. He allowed Washington’s first two hitters to reach on singles to left field before retiring National League batting average leader Daniel Murphy on a liner to left that just happened to be hit directly at Ramon Flores. Bryce Harper followed, and the young phenom jumped all over the struggling right hander, crushing a three-run home run to give the Nationals an early 3-0 lead (+.218).

TOP PLAY:
The Brewers offense tried their damnedest to bail out Garza after he staked them to a four run deficit, getting all those runs back in a big third inning off of Nationals starter Tanner Roark. The bottom of the order got things started for Milwaukee, as a pair of singles from Hernan Perez and Flores preceded a Garza strikeout to turn the lineup over with a couple of men on base. The top of the lineup cashed in, as three consecutive singles left from Jonathan Villar, Scooter Gennett and Jonathan Lucroy (+.138) left the Brewers with runners on the corners and still only one out, now trailing by just one.

THE MOMENT:
Keeping the action right where we left it, Milwaukee sent perhaps the last man they’d want to into the batter’s box, Chris Carter, to attempt the even the score. The Brewers have been abysmal with runners on third base and one out, leading the league with 33 strikeouts in a situation in which one must absolutely put the ball in play to allow the runner to attempt to score. Overall, the Brewers have been able to score a runner from third with less than two outs just 46 percent of the time this season, which ranks 27th in the league. Predictably, Carter struck out, adding to his team-high seven in such situations and seemingly killing another rally.

But oh ho, dear reader! As Carter swung through a strike three, the Brewers had a little mischief planned, as Lucroy took off toward second base, drawing a throw from Jose Lobaton, who might have been better off putting it in his pocket:

Gennett’s cunning baserunning tied the game at four, a score that would hold for less than a half inning.

TREND TO WATCH:
After a pair of starts that perhaps looked a little cleaner in the box score than they actually were to start his season, Garza has now delivered three below average-to-poor pitching performances in a row, and Wednesday afternoon’s was certainly his worst. He allowed seven runs, all earned, in four and a third innings on eight hits. He struck out just two batters, the third time in five starts he has retired less than three hitters via strike out. Perhaps most troublingly, Garza was heavily victimized by the long ball, as he watched three balls sail over the outfield fence.

The striking (sorry, I’m sorry) decline in Garza’s strikeout percentage is an obvious cause of his struggles the past season-plus. He entered the 2015 season with a strikeout rate of 19.8 percent, and has seen that steadily decline the past two seasons to 15.6 percent last year and 12.8 percent this season. His numbers this season suffer from small sample size bias, of course, but his strikeout rate would rate the fourth-worst among qualifying starters, just slightly better than flame-throwing Jered Weaver. When taken with a .300+ BABIP and a 66 percent strand rate, it’s easy to see why Garza’s ERA has been sitting over 5.50 the past year and a half.

COMING UP NEXT:
The Brewers have another off day today before returning how for a weekend set against the St. Louis Cardinals at Miller Park. Milwaukee will hope for better results than a week ago, when they were swept out of Busch Stadium and outscored 19-9, with two thirds of those runs coming in the final three innings on Sunday afternoon. It will be the final series of the unofficial first half for Milwaukee, and fittingly it will be closed out by 31-year-old rookie Junior Guerra, whose 3.12 DRA leads Brewers starters.